Dissertation plan.

Kripke’s essentially of origin argument

has a hidden premise – mcginn.

What intuitions support it?

In Kripke’s naming an necessity he puts forth an argument for necessary connections

between distinct existents. Particularly, he makes a case for some things having a necessity of
origin. They necessarily come from the thing they actually come from. The general principle
seems to be. If x’s origin is actually y, then x’s origin is necessarily y.

Kripke gives two examples of this purported necessity of origin. The Queen necessarily has
the parents she has, or is necessarily derived from the zygote that she is actually derived
from. Another is that a table that is actually made from a hunk of wood, then it is necessarily
derived from the hunk of wood which it is actually derived from.

In footnote 56, Kripke gives ‘something like a proof’[ CITATION Kri81 \p 114 \l 2057 ]. It is as
follows: Let 'B' be a

Let B be a name (rigid designator) of a table, let 'A' name the piece of wood from which it
actually came. Let 'c' name another piece of wood. Then suppose B were made from A, as in
the actual world, but also another table D were simultaneously made from C. (We assume
that there is no relation between A and C which makes the possibility of making a table from
one dependent on the possibility of making a table from the other.) Now in this situation B op
D ; hence, even if D were made by itself, and no table were made from A, D would not be B.
Strictly speaking, the 'proof' uses the necessity of distinctness, not of identity. However, the
same types of considerations that can be used to establish the latter
can be used to establish the former. (Suppose X op Y; if X and Y were both identical to some
object Z in another possible world, then X = Z, Y = Z, hence X = Y.) Alternatively, the
principle follows from the necessity of identity plus the 'Brouwersche' axiom, or,
equivalently, symmetry of the accessibility relation between possible worlds. In any event,
the argument applies only if the making of D from C does not affect the possibility of making
B from A, and vice-versa.

What does the argument look like?

He first establishes that identity is the necessary relation between the thing and itself. p108
Then we consider a situation where Hesperus and phosphorus are 2 distinct objects. He
claims that this is not a situation where Hesperus is not phosphorus. I.e. a denial of the
necessity of identity. In fact, it is a situation where one or the other, or both of those objects is
not the object it actually is. This hints at the first of the essential properties that objects must
have

Salmon: the possibility od xonstructing the verytable

In one place he says that the argument assumes that
the possibility of constructing table B from hunk A does not affect
the possibility of simultaneously constructing table D from hunk
C, and vice-versa.
that the premise
Kripke actually uses asserts that the possibility of constructing
the very table B from hunk A does not affect the possibility of
simultaneously (i.e., in the same possible world) constructing a
distinct table (meaning some table or other distinct from B) from hunk
C, and vice-versa.