Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

De What Re is de Re Modality?
Author(s): J. L. Mackie
Source: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 71, No. 16 (Sep. 19, 1974), pp. 551-561
Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
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 THE JOURNALOF PHILOSOPHY
VOLUME LXXI, NO. I6, SEPTEMBER I9, I974

- - -F~~~~~~~~. * -4.: -:

DE WHAT RE IS DE RE MODALITY?
jOGICAL and epistemicmodalitiesare metaphysically harmless,
I but empiriciststend to be suspicious about any further
Li varieties of necessity.What could constitute a necessity
which attachesdirectlyto a thing'sbeing somethingor having cer-
tain properties,and which is not analyzable in termsof what we
know or in termsof the meaningswe attach to various expressions?
Saul Kripke,however,has put forwarda numberof veryplausible
theses involving de re modalities,illustratedwith many such ex-
amples as these.*
Queen Elizabeth-this verywoman-might neverhave become a
queen; but she could not have been born of different parents.It is
indeed possible thatshe was not born of thosewhomwe now believe
to be her parents; but given that she was born of them,she was
necessarilyborn of them; anyone not born of them, though she
might have done all the things that Elizabeth has done since
infancy,would not have been thiswoman.
This table, which seems to be made of wood, may reallybe made
of ice. But if it is made of wood, then it is necessarilymade of wood.
A table, like this one to all appearances,mighthave been made of
ice; but it would not have been thistable. But thistable mighthave
been in a differentroom, and might have been destroyedbefore
now.
It is possible that gold does not have atomic number 79. But if
it has it, then it necessarilyhas it, and any materialin any possible
world with a different atomic number,no matterhow like gold it
was in all its observableproperties,would not be gold. Gold could
not have had a different atomic number. But this verystuff,gold,
#"Naming and Necessity," in Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman, eds.,
Semantics of Natural Language (Dordrecht: Reidel; New York: Humanities,
1972), hereafterreferredto as SNL, pp. 253-355.

55'
552 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

might not have been yellow, and might not have had the other
propertiesby which we now recognizegold.
This view is built upon a sharp distinctionbetween epistemic
modalities and modalities of another sort; to be necessaryand to
be known or even knowable a priori are not the same, and we can
in fact have eitherwithout the other. It is not clear whetherthis
sortof modalityshould be called logical, but at any rate it is quite
different fromlogical necessityand possibilityabout concomitances
of general features.Nor are these modalities causal. It is causally
necessarythat somethingwith atomic number 79 should have the
observable and testable featuresthat gold now has; but, Kripke
would say, the causal laws might have been different.And the
thingswhich in his sense Elizabeth mighthave done are not con-
fined to those which it was ever causally possible that she should
do. If we call thesede re modalities,theywould seem to include at
least threesubclasses.For an individual person or thing,its having
had whateveroriginit actuallyhad is necessary,but its subsequent
historymighthave been veryidifferent. Also, both foran individual
and fora natural kind-gold, tigers,light,heat-its havingwhatever
constitutionit actually has is necessary:tigersare necessarilynon-
reptilian; heat is necessarilymolecularmotion. But what it does or
causes is contingent:heat mightnot have given us the sensationof
heat. That is, there are necessitiesof origin contrastedwith con-
tingenciesof development,and necessitiesof constitutioncontrasted
with contingenciesof operation.There are also constraintsof thing-
kind: Julius Caesar could not have failed to be a man.'
These doctrines,as I said, seem plausible: but what are they
about? To what subject or subjects are they a contribution?
One subject of Kripke's lectures is obviously the meaning and
use of propernames. He is concernedto criticizeseveralvariantsof
Frege's view and to defend somethinglike Mill's view, but also to
argue that the lattershould be extended to apply to some general
words.But the subject of necessityseems to be partlyseparatefrom
thatof naming.Kripkesays,"Not only is it trueof theman Aristotle
that he mightnot have gone into pedagogy; it is also true that we
use the term'Aristotle'in such a way that,in thinkingof a counter-
factualsituationin whichAristotledidn't . . . do any of the achieve-
mentswe commonlyattributeto him, still we would say that was a
situationin whichAristotledid not do thesethings"(SNL 279). But
I presume that we can turn this round and read "Not only do we
use the term'Aristotle'in that way, but also it is true of the man
I David Wiggins has drawn my attention to these.
 DE WHAT RE IS DE RE MODALITY? 553

Aristotlethat he might not have gone into pedagogy etc." The

claims about de re counterfactualpossibilities,about what thisvery
man might have done, are additional to the claims about how
proper names and certain general words are used. It has, indeed,
been argued2 that Kripke's criticismof Frege fails,because proper
names still behave like definite descriptions with large scope.
Whether this is so or not, it is clear that Kripke's characteristic
points about necessitycould have been made with respectto indi-
viduals introducednot by names but by definitedescriptionswith
large scope: "Concerningthe teacherof Alexander,he mightnever
have taught anyone,but he could not have failed to be a son of
Nicomachus, though Alexander might well have had someone
otherthan a son of Nicomachus as his teacher."
This second topic, necessityas opposed to naming,seems to be
that of how we handle counterfactualpossibilitiesand identityin
relationto one another.Kripke is veryforthright about possibilities.
"'Possible worlds' are stipulated,not discoveredby powerfultele-
scopes" (SNL 267). But we can and do stipulate that in a counter-
factual possibilitycertain things happen to this very individual.
We do this, Kripke claims, in a characteristicway. "One is given
... a previoushistoryof the world up to a certaintime,and from
thattimeit divergesconsiderablyfromthe actual course" (SNL 314).
The possibilitiesin the considerationof whichde re modalitiesarise
are such divergences.And thoughKripke doesn't quite say this,he
could add that when we are consideringsuch divergent-from-the-
actual histories,we secure the identity of persons and things
throughthe transitionfrom the actual to the merelypossible by
meansof the same continuitiesthatordinarilysecureidentitywithin
theactual world.
I think that we can develop fromthis an understandingof the
necessitiesof origin.
We have a picturesomethinglike thatof Diagram (i). The actual
careerof, say,Nixon is shown by the continuousline fromt1 to t3.
The dotted line divergingfromit representssomethingthat Nixon
mighthave done and experiencedfromt2 onwards till t4.We take
thisas a possible careerforNixon because in thispossible course of
eventsthe man who is doing thingson the dotted line fromt2 to t4
is related to the actual Nixon fromt1 to t2 by just the same sorts
of continuityby which the actual Nixon fromt2 to t3 is related to
the actual Nixon fromt1to t2-
2 For example by Michael Dummett in Frege: Philosophy of Language (New

York: Harper & Row, 1973), pp. 110-151.

554 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

"ta

tl

It~~~~~~~~~~~~O

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ .

iii I'I

vi'

v g -

Diagrams

But this diagram suggestsanother: Diagram (ii). That is, we

might consider possibilities that converge with actuality instead
of divergingfromit or, what comes to the same thing,that diverge
from actuality backwards instead of forwardsin time. Here we
contemplatea possible person who is conceived at to, not at t1,
whose careerfromtoto t2 is differentfromthatof the actual Nixon,
but whose actions and experiencesfrom t2 to t3 are exactly like
thoseof the actual Nixon. To make thiscase symmetrical with that
 DE WHAT RE IS DE RE MODALITY? 555

of Diagram (i), let us suppose that this person's likeness to the

actual Nixon fromt2to t3goes rightdown to the arrangementof all
the moleculesin his body. Kripke would say that this wouldn't be
Nixon; it wouldn't be the same man. Yet we could have the same
sorts of continuityconnectingthe t2-to-t3 career on the firmline
with the t0-to-t2 career on the dotted line as in Diagram (i) con-
nected the t2-to-t4 career with the tl-to-t2career. There are indeed
some difficulties in workingout this symmetry. If the possible per-
son who startsat tois to have, fromt2to t3,exactlythe same history
as the actual Nixon, and yet to have memorylinks with the dotted-
line historyfromtoto t2,therewill have to be sufficient resemblances
between the latterand Nixon's actual historyfromt1 to t2,or else
the actual Nixon will have to be supposed to have, aftert2,pseudo-
memoriesof an appropriatesort.But thereis no difficulty in prin-
ciple in patchingthe storyup. It mightbe objected that the to-t2-t3
careerwill be causallyimpossible,thata man causallycouldn't have
exactly the same career from t2 to t3 joined on to either of two
alternativeearlier careers,the actual t1-to-t2one and the possible
tO-to-t2 one. But this objection is irrelevant,since Kripke's modali-
ties are not causal. Rather he would say that,even if we do contem-
plate the conceivableeven if not causally possible to-t2-t3 career,we
cannot claim that the possible person whose career it is would be
Nixon. Even where the actual and possible paths are exactlyalike,
fromt2 to t3, we should put in a dotted line beside the firmone:
our possible person maintainshis own identitythrought2,but he
neverbecomesNixon and so neverwas Nixon.
Still, there plainly is an alternative,more liberal view which
would allow identities to be preservedin possible historiesthat
divergebackwardsas well as in those that divergeforwards.There
is also a third, less liberal, Leibnizian view that even forward
divergencesdestroyidentity.Leibniz would say that, though God
mighthave made a person who had the t1-t2-t4 career of Diagram
(i), this person would not have been Nixon. This possibility,
Leibniz would insist,is not correctlydescribedby sayingthatNixon
mightaftert2have done somethingotherthan he actuallydid; it is
rather that God might have made not Nixon but another man
whose early career only was just like Nixon's,3so that in Diagram
(i) also we need a dotted line runningalongside the firmone from
t1to t2.Kripke'sview,therefore, is intermediatebetweenthe liberal
view that preservesidentityin counterfactually possible divergences
3 "Essais de Th6odic&e" in G. W. Leibniz, Die Philosophischen Schriften,
Gerhardt,ed. vol. vi, p. 363.
556 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

both backwardsand forwardsand the Leibnizian view whichdenies

identityin eithercase.
Leibniz's view would clearlynot be a correctaccount of how we
actuallyhandle possibilityin relation to identity:we do commonly
entertainthe possibilitythat this veryman mighthave done other
than he did. Believersin freewill thinkthat some such actions are
also causally possible,but even determinists say that though it was
not causally possible, it was still conceivable that this man should
have done otherwise,withoutprejudice to his identity.
But the more liberal alternativecannot be so easily ruled out. It
is not clear that if we consideredthe tO-t2-t4 possibilityin Diagram
(ii), we should say confidently,"But that person wouldn't be
Nixon." The truthis ratherthat we don't normallyconsider that
sort of possibility. The counterfactualpossibilities-might-have-
beens-that interestus are nearlyalways forwarddivergencesfrom
actual history.Still we can concede thismuch to Kripke,thatamong
the possibilitiesthat we ordinarilyconsider it is the origin of-an
individual personor thingthatis necessaryforthatveryindividual,
whereas all its subsequent historyis contingent.
But why do we handle possibilityand identitytogetherin this
way?And is the resultingde re modalityjust a featureof how we
talk and think,or is there some deeper metaphysicaltruthwhich
our thinkingtries-perhaps successfully-tocapture?Kripke relies
on "intuitions";but are theyintuitionsabout our natural ways of
thinkingand speaking or about some furthermetaphysicaltruth?
(Of course,if thereis a metaphysicalissue here,the Leibnizian alter-
native might be revived: perhaps, although we commonlyallow
identityto be preservedthroughforwarddivergences,we are wrong
to do so.)
Looking around fora possibleexplanationof thesewaysof think-
ing and speaking,we may findusefula slightlydifferent sortof dia-
gram whichis used by,forexample, Prior,von Wright,and Lucas.4
In this,small circlesrepresentactual or possible statesof the world,
and lines joining them representcausally possible developments.
(Time is representedas discrete,but thisis a harmlesssimplification.)
In Diagram (iii), if the present state of the world is (a), it is
causally possible that the next stateshould be either (b) or (c), and
4 A. N. Prior, Past, Present and Future (New York: Oxford, 1967), p. 127;
G. H von Wright, Woodbridge Lectures on Causation and Determinism (New
York: Columbia, not yet published); J. R. Lucas, A Treatise on Time and
Space (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1973), pp. 268-272.
 DE WHAT RE IS DE RE MODALITY? 557

so on. If the presentstateis (d), the lines from(a) through(c) to (g)

and (h) and from(b) to (e) and (f) representlost,defunct,possibili-
ties,what mighthave been but was not and now cannot be.
All thesewritersfavorstructureslike that of Diagram (iii), a tree
branchingout toward the right,that is, toward the future.But we
mightwell considersuch structures as thoseof Diagrams (iv) and (v),
and also a reversedtree and a simple line as in Diagrams (vi) and
(vii).
That is, we mightallow forconvergentas well as divergentpossi-
bilities, or for convergentones only, or for neither convergence
nor divergence.Determinism,in the sense that every event has
precedingsufficient causes, would confineus to diagramsof either
type (vi) or type (vii). Traditional determinismwould, I think,
confineus to type(vii), denyingthata total stateof the world could
have come fromany varietyof antecedents.Libertariansfavortype
(iii), but there seems no reason why theyshould not admit types
(iv) and (v): if causal laws allow alternativedevelopmentsfromthe
presentstate,should theynot also allow a particularstate to have
come fromalternativeantecedents?
There is, however,a reason why the sorts of possibilityshown
in Diagrams (iv), (v), and (vi) tend to be ignored. Even if it is
causally possible for (d) in any of these to have come either from
(b) or from(c), still thereis just one immediatelyprecedingstate,
say (b), fromwhich it actually did come. The past is fixed,even if
it is not causally fixed by the present.So if in each diagram the
top horizontalline representsthe actual course of events,(c), (a),
and (e) in (vi) were at no time real possibilities,though they are
causallypossiblesourcesof the actual state (f),whereasif in (iii) the
presentstate is (a), all the othersshown are still real possibilities,
while if the presentstate is (d), still (c), (e), (f), (g), and (h) are
real might-have-beens: it was at one timereallypossible thateach of
theseshould come about. But some convergencesrepresentreal pos-
sibilities:for example, in (iv) (d) really mighthave come from(c),
thoughit actuallycame from(b).
We have thus an asymmetrybetween past and future possi-
bilities, even if the causal possibilities as such are symmetrical.
Though the present state causally could have come from more
than one antecedent,it did come fromjust one, and the only way
in which it really could have come from some alternativeante-
cedentis by that alternative'sbeing a possible resultof some earlier
possible divergencefromactuality.Could we restorethe symmetry
558 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

by sayingthat it is equally true that though (given indeterminism)

the presentstate causally could give rise to alternativesubsequent
states,thereis just one state that will actually follow?The future,
someone mightsay,is as metaphysicallyfixedas the past, even if it
is causally open, just as, on this view, the past is causally under-
determinedby the present.But this logical fatalism,if separated
fromboth causal determinismand divine foreknowledge, has seldom
carriedmuch weight.5In our ordinarythinkingwe suppose that,if
the futureis causally underdetermined,more than one possibility
is reallyopen, whereasthe past is closed,even if it is causallyunder-
determinedby thepresent.
In factour ordinarythinking,particularlyabout human action,is
libertarian.We take it that there are genuinelyopen alternatives
for the future,but not for the past. And this results from our
combiningcausal underdeterminism with the view that the past is
fixedjust by having occurred.
It is, I suggest,thisway of thinkingthat gives rise to the necessi-
ties of-originand contingenciesof development.But, it might be
objected, these concern possibility in association with identity;
where,in the presentstory,does identitycome in? Well, see what
happens when we simplyadd the identityof persistingindividuals
to our recent scheme. If the present state is (a) in (iii), and it
includes Nixon, then each of its alternativesuccessor states (b)
and (c) can also include thisveryman. So when the actual courseof
events has run on through(b) to (d), we must say that the now
defunct possible sequence through(c) to (g) would also have in-
cluded this same man. It is not only a might-have-been, but also a
might-have-beenfor Nixon. But our ordinary way of thinking
allows for no similar convergentpossibilities,except where these
followpreviousdivergences.So, going back to our earlierdiagrams,
our ordinaryways of thinkingprovide that Nixon may, at t2,pur-
sue eitherthe firmor the dotted line in (i), and consequentlythat,
speakingat t4, we can say that,althoughhe did followthe firmline,
he mighthave followedthe dottedone. But theydo not allow any-
thinglike (ii), though theydo in principleallow forwhat is repre-
sented in Diagram (viii); he might temporarilyhave gone offthe
rails without this having any lasting effect.
Thus the libertarianview of causal possibilities,conjoined with
5 G. Ryle, Dilemmas (New York: Cambridge, 1956), pp. 15-17; but contrast
A. N. Prior's discussion of Diodorean modalities, e.g., in Past, Present and
Future, op. cit., pp. 2 and 3.
 DE WHAT RE IS DE RE MODALITY? 559

the view of the past as fixed,would yield the main principles of

our handling of identityin relation to what might have been. I
admit that,to yield the full Kripkean account of the necessitiesof
origin and contingenciesof development,these principlesmust be
extended to apply to contracausalas well as merelycounterfactual
possibilities.But it is not surprisingthatwe should so extend them
once theyhave been formedin the contextof causal underdetermi-
nation. If we startconsideringidentitythroughcontracausalpossi-
bilities,what could be more natural than to use as a model the
ways in which we automaticallyhandle identitythroughcounter-
factual possibilities?
If this explanation is correct,we should not have come to con-
trast necessitiesof origin with contingenciesof-development if
our natural thinkinghad been deterministic[if we had seen the
causal possibilitiesas confinedto the linear path of Diagram (vii)],
or if we had not seen the past as more fixedthan the future.If there
is any metaphysicaltruthunderlyingthesede re modalities,then,it
will be the truth of causal underdeterminismtogetherwith the
past's being fixedjust by having occurred,and with the absence of
any symmetricalDiodorean fatalityabout the future.
It may be objected that there is a rival explanation of our in-
clination to allow forwardbut not backward divergencesfromthe
actual.6 Backward divergencescreate the possibilityof competing
claimants.If we considera possible world in which some person is
conceived at to as in (ii), has a career differentfrom that of the
actual Nixon up to t2 but thereafterjust like that of the actual
Nixon, we must also be able to considera possible world in which.
as well as this person, there is one who is conceived at t1 by the
union of the sperm and ovum that in the actual world produced
Nixon, who has the actual Nixon's career for a short time after-
wards,but thenis, say,dropped on his head in infancyand survives
only as a human vegetable. Diagram (ix) illustratesthis possible
world,the two individuals being representedby a line of dots and
a line of dashes. (The continuousline does not representany person
in this possible world, but only indicates,for comparison,Nixon's
actual career.) The line-of-dashesman has a better claim to be
Nixon than the line-of-dots man. Since therecould be this stronger
claimant,we must not say even with regardto a world fromwhich
he is absent,in which we have only the line-of-dots man, that the
8 This was suggestedby M. G. J. Evans.
560 -THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

latter is Nixon. And this explains why we should, and do, deny
identitythroughcounterfactualbackward divergences.
However, the competitionfor the role of Nixon has arisen, in
(ix), only because we have both a backward and a forwarddiverg-
ence, and eitherof thesecould be said to leave room for a possible
competitor.The real forceof the objection lies in the claim that the
line-of-dots man is the strongercompetitor.Intuitively,this seems
correct.But thisis just the originalasymmetry in our thinkingover
again, the verythingwe are tryingto explain, and cannot without
circularitybe cited as an explanation. It may be argued that the
line-of-dashes man is made of the same material,originally,as the
actual Nixon, and that is why he has the strongerclaim to be
Nixon: the necessityof origin here restson a necessityof constitu-
tion. But we could say equally that the line-of-dots man is made
of the same material,finally,as the actual Nixon: the necessityof
constitution does not in itself set up the required temporal
asymmetry.
It may be argued thatconstitutionplays some part in the necessi-
ties of origin, since these do not apply to nonmaterial entities.
Marxism,say,or Cubism, thatverydoctrine,mighthave originated
in different ways. But this is so merelybecause a doctrineis iden-
tifiedby itspurelygeneralfeatures.A movement,on the otherhand,
is an individual, and my intuitionsat least are against sayingthat
anything that originated differentlycould have been the same
movementas the actual Marxism or Cubism. I conclude that con-
trastbetweenthe necessityof originand the contingencyof develop-
mentis not essentiallyconnectedwith constitution,and as yetI can
find for this contrastno genuinelyalternativeexplanation to the
one I have proposed.
So far I have explained only the necessitiesof origin. I think
that somewhatsimilar accounts can be given of the necessitiesof
constitutionand the constraintsof thing-kind, but I cannot develop
them here. If such explanations are correct,it will follow that
these de re modalities are, in a very broad sense, de dicto
afterall. Though these necessitiesapply to individual thingsand
natural kinds ("This man could not have . . . ," "Gold could not
have . . . ," etc.), that theyso apply is primarilya featureof the
way we thinkand speak, of how we handle identityin association
with counterfactualpossibility.They reflectimplicit rules for the
ascriptionof identity,for the recognitionof the same person or
thingor stuffor species,in neutrallydescribedmerelypossible situa-
tions. The topic of names (and certaingeneral terms)comes in be-
 A PROLEGOMENON TO MEINONGIAN SEMANTICS 56I

cause such names (etc.) are intendedto belong to things(etc.) whose

identityis determinedby theserules.
If this is correct,then these de re modalities need not in them-
selves offendempiricists.But, as I have indicated, there may be
metaphysicalassumptionsthat underlie our ways of handling iden-
tity,and these,of course,may be open to dispute.
J.L. MACKIE
UniversityCollege, Oxford

A PROLEGOMENON TO MEINONGIAN SEMANTICS *

It is strange . . . that Meinong's object-theoryshould have been

regardedby someas a bewildering
and tangled'jungle',it resembles
ratheran old formalgardencontainingsomebeautifuland difficult
mazes.

Meinong'sroundsquare could be stitched,withcompleteseamless-

ness,intothefabricofCarnap'sMeaningand Necessity.

IN
J. N. Findlay
sectioni of thispaper I willdescribeMeinong'sjungle. In
section ii I will attempt to reconstructit as a formalgarden.
And in section iII I will tryto place it withinthe traditionof
semanticsto whichCarnap's Meaningand Necessitybelongs.I make
the followingclaim to historicalaccuracy: although I don't know
what Meinongmeant,if I had said what I know him to have said, I
would have meant the following.
I. THE JUNGLE
Ideally I would begin with a good expositionof Meinong,but that
would take too long. Instead I'll give a roughsketch,whichmay be a
,caricature.t
Meinong's theoryof objects is about objects. What are objects?
This muchis clear: anythingthat could be an object of thoughtis an
* I am indebted to R. Chisholm, G. Fitch, E. Gettier, K. Parsons, R. Routley
J. Farrell Smith, J. Vickers, K. Wilson, and (especially) to K. Lambert. Two
papers which bear some similarityto this one are H. Castafieda, "Thinking and
the Structureof the World," and R. Routley, Exploring Meinong's Jungle, both
unpublished manuscripts.
t This is based principallyon the accounts in A. Meinong, "The Theory of Ob-
jects," in R. Chisholm, ed., Realism and theBackgroundof Phenomenology(New
York: Free Press, 1960), hereafterabbreviated "M," followedby arabic numerals
forsection numbers; and in J. N. Findlay, Meinong's Theoryof Objectsand Values
(New York: Oxford,1963), chs. ii and vi, hereafterabbreviated "F," followedby
arabic numerals for pages or roman numerals for chapters. The quotations from
Findlay, above, come fromthis book, pp. xi and 327, respectively.