Professional Documents
Culture Documents
What is a search?
Katz v. US:½here is a twofold requirement, 6irst that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation o6 privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable. ½hus a man¶s home is, for the most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but
objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the µplain view¶ of outsiders are not µprotected¶
because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the other hand, conversations in the
open would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the
circumstances would be unreasonable.
Holding: (1) one who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a
call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the
world. ½o read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has
come to play in private communication«.½he Gov¶t¶s activities in electronically listening to and
recording the petitioner¶s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the
telephone booth and thus constituted a search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
(2) since there was a reasonable expectation of privacy, there must be a warrant. Here there was no
warrant and as such the search and seizure was UNREASONABLE.
Open Fields
Oliver v. US: ½he police received a tip that the def was growing marijuana. ½he def had a no trespassing
sign and had locked the gate at the entrance to the center of the farm. About a mile from his house, the
police was around the gate and found a field of marijuana growing. When the police walked passed
oliver¶s camper, someone standing in front of the camper shouted, ³No hunting is allowed, come back up
here.´ ½he officers shouted back that they were Police officers.
Rule:
ñc ½he gov¶t¶s intrusion upon the open fields is not one of those ³unreasonable searches´ proscribed
by the text of the 4th Amendment
ñc ½he amendment does not protect the merely subjective expectation of privacy, but only those
³expectation[s] that society is prepared to recognize as ³reasonable´
Holding: è
Aerial Searches
c ½he Court has 6ound it is not a search within the meaning o6 the Fourth Amendment when
the police observe behavior in a person¶s home and cartilage by using low 6lying airplanes.
Cali6ornia v. Ciraolo: ½he police received an anonymous tip that the def was growing marijuana. ½he
police were unable to see the marijuana from the street b/c the fence was too tall. As such, the police
officer used a helicopter to see the drug from an aerial view.
c 0atz posits a two part inquiry: first, has the individual manifested a subjective expectation of
privacy in the object of the challenged search? Second, is society willing to recognize that
expectation as reasonable?
c At common law, the cartilage is the areas to which extends the intimate activity associated with
the µsanctity of a man¶s home and the privacies of life¶
Holding (the Court applied the 0atz¶s test): the claimed area here was immediately adjacent to a suburban
home, surrounded by high double fences. ½he close nexus to the home would appear to encompass this
small area within the cartilage. Accepting, as the State does, that this yard and its crop fall within the
cartilage, the question remains whether naked-eye observation of the cartilage by police from an aircraft
lawfully operating at an altitude of 1,000 ft violates an expectation of privacy that is reasonable«½he
c
observation in this case took place within public navigable airspace, in a physically non-intrusive manner.
½hat the observation from aircraft was directed at identifying the plants and the officers were trained to
recognize marijuana is irrelevant. Such observation is precisely what a judicial officer needs to provide a
basis for a warrant. Any member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen
everything that these officers observed. On this record, we readily conclude that respondent¶s expectation
that his garden was protected from such observation is unreasonable and is not an expectation that society
is prepared to honor. Ën Ciraolo, the Court stressed that the plane was 6lying law6ully at a level o6
1,000 6t. Ën Florida v. Riley, the search was an aerial surveillance 6rom a helicopter at 400 6t. ½here
was no majority opinion.
Florida v. Riley: ½he def¶s mobile home was 10-20 feet in front of the greenhouse. ½he greenhouse was
covered by corrugated roofing panels, some translucent and some opaque. At the time relevant to this
case, two of the panels, amounting to approximately 10% of the roof area, were missing. ½he
investigating officer discovered that he could not see the contents of the greenhouse from the road;
however, on the helicopter he could see it with his naked eye.
Holding: Here, the inspection was made from a helicopter, but as in the case with fixed wing planes,
³private and commercial flight [by helicopter] in the public airways is routine¶ in this country and there is
no indication that such flights are unheard of in Pasco County. Riley could not reasonably have expected
that his greenhouse was protected from public or official observation from a helicopter had it been flying
within the navigable airspace for fixed wing aircraft. Nor on the facts before us, does it make a difference
for fourth amendment purposes that the helicopter was flying at 400 ft when the officer saw what was
growing in the greenhouse through the partially open roof and sides of the structure.
Ë6 we get an exam question on open 6ield doctrine: First, we need to examine whether the area is
within the cartilage. Ë6 not, then no expectation o6 privacy. Ë6 so, then we see i6 the search was
reasonable b/c the person has an expectation o6 privacy (use Katz test).
Searches o6 ½rash
c Ën Cali6ornia v. Greenwood, the Court considered this and 6ound no reasonable expectation
o6 privacy in what a person chooses to discard.
c
Cali6ornia v. Greenwood: ½he police received a tip that drugs trafficking was occurring within a
neighbor. She investigated the tip. She ask the neighborhood¶s regular trash collector for the defendant¶s
trash bags before mixing it with other people¶s garbage, which the trash collector complied. ½he officer
found items indicating narcotic uses.
Holding: We conclude that respondents exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their
claim to Fourth Amendment protection. It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at
the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other
members of the public. Moreover, respondents placed their refuse at the curb for the express purpose of
conveying it to a third party, the trash collector, who might himself have sorted through respondents¶
trash or permitted others such as the police to do so. Accordingly, having deposited their garbage ³in
an area particularly suited 6or public inspection and in a manner o6 speaking, public consumption,
6or the express purpose o6 having strangers take it, respondents could have had no reasonable
expectation o6 privacy in the exculpatory items that they discarded.´
U.S. v. Karo: Drug Enforcement Administration agents installed an electronic beeper in a can of ether
with the consent of the owner, a government informant. ½he marked can was sold along with a shipment
of 50 gallons of ether to the respondents, who intended to use the ether for the extraction and production
of cocaine. Having tracked the can of ether as it was moved between various residences and commercial
storage lockers, the federal investigators determined the location of the can and obtained an arrest
warrant. Respondent 0aro and his accomplices were arrested for possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute.
Holding: ½his case is not like 0notts, for there the beeper told the authorities nothing about the interior of
knott¶s cabin. ½he in6ormation obtained in Knotts was ³voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted
to look;´ here, as we have said, the monitoring indicated that the beeper was inside the house, a 6act
that could not have been visually veri6ied. ½HIS WAS INSIDE A HOUSE. We discern no reason for
deviating from the general rule that a search of a house should be conducted pursuant to a warrant.
SUMMARY: Electronic monitoring using tracking devices, such as beepers, does not violate a
de6endant¶s 4th Amendment right i6 the search could have been visually veri6ied. Ën Knotts, the
search was visually veri6ied b/c the police could see where the de6endant was driving. Ën Karo, the
search was unreasonable b/c the police could not visually veri6y that the beeper was inside the
house.
c ½aping a conversation
In US v. White, the Court considered whether there was a search when a government informer carrying a
radio transmitter engaged in a conversation with a suspect. ½he Court held that the listening to this
conversation by another agent, in possession o6 a radio receiver, was not a search. ½he Court argued
that it was similar to listening to a confession at the police station that doesn¶t require a search warrant.
c {ank Records
½he Court has similarly found that inspection of bank records are not searches under the Fourth
Amendment because banks are parties to any transactions and thus have knowledge of them. Cali6ornia
{ankers Assn. v. Schultz. ½he case involved a federal law, the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, which
required that banks file reports with the federal government of certain types of transactions. A Fourth
Amendment challenge was rejected by the Court on the grounds that people have no reasonable
expectation o6 privacy as to this in6ormation because it is known by others, the banks that process
the transactions. In other words, because some others in the government will see the bank records, the
Court concluded that there is no privacy expectation in them.
c Pen Registers
½he Court has gone even further and found that people have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
phone numbers they dial or receive calls from.
Smith v. Maryland: ½he police put a pen register to find out who the defendant has been calling b/c he
was suspected of harassing Patricia McDonough. A pen register is usually installed at a central telephone
facility and records on a paper tape all numbers dialed from the line to which it is attached.
c
Holding: All telephone users realize that they must ³convey´ phone numbers to the telephone company,
since it is through telephone company switching equipment that their calls are completed. ½he Court
consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation o6 privacy in in6ormation he
voluntarily turns over to third parties. ½here is no legitimate expectation o6 privacy b/c petitioner
voluntarily conveyed numerical in6ormation to the telephone company and ³exposed´ that
in6ormation to its equipment in the ordinary course o6 business. Ën so doing, petitioner assumed the
risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.
Drug-Sni66ing Dogs
c ½here is no overall answer to whether it is a search if the police use drug-sniffing dogs. But the
Supreme Court has found the use of such does is not a search in a couple of contexts.
c In United States v. Place, the Court held that a canine sni66 o6 closed luggage is not a searchb/c
a canine sni66 by a well-trained narcotics detection dog does not require opening the
luggage.
Drug Sniffing Dogs at ½raffic Stop
Ëllinois v. Caballes: One police officer stopped the defendant for speeding. Another officer, along with
his drug dog, came to help the police officer. ½he dog smelled marijuana in the car. ½he entire incident
lasted less than 10 minutes.
Rule: In U.S. v. Place, a canine sniff by a well-trained narcotics-detection dog as ³sui generis´ b/c it
³discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item.´ Drug sniffs are designed, and if
properly conducted are generally likely, to reveal only the presence of contraband.
Holding: ½he use o6 a well-trained narcotics-detection dog²one that ³does not expose non-
contraband items that otherwise would remain hidden 6rom public view,´²during a law6ul tra66ic
stop, generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests.In this case, the dog sniff was performed
on the exterior of respondent¶s car while he was lawfully seized for a traffic violation.
o66icer to warrant a man o6 prudence and caution in believing that an o66ense had been
committed or contraband was in the place to be searched?
Ën6ormants
Ëllinois v. Gates: An anonymous letter was sent to the police describing future events in which details
how the Gates obtained drugs by flying to Florida and then driving home to Illinois. ½he police officer
tried to collaborate as many details as he could.
Holding: overruling the ³two pronged test´ established in Spinelli and rea66irmed the totality o6 the
circumstances analysis that traditionally has in6ormed probable cause determinations. ook at all:
veracity, reliability and basis o6 knowledge o6 the in6ormant.
³{ecause an in6ormant is right about some things, he is more probably rights about other 6acts,´
including the claim regarding the Gateses¶ illegal activity. ½his may well not be the type o6
³reliability´ or ³veracity´ necessary to satis6y some views o6 the ³veracity prong´ o6 Spinelli, but
we think it su66ices 6or the practical, common sense judgment called 6or in making a probable cause
determination.
c Gates remains one of the Supreme Court¶s most important decisions concerning the standard for
probable cause. Yet, there is an inherent uncertainty as to what is enough. Probable cause is
more than the lesser standard of ³reasonable suspicion´ and it is thought to be less than
preponderance of the evidence.
A recent case that raised this question was Maryland v. Pringle. If a police officer knows that someone
within the car is responsible for contraband, is there probable cause to arrest all of those within the
car?
Maryland v. Pringle: It was a routine traffic stop. ½he officer saw that there was a large roll of money in
the glove compartment. ½he officer asked if they could search the car. ½he three men in the car allowed
the police officer to search the car. ½he officer found cocaine between the backseat and the arm rest.
Pringle did not own the car and was not in the back seat.
Rule:
c ½o determine whether an o66icer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine the
events leading up to the arrest, and then decide ³whether these historical 6acts, viewed 6rom
the standpoint o6 an objectively reasonable police o66icer, amount to probable cause´
Holding: In this case, Pringle was one of three men riding in the car. ½here was $763 of rolled up cash in
the glove compartment directly in front of Pringle. Five plastic glassine baggies of cocaine were behind
the back seat armrest and accessible to all three men. Upon questioning, the 3 men failed to offer any
information with respect to the ownership of the cocaine or the money. e think it an entirely
reasonable inference from these facts that any or all three of the occupants had knowledge of, and
exercised dominion and control over the cocaine. ½hus, a reasonable officer could conclude that there
was probable cause to believe Pringle committed the crime of possession of cocaine, either solely or
jointly.
Whren v. US: A suspicious truck was stopped for a traffic violation. ½he undercover police officer found
crack cocaine in the passenger¶s hand.
Rule:
±c ½emporary detention o6 individuals during the stop o6 an automobile by the police, even i6
only 6or a brie6 period and 6or a limited purpose, constitutes a ³seizure´ o6 ³persons´
within the meaning o6 this provision. An automobile stop is thus subject to the
constitutional imperative that it not be ³unreasonable´ under the circumstances. As a
general rule, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have
probable cause to believe that a tra66ic violation has occurred.
Holding: there was probable cause here b/c of the defendant¶s suspicious actions, illegal u-turn, and
speeding away from the police car. Probable cause is objective and 6ocuses on whether the
reasonable o66icer could have 6ound probable cause under the circumstances; the subjective intent
o6 the o66icer does not matter. ook at what a reasonable police o66icer could have done.
of crime at this time unknown´. Petitioner contends that it permits the search for and seizure of any
evidence of any crime.
Rule
±c General warrants of course, are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. ½he problem is not that
of intrusion Per se, but of a general, exploratory rummaging in a person¶s belongings.
Holding: ½he challenged phrase must be read as authorizing only the search for and seizure of evidence
relating to ³the crime of false pretenses with respect to Lot 13½´. the challenged phrase is not a separate
sentence. Instead, it appears in each warrant at the end of a sentence containing a lengthy list of specified
and particular items ot be seized, all pertaining to Lot 13½.
½he Supreme Court recently considered the requirement 6or particularity in the warrant in the
context o6 a situation where the a66idavit in support o6 the warrant contained the necessary
particularity, but the warrant itsel6 did not list speci6ically what was to be searched 6or or seized.
½he Court 6ound that this warrant violated the Fourth Amendment.
Groh v. Ramirez: ½he defendant was suspected of possessing illegal weaponry. ½he police requested an
a search warrant. In their application for a search warrant, the police listed where they wanted to search
and what they wanted to seize. Although the application particularly described the place to be searched
and the contraband petitioner expected to find, the warrant itself was less specific; it failed to identify any
of the items that petitioner intended to seize.
Holding: ½he warrant was plainly invalid. ½he Fourth Amendment states unambiguously that ³no
Warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the pace to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.´ ½he warrant in this case
complied with the first three requirements: it was based on probable cause and supported by a sworn
affidavit, and it described particularly the place of the search. On the fourth requirement, however, the
warrant failed altogether. ½he Fourth Amendment by its terms requires particularity in the warrant, not in
the supporting documents.
c Anticipatory Warrants
Anticipatory warrant is where the affidavit for a search warrant states that the search will occur only if
certain events take place. In US v. Grubbs, federal law enforcement officers obtained a search warrant
for respondent¶s house on the basis of an affidavit explaining that the warrant would be executed only
after a controlled delivery of contraband to that location. ½he court held that anticipatory warrants are
permissible.
A. How May Police ½reat ½hose Who Are Present When a Warrant is {eing Executed?
ñc ½he Supreme Court has held that a person who happens to be present in premises that are
subject to a search cannot be searched just by virtue o6 being there. Ybarra v. Ëllinois. ½he
c
Court explained that a search ³must be supported by probable cause particularized with
respect to that person´
ñc However, in Michigan v. Summers, the Supreme Court held that when there is a search o6 a
residence, those present at the time o6 the search may be detained. ½he Court explained
that allowing such detentions serves may purposes: preventing 6light by the individual in
case incriminating evidence is 6ound; minimizing the risk o6 harm to the police; and helping
the police complete the search in the event that questions arise.
Muehler v. Mena: ½he police were looking for gang related items at Mena¶s home. ½he police
handcuffed Mena and questioned her about her immigration status while the search is happening. ½he
police were looking for deadly weapons. 1983 claim, rights violated.
Holding: the Court reasoned that it was reasonable to detain people who are present at the scene.
Using handcu66s were reasonable because they were looking 6or weapons speci6ically and the
intrusion was only 6or 2-3 hours.
Wilson v. Arkansas
½he door was unlocked, and police officers walk into a screen door and announce themselves as
having a warrant.
common area. If the officers had known, or should have known, that the third floor contained two
apartments before they entered the living quarters on the third floor, and thus had been aware of the error
in the warrant, they would have been obligated to limit their search to McWebb¶s apartment. ½he
officers¶ conduct and the limits of the search were based on the information available as the search
proceeded«½he Court has also recognized the need to allow some latitude 6or honest mistakes that
are made by o66icers in the dangerous and di66icult process o6 making arrests and executing search
warrants. ½he validity o6 the search o6 respondent¶s apartment pursuant to a warrant authorizing
the search o6 the entire third 6loor depends on whether the o66icers¶ 6ailure to realize the
overbreadth o6 the warrant was objectively understandable and reasonable. ½he objective facts
available to the officers at the time suggested no distinction b/t McWebb¶s apartment and the third floor
premises.
os Angeles County Cali6ornia v. Rettele: Deputies obtained a valid warrant to search a house, but they
were unaware that the suspects being sought had moved out three months earlier. When the deputies
searched the house, they found in a bedroom two residents who were of a different race than the suspects.
½he deputies ordered these innocent residents, who had been sleeping unclothed, out of bed, and they
were naked. ½he deputies required them to stand for a few minutes before allowing them to dress.
Holding: ½he Fourth Amendment allows warrants to issue on probable cause, a standard well short of
absolute certainty. Valid warrants will issue to search the innocent, and people like Rettele and Sadler
unfortunately bear the cost. When o66icers execute a valid warrant and act in a reasonable manner to
protect themselves 6rom harm, however the Fourth Amendment is not violated.
One well-established exception to the warrant requirement is the ability o6 police to search a person
at the time o6 a law6ul arrest and the area ³within his immediate control´.
Chimel v. Cali6ornia: ½he police searched the defendant house after lawfully arresting him. ½he
evidence was used against him at trial.
Rule:
Èc When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officers to search the person arrested in
order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or affect his
escape.
Èc In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence
on the arrestee¶s person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into
which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items.
Holding: ½here is ample justi6ication, there6ore, 6or a search o6 the arrestee¶s person and the area
³within his immediate control´²construing that phrase to mean the area 6rom within which he
might gain possession o6 a weapon or destructible evidence.½here is no comparable justification,
however, for routinely searching any room other than that in which an arrest occurs«Such searches, in
the absence of well-recognized exceptions, may be made only under the authority of a search warrant.
In United States v. Robinson, the Supreme Court held that police may search a person incident to
arrest regardless o6 the crime that led to the arrest.
However, in order 6or there to be a search incident to an arrest, there must actually be an arrest.
Knowles v. Ëowa: 0nowles was stopped for speeding. He was then searched and the police officer found
marijuana. 0nowles moved to suppress the evidence so obtained. He argued that the search could not be
sustained under the ³search incident to arrest´ b/c he had not been placed under arrest.
Issue: An Iowa police officer stopped petitioner for speeding, but issued him a citation rather than
arresting him. ½he question presented is whether such a procedure authorized the officers, consistently
with the Fourth Amendment, to conduct a full search of the car. We answer this question, ³NO´.
Rule:
c
m In Robinson, we noted the two historical rationales for the ³search incident to arrest´ exception:
(1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the need to preserve evidence
for later use at trial.
Holding: rE˽HER o6 these underlying rationales 6or the search incident to arrest exception is
su66icient to justi6y the search in the present case. rO SË A 6or citation only o66enses.
But Payton v. NY is important in making clear that police cannot enter a home without a warrant to make
a routine arrest.
Payton v. rY: A NY statute authorizes police officers to enter a private residence without a warrant and
with force, if necessary, to make a routine felony arrest.
Holding: Ët is a ³basic principle o6 Fourth Amendment law´ that searches and seizures inside a
home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable. ½he zone o6 privacy is no more clearly
de6ined that when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions o6 an individual¶s home. Ën
terms that apply equally to seizure o6 property and to seizures o6 persons, the Fourth Amendment
has drawn a 6irm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold
may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.
As Coolidge and Horton make clear, it must be immediately apparent that the seized item is illegal.
½est 6or Plain View:
1. was the o66icer law6ully present?
ñc execution o6 a valid search warrant; in-home arrest with an arrest warrant; during a
search justi6ied under an exception to the warrant requirement; in a public place
2. First, not only must the item be in plain view; its incriminating character must also be
³immediately apparent´. Second, not only must the o66icer be law6ully located in a place 6rom
which the object can be plainly seen, but the o66ice must also have a law6ul right o6 access to the
object itsel6
**It must be remembered that the police are allowed to use all of their senses when they are lawfully
present. Usually, sight is the most important, but it could be ³plain smell´ or ³plain touch´ that is
used by the officer.
An example of the applicability of the ³plain view´ doctrine is the situation in which the police have a
warrant to search a given area for specified objects, and in the course of the search come across some
other article of incriminating character. Where the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain
view of such an article is supported, not by a warrant, but by one of the recognized exceptions to the
warrant requirement, the seizure is also legitimate. ½hus the police may inadvertently come across
evidence while in ³hot pursuit´ of a fleeing suspect. And an object that comes into view during a search
incident to arrest that is appropriately limited in scope under existing law may be seized without a
c
warrant. Àinally, the plain view doctrine has been applied where a police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
Examples:
Èc Ëtems not described in the warrant
Èc Ë6 the police enter a house n hot pursuit
rO½ Applicable: When the o66icers move the ³assumedly stolen´ stereo equipment to better view
the serial numbers, a ³search´ has occurred, 6or which a warrant is required. Ët is because the
stereo was not immediately apparent that the seized stereo was illegal.
Formerly, the Court required that to quali6y under the plain view exception, the evidence had to be
inadvertently discovered. ½he Court departed 6rom this approach however, and now evidence may
constitutionally be seized under the exception even i6 discovery is not inadvertent.
Horton v. Cali6ornia: Officers were searching defendant¶s home under a valid search warrant. ½he
officers did not find the stolen property, however, the officers discovered the weapon used in the robbery
in plain view and seized it. ½he officer testified that while he was searching for the stolen rings, he also
was interested in finding other evidence connecting petitioner to the robbery. ½hus, the seized evidence
was not discovered ³inadvertently´.
Holding: the suggestion that the inadvertence requirement is necessary to prevent the police 6rom
conducting general searches, or 6rom converting speci6ic warrants into general warrants, is not
persuasive b/c that interest is already served by the requirements that no warrant issue unless it
³particularly describes the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized´ and that a
warrantless search be circumscribed by the exigencies which justi6y its initiation. Once those
commands have been satis6ied and the o66icer has a law6ul right o6 access, however, no additional
Fourth Amendment interest is 6urthered by requiring that the discovery o6 evidence be inadvertent.
c When police have PC to believe that car contains contraband, can search any part of car that
could reasonably hold contraband, including containers
c Rationales: mobility of car, reduced expectation of privacy in cars, highly regulated by gov¶t
Ën Chambers v. Maroney, the Court went even 6urther and held that even i6 the automobile had
been taken to the police station, and thus was not movable, the automobile exception still applies.
silver Honda in the parking lot. He place the bag in the trunk of the car and started to drive away.
Fearing the loss of evidence, officers in a marked police car stopped him. ½hey opened the trunk and the
bag and found marijuana.
Holding: Recognizing that under Carroll, the entire vehicle itself«could be searched without a warrant,
we concluded that prohibiting police from opening immediately a container in which the object of the
search is most likely to be found and instead forcing them first to comb the entire vehicle would actually
exacerbate the intrusion of privacy interests. At the moment when officers stop an automobile, it may be
less than clear whether they suspect with a high degree of certainty that the vehicle contains drugs in a
bag or simply contain drugs. If the police know that they may open a bag only if they are actually
searching the entire car, they may search more extensively than they otherwise would in order to establish
the general probable cause required by Ross«we now hold that the 4th amendment does not compel
separate treatment 6or an automobile search that extends only to a container within the vehicle.
½he interpretation o6 the Carroll doctrine set 6orth in Ross now applies to all searches o6 containers
6ound in an automobile. Ën other words, the police may search w/o a warrant i6 their search is
supported by probable cause.
c Ënventory Searches
c Ë6 property is law6ully in the possession o6 the police, they may inventory the contents to
protect the owner¶s property while it is in police possession.
|utomobiles
South Dakota v. Opperman: the defendant¶s car was towed due to parking violations. At the impound
lot, the police officer were taking an inventory of the car. ½here they found marijuana. ½he defendant
was arrested for possession of marijuana
Holding: When vehicles are impounded, local police departments generally follow a routine practice of
securing and inventorying the automobile¶s contents. ½hese procedures developed in response to three
distinct needs: the protection of the owner¶s property while it remains in police custody; the protection of
the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property; and the protection of the police from
potential danger«½his Court has consistently sustained police intrusions into automobiles impounded or
otherwise in lawful police custody where the process is aimed at securing or protecting the car and its
content«we conclude that in 6ollowing standard police procedures, prevailing throughout the
country and approved by the overwhelming majority o6 courts, the conduct o6 the police was not
³unreasonable´ under the 4th Amendment.
Person¶s Possession
c
Ëllinois v. aFayette: ½he defendant was arrested for disturbing the peace and was taken to the police
station. ½he defendant was carrying a shoulder bag on the trip to the station. ½he officer removed the
content of the bag and found amphetamine pills inside a cigarette case package.
Holding: At the stationhouse, it is entirely proper 6or police to remove and list or inventory property
6ound on the person or in the possession o6 an arrested person who is to be jailed. Ën short, every
consideration o6 orderly police administration bene6iting both police and the public point toward
the appropriateness o6 the examination o6 respondent¶s shoulder bag prior to his incarceration.
½he government has the ability to stop all cars at the border and to conduct warrantless searches. In 2004,
the Court considered whether this includes the ability to take apart a car¶s gas tank without a warrant,
probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion.
US v. Flores-Montano: Custom officials seized 37 kilograms of marijuana from respondent¶s gas tank at
the international border.
Holding: ½he Gov¶t¶s interst in preventing the entry of unwanted person and effects is at its zenith at the
international border. We have stated that ³searches made at the border, pursuant to the longstanding
right o6 the sovereign to protect itsel6 by stopping and examining persons and property crossing
into this country, are reasonable simply by virtue o6 the 6act that they occur at the border. ³ We
conclude that the gov¶t¶s authority to conduct suspicionless inspections at the border includes the
authority to remove, disassemble, and reassemble a vehicle¶s fuel tank.
US v. Ramsey: Custom officials, acting with ³reasonable cause to suspect´ a violation of customs laws,
opened for inspection incoming international letter-class mail without first obtaining a search warrant.
Holding: It was conceded at oral argument that custom officials could search, w/o probable cause and w/o
a warrant, envelopes carried by an entering traveler, whether in his luggage or on his person. Surely no
different constitutional standard should apply simply b/c the envelopes were mailed not carried. ½he
critical 6act is that the envelopes cross the border and enter this country, not that they were
brought in by one mode o6 transportation rather than another. Ët is their entry into this country
6rom without it that makes a resulting search reasonable.
Ëndividuals, o6 course, can be stopped at the border to ensure that they are law6ully entering the
country. {ut more intrusive searches, such as body cavity searches or detentions, require at least
reasonable suspicion.
US v. Montoya-Hernandez: Respondent was detained by customs upon her arrival at LA airport. She
was found to be smuggling 88 cocaine-filled balloons in her alimentary canal, and was convicted.
Holding: We hold that the detention o6 a traveler at the border, beyond the scope o6 a routine
customs search and inspection, is justi6ied at its inception i6 customs agents, considering all the 6acts
surrounding the traveler and her trip, reasonably suspect that the traveler is smuggling contraband
in her alimentary canal.
cCheckpoints
c
½he police may stop a vehicle if they observe a traffic violation and may demand to see the driver¶s
license and the vehicle¶s registration.
Ëntoxicated Drivers (Reasonable)
Michigan Dept. o6 State Police v. Sitz: ½he state established sobriety checkpoints along state roads and
stopped passing vehicles to check for signs of intoxication. If the police suspected intoxication, the
motorist would be directed to a location out of the traffic flow where an officer would check the
motorist¶s driver¶s license and registration, and if warranted, connect more sobriety test.
Holding: a Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred but it is reasonable. ½he balance o6 the State¶s
interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this system can reasonably be said to
advance that interest, and the degree o6 intrusion upon individual motorists who are brie6ly
stopped, weighs in 6avor o6 the state program. We hold that it is consistent with the 4th
amendment.
c Consent (½OC)
A search is permissible without a warrant or even probable cause if there is voluntary consent. ½he
standard for voluntariness was initially articulated in Schneckloth v. Bustomonte
Schneckloth v. {ustamonte: Six men were in a car that was pulled over. ½he car belonged to Alcala¶s
brother, and he was not present. An officer asked Alcala if he could search the car, which Alcala replied,
³sure, go ahead!´ the officers found three checks that had previously been stolen from a car wash.
c
Holding: In determining whether a defendant¶s will was overborne in a particular case, the Court has
assessed the totality of all the surrounding circumstances²both the characteristics of the accused and the
details of the interrogation. In examining all the surrounding circumstances to determine if in fact the
consent to search was coerced account must be taken of subtly coercive police questions, as well as the
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents. We hold only that when the subject of
his consent, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in
fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, expressed or implied. A search may be
conducted without a warrant or probable cause i6 voluntary and intelligent consent is
given.Voluntariness is a question o6 6act to be determined 6rom all the circumstances, and while the
subject¶s knowledge o6 a right to re6use is a 6actor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not
required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent.
Knowledge o6 right to withhold consent is rO½ a prerequisite to proving that intelligent consent
was given.
Administrative Searches
Camara v. Municipal Court o6 City and County o6 San Francisco (searching residential
buildings): An inspector of the Divison of Housing Inspection of the San Francisco Dept of Public
Health entered an apartment building to make a routine annual inspection for possible violationsof the
city¶s Housing Code. ½he building manager informed the inspector that appellant, lessee of the ground
floor, was using the rear of his leasehold as a personal residence. Appellant wouldn¶t let the inspector
into his apartment.
Holding: We cannot say that the protections provided by the warrant procedure are not needed in this
context (housing); broad statutory safeguards are no substitute for individualized review, particularly
when those safeguards may only be invoked at the risk of criminal penalty. ½he court needs to obtain a
warrant but not based on probable cause but a lower standard than the criminal context. ½hey
don¶t need individualized suspicion. Such standard, which will vary with the municipal program being
enforced, may be based upon the passage of time, the nature of the building, or the condition of the entire
area, but they will not necessarily depart upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular
dwelling. It has been suggested that so to vary the probable cause test from the standard applied in
criminal cases would be to authorize a ³synthetic search warrant´ and thereby to lessen the overall
protections of the 4th Amendment.
c
rew York v. {urger (commercial buildings): for business contexts, the court said that you don¶t
need a warrant nor probable cause b/c o6 the gov¶t regulations.
½he test:
1, there must be a ³substantial´ government interest that informs the regulatory scheme pursuant to
which the inspection is made;
2, the warrantless inspections must be ³necessary to further the regulatory scheme´;
3, ³the statute¶s inspection program, in terms of the certainty and regularity of its application, must
provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant.´ In other words, the regulatory statute
must perform the two basic functions of a warrant: it must advise the owner of the commercial
premises that the search is being made pursuant to the law and has a properly defined scope, and it
must limit the discretion of the inspection officers.
½o perform this first function, the statute must be ³sufficiently comprehensive and defined that the
owner of commercial property cannot help but be aware that his property will be subject to periodic
inspections undertaken for specific purposes.´
Highly regulated industries exception: a warrant is not required for searches of businesses in highly
regulated industries. ½his exception is based on two theories (1) the urgent public interest involved, and
(2) the implied consent of businesses entering such industries. Furthermore, such regulatory violations
are often easily hidden and a business owner could thwart gov¶t regulation unless warrantless searches
were permitted.
Drug testing
c Area o6 Employment
Èc Skinner v. Railway Executives¶ Assn.: the Court upheld FRA regulations requiring drug
testing of railroad workers involved in accidents. ½he Court stressed the ³special need to
ensure the safety of the traveling public. ½he court said that the privacy expectations of
the employees were diminished by their working in ³an industry that is regulated
pervasively to ensure safety.´
Èc rational ½reasury Employees Union v. Von Raab: the court upheld urinalysis for
customs workers upon their transfer or promotion to positions having a direct
c
involvement in drug interdiction or requiring the carrying of firearms. ½he Court struck
down the requirement as applied to those who would be handling classified documents.
Èc Chandler v. Miller: the Court struck down a Georgia statute requiring that candidates for
state office pass a drug test. ½he Court stressed that ³Georgia asserts no evidence of a
drug problem among the State¶s elected officials, those officials do not typically perform
high-risk, safety sensitive tasks, and the required certification immediately aids to
interdiction effort.
c School O66icials
Èc rew Jersey v. ½ O: the Court held that school officials could search a student¶s purse
based on reasonable suspicion; there did not need to be a warrant or probable cause. ½he
Court said that ³the Fourth Amendment is applicable to the activities of civil as well as
criminal authorities.´ ½he Court said ³there be reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or
the rules of the school.´ ½he Court stressed that the search must be reasonable in scope.
It explained that ³the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the
search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the
nature of the infraction.´
Èc Savannah v. Redding:
Èc Vernonia v. Acton: the Court upheld random drug testing for students participating in
athletic events.
Èc {oard v. Earls: the Court upheld random drug testing for students participating in
extracurricular activities
c Hospitals
Èc Ferguson v. City o6 Charleston: the Court held that drug testing of pregnant women,
with results to be used for law enforcement purposes did not fit within the ³special
needs´ exception.
c Exigent Circumstances:
In an emergency, the police can search without a warrant i6 there is probable cause. ½his is often
referred to as exigent circumstances. ½he ability of the police to enter a home when in hot pursuit of a
felon is an example of this. For this exception to apply, it must be an emergency situation justi6ying
warrantless activity and there must be probable cause.
In Welsh v. Wisconsin: ½he defendant was driving erratically at night and swerved off the road into an
open field. ½he defendant left the scene. ½he police arrived at the scene and learned that the defendant¶s
home was a few blocks away and assumed that he just walked home. ½he police went into his home and
arrested him for DUI.
½he search was unconstitutional b/c there was no present danger when the search happened. ½he State
attempts to justify the arrest by relying on the hot pursuit doctrine«on the facts of this case, however, the
claim of hot pursuit is unconvincing b/c there was no immediate or continuous pursuit of the petitioner
from the scene of a crime. Moreover, b/c the petitioner had already arrived home, and had abandoned his
car at the scene of the accident; there was little remaining threat to the public safety.
c
½he Court generally has been reluctant to 6ind exigent circumstances. For example, in Mincey v.
Arizona, the Court rejected a claim that there should be a blanket exception to the warrant
requirement 6or all murder scenes. But police may act w/o a warrant if it is an emergency and the
police believe that entering premises will provide protection.
{righam City, Utah v. Stuart: One exigency obviating the requirement o6 a warrant is the need to
assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury. Accordingly, law
en6orcement o66icers may enter a home w/o a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured
occupant or to protect an occupant 6rom imminent injury. An important 6actor to be considered
when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity o6 the underlying o66ense 6or which the
arrest is being made´. ½he test is objectively reasonable basis 6or believing both that the injured
adult might need help and that the violence in the kitchen was just beginning. ½he Court held that
the officers had the right to enter w/o a warrant.
½he Fourth Amendment applies to seizure, whether of a person or of his or her property. Arrests must be
based on probable cause, though as discussed in section G, a person may be stopped by the police with
just reasonable suspicion. Both arrests and stops are seizures w/in the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
{rendlin v. Cali6ornia: {oth driver andPassengers are seized when they are riding in a car that was
stopped by the police
Cali6ornia v. Hodari D.:Officers were in a high crime area of Oakland in plain clothes but wearing
jackets with ³Police´ on both front and back. As their unmarked car turned a corner, they saw four or five
youths huddled around a small red car parked at the curb. ½he youths saw the car and took flight. ½he
officers were suspicious and ran after them. Looking behind as he ran, the defendant tossed away what
appeared to be a small rock. ½he officer then tackled Hodari, handcuffed him, and radioed for assistance.
Hodari was found to be carrying $130 in cash and a pager; and the rock he had discarded was crack
cocaine.
Issue: was the defendant seized when he dropped the drugs? If so, the drugs were the fruit of that seizure
and the evidence should be excluded. If not, the drugs were abandoned by Hodari and lawfully recovered
by the police and should be admitted.
Holding: An arrest requires either physical 6orce (6or example, i6 the o66icer had laid his hands upon
Hodari to arrest him but Hodari had broken away and then cast away the cocaine) or, where that is
absent, submission to the assertion o6 authority. Street pursuits always place the public at risk, and
compliance with police orders to stop should there6ore be encouraged. A person is not seized when
they give chase to the police. In sum, assuming that the officer¶s pursuit in the present case constituted a
c
³show of authority´ enjoining Hodari to halt, since Hodari did not comply with that injunction he was not
seized until he was tackled. ½he cocaine abandoned while he was running was in this case not the fruit of
a seizure, and his motion to exclude evidence of it was properly denied.
Stop and Frisk
c ½here is important differences b/t an arrest and a stop under the 4th Amendment: an arrest
requires probable cause and a stop only requires reasonable suspicion.
c Ë6 a person is arrested, police can do a search incident to the arrest. {ut i6 a person is
stopped, there can be a 6risk only i6 there is reasonable suspicion that the person has a
weapon that might endanger the police.
c Ë6 a person driving a car is arrested based on probable cause, the police may search the car;
but i6 a person is stopped, there can be an inspection only o6 the area where the driver
might obtain a weapon a6ter returning to the car.
1.c if a person is detained for sustained interrogation that is an arrest within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. For example: an arrest has occurred if police officers take a suspect to the
station for questioning.
2.c ½aking a suspect from the public area of an airport into a small room constituted an arrest.
3.c ½aking a suspect to the police station for fingerprinting is an arrest and needs to be based upon
probable cause
4.c ½he duration of the detention also matters in determining whether there has been a stop or an
arrest: detaining a person¶s luggage for 90 minutes was a seizure under the 4th amendment; a
police officer detained suspects b/t 30-40 minutes while waiting for DEA and the Court said this
was a stop. ½he Court has said that there is no ³hard-and-fast time limit´ b/t a stop and an arrest.
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court o6 revada:the defendant was arrested and convicted for refusing to
identify himself during a stop allowed by ½erry v. Ohio. Earlier that day, the police received a call
reporting an assault. An officer approached a truck that looked similar to the caller¶s description. ½he
officer observed skid marks in the gravel behind the truck, leading him to believe it had come to a sudden
stop. ½he officer approached the driver, who appeared drunk, and asked for his identification over 11
times, and the man refused. ½he officer arrested him for willfully delaying or obstructing a police
officer¶s investigation.
Holding: Interrogation relating to one¶s identity or a request for identification by the police does not, by
itself, constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure´. A suspect¶s identity is a routine and accepted part of
many ½erry stops. A state law requiring a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a valid ½erry stop
is consistent with Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures.
United States v. Arvizu: A border patrol officer was investigating a car that avoided checkpoint areas
and waited until patrol officer were switching shifts before driving. ½he driver was driving a minivan
which is the vehicle of choice for smugglers. Also, the driver failed to acknowledge the patrol car when
the officer approached him at a stop. ½he children in the back of the van had their feet resting high,
suggesting that their feet were on cargo. ½he officer radioed for a registration check of the minivan and
learned the address was in an area notorious for alien and narcotics smuggling. ½he officer then stopped
the vehicle.
Holding: Courts should look at the ³totality o6 the circumstances´ when determining reasonable
suspicion.A determination that reasonable suspicion exists, however, need not rule out the possibility of
innocent conduct. Undoubtedly, each of these factors alone is susceptible of innocent explanation, and
some factors are more probative than others. ½aken together, we believe they sufficed to form a
particularized and objective basis for Stoddard¶s stopping the vehicle, making the stop reasonable within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Florida v. J : An anonymous caller reported that a young black male standing at a particular bus stop
and wearing a plaid shirt was carrying a gun. Sometime after²the record doesn¶t say how long²two
officers arrived at the bus stop about six minutes later and saw three black males there. One of the three
was wearing a plaid shirt. Apart from the tip, the officers had no reason to suspect any of the three of
c
illegal conduct. ½he officers didn¶t see a firearm nor did JL make any threats. One of the officers
stopped JL and frisked him and seized a gun.
Holding: ½he officer¶s suspicion that JL was carrying a weapon arose not from any observations of their
own but solely from a call made from an unknown location by an unknown caller. Unlike a tip 6rom a
known in6ormant whose reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible i6 her
allegations turn out to be 6abricated, an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the in6ormant¶s
basis o6 knowledge or veracity.´ However, an anonymous tip that suitably corroborates the
in6ormation will exhibit ³su66icient indicia o6 reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the
investigatory stop´. ½he anonymous call here provided no predictive information and therefore left the
police w/o means to test the informant¶s knowledge or credibility.
Exclusionary Rule
-- the exclusionary rule states that material obtained in violation of the Constitution cannot be introduced
at trial against a criminal defendant
Hudson v. Michigan: the exclusionary rule does not apply to cases when the police fail to apply the
knock and announce rule properly.
c Who Can Object to the introduction o6 evidence and raise the exclusionary rule?
c
Rakas v. Ëllinois: A police officer received a call that a clothing store had been robbed. ½he call gave a
description of the getaway car. ½he officer located a car that matched the getaway car¶s description. ½he
officer stopped the car. ½he petitioner and two female companions were in the car. Officers illegally
searched the car and discovered a box of rifle shells in the glove compartment which had been locked and
a sawed-off rifle under the front passenger seat. ½he petitioners concede that they did not own the car and
were only passengers in the car. ½hey move to suppress the evidence.
Holding: ½he Court held that only those whose Fourth Amendment rights were violated may raise
the exclusionary rule.the 6ocus in determining who can raise the exclusionary rule is on whether a
person¶s Fourth Amendment rights were violated, which generally turns on whether a person has a
reasonable expectation o6 privacy? here, the petitioners didn¶t have any privacy rights violated because
it was not their car nor did they have a reasonable expectation of privacy within another¶s person¶s glove
compartment or area under the seat of the car. Like the trunk of an automobile, these are areas in which a
passenger qua passenger simply would not normally have a legitimate expectation of privacy.
On the exam:
c First ask, does the defendant have an expectation of privacy (0atz)
c Second, do they have standing to object? (Rakas)
c third, was this expectation violated? (was there probable cause? Does it fall under a warrant
exception?
Holding: A passenger in a vehicle is seized the moment the driver¶s car comes to a halt on the side of the
road. Brendlin has standing and the evidence should be suppressed.
2.c Ënevitable Discovery (preponderance o6 the evidence) ± if the police can demonstrate that they
inevitably would have discovered the evidence, even w/o a violation of the Fourth Amendment,
the exclusionary rule does not apply and the evidence is admissible.
rix v. Williams: the defendant was suspected of killing a ten year old girl. Police surmised that Williams
left the girl¶s body somewhere b/t Des Moines and the Grinnell rest stop. ½here was a large scale search
and searchers were instructed to check all roads, abandoned farm buildings, ditches, culverts, and other
places in which a small child¶s body could be located. ½he police illegally obtained a confession from
Williams about where the body was located. ½he defense wants to suppress the confession and the body
b/c it is fruits of an illegal coercion. However, the gov¶t argues that they would have found that body
anyways because the body was located within the designated search area.
Holding: Ë6 the prosecution can establish by a preponderance o6 the evidence that the in6ormation
ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by law6ul means²here the volunteers¶
search²then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be received.
3.c Exclusionary Rule applies only to police action that is deliberate or reckless or grossly
negligent, or the result o6 systemic department violations/ Good Faith Exception
US v. eon: ½he police executed a search warrant, which was facially valid, to search defendant¶s home.
½he search yielded large quantities of drugs. At an evidentiary hearing, the court decided the warrant was
not based on sufficient evidence to produce probable cause and as such the search was illegal. ½he court,
however, admitted it was a close call.
Holding: Searches pursuant to a warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonableness
6or a warrant issued by a magistrate normally su66ices to establish that a law en6orcement o66icer
c
has acted in good 6aith in conducting the search. revertheless, the o66icer¶s reliance on the
magistrate¶s probable cause determination and on the technical su66icient o6 the warrant he issues
must be objectively reasonable, and it is clear that in some circumstances the o66icer will have no
reasonable grounds 6or believing that the warrant was properly issued.
Exception to Good Faith Exception: Suppression remains an appropriate remedy i6 the magistrate
or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by in6ormation in an a66idavit that the a66iant knew was
6alse or would have known was 6alse except 6or his reckless disregard o6 the truth. Or where the
issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role. ror would an o66icer mani6est objective
good 6aith in relying on a warrant based on an a66idavit ³so lacking in indicia o6 probable cause as
to render o66icial belie6 in its existence entirely unreasonable´.
Herring v. US: Herring was no stranger to law enforcement. A police officer at Coffee County checked
to see if there were any outstanding warrants for Herring, and there were not. ½he officer then asked
another county if they had any outstanding warrants, to which they replied they did. After he left the
police station to get his impounded trunk, the police officer arrested him for this outstanding warrant.
½hey then completed a search incident to a lawful arrest (SILA) and they found meth in his pocket and a
pistol in his trunk (he was a felon). ½here was a mistake in the warrant b/c it was recalled five months
earlier. At this happened within ten minutes before the mix-up could be fixed.
Holding: ½here is no exclusionary rule i6 the police mistaken conduct in executing an arrest
warrant, which then leads to SË A, was made in good 6aith. If the police have been shown to be
reckless in maintain a warrant system, or to have knowingly made false entries to lay the groundwork for
future false arrests, exclusion would certainly be justified under our cases should such misconduct cause a
Fourth Amendment violation.
{rown v. Ëllinois: the police illegally searched the defendant¶s home and arrested him at gunpoint. ½hey
took Brown to the police station and read him his Miranda rights. For a couple of hours, Brown asked
questions about killing a man named Corpus. ½he officers then had Brown help them locate his co-
defendant in a patrol car. After they obtained the co-defendant, the police question Brown again at the
station and again give him his Miranda rights. Half an hour later, a court reporter appeared and Brown
gave a second statement. Brown refused to sign his typed confession. ½he court introduced statements
from both interrogations.
c
Holding: Confessions resulting from a seizure in violation of the defendant¶s fourth Amendment rights
(e.g. resulting from a warrantless seizure) may be admissible in some circumstances. In such cases,
courts look to factors such as (1) whether the defendant was informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to the assistance of counsel, (2) the closeness in time of the detention and the
confession, (3) the purpose of the government action, and (4) the flagrancy of the official behavior.
Brown¶s statement was separated from his illegal arrest by less than two hours, and there was no
intervening event of significance whatsoever. We could hold Brown¶s first statement admissible only if
we overrule Wung Sun. We decline to do so. And the second statement was clearly the result and the
fruit of the first. ½he Illinois court were in error in assuming that the Miranda warnings, by themselves,
under Wung Sun always purge the taint of an illegal arrest.
Ënterrogations
½he privilege against self-incrimination arises in many contexts, including during police interrogation.
Police questioning of suspects is a crucial investigative tool.
A con6ession obtained a6ter a de6endant is physically coerced or threatened with physical 6orce, is
not voluntary.
Arizona v. Fulminante: In 1982, the 11-year-old stepdaughter of one Oreste Fulminante was murdered
in Arizona. Later, Fulminante was incarcerated for an unrelated crime. While in prison, Fulminante met
Anthony Sarivola, a fellow inmate, who was also a confidential informant for the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. Sarivola offered Fulminante protection from "tough treatment" in prison in exchange for a
confession to the murder of Fulminante's stepdaughter. Fulminante agreed, confessing to Sarivola that he
murdered his stepdaughter. As a result, Fulminante was charged with the murder, and his confession to
Sarivola was used against him at trial.
Holding: We agree with the Arizona Supreme Court¶s conclusion that Fulminante¶s confession was
coerced. ½he Arizona Supreme Court found a credible threat of physical violence unless Fulminante
c
confessed. Our cases have made clear that a 6inding o6 coercion need not depend upon actual
violence by a government agent; a credible threat is su66icient.
Spano v. rY: Spano was an immigrant in his mid-twenties with a junior high school education. He shot a
person after a bar fight. He fled the crime scene and was indicted for murder while he was in hiding.
Spano called Gaspar Bruno, a close friend of his who training to become a police officer. Spano told
Bruno that the deceased had injured him, and that he intended to get a lawyer and turn himself in to law
enforcement. Bruno relayed the information to his superiors. Spano, along with his newly appointed
attorney, turned himself in the day following his conversation with Bruno. Spano was questioned
continuously for several hours and was told he could not consult with his attorney. ½he police provided
him with dinner during his first night of questioning. ½he following day, Spano was transferred to another
police station where questioning continued. He was again denied assistance of counsel. Bruno, upon
police instructions, told Spano that he could get into trouble if Spano did not confess although Bruno's job
was not really in jeopardy. Bruno approached Spano four times before Spano gave a statement; each time
questioning had resumed, Spano requested assistance of counsel. Police escorted Spano to the location
where they believed he had disposed of the murder weapon. While searching for the weapon, Spano
confessed.
Holding: the confession was involuntary b/c (1) use of ³childhood friend´; (2) foreign born man; (3) def¶s
low education level; (4) questioned by many officers; (5) eight straight hours of interrogation before
confessing; and (6) conducted all night.
Deception:
c In ynumn v. Ëllinois, a suspect was told that if she cooperated and answered the questions, she
would not be prosecuted for marijuana sale. But she was told that if she did not cooperate, she
would face ten years in prison and have her children taken away from her. She told the police
that she would say whatever they wanted. ½hey told her to admit the marijuana sale and she did.
½he Court found the confession involuntary.
c Although deception can make a confession involuntary, the Court has been tolerant of many
police techniques. For example: if the police lie to a suspect and tell him that is accomplice had
already confessed. Also, if the officer acts a friend to the suspect and expresses sympathy for the
suspect¶s plight.
Miranda Warnings
c
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does not make may be used as evidence against his, and that he has a right to the
presence o6 an attorney, either retained or appointed. ½he de6endant may waive e66ectuation o6
these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Ë6, however, he
indicates in any manner and at any stage o6 the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney
be6ore speaking there can be no questioning. ikewise, i6 the individual is alone and indicates in
any manner that he doesn¶t wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. ½here mere
6act that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own so does
not deprive him o6 the right to re6rain 6rom answering any 6urther inquires until he has consulted
with an attorney and therea6ter consents to be questioned.
What are the requirements 6or Miranda to apply?
Miranda requires that during in-custodial interrogation police administer the prescribed warnings, make
counsel available; and behave as described in the decision. ½herefore there are three key questions arise
in applying Miranda:
1.c When is a person ³in custody´?
2.c What is interrogation?
3.c What police actions are sufficient to meet the requirements of Miranda?
Yarborough v. Alvarado: Our decisions make clear tha the initial determination o6 cutody depends
on the objective circumstances o6 the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either
the interrogating o66icers or the person being questioned.
where the defendant took an intoxilyzer test. ½he test results were negative for the presence of alcohol.
½he officer then resumed questioning the defendant. ½he defendant responded affirmatively when asked
if had been drinking. When asked if he was under the influence of alcohol said "I guess, barely." At no
time was the defendant advised of his Miranda rights.
Holding: a tra66ic stop is more analogous to a so called ½erry stop than a 6ormal arrest. ½he
similarly noncoercive aspect o6 ordinary tra66ic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily
detained pursuant to such stops are not ³in custody 6or the purposes o6 Miranda. We conclude that
the Miranda sa6eguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express
questioning or its 6unctional equivalent.
What is an ³Ënterrogation´?
If police are questioning a person, that is an interrogation; if a person blurts out something to the police
without being questioned, that is not an interrogation.
RË v. Ënnis: ½he suspect was arrested and read his Miranda rights and refused to talk without a lawyer.
½he police put him in the back of the patrol car. ½he two officers in the patrol car never questioned the
defendant but had a conversation about, what if a young girl found the gun the defendant murdered
someone with. After hearing this conversation, the defendant showed the police where the gun was
located.
Holding:½hat is to say, the term interrogation under Miranda re6ers not only to express
questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part o6 the police that the police should know
are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response 6rom the suspect.Here, the respondent was
not ³interrogated´ within the meaning of Miranda, for the conversation b/t the police officers included no
express questioning of the respondent.
Arizona v. Mauro: an individual was in police custody and indicated that he did not wish to answer any
questions until a lawyer was present. ½here is no interrogation when an o66icer allowed a suspect to
speak with his wi6e in the presence o6 a police o66icer.
In Cali6ornia v. Prysock: the Court has never indicated that the ³rigidity´ of Miranda extends to the
precise formulation of the warnings given a criminal defendant. ½his court and others have stressed as
one virtue of Miranda the fact that the giving of the warnings obviates the need for a case by case inquire
into the actual voluntariness of the admissions of the accused. rothing in these observations suggests
any desirable rigidity in the 6orm o6 the required warnings.Quite the contrary, Miranda itself
indicated that no talismanic incantation was required to satisfy its stricture«It is clear that the police in
this case fully conveyed to respondents his rights as required by Miranda. He was told of his right to have
a lawyer present prior to and during interrogation, and his right to have a lawyer appointed at no cost if he
could not afford one.
Duckworth v. Eagan: at issue is the warning: if and when you go to court, you may have a lawyer. ½he
Court found that (1) this intrusion accurately described the procedure for the appointment of counsel in
Indiana«(2) Miranda does not require that attorneys be producible on call, but only that the suspect be
informed that he has the right to an attorney before and during questioning, and that an attorney would be
appointed for him if he could not afford one.
Oregon v. Elstad: at the defendant¶s home, the police asked the def. whether he was involved in a
burglary. ½he def. confessed to his involvement. ½he police then took the def. to the station and read him
his Miranda rights. ½he def again confesses and signs a document that has his confession on it.
Holding: a violation o6 Miranda does not prohibit evidence obtained a6ter the illegal con6ession 6rom
being admissible; in other words, no suppress due to ³6ruit o6 the poisonous tree´ (no poisonous fruit
due to improper Miranda warning) If errors are made by law enforcement officers in administering the
prophylactic Miranda procedures, they should not breed the same irremediable consequences as police
infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself. It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a
simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances
calculated to undermine the suspect¶s ability to exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory process
that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period. ½hough
Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility o6 any
subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and
voluntarily made«We must conclude that, absent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining
the initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a
presumption of compulsion. A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has
given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remover the conditions that
precluded admission of the earlier statement.
***½he Supreme Court returned to the issue of when information gained in violation of Miranda can be
used as evidence in two decisions in 2004. In Missouri v. Seibert, the Court held that subsequent
c
statements must be excluded, even if Miranda warnings were given before the statements were repeated.
But in US v. Patane, the Court said that tangible evidence could be introduced even if it resulted from
violations of Miranda.
Missouri v. Seibert: the police officer testified that he made a ³conscious decision´ to withhold Miranda
warnings, thus resorting to an interrogation technique he had been taught: question first, then give the
warnings, and then repeat the question ³until I get the answer that she¶s already provided once´. ½his
tactic was an end run around Miranda: ³Because the question first tactic effectively threatens to thwart
Miranda¶s purpose of reducing the risk that a coerced confession would be admitted and b/c the facts here
do not reasonably support a conclusion that the warnings given could have served their purpose, Seibert¶s
postwarning statements are inadmissible.
United States v. Patane: Officers were reading the def his Miranda rights but the defendant interrupted
and asserted that he knew his rights and neither officer attempted to complete the warning. (the defendant
has to be told his Miranda rights and therefore there was a violation here)
Rule: Our cases also make clear the related point that a mere failure to give Miranda warnings does not by
itself violate a suspect¶s constitutional rights or even the Miranda rule. It follows that police do not
violate a suspect¶s constitutional rights by negligent or even deliberate failures to provide the suspect with
the full panoply of warnings prescribed by Miranda.
Holding: there is therefore no reason to apply the ³fruit of the poisonous tree´ doctrine. It is not for this
Court to impose its preferred police practices on either federal law enforcement officials or their state
counterparts. Although it is true that the Court requires the exclusion of the physical fruit of actually
coerced statements, it must be remembered that statements taken without sufficient Miranda warnings are
presumed to have been coerced only for certain purposes and then only when necessary to protect the
privilege against self-incrimination.
Exceptions to Miranda
1.c Ë6 the statements are used 6or impeachment purposes
c In Harris v. rY, the Court held that statements gained from a criminal defendant are
admissible for impeachment purposes if the defendant chooses to testify at trial.
2.c Ë6 the statements were obtained in an emergency situation
c In rY v. Quarles, the Supreme Court held that statements obtained by police from
suspects during emergency situations could be used against a criminal def even if
Miranda warnings were not properly administered.
c We think police officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively b/t questions
necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public and questions designed
solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect
3.c Ë6 the statements were made at the time o6 booking the suspect in response to routine
questions by the police
c ½he Supreme Court has held that the police can ask a person questions when taking a
person into custody that are needed in the booking process, such as name, address, date of
birth, height, and weight. ½he court has said that the answers to these questions are
admissible even without administration of Miranda warning.
c
In Muniz (drunk guy questioned during booking), the Court held that the slurred speech that was evident
on the videotape did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination b/c it was not testimonial. ½he
privilege against sel6 incrimination applies only i6 a person is compelled to make statements;
physical evidence or observations o6 physical characteristics are not testimonial. Muniz¶s answers
to the 6irst seven questions are nonetheless admissible b/c the questions 6all within a ³routine
booking questions´ exception which exempts from Miranda¶s coverage questions to secure the
biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services.
½
4.c Ë6 the suspect waived his or her rights under Miranda
c ½he Court said that the government would have a ³heavy burden´ of demonstrating ³that
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination
and his right to retained or appointed counsel. ½he Court said that ³a valid waiver will
not be presumed from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from
the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.
c In rC v. {utler, the Court is going to look at the ½OC in waivers. An express written
or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is
usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either necessary or
sufficient to establish waiver.
c ½he Supreme Court has ruled that whether there was a waiver is to be determined
6rom the totality o6 the circumstances. ½his includes considering the ³juvenile¶s age,
experience, education, background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the
capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature o6 his Fi6th Amendment
rights, and the consequences o6 waiving those rights.
c Can there be a knowing and voluntary waiver if police withhold from a suspect the
information that an attorney sought to consult with him? ½his knowledge and the
resulting consultation might well have prevented the incriminating statements. In Moran
v. Burbine, the Court resolved this issue in favor of the police. A suspect in a murder
case waived his Miranda rights, including his right to counsel, and confessed. ½he
suspect¶s sister had hired an attorney who telephoned the police station and was told that
no interrogation would occur until the next day. At no point was the suspect told that
there was an attorney who had been retained and wanted to see him. ½he Court found no
constitutional violation and said that ³events occurring outside o6 the presences o6 the
suspect and entirely unknown to him can have no bearing on the capacity to
comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right.
c ½he police have no duty to inform a suspect of the nature of the crime for which he or she
is under suspicion
c For the right to remain silent, the Court has been willing to 6ind waivers in these
situations where the de6endant speaks to police a6ter initially invoking the right to
remain silent.
Michigan v. Mosley: the defendant was questioned for a burglary crime. He was given his Miranda
rights. He said he did not want to answer any questions about the robberies; therefore, the police had to
stop, which they did. ½he defendant was then questioned about a murder. He was given his Miranda
c
rights here too. ½he interrogation by the police lasted approximately 15 minutes, and at no time during its
course did Mosley ask to consult with a lawyer or indicate that he did not want to discuss the homicide.
Holding: We there6ore conclude that the admissibility o6 statements obtained a6ter the person in
custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his ³right to cut off
questioning´ was ³scrupulously honored´ (they need to re-read Miranda and obtain a waiver or the
de6endant could have reinitiated it). this is not a case, there6ore, where the police 6ailed to honor a
decision o6 a person in custody to cut o66 questioning, either by re6using to discontinue the
interrogation upon request or by persisting in repeated e66orts to wear down his resistance and
make him change his mind. In contrast to such practices, the police here immediately ceased the
interrogation, resumed questioning only after the passage of a significant period of time and the provision
of a fresh set of warnings, and restricted the second interrogation to a crime that had not been a subject of
the earlier interrogation. We conclude that the admission in evidence of Mosley¶s incriminating
statement did not violate the principles of Miranda
c For the right to counsel, the test is different and stricter. Remember the defendant can
invoke his rights at any time during questioning.
In Davis v.US, the defendant was given Miranda and waived his right. Later on, during questioning, he
says, ³Maybe I should talk to a lawyer´. ½he Court held that the suspect has to be clear and unambiguous
when requesting counsel.
Holding: We held in Miranda that a suspect is entitled to the assistance of counsel during custodial
interrogation even though the Constitution does not provide for such assistance. We held in Edwards,
that i6 the suspect invokes the right to counsel at any time, the police must immediately cease
questioning him until an attorney is present. {ut we are unwilling to create a third layer o6
prophylaxis to prevent police questioning when the suspect might want a lawyer. Unless the
suspect actually requests an attorney, questioning may continue.
c If a defendant requests counsel at any time then the police have to stop questioning
(similar to right to remain silence). However, unlike the right to remain silence, the
police cannot go back and ask questions later. Edwards
Maryland v. Shatzer: the defendant is questioned about sexually abusing his son. Questioning stopped
after the defendant requested his attorney. ½he defendant returns to the general public. ½he case is
closed. ½wo and half years later, the police reopen the case and question the defendant again. He is read
Miranda again. ½he defendant made incriminating statements before requesting an attorney. At no point
did he request an attorney nor refer to the other interrogation.
Holding: the statements are admissible. Ëncarceration is ³in custody´ 6or Miranda purposes. ½he
court says this waiver is only applicable 6or a two week period.
Admissibility of statements:
Úc If a suspect is being subjected to custodial interrogation and makes a statement, inquires for the
court is:
±c Were the Miranda warning properly given
±c And if so, did the suspect give a valid waiver of his Miranda rights? OR
±c Did suspect invoke any of his rights under Miranda?
ñc He believed he was speaking to an accomplice. He was not warned that he was speaking to a
police agent. ½herefore, he was compelled to self-incriminate and the statements must be held
inadmissible. Reversed.
Subsequent cases have made clear that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies only after the
initiation of formal adversarial proceeding. In Kirby v. Ëllinois, the Court held that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel at police identi6ication procedures such as lineups) applies only ³at or
a6ter the initiation o6 adversary judicial criminal proceedings ± whether by way o6 6ormal charge,
preliminary hearing, indictment, in6ormation, or arraignment.
Ëssue: Does the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extend to crimes that are ³factual related´ to hsoe that
have actually been charged?
Holding: No
ñc ½he Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to crimes that are ³6actual related´
to those that have actually been charged. ½he Sixth Amendment right o6 counsel is o66ense
speci6ic and cannot be invoked once 6or all 6uture prosecutions since it does not attach until
a prosecution has commenced.
ñc ½his court had held that a defendant¶s statements regarding offenses for which he had not been
charged were admissible notwithstanding the attachment of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
on other charged offense. Some courts, however, had carved an exception for crimes that are
³factual related´ to a charge offense. We decline to support this view. However, we do hold that
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, when it attaches, does encompass o66enses that even
i6 not 6ormally charged would be considered the same o66ense under the {lockburger test.
ñc ½he test to be applied to determine whether there is more than o66ense is whether each
provision requires proo6 o6 a 6act that the other does not. As defined, by ½exas law, capital
murder and burglary are not the same offense under Blockburger. ½hus, the police were not
barred from interrogating Cobb regarding the murders and his confession was admissible.
Reversed.