Are the Dutch

Europhiles or
Eurosceptics?
The relation between the Netherlands and Europe in the twentieth century

Stephan Leewis (290826)

 1. Introduction

‘A Europe of core-principals with which has less task and which does these more efficiently will
restore the legitimacy of European integration’1

This line from the book ‘boarders of Europe’ by former European commissioner Frist Bolkestein
is exemplary of his brand eurosceptics. Bolkestein is recognized is the Netherlands as the first
politician to be publically critical of the European project. Long have the Netherlands been seen
as the most or one the most pro-European nations of the Union. An image cherished and
proclaimed by the country itself. The Netherlands as power broker between the big countries, the
Netherlands as a guide country within in Europe. These were slogans often used by politicians,
journalists and businessmen. In that context the resounding “No” by the Dutch public during the
2005 referendum on the European Constitution probably came as a surprise to the casual
observer. Certainly if we take into account that public opinions polls have consistently shown that
there was wide support for the European project within the Netherland, even in the years leading
up to the vote on the EU constitution.
Although the mood among the populace might have been consistently supportive of the
European project, what had changed in the run up to the constitution vote was the mood and the
positioning of some political parties towards the EU. We see signs of this during the nineteen
nineties as Frist Bolkestein, in the position of party leader of the liberal-conservative Party for
Freedom and Democracy (VVD), started to question the relevance, the expansion and the costs of
the EU. These points of contention have remained part of the political debate ever since. We see
this clearly in the current party manifesto’s of the VVD but also that of the anti-immigration
party Party of Freedom (PVV).2 But other arguments against the EU have also surfaced such as
the neo-liberal anti-social character of the Union raised by the Socialist Party (SP) 3. However
other parties such as the Christen Democrats (CDA) and the Social Democrats (PvdA) together

1
Frits Bolkestein, ‘De grenzen van Europa’, (Tielt, 2004) 31.
2
VVD, ‘Voor een werkend Europa 2009-2010’
http://geertruidenberg.vvd.nl/europees_verkiezingsprogramma_2009-2014_8463 (visited (30-3-2011); PVV, ‘PVV
Visie’, http://www.pvv-europa.nl/index.php/visie.html.
3
SP, ‘Een beter Europa begint in Nederland: programma van de SP voor de verkiezingen van het Europees
Parlement 2009-2014’,

2
with the Radical Liberals (D’66) and even the Green Party (GroenLinks) have remained, if
sometimes lukewarm, supporters of European integration.
The general feeling thus remains that eurosceptics (a sceptical approach to the process of
European integration) in the Netherland is a relatively new phenomena, having its origins in
nineteen nineties, while also being a minority opinion. All superficial evidence seems to point out
that the Netherlands have always been a Europhile (a positive approach to the process of
European integration) nation. It was among the founding fathers of the BeNeLux, the European
Coal and Steal Community (ECSC) and the European Communities (EC). This idea of Dutch
europhilia would seem to be affirmed in, as said, public surveys. The question that than rises is:
was the 2005 “No” vote a one-off? Was it just this particular issue that the Dutch voters disliked
about the EU or is it a sign of a more systemic form of euroscepticism in Dutch society? In turn
such a question leads us to more generic question of: Whether during the image of the
Netherlands as an Europhile nation is historically correct? This is the question this essay will
explore. It will do so by looking at three actors of the European Integration in the Netherlands
during the second half of the twentieth century. The most interesting subjects are Dutch political
parties and the Dutch public since they show both the general attitude towards Integration as well
as the specific ideological differences. However we will also look at the attitude of the Dutch
government during the formative years of European integration. The reason to do so is that in this
period there are no clear positions yet on European Integration along party lines and discussion
on the route towards European integration were mainly held within the government. This leads us
to the following three actors. 1. The Dutch government at the start of the European project (1945-
1958) 2. political parties (1958-2000) 3. The Dutch public (1970-2000) in which the choice for
this particular period is based on the availability of relevant data. These three actors will be
discussed in three different chapters looking in to different pieces of data to try to give a clear
picture of the changes in attitude towards the EU integration. However first we need to get to
better definitions than euroscepticism and europhilia.4

2. Definition
4
Peter C. Hylarides, ‘The Netherlands: from Eurosceptisicm to Europhoria’, Contemporary Review (1629, 2001) 225-
230.

3
The debate about the opinions on European integration has started with the research on the
negative perception of this process but has ever since progressed to encompass the full spectrum.
Today we have three major methodological models by which to analyze the opinions towards the
European integration: 1. Taggart & Szyzerbiak 2. Mudde & Kopecky 3. Flood. The major
difference between these models are the scales within which they place the different opinions.
Taggart and Szyzerbiak were the first to create a model by which to analyze euroscepsis. They
defined euroscepsis as: having critique both in a qualified and conditional way as well as in an
unqualified way on the process of European Integration. They divided this critique into two
subsections: hard-euroscepsis and soft-euroscepsis. Hard-euroscepsis being fundamental and
unqualified critique of European Intergration, basically the rejection of the entire idea. Soft-
euroscepsis is the critique on the way the European Union and other European institutions
function, soft-euroscepsis does thus not reject the whole idea of European integration but rather
the current form it is given.5
This model, although it has widely contributed to the field, has drawn critique by among
others Mudde and Kopecky and Flood because of its lack of nuance. Their argument is that
especially the definition of soft-euroscepsis is so broad that almost all political parties co and
most people in general could in some way or sense be classified as euroscepsis. This means that
the class becomes so big that it hardly informative anymore. To exemplify this Mudde and
Kopecky argue that all political parties, except possibly the CDA, qualify as soft-eurosceptics
even though there is a vast difference of opinions.6
Mudde and Kopecky have thus formulated a system in which general opinion on the
European Integration is spread over four attitudes. These attitudes stand in a 2x2 table with on the
vertical axes europhilia and europhobia and of the horizontal axes EU-optimists and EU
pessimists (see table 1.1) . Europhilia and Europhobia on the vertical axes refer to the general
attitude towards European integration, Europhilia indicating a accepting the idea of European
integration and Europhobia indicating the rejection of the idea. Europositivism and
euroscepticism on the horizontal axes address the attitude towards the EU and her institution. EU-
optimist thus means an attitude in which the current state of the EU is accepted and or that it is
5
P. Taggart and A. Szczerbiak, ‘Opposing Europe: Party Systems and Opposition to the Union, the Euro and
Europeanisation’, SEI Working paper 36 (2000).
6
Cas Mudde and Peter Kopecky, ‘Euroscepsis: een conceptualisatie’ Euroscepsis in Nederland Ed. Hans Vollaard en
Bartho Boer, (Utrecht, 2005) 15-21; Chrisopher Flood, ’Ideological Factors in Party Alignment on the EU: A
comparison in three cases’ Paper presented at EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference (2007).

4
developing the right direction, EU-pessimist means a critical attitude towards the EU and the idea
that it is developing in the wrong way.7
Tabel 1

General Attitude towards European Integration

Europhilia Europhobia

General EU-Optimist Europositivism Europragmatism

Attitude
towards the EU-Pessimist Euroscepticism Euronegativism
EU.
Together this leads to four specific attitudes in which one of each general attitude can be
found. euroscepsism is thus an attitude in which one is supportive of the general idea of European
integration but critical of its current direction of development while europragmatists are opposed
to the generally idea of European Integration but accept that as long as the institute is there it
functions quite well. euronagativism denounce every aspects of European integration and the EU
and europositivists are supporters of European integration as well as the current development of
the EU.8
At first glance this model seems to give a wider variation of types in which to place the
attitude towards the European project. This however is only partly true, certainly if applied to the
Netherlands. Although it is true that the model makes a clearer distinction in the reasoning or
even ideological factors behind a certain position towards the EU it does so in skewed way. This
becomes fascinatingly clear if we apply this model to the Dutch political parties. No single Dutch
political party, even the PVV, rejects the entire European project out of hand. That means that the
euronegativism is already a useless term for the Dutch case. Equally one would be hard pressed
to find europragmatism among the Dutch parties, if there is criticism on the EU it is not the
principal idea of integration, but the current trajectory of the integration. That leaves us with only
two possible categories: europositivsm and eurosceptism. If applied strictly only perhaps CDA
would qualify as europositivist all other parties would be eurosceptist. Huib Pellikaan and Gijs
Brandsma are a little more lenient and position GroenLinks, D’66 and PvdA also, though barely,
7
Mudde and Kopecky, ‘Euroscepsis’, 15-21.
8
Mudde and Kopecky, ‘Euroscepsis’, 15-21.

5
in the Europositivist camp. This however still means that only two out four possible types of
variation are applicable and that within the types there still remain a huge differences.9
This problem is recognized by Christopher Flood, although he also concedes that a large
number of variation types also brings problems while analyzing a social phenomena. Floods main
criticism of Kopecky and Mudde is based on the fact that they view the ideological differences
towards the European integration as a binary state either for it (europhilia) or against it
(europhobia) Flood argues that between these two there is a more complex and nuanced field of
opinions. To cope with these problems Flood has set up a model that consists of six types to
describe the attitude towards the European project which are displayed in tabel 2.10
Tabel 2

Maximalist Pushing integration as far and as fast as is feasible towards the practical
realization of a chosen model.
Reformist Endorsing advance of integration, subject to remedying the deficiencies of
what has already been achieved.
Gradualist Accepting some advance of integration, as long as it is slow and piecemeal.
Minimalist Accepting the status quo, but wanting to limit further integration as far as
possible.
Revisionist Wanting to return to an earlier state, usually before a treaty revision.
Rejectionist Outright refusal of integration, coupled to opposition to participation.

This model gives the user a great liberty in analysis certain standpoint. This liberty is
obviously found in the fact that there is greater range of types but also in the fact that the types
can be applied on the specific items instead on just only the entire EU or the ideological idea of
European integration. A party or a person can thus have a maximalist ideology but reformist
political ideas. This makes the model much more applicable to the Dutch case and it is thus the
model which will be used during the rest of this essay.11
With this model it is now become possible to specify the research question. On the basis
of the information already spoken of in the introduction it would be expected to find the Dutch
government, population and political parties during the latter half of twentieth century to be either
maximalist or reformists. Hence a more specified version of the research question of the essay is:

9
Huib Pellikaan and Gijs Jan Brandsma, ‘Ruimtelijk model voor onderzoek naar euroscepsis toegepast op
Nederlandse en Vlaamse politieke partijen‘, Euroscepsis in Nederland Ed. Hans Vollaard en Bartho Boer, (Utrecht,
2005) 89-108.
10
Flood, ’Ideological Factors in Party Alignment on the EU’, 1-11
11
Flood, ’Ideological Factors in Party Alignment on the EU’, 1-11

6
Is it true that the Dutch government, population and political parties can during the second half
of the twentieth century be qualified as either maximalist or reformists?

3. The Dutch Government

With the invasion of the Netherland by the German military on the 10 th of may 1940 it had
become clear that the formal Dutch strategy of strict neutrality had failed. It was a message that
came loud and clear to the Dutch government. Even while it remained in exile in London the
government started working on a plan to bring the Netherlands into a large whole. The first
dividends of this new attitude towards foreign policy came already before the whole of the
country was freed from German occupation with the signing of the BeNeLux treaty in London in
September 1944. With this treaty the Netherlands bound itself to multilateral economic
cooperation with Belgium and Luxemburg. But this was not the only form of European
cooperation in which the Dutch government in exile was involved in. Talks about cooperation in
the fields of economics and defends with Norway and Belgium had predated the BeNeLux treaty.
The government in exile had also had negotiations with France and Belgium to form a customs
union or come to any other form of cooperation. These negations finally lead in 1946 to the little
known Conseil Tripartite discussion Forum.12
Although the Dutch government clearly was involved in many discussion that strove
towards European cooperation on some level it was not willing to relinquish sovereignty just for
cooperation’s sake. The Ducth government saw the Netherlands, rightly or wrongly, as a middle-
great power or the smallest of the colonizing powers, and it wanted to keep its influence. Foreign
Affairs Minster van Kleffens (1894-1983) dreaded becoming another Denmark or Greece. Within
that perspective European cooperation should always mean that the Dutch gained influence in
return for giving up a little bit of sovereignty. It thus isn’t strange that talks on a customs union
with France couldn’t be agreed on as that would mean that the Netherland would be joined with a
great power which could easily overrule it. Balance of power within any form of cooperation was
the ideal for the Dutch government. A form of cooperation in which the great countries would
balance each other out and that would thus give the Netherlands the ability to play the role of
mediator. In that light it also isn’t strange that the Dutch government didn’t feel much for any
ideas for the creation European federation of states, an idea that was floated just after the end of
12
H. Daalder, ‘Nederland en de wereld, 1940-1945’ , De kracht van Nederland Internationale positie en
Buitenlandsbeleid’, ed. N.C.F. van Sas (Bloemendaal, 1991)119-149.

7
World War Two. Then minister Van Schaik (1882-1962) dismissed the idea as an utopian
figment of the imagination.13
We see this same type of reasoning when the Dutch government had to decide on its
participation in the European Coal and Steal Community. The Dutch government was in principal
opposed to joining the ECSC as the country had little heavy industry and saw thus that it had
little to gain from joining, on the other hand it would lose a part of sovereignty. Prime minister
Drees expected that such a union would prove to be more of a burden than a boon to the
Netherlands. In the end however the government did agree to join this new organization because
it felt internationally factors, such as pressure by the Americans but also the ability to bind
Germany in a European program, made it an unfortunate necessity.14
Where European integration did meet Dutch interest, the separate Dutch
governments did advocate it. Economic integration of West-Europe was a point in case. The
abolition of trade tariffs and bilateral trade deals and the creation of mutually interchangeable
currencies were policies that were perceived to help rebuild the Dutch economy that was mostly
reliant on West-European trade. These needs were given voice during the 1950’s by the Dutch in
the Strikken-plan and the Beyen-plan, both plans on European integration advocated the creation
of a common European market. The Dutch government made it clear that economic integration
took precedence over any other kind of integration. This is reflected in Prime Minster Drees’
strong reservation towards supranational organizations, in his opinion countries would never
relinquish enough authority to such organizations to make them effective. In such a case Drees
argued, supranational organization would hinder economic integration rather than propelling it. If
we view this early era of European integration we can see that the Dutch eventually got much
what they wanted. In 1958 the treaty of Rome was signed creating a European common market
within the European Economic Community while the ideas for a European Political Community
(EPC) and the European Defense community both failed to failed. This is not to say that the
Dutch government was opposed to these initiatives, its attitude can rather be described as

13
H.A. Schaeper, Het Nederlands veiligheidsbeleid 1945-1950, De kracht van Nederland Internationale positie en
Buitenlandsbeleid’, ed. N.C.F. van Sas (Bloemendaal, 1991) 150-170; A.G. Harryvan en A.E. Kersten, Nederland, de
Benelux en de ‘relance européene’, 1954-1955’ De kracht van Nederland Internationale positie en
Buitenlandsbeleid’, ed. N.C.F. van Sas (Bloemendaal, 1991) 171-191; Daalder, ‘Nederland en de wereld’ 119-149.
14
Schaeper, Het Nederlands veiligheidsbeleid’, 150-170; Harryvan en A.E. Kersten, ‘Nederland, de Benelux en de
‘relance européene’ 171-191;

8
sceptical, the only cooperation it gave a full throated support was economic integration and this
was finalized.15

4. political parties
This chapter will look the attitude of the three major political movements (Liberals, Social-
Democrats and the Christian Democrats). As the European Project was given form and substance
political parties began to form more sophisticated ideas regarding European integration. It thus
becomes possible to categories their approach to European Integration. conservative-liberal party
VVD. During the 1960’s and the 1970’s the VVD changed from a party that was skeptical of the
possibilities European integration to a party that saw Europe taking over many socio-economic
policies form the member states. Under such party prominent as Pieter Oud (1886-1968) the party
line had been that that European Integration was a strictly economic project and that state
sovereignty should be protected as much as possible. But with the changing of party leadership
to such people as Hans Wiegel (1941) this line changed. First the party began recognizing
European Integration as way to form a anti-communist block of European nations. And as social
liberals such as Cees Berkhouwer (1919-1992) gained power within the party ideas such as an
European currency, an European time zone and European television programs became official
party points. The attitude of the VVD towards economic integration had always been maximalist
but during the 1960’s and 1970’s its approach to integration on other levels changed from a
minimalist stance in which it rejected other forms of integration to a maximalist approach in
which it launched ideas for an ever increasing number of European tasks. This maximalist
approach continued throughout the 80’s and only truely started to change with the rise to power
of the earlier mentioned Frits Bolkestein. He argued that the Europe had taken on to many tasks
that belonged to the national level, naming the European agriculture policy as a prominent
example of such a task. In his opinion the purpose of European integration was principally
economic and secondary to overcome those problems that were truly border crossing such as
international criminality and immigration and certainly not to subsidies farmers. In short Europe
should do only those things that cannot be done in any way other on the national level. Another
point of contention that Bolkestein raised was contribution paid by the government of the
Netherlands to the European budget, arguing that the Dutch paid much more per capita than any
15
Hylarides, ‘The Netherlands’, 225-230; Schaeper, Het Nederlands veiligheidsbeleid’, 150-170; Harryvan en A.E.
Kersten, ‘Nederland, de Benelux en de ‘relance européene’ 171-191.

9
other member state. In many ways this meant that the VVD changed its views on Europe from
maximalist to revisionist. Bolkestein’s course change proved an enduring one as following party
leaders all took a more sceptical approach to European integration. One point did however
change and that was Bolkestein’s line on EU enlargement and especially Turkey’s membership.
Bolkestein argued that on the basis of national identity that Turkey could not join and that union
was large enough as it was. The official VVD line has however been that Turkey can join and it
has voted for the last rounds of EU enlargement. What is more is that the VVD is also part of the
European Liberal Party, a party that is much more supportive of further European integration than
the VVD’s national profile would imply. In this light the current VVD is more a gradualist party
accepting and voting for certain forms of further European integration.16
Contrary to the VVD the social-democratic Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) was a strong
proponent of European integration. It was an idea that almost organically fitted into the
internationalist social-democratic worldview. An important exemption from this general attitude
was PvdA its Prime-Minister Willem Drees who feared that European integration would lead to
catholic domination. Despite Drees the PvdA was a strong proponent of positive European
integration meaning that the party strove towards common European policies in such eara’s as the
economy and defence. The party was subsequently disappointed when the European Economic
Community proved to be based on negative integration policies such as the banning of trade
tariffs. The party however continued pushing for positive integration and a transport of
sovereignty from the national level to the European level in true maximist style. During the
1970’s the attitude of the party changed as the critique within the party grew that there was only
economic integration without the formulation of economic or social policy on a European level.
What was even more problematic for the party was the lack of democracy in the process. The
party started formulating its consent with further European integration increasingly along
conditional lines. Further integration could be agreed with if it was accompanied with
democratization and institutionalization. In short the party changed to more Gradualist approach
on Europe. At the start of the 1980’s the party was even more critical stating that European
cooperation should be reformed to form a socialist Europe. This was the most critical the party
got and during the second half of the 1980’s the party changed its stands back to unequivocal
support for European integration stating that every Dutchman should become a citizen of the
16
Bartho Boer, ‘Euroscepsis en liberalisme in Nederland’, Euroscepsis in Nederland ed. Hans Vollaard & Bartho
Boer, (Utrecht, 2005) 129-150.

10
European Community and that the Dutch government should commit its legislation to the
European Parliament rather than the Dutch Parliament. The fact that there now was a European
parliament was of course important for this course change, but Ruud Koele and Marianne Raap
also suggest that the end of political polarization and the return of the PvdA to coalition
government was important for this change. This all meant that the party much more supportive of
European integration and less critical of European institutions. The party fully supported EU
enlargement and the enlargement of EU mandate making it once more a maximalist party.17
For Christian Democrats and especially for the protestants European integrations was a
difficult subject. Within the Dutch political spectrum there were until 1980 three major political
parties based on Christian Democratic principles: the Catholic Katholieke Volks Partij (KVP) and
the protestant Christelijke-Historische Unie (CHU) and the Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (ARP).
The KVP stance towards European integration was simple: it was an unequivocal supporter. It
had been a founding father of the Nouvelle Equipes International (NEI). This Christian-
Democratic discussion forum proved fertile ground for political cooperation across country lines
laying a basis for European integration within the respective parties. This led prominent KVP
members such Marga Klompé, Jos Serraens and Carl Romme to be strong supporters of the
European movement in a maximalist sense. For the protestants it was more complicated, within
the protestant movement the link between European integration and the biblical story of the tower
of Babel was soon drawn. Manny protestants felt that combining all the nations of Europe in a
single institution was directly in conflict with the Devine and could hence call upon the world the
wrath of God. This meant that federalism on a European level was for the protestant parties,
opposed to KVP and PvdA, impossible. The CHU and ARP leadership already during the 1950’s
recognized that some form of European cooperation did provide some benefits. They also
accepted that that such cooperation could lead to small reduction in national sovereignty. This
attitude changed during the 1960’s as the perceived threat for the Sovjet Union became
increasingly larger so did the perceived benefits from a close cooperation between capitalist
European countries. European integration was seen as protecting shield for civilization and
freedom. This however still meant that federalism was undebatable as it was, according to the
influential ARP politician Sieuwert Bruins Slot (1906-1972), together with nationalism a pagan
ideology. In the end this meant that both protestant parties accepted economic integration and
17
Ruud Koole en Lianne Raap, ‘Euroscepsis en de sociaal-democratie in Nederland’, Euroscepsis in Nederland ed.
Hans Vollaard & Bartho Boer, (Utrecht, 2005) 109-128.

11
some forms of social-economic policy on European level. But even this hesitant approach
towards the European union meant that the parties caught a lot of flak from their electorate and
from the smaller protestant parties. The smaller reformed and evangelical parties were firmly
opposed to any kind of European integration seeing it as the devils work and they were not afraid
to use it as an electoral weapon. Despite these attack both CHU and ARP had increasingly
accepted European integration as valuable. This meant that CHU and ARP until they merged in
1980 with the KVP into the Christen-Democratisch Apell (CDA) supporters, if sometimes
reluctant, of European integration. Since the creation of the CDA however Christen Democracy
has been the strongest proponent of European integration. Although the KVP’s federalist ideal
never made it into the CDA manifesto the party was a strong supporter of European growth both
in the sense of tasks for its institution as for the number of member states. It remained so
throughout the rest of the twentieth century though it had some critical remarks of the
governments European course during the 1990’s as the party the entire Christen-Democratic
movement was reduced to the opposition for the first time since 1918. Together with its now anti-
federalism the CDA manifested itself as an gradualist party that generally supported European
integration.18

5. The Dutch electorate

To analyze longitudinal shifts in attitude towards European integration among the Dutch public
we have two instruments to our disposal. The Eurobarometer and the Nationaal Kiezers
Onderzoek (NKO); the National Electoral Research. Of these two the Eurobarometer gives the
best uninterrupted trend of the general attitude of the Dutch public towards integration. This
polling instrument was instituted in the 1974 and has ever since polled on questions relating to
the public’s general attitude towards the European Community, the Common Market and/or the
European Union. The NKO is a poll that has been done on a wide variety political issues, among
which are European issues, a month before and a month after national election. The main
problem with this instrument is the inconsistency with which European issues are part of the
survey. Although Joop van Holsteyn and Josje den Ridder have made an analysis of attitude

18
Hans Vollaard, ‘Euroscepsis en protestantisme in Nederland’, Euroscepsis in Nederland ed. Hans Vollaard &
Bartho Boer, (Utrecht, 2005) 151-176.

12
towards the European integration on the basis of the data from the NKO this essay will make use
of the Eurobarometer for its more transparent and complete character.19
This essay will look into four question from the Eurobarometer to give an accurate
measure of the general attitude of the Dutch public towards European integration: 1. Generally
speaking, do you think that Dutch membership of the European community is a good thing, a bad
thing or neither good nor bad? 2. Taking everything into consideration would you say the
Netherlands have on balance benefited or not from membership of the European community? 3.
If you were told tomorrow that the European community was scrapped would you be very
relieved, very worried, or indifferent? 4. In general are you for efforts being made to unify
Western Europe? Are you very much for, to some extent for, to some extent against or very much
against? These four question all go into whether the respondent in general feels that the European
integration is a good or a bad thing. Positive answers on question about membership, benefits of
membership and unification and a negative answer on redrawing from that community all
indicate a positive attitude towards European integration while the reverse answers indicate a
negative attitude. With the question the question on unification also shows us in some measure
the extent in which respondents are supportive of European integration.20

19
Joop van Holsteyn & Josje den Ridder, ‘Een reus in de polder? Nederlanse kiezers en het electorale belang van
Europese intergratie’ Euroscepsis in Nederland ed. Hans Vollaard & Bartho Boer, (Utrecht, 2005) 23-44.
20
Eurobarometer, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm, (visited 4-4-2011).

13
Figure 1 Source: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm

Figure 1 represent a line over time showing the percentages of the answers of the
respondents to question 1. We see that on the basis of this graph support of the European
community is very high with generally more than 70% of respondents indicating that membership
is generally a good thing and only small percentages of people, generally no more than 10%
indicating that is a bad thing. The trend among those indicating that membership is a good thing
is positive from 1973 until 1990 and negative there after though scores never go below 60%.
Figure 2 show similar strong support of the statement that the Netherland benefit from the
European Community with generally around 60% of respondents indicating this to be the case. In
contrast to question one however the percentage of respondents giving a negative answer is also
higher. With until 2002 generally a stable number of around 16% of respondents saying The
Netherlands did not benefit from the European Community a number that hiked up to more than
30% after 2002 before coming down into the 20s during the period 2008-2010. Together with the
negative hike around 2002 the percentage of those indicating they didn’t know whether the

14
Netherlands benefitted fell while the positive answer remained steady after an initial dip. This
meant that those undecided on the benefits of the European community were making up their
mind in a negative sense. However a strong majority still remains devoted to the idea of a
European Community from which the Dutch benefit.

the

Figure 2 Source: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm

In figure three we once against see that majority of the public is generally in favour of the idea of
the European Community as a majority of people, with a single exception in 2002, indicate that
they would be very sorry if it would be scrapped. Here we see a steady trend with around 50% of
the people indicating that they would be very sorry. This however falls quite sharply after 1993
dipping below 40% in between 2001 and 2003. At the same time we see that around 30% of the
public is indifferent to the fate of the European Community with only a low percentage of people
indicating that they would very relieved. Both these number show a rise equal to the fall of the
positive answer. However relative support of the European Community remains relatively strong
with support returning to 49% in 2004.

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Figure 3 Source: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm

Generally we might thus say that support of the European Intergation has been high among the
Dutch public. Negatives are on the rise but so far the positives remain high. If we then look at
how strong this positive feeling is with question 4 in figure 4 we get a more nuanced picture
though this question has been in the only been in the survey until 1995. What we can however see
is that strong support of unification steadily fell from in the 30s in the period before 1987 to the
low 20s in 1995. At the same time we see that the combined negative answer bare get above 20%
though this is steadily rising throughout the entire 1973-1995 period. Of this 20% the majority is
to some extent against with only around 5% saying they are very much against.

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Figure 4 Source http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm

Together the answers to these questions indicate that support for European Integrations in general
is strong within the Dutch public with consistent majorities giving positives answers when asked
about the process. We can also say that with a declining number of people indicating that they are
very much for unifying Western Europe and consistently small numbers of people indicating they
would like to see the European Community scrapped that both maximalist and rejectionist
opinions represent minorities within the Netherlands. On the basis of the fact that most people
support European integration, but 50% or more indicate they only support it to some extent, we
can say the majority of Dutch is probably in the gradualist or reformists categories for the period
1975-2000.

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 6. Conclusion
We must thus conclude that the Netherlands in the second half of the twentieth century are hard
to describe either as europhile or eurosceptic. If we look at the attitude of the Dutch government
during the formative years of European integration (1940-1958) we see that is was not dismissive
of political or defence integration but it would be best to describe its attitude as lukewarm. For
the Dutch economic integration took precedence over any other form of integration. We see that
prominent figures in the government such as Prime Minister Drees had strong reservations
against reducing national sovereignty in favour of European institutions. What the Dutch
government feared above all was that it would lose influence, its tactical responds was that it
constantly sought a balance of power. This meant that proposal in which one or two great
European powers would gain a dominant position within any form of cooperation were seen as
not in the interest of the Dutch people. Genrally we may thus say that the Dutch government was
in favour of European integration but only on the basis on its own conditions. On the whole the
Dutch government did agree with the such far-reaching projects as the EPC and EPD but on the
other hand it voted against the creation of a customs union and a common foreign policy. In the
period 1940-1959, the Dutch Government as a representative of the Dutch people can thus by no
means be described as maximalist, rather it can be seen as reformist or gradualist if we apply
those definitions in such a way that they include not only critique in exciting treaties but also
critique on possible paths of integration.
If we look at the stand points of the major political parties since the foundation of the EEC
we see that their approaches have varied. They have certainly not been continued strong
supporters of the integration process neither has there been a consensus on the goal of such
integration. Only the CDA and its catholic predecessor KVP have been continued supporters of
the process integration. Both VVD and PvdA have seen fluctuations in their attitude to the role,
the need and form of European integration. Their general attitudes have varied between
maximalist and minimalist approaches. What we can say however is that all parties have
throughout the twentieth century remained supporters of the general idea of European integration.
We can also conclude that at end of the twentieth century all the major parties have abandoned
the ideal of federalism. That is to say that all parties by now accept that a united states of Europe
should not be the end goal of the European integration. In other words European integration is not
supported unconditionally.

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 Throughout the 1970’s until the end of the twentieth century support for European
integration within the Dutch public has also been strong. Generic support for the European
community has never fallen below 50% it is thus fair to say that European integration has a
mandate within the Dutch population. However as we seen with the government and political
parties this support does not seem to be unconditional.
Can we thus say that during the second half of the twentieth century there was support
within the Netherlands for European integration? The answer is yes. The government and later
the political parties in general formulated policies in favour of European integration and the
public supported the idea. This support has however not been full and never unconditional. Ideas
about the terms, the cost, the endgoal, etc. have fluctuated. The conclusion that the Netherlands
thus is not a maximalist country is a valid point. At its strongest the Netherlands have been a
reformists country with strong support for economic integration but differing views on political
and social integration. For the last years of the twentieth and the first few years of the twenty-first
century a gradualism attitude seems to be a more apt description as the negatives of political
integration are on the rise within the public and political support has become increasingly
conditional.

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