Adam Smith's analysis of bounties as an early example of

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From: The American Journal of Economics and Sociology | Date: 10/1/2004
| Author: Elmslie, Bruce
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Smith uses his analysis of bounties to form one aspect of his overall
critique of the mercantile system. He stresses the fact that the system of
bounties has not promoted the development of the English economy. However,
Smith also stresses that, as destructive as the system of export bounties
is to public welfare, these bounties are not significant enough to greatly
retard the growth of the English economy, which has more to do with secure
property rights and securing investors their return on their investments.
I
Introduction
IT SEEMS THAT economists have finally forgiven Adam Smith for not being
David Ricardo. From Ricardo through Jacob Viner, most economic theorists
have considered "Smith's contribution to the theory of international trade
[to be] slight at best and erroneous at worst" (Maneschi 1998, p, 48) The
main reason for this lowly opinion was Smith's failure to discover the
theory of comparative advantage. This failure seems all the more glaring
given that David Hume left Smith with all of the analytical tools
necessary to develop such a theory: all Smith had to do was put the pieces
together.
This perception of Smith's contribution to trade theory began to turn with
Myint's (1958) recognition that Smith's theories of trade were intimately
connected with his overall theory of economic development. Today, it is
generally recognized that Smith's emphasis on increasing returns and
dynamic gains provides an analysis of trade and the gains from trade that
is rich with insight (Blecker 1997) and internally consistent with Smith's
overall system of natural liberty (Elmslie and Sedgley 2002). (1)
While Smith's theories of trade have enjoyed a renaissance, his work on
trade policy has "largely been ignored. This paper is interested in
Smith's critiques of bounties (read "subsidies") on exports. I argue that
Smith's analysis of bounties foreshadows the basic trade policy framework
of distortions and noneconomic objectives that, since Bhagwati (1971), has
formed the basis of neoclassical policy analysis. While Smith does not
develop a coherent theory of distortions, he captures the logic of the
theory of noneconomic objectives and attempts to rank policy alternatives
based upon their relative social costs. Moreover, Say extended Smith's
analysis of the effects of bounties to develop policy based on endogenous
distortions.
II
Smith and the Theory of Noneconomic Objectives (2)
NEOCLASSICAL THEORETICAL POLICY analysis is based upon a foundation of
complete transparency. The policy prescriptions for the elimination of
distortions and the most efficient manner to meet noneconomic objectives
are the foundation of this analysis. The theory shows that if a distortion
 exists the first-best option is to eliminate the distortion directly
rather than to erect a countervailing distortion in the system. The
analysis of noneconomic objectives develops as a corollary to that of
distortions: if a noneconomic objective exists, it is best to meet the
objective as efficiently as possible by directing the policy measure (tax
cum subsidy) specifically at the objective. (3) Given that the government
policy is not directed at the elimination of a market-created distortion,
intervention will create a distortion in the system. The idea here is to
create as few distortions as possible while still meeting the objective.
(4)
A noneconomic objective of a government can be represented by a minimum
output objective for an industry. The objective could be met, for example,
by a subsidy on exports. However, such a policy will create other
distortions elsewhere in the economy. If one industry is given a subsidy
on exports, two external effects are created. First, the home price of the
good will increase. This essentially makes home consumers pay for the
subsidy twice. Not only must they finance the subsidy, but they are also
taxed indirectly in the form of higher prices for the good in the home
market. Moreover, a subsidy on exports of one industry taxes other
industries through a Lerner effect. The expansion of the exports of one
industry will either reduce the exports of other industries or increase
imports that compete with domestic producers.
A preferred solution is a direct production subsidy. A production
objective is best met by a production subsidy. A policy directed at the
objective creates fewer distortions in the system. The disincentive to
other industries is lessened, while consumers pay the tax only once.
Consumers may even get some benefit in the form of lower prices for the
goods of the subsidized industry.
All of the modern policy prescriptions for an output objective along with
modern (Lerner) reasoning are evident in Smith's critique of export
bounties. Smith is interested in developing a general theory of the
effects of bounties, but his direct target is often England's bounties on
corn. (5)
How does Smith's analysis of bounties qualify as an analysts of a
noneconomic objective? Specifically, does it assume that the government's
policies are not directed at the maximization or increase of the
consumption stream because the policy is not directed at the elimination
of an endogenous distortion? After all, Smith admits that these and other
mercantile policies were defended on the basis of an expected improvement
in social welfare. Smith flatly rejects such arguments. He clearly states
that policies that direct resources to and from industries on a basis
other than competitive forces reduce welfare as defined by the value of
national output. By implication, he also suggests that endogenous
distortions are not present:
A trade which is forced by means of bounties and monopolies, may
be, and commonly is disadvantageous to the country in whose
favour it is meant to be established ... But that trade which,
without force or constraint, is naturally and regularly carried
on between any two places, is always advantageous.... By advantage
or gain, I understand, not the increase of the quantity of gold
and silver, but that of the exchangeable value of the annual
produce of the land and labour of the country, or the increase of
the annual revenue of its inhabitants. (Smith 1994 [1776], p. 521)
Later, Smith gives an explicit example of a policy directed at a minimal
output level that costs society in terms of the value of national output
but still may be warranted based upon the noneconomic objective of
 national defense. But even in this case, Smith argues that it should be
clearly demonstrated that the industry could not be supported by the
market. "If any particular manufacture was necessary, indeed, for the
defence of the society, it might not always be prudent to depend upon our
neighbours for the supply; and if such manufacture could not otherwise be
supported at home, it might not be unreasonable that all the other
branches of industry should be taxed in order to support it" (1994 [1776],
p. 559, emphasis added). (6) Thus, it seems reasonable to think of Smith's
analysis of bounties on exports and production as an early example of what
we now refer to as noneconomic objectives.
A. Smith's Analysis
Smith understood that an export bounty causes "distortions" (to use the
modern term) in both the domestic and foreign markets. Specifically,
export bounties impose "two different taxes upon the people; first, the
tax which they are obliged to contribute, in order to pay the bounty; and
secondly, the tax which arises from the advanced price of the commodity in
the home market" (1994 [1776], p. 543). Smith implicitly assumes that
England is a large country in the corn market, as the bounty could cause
the price of corn in international markets to fall. (7)
Whatever be the actual state of tillage, it [the bounty on
exports of corn] renders our corn somewhat dearer in the home
market than it otherwise would be in that state, and somewhat
cheaper in the foreign.... It enables foreigners, the Dutch in
particular, not only to eat our corn cheaper than they otherwise
could do, but sometimes to eat it cheaper than even our own
people can do upon the same occasions. (1994 [1776], p. 549)
The effect of this rise in the price of corn is to essentially tax the
output of other industries. It raises the cost of production. This will,
in turn, decrease the competitiveness of the home industry relative to
foreign competitors.
It [the export bounty] hinders our own workmen from furnishing
their goods for so small a quantity of silver as they otherwise
might do; and enables the Dutch to furnish their's for a smaller.
It tends to render our manufactures somewhat dearer in every
market, and theirs somewhat cheaper than trey otherwise would be,
and consequently to give their industry a double advantage over
our own. (1994 [1776], pp. 549-550) (8)
Thus, as with modern analysis, the subsidy on exports creates distortions
in other markets that unnecessarily decrease welfare and tax other
industries. (9) Smith's policy prescription should sound familiar. The
first-best policy (except in those occasions where a genuine national
interest could be shown) is to reduce the bounty or, if possible,
eliminate the policy altogether. "If bounties are as improper as I have
endeavoured to prove them to be, the sooner they cease, and the lower they
are, so much the better" (Smith 1994, p. 583). However, if the government
must encourage the production of a particular industry, it is clearly more
effective to subsidize production directly:
To encourage the production of any commodity, a bounty upon
production.... would have a more direct operation, than one upon
exportation. It would, besides, impose only one tax upon the
people, that which they must contribute in order to pay the
 bounty. Instead of raising, it would tend to lower the price of
the commodity in the home market; and thereby, instead of
imposing a second tax upon the people, it might, at least in
part, repay them for what they had contributed to the first.
Bounties upon production, however, have been very rarely
granted. (1994 [1776], p. 553, emphasis added)
Smith sets out a relatively complete argument that subsidies designed to
artificially maintain or increase production levels of one industry (or
group of industries) will negatively impact social welfare as he defines
it. Moreover, he appears to be the first writer to explicitly rank
policies on the basis of distortions or relative costs accruing to
consumers and other sectors of the economy. He sees this as a very
important point, emphasizing it in several places. A government that has
what we now refer to as a noneconomic objective can achieve this objective
with several different specific policies. Each policy alternative has
different effects on the economy that can be ranked in terms of their
relative impact on social welfare. (10,11)
B. Subsidizing Innovation
One final point may be made along this same line of inquiry. Modern trade
policy analysis is set out utilizing static or comparative static tools.
Smith did not see the economy in a static manner. Thus, while Smith
clearly ranked a direct production subsidy above an export subsidy, this
was not necessarily his first-best policy option for achieving a
noneconomic objective. As with his theories of trade, Smith embodied his
analysis of trade policy within a growth framework. In such a framework,
he argued that the best policy to encourage the production of a particular
industry was to subsidize innovation rather than production. In Smith's
mind, these types of subsidies had two advantages. First, they were small
relative to other subsidies, and second, of course, they encouraged the
continual development of new ideas, which would naturally maintain the
domestic industry in an otherwise competitive international market:
Premiums given by the public to artists and manufactures who
excel in their particular occupations, are not liable to the same
objections as bounties. By encouraging extraordinary dexterity
and ingenuity, they serve to keep up the emulation of the workmen
actually employed in those respective occupations.... Their
tendency is not to overturn the natural balance of employments,
but to render the work which is done in each as perfect and
complete as possible. The expence of premiums, besides, is very
trifling; that of bounties very great. (1994 [1776], p. 560)
When Smith sets out the case for premiums over production subsidies, he
clouds the already opaque distinction between the theory of distortions
and that of noneconomic objectives. After all, the failure of the market
to properly compensate innovators may be a distortion. Why else would they
be encouraging? Several suggestions are possible. First, Smith may have
been thinking along the same national defense lines as outlined earlier.
Second, he may have been following a line of theory developed by Hume that
suggested a natural tendency for the rate of innovation to fall as the
stock of knowledge accumulates. Or, finally, he may have been thinking
along lines similar to the modern analysis of distortions due to
technology spillover effects. Whether or not we interpret Smith's analysis
of premiums given to innovators as an embryonic theory of distortions due
to a positive externality is open to question. However, it is clear that
Jean-Baptiste Say (1964 [1880]) used Smith's work on bounties to develop
 such a connection. He sets out a similar pattern of argument as Smith.
"Though bounties are chargeable, and a dead loss to the gross national
wealth, there are cases in which it is politic to incur that loss; (1) as
when a particular product is necessary to public security" (Say 1964, p.
172). (12) He also develops the same policy ranking for noneconomic
objectives. "When a bounty is paid, not at the moment of export, but at
the commencement of productive creation, the home consumer participates
with the foreigner in the advantage of the bounty; for in that case, the
article can be sold below cost price in the home as well as in the foreign
market" (1964, p. 171). Say also follows Smith's analysis of premiums:
I have no fault to find with the honours, or even pecuniary
rewards publicly given to artists or mechanics, in recompense of
some extraordinary achievement of genius or address. Rewards of
the kind excite emulation, and enlarge the stock of general
knowledge, without diverting industry or capital from their most
beneficial channels. Besides, they cost nothing in comparison of
bounties of another description. (Say 1963, p. 175)
Say goes on to argue that such rewardss are often necessary to overcome
information failures that can occur when markets are left to their own
accord. He specifically addresses an information failure in agriculture
where "the interference of the public authority.... has generally been of
a beneficial kind" (1964, p. 175). Say argues that information regarding
the most efficient production techniques in agriculture is slowed by
several factors and concludes that public welfare is enhanced by the
"granting of premiums and encouragements, and to the diffusion of
knowledge which has often contributed largely to the progress of this art"
(Say 1964, p. 176). Say extended Smith's policy analysis found in the
chapter "Of Bounties" to create a positive policy analysis designed to
counter market failure.
III
Political Economy of Trade Policy
IF SMITH COULD demonstrate that a subsidy on production would have a "more
direct operation" than a subsidy on exports, why was the former so rare?
Clearly, the lessons of the modern political economy of trade policy
literature would not be lost on Smith. He tells the reader that such
subsidies are rare because they are not in the vested interest of the
group that lobbies for the encouragement. Smith makes this point on both
general and specific levels. In general terms, mercantilists had persuaded
the public that increased prosperity (welfare) is directly connected with
exports, making export bounties seem naturally in the public interest:
The prejudices established by the commercial [mercantile] system
have taught us to believe, that national wealth arises more
immediately from exportation than from production. It has been
more favored accordingly, as the more immediate means of bringing
money into the country. (Smith 1994 [1776], p. 553)
Specifically, the subsidy on exports is more profitable to the recipient
than one on production:
[I]t is not the interest of merchants and manufactures, the great
inventors of all these expedients, that the home market should be
overstocked with their goods, an event which a bounty upon
production might sometimes occasion. A bounty upon exportation,
by enabling them to send abroad the surplus part, and to keep up
the price of what remains in the home market, effectually prevents
 this. Of all the expedients of the mercantile system, accordingly,
it is the one of which they are the fondest. (1994 [1776],
p. 555, emphasis added)
Clearly, Smith developed an analysis of lobbying that was the forefather
of modern neoclassical political economy. Not only do interest groups
lobby government for protection, they lobby for the form of protection
that benefits them to the greatest extent.
Once again, Say closely follows Smith's ideas and develops the analysis to
include a collective action argument. The interests of manufacturers are
highly concentrated due to their relatively small numbers, while the
interests of consumers are diluted across great numbers. Thus, it is
easier to measure the gains of polices such as bounties and difficult to
understand the costs. "The reason why governments are so easily entrapped
into measures of this kind is, partly because they see a statement of
large profits.... [and this] profit is easily reduced to numerical
calculation.... whereas the loss and mischief resulting to the nation are
infinitely subdivided amongst the members of the community, and operate
after all in a very indirect, complex, and general way, so as to escape
and defy calculation." (Say 1964, p. 188)
IV
Conclusion
IN THE WRITINGS OF ADAM SMITH, we find a strikingly complete analysis of
policies relating to production goals. If such a target is to be granted,
he demonstrates the most efficient policy for its achieving the objective.
This is a very different question from whether the objective should be
granted in the first place. Smith argues that bounties on exports or
production are suboptimal given his competitive economy. Such policies
create costs to society (distortions) that impact the current efficiency
of resource use and ultimately slow the growth of industry. "The effect of
bounties, like that of all other expedients of the mercantile system, can
only be to force the trade of a country into a channel much less
advantageous than that in which it would naturally run of its own accord"
(Smith 1994 [1776], p. 541). Smith even shows an understanding of the
modern concept of natural trade when he states that a bounty that forces
exports to go against a country's natural advantage results in losses from
trade. "[T]he trade which cannot be carried on but by means of a bounty
[is] necessarily a losing trade" (1994 [1776], p. 552). While Smith's
performance in this particular area of policy analysis is truly
remarkable, it is not, upon reflection, surprising. Both analyses are
formed from similar competitive frameworks and both reflect the proper
working out of these frameworks to the issue of noneconomic objectives. In
both instances, the policy rankings that are formed are the byproducts of
a competitive economic system in which actors respond to market signals.
While interesting in its own fight, the importance of Smith's analysis
lies in its use in policy making and by other economists. Say further
developed the logic of Smith's analysis to include a companion analysis
based on distortions away from the classical competitive outcome.
Smith uses his analysis of bounties to form one aspect of his overall
critiques of the mercantile system. And he stresses the fact that the
system of export bounties (especially corn bounties) has played no
positive role in the development of the English economy. However, Smith
also stresses that, as destructive as the system of export bounties is to
public welfare, these bounties are not significant enough to greatly
impact the growth of the English economy. England's policy of securing
property rights (especially in securing the right to a return on one's
investments), which allow the positive effects of individual self-interest
to operate, are more than sufficient to counter the distorting effects of
the bounties.
Notes
(1.) Maneschi (1998, p. 49) goes so far as to argue that "the various
strands of Smith's trade theory make it much richer than the neoclassical
theory which followed it a century later."
(2.) This section follows and builds on Elmslie (2004).
(3.) To a certain extent an economic versus a noneconomic objective is in
the eye of the beholder. As described in Bhagwati, Panagariyz, and
Srinivasan (1998), an economic objective is generally thought of as an
objective that maximizes a social utility function that has only the flow
of final consumption as an argument. Therefore, a noneconomic objective
contains a production, consumption, national defense, or other argument in
the utility function. Perhaps a more natural way to think about
noneconomic objectives is as a constraint on the usual social utility
function. For example, a government may act to maximize a consumption
stream subject to an output objective for an industry due to national
defense concerns.
(4.) The concept of noneconomic objectives is developed more formally in
Maneschi (2004).
(5.) Smith's analysis of bounties has virtually been ignored by the
secondary literature. One potential reason for this is Ricardo's rather
violent reaction to one peculiarity of Smith's analysis of export bounties
when applied to corn. Ricardo stated that, "Perhaps in no part of Adam
Smith's justly celebrated work, are his conclusions more liable to
objection, than in the chapter on bounties" (Ricardo 1990 [1817], p. 304).
Specifically, Smith appears to rose a corn model to show that the bounty
will not increase the real value of corn, and will thus not change land
tents or increase domestic production. While this particular result is not
the focus of this paper, it should be pointed out that Samuelson (1992, p.
10) supports Smith's conclusion based on a model that "both Ricardo and
Smith occasionally found congenial."
(6.) A similar argument is directed at the tonnage bounties given to the
fishing industry (Smith 1994 [1776], p. 554).
(7.) In the corn market Smith estimates that the domestic price rises by
4/5 of the bounty (Smith 1994 [1776], p. 544).
(8.) This argument was not new in Smith. Viner (1975, p. 71) demonstrates
that the link between the bounty on corn and the competitiveness of other
industries was made by several authors prior to Smith.
(9.) Another problem that Smith sees arising from the export bounty is the
need for additional regulations to counter the adverse incentives created
by the bounty. Specifically, the bounty on exports could make it
profitable to import corn at the world price and then, re-export it to
collect the bounty. This would make it necessary to raise import
restraints on corn (1994 [1776], p. 577).
(10.) Drawbacks are another example (Smith 1994: 533, 539).
(11.) It is interesting that Ricardo (1990) explicitly denies that a
bounty on production will have any effect on the value of a country's
annual output for a country that is in autarky. However, for a country
engaged in international trade, a Lerner effect similar to that offered by
Smith is assumed:
 By altering the relative value of commodities and corn.... we
should be applying a strong stimulus to the exportation of those
commodities whose natural prices were lowered, and an equal
stimulus to the importation of those commodities whose natural
prices were raised, and thus such a financial measure might
entirely alter the natural distribution of employments; to the
advantage indeed of the foreign countries, but ruinously to that
in which so absurd a policy was adopted. (Ricardo 1990 [1817],
p. 326)
In assessing the costs associated with an export bounty, Ricardo makes an
interesting deadweight loss argument and calls an export bounty "[t]he
worst species of taxation, for it does not give to the foreign country all
that it takes away from the home country, the balance of loss being made
up by the less advantageous distribution of the general capital" (1990
[1817], p. 314, emphasis added). However, Ricardo never extends his
analysis to try to rank one policy against another.
(12.) While the term "dead loss" bears an obvious similarity to the modern
term "dead-weight loss," it is not obvious from his text what he meant.
However, Say earlier (1964, p. 162) argued that "the loss of the consumer
exceeds the gain of the monopolist" from various types of trade
restraints.
References
Bhagwati, Jagdish. (1971). "The Generalized Theory of Distortions and
Welfare." In Trade, Balance of Payments, and Growth: Papers in
International Economics in Honor of Charles P. Kindleberger, edited by
Jagdish Bhagwati et al. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Bhagwati, Jagdish, Arvind Panagariyz, and T. N. Srinivasan. (1998).
Lectures on International Trade, 2nd ed., Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Blecker, Robert A. (1997). "The 'Unnatural and Retrograde Order': Adam
Smith's Theories of Trade and Development Reconsidered." Economica, 64:
255, 527-537.
Elmslie, Bruce. (2004). "Adam Smith and Noneconomic Objectives." Review of
International Economics 12: 689-692.
Elmslie, Bruce, and Norman Sedgley. (2002). "Vent-for-Surplus: A Case of
Mistaken Identity." Southern Economics Journal 68 (3): 712-720.
Maneschi, Andrea. (1998). Comparative Advantage in International Trade: A
Historical Perspective. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
--. (2004). "Noneconomic Objectives in the History of Economic Thought."
American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 63 (4): 911-920.
Myint, Hla. (1958). "The 'Classical Theory' of International Trade and the

Underdeveloped Countries." Economic Journal 68: 317-337.

Ricardo, David. (1990). On the Principles of Political Economy and
Taxation. Edited by Piero Sraffa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Samuelson, Paul. (1992). "The Overdue Recovery of Adam Smith's Reputation
as an Economic Theorist." In Adam Smith's Legacy: His Place in the
Development of Modern Economics. Edited by Michael Fry, New York:
Routledge.
Say, Jean-Baptiste. ([1880] 1964). A Treatise on Political Economy, or the
Production, Distribution, and Consumption of Wealth, 4th ed. New York:
Augustus M. Kelley.
Smith, Adam. (1994). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth
of Nations. Edited by Edwin Cannan. New York: Modern Library.
Viner, Jacob. (1975). Studies in the Theory of International Trade.
Clifton, NJ: Augustus M. Kelley.
BRUCE ELMSLIE, The author is at the University of New Hampshire,
Department of Economics, Durham, NH 03824. His email is . The author
thanks the Reginald F. Atkins Chair for financial support. He also thanks
Jagdish Bhagwati, Lewis Davis, Jonathan Eaton, Timothy Ford, Douglas
Irwin, Andrea Maneschi, and Norman Sedgley for helpful comments and
encouragement on this and another related paper.
COPYRIGHT 2004 American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc.
This material is published under license from the publisher through the
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