Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1. INTRODUCTION 1
2. REGISTRATION OF TRADEMARK 7
3. REGISTRABILITY OF TRADEMARK 12
4. ASSIGNMENT OF TRADEMARKS 20
5. DECEPTIVE SIMILARITY 25
6. PASSING OFF 26
8. WELL-KNOWN TRADEMARK 30
9. CASE-LAWS ON TRADEMARKS 34
INTRODUCTION
Fundamental of Trademarks
Trademark infringement law and unfair trademark law are different. The
essential element of a trademark is the exclusive right of its owner to
use a word or device to distinguish his products. On the contrary a
claim of unfair competition consider the total physical image given by
the product and its name together.
In a sense the law of trademarks reflects the societal view that certain
forms of competitive behaviour in business practices are unfair. Today
there is consensus that gaining customers by the use of confusingly
similar to trademarks is contrary to all concepts of commercial morality,
ethics and fairness.
It had been argued by many scholars that the trademark like a patent or
copyright served to differentiate the product with which it is associated
and thus leads to control over a segment of the market.
Many judges and writers have later however restricted the contention
that trademarks partake of the essential aspects of monopoly. Perhaps
Judge Frank’s conclusion is appropriate to appreciate the question in
proper perspective. He said that judges should keep in mind “the basic
common law policy of encouraging competition and the fact that the
protection of monopolies in names is but a secondary and limited
policy.” (Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslaw – Warren-Ltd. 137 F.2d 955).
5
While free competition is a goal, it does not override protection for the
goodwill established by a user for though the goodwill name and
reputation of the producer remains his private property and may not be
traded upon and exploited by the competitors.
Sometimes, the private rights of trademark owners conflict with the right
of the public to know the truth about the significance of a trademark.
REGISTRATION OF TRADEMARK
Section 18 of the Trade Marks Act 1999 says that any person, claiming
to be the proprietor of a trademark used or proposed to be used
by him, who is desirous of registering it shall apply in writing to
the registrar in the prescribed manner for the registration of the
mark.
At this stage of making application, the proprietor has to show his bona-
fide claim. If the mark is not mistaken on the face of application and also
there is not objection to the claim, the registrar is entitled to accept the
application.
In case of manufacturer having a trademark abroad has made goods
and imported them into this country with foreign mark on them, the
foreign mark may acquire distinctive character and in such
circumstances, the same or colourably similar mark cannot be
registered not because it is registered abroad but because it lacks
distinctiveness.
The law permits registration of a mark, which has been or is being used
or is proposed to be used. In case of proposer of the mark, he must have
definite and present intention to use the mark as on the date of the
application. Definite and present intention is different from the general
intention to use the mark sometime in future to something, which he
may think desirable later on. Definite and present intention means a real
intention to use the mark for resolved and settled purpose. In case of
used mark, the use in itself is not sufficient but is to be accompanied
with real intention continue with the use.
The ‘proposed use’ of the trademark must be normal and fair, which,
however, may include variations in presentation or colour difference but
such variation should not stretched to far so that the used form will be
totally different from the one sought to be registered. If proprietor does
not have the real and present intention to use the mark, and try to
register it for some mala-fide intention, such as to block the mark, it
10
The application for registration of the mark must be filed with the
Registrar in the prescribed manner who has been conferred the
discretion either to accept or reject or accept with amendments,
modifications, conditions or limitations2. The Registrar must
communicate his decision in writing with the applicant and is under
obligation to give the reasons in cases of rejection or acceptance on
conditions or with modification.3
1. Withdrawal of Acceptance
In case the Registrar decides to accept the mark for registration, but
before actual registration, the Registrar may withdraw his acceptance
under certain circumstances under section 19 of the Trade Marks Act
1999. For example, if the Registrar is satisfied that the application is
being accepted in error or that circumstances are such that such
registration should not be granted, he has been empowered to withdraw
the acceptance of application. This power can be exercised subject to
certain conditions. Registrar has to issue a notice, specifying the
objections, which has led him to think that the application has been
accepted in error or why the mark should not be registered, to the
applicant and give him an opportunity of being heard by requiring him to
show cause why acceptance should not be withdrawn.4
2. Advertisement of Application
1
K. C. Kailasam/Ramu Vedaraman, Law of Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Wadhwa and
company, Nagpur) 2003 at 239
2
Section 18 (4)
3
Section 18 (5)
4
Relevant Case: Tikam Chand and Another v Dy. Registrar of Trade Marks 1998 PTC 542 (Del).
11
Once the Registrar for registration has accepted the application, he shall
get the application advertised in the prescribed manner after
acceptance. However, the application shall be advertised before
acceptance if the application is related to a trademark to which section
9(1) and 11(1)(2) apply or in any other case as it seems expedient to the
Registrar.5 The purpose of advertisement is give information to the
public at large in respect of the trademark advertised and afford an
opportunity to oppose the registration of the mark on given grounds. So
the advertisement must be complete in all respects and otherwise the
very purpose of advertisement will be frustrated.6 If there is incomplete
or incorrect information in the advertisement, it would amount to
misrepresentation, which deprives a prospective opponent of the
opportunity to get full information and of filing an effective opposition.7
3. Opposition to Registration
Section 21 of The Trade Marks Act 1999 allows any person to oppose an
application for registration. “Any person” need not be only a prior
registered trademark owner.8 Even a customer, purchaser or a member
of the public likely to use the goods may object to the registration of a
trademark in respect of such goods on the ground of possible deception
or confusion. The period within which opposition to the application for
registration can be filed is three month from the date of advertisement,
which can be extended by Registrar not exceeding one month on
application made to him and on payment of the prescribed fee. So the
period cannot exceed four months in toto.
5
Section 20
6
Relevant case: Virendra Sethi v Kundan Das 20002 (25) PTC 50 (Del)
7
Ashoka Dresses v Bonn’s Shirts & Another (2000) RPC 507
8
P. N. Mayor v Registrar of Trademarks AIR 1960 Cal. 80
12
4. Registration
9
K. C. Kailasam/Ramu Vedaraman, Law of Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Wadhwa and
company, Nagpur) 2003 at 261.
10
Case relating to adducing evidence: Hemla Embroidery v Hindustan Embroidery FAO No. 21 of 1968;
Hastimal Jain trading as Oswal Industries v Registrar of Trade Marks 2000 PTC 24; Jagajit Industries Ltd. v
The Registrar of Trade Marks 2001 PTC 24; Kantilal Thulasidas Jobanputra v Registrar (1982) PTC 127;
Torrent Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v Union of India (1998) (2) Arb. LR 45
11
K. C. Kailasam/Ramu Vedaraman, Law of Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Wadhwa and
company, Nagpur) 2003 at 272
13
fee by the proprietor. Such restoration shall be for another ten years
period.
15
Any mark, which is not hit by the definition and section 9, qualifies for
registration. However, a mark qualified under section 9 has to meet the
positive objections under section 11 to be finally registered. Section 11
is the qualification of section 9. Mark having crossed the threshold under
section 9 is capable of getting the protection of the Trademark Act
subject to section 11. It deals with prohibition on registration but does
not hit the inherent capability of mark as to its registrability. The marks
prohibited under section 11 may not be desirable based upon public
policy considerations.
Whereas Section 9 of The Act lays down the ground for on the basis of
which, the registration of the mark can be denied absolutely. One of the
grounds is ‘if the mark is devoid of distinctive character’12. The phrase
‘distinctive character’ implies the ‘incapability of the mark to distinguish’
the goods or services of one person from that of the others. It also
implies that the mark in itself should be distinctive in certain cases. For
12
Section 9(1)(a)
16
example, common word of dictionary or the name of the place can not
be registered unless it is shown that the common word or the name has
become distinctive of his goods or services in the mind of the purchasing
public, but if he succeeds, then he will be entitled to protect his mark by
registration.13
Another ground14 for refusal to register the mark is that the mark should
not indicate the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, values,
geographical origin or the time of production of the goods or rendering
of services or other characteristics of the goods or services. In addition
to these, a mark stands disqualified from registration if represents the
shape of goods results from the nature of the goods themselves or
shape of the goods necessary to obtain a technical result or shape which
gives substantial value to the goods.15
Yet another ground16 is that the mark must not be consisted of the
marks or indications, which have become customary in current language
or in the bona fide and established practices of the trade it is not
desirable to monopolize such marks.
These are the grounds, which are specific to the mark that means, if the
mark is affected by any of these characteristics, it cannot be registered.
But this is not the end. The mark not affected by any such
disqualification, has to pass what can be called as the effect test. That
means, the mark should not deceive the public or cause confusion or
hurt the religious susceptibilities of any class or section of the citizens or
13
K. C. Kailasam/Ramu Vedaraman, Law of Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Wadhwa and
company, Nagpur) 2003 at 91
14
Section 9(1)(b)
15
Section 9(3)
16
Section 9(1)(c)
17
In National Bell Co. v Metal Goods MFG. Co18., Supreme Court of India
observed that distinctive in relation to the goods or services as meaning
‘adapted to distinguish’ goods with which the proprietor is/ may be
connected. Whereas in Davis v Sussex Rubber Co. Ltd.19, the Court of
Appeal drew the distinction between capable of distinguishing and
adapted to distinguish by saying that ‘capable of distinguishing’ seems
to have a somewhat wider import than the expression ‘adapted to
distinguish’ as it embraces marks which have not at the date of the
application, but which, if used long enough, may become distinctive of
the goods of the proprietor of the mark. The court in this case, observed
that ‘capable of distinguishing’ might perhaps refer to the future, in the
sense that a word may be able to distinguish although at the moment of
time at which the application is made it may not have become fully
effective to distinguish. However, the Court of Appeal observed that the
general considerations, which have to be taken into account in
construing the expression ‘capable of distinguishing’, are the same as in
construing ‘adapted to distinguish’. 20
The expression ‘kind’ includes the name or size or type of the goods or
services. This is based on the public policy of not affording registration
21
Section 9(3)
19
to the generic description of the goods which are the only available
method of description of the goods would not be having a capability to
distinguish. E.g. words like extra, small, big, liquid, solid etc.
22
Chef TM (1979) RPC 143.
23
Moneysworth Trade Mark (1976) RPC 317.
20
The proviso to Section 9(1) provides that any mark or name, which
though is not distinct, nevertheless may be registrable if it is shown that
it has by virtue of use acquired a distinctive character. That means, as a
result of use, the mark has become distinctive of the goods or services
of the proprietor. In an well-know case in Registrar of Trade Marks v
Hamdard National Foundation (India)24 the Delhi High Court gave
approval of the registration of the mark ‘SAFI’ by holding that words
having direct relation to the character and quality of the goods,
sometimes lose their primary meaning and acquire secondary or good
specific meaning of a particular manufacturer. If it happens then such
marks may be registered as trademark.
In English case, Cycling IS…TM Applications25 the Court laid down the
test to determine the distinctiveness on the basis of use by holding that
24
AIR 1980 Del 180 (DB)
25
(2002) RPC. 37, 729
21
“Right view to take of a particular sign may well depend upon the use (if
any) that has been made of it and more generally upon the usage of
persons involved in the relevant field(s) of commercial activity.”
Section 9 (2) (a) seeks to prevent the registration of marks, which are of
such nature as likely to deceive the public or cause confusion.
Generally deception or confusion might arise by reason of similarity
between the proposed mark and another existing mark or might result
from the nature of the mark itself or nature of the use of the mark. 26 For
example, Deception in the nature of the Mark may be in the form of
misrepresentation as to the characteristics of the goods or services or to
the effect that they were made in a specified geographical region or
place, when in fact not so made. Deceptive use may involve where mark
contains false or misleading information. E.g. use of word Regd. when
the mark is actually not registered.
26
K. C. Kailasam/Ramu Vedaraman, Law of Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Wadhwa and
company, Nagpur) 2003 at 150
22
27
This is in consonance with the heading of section entitling “absolute grounds for refusal”.
28
Philips Electronics v Remington [1999] RPC 809
29
Philips Electronics v Remington [1999] RPC 80; Triomede (PTY) Ltd. v Beecham Group PLC FSR [2001]
583.
23
the definition of the mark itself provides that mark includes shape of
goods or packaging. However generally the shapes would not be allowed
registration unless it is shown that the shape is distinctive of the goods
or services.
So the Registrar before refusing to register a mark that has come up for
registration has to function at three levels. One, he must find out the
identity or similarity of mark. Two he must look for identity or similarity
of goods or services to which the mark is going to be applied. And three,
he must check out whether there is any likelihood of confusion on the
part of the public.
24
goods of the respective owners of the mark. After considering all these
circumstances, if one comes to the conclusion that there will be
confusion, registration must be refused.
While comparing, one must not take a part of the word rather consider
the whole and compare it. Supreme Court31 while recognizing it further
observed that the approach to comparison should be from the point of
view of a man of average intelligence and of imperfect recollection.
Whether to such a man, the overall structure and phonetic similarity or
similarity of the idea in the two marks is reasonably likely to cause a
confusion between them, is the test.32
Search Procedure
31
In Corn Products v Shangrila Food Products Ltd. AIR 1960 SC 142. Also refer to Amritdhara Pharmacy v
Satya Deo Gupta AIR 1963 SC 449; Torrent Pharmaceuticals v Wellcome Foundation Ltd. 2001 (2) CTMR
158.
32
Corn Products v Shangrila Food Products Ltd. AIR 1960 SC 142
33
India being member of Paris Convention for protection of industrial property is bound to accord priority
date under section 154.
27
Laying down the test in Amritdhara Pharmacy case34 the Supreme Court
observed:
“for deceptive resemblance two important questions are: (1) who
are the persons whom the resemblance must be likely to deceive or
confuse, an (2) what rules of comparison are to be adopted in judging
whether such resemblance exists. As to confusion, it is perhaps an
appropriate description of the state of mind of a customer who, on
seeing a mark thinks that it differs from the mark on goods, which he
has previously bought, but is doubtful whether that impression is not
due to imperfect recollection… the question has to be approached from
the point of view of a man of average intelligence and imperfect
recollection.”
35
Dalip Chand Aggarwal v Escorts Ltd. AIR 1981 Del 150.
30
DECEPTIVELY SIMILARITY
Section 2(h) of the Act defines mark, which can be called deceptively
similar. According to the definition, a mark shall be deemed to be
deceptively similar to another mark if it so nearly resembles that other
mark as to be likely to deceive or cause confusion.
The act does not lay down any criteria for determining what is likely to
deceive or cause confusion. So every case of deceptive similarity
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case after applying
the test, which has been laid down by judiciary through cases. In H. C.
Dixon36, the Court held that likely to deceive is a question largely one of
first impression and not necessary to prove the intention to deceive. It is
sufficient if the ordinary user entertains a reasonable doubt 37 as to the
source of the product. It is the likely hood of deception and not the
actual deception, which is the deciding factor.
36
H. C Dixon & Sons Ltd. v Geo Richardson & Co. Ltd. 50 RPC 36, p. 374
37
Jellineck’s Appl., (1946) 63 RPC 59. P. 78
31
PASSING OFF
38
Singer Manufacturing Co. v Loog (1880) 18 Ch. D. 395, p. 412.
39
Stephen P. Ladas on Patents, Trade Marks & Related Rights (Vol II – 1975)
32
(iii) The broad and salient features must be considered for which
the marks must not be placed side by side to find out the
difference in design.
(iv) Marks must be looked apart from the first impression of a
person of average intelligence and imperfect recollection
(v) Overall structure, phonetic similarity and similarity of idea are
important and both visual and phonetic tests must be applied.
In addition to the these factors, the nature of commodity, the class of
purchasers, the mode of purchase and surrounding circumstances must
also be taken into consideration.
34
42
Important case on this point is Revlon Inc. and another v Hosiden Laboratories (India) and others 2001
PTC 595.
43
Section 29.
44
Ruston & Hornby Ltd. Zamindara Engineering Co. Ltd. AIR 1970 SC 1649
45
Torrent Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v The Wellcome Foundation Ltd. (guj) 2001 (2) CTMR 158.
35
In Dyechem Ltd.46 case the Supreme Court traced the legal principles
applicable to cases of infringement with reference to the dissimilarities
in essential feature of a mark.47 The Apex Court observed that the
question of resemblance of two marks could be determined by
considering the leading characters of each. Yet the sameness of most
leading elements in each may give very different impression. On the
other hand, critical comparison of the two marks might disclose
numerous points of difference and yet the impression which would
remain with any person seeing them apart at different time might be the
same. Thus it is clear that a mark is infringed if the essential features or
essential particulars of it are copied. It is more so, when any distinctive
arrangement or unusual features of the common elements are copied. 48
The apex court further recognized that under other laws, emphasis is
laid on the common features rather than on essential features and held
that “where common marks are included in the rival trade marks, more
regard is to be paid to the parts not common and the proper course is to
look at the marks as a whole but at the same time not to disregard the
parts, which are common.”
Thus the Supreme Court lays down three-step test to determine the
infringement:
(i) Is there any special aspect of the common feature, which has
been copied?
(ii) Mode in which parts are put together differently, i.e. whether
dissimilarities are sufficient to make the mark dissimilar?
46
S. M. Dyechem Ltd. v Cadbury (India) Ltd. (2000) 5 SCC 573
47
K. C. Kailasam/Ramu Vedaraman, Law of Trademarks and Geographical Indications (Wadhwa and
company, Nagpur) 2003 at 397.
48
S. M. Dyechem Ltd. v Cadbury (India) Ltd. (2000) 5 SCC 573
36
(iii) Paying more regard to the parts which are not common while at
the same time not disregarding the common parts.
Relying upon the Dyechem case, Delhi High Court held in Peshawar
Soap case49 that for determining the comparative strength of
infringement in favour of plaintiff, regard must be had to the essential
features. Ascertainment of essential features is not by ocular test alone
by excluding sound of words forming part of the whole mark. In cases of
word mark, resemblance is important, but in cases of devices and
composite marks dissimilarity in essential features is more important
than similarity. The leading characters, both orally and visually, in each
as a whole would be the relevant indicia. In cases of similar marks, the
dissimilarities would be relevant to adjudge the impression left on the
mind. The ascertainment of distinctive arrangement of common
elements is also relevant to determine infringement. The Court further
observed that defendant couldn’t take a plea that his mark contains
besides the plaintiff mark other matters also, though this is not an
absolute proposition.
WELL-KNOWN TRADEMARK
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention, 1967 provides for protection of well-
known mark by mandating the member countries to prohibit the use of a
trademark, which constitutes a reproduction, an imitation, or a
translation liable to create confusion of a mark considered by the
competent authority of the country of registration or use to be well-
known mark in that country as being already the mark of a person
entitled to the benefits of the convention.
Neither the Paris Convention nor TRIPS agreement contains any
definition of well-known mark, which is defined, for the first time, under
Section 2 (1) (zg) of Indian Trade Marks Act 1999. Section 2 (1) (zg)
defines:
49
Peshawar Soap & Chemicals Ltd. v Godrej Soap Ltd 2001 PTC 1 (Del.)
37
It must be mentioned here that these factors are only indicative and
illustrative and by no means exhaustive. Registrar is not precluded from
taking into consideration other factor, if found relevant. Also it is not
necessary that all the criteria mentioned in the subsection (6) must be
38
The number of actual or potential users may vary depending upon the
nature of goods or services. What the Registrar is supposed to do is not
39
to count the numbers of person physically but to take into account the
concerned section of users of those goods or services. As far as the
distribution channels are concerned there has been sea change in the
traditional mode of distribution and supply. The recent growth of super
malls has changed the mode of distribution that must not be lost sight
of. The third factor ‘business circles’ may include importers, wholesalers,
franchisees and other dealers interested in dealing with the goods or
services to which the mark applies.
50
Section 11(10)(i)
51
Section 11(10)(ii)
40
implication that he intends to use the mark in the manner applied for
and which is nothing but normal and fair use. If the applicant’s use or
propose use of the mark in not normal and fair that would bring upon
him the charge that the mark proposed has been applied for in ‘bad
faith’
Act does not define the expression ‘bad faith’ and is left to the Registrar
to decide in each case based upon the facts and circumstances. ‘Bad
faith’ as interpreted by the courts in India connotes the breach of faith
or willful failure to respond to one’s known obligations or duty. It
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and implies
conscious doing of wrong.52 The allegation of ‘bad faith’ is a serious form
of commercial fraud, which should not be taken lightly.
52
Bhupinder Singh v State of Rajasthan AIR 1968 Pun 406 at 411. Another case: Manish Vij v Indra Chugh
2002 (24) PTC 561. Also see: Growmax Plasticulture v Don & Low Nonwovens (1999) RPC 379.
41
The court held that the decisions of English courts would be relevant in a
country where literacy is high and the mark used are in the language
which the purchaser can understand. While the English cases may be
relevant in understanding the essential features of Trade Mark law but
while dealing with sale of consumer items in India it has to see and bear
in mind the difference in situation between England and India. In a
country like India where there is no single common language, a large
percentage of population is illiterate and a small fraction of people know
English, then to apply the principles of English law regarding
dissimilarities of the marks or the customer knowing about the
distinguished characteristics of the plaintiff's goods seems to overlook
the ground realities of India. While examining such cases in India, what
42
has to be kept in mind is the purchaser of such goods in India who may
have absolutely know the English language or the language in which the
trade mark is written and to whom different words with slight difference
in spellings may sound the phonetical the same. While dealing with
cases relating to passing off, one of the important tests which has to be
applied in each case is whether the misrepresentation made by
defendant is of such a nature as is likely to cause an ordinary consumer
to confuse one product for another due to similarity of marks and other
surrounding factors.
The court held that with the advancement and progress in technology
the services rendered by an internet site have also to be recognised and
accepted and are being given protection from passing off.
The court further held that with the advent of modern technology
particularly that relate to cyberspace, domain names or internet sites
are entitled to protection as a trade mark because they are more than a
mere address. The rendering of internet services is also entitled to
43
protection in the same way as goods and services are and trade marks
law applies to activities of internet.
The appellant in this case who was the original petitioner was engaged
in the business of manufacturing and marketing pharmaceuticals and
medicinal preparations. He applied for registration of trade mark
"VIREX" on January 27, 1987 which was advertised in the Trade Journal
on 1st January, 1995. The Welcome Foundation Ltd. filed notice of
opposition on 6th April, 1995. Appellant filed counter statement on 10th
October, 1995, copy served on third- respondent on November 22, 1995.
The third respondent was required to adduce evidence in support of his
opposition within 2 months of the service of counter statement under
rule 53 of the Rules. Extension of time was granted to third respondent.
An interlocutory application filed by the third respondent for taking
further evidence on second was allowed.
After considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned
single judge found no error of law in the said action and dismissed the
petition, holding that the provisions of rule 53 were directory and not
mandatory and non-compliance thereof would not result in
abandonment of opposition under sub-rule 2 of rule 53.
The High Court held that the order passed by respondent No. 2 the
Controller did not suffer from any infirmity and the learned single
44
judge had committed no error in not interfering with the said order.
The letters patent appeal was, therefore, dismissed.
The High Court however, held that it was necessary for the learned
single judge to opine on interpretation of rule 53 and all observations
made by the learned single judge would not be treated as final. The
appropriate court would decide the said question in accordance with law
without being inhibited by the observations made by the single judge.
The appellant had applied for registration of his trade mark 'GUPTA' in
respect of electric boxes, lights (tube patties and chokes). In response to
the notice, M/s. Gupta Enterprises and was registered proprietor of trade
mark Gupta since 1953.
The court in the appeal against Registrar's order set aside the order
holding that Registrar could not rewrite his judgment under the garb of
review as he has no jurisdiction to review his own order.
45
The High Court held that the Registrar's impugned order could not be
sustained and was set aside primarily on the ground that Kewal Kishan
had failed to establish that he was the registered proprietor of the trade
mark "GUPTA" on that he was prior user in case of that trade mark. The
court remanded the case back to Registrar to decide the matter on
merits in accordance with law.
7. Sri Sai Agencies Pvt. Ltd. v. Chintala Rama Rao, AIR 1998
AP86
Both the parties in this case applied for registration of trade mark. The
trade marks used by the two rivals were "Mathura Ghee" and "Mathurag
Ghee".
The use of the trade mark 'Mathurag' by the rival producer had
commenced after lapse of five years from the use of trade mark
'Mathura Ghee'. The owner of trade mark /Mathura' had popularised his
mark by investing huge amounts on advertisement. The two marks were
phonetically similar. There was not much difference in pictorial and
monogram. The only difference was the word 'g'.
manufacturing and selling their product using the trade mark 'Mathura
Ghee' as prior users.
10. S.B.L. Limited v. Himalaya Drug Co., AIR 1998 Del 126
The court held that the test for judging a case of infringement and/or
passing off remains the same when applied to medicines and
pharmaceuticals. However, a few additional considerations arise when
dealing with case of such drugs which cannot be sold except on
prescription of a doctor and which are sold only by such persons who
have special knowledge or expertise in the field. The manner in which
trade in such medicines is carried on that is, they can be sold only on
prescription and at authorised outlets only and the class of persons who
would purchase that is, the patients advised by doctors, chemists and
druggists. These two facts assume significance and shall have to be kept
in view by the courts. There are about 100 drugs in the market using the
abbreviation 'Liv' made out of the word Liver — an organ of the human
body, as a constituent of names of medicinal/pharmaceutical
preparations with some prefix or suffix — mostly suffixes — meant for
treatment of ailments or diseases associated with liver. 'Liv.' has thus
become a generic term and publici juris. It is descriptive in nature and
common in usage. Nobody can claim an exclusive right to the use of 'Liv'
48
In the instant case the two rival marks Liv. 52 and Liv-T contain a
common feature Liv which is not only descriptive but also publici juris; a
customer will tend to ignore the common feature and will pay more
attention to uncommon features, i.e., 52 and T. The two do not have
such phonetic similarity as to make it objectionable. The Cartons of
the two products respectively of the plaintiff and of the defendant
show that there is no possibility of one being accused of being
deceptively similar with the other, and the customer mistaking one with
the other, even by recollecting faint impressions. Therefore the
proprietor of Liv 52 was not entitled to the grant of an injunction the use
of Liv-T.
11. Rupa &c Co. Ltd. and another v. Dawn Mills Co. Ltd. and
another, AIR 1998 Guj 247
In this case the High Court held that the plaintiffs were owner of
registered trade mark in the form of label depicting figure of sun at
dawn with prominently displayed word 'DAWN' and subsidiary word
hosiery beneath DAWN as well as words 'DAWN HOSIERY per se since
last over 40 years and were marketing their products under that name.
So also defendants were manufacturing and trading in the same field of
hosiery for over 25 years now under their own registered trade name
RUPA. From the sample of offending hosiery products and cartons in
49
which the same were offered to buyers by the defendant shown to the
court, it was clear that on labels attached to it word 'DON' was shown in
prominence rather than its registered trade mark 'RUPA'.
Court held that the use of word 'DON' by defendant prima facie
infringed plaintiff's registered mark in question and he was entitled to
grant of temporary injunction.
In this case the plaintiff was selling its product, allopathic medicinal
preparation under trade mark "Enerjex". Plaintiff's grievance was
adoption of trade mark "Enerjase" by defendant for selling his Ayurvedic
medicinal preparation. Prefix for both marks viz. "Enerj" was common
and abbreviation of generic name 'energy'. Suffix to said words "jex"
and "jase" were totally dissimilar not creating confusion in mind of users
especially when visual impression of the said two trade names was
completely different. Total sound effect of these two words lacked any
similarity. The court held that no infringement of trade mark of plaintiff
was noticed. Injunction was refused.
In this case of the High Court observed that a plaintiff with a reputation
which is established internationally can sue to protect in this country
even if it does not have any business activity here. In other words,
reputation of a product may precede its introduction and may exist
without trade in such product in the country.
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The court also observed that where the two products in question were
pharmaceutical preparations with identical names and the foreign
manufacturer company chose the name first and used it on its product
in several countries around the world excluding India, whereafter the
Indian Company entered the market with their product and the foreign
company together with certain Indian Pharmaceutical company set up a
joint venture company for sale of its product in India and had applied for
registration of the disputed mark before the Registrar of Trade Marks,
Indian Company can be restrained from using the trade mark. Moreover,
if it is possible for a purchaser of the Indian Company's product in India
to do so under the impression that he is buying the foreign company's
product the Indian Company as the subsequent adopter of the mark
must be restrained from doing so. Further, once the foreign product is
released in the Indian market the consequences may well prove
disastrous given the fact that in India, drugs are available without
prescription. In such a case, where the interest of the general public is
affected, delay is of no consequence. Moreover, delay could defeat the
foreign company's right if the Indian Company having built up their
sales, were suddenly faced with the prospect of an injunction. Moreover,
the Indian Company was put on notice of the foreign company's claim in
1994 and no surprise could have been caused by the filing of the suit by
the foreign company to enforce that claim.
The Supreme Court held in this case that jurisdiction of the High Court
in entertaining write petition under Article 226 of the Constitution
51
The Supreme Court held in this case that the High Court was not
justified in dismissing the writ petition at the initial stage without
examining the contention that the show cause notice issued to the
appellant was wholly without jurisdiction and registration in the
circumstances of the case was not justified in acting as the 'Tribunal'.
15. Playboy Enterprises Inc. v. Bharat Malik, 2001 PTC 328 (Del).
The court concluded that though the plaintiff has secured registration of
the trade mark ‘Playboy’ in respect of the magazine and several other
goods which is more than seven years old and has demonstrated its
strength due to the degree of distinctiveness, fame and reputation of
the trade mark playboy yet being title of the magazine it qualifies to be
a valid trade mark even if it is not registered because of its long and
continuous use.
DOMAIN NAMES
With the advent and acceptance of Internet by people across the globe,
the notion of trademark took a new turn. To access a website, one
requires a web address. This web address comprises of domain names.
As the number of Internet users increased, the importance of domain
name increased. People started identifying the domain name with its
owner. For example, if one is to access the website of TATA, one would,
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gTLD
In addition to the above, seven new gTLDs were also selected by ICANN
on November 16, 2000.
.biz: It is only intended for domain names that are or will be used
primarily for a ‘bona fide business or commercial purpose’.
ccTLD
57
Two letter domains, such as .uk, .fr or .au (for example), are called
country code top-level domains (ccTLDs) and correspond to a country,
territory, or other geographic location. The rules and policies for
registering ccTLDs vary significantly and a number of ccTLDs are
reserved for use by citizens of the corresponding country. A few of these
ccTLDs were established in the 1980s, but most of them created in the
mid and later 1990s.
Indian (.in)
The Indian ccTLD is .in. Initially, the policy for registration in India was an
extremely restrictive on and allowed for a registration only if the
application was a registered commercial entity in India. Owing to
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(a) New categories of the sub-domains such as gen.in, firm.in and ind.in
have been added.
(b) For a foreign entity seeking to register a domain name in India ,the
relevant sub-domains would be co.in, gen.in and firm.in.
(c) The initial co.in requirement that one has to have a local presence in
the form of a branch/liaison office has, to a certain extent, been done
away with.
(d) The gen.in category has been specifically added for foreign
corporations who are unable to meet the stringent requirements added
for a co.in registration.
(e) The earlier requirement stipulating that the name-server should be
physically present in India and the domain name applicant should have
permanent Internet connectivity through an Internet Service Provider,
located in India has been dispensed with.
The domain name gained importance over the years as business entities
realized that Internet could be a convenient mode for not only imparting
information but also using it for gaining access to a world-wide market
and selling its products. Naturally, a company would prefer its own trade
mark to be used as domain name since people recognize the trade
mark. So a newspaper like The Economic Times would prefer
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It is also important to realize that in the online world, there can be only
one domain name as opposed to the possibility of two or more
trademarks co-existing in different working spheres. For example, might
be selling garments under the mark ‘Roughins’ in India and somebody
else might be selling the same product under the same mark maybe in
New Zealand. One can even have ‘Roughins’ registered as trade marks
in different countries without affecting the other registrations. Leaving
apart legal objections, this arrangement is perfectly possible in the
physical world. However, the online world does not permit of such
technological arrangement. If one person owns www.roughins.com,
registration of the same domain name by another person is not
permissible. One might register www.roughins.net or www.roughins.org
or www.roughins.biz but cannot register www.roughins.com. In such a
situation, one might conclude that the domain names have a higher
degree of importance than the trade mark. Even though one might be
using the trade mark ‘Roughins’ somewhere else in the world but it is
not affecting one’s business in India, not much damage is done. But
domain name is single. If one registers, another cannot. This
predicament has lead the trade mark owners to protect their marks
online by registering their domain names. Adding to this problem is the
tendency of net surfers to hunt for a particular company’s website by its
trademark itself.
The journey of legal protection of domain names in India has been more
or less a favourable one. The Courts in India have been more patient
towards the concept of permitting legal protection to domain names on
a status more or less equal to that of a trademark. There has been a
widespread realization of importance of legal protection of domain
names among the Indian legal circles right from its very inception and
the Courts have adopted a more progressive interpretation. There have
been disputes between trademark holders and domain-name owners or
between domain-name owners themselves. The Courts have uniformly
applied the law of passing off to such domain name disputes. Let us look
at a few decisions to appreciate this point.
This suit was filed by the plaintiff before the High Court of Delhi seeking
a decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendant from
operating any business or selling, offering for sale, advertising and in
any manner dealing in any services or goods on the Internet under the
domain name ‘YAHOOINDIA.COM’.
It was submitted that the plaintiff was the owner of the trademark
‘Yahoo!’ and domain name ‘YAHOO.COMwhich are well-known and have
acquired distinctive reputation and goodwill. It was submitted that a
domain name adopted by the plaintiff is entitled to equal protection
against passing off as in the case of a trademark. The plaintiff
contended that that it would not be unusual for someone looking for an
authorized ‘Yahoo!’ site with India-specific content to type in
‘YAHOOINDIA.COM’ (which is defendant’s domain name) and thereby
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instead of reaching the Internet site of the plaintiff, such person would
reach the Internet site of the defendants. Allegation of cybersquatting
was also made.
The defendants, on the other hand, averred that the Indian Trade Marks
Act related only to good and not services and there could not be any
action of passing off as the services rendered both by the plaintiff and
the defendants cannot be said to be goods within the Act. It was also
contended that ‘Yahoo!’ is a general dictionary word. Further,
defendants have been using a disclaimer and thus, there were no
chances of any deception. The contention that the principle of unwary
customer which is applicable in a case of infringement and passing off of
the trademark would not be applicable since the Internet users are
technically education and literate persons.
the word ‘services’ may not find place in the expression used in Sections
27 and 29 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, yet, services
rendered have come to be recognized for an action of passing off.
(b) There can be no two opinions that the two domain names
‘YAHOO.COM’ and ‘YAHOOINDIA.COM’ are almost similar except for use
of the suffix ‘India’ in the latter. When both the domain names are
considered, it is crystal clear that the two names being almost identical
or similar in nature, there is every possibility of an Internet user being
confused and deceived in believing that both the domain names belong
to one common source and connection, although the two belong to two
difference concerns.
(c) On the ‘literate Internet consumer’ argument, it was held that the
consumer might be an unsophisticated consumer of information and
might find his way to the defendant’s website providing for similar
information thereby creating confusion.
(d) The ‘disclaimer’ contention was rejected on the ground that the
defendant’s appropriation of plaintiff’s mark as a domain name and
home page address cannot adequately be remedied by a disclaimer.
The defendants contested the plaintiff’s action on the ground that the
‘look and feel’ of the plaintiff’s website is totally different from that of
the defendant’s website. RADIFF has been coined by taking the first
three letters of the word ‘radical’, first letter of the word ‘information’,
first letter of the word ‘future’ and first letter of the word ‘free’. It was
also contended that there is no likelihood of deception or confusion
between the two domain names.
The Court found that both the plaintiffs and the defendant have common
field of activity. They are operating on the website and providing
information of similar nature. When both domain names are considered,
it is clearly seen that two names being almost similar in nature there is
every possibility of Internet user being confused and deceived in
believing that both domain names belong to one common source and
connection although two belong to different persons.
(C) Acqua Minerals Ltd. v. Pramod Borse, 2001 PTC 619 (Del)
This was a suit seeking a decree for permanent injunction restraining the
defendants from using the mark BISLERI and directing them to transfer
the domain name BISLERI.COM to the plaintiff.
The question which arose for consideration was whether the domain
name registred with the Network Solutions, Inc. i.e., the Registering
Authority has the same protection as the trade name or trade mark
registered under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958.
The court also relied upon the ‘bad faith’ test under the UDRP. It found
that the defendants had blocked user of the trade name BISLERI from
getting the registration as a domain name and as such it has affected
the trade and name of the plaintiff. It was obvious that the domain name
‘BISLERI’ was chosen by the defendants with mala fide and dishonest
intention and as a blocking or squatting tactic.
It was also found that the defendants already had their own domain
name, namely, info@cyberworld.com. It appeared that the only object of
the defendant in adopting BISLERI.COM was to earn huge money for
transferring the said domain name in the name of the plaintiff knowing it
well that they had no right either of registration of the domain name or
of any other domain name which consisted of the plaintiff’s mark or
copyright name.
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(D) Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Ltd. v. Manu Kosuri, 2001 PTC 859 (Del)
The plaintiffs also contended that the defendants are in the business of
registering domain names in India and their purpose of existence
appears to be to block well-known trademark and even names of well-
known personalities on the Internet. Having once registered as domain
names, the defendants offer them for sale for large amounts. The
potential for confusion or deception being caused on account of the
adoption of the impugned trademark/name by the defendants and the
likelihood of damage to plaintiff’s company business, goodwill and
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(E) Info Edge (India) (P) Ltd. v. Shailesh Gupta, (2001) 24 PTC 355 (Del)
The defendant, on the other hand, was offering similar services through
jobsourceindia.com. However, it also registered NAUKARI.COM in 1999
and used as a hyperlink to jobsourceindia.com Therefore, anyone who
types NAUKARI.com would be lead to jobsoureindia.com. The plaintiff
alleged that NAUKARI.COM was registered in bad faith and to attract
web-surfers and innocent users for diverting the traffic to
jobsourceindia.com
In nutshell, plaintiff alleged that: (a) there was passing off of services
and goods; (b) defendant’s domain name was deceptively similar to the
plaintiff’s; (c) there is grave and immense possibility of confusion and
deception; (d) defendant’s dishonesty is clear since jobsourceindia.com
and NAUKARI.COM was registered two years after the plaintiff registered
NAUKRI.COM.
The main line of defence for the defendant was that NAUKRI.COM is
generic and hence, incapable of achieving the trademark significance or
secondary meaning. It was further contended that in case NAUKRI.COM
has attained secondary meaning, same has to be proved.
The Court, after relying on, Yahoo, Inc., Rediff Communication, Acqua
Mineral and Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories reiterated that a domain name is
more than an Internet address and is entitled to be equal protection as
that of trademark. The Court also observed that in a matter where
services rendered through the domain name in the Internet, a very alert
vigil is necessary and a strict view is to be taken for its easy access and
reach by anyone from any corner of the globe.
After considering the material and evidence on record, the Court held
that a distinctiveness can be attributed to the domain name of the
plaintiff. On this finding, the Court rejected the defendant’s contention
71
The Court also observed that the defendant has employed minor mis-
spelling of the plaintiff’s mark, although it has another such mark
available to it, which is also a registered domain name. The defendant’s
choice of slightly mis-spelt version of the plaintiff’s domain name was
deliberate in order to suit the business activities of the defendant and
for the purpose of diverting traffic of the Internet users to website
unrelated to the plaintiff. (This kind to activity is known as ‘typo-
squatting’. See, for example, the case of Yahoo.com under ‘Cases under
WIPO-UDRP’ infra)
A case of temporary injunction was made out and the Court restrained
the defendant from using NAUKARI.COM till the disposal of the suit.
(D) Tata Sons Ltd. v. Manu Kosuri, 2001 PTC 432 (Del)
The Court, on the basis of the materials on record, found that the
plaintiff has been able to prove the averments made in the plaint.
The suit was decreed was the defendants were restrained from using the
above domain names.
(G) Satyam Inforway Ltd. v. Sifynet Solutions (P) Ltd., (2004) 6 SCC 145
This case is the first one from the Apex Court dealing with legal
protection of domain names and has given seal to the law laid down by
the High Courts that the domain names are entitled to legal protection
equal to that of a trademark.
The main question for the consideration before the Supreme Court was
whether Internet domain names are subject to the legal norms
application to other intellectual properties such as trademarks.
In view of the decisions of various High Courts, it was held that the
domain names are entitled to legal protection equal to that of a
trademark.
The Court also discussed at some length the provisions of UDRP relating
to resolution of domain name disputes. It was held that a prior registrant
can protect its domain name against subsequent registrants. Confusing
similarity in domain names may be a ground for complaint and similarity
is to be decided on the possibility of deception amongst potential
customers.
After looking into the evidence, the Supreme Court reached a prima
facie conclusion that the appellant had been able to establish the
goodwill and reputation claimed by it in connection wit the trade name
‘Sify’. Apart from the close visual similarity between ‘Sify’ and ‘Siffy’, the
Court held that there was phonetic similarity between the two names as
well. The addition of ‘net’ to ‘Siffy’ did not detract from this similarity.
The Court was not impressed with the argument was of the defendant
that the word ‘Siffy’ has been derived from a combination of the first
letter of the five promoters of the respondent, namely, Saleem, Ibrahim,
Fazal, Fareed and Yusuf. It was found that the domain name of the
respondent already stood registered as in the name of one Mr.
C.V.Kumar. Further, ‘Siffy’ as an original acronym was based on the
initial letters of the respondent company’s promoters seemed
unsupported by any evidence.
It was also noticed by the Supreme Court that admittedly, the appellant
was the prior used and had the right to debar the respondent from
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eating into the goodwill, it may have built up in connection with the
name.
53[1]
Shamnad Basheer, Trademark Issues on the Internet: Domain Name Dispute Resolution, Legal
Dimenstions of Cyberspace, Indian Law Institute, 2004, p. 156
77
iii) Even if one gets an injunction, the possibility that the defendant
would obtain registration of alpha-numeric variations. This makes the
enforcement an expensive affair.
grounds include, as their central criteria, the way in which the domain
name is identical or similar to a trademark to which the complainant has
rights; why the respondent should be considered as having no rights or
legitimate interests in respect of the domain name that is the subject of
the complaint; and why the domain name should be considered as
having been registered and used in bad faith. The respondent is offered
the opportunity to defend itself against the allegations. The dispute
resolution service provider (e.g., the WIPO) appoints a panelist who
decides whether or not the domain(s) should be transferred.
(a) WIPO took the lead in becoming the first approved. This was on
29.11.1999 dispute resolution provider.
(b) National Arbitration Forum, closely followed WIPO. It was approved
on 23.12.1999.
(c) On 22.05.2000, CPR Institution for Dispute Resolution became the
fourth approved service provider.
(d) >From 28.02.2002, the final approved service provider so far, Asian
Domain Names Dispute Resolution Centre began accepting proceedings.
79
The Statistics on WIPO’s UDRP domain name cases reflect the mammoth
task we have taken at hand. And remember, this is just the tip of
iceberg. For there are very many disputes which are not brought to the
notice of any of the domain name dispute providers. The WIPO statistics
(as on 28.08.2004) relating to Geographical Distribution of Parties
cumulative: gTLDs gives us the domicile of the complainant and
respondent. The statistics in itself gives an interesting revelation. Note,
for example, Republic of Korea: there are only 27 complainants whereas
a whooping 333 respondents! One might conclude that either there are
just too many coincidences that the people there have registered such
domain names which should have been genuinely registered by
someone else. Or maybe, cybersquatting is a popular way of making
money. Same conclusion might be reached for Russia. On the other
hand, Switzerland seems to have been more of a victim of
cybersquatting – 209 complainants as against 53 respondents.
This was the first case conducted under the UDRP. The proceedings
were initiated on 09.12.1999. The respondent registered the domain
name <worldwrestlingfederation.com> for a term of two years from
October 7, 1999. The complainant provided evidence of registration of
the following marks:
81
It was found that because respondent offered to sell the domain name
to complainant “for valuable consideration in excess of” any out-of-
pocket costs directly related to the domain name, respondent has
“used” the domain name in bad faith as required under Paragraph 4, b, i
of the UDRP. Therefore, pursuant to Paragraph 4,i of the UDRP, the
Panel required that the registration of the domain name
<worldwrestlingfederation.com> be transferred to the complainant.
The Backstreet Boys are well-known pop singers. The Backstreet Boys
have licensed a wide range of products bearing their trademark,
including posters, watches, backpacks, musical products, live concert
photos, etc., which are projected to result in over twenty million dollars
in revenue. The Backstreet Boys operate a website at
“http://www.backstreetboys.com”.
It was found that the domain names are ‘virtually identical and
confusingly similar’ to the trademark, respondent’s use of the domain
names do not give him a legitimate interest in the domain names, and
respondent did register and use the domain names at issue in bad faith.
Having concluded that all the requirements of Para. 4(a) of the UDRP
have been fulfilled, the Panel, pursuant to paragraph 4(i) of the UDRP,
concluded that the registration of the domain names at issue was to be
transferred to the Complainant.
After looking into evidence and averments, the Panel found that:
(c) Since the domain name was a well-known trademark and the domain
name is being used in connection with a pornographic site, the domain
name has been registered and is being used in bad faith.
84
Pursuant to paragraph 4(i) of the Policy, the Panel required that the
registration of the domain name <bahaiwomen.com> be transferred to
the Complainant.
The Complainants, Calvin Klein Trademark Trust and Calvin Klein, Inc.
(hereinafter "Complainant"), are respectively the record owner and the
beneficial owner of the CALVIN KLEIN trademarks (referred to
hereinafter as the "CALVIN KLEIN Marks"). The Complainant is involved
in the apparel business and designs, manufactures, markets and sells
merchandise for men, women and children including watches, shoes,
accessories, underwear, jeans, cosmetics, home furnishings, sweatshirts
and many other apparel items. In June 1997, the Complainant registered
the domain name <calvinklein.com> with Network Solutions, Inc.
The Domain Name was registered in August 2000, three years after the
registration of Complainant's <calvinklein.com> domain name and over
13 years after Complainant began using the CALVIN KLEIN Marks.
Based on the evidence and contentions, the Panel found that the
Domain Name is confusingly similar to the CALVIN KLEIN Marks and the
<calvinklein.com> domain name in which Complainant has rights.
The Panel agreed with the contentions of the Complainant that the
Respondent had no rights or legitimate interests in the Domain Name.
The Respondent had an opportunity to demonstrate such rights or
legitimate interests but did not do so.
85
The Panel found that the Domain Name was registered and is being
used in bad faith.
The Respondent had also registered over fifty (50) other domain names,
including names incorporating other movie stars names within
<madeleinestowe.com> and <alpacino.com> and a famous Russian
86
The Panel found that common law trademark rights could exist in an
author’s name. The other requirements of paragraph 4(a) of the UDRP
were also found to be existing in the present case: (a) the domain name
is identical the complainant’s name; (b) Respondent had no rights or
legitimate interest in the domain name; and, (c) Respondent had
registered and used the domain name <juliaroberts.com> in bad faith
since he had not only registered other domain names including several
famous movie and sports stars, he had also placed the domain name up
for auction on the commercial website eBay.
Since the elements of paragraph 4(a) of UDRP were proved, the Panelist
ordered that the domain name "mahindra.com" be transferred to
Mahindra & Mahindra.
The Respondent was the registrant of the domain name <tata.org> with
NSI but did get the website activated.
Since the website was not activated even though it was registered
almost three years earlier, it was found that the respondent is merely
‘hoarding’ the said domain name. It was further observed that even if a
website under the said domain name had been activated, in the facts
and circumstances of the case, it would still constitute dishonest
adoption and misappropriation.
(i) the Respondents adopted in their domain names the identical marks
in which the Complainant has rights,
(ii) that the Respondents had no rights or legitimate interests in respect
of the domain names; and
(iii) that their registration and use of the domain names is in bad faith in
the sense that their use amounted to an attempt intentionally to attract,
for commercial gain, Internet users to their web sites by creating a
likelihood of confusion with the Complainant’s marks as to the source,
sponsorship, affiliation or endorsement of those web sites and the
services on them.
Internet users daily. Yahoo! is the owner of the service marks and
trademarks YAHOO!, as well as the trade name YAHOO! and the domain
names <yahoo.com> and <yahooligans.com>.
The respondent did not file any submissions before the Panel.
The Panel supported the Complainant’s argument that the very nature
of the Yahoo name (i.e. its arbitrary nature) makes it unlikely that the
Respondent had not realized that its names could be other than
confusingly similar to those of the Complainant. It further found that the
Respondent used the Domain Names to intentionally attract, for
commercial gain, Internet users to its affiliated websites by creating a
likelihood of confusion with Complainant’s YAHOO! And YAHOOLIGANS!
marks as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation and endorsement of
Respondent’s affiliated websites and/or the goods and services offered
on those websites.
Panel found the three elements that is confusing similarity with the mark
of the complainant, lack of respondent’s legitimate interest and bad
faith, as set out in paragraph 4(a) of the UDRP present and therefore,
directed that the domain names in dispute be transferred to the
Complainant.
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(4) The domain name has not been used by the registrant for over on
year.
(6) Any other dispute, accepted by the Domain Registrar in his own
discretion.
META-TAGS
buy them. In such situations, Y company suffers from the risk of loosing
potential consumers due to use of its trademark by X company as meta-
tags in its website.
(A) Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label [985 F. Supp. 1218
(N.D. Cal. 1997) (temporary restraining order issued), 985 F. Supp. 1220
(N.D. Cal. 1997) (preliminary injunction granted), 1999 WL 329058 (N.D.
Cal. 1999) (summary judgment entered for plaintiff)]
In this case, Global Site Designs registered two domain names that
incorporated Playboy’s trademarks, www.playmatesearch.net and
www.playboyonline.net. The words ‘playboyonline’ was also used in the
meta-tags of the website. The Court found infringement of trade mark
and restrained the defendant from using the plaintiff’s trademarks,
Playboy and Playmate, as meta-tags or as part of a domain name.
(D) SNA, Inc. v. Array, [51 F. Supp. 2d 554 (E.D. Pa. 1999)]
97
(E) Niton Corp.v. Radiation Monitoring Devices, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d. 102
(D. Mass. 1998)
In this case, the defendant not only used all trademarks of the plaintiff
as meta-tags but also literally copied all of the meta-tags that plaintiff
had used to design its own website. The Court came to the conclusion
that the act of the defendant would probably lead an Internet consumer
to believe that the defendant is in someway either connected to or
sponsored by the plaintiff. Injunction was granted.
Linking
it takes the user to the website of the particular newspaper. Sounds fair
enough! It actually facilitates the user in navigating through the Internet
with considerable ease. In most cases, linking is welcome. For example,
enter www.yahoo.com and you would notice a whole range of
advertisements towards the top. Those are nothing but links to another
website.
Before we look into the problem, we shall also understand how one can
increase revenues through advertisements on a website. An
advertiser/companiy chooses where to advertise on the Internet by
checking the number of ‘hits’ on a website, that is, how many people
have accessed/visited the website. When we say ‘accessed’, we mean
accessing the homepage/main webpage. The more there are ‘hits’ on
www.yahoo.com, the more advertisers/companies are attracted to
advertise there. A problem would arise if another website would permit
somebody to skip the homepage of a website (which contains the
advertisements) by deep linking into the site. This would not be counted
as a ‘hit’ for that website and as more and more deep linking would
happen, the number of ‘hits’ would decrease.
Framing
GEOGRAPHICAL INDICATIONS
GIs are essentially the DNA of Nature impregnated into the Mother
Earth – difficult to clone and beyond scientific calculation.
GIs are about culture, geography, traditions, heritage and
traditional practices of people and countries.
Thus, putting it in simple words, GIs are any noun or adjective (need not
necessarily be a geographical name) that designates geographical
location and would tend to be regarded by buyers as descriptive of the
geographical location of origin of goods.
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The persons dealing with three categories of goods are covered under
the term Producer:
" The authorised users can exercise the exclusive right to use the
geographical indication.
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" An authorised user has the exclusive rights to the use of geographical
indication in relation to goods in respect of which it is registered.
It can be renew from time to time for further period of 10 years each.
" However, when an authorised user dies, his right devolves on his
successor in title.
Provisions of TRIPS
Please check whether the indication comes within the ambit of the
definition of a Gl under section 2(1)(e).
E-mail: gir-ipo@nic.in
Website : ipindia.gov.in
Opposition to Registration
Registration
Renewal
Appeal