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Dissertation

Abstract

In this essay I will defend a version of Kripke’s necessity of origin thesis. Firstly I will exposit
Kripke’s n.56, and lay out his argument. Following that I will detail Salmon’s response to it. Salmon
purports to show the extra premise Kripke needs to complete his argument. I will then show
Cameron’s response to Salmon, which points out that this premise is unacceptable for those with anti-
essentialist intuitions. I will then respond to Cameron with a thesis for the essentiality of origin that
uses identity, rigid designation and Leibniz’ law. I will show how that this solves Cameron’s belief
that his W3* cannot be shown to be an impossible world without assuming essentiality of origin. I
will make an attempt to further extend my argument by arguing that tables that are not identical to
their hunks can be shown to have their origin essentially by this principle.

Introduction to Kripke

In lecture III of Naming and Necessity Kripke puts forth an argument for necessary connections
between distinct existents contra Hume. Particularly, he makes a case for some object having an
essentiality of origin. Some objects, according to Kripke, essentially have the origin that they actually
have. The general principle seems to be: for certain types of x, if x’s origin is actually y, then x’s
origin is essentially y.

Kripke gives two examples of this purported necessity of origin. Case 1: the Queen necessarily has the
parents she has, or is necessarily derived from the zygote that she is actually derived from. Case 2: if a
table that is actually derived from a certain hunk of wood, then it is necessarily derived from that hunk
of wood which. I will focus on the essentiality of origin for tables throughout this essay, though I
think that with a certain amount of tweaking, I can demonstrate show how my thesis can also apply to
the Queen/zygote case.

In footnote 56, Kripke gives ‘something like a proof’[ CITATION Kri81 \p "114 n.56" \l 2057 ] of the
principle ‘if a material object has its origin from a certain hunk of matter, it could not have had it its
origin in any other matter’ [ CITATION Kri81 \p "p114 n.56" \l 2057 ]. This is, of course equivalent to
the principle – If a material object’s actual origin is a certain hunk of matter, then its origin is
necessarily from that hunk of matter and no other. In logical form, using Salmon’s notation:

(x)(y)[T (x, y) (z)(T (x, z) → z = y)]

Where x is a material object, T is the origin relation and y is derived object.


In clumsy English, for all x and for all y, if x’s origin is actually y then necessary that for all z such
that x is derived from z then z is identical to y.

Background to the argument


I will undertake an exegesis of Kripke’s argument. I’ll go through lecture III leading up to n.56. It is
particularly important to examine the genesis of the argument because footnote 56. is very bare. From
reading the text we may be able to determine the possible suppressed premises that Kripke uses. From
my reading of Kripke, it seems that he puts the cart before the horse in his belief of the essentiality of
origin. He has strong intuitions for origin essentiality, and the argument is used to justify these
intuitions, rather than the other way round. He writes of the Queen ‘it seems to me that anything
coming from a different origin would not be this object’[ CITATION Kri81 \p 113 \l 2057 ]. This
intuition about objects and their origins come well before footnote 56.
Kripke first establishes that identity is the necessary relation between the thing and itself [ CITATION
Kri81 \p 108 \l 2057 ]. We then consider a situation where Hesperus and Phosphorus are 2 distinct
objects. He claims that this is not a situation where Hesperus is not Phosphorus - a denial of the
necessity of identity. In fact, it is a situation where one, the other or both of those objects is not the
object it actually is. This hints at the first of the essential properties that objects must have. The object
that is Hesperus is necessarily Phosphorus. He then introduces the arguments by the essentialist
Sprigge who asks if we can conceive of this very object (the Queen) being possibly a swan [ CITATION
Kri81 \p 111 \l 2057 ]. These rhetorical devices are understandable because of the lecture format of
these essays. However, should we really be allowed to motivate belief in essentiality because of the
limits of our conceivability CITATION Den91 \p 12 \l 2057 ?

Kripke’s argument
Kripke seems to utilise various intuition pumps1 to motivate one’s belief in the essentiality of origin.
These intuitions pumps soften us up for the ensuing footnote argument. Questions about the Queen
possibly being a swan linked to questions about whether she could be derived from different parent’s
structure our intuitions in an unhelpful way. Firstly, asking whether we could imagine the Queen to be
a swan is a sortally essentialist question – not a question about the essentiality of origin. Any intuition
produced by examining whether the Queen could have different parents can be matched by equally
compelling intuitions from an anti-essentialist position. If we transfer my gametes into another
possible world and they grow, by a series of odd happenstances into an exact model of the adult
Queen who is the head of state in that world while simultaneously the Queen’s gametes evolve into an
exact adult replica of me it seems odd to identify me with the Queen, or vice versa.

Another way of structuring our intuitions in the opposite direction is to suppose that 2 of the Queen’s
ancestors might be different. Let’s suppose that her great-great Grandmother on her mother’s side and
her great-great Grandfather on her father’s side were not who they actually are. I think it’s perfectly
possible to imagine this very Queen having partially different ancestors. However, according to
Kripke, this would not be our Queen – because with different ancestors, one has different parents. I
don’t think intuitions are particularly helpful when discussing cases of metaphysical necessity.

Footnote 56
I’m now examine footnote 56, and provide Salmon’s reinterpretation.

Argument 1:

Let ‘B’ be a name (rigid designator) of a table, let 'A' name the piece of wood from which it actually
came. Let 'C' name another piece of wood. Then suppose B were made from A, as in the actual world,
but also another table D were simultaneously made from C. (We assume that there is no relation
between A and C which makes the possibility of making a table from one dependent on the possibility
of making a table from the other.) Now in this situation B ≠D; hence, even if D were made by itself,
and no table were made from A, D would not be B. Strictly speaking, the 'proof' uses the necessity of
distinctness, not of identity.
[ CITATION Kri81 \l 2057 ] Emphasis my own.

This argument purports to use a rigid designation theory of reference, coupled with necessity of
distinctness and an independence thesis to prove an instance of the essentiality of origin. If B and D
name two separate tables as in the actual world, and they have their origin in two separate hunks of
CITATION Den91 \p 12 \l 2057
This was meant to be ironic. I hope that’s acceptable for a dissertation.
1
As described by Daniel Dennet in consciousness explained [ CITATION Den91 \p 12 \l 2057 ]
wood A and C and producing a table from one does not prevent the possibility of producing a table
from another, they are not identical, and by necessity of distinctness, they are necessarily distinct. So
by this principle, even if D was made by itself, and no table were made from A, D would not be B.
The desired conclusion is that it is not possible for table B to be made from C.

At first reading, in an unreconstructed version of the argument, all Kripke has shown is not that it is
that it is not possible that table B comes from hunk C. Rather, Kripke has shown is that even if D were
made by itself, it would not be B.

Salmon’s Reply
Salmon frames Kripke’s arguments clearly in terms of possible worlds. He strengthens the argument
to show that if we frame B as being a possible table, rather than an actual one we can show that not
only is it the case that if the origin of an object is actual it is necessary but additionally if a table’s
origin is possible, then its origin is necessary. The argument begins as follows:

We begin by letting 'B' be a name of an arbitrary possible table in an arbitrary possible world W 1. We
also let 'A' name the hunk of matter from which table B is originally constructed in W 1, and we let 'C'
name some distinct hunk of matter that also exists in W1. [...] [We] must assume at this point that
there is a possible world, call it 'W2', in which B is still a table originally constructed from hunk A,
but now a second table, which he names 'D', is constructed from hunk C in such a way that it follows
from the fact that their original component materials, A and C, are distinct that the tables B and D
are distinct.
[ CITATION Sal79 \p 708 \l 2057 ]

Salmon extends the argument by adding two additional premises in attempt to derive the desired
conclusion. Firstly he adds P1:

P1: For any table x and any hunks of matter y and y', if it is possible for table x to be originally
constructed entirely from hunk y while hunk y' does not overlap with hunk y, then it is also possible
for table x to be originally constructed entirely from hunk y while some other table x' distinct from x
is simultaneously originally constructed entirely from hunk y'.
[ CITATION Sal79 \p 708 \l 2057 ]

This is the compossibility thesis. One can derive from this that for any table produced from hunk C, it
is also possible to produce a distinct table from hunk A. Salmon’s rebuttal follows:

“The immediate conclusion that Kripke intends to derive is the assertion that table B could not
originate from hunk C, i.e., that there is no possible world in which table B is originally constructed
from hunk C. B is an arbitrary table in an arbitrary possible world W 1, and C is an arbitrary hunk of
matter that does not overlap with hunk A, B's original component material in W1. If B cannot
originate from any arbitrary hunk, then it necessarily originates from is its actual hunk. It follows
from this that if it is possible for a given table to originate from a certain hunk of matter, then it is
necessary that the given table originate from that very hunk of matter, or at least from no entirely
distinct hunk of matter.”
[ CITATION Sal79 \p 709 \l 2057 ]

In W2, B and D are distinct physical objects, hence B≠D. By necessity of distinctness B≠D. If D
were made from C by itself, in any possible world, it would not be identical to B. To illustrate the
connections between this and the necessity of origin I’ll extend Salmon’s argument to hopefully shed
light on Kripke’s intuitions. We can take another possible world W 3. In W3 a table is made from C. Is
it B? Kripke would say no. We go back to W2, the world where C & A are made into tables. The table
made from A in W2 is B, as in the actual world, and the table made from C is D. Because the table
made from C is distinct from B, by necessity of distinctness it is distinct in W 3 therefore C cannot be
the origin of B.

Sadly, this extension fails. To presume that because D or that because some non-B table is derived
from C in W2m it must be the case that some non-B table must be derived from C in W 3 is already to
assume some sort of essentiality of origin thesis.

According to Salmon’s reconstruction, without my (failed) extension what Kripke shows is not that
¬T(B,C) – that any possible table constructed from C would not be B. All he has shown is that table
D, when derived from C, even in a world where B does not exist, would not be B, by necessity of
distinctness. This is not essentiality of origin. Salmon suggests an extra premise to move from
[T(D,C)B≠D] to (x)[T(x,C)x≠D] – a thesis that implies essentiality of origin.

From here on I will discuss the reconstructions by Salmon, Cameron and others.

Reconstructions Of Kripke’s Argument


Kripke’s argument is incredibly bare. The bulk of it is under 100 words. Because of this there have
many attempts to reconstruct the argument to make it formally valid. I will explore a few of them
here.

Salmon

According to Salmon, Kripke has shown that:

(1) T(B,A) Assumption


(2) T(D,C) Assumption
(3) B≠D Assumption
(4) B≠D By necessity of distinctness axiom & (3)
(5) [T(D,C)B≠D]   introduction

What he has not shown is

N1. (x)[T(x,C)x≠B]

which is equivalent to

N2 ¬T(B,C).

This is the principle that Kripke is aiming for if he wants the basis for a proof of the necessity of
origin. Can Kripke move from (5) to a necessity of origin principle using solely uncontroversial
premises, or those derived from a theory of reference?

Salmon suggests that another premise needs to do the work to move from (5) to N1. The first
suggestion is that ‘if it is possible for table D to originate from hunk C, then it is necessary that D
must originate from hunk C’ [ CITATION Sal79 \p 711 \l 2057 ]. This would do the brunt of the work
of the argument. One would almost immediately be able to move from this to N2, the only additional
premise being needed would be the antecedent of the conditional – that it is actually possible that
T(D,C).This is a question begging premise – it is a statement of the essentiality of origin. In Salmon’s
words – it’d be a howler if it were Kripke’s missing premise [ CITATION Sal79 \p 711 \l 2057 ].
Additionally, it does not fit Kripke’s footnote argument. One does not need necessity of distinctness
to prove necessity of origin if one has this premise. If Kripke had had this premise would render much
of his footnote discussion redundant.
Salmon’s second proposal to rescue Kripke’s argument is P2 or P2’. According to Salmon, Kripke
assumes P2 as a tacit premise, though as this may be too strongly essentialist, he further weakens it to
P2’.

P2: If it is possible for a table x to originate from a hunk of matter y, then necessarily, any table
originating from hunk y is the very table x and no other.

[ CITATION Sal79 \p 711 \l 2057 ]

P2': If it is possible for a given table x to originate from a certain hunk of matter y according to a
certain plan P, then necessarily any table originating from hunk y according to precisely the same plan
P is the very table x and no other.

[ CITATION Sal79 \p 716 \l 2057 ]

P2 will get you straight to the essentiality of origin if we add the compossibility premise P1; there is
no need to appeal to (5). Again, it doesn’t fit the structure of the footnote argument. Additionally,
anyone with anti-essentialist intuitions would reject this argument, because P2 is an essentialist
premise. For anti-essentialists, a premise like P2 would only justify indulging in confusion – it
wouldn’t motivate any new believers in essentiality. Salmon finds P2 very intuitive but others may
not, and he doesn’t provide an independent motivation for it. I will now explore Cameron’s
reconstruction.

Cameron

Another approach to reconstructing Kripke’s argument involve taking D to not be a rigid designator.
There is textual support for this, as I’ve indicated in the Kripke block quote above. In n.56 Kripke
specifies that all the other hunks and tables are named. When invoking table D he writes ‘...another
table D’ and does not encase it with quotation marks. Cameron suggests that D is a table variable and
does is not a rigid designator for a particular table. Instead, it is merely the table that is derived from
C.

Though Salmon finds P2 or P2’ very convincing, Cameron does not. Intuitive appeals to essentialism
to justify a particular essentialist thesis guarantees that many will not sympathise with that argument.
Cameron argues that if he were given a block of wood he ‘could make a table that was four-legged or
three-legged, tall or short, round or square, thin or wide’ [ CITATION Cam05 \p 264 \l 2057 ] – why
would they all be identical tables? Additionally, what’s so special about a table – One man’s footstool
is another man’s table – does their identity depend on which it is? Obviously these intuitions will not
wash against the weakened premise P2’ as it implies extra sortal conditions on table identity.
However, those with anti-essentialist intuitions can reject this too.

Kripke’s project is to derive necessity of origin from his theory of reference coupled with
uncontroversial premises. We should see if we can finish the project with this design, rather than
jumping to premises that Kripke may not have used.

Cameron tries to construct essentiality of origin it using strictly Kripkean premises. He focuses on the
independence assumption, ‘there is no relation between A and C which makes the possibility of
making a table from one dependent on the possibility of making a table from the other’ [ CITATION
Cam05 \p 262 \l 2057 ]. It proceeds as follows. Let’s take a case where in the actual world B is made
from A and C is made from D. In this world, it is clear that A and C are distinct as distinct physical
objects are distinct. Because they are distinct, they are necessarily distinct – by the necessity of
distinctness. If we take a world where B is made from C but no table is made from A this seems to
violate the independence principle, as then B would not be able to be made from A as distinct tables
are distinct. It seems that the table made from C cannot be B – it is not a genuine possibility because
for it to do so, it would prevent B being made from A – violating the independence principle.

This argument preserves validity. However, if we read the independence principle as implying that the
table that is derived from a hunk restricts necessarily the possibility of particular tables being derived
from other hunks this doesn’t seem to be a principle we should accept. Why would an anti-essentialist
accept this strong reading of the essentialist principle? It seems that the only justification for a
principle would be rooted in intuitions for the essentiality of origin.

This reconstruction differs from both Salmon’s and Kripke’s. It differs from Salmon as Cameron’s
conclusion is mostly derived from Kripkean premises while Salmon’s argument can discard
requirements of the necessity of distinctness and independence. However, though it largely matches
the text of Kripke – there is clearly some value added material. Kripke relies on the necessity of
distinctness between B & D to reach his conclusion that B≠D even if B does not exist. If we treat D
as a variable, this collapses as it is not longer a rigid designator.

P.T.O
A Modest Proposal

I want to make a modest proposal to derive what I see as some value in Kripke’s argument. It is
slightly different to the other versions I have read. It relies heavily on the necessity of identity &
Leibniz’s law to justify another premise in the chain of Kripke’s reasoning. It’ll be restricted in its
application but may provide some justification for some instances of purported necessity of origin.
Briefly, I’m firstly going to claim that by Leibniz’ law & the necessity of identity the hunk from
which a table is derived is identical to it. Because they are identical, they are necessarily identical, and
by this construction their origin being the hunk is essential to it.

Salmon writes:

“We may assume, for the sake of simplicity, that when Kripke says that a table x was
originally made from a hunk of matter y, he means that table x was originally constructed entirely
from all of hunk y, i.e., that no (original) part of table x did not come from hunk y, and furthermore
that no part of hunk y did not contribute to forming part of table x. It follows from this, presumably,
that it is impossible for the same table x to be originally constructed from a hunk of matter y and at
the same time to be originally constructed from a distinct hunk’ of matter y'”
[ CITATION Sal79 \p "707 n. 4" \l 2057 ]
Diagrams like Cameron’s CITATION Den91 \p 12 \l 2057 are misleading from the perspective that they appear to
show the hunk and the table from which it is made as being two distinct objects – they are different
sizes and shapes and appear to coexist. Taking Salmon’s footnote into account, I envisage it more like
this:
Hunk O

Hunk X
Table Y
Diagram 1.
Diagram 2.

When we refer to the hunk, there are nominally two hunks that we may be referring to. Firstly there is
the hunk (Hunk O) that is the totality of the wood that surrounds and includes hunk X. Secondly there
is the hunk (Hunk X) which consists of the entirety of the material that constitutes table Y and no
extra. It seems clear that if we are going to follow Salmon’s footnote, when we say that table are
essentially derived from hunks, we are talking about hunk X, not hunk O.

If we were talking about hunk O, it is likely we would prove too much when arguing for essentially of
origin. If we could prove that tables not only essentially have their origin in the wood from which they

CITATION Den91 \p 12 \l 2057


For example, see this image:
were actually made but also in the wood surrounding the wood of which they were actually made –
what’s to stop the argument running on and proving that the workshop in which the table was created,
or the particular space-time location of the object are essential to it. This doesn’t seem to be
something that modern supporters of the essentiality of origin are willing to
accept CITATION Den91 \p 12 \l 2057 .

If we have an unrestricted composition then, the spatial coordinates that mark out Hunk X are an
object. While hunk O and table Y are, by Leibniz’ law not identical, hunk X and table Y seem to
follow the principle ∀F(Fx ↔ Fy)→x=y. They both consist in the same material, the only thing that
differs from the two is that hunk x is sheathed by a wooden cladding and table y is not. It seems that
hunk X and hunk y are numerically identical. Firstly, I will run through my argument and then in the
next section I will discuss some criticisms that Leibniz’ law does not indicate that hunk X = table Y.

Following the above, let’s assume that hunk X and table Y are identical objects. When we form table
Y out of hunk X we are not so much as forming a new object out of distinct, old one we are revealing
a pre-existing object. From this principle there are an almost infinite amount of tables contained
within Hunk O, each one is its own individual ‘hunk’, and each one is necessarily connected to the
material from which it would have came if it had been revealed. The traced lines in Diagram 1
represent a possible table. Each time Hunk O is destroyed to reveal an individual table, that table is
identical to the ‘hunk’ from which it actually came, in the case of table y it is hunk x. If the hunk were
different then the tables that are revealed from it will be different. Table Y=X, so if table Y were
derived from hunk X in the actual world, it is necessarily identical to hunk X - (X=Y)

This seems like a long way from footnote 56. but I shall attempt to show that principles that are
invoked here are similar to n.56. I’m going to argue by reduction ad absurdum that if it’s the case that
in the actual world X is the origin of Y, it is the case that it is not possible that any other Z could be
the origin of Y. This models the proof in n.56 for the necessity of identity. To do this I claim that
X=Y, and by necessity of identity, (X=Y). From here onwards, I will show that because of this there
is no other object such that it can be the origin of Y.

Let’s posit some arbitrary distinct hunk Z which is the origin of Y, that is, it is distinct from X, such
that it could be the origin of Y, while @T(Y,X). So ZX and T(Y,Z). By the intuition above Z=Y.
However, if Z=Y and Y=X then X=Z. If Z is identical to table X then by S5, or the symmetry of the
accessibility relation between possible worlds, or the transitivity of identity then Z is identical to Y.
However, we have already specified that Z≠Y so either ¬ (Z=X) or ¬(Y=X). If it’s the case in the
actual world that Y originates from X, we determine that Y=X, thus we can discard the case where
¬(Y=X). So it must be the case that ZY. By necessity of distinctness (ZY). Because we are
talking about arbitrary tables and arbitrary hunks, it seems that from this we can derive the essentially
of origin for table Y – i.e. (X)(Y)[T(X,Y) (Z)(T(X, Z) → Z=Y)].

More formally:
(1) ¬(X=Z) As hunks are actually distinct
(2) @T(Y,X) Y is derived from X, as in the actual world
(3) T(Y,X)X=Y Above thesis
(4) X=Y  elimination
(5) T(Z,Y) Assumption for RAA
(6) T(Z,Y)Z=Y Above thesis
(7) Z=Y  elimination
(8) X=Z By S5 and (4) & (7)
(9) (X=Z)&¬(X=Z) Contradiction
(10)¬(T(Z,Y)) Conclusion CITATION Den91 \p 12 \l 2057

CITATION Den91 \p 12 \l 2057


Contra Leibniz, who under some readings believed that all things predicates of an object are
essential to it.
The conclusion has not got the force of necessity. However, because I’ve made no specific
assumptions about the table Y other than that it made from X and the origin relation in certain cases is
a necessary identity relation – it seems that (10) is a necessary truth. For any Z, such that Z≠X, it is
not possible for it to be origin of Y.

First I am going to dispute an argument that Cameron makes in his article – that his W3* cannot be
shown to be an impossible world without assuming essentiality of origin. Kripke claims that W3 is an
impossible world if B=D – as two distinct objects cannot be identical. Cameron claims that W3 is
only impossible if the compossibility claim holds.

[Kripke claims] since it is possible to make B from A, if it is possible to make D from C then there
exists a world where both D is made from C and B is made from A. [...] It is not clear why, if we are
not essentialists about origin the table B(=D) cannot be made from the fusion of blocks of wood A
and C. In which case W3 is better drawn as W3*. I cannot think of a reason why W3* is impossible
that does not assume the essentiality of origin.
[ CITATION Cam05 \p 272-273 \l 2057 ]

The reductio only goes through if the possibility of W1 (where T(B,A)) and the possibility of W2
(where T(C,D)) entails the possibility of W3. But that entailment only succeeds, it seems, if the
compossibility claim is true: that if it’s possible to make B from A and possible to make D from C
then it is possible to make B from A and make D from C[ CITATION Cam05 \p 273 \l 2057 ]. But the
compossibility claim does not look plausible unless one accepts the essentiality of origin. I dispute
that to get to W3 one needs to hold compossibility. With my depiction of the mechanics of necessity
of origin, it seems possible to dispute Cameron’s conclusion.

If table Y is made only and entirely out of hunk X, they are identical; by necessity of identity they are
necessarily identical. If we take another hunk, hunk Z and construct table P out of it. Hunk Z and
hunk X are such that they are distinct. By necessity of identity and necessity of distinctness, Y=X
and Z=P and Z≠Y. It is possible now to construct W3 without going beyond S5 or assuming the
compossibility claim (p&q)(p&q). Additionally, if Y=X and Z=P and Z≠Y then, by
transitivity of identity X≠P. So W3* is an impossible world.

CITATION Den91 \p 12 \l 2057


I’m aware that I’m moving between possible worlds here without notation. Howeverm as
I’m constantly deriving identitym which is necessary, my logic remains valid, if a little sloppy.
Possible criticisms

What is limiting about this proof is that it requires no manipulation on the part of the table for it to be
sound. For the identity relation to hold between X and Y, nothing can be added to Y as it will no
longer will satisfy the Leibniz law criterion for identity. If we were making foldable tables, or tables
which change and include outside parts, it’s not clear that this proof will work. Additionally, other
objects that change or lose their parts will not be necessarily identified with their origins using this
argument. This argument needs heavy modification to ensure essentiality of origin for the Queen and
her actual zygotes. I believe it is possible, though it would only be contingently necessary that the
Queen is derived from her zygote as it requires some sameness of material and it may not be the case
that we all retain the material from our zygotes throughout our lives.

In this section I’m going to that argue Leibniz’ law is applicable in this case. I will attempt to
demonstrate that only internal properties are relevant in determining identity from Leibniz law.
Secondly I’m going to attempt to extend the argument and argue that even though the table changes
over time, it remains essentially connected to its origin. Thirdly I’m going to examine the egg, flour,
cake case CITATION Den91 \p 12 \l 2057 and examine the problems that it produces for my demonstration of the
necessity of origin.

Applicability of Leibniz law.

The first claim against my depiction that actual origin entails necessity of origin because of necessity
of identity in the above case is that Leibniz law is not applicable. Opponents may claim that ¬(hunk
X= table Y) because it’s not the case that they share all and only the same properties. For example
they may claim that hunk x might be located in a workshop, while table Y might be located in a house
or they may claim that hunk x is sheathed by wood, while table y is not, or that hunk x has the
relationship of parthood to hunk o, while table y does not. Because of these different properties,
Leibniz’ law and thus identity does not apply, and my argument fails. I claim that the properties
required for a valid implementation of Leibniz law are only intrinsic properties, as the properties
listed above are relational properties, it does not matter if these change.

To illustrate why this is the case, let’s take the case of an arbitrary object p and change its
environment. If we change its location, cover it or surround it by other objects (say to make a pile of
objects such that p is part of the pile) its relational properties change CITATION Den91 \p 12 \l 2057 . If we accept
Leibniz’ law applies to relational properties, as we change the relational properties around p it seems
that p goes out of existence. If we reverse these changes p comes back. It seems very odd to say that
by changing relational properties we can force objects out of existence. Additionally, it violates the
uniqueness of composition thesis CITATION Den91 \p 12 \l 2057 . This is why I think my use of Leibniz’s law as
applying to only intrinsic properties is acceptable.

Accounting for tables made from disparate parts.

In the argument I gave in the previous section I characterised the forming of table y from hunk x as
the revealing, or unsheathing of a previously existing objects. It was easy to demonstrate that if we
mapped out the connected spatial coordinates that contain object x that that object was identical to the
spatial coordinates that constitute y. However, what happens when you have tables made from
disparate objects? For example, if a table is made from separate planks? In forming the table one
brings the planks together. Is it still the case that the y=x? I think so. In this case, one would map the

CITATION Den91 \p 12 \l 2057


Kindly pointed out to me by Andrew McGonigal.
CITATION Den91 \p 12 \l 2057
Note that I’m modelling the things that happen to hunk x.
CITATION Den91 \p 12 \l 2057
Which is in turn implied by Leibniz’ Law and unrestricted composition, so to allow relational
properties would contradict two relatively uncontroversial pillars of my thesis.
spatial coordinates that mark out each of the planks. The table is identical to the sum of the planks.
Each plank is marked out individually by spatial coordinates. These can be manipulated, rearranged
and brought together without changing any of the internal properties of the plank. Leibniz’ law still
applies to cases where objects have disparate origins.

Accounting for Change

This depiction of essentiality still appears very limited. If I hammered a rusty nail into table y to better
hold it together it seems that table y now has different internal properties to hunk x. If this is the case
then it is not longer the case that hunk x = table y and because of this I can’t make a proof of the
essentiality of origin. If my theory cannot withstand the slightest change in the properties of the table
without losing its essentiality of origin, this seems like a pretty feeble theory. I’m going to now claim
that if it’s the case that y is a part of y’ and y=x, then still (T(y,x’). So, if we hammer a nail into y
such that y becomes y’, if it’s still the case that y=x then it’s the case that y’s origin is necessarily x. I
think it’s a very plausible intuition to say that if the grouping concept of ‘table’ contain parts that have
an essential origin, then the table as a whole has an essential origin. If a table is necessarily derived
from a hunk, adding parts to that table doesn’t remove the essentiality of that
origin CITATION Den91 \p 12 \l 2057 .

Egg + flour = cake.

Another purported counterexample is that of the cake. When we combine eggs and flour to
create a cake it seems that the eggs and flour go out of existence, and the cake comes into existence.
The origin (eggs & flour) are such that ≠ the later object – the cake. It is claimed here I can’t derive
essentiality of origin because there is no identity relation between the origin and the object. My first
pass response is to claim that though they may go out of existence but it’s still the case that the
ingredients of the cake are identical to the cake. The concept ‘egg’, for example, is a grouping concept
for a morass of microphysical particles arranged in a certain way. These physical particles remain
intact when the eggs and flour are formed into a cake so it’s still the case that Leibniz’ law and thus
identity holds. This case is better depicted thusly: the microphysical particles such they constitute egg
and flour are identical to the microphysical particles that constitute the cake. Identity can still hold,
it’s just the case that there is a very complicated rearrangement of the microphysical particles during
the transformation from ingredients into cake. Each microphysical particle that constitutes the cake is
identical to a microphysical particle that constitutes an ingredient. As all are identical, the
ingredients=the cake, thus necessity of origin follows.

Andrew McGonigal has suggested CITATION Den91 \p 12 \l 2057 that it might be the case that all the particles
that were up spin in the eggs and flour and they might become down spin when formed into a cake. In
this case it seems that identity would not hold between the cake and the eggs/flour, and thus the cake

CITATION Den91 \p 12 \l 2057


I’m thinking that this is entailed by the logical axiom weakening.
CITATION Den91 \p 12 \l 2057
In a personal conversation.
no longer has an essential origin in the eggs/flour because every particle that existed in the ingredients
is no longer identical to any particle in the cake.

I think what Andrew has depicted is a limiting case of the necessity of origin. If every particle that
constituted the origin ingredients of a cake has transmogrified into an entirely different particle I
believe one has lost the link between the origin and the cake. The necessity of origin relationship that
I’ve proposed is not something metaphysically fundamental; instead it is rooted in identity. My
argument is slightly more limited that a universal theory for the essentiality of origin as it does not
appear to include the cake example but it is deeply empirical, the things that have necessity of origin
are the things that have a relationship of identity between the object and its origin. What follows from
this is that we could factually determine which objects actually have an essential origin – this seems
far better than relying on intuition, which is somewhat vague, and often liable to disagreement.

Conclusion

To conclude, in this essay I began expositing Kripke’s n.56. I then ran through Salmon’s and
Cameron’s reconstructions of Kripke and showed why, in both cases they either wouldn’t convince
the anti-essentialist, or how they failed. Cameron made assertion that the only way to show that W3*
was an impossible world was to beggar the question. I then demonstrated that in some cases of table,
W3* is an impossible world because of the necessity of identity and table/hunk identity relations.
Finally, I examined some criticisms and gave them cursory responses to further clarify what I am
proposing.
Bibliography
Cameron, R. (2005). A note on Kripke's footnote argument for the essentiality of origin. Ratio , 262-
275.

Dennet, D. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown and Co.

Kripke, S. (1981). Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell.

Salmon, N. (1979). How not to derive essentialism from the theory of reference. The Journal Of
Philosophy , 708-725.
I will then respond to Cameron with a thesis for the essentiality of origin that uses identity,
rigid designation and Leibniz’ law. I will show how that this solves Cameron’s belief that his
W3* cannot be shown to be an impossible world without assuming essentiality of origin. I
will make an attempt to further extend my argument by arguing that tables that are not
identical to their hunks can be shown to have their origin essentially by this principle.

However, the same types of considerations that can be used to establish the latter can be
used to establish the former. (Suppose X ≠ Y; if X and Y were both identical to some object Z
in another possible world, then X = Z, Y = Z, hence X = Y.) Alternatively, the principle
follows from the necessity of identity plus the 'Brouwersche' axiom, or, equivalently,
symmetry of the accessibility relation between possible worlds. In any event, the argument
applies only if the making of D from C does not affect the possibility of making B from A, and
vice-versa.

Reduction Cameron

It is possible to do a reduction on this suggestion

(x) (y) (y')[O (T(x, y) &- y does not overlap with y')
D Li T(x, y')]

Example of a strongly essentialist premise: If it is possible for table D to originate from hun
C, then it is necessary that D originate from hunk C.
Salmon suggests that Kripke uses a third premise to get to his desired conclusion regarding
the necessity of origin. He calls this P2 (If it possible for table X to originate from a hunk of
matter y, then necessarily, any table originating from hunk u os tje very table x and no other).
This does not beg the question, but it is still a strongly essentialist premise.

Suppose a table B, made from a hunk of matter A,,, in


the actual world, and another hunk of matter Cm—completely
different from Am—from which a table exactly like Bt could be made
(the subscripts are merely a mnemonic device). Now consider a
possible world W1( in which Cm is made into such atable, no table in
this world being made from Am. Is the table made from Cm in W(
the table Btl which in the actual world is made from A^,? No, Kripke
answers, for there is another possible world, W2, in which both Am
and Cm are made into tables. Clearly the table made from Am in W2
is Bt, the table made from Am in the actual world, so the table made
from Cm in W2, call it Dt , cannot be Bt in W2> and hence, by the
necessity of distinctness, cannot be B, anywhere at all. So the table
made from Cm in W[, which is identical with Dt, the table made
from Cm in W2, cannot be B, either. Thus Bt could not have been
made from a hunk of matter completely distinct from that from
which it was actually made,1 for the supposition of this being so is
the supposition of just such a hunk Cm and possible world Wt as the
argument has shown to be impossible. Note that the role of the
expression 'the actual world' in the argument could be filled by a
designation of an arbitrary possible world without detriment to its
validity. Thus, if valid the argument establishes also that B, could
not have been made from a hunk of matter completely distinct from
any from which it could have been made.
[T(D,C

Motivations for the hidden premise


Branching times

If we construct a branching times model of necessity.


 it explains why origin is important, in fact if the only essential properties were those
that were constructed out of a branching times scheme, origin would be the only thing
necessary to an object.

Footnote 57

Salmon: the possibility od xonstructing the verytable


In one place he says that the argument assumes that
the possibility of constructing table B from hunk A does not affect
the possibility of simultaneously constructing table D from hunk
C, and vice-versa.

that the premise


Kripke actually uses asserts that the possibility of constructing
the very table B from hunk A does not affect the possibility of
simultaneously (i.e., in the same possible world) constructing a
distinct table (meaning some table or other distinct from B) from hunk
C, and vice-versa.

What could motivate a proposal like P2? One proposal is the branching times model of
necessity proposed by Mackie? He takes a belief based/etiology (why are we motivated to
belief these premises). Mcginn philosopher suggests that these are truths de intellectu

In a branching times model of the necessityorigin the notion of possibility is characterised


like this@
We are identical with our gametes.
Our gametes have a range of possible futures
there are many possible ways our life could have gone.

Logical possibilites that involve different gametes don’t allow for the transitivity of identity
between us and the gametes and are thus not identical to us. According to this model it is true
that it is possible that someone very similar to us has one or both different parents to us.
However, what is not true is that that person is me. It doesn’t have the same identity as me.

The second point to justify is the idea that we are identical with out gametes.
Another model of the argument’s (in)validity is to be found in Mcginn.

Salmon

Cameron

sTUFF
Non trivial TWI conds
As we can see here. For any such argument to be valid, there must be some non-trivial
(criterion) identifier for transworld identification. What’s used here is This is the only way

Argument 2:
That object in other worlds can be stipulated in such a way. This stipulation is equivalent to
metaphysical essentialism

The table made from C, cannot be B, and hence by necessity of distinctness cannot be B
anywhere at all. It cannot be B because, in the world where a table comes from Hunk A and a
table comes from hunk C, if both are B then they would be the same table, but we have
previously specified that they are distinct.

Cameron shows that P2 can completely circumvent Kripke’s argument for the essentiality of origin,
one can get there only using P2 and (a≠b)¬(a=b).

Ross went on to discuss Nathan Salmon’s discussion of Kripke’s argument in How Not to Derive
Essentialism from the Theory of Reference. Salmon notes the ambiguity in Kripke’s principle and
suggests that it should be read as asserting that “the possibility of constructing the very table B
form hunk A does not affect the possibility of simultaneously (i.e. in the same possible world)
constructing a distinct table (meaning some table or other distinct from B) from hunk C, and vice
versa.” But, says Salmon, while this gets Kripke to the conclusion that “in any possible world in
which a table D is constructed, D . . . is not the same table as B” that is not the essentiality of
origin; for the essentiality of origin has nothing to do with the specific table D. What Kripke needs
to show, says Salmon, is that any table constructed from C is not B. Let ‘T(x,y)’ denote that table x
has been made from hunk of wood y. Salmon’s claim is that although Kripke has proven

E1: □[T (D,C) → D = B], he needs to prove

E2: □∀x[T (x,C) → x = B] which is the essentiality of origin.


Salmon then seeks to find an extra premise that will take us from E1 to E2. The premise he chooses
is

P2: ∀x∀y[♦T (x, y) → □∀z(T (z, y) → z = x)]

P2 tells us that in any possible world any table originating from hunk C must be D and not B; and
so, says Salmon, we use “origin as a (necessarily) sufficient condition for being this very table in
order to prove that origin is also a (necessarily) necessary condition.”

If he were to use this premise he would have to independently verify it through some other
intuitions (like branching times) which I will discuss later, or show how it can be derived
from his theory of reference. It also does not fit into his argument. If he used this premise all
he would have to show is that it is possible for a table to be derived from a hunk of matter –
because then it would follow that it is necessary for it be derived from that hunk of matter. It
would be needless to make the additional steps that Kripke actually makes

He would not need necessity of distinctness. These are all claims against this being a hidden
premise that Kripke actually uses. However, it does have some independent force as an
argument itself and I will examine the motivations later when discussing branching time
models of necessity and deRosset’s paper.

Additionally, it also seems to prove too little as part of Kripke’s prject. It might prove that if
one takes a particularly possible thing then it’s origin is necessary. However, it doesn’t show
that the necessity of origin is nevessary.
P2 Redux. What Ps actually says tha if any table y originating x then any table y that
originates from x is y and no othter.

Box(D≠B)
Box(T(D,C)->D≠B)

It makes the argument work how?

In addition, it does not seem the premise that Kripke is a assuming. He seems to sincerely
believe that there is no additional premise that he needs to prove his argument.

 Why? The things that can be [possibly] be predicated of an object are the things
which may have happened to it after the thing itself was brought into existence?? The
point at which an object is brought into existence is the object’s origin. This point
cannot be altered as if we altered the origin of the object, we’d alter the object itself...

They are distinct, and by necessity of distinctness, they are necessarily distinct. In another
possible world there exists.

Kripke asks how this very person could have originated from different parents [ CITATION
Kri81 \p 113 \l 2057 ]. He says one can imagine that things in her life might have changed. We
can imagine forward divergence, an open future, but we cannot imagine backward
divergence. This is the branching times thesis of modality.
He suggests that though a full discussion of the problems of essential properties are
impossible. When we ask what is possible of an object, we ask whether the universe could
have gone on as it did from a certain time but diverge from its course to the actual world at a
certain point. As an example, it would be possible for X to be have the properties Fx iff
history could have diverged at point t, where X is in existence, and x is F at one divergence.
This intuition supports essentiality of origin

 Change over time,. Table no longer = hunk x.


o Could argue for partial identity, such that table y is partially identical to hunk x

Could argue that because part of table is identical to hunk x then the whole table, when you take the
table as a whole, it’s origin is necessarily that of hunk x

 ..point out that hunk o ¬= Y because of leibnizs law, but hunk x is.
 Egg cake case. All the up spin particles are now down spin. How does my solution propse
this. Is it an empirical one
o
 When some of it’s properties change I want to still claim that it has that essential origin but
let’s say a alrger obejct including the table a sub part of it originates from hunk x. Is the larger
space tome coordinates have x essentially as it’s origin?

The principle I am using to claim that @T(X,Y)T(X,Y) is that@(T(X,Y) X=Y. I obtain identity via
leibniz’ law ∀F(Fx ↔ Fy) → x=y. The spatial coordinates that carve out hunk x within hunk o are
identical to the spatial coordinates that table y consists of. I envisage that some will disagree
The problem with this version of the necessity of origin is that is solely seems to be a jazzed up
version of necessity of identity and not really a example of necessity of origin at all. I am trying to
derive metaphysical necessities from logical necessities. However, the only reason that X=Y holds for
T(X,Y) is because of leibniz’ law - ∀F(Fx ↔ Fy) → x=y. Is it true that ∀F(Fx ↔ Fy) in the table/hunk
example? Two possible differences in properties could be that hunk x does not have the property of a
table and that hunk x is encased in wood while y is. To the latter I respond that leibniz’ law is only
concerned with internal properties. To the former, I think this suffers from the fallacy of verbalism.
Hunk x is table shaped, constructed out of the same material of as table y

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