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Dissertation plan.

Kripke’s essentially of origin argument

 What does it look like

has a hidden premise – mcginn

 what is the hidden premise.

What intuitions support it?

 branching times
 independecy of origin

In Kripke’s naming an necessity he puts forth an argument for necessary connections


between distinct existents. Particularly, he makes a case for some things having a necessity of
origin. They necessarily come from the thing they actually come from. The general principle
seems to be. If x’s origin is actually y, then x’s origin is necessarily y.

Kripke gives two examples of this purported necessity of origin. The Queen necessarily has
the parents she has, or is necessarily derived from the zygote that she is actually derived
from. Another is that a table that is actually made from a hunk of wood, then it is necessarily
derived from the hunk of wood which it is actually derived from.

In footnote 56, Kripke gives ‘something like a proof’[ CITATION Kri81 \p 114 \l 2057 ]. It is as
follows: Let 'B' be a

Let B be a name (rigid designator) of a table, let 'A' name the piece of wood from which it
actually came. Let 'c' name another piece of wood. Then suppose B were made from A, as in
the actual world, but also another table D were simultaneously made from C. (We assume
that there is no relation between A and C which makes the possibility of making a table from
one dependent on the possibility of making a table from the other.) Now in this situation B op
D ; hence, even if D were made by itself, and no table were made from A, D would not be B.
Strictly speaking, the 'proof' uses the necessity of distinctness, not of identity. However, the
same types of considerations that can be used to establish the latter
can be used to establish the former. (Suppose X op Y; if X and Y were both identical to some
object Z in another possible world, then X = Z, Y = Z, hence X = Y.) Alternatively, the
principle follows from the necessity of identity plus the 'Brouwersche' axiom, or,
equivalently, symmetry of the accessibility relation between possible worlds. In any event,
the argument applies only if the making of D from C does not affect the possibility of making
B from A, and vice-versa.

What does the argument look like?


He first establishes that identity is the necessary relation between the thing and itself. p108
Then we consider a situation where Hesperus and phosphorus are 2 distinct objects. He
claims that this is not a situation where Hesperus is not phosphorus. I.e. a denial of the
necessity of identity. In fact, it is a situation where one or the other, or both of those objects is
not the object it actually is. This hints at the first of the essential properties that objects must
have. The object that is Hesperus is necessarily Phosphorus.

He introduces the arguments by the essentialist Sprigge. And asks if we can conceive of this
very object (the queen) being possibly a swan (111). Should we really be allowed to motivate
belief in modality because of the limits of our concievebaility.

Kripke asks (113) how this very person could have originated from different parents. He says
one can imagine that things in her life might have changed. We can imagine forward
divergence, an open future, but we cannot imagine backward divergence. This is the
branching times thesis of modality.

Footnote 56

The argument is as follows. We name rigididly designate B as the name of a table. It is made
out of hunk of wood A. Let C name anoter piece of wood. We suppose B was made from A,
either in the actual world, or in an arbitrary possible world1. We also suppose that
simultaneously another table D is made from C. In this situation, b≠d. By necessity of
disctinceness, if D were made by itself, it wuold not be identical to B. To illustrate, we take
another possible world W1. In W1 a table is made from C. Is it B? Kripke would say no. We
can posit another world, W2 in this world both C & A are made into tables.
Clearly CITATION Noo83 \l 2057 the table made from A, in W2 is B, the table made from A as in the
actual world. The table made from C, cannot be B, and hence by necessity of distinctness
cannot be B anywhere at all.

As we can see here. For any such argument to be valid, there must be some non-trivial
(criterion) identifier for transworld identification. What’s used here is This is the only way
that object in othreh worlds can be stipulated in such a way. This stipulation is equivalent to
metaphysical essentialism

From here on I will discuss the hidden premises that have been proposed by kripke, salmon
rorbargh, and others.

Kripke

Kripke seems to utilise various intuition pumps to motivate this premise. He asks whether the
table could have originally made of anything other than wood [ CITATION Kri81 \p 115 \l 2057 ].
This is a loaded question in itself, asking whether this table, could be identified with another
possible world. By asking this question, he is already presupposing that this table could be
identified with another possible table, and not only that, he is suggesting that a possible
criterion of TWI is origin.

He suggests that though a full discussion of the problems of essential properties are
impossible. When we ask what is possible of an object, we ask whether the universe could
1
as mentioned by [ CITATION Noo83 \l 2057 ]
CITATION Noo83 \l 2057
Maybe not so clearly, I will discuss this further, need appropriate criterions for TWI
have gone on as it did from a certain time but diverge from its course to the actual world at a
certain point. As an example, it would be possible for P to be x iff history could have
diverged at point t, where P is in existence, and P is x. Perhaps this should be erected into a
general principle about essence.

If we construct a branching times model of necessity.


 it explains why origin is important, in fact if the only essential properties were those
that were constructed out of a branching times scheme, origin would be the only thing
necessary to an object.
 Why? The things that can be [possibly] be predicated of an object are the things
which may have happened to it after the thing itself was brought into existence?? The
point at which an object is brought into existence is the object’s origin. This point
cannot be altered as if we altered the origin of the object, we’d alter the object itself...

They are distinct, and by necessity of distinctness, they are necessarily distinct. In another
possible world there exists.

Another model of the argument’s (in)validity is to be found in Mcginn.

Footnote 57

Salmon: the possibility od xonstructing the verytable


In one place he says that the argument assumes that
the possibility of constructing table B from hunk A does not affect
the possibility of simultaneously constructing table D from hunk
C, and vice-versa.

that the premise


Kripke actually uses asserts that the possibility of constructing
the very table B from hunk A does not affect the possibility of
simultaneously (i.e., in the same possible world) constructing a
distinct table (meaning some table or other distinct from B) from hunk
C, and vice-versa.

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