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Terror and Guerrilla Warfare
in Latin America, 1956-1970
TIMOTHY P. WICKHAM-CROWLEY
Georgetown University
201
202 TIMOTHY P. WICKHAM-CROWLEY
Government Terror
We will consider terror to be certain acts forbidden by the rules of war.
Among these are: (1) beating, killing, robbing, bombingor otherassaultson a
civilian population, including relatively unusualitems such as forced reloca-
tion; (2) beating, torturing, or killing or combatantswho have indicated a
willingness to surrender;(3) the use of weapons which do not sufficiently
discriminateamong combatantsand others. Such weapons include germ war-
TERROR, GUERRILLA WARFARE IN LATIN AMERICA 203
fare, nuclear weapons, and punji stakes. The latter were used by the Viet
Cong in Indochina, where a high percentageof casualties were the result of
people falling into pits filled with these sharpened, dung-covered stakes.3
First, some preliminaryconceptualdistinctionsmay help us to sort out the
empirical accounts to follow in our analysis. Eugene Victor Walterhas done
the yeoman work in developing a systematic theory of terror. Walter dis-
tinguishes between a regime of terror(by a government)and a siege of terror
(by the opposition to a government).Eitherof these encompassesthe process
of terror, which has three distinct elements: (1) the violent act itself; (2) the
victim of the violent act; and (3) the targetof the violent act. This last element
is fundamentalto any system of terror,for the basic aim of terroris not to kill
individuals but to frighten entire social groups.4 Under these criteria, the
Cubanpeople certainly sufferedintensive terrorfrom 1953 to 1958, although
the extent has been overestimatedby Fidelistas. Hubermanand Sweezy ap-
parentlyfirst gave the total of 20,000 deaths duringthe Cuban insurrection,
which was a figure that they attributedto Castro. This numberwas quickly
converted-a typical occurrence in the building of revolutionary my-
thology-into the killing of 20,000 innocent civilians by Batista.s These
figures appearto have no factual basis, and there is good reason to lower the
total numberof deaths by a factor of ten. A list of the war dead publishedin
Bohemia on 11 January1959 (after Castro's victory) counted 898 dead, with
over half of these being combatants. These figures exclude the deaths of
peasants, which probablynumberedseveral hundred.6Estimatesof hundreds
or perhapsabout a thousanddeaths due to Batista's terrorare also supported
by comments made by Fidel Castro and other Batista critics during the war
itself.7 The figure of 20,000 apparentlyis a giganticballoon blown up by anti-
Batista emotions.
Batista's terror was especially evidenced by the faithfully fulfilled "no
prisoners" rule. Following the Moncadaattackof 26 July 1953, Castrohim-
self was only saved from summaryexecution by a lieutenantwho knew him
from the university. Later, both an attemptedlanding of guerrillareinforce-
ments and a naval uprising at Cienfuegos in 1957 ended in the same fashion:
3 See James E. Bond, The Rules of Riot: Internal Conflict and the Laws of War (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), for a full discussion of the rules of war and possible
applicability to guerrilla warfare.
4 Eugene Victor Walter, Terror and Resistance (New York: Oxford, 1969), Chs. 1, 2. For
some less formal observations about the social functions of terror, see Rogger Mercado, Las
Guerrillasdel Peru (Lima:Fondo de CulturaPopular, 1967), 160-1, and H6ctorB6jar, "Ne pas
surestimerses forces," Partisans (Paris), 38 (July-September 1967), 111.
5 Leo Hubermanand Paul Sweezy, "Cuba: Anatomy of a Revolution,"
MonthlyReview, 12
(July-August 1960), 29.
6 Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (New York: Harperand Row, 1971), 1044;
Boris Goldenberg, The Cuban Revolutionand Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1965), 144.
7 Fidel Castro Ruz, RevolutionaryStruggle: Vol. 1 of The Selected Works Fidel Castro,
of
Rolando E. Bonachea and Nelson P. Vald6s, eds. (Cambridge,Mass.: MassachusettsInstituteof
Technology Press, 1972), 375, 399; Thomas, Cuba, 972, 999.
204 TIMOTHY P. WICKHAM-CROWLEY
and later:
Youworthless,you'reall guerrillas.Getoutof here.We'regoingto burnit, to bomb
it.
Valsalice also reports forced evacuations in Lara State.14
There is little doubt that torturetook place duringthe 1960s in Venezuelan
prisons, especially that carried out by national police agents of DIGEPOL
(General Directorate of Police), as occasional congressional investigations
revealed. DIGEPOL's public reputation was so tarnished that President
Rafael Caldera was forced to reorganize the agency after taking office in
1969.15
A torturesession might begin with a warningspeech such as the following
delivered in a DIGEPOLjail cell in Falcon:
You know who I am, don't you? To you I'm called CaptainVegas, you fucking
commie.Lookat me, you shittycommie.I amCaptainVegas,I'll be theterrorof you
faggots.Lookat me well so you'll rememberme yourentirelife.16
The tortureswhich followed, at least in a well-equippedDIGEPOLheadquar-
ters in Caracas, might consist of suction devices appliedto the fingers, elec-
tric shocks, steel rods placed with pressurebetween the fingers, a large paper
clip-type device for pulling and pinching the skin, and such other torturesas
ice picks under the fingernails, dunking the head in unflushedtoilets, lemon
juice in the eyes, standing with the arms over the head for hours, beatings
with rubbertubing, and hot candle wax applied to the skin. 17 (In ruralareas,
techniques by army patrols were cruder, but these will be discussed.below.)
The routinegoal of torturesessions was informationon the FALN guerrillas.
After the torturesessions or beatings, especially if a court appearancewas
required,the following advice might be given to those who might potentially
talk:
Carefulwhatyou say. No one has beatenyou. Andif you denyyourwrittendeclara-
tions, we'll takeanother,moreseriousjauntto the camp.18
It is perhapsmore importantthat the "hidden" terrorin ruralareas should
be placed on the historical record. Even allowing a substantialdiscount for
propaganda,the recordof ruralterroris a brutalone and is admittedby even
such a skeptic as Valsalice. Occasional reports of abuse and torture even
reached the orthodox press and the halls of Congress.19
In Falc6n, FALN leader Elias Manuitt alleged that peasants had been
publicly torturedin the Sierra del Coro, while his comrade Douglas Bravo
describeda raid on a village by thirtycommandosin which every woman was
raped, including one over forty years old, whose violation was carried out
under the eyes of her husbandand children. He also alleged that a gang rape
of a sixteen-year-oldpeasantgirl by twenty-five soldiers took place at Pueblo
Nuevo in 1963.20 As we shall see below, the common incidence of such
assaults on female members of "heretic" populationsin guerrillawar bears
closer theoretical scrutiny.
In Lara, Angela Zago's hamlet was raidedby armytroops, from whom she
16 Guevara, Los Cachorros del Pentagono, 32. The translationattempts to capture flavor
ratherthan exact denotation. Lists of killing and torturevictims of government-whatever their
accuracy-can be found in Cabieses, Venezuela,Okey!, 269-76, and EduardoVicente, "On the
FALN," Studies on the Left, 5 (Winter 1965), 99.
17 Cabieses, Venezuela,Okey!, 203; WalterH. Slote, "Case Analysis of a Revolutionary,"in
Frank Bonilla and Jose A. Silva Michelena, A Strategy for Research on Social Policy
(Cambridge,Mass.: MassachusettsInstituteof Technology Press, 1967), 304.
18 Guevara, Los Cachorros del Pentagono, 118-20.
19 Daily Journal (Caracas) 4 February 1966, 9 March 1966, 3 June 1966; El Nacional
(Caracas)4 May 1962, 13 August 1965.
20 James D. Cockcroft and Eduardo Vicente, "Venezuela and the FALN Since Leoni,"
MonthlyReview, 17 (November 1965), 36; Maspero, Avec Douglas Bravo, 53.
TERROR, GUERRILLA WARFARE IN LATIN AMERICA 207
was forced to hide; but the events related to her by the peasantswho experi-
enced the terrorwere grisly indeed. Peasantswere tried to jeeps and dragged
on the ground;others were beaten to death or had their hands cut off; women
were raped;huts and grain stores were burnt. A small boy was allegedly shot
for refusing to sell meat pies to a soldier. One woman (who had only grudg-
ingly accepted the guerrillas in the area) was taken into the center of the
hamlet, disrobed, and stomped by soldiers for thirtyminutes. More than fif-
teen soldiers raped one pregnantwoman. Anotherpregnantwoman was also
rapedand miscarriedas a result. Zago sums up the results: "What the govern-
ment wanted it got: The peasants are terrified."21
More fragmentaryreportsare available from other areas, including Miran-
da, Portuguesa,Trujillo, and the llanos (plains states), in which the residence
of a guerrilla was blown to pieces with grenades without first attemptingto
see if it was occupied; and three women were rapedby NationalGuard(Fuer-
zas Armadas de Cooperaci6n, or FAC) troops. When one of the victims
lodged a complaintat the local FAC post, the captainreplied, "No sir! Take
these 100 Bolivares and buy some new clothes; and take care what you say,
because the next time we'll kill them. And you're not to say anythingabout
this."'22
Even if one takes these reportswith much skepticism, the recordis still one
of agonizing humanmisery. This is neitherto say thatthis activitywas official
policy, nor that it always occurred,nor thatthe guerrillasdid not employ it for
propagandapurposes. Two illuminating comments were made by guerrilla
leader "El Gavilan" (Jose Diaz) when he came down out of the Larahills in
August, 1965. He indicated not only that he had been treated well by the
soldiers who capturedhim, contraryto his expectations, but also that such a
public statement might cost him his life.23 Governmentsare apparentlynot
alone in wishing to control informationflows duringguerrillawar, and guer-
rillas also obey the rules of propagandacontrol.
The contrastof the terrorby the Venezuelan governmentwith that carried
out in Guatemalais strikingfrom a methodologicalpoint of view. There is far
less specific informationin the lattercase, even though the terroristicexecu-
tions of Guatemalanpeasants ran into the thousands, as opposed to a few
hundredin Venezuela. Indeed, the Guatemalanexperience in 1966 and 1967
clearly standsout as the most brutalregime of terrorimposed upon a peasant-
21 Angela Zago, AquiNo Ha Pasado Nada (Caracas:El Sobre, 1972), 111-46, 149-50, 156-
7, 170.
22 Maspero, Avec Douglas Bravo, 53; Cabieses, Venezuela Okey!, 204-5; Norman Gall,
"Teodoro Petkoff:The Crisis of the ProfessionalRevolutionary-Part II: A New Party," Ameri-
can Universities Field Staff Reports-East Coast South America Series [hereafter called
AUFSR-ECSA], 17:9 (August 1973), 6. On the llanos events, see the memoir by Antonio
Zamora, Memoria(s) de la Guerrilla Venezolana(Caracas:Sintesis Dosmil, 1972), 88, 99, 125
(quote).
23 El Nacional (Caracas), 27 August 1965.
208 TIMOTHY P. WICKHAM-CROWLEY
liberal and not only for use in burningfields: The guerrillasreportedthat five
peasants found dead near Rio Hondo were burnt beyond recognition by
napalm.29
Terrorappearedin armyand police sweeps throughoutZacapa. One partic-
ular twist, also reportedin Venezuela, was that local feuds or vendettaswere
grafted onto the terror by the army. One peasant would point out a local
"enemy" as a guerrilla collaborator,whom the army would promptly ex-
ecute. In the Guatemalancase, the heavy elements of distrustand suspicion
were accentuatedby the presence of local militaryoutposts or comisionados,
which apparentlytook on the aspects of a vast spy network after 1954-a
feature accentuatedduring and after the Zacapa sweep of 1966-67.30 In the
Guatemalancase, then, the totalitarianelements of government and right-
wing terrorreachedtheir highest peaks for the periodpriorto 1970. It should
be no wonder, then, that the governmentsucceeded in eliciting collaboration
from peasants under such extraordinaryconditions, especially when such
terror was wedded to simultaneouscivic action campaigns in the same re-
gions. (The government's employmentof both terrorand civic action would
escalate yet furtherfrom 1978 to 1984.)
The broad outlines of terrorin Zacapa have been described by the FAR
guerrillas and others. Mano Blanca (White Hand), the leading right-wing
terroristgroup, apparentlywas the cutting edge or at least a majorparticipant
in the terror. The army came into the most revolutionaryvillages, gathered
and shot peasantleadersin fronteveryone, threateningto execute morepeople
if the villagers did not collaboratewith the authorities.This kind of activity
continued for more than half a year, and the peasantcasualties numberedin
the thousands. It was Walter's "regime of terror" at its most brutal.31
Army terrorneitherbegan nor ended with Zacapain 1966-67. In February
and March of 1964, military bombing of Izabal guerrilla areas allegedly
resulted in seventeen peasant deaths; and army sweeps in the same area
routinelyemployed tortureof peasantsfor information.On the day following
a guerrillavisit and talk ("armed propaganda")to the Kekchi Indianvillage
of Panz6s in Alta Verapaz, the army raided the town. One pregnantwoman
was gang-rapedby thirtysoldiers, and five peasantswere executed at a nearby
hacienda in which the guerrillas had paid a similar call. (That same town
would suffer a notorious massacre by the military in 1978.) The guerrillas
34 Comite de Solidaridad con los Presos Politicos, Libro Negro de la Represion: Frente
Nacional 1958-1974 (Bogota: Editorial Graficas Mundo Nuevo, 1974). This work is a good
example of the use of political blindersin moralevaluation:No guerrillaviolence againstpeasants
is reported, except for one peasant who was ajusticiado ("judged," the euphemism for ex-
ecuted). The two verbs employed to describe killings by governmentare consistently different
from the words used for those slain by guerrillas.
35 See Mercier, Guerrillas in Latin America, 236-7, for official casualty figures.
36 Larteguy, The Guerrillas, 69.
37 Specific allegations of violence against peasants in guerrilla zones appear in Comite de
Solidaridad, Libro Negro, on 69, 70, 83, 87, 88, 90, 119, 151; Jacobo Arenas, Diario de la
Resistencia de Marquetalia (Bogota?: Abejon Mono, 1972), 27-28, 70-72, 89. See also Jaime
Velbsquez Garcia, Contrainsurgenciay GuerraRevolucionaria(Bogota: Tinta Roja, 1974), 20-
23.
212 TIMOTHY P. WICKHAM-CROWLEY
for the 1958-63 period, and the core areas of the peasantrepublicswere not
prominent in degrees of banditry or violence; indeed, there is substantial
evidence that they were created as havens from violence. For example, the
municipioof Marquetalia,in Caldas, which gave its name to the most impor-
tant peasant republic, only had one violent event in that period.38
Personal testimony providing particularexamples of governmenttorture,
beatings, and killings was given before the ColombianCongressin November
1964 (thatis, at the beginningof the guerrillamovementsproper).Among the
techniques reportedwere the placement of a grenade in a prisoner's mouth
and threateningto pull the pin; faked firing squads;punching, kicking, and
walking on prisoners;electric currentappliedto the genitals, hands, and ears;
burning with cigarettes; and outright execution.39 It is hard to believe that
such tortures-aimed at finding ManuelMarulanda(also known as Tiro Fijo,
or "Sure Shot"), who was later the commanderof FARC-ended after the
guerrillas became mobile.
Estimatesof the scope of terrorin Peru vary widely, and one suspects that
the presence of inflation in the body counts is similarto that noted above for
Cuba and Colombia. The highest number,takenprobablyfrom a MIR propa-
gandasheet and propagatedfurtherby Victor Villanueva,claimedthe govern-
ment was forced "to massacre 8,000 peasants" to suppress the guerrillas,
while Petras suggested over a thousandsuch deaths, yet a MIR radio broad-
cast spoke only of hundredskilled, and the MIR's newspaper "El Guer-
rillero" on 5 September 1965 spoke only of "dozens" killed in Junin, the
area with the heaviest fighting and bombing. Clearly most of the dead peas-
ants were there and in Bejar's area of Ayacucho, where he lodged the infla-
tionary charge of "genocide." Gall, our best chronicler of the Peruvian
events, suggests that hundredsof CampaIndianswere killed in Junin alone.
Overall, an estimateof "only" 300 to 1,000 deathsfrom governmentterroris
a best guess, which is still bloody enough indeed for a short six-month
military campaign.40Indirectevidence also indicates that hundredsof peas-
ants died at the hands of the army. For example, the guerrillas, including
those in Piurawho never fought a battle, only numbered100-150 at best; yet
by mid-August, before any serious guerrilla losses were ever incurred, the
governmentclaimed to have killed 100 or even more guerrillasin the Satipo
and Pucuta areas of Junin alone.41
late Septemberthe governmentclaimed that only fifty guerrillashad been killed in the area in the
previous two months; see La Prensa, 28 September 1965.
42 See La Prensa, various issues,
especially 7 August 1965; Guardia,Proceso a Campesinos,
20; Mercier, Guerrillas in Latin America, 84; Norman Gall, "Peru's Misfired GuerrillaCam-
paign," The Reporter, 36 (26 January1967), 38.
43 Mercado, Las Guerrillas del Peru, 55-60; Gall, "Peru's Misfired GuerrillaCampaign,"
38; Guardia,Proceso a Campesinos, 21.
214 TIMOTHY P. WICKHAM-CROWLEY
When asked if the police had injuredhis family, he replied, "No, but my
countrymen, yes." Miguel Matensio Torres also said that he was torturedin
jail to force a confession to the charges against him. A somewhat more
educatedpeasant (?) and MIR member, Jose MirandaBalbin, admittedin his
testimony to serving as a guerrilla contact only after a month of torturein
which he was hung up and beaten into unconsciousness.44
These Peruvianpeasantsalso had to worry, as in Venezuela, of the possible
consequences of retractingtorture- and threat-induced"confessions" once
they entered public courtrooms, since they knew that they would not always
be in the presence of legal protections. Nonetheless, some exchanges were
remarkableand even injected elements of macabrehumor into the proceed-
ings:
Prosecutor: "Have they [the jailers] mistreatedyou?"
Peasant: "Only verbally."
Defense lawyer: "What did this verbal mistreatmentconsist of?"
Peasant: "They hung me up and beat me."
Anotherpeasant, afterthe prosecutorexposed inconsistenciesin his testimony
concerninga tripto Cuba, exculpatedhimself by suggesting, "I'm sick in the
head. I forgot because they beat me a lot."45
We come now to the Bolivian experience. Despite Che Guevara's com-
ments recordedat the beginning of this article, the Bolivian guerrillawar was
almost completely devoid of terroron either side-an issue to which we shall
returnin our theoreticaldiscussion below. The government, for its part, felt
assuredof the supportof the peasantry,while the guerrillaswere too mobile,
too weak, and too fragmentedto be able to derive any practicaladvantages
from terror.Allemann arguesthatreprisalsagainstthe peasantsby the govern-
ment occurred "only exceptionally" in Bolivia, but he provides no exam-
ples.46 Guevara's diaries did note the bombing of guerrillaareas (in a very
sparsely populatedzone) on 24 March, 28 March(napalm), and 3 September
1967. On 5 September, he also noted that soldiers coerced nearby peasants
into giving them informationabout the guerrillas.
Those guerrillaswho deserted or surrenderedwere in some cases the vic-
tims of sadistic excess. For example, two desertershad theirsilhouettestraced
on a backdrop with bullets (wounding one); and a guerrilla who tried to
surrenderfollowing the Vado del Yeso ambushin late August and had his arm
literally shot to pieces afteran exchange of invective with a soldier, was killed
shortly thereafter.47The most famous case is that of Guevarahimself. After
44 Guardia,Proceso a Campesinos, 41-66, gives the trial evidence. Similar reportsof peas-
ants who had been killed by troopsappearin a privateletterfromGuillermoLobat6nto Luis de la
Puente on 20 June 1965; see Mercado, Las Guerrillas del Peru, 154-5, or Gott, Rural Guer-
rillas, 421-3.
45 Guardia, Proceso a Campesinos, 44-45, 66-70.
46 Allemann, Macht and Ohnmacht, 238.
47 Luis J. Gonzalez and Gustavo Sanchez Salazar, The Great Rebel: Che Guevara in Bolivia
(New York: Grove, 1969), 167, 171-2.
TERROR, GUERRILLA WARFARE IN LATIN AMERICA 215
Guerrilla Terror
"Killjust one andfrightenten thousandothers."
Chineseproverb
murder into a legitimate act of war, without the conditions that normally
justify killing in war [that is, a fire-fight engagement]is not clear."50
The consistent reappearanceof guerrillaterroragainst fellow countrymen
in the most diverse settings is due directly to two factors: the claim by the
guerrillasthatthey constitutelegitimateauthorityand the high degree of their
vulnerabilityto "informationleakage."51 This second point means simply
that many guerrillas can only survive as sub rosa organizationsand must
controlthe informationflow aboutthem if they areto survive;yet, pace Eqbal
Ahmad,52 survival provides insufficient moral grounds for guerrillasto kill
noncombatants,just as "suppressionof guerrillas," "regime survival," or
"defense of the fatherlandagainst communist subversion" do not provide
such grounds for the military. From such legitimations are "dirty wars"
created. In general, attempts to legitimize the killing of civilians contain
elements of a moralized Whig history, that tendency to view certainpresent
results-and some putative future ones-as providing historical and moral
validation for past or present evils. History is indeed often written by the
victors of such wars;yet the tales of the losers andthe dead also have much to
tell us.
Guerrillaterroris generally far more selective than governmentterror.For
one thing, socialist guerrillasare often fundamentallymotivated by a moral
vision of a betterworld, which precludesterroristactions as inconsistentwith
such a vision. There are, of course, always exceptional cases. One of the
more interestingis Che Guevara,who behaved in a highly principledfashion
in Bolivia, while writing the quotationthat began this article, as well as the
following: "In fact, if Christ himself stood in my way, I, like Nietzsche,
would not hesitate to squish him like a worm."53 Such sentimentsare, how-
ever, rare; and one should not underestimatethe role of moral principles in
restrictingguerrillaterror.
Second, guerrillaterroris, death for death, far more effective than govern-
ment terrorin eliciting compliance from the peasantry.Studentsof criminal
deterrence have argued that quick and sure punishment, more than severe
punishment, maximizes deterrenteffects. If we visualize guerrillaand gov-
ernmentterrorin these terms, we may understandwhy minimal terrorcan be
so effective. A peasant may collaborate with the guerrillasyet still have a
54 Daniel Glaser, Social Deviance (Chicago: Markham, 1971), 58, cites a study by Tittle
which shows that certaintybut not severity of punishmentis inversely relatedto crime rates. See
as well the discussion and accompanyingreferencesin MarshallB. Clinard,Sociology of Deviant
Behavior (New York et al.: Holt, Rinehartand Winston, 1974), 346-50. One Eurasianofficer
noted of earlier Indochina that "the French destroy at random because they don't have the
necessary information";see Nathan Leites and CharlesWolf, Jr., Rebellion and Authority:An
Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts (Chicago: Markham, 1970), 109.
55 See Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, "The Rise (and SometimesFall) of GuerrillaGovern-
ments in Latin America," Sociological Forum, 2:3 (Summer 1987), 473-99, for an expanded
treatmentof this and related themes.
56 HowardNewby, "The DeferentialDialectic," ComparativeStudiesin Society and History,
17:2 (April 1975), 164.
57 Ralph H. Turner and Lewis M. Killian, Collective Behavior (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prenctice-Hall, 1957), 337; El Nacional (Caracas),29 August 1965;Daily Journal (Caracas),29
August 1965.
218 TIMOTHY P. WICKHAM-CROWLEY
58 Jaime Arenas, La Guerrilla Por Dentro (Bogota: Tercer Mundo, 1970), 199-204.
59 La Violencia's atrocities are now legend both for their number and for their grisly and
creative character.For an account of one haciendaraid punctuatedby rape and dismemberment,
see Evelio Buitrago Salazar, Zarpazo the Bandit: Memoirs of an Undercover Agent of the
ColombianArmy (University, Alabama:University of Alabama Press, 1977), 61.
60 Arenas, La Guerrilla Por Dentro, passim. For more informationon Vasquez's importance
in the ELN, see Mario Men6ndezRodrfguez, "Colombia: !Al Ataque!," Sucesos (Mexico City),
1777 (24 June 1967), 21-22. This was the first of a series of four or five weekly articlesin which
the journalist reported on his visit to the ELN's foco. The reports are very informative, if
uncritically laudatory,especially of Vasquez.
TERROR, GUERRILLA WARFARE IN LATIN AMERICA 2I9
broughtnews of the event also reportedthe tortureof his two sons.65 There
was also a ratherbizarrereportthatguerrillasin Concepci6nProvince(Junin)
beheaded six membersof a peasant family, aged five to forty-two years old.
At this time Guillermo Lobaton's guerrillas were desperatelyfleeing army
pursuit, and Lobat6n himself died while fighting two weeks later.66
The Guatemalanguerrillasused still more terrorthan in Peru but selected
their targets more carefully: hacendados and their foremen, informers and
suspected informers,as well as villagers whose collaborationwith the armed
forces led to the deaths of innocentpeasants. Luis Turcios Lima of the FAR
defended executions by arguing, "We only respond to violence with vio-
lence. We deal out revolutionaryjustice." Indeed, one accountof the ajusti-
ciamiento of a villager was quoted directly from a proguerrillasource by
Munson. The guerrillaspounded on the offender's door with the command,
"Open in the name of revolutionaryjustice." In general, there is, however,
little evidence, as one critic has proposed, that the the use of terrorby the
guerrillas paralleled the atrocities by the government which we cited
earlier.67
By far the best documentationon guerrillaterroris that which is available
for Venezuela. In this case, I do not believe the amount of documentation
misleads us as to its extent. Venezuelanguerrillaswere faced with the task of
gaining supportfrom a peasantrythatwas largelyorganizedby and supportive
of the Accion Democrdtica (Democratic Action, or AD) party, which held
governmentalpower from 1959 to 1969. One might expect thatterrorin such
a milieu would be especially directedagainstAD peasantleaders,just as most
of the early Viet Cong terrorwas directedagainstlocal officials appointedby
the Diem governmentof South Vietnam. Our expectationshave been largely
borneout by reportson guerrillaexecutions. NormanGall reportsthe guerrilla
execution of a local AD peasantleader, Rodolfo Romero, in October 1964 in
Falc6n. "With his hands tied behindhis back, the guerrillashung him from a
tree by his armpitsand threw broken bottles in his face to make him bleed.
They read an execution decree accusing Romero of betrayingthe cause of
national liberation, then shot him as the whole community watched." In
65 Guardia,Proceso a
Campesinos, 38-63; Ministeriode Guerra,Las Guerrillas en el Peru,
67; Mercier, Guerrillas in Latin America, 185; Mercado,Las Guerrillasdel Peru, 199-201; La
Prensa (Lima), 25 September 1965, 14 October 1965 (the latterfor the man's reporton the raft
incidents).
66 The New YorkTimes, 24 December 1965; Manuel Castillo, "Las Guerrillasen el Peru,"
Estudios (Buenos Aires), 581 (April 1967), 165.
67 Munson, Zacapa, 115 (Turcios' quote), 111; Georgie Anne Geyer, "Guatemalaand the
Guerrillas," The New Republic, 163 (4 July 1970), 18. For some referencesto executions, see
Lart6guy,The Guerrillas, 88; RobertRogers andTed Yates, "The UndeclaredWarIn Guatema-
la," SaturdayEveningPost, 239 (18 June 1966), 33; Adolfo Gilly, "The GuerrillaMovementin
GuatemalaII," MonthlyReview, 17 (June 1965), 11.
TERROR, GUERRILLA WARFARE IN LATIN AMERICA 221
addition, Alexander reportsthat Romero was beaten, his teeth knocked out,
and his fingers and toes brokenbefore being shot-all before the eyes of his
wife and small children. Gall also reportedon the FALN's kidnapand killing
of four peasants in Trujillo State.68
The numberof civilian deaths-almost all peasants-attributable to rural
guerrillas in the Venezuelan literatureis at least twenty-nine and perhapsas
high as fifty. The commentby a radicalleftist thatthe victims of guerrillascan
be "counted on one's fingers" thereforeseems a bit of an understatement,
especially in view of the FALN's recordof massive urbanterror.69At times
the executions by guerrillas took on grisly aspects, as in the one already
described. Two uncooperativepeasant leaders were killed and their bodies
hacked to pieces on one occasion, and in another instance the guerrillas
allegedly shot the victim, stabbed him seven times, and stuffed his mouth
with propagandaleaflets. The allegationsby the governmentaboutthe "bru-
tal and insane" rape of many'women by the guerrillasreportedno details,
however, and are largely unpersuasive.70
Venezuelan guerrillasdid not restrictterrorto noncompliantpeasants. On
27 November 1966, a school for childrenfrom the United States was machine
gunned;a formergovernmentofficial from the Social SecurityAdministration
was kidnappedand killed in early 1967; many peasantswere kidnappedand
later released in addition to those simply executed; and at least two guer-
rillas-and probably many more-were executed for trying to desert the
focos.71 In the urbanareas, the FALN also killed 160 policemen from 1960 to
1966, who were not generally chosen for specific crimes but ratheras repre-
sentatives of government. Critics, radical sympathizers, and ex-guerrillas
agree that this tactic eventually generatedrevulsiontowardthe FALN among
poor barrioresidents, since most of the police came from these same barrios.
Finally, and in reference to our previous discussion of DIGEPOL's use of
torture, an instance of "sweet revenge" occurred in September, 1964: A
guerrilla deserter reported that three captured DIGEPOL agents had been
torturedwith hot irons and executed by his formerguerrillacompanions.72
behaviorsuch as deviance or crime, both they and the generalpublic are aptto
confuse such theories about the behaviorof people in group settings with the
ethical evaluationof such conduct. Such a mixtureis invalid for two reasons.
First, there are elements of the ecological fallacy in such an admixture,which
is the errorof identifying the propertiesof groups with those of their respec-
tive individualmembers. Causal sociological analysisconsists of probabilistic
statementsabout the incidence of such behaviors, including statementsabout
the incidence and intensity of such behaviorswithin differentgroups, neigh-
borhoods, communities, or societies. Theory must also explain cases of non-
occurrence, and "poverty" can explain neither the stealing of food by a
particularhungrychild nor the theft of a television by a particularunemployed
teenage looter, since most poor people do not steal or loot. In contrast,ethical
analysis is concernedprecisely with the evaluationof such individualbehav-
iors. To conflate these two modes of analysis is a variantof the ecological
fallacy.
The second objection, which appliesjust as well to terroristicacts commit-
ted during guerrilla war, was stated eloquently by John Dewey over half a
century ago. Dewey argued that one should never try to lay total blame on
society or the criminal (read: soldier or guerrilla) for crime (read: terror),
because this implies:
An unrealseparation of manfromhis surroundings, mindfromthe world.Causesfor
an act alwaysexist, butcausesarenot excuses.Questionsof causationarephysical,
not moral except when they concern futureconsequences. . . . Society excuses itself
by layingblameon thecriminal,he retortsby puttingtheblameonbadearlysurround-
ings, the temptationof others,lackof opportunities,
andthepersecutionsof theoffi-
cers of the law. Bothareright,exceptin the wholesalecharacter
of theirrecrimina-
tions.
Dewey adds that good intentions alone do not meritper se the estimation of
"good," for the consequences of an act also fix its moral quality.76
The purpose of this introductorypreface is simple: The readershould not
understandmy following attemptto build a theory of terroras an attemptto
exculpate those who commit atrocities in guerrillawar. Readers may make
judgments based on the informationpresentedhere, but I cannotbe the Virgil
to their Dante in this ethical realm, in which we are in principleall equals and
claims to moral virtuosity inevitably smack of hubris.
tions, and support systems. The support systems include arms, factories,
transportationnetworks, and the supply lines which connect the sources of
supplies with the combatants. The combatant-noncombatantdistinction is
perhapsthe centralissue. Under the laws of war, primarilyderiving from the
Geneva Convention, the combatantsare to be distinguishedfrom noncomba-
tants by standarduniforms with a distinctive insignia visible at a distance.
Attempts are also to be made to keep the civilian population distinct from
supportsystems, but the mere presence of a civilian populationnear an arms
factory does not, under the Laws of War, always protect that factory from
attack. Under "Rules for the Limitationof Dangers Incurredby the Civilian
Population in Time of War" (1956), Chapter 11, Article 6, it is stated that
attacks on the civilian populationas such are prohibited,but "should mem-
bers of the civilian population . . . be within or in close proximity to a mili-
tary objective they must accept the risks resulting from an attack directed
against that objective." Such attacks, however, are forbiddenif the military
gain is not proportionalto the degree of destructioninvolved. Furthermore,
the presence of "individual combatants"within the civilian populationdoes
not immediately renderthe latter subject to attack.77
In situationsof guerrillawarfare-Vietnam serving as the clearest case-
the distinction between combatant and civilian population is intentionally
blurredby the guerrillafighters. This was accentuatedin Vietnam when they
actually located themselves within villages, fortifiedtheirpositions, and then
fired at army patrols from within the villages. This tactic often produced
village bombings and terroristicsweeps as a response, with drastically re-
duced regard for the combatant-noncombatantdistinctions by the soldiers
from the United States, which in extreme cases could and did produce a
massacre of 150-500 civilians like that in My Lai.
In fact, the tripartitedistinction of the combatant,the noncombatant,and
the support and supply system is typically blurredin guerrilla war, unlike
conventional war. Does the villager who carries potatoes to the guerrilla
camp, as in Peru, constitute a military target?What about the peasant who
lodges a guerrillafor the night (a common occurrence)?Or the peasant who
serves as lookout for the guerrillas?Or peasants who regularlyprovide tor-
tillas and otherfood for guerrillas,as in Guazapa,El Salvador?Or those who,
as in Guatemala and later in El Salvador, serve on sporadic or permanent
peasantmilitias?In El Salvador'sguerrillawar, for example, evidence strong-
ly indicates thatthe peasantryhas often mixed with the guerrillasin ways that
makes them very hardindeed to distinguish.78Those featuresonly accentuate
77 Bond, The Rules of Riot, 201, 214, for reportson the rules of war.
78 See the commentsby JoaquinVillalobos in MartaHarnecker'scollection of interviewswith
CentralAmericanrevolutionaries,Pueblos en Armas (Mexico, D.F.: EdicionesEra, 1984), 173-
232; the reportof a brief visit by PhilippeBourgois, "What U.S. ForeignPolicy Faces in Rural
El Salvador:An Eyewitness Account," MonthlyReview, 34:1 (May, 1982), 14-32; and for a
TERROR, GUERRILLA WARFARE IN LATIN AMERICA 225
in high relief the features found in bas-relief in those nations in which the
peasantssupportedthe guerrillamovementsdiscussedhere:Cuba, Venezuela,
Guatemala,and Colombia. (Even in El Salvador,a distinctioncontinuedto be
made, however, between those who supportedthe insurgencyand those who
incorporarse, became full-fledged soldiers.)
Terroragainst civilians is apparentlya far more regular, even "natural,"
concomitantof modem guerrillawarfarethanof modem conventionalwarfare.
Highly suggestive evidence along these lines comes from the difference in
behaviorbetween the combattroopsfrom the United Stateswhile they were in
Europe(including Germany)duringWorld War II and the way in which they
conducted themselves in some areas of Vietnam, as Susan Brownmiller's
sequentialaccountsof the two wars suggests, despiteherown (ratherdifferent)
intent and conclusions. Other suggestive evidence comes from the Vietnam
War itself, in which the militaryforces of the United States seemed to employ
terrormorecommonly in insurgentareasof SouthVietnamthanin the enemy's
homelandof North Vietnam.79I submitthatthe disparityin the actions of the
American combat troops-in degree, not absolutes-derived from the dis-
tinctive types of army, civilian, and supplynetworkcomplexes thatthey faced:
They engaged in lesser degrees of terrorwhen they confronteda conventional
army that was controlled, supplied, and directedby the state, with a civilian
population which still resided at home and far from the fronts; the troops
employed greater levels of terror, at times quite intense, when they instead
faced a guerrilla army intimately tied into the civilian peasant population,
especially in the Mekong Delta and (perhaps)in certaincoastal areas.80
Terror is particularlycommon in guerrilla warfare because there is an
aggregation and mixture of combatant, noncombatant,and support system
into a very small social and geographical space. The natureof the support
system is fascinating, for it consists in large part-although not completely-
of the peasantryitself. Whetherthe peasantryacts willingly or not, there is
often a very deep social and geographicaloverlapin guerrillawarfarebetween
the support system (the source of military intelligence, food, supplies, and
recruits)and the civilian population,with a large overlapbetween the civilian
populationand the combatantsas well, often in the form of peasant militias.
The contrastwith conventional war may be illustrated(see Figures 1 and 2)
with Venn Diagramsin which each circle indicatesa set or a "population"of
elements. The intersectionbetween the two circles indicates that certainele-
ments are members of both sets; in this case, civilians and combatants, or
combatantsand partof the supportsystem, and so forth. The shaded areas in
Figure 2 can also be understoodto represent,not just support,but also areas
of potential reprisalsagainst the civilian population-that is, the deeper and
more thoroughthe overlap between the guerrillacombatantsand the civilian
population, the more likely that the government would engage in terror
against the civilian population in guerrillazones.
Two types of comparative evidence strongly suggest that the depth of
"system overlap" within guerrilla zones is correlatedwith the intensity of
government terror. During the period covered in this essay, we can clearly
detect two areasin which the local peasantswere not subjectedto terrorby the
military: La Convencion, Peru (although the nearby, isolated foco site was
certainly bombed) and Bolivia during Guevara's insurgency. In both cases,
the peasantry had given clear indications that they were indifferent to the
insurgency, if not actively hostile to it. In one Peruviancase in Cuzco, several
local peasant leaders abandonedthe insurgencyafter a brief period of mem-
bership and later guided the army to the destructionof the campsites on the
Mesa Pelada. In Bolivia, the nation's peasantry,especially in the Cochabam-
TERROR, GUERRILLA WARFARE IN LATIN AMERICA 227
ba Valley, were very strong backersof and voters for the Barrientosgovern-
ment; their nationalconfederationdeclaredsupportfor him in mid-1967; and
the leader of the peasant union in Guevara'slocale was also a pro-Barrientos
man.8' In contrast, we encounteredterroralmost everywhereelse in our four
other cases, and in all those cases we have clear evidence of strong peasant
supportfor the guerrillamovements in certain areas of each nation.
The second type of comparativeevidence comes from the "second wave"
of insurgenciesin Latin America, after about 1975. Every one of these move-
ments, except perhapsin Nicaragua, establishedbases of peasant supportin
the countryside far strongerthan the pre-1970 movements had done. Hence,
the peak numberof guerrillacombatantswas routinely in the thousands, not
the hundreds seen before 1970: perhaps 10,000 in El Salvador; 7,000 in
Colombia; 6,000 in Guatemala;and at least 5,000 for Peru's Sendero Lumi-
noso.82 Those numbersare sure signs that peasant supportfor the insurgen-
cy-and hence the overlapof our threesystems-has been greatersince 1975
than it was before 1970. The correlateof that greatersupporthas also been
obvious: In nations with majorruralinsurgenciessince 1975 (includingNic-
araguaas well), the centralgovernment,and often the death squads linked to
it, have responded with levels of terror which have taken at least 10,000
civilian lives (perhapsfewer than that in Colombiaand more than that-over
50,000 lives each-in El Salvadorand Guatemala).
Element Two: Legitimate Authority and "Heresy"
The above correlation strongly suggests the second necessary element in
understandingterroragainst civilians in the context of guerrillawarfare.As I
have arguedelsewhere, drawingparticularlyon BarringtonMoore's Injustice,
governments and their underlying civilian populaces typically iron out an
"implicit social contract" which unites the rulerand the ruled into a system
of interlockingrights and duties. The main duties of the populace are obe-
dience to appropriatedirectives and the renderingof surplusto supporttheir
governors;the duties of the rulersare to defendthe region, providepolice and
conflict resolution, and arrange for the material security of the populace.
When those rights and duties are perceived as fulfilled and intact by both
parties, we may speak of legitimate authority.The peasantpopulace in many
regions of Latin America has, however, clearly transferredits loyalty to
guerrilla "governments" in many instances, precisely because the central
governments (or informal landlord "governments") do not protect, defend,
and benefit the locals; indeed, they may do just the reverse.83
Notwithstandingsuch a peasant viewpoint, the authoritiesview the peas-
ants' allegiance to and supportof guerrillagovernments-and the consequent
existence of dual power or a counter-state in the nation as a whole-as
tantamountto the denial of the centralgovernment's "contractual"claim to
the obedience of the populace, that is, traitorousactivity. They have become
heretics, not from the churchmilitantbut the body politic. The sheer number
of guerrillasand the depthof theirsupportby the peasantsin certainregions of
these nations have made them something more: a "cancer" in the body
politic, something to be rooted out and destroyed througha kind of "sur-
gical" terror.
82 The
figure of 10,000 for El Salvadorhas been widely disseminated;for the 7,000 Colom-
bian guerrillas,see the LatinAmerica WeeklyReport, 31 August 1984; for the 6,000 Guatemalan
guerrillas, see James Dunkerley,Power in the Isthmus(London:Verso, 1988), 483; for Sendero
Luminosoof Peru, I am indebtedto privateconversationswith Michael Smith and also to Cynthia
McClintock, "Peru's SenderoLuminosoRebellion:OriginsandTrajectory,"in Eckstein,Power
and Popular Protest, 63.
83 Wickham-Crowley, "GuerrillaGovernments,"passim. BarringtonMoore, Jr., Injustice:
The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt (White Plains, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1978), ch. 1,
especially 20-22.
TERROR, GUERRILLA WARFARE IN LATIN AMERICA 229
84
BarringtonMoore clearly assertsthe first principle, and the Nazi diariesthathe quotes from
strongly suggest the second; see Injustice, 413-34.
230 TIMOTHY P. WICKHAM-CROWLEY
priately encoded by the label of "Macho"); and (3) the presence of male-
segregatedsocial institutions(the last echoing Stark'slaterstudy). She found
no significant correlationbetween rape and "sexually repressive" societies.
Sanday argued, in summarizing those findings, that rape would be more
common in those situationsin which there is a clear social disruptionof the
harmonybetween men and their naturalenvironments,which, her argument
suggests, should naturallyentail closeness to a variety of women.90
Those "disruptive" elements of separateness and social distance from
women dovetail with another increasingly consensual finding among so-
ciologists who study rape: Rape is likely to be more prevalentwhen women
are "objectified," including the proverbialtreatmentof them as nothing but
sex objects. Men who live in sex-segregated environmentsand those who
stress sharpmasculine-feminine differencesare precisely those lacking in the
nuanced and intimate contacts with women-including mothers, sisters,
friends, and sociosexual intimates-which would lead them to treatwomen in
subtler ways, not as objects. Such men seem to be the prime candidatesfor
rape.
To speak the obvious yet heretoforeunspoken:The barrackslife of soldiers
heavily emphasizes all three of the elements that Sandy found to be presentin
rape-pronecultures;hence, we would expect soldiers in generalto be particu-
larly prone to rape when they come into contactwith the civilian populationin
a context of war (thatis, "interpersonalviolence"). The aggravatingfeatures
of guerrilla warfare with regard to the incidence of rape lie in the extraor-
dinarilyintense "objectification" of the civilian populacethattakes place. To
reiteratemy earlierpoint, the civilian supportersof the guerrillashave placed
themselves, from the regime's perspective, outside of the body politic, as its
"enemies"; worse thanthat, they have declaredthemselvesto be hereticsand
renegades. The recurringuse of official language that utterly dehumanizes
and categorizes all of the civilians in guerrillazones-who become nothing
but "communists," "reds," and "subversives," to use the three foremost
terms-is an indication of the symbolic political excommunicationthat has
taken place; for they are no longer viewed as one's fellow Cubans, Guatema-
lans, Peruvians, and so forth. Those who have moved "beyond the pale" of
the body politic therefore suffer the double objectificationof being traitors,
and not simply the citizens of a conqueredenemy province.
In contrast to the behavior of governmenttroops, there is very little evi-
dence that left-wing guerrillashave committedrape against civilian women,
even in areas which have not provided support for the insurgency. Two
contributoryelements here are of an ideological nature:left-wing radicalism,
90 Rodney Stark, Instructor'sResource Book with Demonstrationsand Activities to Accom-
pany Sociology (Second Edition) (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1987), 46-47, 51-53, 109-13;
Peggy Reeves Sanday, "The Socio-CulturalContextof Rape:A Cross-CulturalStudy," Journal
of Social Issues, 37:4 (Fall, 1981), 5-27, especially the results on 23-24.
TERROR, GUERRILLA WARFARE IN LATIN AMERICA 233
unlike right-wing radicalism, has not generally glorified violence per se (al-
though the writings of Frantz Fanon give us pause here);91and the strong
egalitarianelements in all socialist ideologies, including the stress on com-
radeship, also militate against rape. Both of these left-wing ideological ele-
ments are the opposites of Sanday's first two findings about rape-prone
cultures (that is, they are the opposite of emphases on interpersonalviolence
and on male dominance). The last of Sanday's elements is relevant to the
soldier-guerrilladistinctionas well: The guerrillatypically lives in very close
cooperation with the local peasantry, including peasant women, and hence
does not have the utterly sex-segregated life of the soldier in the barracks.
Moreover, and perhaps the most sociologically importantfactor in differ-
entiating the two armies with respect to rape, the guerrillaarmies began to
include women in the 1950s and 1960s; and by the 1970s and afterwards,the
level of this integrationrangedanywherebetween 20 to 40 percentof the rebel
armies in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Peru.92If there was any social struc-
tural feature of the guerrilla armies, as opposed to an ideological one, that
should limit the tendencytowardrapeby male guerrillas,it would be the close
cooperation with female guerrillas.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF TERROR
Peasants typically find themselves caught between the pressuresexerted by
both contendersfor power, and there is little doubt that they react with fear
and terrorat the prospect and reality of fire fights, bombings, and military
roundups. When possible, flight from an area is a logical course of action.
Such a step involves an enormoussacrifice in lost crops and changedlives yet
still often occurs. Indeed, the massive flight and emigration from the war
zones of Nicaragua, Guatemala, and El Salvador since 1975 serve only to
confirm that flight is a prime option for those affected by war. On a clearly
reducedscale, we have previouslyobservedsimilarphenomenain Venezuela,
as well as the en masse desertionby Peru's CampaIndiansfrom their villages
after bombing attacks and by Cuban squattersfrom the SierraMaestra, who
similarly ran away from Batista's terror.93
Yet peasantssubjectto terrormight insteadstandand fight. Moore suggests
thatone of the prerequisitesof revolutionaryactionby the lower classes is that
91 FrantzFanon, The Wretchedof the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1966).
92 On leftist radicalism, again see Moore, Injustice, 420-33; on the breakdownof the gender
of the guerrillas, see George Black, Triumphof the People: The SandinistaRevolution in Nic-
aragua (London:Zed, 1981), 323-4; for El Salvadorand Nicaraguaboth, see StanfordCentral
America Action Network (SCAAN), eds., Revolution in Central America (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview, 1983), 383, 416-7; for Peru, McClintock, "Peru's Sendero Luminoso Rebellion,"
original manuscript,and a private communicationfrom Michael Smith.
93 Gall, "The ContinentalRevolution," 5; Minsterio de Guerra,Las Guerrillas en el Peru,
60; La Prensa (Lima), 23 June 1965; Guevara,Reminiscences,94. In the Peruviancase the army
reportedthat the mass exodus was due to the "excitement" caused by the guerrillas.
234 TIMOTHY P. WICKHAM-CROWLEY
100 Adolfo Gilly, "The Guerrilla Movement in GuatemalaI," Monthly Review, 17 (May
1965), 24-25; Munson, Zacapa, 194-5; Schump, Las Guerrillasen AmericaLatina, 55; A. P.
Short, "Conversationswith the GuatemalanDelegates in Cuba," MonthlyReview, 18 (February
1967), 37.
101 Guevara, Reminiscences, 192-4; Hector Bejar, "Bilan d'une Gu6rilla au Perou," Par-
tisans, 37 (April-June 1967), 98; B6jar, "Ne Pas SurestimerSes Forces," 111; Lt. Colonel John
W. Woodmansee, Jr., "Mao's ProtractedWar:Theory and Practice," Parameters, 3:1 (1973),
40-41.
102 See
Wickham-Crowley, "GuerrillaGovernments," 492-3 for more details on all but the
final case; for some evidence that Sendero Luminoso's supportin the Andes has fallen because
they failed to protectthe peasantry,see McClintock, "Peru's SenderoLuminosoRebellion," 90.
236 TIMOTHY P. WICKHAM-CROWLEY
IN LIEU OF AN EPILOGUE