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Ontic Vagueness: Two Objections

In their recent paper, Elizabeth Barnes and Ross Cameron defend a certain view of the
open future that is compatible with bivalency, determinism, and the existence of a
future ontology. To perform this feat, they develop a conception of indeterminacy in
which for some domains liable to metaphysical ‘precisifications’ there exists a set of
possible precisifications for which it is determinate that one is true, though it is
unsettled as to which one it is.

Formally

Det{P1, P2, P3, Pn...)

But ¬ (Det(P1) v Det(P2) v Det(P3) v Det(Pn)...)

In Cameron’s paper he formulates a model for Presentist truthmakers using this model
of metaphysical indeterminacy.

This essay will provide two criticisms. Firstly I will argue that this model of
indeterminacy for an open future leads to too much indeterminacy in the present.
Secondly, using the Cameron view on truthmaking for Presentists as an example I will
argue that this view fails to provide an open future of the sort that allows for free will.
Additionally, I will argue that any way of cashing out the metaphysic of the Barnes-
Cameron indeterminacy thesis as a way of providing for an open future that allows for
free will will fail.

Exposition

In the Cameron-Barnes view of the open future, there are a set of worlds that represent
the state if the world at any arbitrary time. The future of w is open insofar as it is
unsettled which of the precisifications w is, though determinately one of them is.

A parallel can be made to the status of vague predicates – for any Bn (where Bn is a
borderline case) determinately Bn is true or false but it is unsettled as to whether it is
true or false, though determinately it is either of these.

Barack Obama objection

We treat future possible worlds as precisifications of the actual one. Future directed
propositions that are true on every precisification are determinately true, those that
true on some precisifications are of indeterminate truth value. This indeterminacy,
taken prima facie, with an unrestricted domain of possible worlds seems likely to be
rather radical – and may begin to taint present day events. The proposition, for
example, ‘the current President of the United States will be discovered to be a robot’
will be true on some precisifications and false on others, thus the truth value of this
statement is indeterminately (true or false.) If the Future (current President) is the
same object as the Present(current President) – say both are Barack Obama - then it is
indeterminate now whether the current president of the US is a robot

More formally:

The current President will be discovered to be a robot

If the current President will be discovered to be a robot then the current President is a
robot now

-------------

The current President is a robot now

This is a valid argument in the form modus ponens. The Barnes-Cameron view argues
that in some universes to be actualised the first premise is true, in other universes it is
false. So determinately (T P1 v F P1) and following the argument through - in some
possibly actualised worlds P3 is true and some possibly actualised worlds P3 is false,
so P3 is indeterminate in this world. If we accept an identity relation between the
present current president, and the future current president, it seems that it is presently
the case that the current President’s humanity is unsettled.

This is my initial worry with this construction of the open future, in some senses the
Barnes-Cameron hypothesis leads to too much indeterminacy. It licenses widespread
scepticism about the current world - propositions concerning other minds and the
existence of an external reality can be also formulated in this way. Sure, their
depiction of an open future does not entail presentism and bivalency, but it seems an
unpalatable position to hold if it leads to radical indeterminacy.

How to get out of it

Isn’t it better to have a wholesale rejection of the bivalency of future directed

propositions, or reject the existence of future ontology than admit radical
indeterminacy into this world?

If we reject a future ontology then it will make it the case that there is no future object
such that it is the current President. When one states ‘the current President will be
discovered to be a robot’ a case of reference failure occurs, as in ‘the current king of
France is bald.’ If we enclose statements with a ‘future’ operator they become
denotationless i.e. Future(The current President is discovered to be a robot) – under
Russell’s analysis, this results in a statement that is on a logical level, false
[ CITATION Rus05 \l 2057 ] . However, regardless of the analysis of denotationless
statements, a rejection of future ontology renders the future indeterminate and keeps
the present fixed as it denies that there is any identity between present objects and
future objects (as there are no future objects) this provides a basis for the rejection of
the second premise.

A rejection of the bivalency of future directed statements solves this problem too. It
ensures a clear break between the present and the future, and stops an open future
infecting the present with indeterminacy. We reject the set of futures model that that
the Barnes-Cameron thesis provides, this doesn’t lead us to the view that for future Ps
Det(Pv¬P). Running the above argument again without Bivalency seems to lead us to
the same indeterminacy about the current status of the President, however, as we
retain bivalency for present statements, we know it cannot be the case that present
President is indeterminately a robot. A dividing line of bivalency ensures that future
indeterminacy does not affect the present.

Rejecting Bivalency for future statements, while retaining it present statements would
allow us to run a modus tollens on the above argument form:

(1) It is indeterminate whether the current president will be discovered to be a

Robot

(2) If it is indeterminate that the current president will be discovered to be a robot,

then it is indeterminate whether the current president is a robot now

(3) It is indeterminate whether the current President is a robot now.

If we hold that Bivalence is necessary for current propositions, we add a further

assumption to this argument.

(4) No present directed propositions are indeterminate.

(3) and (4) contradict each other, so we must reject one of the premises. The most
obvious to reject would be (2). This affirms what we want to do – ensure strict and
distinct partition between the range of acceptable truth values of present and future
statements – i.e. bivalency in the present, indeterminacy in the future. Barnes &
Cameron can’t make the same move as they do not accept (4) ([ CITATION Bar09 \p
302 \l 2057 ].

However, it still seems that we need independent motivation for rejecting the
bivalency of future statements; I won’t attempt to do this here.

I have shown that in some senses the Barnes-Cameron view is too unsettled, and
appears to bring radical indeterminacy into the present. I will now show that in other
senses it is too settled, and does not provide us with the conceptual resources to allow
for free will.

Exposition of Cameron’s view

In Cameron's paper describing temporal distributional properties he responds to the

objection that this way of mapping truthmakers for the Presentist does not allow for an
open future. His rejoinder begins thusly. There are a range of temporal distributional
properties that represent ways for X (where X is the actual world) to be across time. X
instantiates exactly one of these properties, but it is indeterminate which. Some of
these properties disagree on how X will be beyond the present moment, so t there will
be some claims concerning future X that are indeterminate [ CITATION Cam10 \p
17 \l 2057 ]. This does allow for the open future in one sense - for any future directed
proposition P, it is not determinate that P, and not determinate that ¬P, Though P v ¬
P.

But what about free will ?

The worry I have is that it provides problems for the person who wants to claim free
agency as a consequence of the open future thesis. Determinately one of the TDPs is
true now, it is just unsettled as to which one it is.

For Jones, who is deciding what to have for lunch today this presents a quandary.
Can’t he exclaim ‘What’s the use trying to choose from the menu? X currently
instantiates a TDP, which means that there is already a fact of the matter about what
I’m ordering. It’s just not settled which fact it is. Whatever the fact is, it’s unavoidable
that I choose it.’ This seems to undermine one of the primary motivations for an open
future – free will.

For me it feels that it shouldn’t be the case that X ‘currently instantiates a TDP’
[ CITATION Cam10 \p 17 \l 2057 ] if we want to have free will. The unsettledness
keeps the future open for future directed propositions as the truth value is unsettled,
but it doesn’t seem to hold the same force for will – if X currently instantiates some
TDP, and if it isn’t the case that the TDP can change, the would-be actor is ‘locked in’
to making some sort of act – it is no respite to tell the actor that it’s unsettled to what
act they are locked into.

I see a few options available in order to preserve free choice:

 X doesn’t instantiate a TDP – so future oriented states of affairs lack a truth

value. However, this would mean a rejection of the bivalence, or even the
valence of future oriented statements – something that Cameron doesn’t want
to do.
  X instantiates a set of TDPs which allow for human agency to have an effect on
the outcome on the future, perhaps in a branching time like model. Though if
we claim this, the instantiated set may lead to inconsistency and contradictions
– it seems for any P, it will be the case that P&¬P.

 It instantiates a TDP only up to a point, any TDP that stretches beyond the
present isn’t instantiated and the TDP is constantly changing to accommodate
what becomes settled, but then this entails a rejection of bivalency for future
directed propositions.

 It could be the case that the TDP that is instantiated coheres with every
supposedly ‘free’ choice made in the world – in a sort of compatibalistic type
sense. Every choice that Jones makes settles the TDP that is already
instantiated.

The last option seems the only one available to Cameron if he wants to retain free will
as well as the sense of his theory.

Henceforth, I will take a definition of free will to be thus – my choices are only free
iff I could have done otherwise [ CITATION Aye54 \l 2057 ] [ CITATION OCo10 \l
2057 ].

The proponent of Ontic vagueness may tell a story to Jones that says that the way the
temporal distributional property is settled is dependent on his choice. It may be the
case that the way that the TDP is settled is dependent on how Jones makes his choice.
The TDP ‘narrates’ the way the world is, through reflecting the choices that Jones’
makes.

Cameron could say that it’s only settled what Jones’ orders for lunch when Jones
actually orders something for lunch, relegating the TDP to a narrative, not a causal
role. Regardless, at any time tx it is the case that a TDP is instantiated and the TDP
recites future events. However, when one makes choices, one must make choices that
cohere with the TDP, the fact that it is only settled how the TDP after the fact is
doesn’t detract from the point that one seems not to be able to violate the metaphysical
coercion that having a TDP retains.

If we take the definition of free will as above, on cannot look back after the fact and
say ‘I could have done otherwise’ because under the Cameron view, at any t x there is
only one TDP that is instantiated. One could have not done other than what the TDP
narrates, otherwise the TDP would have to be different, and there is only one way the
TDP is.
Problematic for atemporal is-ness too

“One and only one world matches the complete atemporal state of the actual world”
[ CITATION Bar09 \l 2057 ]. So it’s the case that, looking back at our earlier actions,
we must say that we could not have done otherwise, because there is only one single
way the world indeterminately is. As I understand their theory, if Jones ordered
chicken for lunch, it is the case that Jones will order chicken for lunch even before he
ordered – it was just not determinately so. If this is the case, it seems that one can’t
look back and say ‘I could have done differently’ because there is only one way the
world could have gone.

Conclusion

I feel the criticisms I’ve made here certainly have responses and the free will
criticisms are at least partially motivated by struggling to understand metaphysical
indeterminacy. Notwithstanding, I would like clarification on how this depiction of
the Open future keeps an optimum level indeterminacy in the present – enough to be
compatible with deterministic laws, and a small enough amount not to license
scepticisms. I also think further clarification is needed on how this model is
compatible with free will, assuming that is something we want to keep.

Words: 2197

Bibliography
Ayer, A. (1954). Philosophical essays by Professor Sir Alfred Ayer. London: Macmillan.

Barnes, E., & Cameron, R. (2009). The open future: bivalence, determinism and ontology.
Philosophical studies , 291-309.

Cameron, R. (2010). Truthmaking for Presentists. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics .

O'Connor, T. (2010, October 29). Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy - Free Will. Retrieved
December 4th, 2010, from Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy :
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/

Russell, B. (1905). On Denoting. Mind , 479-93.