Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Plaintiffs,
v.
Defendants.
Plaintiffs, David Kardonick, John David, and Michael Clemins individually and on behalf
of all others similarly situated (the “Class”), bring this class action against Defendants JPMorgan
Chase & Co. and Chase Bank USA, N.A. (collectively referred to as “CHASE” or the
“Company”). Plaintiffs seek certification of this action as a class action. Plaintiffs, by and
through their attorneys, submit this Amended Class Action Complaint (the “Complaint”) against
1. This proposed class action stems from the illicit activities undertaken by CHASE
while marketing and selling products associated with its credit cards known as “Chase Payment
Protector,” “Payment Protection,” and other monikers that all offer similar coverage (hereinafter
credit insurance, Payment Protection is not marketed or sold as insurance. CHASE does not
1
This Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint is filed with the consent of Defendants.
Case 1:10-cv-23235-WMH Document 16-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 12/21/2010 Page 2 of 28
register Payment Protection with state insurance departments, thereby avoiding state regulation.
3. CHASE violated the law not only through the sale of a product that should be –
but is not, due to its unlawful activities – subject to insurance regulations, but also by the
deceptive and misleading manner in which it offers the Payment Protection plan to consumers,
represents Payment Protection as a service that pays the required minimum monthly payment
due on the subscriber’s credit card account and excuses the subscriber from paying the monthly
interest charge and the Payment Protection plan fee for a limited period of time, preventing the
account from becoming delinquent. CHASE claims that this service “protects real people like
you.”
Protection plan is a dense maze of limitations, exclusions and restrictions, making it impossible
for consumers to determine what Payment Protection covers and whether it is a sound financial
choice.
Payment Protection benefits at the time of sale. As a consequence, the Company bills thousands
of retired persons (many of whom are senior citizens), along with the unemployed, those
individuals, for Payment Protection coverage, even though their employment or health status
ineligible for Payment Protection benefits after they are enrolled in the plan. Accordingly, when
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subscribers’ employment or health status changes, they will continue to pay for the product even
though they may no longer be eligible for benefits under the plan.
provides subscribers with the terms and conditions of the plan. After a subscriber is enrolled, the
person may then affirmatively cancel the plan through what CHASE markets as a “30-day
satisfaction guarantee.” By not adequately disclosing the terms of Payment Protection coverage
to consumers before they buy the product, CHASE is violating the consumer protection laws of
9. Given the confusing way the written materials present the terms and conditions of
Payment Protection, it would be extremely difficult for a subscriber to decipher those provisions.
10. CHASE has established its “customer service” support in such a way that
subscribers cannot easily cancel the plan or receive answers to benefit questions. It has
established its “claim filing” system in a way to make it difficult for subscribers to file claims or
11. CHASE does not refund Payment Protection premiums after it has denied
subscribers’ claims for Payment Protection benefits, nor does it address subscribers’ continued
obligations to pay the monthly fee for Payment Protection after a claim has been denied.
in terms of the benefits it provides to subscribers, and processing claims is made so difficult by
13. CHASE knows that for those cardholders who choose to pay for Payment
Protection, few will ever receive benefits under the plan and even for those who do receive
benefits, the amounts paid in “premiums” will usually exceed any benefits paid out.
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14. As a result of its misleading and deceptive marketing practices in connection with
sales of Payment Protection, CHASE has increased its profits by many millions of dollars, all
thanks to a product which provides virtually no benefits to millions of Chase customers who are
15. This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to the Class Action Fairness
(b) Plaintiffs, citizens of the States of Florida, Arkansas, and Wisconsin, are
diverse in citizenship from Defendants JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Chase
Bank USA, N.A., which are incorporated in Delaware and have principal
places of business in New York.
16. This case is properly maintainable as a class action pursuant to and in accordance
• There are substantial questions of law and fact common to the class including
those set forth in greater particularity in Paragraph 73 herein;
• This case is properly maintainable as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in that:
a. questions of law and fact enumerated below, which are all common to the
class, predominate over any questions of law or fact affecting only
individual members of the class;
b. a class action is superior to any other type of action for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy;
c. the relief sought in this class action will effectively and efficiently provide
relief to all members of the class; and
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17. The Court has personal jurisdiction over CHASE, which has at least minimum
contacts with this State because it has conducted business here and has purposefully availed itself
of the resources and privileges of this State through its promotion, sales, and marketing efforts.
18. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367.
19. This Court is a proper venue in which to bring this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1391, inasmuch as a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred
PARTIES
20. Plaintiff David Kardonick (“Kardonick”) resides in Miami, Florida. Since 2004,
Kardonick has had a Continental Airlines credit card in his name issued from CHASE bearing
21. Plaintiff John David (“David”) resides in Pine Bluff, Arkansas. Since 2001,
David has had a Chase Mastercard credit card in his name issued from CHASE bearing Payment
Protection features.
22. Plaintiff Michael Clemins (“Clemins,” collectively with Kardonick and David,
“Plaintiffs”) resides in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Since 2001, Clemins has had a Chase Mastercard
credit card in his name issued from CHASE bearing Payment Protection features.
23. Upon information and belief, Defendant JPMorgan Chase & Co. is a publicly
traded holding company incorporated in Delaware with a principal place of business in New
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York, New York. Service can be made upon its registered agent, The Corporation Trust
Company, Corporation Trust Center, 1209 Orange Street, Wilmington, Delaware 19801.
24. Upon information and belief, Defendant Chase Bank USA, N.A. operates a
nationally chartered bank. Chase Bank USA, N.A. is incorporated in Delaware with a principal
place of business in New York, New York. Service can be made upon its registered agent, The
Corporation Trust Company, Corporation Trust Center, 1209 Orange Street, Wilmington,
Delaware 19801.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
this regard, CHASE has not registered or identified Payment Protection as an insurance product
26. However, upon information and belief, prior to developing and marketing
Payment Protection, CHASE did sell credit insurance products, which it registered with
substantially the same type of coverage as what is offered today as Payment Protection.
27. Even though CHASE’s previously offered credit insurance products were nearly
indistinguishable from what is now offered as Payment Protection, CHASE does not designate
Payment Protection an “insurance product” so it can avoid state regulation and charge higher
28. Upon information and belief, CHASE offers Payment Protection to all its credit
card customers, but aggressively markets this product to vulnerable consumers who fall into the
subprime credit category, or customers who have low credit limits because of impaired credit
ratings.
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29. CHASE markets Payment Protection as a service that will safeguard subscribers’
credit card accounts by crediting the required minimum monthly credit card payments due in
circumstances. In such circumstances, the subscribers are also not required to pay the monthly
interest charges or the Payment Protection plan fee for the month in question.
30. CHASE also markets other “add-on” benefits associated with its Payment
Protector plan, like telephone and online resources to manage personal/professional matters and
channels, including direct mail marketing, in which it may ask that the consumer “check the
box” to initiate the plan, through telemarketing, where the consumer may be asked to press a
button on the telephone keypad to approve initiation of the plan, or through unilaterally imposing
32. CHASE shifts its burden and duty of full disclosure prior to the sale to the
customer and requires subscribers to decipher the terms of the product after it has already been
purchased and to then take action to cancel it. It characterizes this sales scheme as a “30-day
satisfaction guarantee” such that “[i]f you are not completely satisfied, just cancel in the first 30
days and get a refund of any fee billed.” 2 In fact, the obligation is affirmative: “[u]nless you
cancel, this fee will be charged to your enrolled credit card each month.” 3
33. Even if the subscriber is later provided with written materials from CHASE, it is
virtually impossible for the subscriber to determine all of the exclusions and limitations of
2
https://www.chasepaymentprotector.com/learnmore.cfm, last viewed on September 13, 2010.
3
https://www.chasepaymentprotector.com/learnmore.cfm, last viewed on September 13, 2010.
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34. Upon information and belief, CHASE imposed charges for “Payment Protection”
upon consumers even though individual consumers did not request the product or clearly assent
to pay for the product in writing after getting the opportunity to review its governing terms and
conditions.
35. In some instances, Payment Protection has been unilaterally imposed upon
consumers. In other instances, no written materials explaining the terms and conditions were
ever provided to subscribers. If Payment Protection is imposed and no written materials are
provided, the only way subscribers could ever know they have been enrolled in Payment
Protection and are being charged for this product is from noticing a line item fee listed on their
36. The terms of CHASE’s Payment Protection program are varied, complicated and
always changing. However, all of the various plans provide for some form of benefit upon the
37. Payment Protection also provides payment for a limited period of time upon the
occurrence of a Life Event, defined strictly by CHASE to include marriage, birth or adoption of a
child, move of primary residence, divorce, retirement, natural disaster and death of a Covered
Person.
38. The restrictions, limitations and exclusions associated with these Payment
Protection covered events and the proofs required to establish them are expansive and constantly
evolving.
39. The telephone marketing scripts and the written materials provided by CHASE
disclose that Payment Protection is actually akin to an insurance product. Despite this fact,
CHASE’s marketing materials carefully avoid any use of the word “insurance.” The materials
refer to “claims,” which indicates that CHASE internally regards this as an insurance product.
The fees paid for Payment Protection by consumers are actually premiums.
41. According to the written materials which are only provided after subscribers have
already been enrolled in the plan, the following restrictions on Payment Protection are imposed.
However, because these restrictions are in small print and in incomplete, indecipherable,
misleading and obfuscatory language, they are not readily comprehensible to subscribers:
d. Payment Protection does not apply for the first 30 days of unemployment
or disability;
e. Payment Protection does not apply to persons who have not held their job
for at least 90 days;
f. Payment Protection does not apply if you qualify for state or federal
unemployment benefits;
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date of birth and name of last employer, which would assist CHASE in knowing whether a
Payment Protection coverage would apply to the cardholder. Accordingly, CHASE engages in
marketing to enroll individuals in Payment Protection even when it has information in its
possession indicating that the product may have limited or no value to the consumer.
44. For instance, retired persons, many of whom are senior citizens, are charged for
this product even though they are categorically excluded from receiving most or all of the
benefits under the plan. In fact, CHASE does not even ask customers whether they are retired.
45. Similarly, the benefits offered to persons employed by family members are
limited, but CHASE nevertheless fails to affirmatively inform such persons of the limitations in
benefits when they are enrolled. In fact, CHASE does not even ask customers whether they are
46. Further, part-time or seasonal workers are also limited or categorically excluded
from receiving benefits. To qualify for benefits, one needs to work at least 30 hours a week in
whether any of the consumers who pay for Payment Protection are part-time or seasonal. These
47. Finally, benefits are unavailable or limited for disabled persons, but CHASE
nevertheless fails to affirmatively inform these individuals of the limitations on benefits when
they are enrolled. In fact, CHASE does not even ask customers whether they are disabled.
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48. The cost of Payment Protection is a monthly charge that is typically $0.89 per
$100 of a subscriber’s month-ending credit card balance. For example, if a CHASE credit card
customer has a balance on a covered account of $10,000, as a Payment Protection subscriber, the
customer owes CHASE $92.29 that month just for Payment Protection coverage.
49. Payment Protection also provides the added benefit to CHASE of lowering
available credit to its subscribers through the imposition of this additional fee. Further, the
imposition of the fee creates a cycle of profitability for CHASE, in that the fee itself increases
subscribers’ monthly credit balances, which in turn increases Payment Protection fees in
upcoming months.
To access customer service, subscribers can call a 1-800 number or send mail to a P.O. Box in
Louisville, Kentucky.
51. Upon information and belief, CHASE’s Payment Protection call center is based in
the Philippines. Employees are trained to assist subscribers with all questions, including
52. CHASE has established its customer service system in such a way that it is
difficult for subscribers to cancel Payment Protection, to get detailed information about claim
53. For example, upon information and belief, employees at CHASE’s call center are
given authority to deny claims immediately over the phone, but do not have authority to approve
54. Further, when claims for Payment Protection benefits are denied, CHASE has not
implemented a process through which subscribers’ Payment Protection premiums are refunded,
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even if the subscribers are deemed to be per se ineligible for Payment Protection benefits. In
fact, if subscribers are denied Payment Protection benefits, CHASE neither affirmatively
removes subscribers from Payment Protection enrollment going forward, nor is it CHASE’s
policy to inform subscribers of their continued obligation to pay for Payment Protection even
55. CHASE is one of the largest issuers of credit cards in the world. Payment
Protection is a profit center for CHASE and serves the Company’s interest in generating fee
“peace of mind,” the Payment Protection device is designed to prey on the financially insecure
and is virtually worthless because of the numerous restrictions that are imposed, because of the
exclusions of benefits, and because of the administrative and bureaucratic hurdles that are placed
in the way of subscribers who attempt to secure payments from CHASE under Payment
Protection coverage.
57. In or around November 2004, Plaintiff Kardonick enrolled for and became a
CHASE credit card holder. In or around February 2005, Plaintiff Kardonick became enrolled in
58. At the time of his enrollment, Plaintiff Kardonick was self-employed; however,
no one from CHASE ever asked him about his employment status before enrolling him in
Payment Protection.
60. At such time, Plaintiff Kardonick informed CHASE about his business, including
his employment status, and requested initiation of the payment protection plan. In response,
Plaintiff Kardonick was informed by CHASE that despite paying for Payment Protection for the
previous five years, self-employed individuals were not eligible for CHASE’s Payment
Protection Program.
61. Similarly, in 2001, Plaintiff David enrolled for and became a CHASE credit card
holder. In that same year, Plaintiff became enrolled in Payment Protection through CHASE’s
62. At the time of his enrollment in Payment Protection, Plaintiff David was retired,
and he remains so today. However, at no time did anyone from CHASE ever ask Plaintiff David
about him employment status before enrolling him in Payment Protection. As a result, Plaintiff
David continued to pay for Payment Protection for approximately nine years even though he was
63. Likewise, Plaintiff Clemins enrolled for and became a CHASE credit card holder
in 2001, also enrolling in Payment Protection through CHASE’s Payment Protector Plan that
same year.
64. As with Plaintiff David, Plaintiff Clemins was retired at the time of his
enrollment in Payment Protection, and he remains so today. However, at no time did anyone
from CHASE ever ask Plaintiff Clemins about him employment status before enrolling him in
Payment Protection. As a result, Plaintiff Clemins continued to pay for Payment Protection for
approximately nine years even though he was not covered under Payment Protection.
65. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and a class of all other persons
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similarly situated (the “Class”), pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
66. Plaintiffs bring this action as a class representative to recover damages and/or
refunds from CHASE for breaches of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violations of
the consumer protection laws of various states as listed in paragraph 87 below and for injunctive
predominance, and superiority requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a)
and (b).
All Chase credit card holders who were enrolled in or billed for a Payment
Protection Product at any time between September 1, 2004 and November 11,
2010. Excluded from the class are all Chase cardholders whose Chase credit card
accounts that were enrolled or billed for a Payment Protection Product were
discharged in bankruptcy.
69. Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants’ sales, billing, and marketing scheme was
not an isolated transaction but was part of a continuing course of conduct in which the
Defendants engaged over a period of time. More specifically, Defendants assumed a duty that
remained in existence after commission of what is alleged to be the original wrong committed
against Plaintiffs and the Class. Because Defendants’ sales, billing, and marketing scheme was
part of a continuing course of conduct, Plaintiffs may prevail on claims resulting from any act
that was part of that continuing course of conduct, even if the particular act was outside the
70. Plaintiffs reserve the right to modify or amend the definition of the proposed
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c. The Judge to whom this case is assigned and any member of the Judge’s
immediate family and any other judicial officer assigned to this case;
d. Persons or entities with claims for personal injury, wrongful death and/or
emotional distress;
e. All persons or entities that properly execute and timely file a request for
exclusion from the Class;
72. Numerosity – Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Upon information and belief, the Class is
comprised of approximately 14.5 million consumers, the joinder of which in one action would be
impracticable. The identity of the Class members is ascertainable from records maintained by
the Defendants and their agents. In addition, the Class members may be located and informed of
the pendency of this action by a combination of electronic bulletins, e-mail, direct mail and
public notice, or other means. The disposition of the claims of the proposed class members
through this class action will benefit both the parties and the Court.
is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact involved affecting
members of the Class. The questions of law and fact common to the Class predominate over
questions affecting only individual Class members, and include, but are not limited to, the
following:
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c) Whether Plaintiffs and the Class members are entitled to restitution of all
amounts acquired by CHASE through its common and uniform scheme;
d) Whether Plaintiffs and the Class members are entitled to injunctive relief
requiring the disgorgement of all fees wrongfully collected by CHASE;
74. Typicality – Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Plaintiffs assert claims that are typical of
the entire Class, having all been targeted by CHASE as consumers and who were improperly
assessed, and paid, charges for Payment Protection. Plaintiffs and the Class members have
similarly suffered harm arising from CHASE’s violations of the law as alleged in this Complaint.
representatives of the Class because each fits within the class definition and has an interest that is
not antagonistic to or in conflict with the interests of the Members of the Class they seek to
represent. Plaintiffs will prosecute this action vigorously for the benefit of the entire Class.
Plaintiffs are represented by experienced and able attorneys from coordinated law firms that will
collectively and jointly serve as class counsel. Plaintiffs’ Counsel have litigated numerous class
actions, and Plaintiffs’ counsel intend to prosecute this action vigorously for the benefit of the
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entire Class. Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ Counsel can and will fairly and adequately protect the
76. Superiority – Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The class action is the best available
method for the efficient adjudication of this litigation because individual litigation of Class
Members’ claims would be impracticable and individual litigation would be unduly burdensome
to the courts. Plaintiffs and members of the Class have suffered irreparable harm as a result of
CHASE’s fraudulent, deceitful, unlawful, and unfair conduct. Because of the size of each
individual Class members’ claims, no Class members could afford to individually seek legal
redress for the wrongs identified in this Complaint. Without the class action vehicle, the Class
would have no reasonable remedy and would continue to suffer losses, as CHASE continues to
engage in the unlawful, unfair, and unconscionable conduct that is the subject of this Complaint,
and CHASE would be permitted to retain the proceeds of its violations of law. Further,
class action in this case presents fewer management problems and provides the benefits of single
COUNT ONE
Breach of Contract and Fraudulent Inducement
77. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all preceding paragraphs of the Complaint as though
78. Upon information and belief, Plaintiffs and CHASE entered a contractual
the cardholder after the purchase of payment protection is an addendum to the Cardholder
Agreement.
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79. The Cardholder Agreement has a choice of law forum selection clause
designating Delaware law as the law that controls the interpretation of the contract.
80. Under Delaware contract law, the essential elements of a cause of action for
breach of contract are: (1) existence of a contract, (2) the breach of an obligation imposed by the
contract, and (3) resulting damages to the plaintiff. See Gutridge v. Iffland, 889 A.2d 283 (Del.
2005).
81. Under Delaware contract law, in order to state a cause of action for fraud in the
inducement of a contract, a party must allege (1) a false representation of material fact, (2) the
reckless indifference to the truth of the representation, (3) the defendant’s intent to induce the
plaintiff to act or refrain from acting, (4) the plaintiff’s action or inaction taken in justifiable
reliance upon the representation, and (5) damage to the plaintiff as a result of such reliance.
82. CHASE breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing to the Plaintiffs by its
marketing and Payment Protection administrative policies, resulting in injury to the Plaintiff and
the Class.
83. The statements made to the Plaintiff were positive representations that Payment
Protection would provide certain benefits in the event of specified losses, these statements were
made by CHASE for the purpose of procuring the cardholder’s agreement to accept and pay for
Payment Protection, the statements constituted misrepresentations of material fact, CHASE knew
or should have known of the falsity of these representations, CHASE cardholders reasonably
relied upon CHASE’s misrepresentations, which induced the cardholders to enter into the
contractual agreement to pay for Payment Protection thereby causing them injury.
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COUNT TWO
Violations of the Truth in Lending Act - 15 U.S.C. §1601 et seq.
84. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege all paragraphs of the Complaint as though set forth
at length herein.
85. During the relevant time period, CHASE sold the credit services at issue in this
86. The purpose of the Truth in Lending Act of 1968, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §1601,
1666j and Regulation Z, 12 CFR part 226 (“TILA” and “Regulation Z”) is “to assure a
meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily
the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect
the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices. 15 U.S.C.
87. TILA requires all solicitations for the extension of credit to clearly, conspicuously
and in readily understood language disclose the terms of the commitment that the offeror is
88. Congress delegated authority for the implementation of the Truth-in-Lending Act
to the Federal Reserve Board (“Board”). 15 U.S.C. §1604. The Board promulgated Regulation
Z, which is the Truth In Lending Act’s implementing regulation. 12 C.F.R. §§226 et seq.
otherwise that the premium charged for Payment Protection is a finance charge, that the
minimum payment does not include all fees imposed, and that the interest is charged on penalty
fees and costs in connection with Payment Protection, which violates sections 1605 and
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90. As a result of CHASE’s violations of the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z,
CHASE is liable to Plaintiffs and members of the Class, who seek damages, pursuant to 15
U.S.C. §1640, including actual damages resulting from CHASE improper and illegal practices,
the lesser of $500,000 or 1% of the net worth of CHASE, and costs and reasonable attorney fees.
COUNT THREE
Breach of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
91. Plaintiffs restate and re-allege the preceding paragraphs of the Complaint as
though set forth at length herein.
92. Upon information and belief, Plaintiffs and CHASE contracted for Payment
Protection benefits.
93. Upon information and belief, the terms and conditions of this agreement are
embodied in the Welcome Kit and other written materials in the possession of CHASE.
94. Implied within this agreement were the covenants of good faith and fair dealing.
As such, each party had a duty of good faith and fair dealing. Good faith and fair dealing, in
connection with discharging contractual performance and other duties according to the contract’s
terms, prohibits a party from taking any action or engaging in any conduct which would have the
effect of destroying or injuring the other party’s right to obtain the benefits prescribed by the
terms of the contract. Put differently, parties to a contract are mutually obligated to exercise
good faith and comply with the substance of their contract in addition to its form. A party
breaches the covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it uses or manipulates contractual
rights as a means to gain an unfair advantage beyond what the parties originally bargained for or
reasonably expected.
Protection claims, CHASE took action which had the effect of destroying or injuring Class
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members’ rights to obtain the Payment Protection benefits they bargained for by enrolling in
Payment Protection. Such conduct constitutes an absence of good faith on the part of CHASE.
96. CHASE has thus breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in
97. Plaintiffs and the Class have performed all, or substantially all, of the obligations
98. Plaintiffs and members of the Class have sustained damages as a result of
COUNT FOUR
Violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices of State Statutes Prohibiting Unfair and Deceptive
Acts and Practices
99. Plaintiffs restate and re-allege the preceding paragraphs of the Complaint as if set
100. The state deceptive trade practices acts were enacted by the various states
following the passage of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”), which prohibits
deceptive acts and practices in the sale of products to consumers. In this regard, the state laws in
this area are modeled on the FTC Act, and, therefore, are highly similar in content.
following state deceptive trade practices acts and other similar state statutes prohibiting unfair
and deceptive acts and practices: Alaska Stat. §45-50-471, et seq.; Arizona. Rev. Stat. §44-1521,
et seq.; Cal. Civ. Code §§1780 - 1784, Business and Profession Code §17200, et seq., §17581, et
seq.; Colorado. Rev. Stat. §§6-1-101 - 6-1-115; Connecticut Gen. Stat. Ann. §§42-110a - 42-
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110q; 6 Del. Code Ann. §§2511-2537; D.C. Code Ann. §§§28-3801 - 28-3819 - 28-3901; Hawaii
Rev. L. §§480-1 - 480-24; Idaho Code §§48-601 - 48-619; 815 ILCS 505/1 to 505/12; Indiana
Code §24-5-0.5-3(a)(1), (2), or 24-5-0.5-1, et seq.; Kansas Gen.Stat. Ann. §§50-623 - 50-644;
Kentucky Rev. Stat. Ann. §§367.110 - 367.990, Louisiana. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§51:1401, et seq.,
Maine Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5 §205A, et seq.; Maryland Code Ann. §13-101 to 13-501;
Massachusetts Gen. L. Ann. Ch. 93A. §§1 – 11; Michigan Comp. Laws Ann. §§445.901 to
445.922; Minnesota Stat. Ann. §§325D.43, et seq.; Missouri Ann. Stat. §§407.010 - 407.701,
Nebraska Rev. Stat. §59-1601 et seq., §97-301, et seq.; Nevada Rev. Stat. §41.600 et seq.,
§598.0903, et seq., New Hampshire Rev. Stat. Ann. §358-A:1, et. seq.; New Mexico Stat. Ann.
§57-12-1, et seq.; New York Gen. Bus. L. §§349 et seq.; North Dakota Gen. Stat. §51-15-01, et
seq.; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §1345, et seq.; Oklahoma Stat. Tit. 15 §751 to 763; Oregon Rev. Stat.
§§646.605 - 646.656; 73 Pa. Stat. §201, et seq.; Rhode Island Rev. L. Ann. §§6-13.1-1 - 6-13.1-
11; South Dakota Comp. L. §§37-24-1 - 37-24-35; Tennessee Code Ann. §47-18-101, et seq.;
Texas Rev. Civ. Stat. §§17.41 - 17.63; Utah Code Ann., §13-11-1, et seq.; Vermont Stat. Ann.
tit. 9§§2451, et seq.; Washington RCW §19-86-010, et seq.; West Virginia Code Ann. §46A-6-
101, et seq., Wisconsin Stat. Ann. §100.18, Wyoming Stat. §40-12-101, et. seq.
102. More specifically, CHASE’s unfair or deceptive and, thus, unlawful conduct
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c. CHASE does not provide the terms and conditions of Payment Protection
to subscribers until after they have enrolled in the plan;
f. CHASE does not alert customers that certain individuals are per se
ineligible for Payment Protection benefits, including but not limited to
retired persons, unemployed persons, persons employed by family
members, persons employed on a part-time or seasonal basis and those
that are disabled.
h. CHASE charges exorbitant fees for Payment Protection, much more than
the value of the benefits offered or paid out to subscribers, and is able to
do so because CHASE does not identify Payment Protection as an
insurance product, which would require it to provide fees and claims-paid
data to state authorities for review and regulation;
103. CHASE’s unlawful conduct as described herein caused injury to Plaintiffs and
Class members in the form of the fees they paid to CHASE for enrollment in CHASE’s Payment
Protection program, which was worthless or virtually worthless. Alternatively, Plaintiffs and
Class members paid fees for enrollment in CHASE’s Payment Protection program that were far
104. The unfair or deceptive acts or practices of CHASE as alleged herein were willful
105. Plaintiffs and Class members have been injured by CHASE’s unfair or deceptive
acts or practices.
106. Plaintiffs and the Class are also entitled to injunctive and declaratory relief
unlawful, unfair, unconscionable and/or deceptive, and enjoining CHASE from undertaking any
107. Plaintiffs and the Class are also entitled to disgorgement and restitution of
CHASE’s ill-gotten gains in the form of unlawful profits obtained from the conduct described in
detail herein.
COUNT FIVE
Injunctive Relief and Payment Protection Restitution
108. Plaintiffs restate and re-allege the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if set
109. Plaintiffs ask the Court to grant the remedy of restitution to himself and to all
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members of the Class who made payments to CHASE for Payment Protection. Specifically,
b) a refund to any consumers who were retired at the time they were sold
Payment Protection by CHASE or at any time they paid for Payment
Protection;
c) a refund to any consumers who were ineligible for benefits, or who faced
additional restrictions to receive benefits as a result of their health or
employment status, at the time they were sold Payment Protection by
CHASE or at any time they paid for Payment Protection;
e) a refund of all amounts CHASE assessed for Payment Protection that were
in excess of sums which would have been permissible had CHASE
correctly identified the service as insurance.
110. Further, Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief enjoining CHASE from continuing to
engage in the deceptive, unlawful, and unfair common scheme described in this Complaint.
COUNT SIX
Unjust Enrichment
111. Plaintiffs restate and re-allege the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if set
112. In seeking to sell credit cards to Plaintiffs and members of the Class, CHASE
withheld material terms from consumers prior to activation of Payment Protection charges,
including the express benefits, limitations, restrictions, and exclusions associated with the
product.
113. CHASE was unjustly enriched by charging Plaintiffs and the Class sums for
Payment Protection coverage that were in excess of amounts which would have been permissible
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114. CHASE was unjustly enriched by the practice of signing people up for Payment
115. CHASE was unjustly enriched by the practice of withholding material terms of
Payment Protection until after the product was charged to consumers’ credit cards.
impermissibly difficult for consumers to actually receive coverage under Payment Protection that
the service was virtually worthless. Such unconscionable acts include, but are not limited to:
d) Establishing a telephone number that does not allow for claimants to speak
to a live person, a person in a timely manner, or a person that is properly
trained to handle Payment Protection claims, in order for the subscriber to
successfully file a claim.
117. CHASE was unjustly enriched by charging Plaintiffs and the Class members for
illusory benefits.
118. CHASE was unjustly enriched by charging Plaintiffs and the Class members who
were retired or were otherwise not eligible to receive payments by the terms of the Payment
Protection plan.
119. As a result of CHASE’s actions which constitute unjust enrichment, Plaintiffs and
Class members suffered actual damages for which CHASE is liable. CHASE’s liability for those
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A. That the Court determines that this action may be maintained as a class
action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that Plaintiffs are proper class
representatives, and that the best practicable notice of this action be given to members of the
the Class on the Causes of Action in this Complaint, for injunctive relief, and for actual,
D. For all other and further relief as this Court may deem necessary and
appropriate.
JURY DEMAND
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Plaintiffs’ Counsel
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