Representational Semantics

-r:0 ~nd~rstand Tarski's account of the logical properties, we need to distinguish clearly between it and representational semantics, But to do ~at.' we need a fairly clear idea of what the latter approach to sernanucs IS all about. .A good place to begin is with a simple puzzle suggested by Donald Davidson, In a well-known article in which he defends his own approach to semantics, Davidson draws a broad distinction between "theo~ies that characterize or define a relativized concept of trut?" and h~s own call for a "theory of absolute truth" (1973, p. 79), Davidson pomts out that as we ordinarily understand it, truth is a property of sentences, a property whose holding or failing to hold is expressed by a monadic predicate, In this respect, truth sets itself apart from n:anr other c,oncepts that we consider peculiarly semantic. Thus, de~otatton IS a rel~tlon between a singular term and an object denoted, satlSfactl?,n a relation between an open sentence and the things it "holds true of, and so forth. But truth, perhaps the preeminent semantic conc~pt, does not relate a sentence to something else; it simply applies or fails to apply, so to speak, absolutely, I

Davidson goes on t~ note that at least on a superficialleve1, much ~nt~m~~rary work in semantics seems to belie this simple point . uc e. on IS devoted to the investigation of what Davidson sees as IrreduCIbly relational notions, notions like "truth in a model tr th i

interpretation, valuation or possible world" Th t h . al' u m an

hi h D . . ese ec rue concepts

~ l~ ;V.Ildson subsumes under the generic term "truth in a model ,;

o or ai to hold between sentences and obiects f '

generically, "models." Because of hi . ~ 0 some other sort: of relative truth do not ha . t IS, DaVIdson argues, such theories

. , ve as consequences the so II d T

distinctive of the theory of absolute truth Th T -ca e -sentences

, e -sentence

2

Representational Semantics 1 3

'Snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white

does not, as Davidson puts it, "fall out of" a theory that simply tells us which models 'Snow is white' is true in. And for this reason, theories of relative truth "do not necessarily have the same sort of interest as a theory (of absolute truth}" (1973, p. 79), A theory that yields Tsentences provides, first and foremost, an explication of absolute truth-that is, of truth as we ordinarily understand it; theories of relative truth must, at least on the surface, be seen as providing explications of something else.

1 am not concerned here with the merits or demerits of competing semantic programs, and in particular I will not spend time considering Davidson's own approach. But it is worthwhile taking seriously Davidson's simple, initial point: truth is, after ali, a property; truth in a model, a relation. What bearing can a characterization of such a relational concept have on our ordinary "monadic" concept of truth? If there is no close tie between the two, as Davidson occasionally implies, then why is the relation of "truth in a model" given a name that sounds so misleading?2

We can look at Davidson's puzzle this way, A theory of relative truth provides us with a characterization of "x is true iny." Yet it is common to think of such theories as telling us something about truth, as having at least intuitive or informal consequences involving the ordinary monadic predicate "x is true." Davidson, of course, is particularly interested in the so-called T-sentences, but the same point might be made about any claims involving "absolute" truth. That point is this. Before a theory of relative truth can be judged to have consequences, formal or otherwise, involving the standard monadic concept, we must give some explanation of exactly how the defined "x is true in y" is related to the already understood "x is true." Somehow, we must explain how we are to move from our theory about the relation to claims involving the property, If we can give no such explanation, then the simple, prima facie evidence is that our theory of relative truth has no bearing on the concept of truth as we ordinarily understand it. But that, of course, is absurd.

Truth as Specification

We often find it advantageous to explain a monadic concept in terms of a relational one. So, for example, we may find the explication of "x is a brother" far more tractable if we first set out to analyze "x is a brother of y." The former then reduces to an existential generalization of the latter: brotherhood is just brother-of-someone-hood. There are similar cases

Representational Semantics

in whic? w.e gain access to the monadic concept through a universal generalization of the relational; thus with comparatives and superlatIVes-say, taller than a~d ta~lest. But clearly the monadic concept of truth, t~e conce~t we ordmarily employ, is no generalization of any of the varrous relational concepts. A sentence can be true in some model, yet not be true;.a sentence can be true, yet not be true in all models.

~f the. monadic concept of truth is not a generalization, universal or ~xlst~ntlal, ~f the concept of truth in a model, then the natural alternative IS to think of the former as a specification of the latter. In other wo.rds, perhaps. the. monadic concept emerges from the relational by ~x~ng on.a S~;Cl~C mstanc~ of.the nonsentential parameter, the "y" in

x IS t~ue In y. .Bemg true simpliciter would then be viewed as equivalent [0 b~mg true In some particular model, and getting from a theory of ~el~t1o~al tru~h to a theory of absolute truth would be a matter of indicating ~hlCh specific model was the "right" model. Our conceptual analogy might then run: "x is true in y" stands to "x is true" as "x is a brother of y" stands to "xis Fred's brother."

. In broad .outline, this is clearly the intended relation between theorres o~ r~latlve tru~h and the ordinary, monadic concept of truth. In a sense It IS the ~ela~lOnal concept that IS a generalization of the monadic conc~pt; what~ustJfies the appearance of the word "true" in theories of relauv~ truth 15 that the relation studied comes from abstracting or "u~fixJng" an implicitly fixed parameter embedded in the ordinary ~lOtJ~n o~ truth. ~heories of relati ve truth try to characterize "x is true III y, while theones of absolute truth aim to characterize so to speak "x is true in Fred." "

Of c~urse, this still does not tell us who or what Fred is. We have not determmed what Sort of "hidden parameter" our models are meant to fill, ?r what makes one model the "right" one, the model that binds the ordinary concept of truth to the more general concept of truth in. I will devo~e seve':'ll chapters of this book to exploring one possible answer t~ ~hls question, the answer presupposed by the model-theoretic defimuons of the logical. properties. But there is another very natural an~wer, on.e assumed In what I have called representational semantics. Briefly, this answer is that Fred is the accurate model, the one that represents the world as it really is.

Truth in a Row

Consider the simplest and most familiar theory of relative truth a ~eor~ we a~e. taught during the first few days of any inaugural cou;se III logic, This IS the theory of truth in a row, the "theory" that enables us to construct truth tables.

Representational Semantics

To fill out a truth table for a simple sentence of English. we have to acquire two principal skills. In the first place, we must master the proper technique for constructing the reference column of the truth table, a column headed by a horizontallist of the atomic components of the sentence in question. This technique generally involves some simple, extendable pattern of writing the words "TRUE" and "FALSE" in horizontal rows beneath our list of atomic sentences, a pattern guaranteed to capture all the required permutations for a given number of such components. Thus, depending on the atomic sentences contained in the target sentence S, each of the following would serve as proper reference columns:

Snow is white S
TRUE
FALSE
Snow is white Roses are red S
TRUE TRUE
TRUE FALSE
FALSE TRUE
FALSE FALSE
Snow is white Roses are red Violets are blue S
TRUE TRUE TRUE
TRUE TRUE FALSE
TRUE FALSE TRUE
TRUE FALSE FALSE
FALSE TRUE TRUE
FALSE TRUE FALSE
FALSE FALSE TRUE
FALSE FALSE FALSE Our reference column-everything to the left of the double linesprovides us with the rows that our target sentence is to be true or false in. The ultimate goal is to write the words "TRUE" or "FALSE" in each row below S; "TRUE" if S is true in that row, "FALSE" if S is not true in that row. But to do that, of course, no standard pattern ofthe sort used in constructing the reference column will suffice, will ensure that we enter the correct value in each row. Rather, we need a radically different technique, a technique that involves the repeated application of

16

Representational Semantics

Cthert~in ;ecubT.,'Sive tables. The following are two sample recursive tables'

e not ta e: ,

p notp
TRUE FALSE
FALSE TRUE
and the 'or' table:
p q p or q
TRUE TRUE TRUE
TRUE FALSE TRUE
FALSE TRUE TRUE
FALSE FALSE FALSE . These recursive tables are meant to tell us when a comple

Ili to b id d " . x sentence

e consi ere true Ill" a row on th . th

I d d' ,e assumption at we have

ahrea y eter~lIned w.hether its immediate constituents are "true in"

t at hth, Equipped with the values of the constituents we need only

mate t em to th' ,

and e approprrate row of the appropriate recursive table

/~~ to the nght. Often the recursive tables will also have been app I~ In order to. determine the values of the relevant constituents and, III turn, of their relevant constituents Indeed there i ' b d h . " ere IS no upper

'ithi on ~ e number of times a recursive table may have to be applied

Wit hn da smgle row before the final value of the target sentence is reac e .

. O~~eh we are adept at these techniques we can easily produce tables Th w IC ~ur target sentence is assigned a definite value in each row

~s, takmg the .ta~get sentence to be 'Snow is white or roses are not ~eldl (~nd ~bbrevlatmg Our reference column somewhat) we get the

.0 owmg SImple table: '

SW RR 'Snow is white or roses are not red'
T T TRUE
T F TRUE
F T FALSE
F F TRUE d Now, consider exactly what this table tells us. First of all it clearly oes not tell us the actual truth value of our target sentence-c-rhaj is, its

Representational Semantics

"monadic" value. But this was to be expected, since our theory is at most a theory of relative truth.! It does, however, tell us exactly which rows our sentence is true in; specifically, it tells us that the sentence is true in every row save the third. But what bearing does this information have on the genuine, "monadic" truth value of our sentence?

At the dose of the last section we noted that truth simpliciter was meant to be a specific instance of "relative" truth. Translating to present terminology, the truth of a sentence should boil down to its truth in some specific row. And since we know that the current sentence is actually true, we can rule out the third row without further ado; that row is surely not "Fred." On the contrary, as any student of introductory logic could quickly tell us, our target sentence is true simpliciter because it holds true in the first row of the present table. Here, at least, it is the first row that binds relative truth to truth.

But what makes the first TOW the right row? This may seem like a silly question; after all, 'Snow is white' and 'Roses are red' are both truethat is, genuinely true-and the first row is the only row in which these sentences both come out true. But notice that in offering this reply, we have simply put off solving Davidson's puzzle. There is no question that 'Snow is white' is true in the first row of this table; for that, we need not even apply our recursive techniques. Yet it is equally clear, even on the level of atomic sentences, that being true in a row is quite different from being "absolutely" true; evidence for that will be found in any of the remaining rows of our table.

Language and the W Mid

Davidson's puzzle reappears at the very bottom level of our theory of truth in a row, with the atomic sentences that acquire their values in the reference columns of our tables. If truth is to be truth in some specific row, then dearly the first row of our sample table must be the "right" one. But it is equally clear that this observation does not provide any account of the link between our theory of relative truth and the ordinary, monadic concept from which we pirate the name. To provide such an account we must explain how the first row, so to speak, comes to be the right row. Furthermore, our explanation cannot simply reduce to the plea that if we picked any other row, various sentences would be "true in" the "right" row and yet not be true simpliciter. Such a response would leave our theory of relative truth entirely suspended in air.

If we could not pinpoint some implicit parameter in our ordinary notion of truth, some parameter whose potential effect on the "absolute" truth values of OUI' sentences is mimicked by the effect of changes from row to row in the theory of relative truth, then Davidson would

- - ""~- ~-~---~~- - --- , ~ -- -_

18

Representational Semantics

?e completely ju~tified in claiming that the defined "x is true in y" is irreducibly relational. And consequently he would be justified in claiming that, for this reason, our theories of relative truth cannot be ~ought t~ iIlumin~te the notion of truth as we ordinarily understand It. But this conclusion would obviously be wrong. It is perfectly dear that truth tables tell us something about truth, about ordinary monadic truth, and th~~ the relation o:f :'trulh in a row" was not just conjured up by some logician or semanticrst with no concern at all for its tie to the ordinary concept.

But Davidson's puzzle is not unsolvable. The problem is not finding an appropriate parameter in our ordinary notion of truth, but rather choosing between two obvious alternatives. Consider the move from the first row of our sample truth table to the third. Here the relevant change in our reference column is the value assigned to the atomic sentence 'Snow is white.' The effect of this move is that the resulting :al~e of our target sentence turns from true to false. Now the question IS SImply what change would have a similar effect on the "absolute" truth value of 'Snow is white,' and a similar effect on the "absolute" value of our target sentence.

There are only two parameters to which the sentence 'Snow is white' owes its truth: broadly speaking, the language and the world. It is due to the language that the sentence means what it means, that it makes the claim it does. But it is due to the world that snow is white. Appropriate changes on either side would have made our atomic sentence false. Thus, had the language been somewhat different, this sentence would have been false in spite of the whiteness of snow-say, if 'white' had meant hot. On the other hand, had the world been different this sentence might have been false in spite of its meaning-say, had snow been red.

We can interpret the move from row to row in our truth table in either of these two ways. In the first place, we can view our theory of truth in a row as explicating the relation "x is true in L" for a limited, though nontrivial range of languages L. From this perspective, we would assume that any extralinguistic fact that might influence the truth value of sentences-say, the color of snow or roses-is held fixed; our concern is not with changes in the world. Viewed this way, ~he ~rst row of our sample table is "right" simply because English, the implicitly specified parameter in "x is true," happens to be one of the languages that expresses true propositions by both 'Snow is white' and 'Roses are red.' Thus, the third row would have been "right" had we been speaking a language exactly like English save that "white" meant hot.

Representational Semantics

19

If we adopt the alternative perspective, then the first row is still "right," but for entirely different reasons. Here we view our theory as, throughout, a theory of truth for English, or for some fragment thereof. Our aim is to explicate the relation "x is true in W," where "W" ranges over various intuitively possible configurations of the world, the world our language describes. Thus, the first row of our table is "right" just because snow really is white and roses are indeed red. From this perspective, the move to the third row involves no change in meaning; that row would have been "right" simply had snow not been the color it is.

We commonly think of truth tables as capable of supporting certain counterfactual claims about the (absolute) truth values of their target sentences. We imagine these claims to be supported because our theory assigns values to these sentences even in rows that are not "right," rows in which the atomic sentences are not assigned their actual values. So, for example, the third row of our sample table supports a claim of the form:

The sentence 'Snow is white or roses are not red' would have been false had ...

Obviously, the appropriate completions of this counterfactual will vary depending on which parameter we view as changing in the move from row to row-that is, depending on what we take to be the relation between "truth in a row" and the monadic truth predicate appearing in the claim. In effect, our theory will support those completions that we consider elucidations of "had the third row been the 'right' row." Thus, if we view our parameter to be the language, we might offer the completed counrerfactual:

The sentence 'Snow is white or roses are not red' would have been false had 'white' meant hot.

While if we view the parameter to be the world, we would likely produce:

The sentence 'Snow is white or roses are not red' would have been false had snow not been white.

As these sample counterfactuals show, the significance we read into our truth tables depends critically on which perspective we assume, on the nature of the parameter that corresponds to the rows our sentences are true in. Of course, since both points of view are possible here, we might justify either of the above counterfactuals by referring to the third row of our sample truth table. Or, to simplify matters, we might

-

- ---=""""~ -~ - - ~~ .~. • - "-- -

20

Representational Semantics

even merge both of our claims into a single counterfactual:

The sentence 'Snow is white or roses are not red' would have been false had 'Snow is white' been false.

But the fact that we can do this does not mean the resulting claim is somehow justified by the abstract theory, quite independent of any account we might give of the relation between "x is true in y" and "x is true." Or, to put it another way, the fact that our theory of "truth in a row" seems doubly illuminating because it admits of either perspective should not lull us into thinking that it retains its illumination independent of these perspectives. Rather, as Davidson's puzzle nicely points out, the purely abstract characterization of relative truth, of "x is true in y," supports no claim whatsoever about absolute truth, about truth as we ordinarily understand it.

A Representational Semantics

When we view a particular theory of relative truth as explicating "x is true in W," we see it as providing an account of how the world wields its influence on the truth values of sentences within afixed language. If characterizing this influence is the aim of our relativized theory of truth, then 1 will say we are engaged in representational semantics. The reason I use this somewhat unusual term is simple. Our theory provides an account of a relation, "x is true in y," and what the theory takes to satisfy the "y" position are, for all intents, just ordinary objects of some sort or other-chunks of the actual world. Thus, in our theory of "truth in a row," the ''y'' term was filled by rows, rows that were fixed by the reference column of our truth table. Other representational theories might define a relation between sentences and abstract, settheoretic objects, maybe functions of some sort. But obviously these in no case actually are the "possible configurations of the world" that they are meant to represent. Rows of a truth table are just blotches of ink, and functions are set-theoretic constructs; the world, thankfully, is neither of these.

The point is a simple one, but all too easily overlooked. When we viewed our theory of "truth in a row" as explicating "x is true in W," the fact that the target sentence came out false in the third row of the table was taken to indicate that the sentence would have been false in a world in which roses were red but snow not white. But the third row itself, the ink marks on paper, is not a world in which roses are red but snow not white. It is just a handy surrogate, used for purposes of our theory. From this "representational" standpoint, our truth table gives us valuable information about truth, but certainly not about how truth would

Representational Semantics

21

be affected by changes in row. Rather, it tells us how truth would be affected by changes in the world, by changes that are represented or depicted by changes in row.

The techniques used in constructing truth tables are not generally thought to constitute a full-fledged semantic theory for any language or language fragment. More than anything else, this is due to certain traditions of fairly recent vintage concerning the accepted format of such theories. Still, it may seem perverse to view our theory of "truth in a row" as a representational semantics, insofar as it may seem perverse to view it as a semantics at all. But this can easily be remedied.

Suppose weare interested in the fragment of English containing the atomic sentences 'Snow is white,' 'Roses are red,' and 'Violets are blue; plus whatever complex sentences can be formed from these using a sign for negation, 'not; and a sign for disjunction, 'or: I will assume that we have a precise syntactic theory for our language, one that enables us to form the negation of any sentence and the disjunction of any two." A standard representational semantics for this simple language might proceed in the following way. First we define a class of models that will represent all possible configurations of the world relevant to the truth values of our sentences. Thanks to the simplicity of our language, this purpose can be served by the class of functions that assign a truth value, either true or false, to each of our three atomic sentences. Thus, our class of models consists of eight functions, one that assigns true to each sentence (representing worlds in which snow is white, roses are red, and violets blue), one that assigns false to each (representing worlds in which snow is not white, roses not red, and violets not blue), and so forth.

Our next step is to provide a recursive definition of S is true in [, for arbitrary sentences S and models f. Since we will take this relation as an indirect characterization of "x is true in W," our aim will be to ensure that any given sentence of our language is true in exactly those models which represent worlds that would indeed have made the sentence true. So if a model depicts a world in which snow is not white, our definition should guarantee that 'Snow is white' comes out false in that model. Here we assume, of course, that the sentence 'Snow is white' means what it actually means; the sentence is ours, even though the world depicted by the model is not.

The definition proceeds in the obvious way, by recursion on the set of sentences in our language:

• If S is an atomic sentence, then it is true in a model fjust in case f assigns it the value true.

• If S is the negation of S', then it is true in a IDodelfjust in case S' is not true inf

22

Representational Semantics

• If Sis .the disl~nction of S' and. S", then it is true in a model [just in

case either S IS true In for S" IS true in f.

For the most part, what we have done here just involves a recasting of our t~e~ry of "truth in a row." But there are two changes worth mentlOnlng_ In the earlier theory, we constructed reference columns for each sentence encountered, the number of rows being determined by the atomic components of the target sentence. In the new theory our model~ take over part of the burden shouldered by the reference ~olumns, since they provide the objects our sentences are true or false In. Indeed, they do so with somewhat more aplomb, allowing us to use the same ~odels for any sentence in our fragment. Thus, we have managed, 10 the new theory, to introduce a standard collection of objects, each of which fully determines the apportionment of truth values throughout the entire language."

Now, although it could easily escape notice, the reference columns of our earlier theory actually did a bit more than our models. The refe~ence columns both delineated the needed rows and simultaneously specified the valu~s of our atomic sentences in those rows. In contrast, w~ether an atomic sentence comes out true in a given model is determme~ not by the model itself but by the base clause of our recursive definition, the clause beginning "if S is an atomic sentence ... " The fact t.hat w.e took models to be functions that yield the values true and fa~e IS entirely a mnemonic convenience in the new theory; any two objects would ha~e worked as well-for example, the numbers zero a.nd one. Indeed, If we had used zero and one, the substantial conrribut~on made. by the base clause of our definition would have been highlighted: without the base clause, we would not know whether a model tha.t assigns zero to 'Snow is white' represents a world in which snow is white, or one in which it is not. To provide similar freedom in the reference columns of our truth tables, say, the freedom to use "+" and "_,, ra~her than ":RUE" and "FALSE," we would have to supplement our recursive tables With base tables to complete the definition of truth in a row. Such tables would look something like this:

Snow is white

'Snow is white'

+

TRUE FALSE

Thus, our new semantic theory, unlike the earlier truth tables ex!:'licitly distinguishes the definition of "x is true in y" from the delineation of the class of objects that sentences of the language are to be "true in."

Representational Semantics

23

Representational Guidelines

The basic motivation underlying a representational semantics, an indirect characterization of "x is true in W," is fairly clear. The approach provides a natural framework in which to couch a theory of meaning, or at any rate a theory of those aspects of meaning relevant to the truth values of sentences, both the values they acttulily have and the values they would have, were the world differently arranged. Needless to say, the simple representational semantics of the last section can at best be considered a partial theory of meaning for the relevant fragment, since it offers no detailed account of the semantic functioning of the three atomic sentences. In giving the semantics, we simply assumed that 'Snow is white' somehow comes to mean what it does, and for this reason is true in exactly those worlds in which snow is white. A more detailed semantics would presumably say something on this score as well.

Of course, the fact that the motivation is clear does not mean the task of devising a representational semantics for any interesting language is either easy or philosophically unproblematic. But these difficulties are not, at present, our concern. For Tarski's analysis of the logical properties does not involve giving a characterization of "x is true in W "; in effect, it involves a characterization of "x is true in L," for a specified range of languages L. As we will see, Tarski's is a remarkably different goal from that presupposed by the representational approach to semantics, in spite of the fact that one and the same account of "x is true in y" may occasionally admit of both construals. Failing to recognize this difference, many philosophers have assumed that Tarski, in defining the logical properties, had in mind something akin to representational semantics, a characterization of "x is true in W," for all "possible worlds" W. For example, we find David Kaplan extolling the insight of "Tarski's reduction of possible worlds to models," a reduction Kaplan claims to be "implicit in" the analysis of the logical properties developed in Tarski's article." But this, as we will see, is just a confusion, one of several that lend undeserved credence to Tarski's analysis.

Let me conclude this chapter by emphasizing the guidelines that will seem natural if our aim in constructing a model-theoretic semantics is to give a characterization of "x is true in W." First, there is the obvious though rather vague criterion we use in judging the adequacy of our class of models. In a representational semantics the class of models should contain representatives of all and only intuitively possible configurations of the world. This was accomplished in the semantics of the last section by employing a rather crude but effective system of representation. Our collection of models imposed, so to speak, a complete

o=c ~ _ _ ~_ __ • ~

24 Representational Semantics

partition on the class of possible worlds, a partition whose boundaries were determined by the color of snow, roses, and violets in those worlds. Had we excluded anyone of our eight functions, the remaining class of models would have been inadequate in this respect, leaving no representative for certain perfectly conceivable worlds. On the other hand, had our atomic sentences been 'Snow is white,' 'Snow is red,' and 'Snow is blue,' then we would have been justified in limiting the class of models to those functions that assign false to at least two of our atomic sentences. The remainder would not represent genuine possibilities.

Once we have specified the class of models, our definition of truth in a model is guided by straightforward semantic intuitions, intuitions about the influence of the world on the truth values of sentences in our language. Our criterion here is simple: a sentence is to be true in a model if and only if it would have been true had the model been accurate-that is, had the world actually been as depicted by that model. Obviously, the possibility of success on this score is not independent of the objects we have chosen to include in our class of models. In particular, it is this ultimate goal that determines the amount of detail we need to incorporate into our models, how crude a system of representation we can get by with. So, for example, with our sample fragment we could not have used functions that assigned truth values only to 'Snow is white' and 'Roses are red.' Although these models would indeed have given us a complete partition of possible worlds, the partition would not have been fine-grained enough to allow us to carry out our semantic task: the accuracy of any of these models would have been consistent with either the truth or falsehood of 'Violets are blue.' And of course with more complicated languages, say, languages containing quantifiers, our technique of constructing representations will have to allow for a considerably more detailed depiction of the world.

Now, the final points to notice about representational semantics concern the sentences that turn up true in all models. It is an immediate and trivial consequence of the two criteria I have just described that sentences which are true in all models should be exactly those that are necessarily true. If a sentence is not necessarily true, yet comes out true in all models, then we have either omitted representations for some possible configurations of the world, namely those that would have made the sentence false, or our definition of truth in a model has gone astray, having declared the sentence true in at least one model that depicts a world in which it would actually have been false. Just so, a sentence that is necessarily true can only come out false in a model if we have gotten its semantics wrong or if the model fails to depict a genuine possibility.

Representational Semantics 25

Clearly, all and only necessary truths ~ilI come o~t tru~ in all models of an adequate representational semantics. And so If logical truths are thought to be necessarily true, these will of course be among t~ose true in every model. Similarly, if one sentence comes out true III every model in which a second sentence is true, then the truth of the first must be a necessary consequence of the second. That is, it m~st be impossible for the first to be false while t~e secon~ is ~rue, at least If our semantics really satisfies the representational gUIdeimes.

Equally trivial is the observation that analyt~c truths, sel_lt~nces that are true solely by virtue of the fixed semanuc charac.tenstlcs o~ the language, will come out true in all models. If a sente~ce IS not true m all models then its truth is clearly dependent on contmgent features of the world, and so cannot be chalked up to meaning alone. Thus, insofar as logical truths are analytic, true in virt~e of meaning, these must again be among the sentences that are true I~ ever~ model of an adequate semantics, one that satisfies the stated cnt~na.

These are all immediate consequences of the Simple represent~· tional guidelines sketched above. But in spite of these c~nsequ~~ces, It would clearly be wrong to view representational semantics as gtvmg ~s an adequate analysis of the notion of logical truth. For one thm!!i' If there are necessary truths that are not logically true, say, mathematical claims, then these will also come out true in all models of a representational semantics. But more important, even if we are prepared to identify necessary truth and logical truth-an iden~ification most people would balk at-it is still dear. t.hat representall~nal seman~l~s affords no net increase in the preCIsion or mathematical tractability of this notion. Any obscurity attaching to the bare concept of necess~ry truth will reemerge when we try to decide whether our semantics really satisfies the representational guidelines-in particular, when we ask whether our models represent all and only genuinely possible

configurations of the world. . . .

The value of representational se~antics does not he m. an analysis ~f the notions of logical truth and logical consequence, or III t~e anal~sls of necessary or analytic truth. Rather, what this approach gIVes us IS a perspicuous framework for characterizing the semantic rules that govern our use of the language under investigation. It should be seen as a method of approaching the empirical study of language, rather than an attempt to analyze any of the concepts employed i'_l that task. Certainly, all necessary truths of a language-~f whatever Ilk-should come out true in every model of a rep:esentatlonal seman~lcs. If they do not this just shows that our semantics for the language IS somehow defective, perhaps that we are wrong about the meanings of ~ertain expressions. But this is only a test of the adequacy of the semantics, not

26 Representational Semantics a sign that we also hi'

is sirn ave an an~ ysrs of necessary truth, The latter notion

bi ply presupposed by this approach to semantics Thi ,

o ~ectlOnable presuppositi b ' IS IS not an illuminate th ,o]n, y any means, so long as Our goal is to

e semantic ru es of the language d h '

necessary truth. an not t e notion of

I have sketched som ' I d

constru ti f e sImp e an general criteria that guide the

W "f c IO~ 0 a representational semantics, a theory of "x is true in

logica~r p::pl:~:e~' !,s I ~xplain in Chapte,r 4, Tarski's analysis of the

. . grves nse to an alternatlve approach to semantic one whose atrn IS to characterize the relation "x is true in L " f s, range oflanguages L Th' .. . , or some h' , . e intuItive Importance of such a theor and

t e general guidelines appropriate to it, are not near! so a y,

:?ose of ~epresentational se~antics. To get a clear ide: of tte~:;~~:~ mes, an to see how they differ from those I have iust sk

need to take a dose look at Tarski's account of logica[ truth =:c:~:g' i:el consequence. a

3

Tarski on Logical Truth

My remark that Tarski's account involves the notion of "x is true in L" for variable L would seem odd to anyone familiar with his original analysis but unfamiliar with modern presentations of it. There is no mention in Tarski's article of any "range of languages," or of any notion of relative truth, of "truth in," The remark is appropriate only, so to speak, in hindsight, as the natural way of viewing the modeltheoretic definitions that emerge from Tarski's account. In Chapter 4, 1 explain how making a few minor (though somewhat confusing) changes in Tarski's original. account yields a recognizable modeltheoretic semantics. But to see exactly how the resulting semantics differs from a representational semantics, it is important to start from the beginning, with a clear understanding of Tarski's original definitions and their underlying motivation.

I approach Tarski's account of logical truth and logical consequence indirectly, by considering first a simpler account developed by Bolzano nearly a century earlier.! The two accounts are remarkably similar; indeed, Tarski initially entertains what is, for all intents, precisely the same definition as Bolzano's, but modifies it for reasons I will eventually explain. But in spite of the striking similarity in the two accounts, Tarski was unaware of Bolzano's work until several years after the initial publication of his article. The key difference between the two accounts is simply that Bolzano employs substitution where Tarski uses the more technical, and for the purposes more adequate, notion of satisfaction.