Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A Commentary
on Theistic
Arguments
Ayatullah Jawadi
Amuli
Translator’s Word
The objective of this book is to analyze, from the
perspective of Transcendent Wisdom (al-Hikma al-
Muta‛āliyya), arguments that have been put forward for the
existence of the Deity. Accordingly, familiarity with basic
ontological perspectives of Transcendent Wisdom is
imperative in order to fully benefit from these discussions.
Though I have tried to make this work as close to the
academic parlance of the west as possible, a fastidious
reader may still find many instances that can be further
improved. I take responsibility for the mistakes that may
have gone undetected, welcome suggestions, and request
the reader to overlook my faults and show magnanimity
and pardon with respect to my shortcomings.
Hassan Allahyari
Qum, June, 1997
1
Note: I have also added a few explanatory
footnotes at certain points as deemed necessary;
these are distinguished by an asterisk (*).
7
Table of Contents
About the Author..............................................................4
Translator’s Word............................................................5
Table of Contents.............................................................7
The Author’s Preface.....................................................13
What is Order?.............................................................181
Does Order Exist?........................................................183
11
Why does Order Exist?................................................186
The Argument from Design and the Noble Qur’ān.....190
The Argument from Design and the Problem of Evil. .193
1
Al-Majlisī, Muhammad Bāqir. Bihār al-Anwār.
(Tehran: Dār al-Kutub al-Islamiyya), vol. 71, 23.
14
we believe in thee until we see God manifestly.”1 And
about the idolaters of Hijāz, the Divine book says, “And
say those who hope not of Our meeting, ‘Why have not
angels been sent down upon us, or see we not our Lord?’
Indeed they think too high of themselves and have
exceeded a great excess.”2
The Noble Qur’ān states that all along history, hearts of
those who maintain naturalistic worldview have been alike.
“And say those who know not: ‘Why speaketh not God
unto us or why cometh not unto us a sign’; Even so spoke
those before them; their hearts are alike. We have indeed
made clear the signs to people who are certainly sure.” 3 In
view of the fact that their hearts are alike, most of the
interrogatories and objections of materialist skeptics are the
same which have been projected time and again since the
antiquity, and first, Divine Apostles have offered profound
answers to them and after them, their followers, namely the
religious theosophers and the mutakellimūn, have defined
and expanded on these answers. However, the
interrogatories of every age reflect that age’s specific
ideological trends and predilections; and accordingly, the
answers are proffered in a manner that is prudent and
proportionate to that time. History bears witness to
individuals who were submissive to truth and in its path
they did not confuse lunacy for lucidity. They managed to
extract liberty from the confinements of ego and embrace
and believe in the truth. It also testifies to individuals who
succumbed to their ego and failed to reach the reality, and
if they were able to discover it, their sordid disposition did
not permit them to believe in it. Pharaoh and his courtiers
realized the authenticity of Moses’ miracles, but “denied
them in inequity and arrogance while their hearts were
convinced.”4 In response to their denial, says Moses,
“Indeed, you know that none hath sent these down save the
1
2: 55
2
25: 21
3
2: 118
4
27: 14
15
Lord of heavens and the earth.”5 Therefore, one has to be
alert to certain indirect fallacies such as the accusations of
being primitive, reiterating ancient dogmas and tales, and
the futility of this answer and that answer; and given the
similarity of hearts and identity of doubts, the very same
profound and cogent answers of revelation and scripture
that have been expanded on and clarified by theosophers,
have to be proffered in a manner adorned with the
expediencies of the time.
Chapter One
• There is a reality.
• The human being is real.
• The human being’s knowledge is real.
Corollaries of Knowledge
Rational analysis of a mental concept (al- mafhūm
al- dhehnī) reveals that knowledge (‛ilm) is a phenomenon,
which is associated with a number of notions, and
wherever there is knowledge, there are eight different
notions that can be abstracted from its various aspects.
However, these notions are not all predicated to knowledge
in the same manner and only extensions (masādīq) of some
of them have external unity (wahda). Understanding the
difference between these notions can delineate the
boundaries of discussion and define the axes of critique,
which in turn can help avoid many fallacies. These eight
items—six of which have been by our teacher Āyatullah al-
Shaykh Muhammad Taqī al-Āmulī, sanctified be his soul,
1
Āmulī, Abdullah Jawādī.. Shinakht Shinasī dar
Qur’ān. (Qum: Rejā’ Publications, 1993), 328.
23
1
in his Durar al-Fawā’id —are as follows:
1
Al-Āmulī, al-Shaykh Muhammad Taqī. Durar al-
Fawā’id. (Qum: Ismā‛iliyān Publications), 124.
2
Mental Existence (al-wujūd al-dhehnī) existence is
divided into two kinds: external existence (al-wujūd
al-khārijī), and mental existence. The presence of
a quiddity before the mind is its mental existence
In other words, just as quiddities exist in the
external world, they also exist, upon their
conception, in the mind. *
24
who possesses knowledge.
8. The quiddity of the knower.
1
Principality and Respectivality: Principality (al-
asāla,) describes something that has reality and
external factuality and is real irrespective of our
perceptions. Respectivality (al-e‛tibāriyya), in its
ontological sense, is a reification or abstraction of
the mind which however devoid of any external
reality, nonetheless corresponds to factuality. An
example in this regard would be to consider light
and shadow. Light is an ontological reality, it has
existence and factuality and is real even if we are
not there to see it, whereas shadow is the
nonexistence of light and not a factuality on its own
right. The theory of principality of existence
(asālat al- wujūd) and respectivality of quiddity
(e‛tebāriat al- māhiyya), as interpreted by the
author and the other students of the late ‛Allāmah
Tabātabā’ī, maintains that what has factuality in
the external world is existence and quiddities are
mere reifications and abstractions of the mind,
25
things in the external world; rather, just one thing exists
externally from which these two separate concepts are
abstracted. Such a unity (wahda) also exists between the
knower and his quiddity, and between the external
existence of the known and its quiddity.
In the discussions of unity of the knower and the known
(wahdat al-‛ālim wa al-ma‛lūm), a sort of unity (wahda)
between the existence of the knower and knowledge
(wahda al-‛ālim wa al- ‛ilm) is proved. Such a unity does
not exist between the quiddities of knowledge and the
knower, nor between the external or mental quiddity of the
known and the quiddity of the knower. Nor does it exist
between the external existences of the known and the
knower. The reason that some philosophers, such as Ibn
Sīnā in some of his books1, have rejected such unity, is
their failure to notice the axis of unity and have presumed
that the unity is suggested between quiddities of the
knower and the known.
In the discussions of unity of the knower and the known,
it also becomes clear that what is known directly and by
virtue of its essence is the existence of knowledge, which is
in unity with the existence of the knower; and the mental
quiddity is known indirectly. Therefore, the indirect
knowledge of the external entity is yet more indirect, since
the external entity is known by means of something that is
itself known indirectly.
Divisions of Knowledge
Dichotomy of knowledge into acquired knowledge
(al- ‛ilm al- husūlī) and intuitive/presential knowledge
(al- ‛ilm al- hudhūrī) is the result of certain secondary-order
rational analyses. In a further division, acquired
knowledge is divided into two kinds: concepts and
1
Al-Nisba al-hukmiyya is the relationship of a
proposition’s subject with its predicate and is
commonly expressed in English by copulas like is
and are. *
32
Self-evident and Primary Cognitions
Given the fact that the ignorance of theoretical reason
(al-‛aql al-nadharī) with respect to objects of primary
knowledge (al- ‛ilm al- awwalī) is inconceivable, primary
knowledge cannot be found in the last two of the above
suppositions, where only it is the practical reason (al-‛aql
al-‛amalī) that may accept and have faith, or reject a
certain idea.
A primary concept (al-tasawwur al-badīhī) has a number
of qualities. It is clear and indubitable. It cannot be
defined; and if one is inattentive to its meaning, his
attention can be drawn towards it. It would be like a
situation in which an individual has something in his hand
or is standing before an ocean, yet is inattentive to it. In
such a situation, his attention is drawn by pointing out to
what he already knows.
Drawing one’s attention (tanbīh) does not call forth new
cognition that has been previously unknown. Rather, it
causes something to be noticed that is already known but
out of one’s attention. The concepts of existence, reality,
thing, nonexistence, and the like are primary concepts that
are intuitively known by all; and if someone does not know
them, in fact, he is inattentive towards the fact that he
knows them.
A primary proposition (al-qadhiyya al-badihiyya) is
necessarily true and the theoretical reason (al-‛aql al-
nadharī) cannot not know it. It is indubitable; and if it is
supposed that someone doubts it—which is an
inconceivable supposition—then its veracity would be
indemonstrable.
The most prominent quality of primary knowledge can
be illuminated by its comparison with self-evident
knowledge (al- ‛ilm al- badihī). Comprehension of self-
evident facts does not require any definition or proof,
nevertheless, if doubted, they can be defined and proved.
Self-evidence (badāha) of these facts is indebted to the
mind’s affinity with their essential parts1 and the premises
1
Essential Part (al-dhātī) is something, which is
33
that entail them. An example of such knowledge is “the
propositions whose syllogisms are with them” (al- qadhāyā
allatī qiasātohā ma‛ahā). That is, the middle terms of their
syllogisms are self-evident and axiomatic properties of
their major and minor terms and are discerned so swiftly
that there is no need to put them in a syllogistic form.
A is B.
B is C.
Therefore, A is C.
44
The conclusiveness of this conclusion and the
validity of the first figure can be proved as follows: If A is
not C, then it must be non-C. And because according to
the minor premise A is B, B is, therefore, non-C. But
according to the major premise, B is C; and “B is C”, is
contradictory to “B is non-C.”
This argument proves the validity of the first figure and
the verity of a conclusion derived thereby. But if this
argument is used to prove the validity of the first figure, in
addition to the problem of impossibility of reduction of
figure to material, it will also be open to the objection that
the argument itself is a first-figure syllogism, or in a figure,
which is reducible to it. Therefore, proving the validity of
the first figure by an argument as such would amount to
begging the question and serve no purpose other than
drawing attention to what is already known (tanbīh).
Knowledge exists.
Anything either exists or it does not
exist.
Therefore, knowledge definitely
exists.
1
Essential Property (al- ‛aradh al- dhātī) A quality
which is not included in an essence, nevertheless,
is not separable from it either. For instance,
evenness is not included in the quiddity of the
cardinal number four, yet it never separates from
it. *
49
external associate2
• Knowledge exists.
As explained earlier, skepticism with regard to this
60
proposition makes inquiry and conversation
irrelevant and its rejection invites nothing but
sophism.
• Knowledge’s reflection of the reality is
infallible.
This is a direct corollary of the previous
proposition; since, if it is denied that knowledge
represents reality, the only thing left is ignorance.
• If principles of knowledge are observed,
reality can be reached.
In other words, it is possible do reach arrive at the
reality and occasionally, because of violating
epistemic principles, one may remain ignorant and
sustain fallacies.
Chapter Two
1
Such as “What! In God is there any doubt?” (14:
10)
2
For instance, “And whoever invokes another god
with God, he has no proof of it,” (23: 117)
3
14: 10
87
at him who doubts God, yet he sees His creation.”4
Moreover, even if these verses were not substantiated by
these proofs, they have no indication on the epistemic
worthlessness or futility of reason in knowing central
religious tenets like God and the hereafter. Rather, they
magnify the tenability and reliability of rational knowledge
about them, because in this case, the verses indicate that
God is a reality whose existence is not only self-evident
(badīhī), but primary (awwalī).
Primary concepts and judgments are those concepts and
judgments that the entirety of the human being’s cognition
is dependent upon them, while on the contrary their
cognitive worth is not indebted to another knowledge. It is
obvious that such independence does not indicate an
imperfection or defect on their side, but it rather enhances
their epistemic respectability. The primary knowledge of
the human being comprises concepts and propositions that
it is impossible for him not to understand and acknowledge
and he relies on their conceptual comprehension and
propositional acknowledgement in every situation—even
when he is inattentive of them or denies their primariness
(awwaliyya).
Although primary knowledge does not depend on any
knowledge antecedent to itself—and therefore, its
conception or acknowledgement is not rendered through
other cognitions, and they rather manifest on their own—
primariness (awwaliyya) is not part of their meaning and is
discerned by scrutiny of their essences. Therefore, it is
possible that their primariness be subject to inattention or
denial, as it is possible that one would clarify or draw
attention (tanbīh) towards it.
One example of such primary knowledge is the
acknowledgement of basic reality. As mentioned earlier,
the human being’s knowledge respecting the basic reality,
which is the boundary between sophistry and realism, is
primary (awwalī), since every effort to establish reality
through rational argument or to express doubt, ambiguity,
4
Nahj al-Balāgha, sayings of wisdom 126.
88
or denial about it presupposes the existence of reality.
Otherwise, the premises will not have any objective
meaning.
Thus, the existence of reality is indemonstrable; and
what can be done in this regard is to draw one’s attention
(tanbīh). However, drawing attention, on its own right,
does not reveal a new proposition, and it merely calls
attention to one of its attributes, that is, its primariness
(awwaliyya). In other words, the course of drawing
attention (tanbīh) to the acknowledgement of basic reality
is not a route from not knowing to knowing; it is a route
from inattentiveness to attentiveness.
Drawing attention toward the existence of reality is
drawing attention towards an actuality that one has known
from the beginning and has simply been inattentive
towards it.
Similar to the primariness (awwaliyya) of man’s
knowledge of the existence of reality—which does not
undermine its epistemic worth in the conceptual
framework, but rather by lending credence to the acquired
knowledge, places it at the zenith of this category of
knowledge—the primariness (awwaliyya) and non-
questionability of man’s cognition with regard to God is a
claim that does not rest on discrediting acquired
knowledge.
The argument devoted to substantiate this claim is the
Demonstration of the Veracious (burhān al-siddiqīn),
which, as will come, is not an argument that intends to
prove the Divine existence. Rather, it calls attention
towards the fact that He is a reality Who is axiomatic in all
conditions, and “therefore, wherever you turn there is the
face of God,”1 “and He is with you wherever you be.”2 It
draws attention to the fact that although His essence is
hidden from everything, He is more evident than any other
thing in all stages and worlds, including the world of
concepts; and this theophony (tajallī) is in such an extreme
1
2: 115
2
57: 4
89
manifestation that the clarity and meaningfulness of all
other concepts owes to Him.
The journey of inquiry towards God in the demonstration
of the veracious is not a journey from ignorance towards
knowledge; rather, it is a journey from inattentiveness to
attentiveness. This demonstration (burhān) draws attention
towards the necessity of veridicality of a proposition that
relates the existence of God and acknowledges that the
veridicality of other discursive, self-evident, or even
primary necessities is indebted to this eternal necessity.
In the light of this discourse, how is it possible to infer
the futility of acquired knowledge and exaltedness and
superiority of God from the horizon of concepts from the
verses, which as attested by the brilliant insights of the
Islamic philosophers, call toward the demonstration of the
veracious and speak of an open and manifest theophony
(tajallī) in the human being’s reasonability?
1
See Chapter Seven for the explanation of eternal
necessity. *
94
Chapter Three
1
57: 4
2
Derived from the holy verse, “Our command is
but one.” 54:50
3
56: 58–63
4
Al-Fārābī, Abu Nasr Muhammad ibn Muhammad.
Zainūn al-Kabīr. (Hyderabad Dakhan: The Uthmanī
Encyclopedia Council Press, 1926), 4.
105
1
favor of Yours is eternal.”
Such eternity, like the everlasting life of the Paradise-
dwellers, does not pertain to the essence of contingents. It
owes to the Divine grace and benevolence and its
attribution to the world and creatures is figurative (majāzī).
Because if eternity is ascribed to the essence of the
contingent entities, contingency—which is an essential
property (al- ‛aradh al- dhātī) of quiddity—gives place to
necessity. This follows that an essential property
(al- ‛aradh al- dhātī), that is, contingency, is not an
essential property, which is a conjunction of
contradictories.
This argument would have indicated the impossibility of
the eternity of the world, if the Divine grace were solely
availed to a single contingent entity. However, in the
infinite series of supplementary causes (al-‛ilal al-
mu‛idda), such an entity does not exist, as in the successive
series, every entity is subject to change and mutability and
every unit generates and corrupts. As far as the putative
series or whole is concerned, it is a mental concept which,
as a result of perception of multiplicities, is brought about
in the mind and does not have any external reality over and
above the units of the series. Therefore, in the course of
temporally successive hādiths, an entity the eternity of
which alone may reflect the infinite grace does not exist.
For this reason, the Divine grace and favor is eternal, but
their recipients, by virtue of their essences, are in absolute
nihility and nonexistenc; and it is by Divine grace that the
natural world, which is the world of change and flux,
generates and corrupts at every moment. With regard to
this, says al-Sabzawārī his Al-Mandhūma,
Chapter Four
HUDUTH
119
Chapter Five
IMPOVERISHMENT
129
1. There is a reality.
2. There is at least one finite, contingent,
entity.
135
Contingency of Impoverishment and the Essential
Independence of the Necessary
With the elucidation of contingency of impoverishment,
it becomes evident that existence, creation, necessity,
necessitation, and needfulness are not different things,
which mutually require each other. Rather, the existence
of the effect is the single entity, which is the very
impoverishment and need, the very emanation, creation,
and necessitation. Since finite existence is
impoverishment, and its entire reality is nothing but
relation and dependence on the “other,” its necessity is also
by virtue of the other. For such a thing, it is inconceivable
to have an essence vacant of destitution and contingency,
so in addition to contingency of impoverishment it may be
characterized by the quality of quidditative contingency.
The prevalence of impoverishment in the bounds of
beings, which are conjoined with quiddities—or to be more
specific, beings the limitations of which narrate their
quiddities—negates every kind of independence from them
3. Existence is principal.
4. The attributes of existence are identical
(‛ain) to the reality of existence, because if they
were other than existence and additional to it,
then it would mean that something other than
existence has factuality and would contradict
the previous premise that asserts the
principality of existence.
5. The finite and contingent entity that was
mentioned in the second premise is the very
finitude and the very dependence and need to
external causal, which produces it, as opposed
to being an essence that is characterized by
finitude and contingency.
6. The presence of something that is the
very contingency and need to external causal
efficacy is impossible without the existence of a
reality that is free of contingency and
dependence. *
136
and illustrates their realities as prepositional notions
(al- ma‛ānī al- harfiyya), which are nothing but relation and
contingence to the other.
A prepositional notion is a notion that by virtue of itself
is devoid of any meaning. If any meaning can be discerned
from a prepositional notion, it is under the auspices of
dependence and relation to the other, and from the other
that the preposition has dependence upon. The other that
bestows a preposition with meaning must be a nounal
meaning (al- ma‛na al- ismī).
The analysis of existence of quiddities, that is, the
elucidation of contingency of impoverishment, speedily
paves the way for the foundation of a demonstration, which
has a higher tenability, more brevity, and a broader range
of usage than all of the previous arguments have. This is
because the reality of a finite existence—that is, the
existence, which is devoid of any independence and is
sheer relation and dependence on the other, and is rather
something the reality of which is nothing but relation and
contingence to the other—cannot exist without the other
side of such relation and dependence. Certainly, the other
side of the relation and dependence, that is, the agency that
furnishes the needful existence of contingents, cannot be
another impoverished being, since with respect to any other
finite existence that may be suggested for this causal
efficiency, it is also true that it does not have anything
from itself and there is no perceivable essence or self for it
which would satisfy the first contingent’s need.
From this perspective, all contingent beings are signs of
a reality, which is exalted from destitution and need and
has independence. Although at a cursory glance a
contingent may seem to be the cause of another contingent,
however, even this mediation indicates the causality of an
independent source that has manifested in this sign.
Because all aspects of an entity, which is sheer need and
contingence, are the need and contingence that evoke the
other, and what it reflects is similar to a light that from a
mirror.
137
A light that appears in a mirror can be traced to a
luminary source, which has manifested in it, without
requiring invalidation of regress. If another mirror is a
mediate in the manifestation of the light therein, it can only
reflect the light of the luminary agency; and it cannot be
suggested it has a light of its own which it gives to the next
mirror.
Signs (‛alamāt) are of two kinds: conventional signs
(al- ‛alamāt al- e‛tebāriyya) and factual signs (al- ‛alamāt
al- haqīqiyya). The former is like words, scripts, traffic
signals, national flags of various countries, and so forth.
Factual signs are like the image of a person who is in front
of a mirror. Factual signs are further divided into three
kinds:
Chapter Six
1
Āmulī, Ayatullah Abdullah Jawādī. Tahrīr Tamhīd
al-Qawā‛id. (Tehran: Al-Zahrā Publications, 1993),
261.
152
(al- e‛tebāriyya) of quiddity and principality (al- asāla) of
existence must be proved, because, the proponents of
principality of quiddity do not consider reality to be
anything except diverse and multiple quiddities. The
abstract notion of existence, according to them, is
prescinded from quiddities and has developed into an
absolute notion through the mental activities.
In the second step, the heterogeneous multiplicity
(al- kathra al- tabāyunī) of existence must be rejected,
because if one should maintain principality of existence
and adhere to heterogeneous multiplicity of beings, then for
him, external entities are diverse realities, which are
heterogeneous from one another. From such perspective,
each entity is peculiar to its own conditions and limitations
and exists only within these boundaries. Therefore, their
existence is marked by essential necessity (al- dharūra
al- dhātiyya), that is, they are existent as long as their
essences exist. From this perspective as well, the absolute
and infinite existence, which is existence qua existence, is
not instantiated in reality, since according to the
heterogeneity (tabāyun) of the beings, existence qua
existence is the very heterogeneous multiplicity, which
does not have any unity (wahda) except for the mere
notional unity (al-wahda al-mafhūmiyya)—that even if the
dispute of the possibility of such notional unity with the
given extensional heterogeneity were laid aside—which
only exists in the mind.
In the third step the opinion of homonymy (al- ishterāk
al- lafdhī) of existence, which suggests the respectivality of
existence in the contingents and its principality in the
Necessary, must be evaluated.
In the fourth step, gradational multiplicity (al- kathra
al- tashkīkī) of existence must be analyzed and its
meticulous details elaborated. Since from the perspective
of gradational multiplicity of existence, though proved, the
Necessary, as the cause of other beings, is at the top of the
gradational series of existence. It is not the extension of
the unconditional existence, which is the infinite and most
153
supreme conceivable perfection. Since, existence qua
existence, according to gradational multiplicity of
existence, is a real multiplicity, which is associated with
real unity (wahda). Obviously, such a reality cannot be the
Necessary, since it includes the Necessary as well as the
contingents.
In the light of this, on the sole grounds that the notion of
absolute existence is absolute existence by predication as
essence, and not nonexistence, its real instantiation
(al- misdāq al- wāqi‛ī) cannot be established. The
affirmation of its external extension is contingent on
establishing other proofs and invalidating views which
challenge the Gnostics’ claims.
A demonstration, which proves the extension of absolute
existence, can be organized by meticulous analysis of the
meanings of dependence and impoverishment; and its
explication can be rendered in the context of the splendors
of the Origin. Another way is the analysis of causality of
the Origin and the comprehension of His absoluteness
(itlāq) and expanse (si‛a). In the discussions of causation,
Sadr al-Muta’allihīn, after traversing these phases, says that
this amounts to the conclusion of philosophy and its
consolidation into ‛irfan—and he thanks the Exalted God in
gratitude of this profound cognitive revolution.1
1
Al-Shirāzī, Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Sadr al-Dīn.
Al-Hikma al-Muta‛āliya fi al-Asfār al-Arba‛a.
(Tehran: Dār al-Ma‛ārif al-Islamiya, 1959), vol. 2,
291.
154
2
necessary existence. This criticism is, nevertheless,
unjustified. Because despite the fact that the extension of
the Necessary is in extreme incognito, its pertinent
concepts are axiomatic and unambiguous. Although an
entity, whose existence is necessary and not conditional,
does not have a categorical or quidditative essence, the
notion of necessary existence is comprised of some general
concepts, comprehension of which—regardless of the
fashion of abstracting and discerning them—abundantly
clear.
Kant’s second criticism suggests that though because of
the logical law of identity, a subject’s essence or essential
parts cannot be negated from it, this impossibility of
negation holds truth when the subject is existent. However,
should the very existence of the subject be rejected, then
negation of the essential parts from the subject does not
invite contradiction. He says,
Addendum
The tenability of the so-called ontological argument of
Anselm cannot be restored by the unity of mind and reality
by saying that since mind and reality are one, hence, what
is conceived in the mind is nothing but factual reality.
That is because first of all, the unity of mind and reality has
no rational foundation, for there are numerous examples—
such as the concept of the Deity’s partner or the concept of
multiplicity of deities—that are sufficient to indicate its
incoherence. Second, Anselm does not hold such a
position and a theistic argument cannot be established on
such shaky grounds.
Another point, which should be established, is that
the existence of Platonic archetypes (arbāb al-anwā‛)
cannot adduce the putative ontological argument, either.
For instance, it could possibly be suggested that mental
exemplification (al- tamāthul al- dhehnī) emanates from the
external world and if there were not a factual reality for
every mental image, there would no mental image. Since
the mental image of “that than which nothing greater can
be conceived” is in our minds, it indicates that there is an
external reality, which conforms to this concept.
This is unjustified because although Platonic archetypes
are real—that is, though external things, in addition their
physical existence in the natural world and intermediate
existence in mundus imaginalis (‛ālam al-khiyāl), have
another existence in the world of intellects such that when
the soul finds the ability to discern intellectual universals
(al- kulliyyāt al- ‛aqliyya), it ascends to the transcendent
stage of their company—mere conception of a few related
concepts does not positively indicate that they have been
derived from a single and sheer (basīt) incorporeal reality.
It cannot be ruled out that due to the influence of certain
faculties of the soul with the capacity to analyze and
164
connect mental notions and images, numerous concepts
that have been abstracted from various beings or have been
attained by their observation, have been connected to one
another and put as “that than which nothing greater can be
conceived.” Therefore, in order to make sure that the
faculties of estimation and imagination are not interfering
with ones comprehension, it is imperative to assess the
truth of one’s understandings with the demonstrative
reason, which relies only on primary and self-evident
concepts and notions.
165
Chapter Seven
1
Note: Eternal necessity of reality is solely
applicable to the Almighty Necessary, since for
instance, although philosophical prima matter is
particular, nonetheless it does not exist in
incorporeal beings. If it were the basic reality, then
the incorporeal beings should not be real. Physical
matter, however, is not even an individual being,
since it is always changing into a new condition,
such as motion and energy. The entity, which is
immutable in every condition, is the prima matter;
but it is limited to the physical world. Therefore,
neither philosophical nor physical matter can have
eternal necessity, as the greatest extent of
necessity, which can be proved for them, is
essential-logical necessity, which is restricted to
the continuance of the essence.
180
Chapter Eight
•1 What is order?
•1 Does order exist?
•2 Why does order exist?
What is Order?
Order (nadhm) is not a quiddity (māhiyya) so it could be
defined through its genus (jins) and differentia (fasl).
However, in order to insure that our inquiry proceeds from
logically solid grounds, it is prudent to clarify the meaning
of order, since if an inquiry is devoted to examining
whether a certain notion is instantiated in the external
world, then before acceptance or dismissal, it is imperative
to elucidate what does that notion stand for.
Although order is not a quiddity, in terms of being a
secondary philosophic intelligible (al- ma‛qūl al- thānī
al- falsafī), it is similar to quiddities. Order is reflected in
the regularity of things, and the meaning of regularity,
which is opposite to entropy, is evident. As will be
reiterated at the end of the chapter, it is important to retain
in mind that orderliness is opposite to entropy, not evil.
Hence, even if there is evil in the world, its operation is
orderly and it is bound by specific rules.
Regularity or orderliness can be conventional (e‛tebārī),
artificial (senā‛ī), or factual (wāqe‛ī). An example of
conventional regularity would be the regularity of words of
a sentence. The orderly arrangement of books of a library
182
and the splendid complexities of a watch are instances of
artificial regularity. Factual order is like the configuration
of the animal body.
Although used in the analogical exposition (al-taqrīr al-
tamthīlī) of the argument from design, artificial design is
not, however, central to its inquiry and in fact analogy
(tamthīl) has little significance in demonstrative
discussions. The argument’s analogical exposition could
run, for instance, as follows: As it is justified to infer from
the labyrinth complexities of a watch that it has a designer,
likewise, it is not irrational to trace the orderliness of the
world to a cosmic orderer (al-nādhim). In brief, in these
versions the similarity of artificial design and cosmic
orderliness is extended to their similarity in being the work
of an intelligent designer.
Factual order, the grounds whereby foundations of the
argument from design is laid, is neither indebted to
conventions of the society nor to the imagination of
inventors. Its abode is the external reality and it is
apprehended from the comparison of external things.
Factual order has three kinds:
1
17: 84
183
chaos over the world and that anything could be produced
by anything.
Immanent order reflects the regularity of internal parts of
a configuration. It is exclusive to things, which have
prima matter (al- mādda al- ūlā) and form (sūra), genus
and differentia, or are totalities of subordinate parts.
Immanent order is inconceivable for something that is
externally sheer, that is, is not made of extraneous parts.
On numerous occasions, the Noble Qur’ān alludes to
these tripartite regularities of things; and in some verses,
like the verse “Our Lord is He Who gave unto everything
its form, and then guided it,”1 the Divine Book mentions all
three together. This verse speaks of God as the efficient
cause of all things Who has furnished them with an
impeccable “form” or regularity and guided them towards
their goals.
In the light of this, it is fair to state that the regularity of
members of a concatenation—on which the argument from
design is based—is only conceivable between a series of
things, which function towards a common objective.
Therefore, the argument from design, contrary to other
arguments such as the arguments from hudūth, motion, and
contingency, cannot be organized with consideration to just
one entity. Rather, it requires an ensemble, which is
perceived in the context of its members and in relation to a
common objective.
Chapter Nine
1
General Prophethood (al-nubuwwa al-ā‛mma) In
kalām, the principle which states that since the
human being is needful of guidance with respect to
how he should live his life, and since God is
All-Merciful, He will provide guidance to the
mankind how to live through His prophets, as it will
contradict His mercy not ot answer man’s need to
guidance.
Particular Prophethood (al-nubuwwa al-khāssa)
indicates the prophethood of a specific individual. *
199
doctrines. For instance, someone who does not
accept the existence of God or some of His names
and attributes such as the Guide (al- Hādī), the
Administrator (al- Mudabbir), and so forth, or a
person who does not believe in the general
prophethood, or someone who doubts the principle
of causation and considers chance and
haphazardness possible, cannot infer the truth of
religious tenets from an extraordinary event, which
cannot be explained on the score of the known
physical grounds.
If certain religious doctrines, such as the
existence of God and the necessity of apostleship
and religious guidance for people who do not have
direct guidance from the Deity, are accepted,
miracles can rationally indicate the prophethood of
a specific person. From this perspective, miracles
do not contradict the principle of causation and are
not incompatible with natural laws; rather, their
occurrence is an imperative law of existence.
If miracles were to contradict the principle
of causation, then haphazardness and chance would
be permissible, which in turn would make the
inquiry of the existence of God irrelevant.
1
Usually translated into English as “miracle.”
200
supplication of a righteous servant of God, it is called
i‛āna1. Extraordinary events may occur as a result of
causes, which are attained through learning and meditation
such as sorcery. It is also possible that they take place to
falsify someone who has falsely claimed prophethood and
has challenged others. In the last case, an extraordinary
event is called ihāna2. For instance, when al-Musaylama
al-Kadhdhāb spat into a well to show to people that he has
blessed it and that its water will increase, what happened
was that even the little water, which was in the well dried.
Although the exsiccation of the well in this manner was an
extraordinary event, nevertheless, it was not what the
perverted claimant had hoped and it led to his debasement.
The most unique characteristic of a mu‛jiza is that it
illustrates God’s omnipotence. A prophet, who claims to
have a message from the Absolute Origin, as his
prophethood is extraordinary and does not come from finite
and conditional sources, exhibits an extraordinary sign that
attests to his connection to the Source of existence.
Because God, the Exalted—Who undertakes the creation
and guidance of all entities including the human beings—is
not subject to sensual vision, His guidance is not
effectuated in a direct manner with them. Rather, it is
carried out by the few chosen servants, who with the
chastity of their tongues and serenity of their hearts have
the aptitude of Divine interlocution and vision. Thus, as
instanced by the Qur’ān, His apostles appear with signs that
testify to their connection to the Source of creation: “And
We have sent thee [O Our Apostle Muhammad] unto
mankind as [Our] Apostle, and God is sufficient a witness
[thereof].”3 The witness and attestation of God is that He
manifests His extraordinary signs on the hands of His
prophets.
1
Literally meaning assistance.
2
Literally meaning to insult.
3
4: 79
201
Miracles as Rational Proofs
Miracles are proofs of particular prophethood; however,
only people who are availed of reason can benefit from
them. Someone who perceives miracles with physical eyes
only and does not fathom what lies behind the appearance,
may evince astonishment and wonder and even succumb to
them, nevertheless, he is far from attaining a certitude,
which is free of doubts and reservations.
In order to be able to ascertain a given prophethood,
first, a reasonable person should be able to differentiate
between an extraordinary act and an act, which is
performed through artificial means. Second, he should
recognize the mutual necessity between the claim’s
veridicality and the miracle.
In the scene of challenge and defiance by Moses, the
Interlocutor, since the magicians were better aware of
sorcery’s limitations than other people, they
instantaneously realized that the extraordinary act was
beyond the means of sorcery; and already believing in God
as the true Guide, they immediately embraced the Lord of
Moses and stood firm in their faith. However, as for the
people who merely saw a stick become a serpent and failed
to apprehend its rational implications, just as they pinned
their faith to Moses by watching a stick become a dragon,
they crowded around the Samaritan by seeing the speech of
a calf. While the Samaritan’s work was sorcery, and his
call to the divinity of a calf, a dogma that reason testifies to
its falsehood.
Ibn Sīnā in al-Ishārāt wa al-Tanbihāt, and Nasīr al-Din
al-Tūsī in his commentary on the same book, divide
miracles into two classes: practical miracles (al- mu‛jiza
al- fe‛lī) and verbal miracles (al- mu‛jiza al- qaulī). They
hold that verbal miracles are more beneficial for the gentry
of people afforded with erudition, whereas practical
miracles are more befitting for the commonality.1
1
Ibn Sīnā, Abu Ali Husain. Al-Ishārāt wa al-
Tanbihāt. Commentary by Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī.
(Tehran: Daftar-i-Nashr-i-Kitāb, 1981), vol. 3, 372.
202
The Seal of the Prophets had many practical
miracles, which mostly satisfied the commonalty.
However, the gentry of the companions, well-aware of the
profound meanings and exalted stature of the Noble
Qur’ān, sufficed on the Qur’ān and never made any
demands for practical miracles. The Majestic Qur’ān, the
verbal miracle of the Seal of the Prophets, is an eternal
miracle that with a clean and vociferous challenge attests to
the prophethood of that Hadhrat, bliss be for him and his
kin, for anyone who believes in God and His attributes.
Chapter Ten
Chapter Eleven
Chapter Twelve
1
6: 75–79
236
ent140 142,
Index Allah...4, 143,
a‛rādh 123, 5, 53, 144,
al- 124, 58, 66, 145,
dhātiy 130, 71, 81, 146,
ya. 113 160 82, 84, 147,
a‛yān acquired 92, 148,
althābi knowl 104, 150,
ta....85 edge 143, 151,
Abdullah 29, 47, 167, 153,
Jawādī 50, 51, 170, 154,
..4, 22, 52, 54, 178, 156,
151 55, 57, 197 157,
Abdullah 66, 73, analogic 162,
Jawādī 75, 88, al 163
Āmulī 89, exposi apostle
.........4 113, tion Muha
Abraham 208, .....182 mmad
....234, 211 analogy .....216
235 actuality 37, 40, Apostles
abstracti ......88, 161, .......14
on..24, 119, 182 apostlesh
37, 225 analytic ip..199
157, Administ propos arbāb al-
159, rator itions anwā‛
221 .....199 .....158 ....163,
Abu agnostic annihilat 185,
Sa‛eed 66, 73, ed173, 190,
Abu 207 178 193
al- al-Redhā annihilati arc of
Khayr .......46 on..85, ascent
.......47 All- 99, .......85
accidents Knowl 174 arc of
26, 62, edgea Ansārī descen
90, 92, ble185 .....197 t......85
121, All- Anselm archetyp
122, Suffici 16, 27, es 185,
237
190, 177, badāha 89, 96,
193 178, ......32, 99,
argument 185 172 108,
from asl basāta 109,
hudūth alhūhū .....169 110,
....119, wiyya Benevole 119,
120, .41, 42 nt...51, 121,
121, atheist 67, 127,
125 66, 67, 203, 134,
argument 80, 204, 166,
from 197 210, 185,
motio atheistic 212 190,
n..119, .......69 Bihār al- 224
121, atomic Anwār burhān
125 theory 13, 84, al-fitra
Aristotle of 85, .....224
.......56 Demo 191 burhān
asāla..24, critus body..72, al-
133, .....216 77, siddiqī
152, attributiv 121, n.....88
169 e 122, burhān
asāla necess 123, alhudū
alwujū ity 171 182, th....96
d....24, autonom 185, burhān
133 y....89, 202, allim
asālat 91, 221, mī 185
alwujū 126 225 Burūjerd
d.....24 Averroës burān ī........4
asbāb.19, .....106 alimkā Canterbu
102 awwaliy n wa ry. 143
Asfār...4, ya..35, alwujū categoric
54, 58, 40, 42, b....96, al...21,
112, 54, 87, 103, 40, 44,
153, 88, 92, 104 154
168, 172, burhān categoric
169, 174 16, 22, al
170, azalī. 120 79, 88, syllogi
238
sm. 21, 103, of 198,
40 104, Luqm 207,
categoric 107, ān. 233 211
al 108, chapter combinat
syllogi 120, of ion157
sms 40 136, Monot Comman
causal 141, heism der of
efficac 153, .....191 the
y....41, 159, chapter Faithf
58, 80, 160, of ul...84,
83, 97, 196 Sincer 209
98, 99, causation ity. .84 comparat
100, 57, 58, chapter ive
102, 82, 83, of necess
109, 98, Spider ity 224
110, 106, .....234 complem
114, 107, circular ent
119, 120, causali ....131,
120, 125, ty.119, 143,
129, 133, 125 149
132, 153, circular concept
134, 157, causati 18, 22,
135, 172, on...79 23, 26,
186 182, circularit 28, 30,
Causal 184, y....18, 31, 50,
order 196, 80, 99, 56, 57,
.....182 199, 127 67,
causal 202 cogitatio 105,
regres causedne n....51, 106,
s. .106, ss...83, 68, 83 109,
119, 120, cognatio 110,
120, 138, n...182 111,
121 196 cognitive 113,
causality chapter certitu 114,
57, 59, of Iron de..34, 132,
99, .....191 40, 45, 143,
102, chapter 187, 145,
239
146, 148, 98, 99, 146,
147, 149, 105, 168,
148, 154, 116, 169,
149, 155, 151, 176,
150, 157, 203 178,
151, 158, constrain 183,
154, 159, ed 187,
155, 163, cause 189,
156, 173, ....125, 235
157, 208, 126 continge
159, 210, continge ncy of
160, 218, ncy21, impov
161, 221 41, 49, erishm
163, conceptu 82, 92, ent
173, al and 95, 96, ....120,
203, propos 100, 129,
217, itional 102, 132,
221, founda 103, 133,
231 tions 104, 134,
concepts .......13 105, 135,
18, 25, conceptu 106, 136,
26, 27, al 107, 140,
28, 29, funda 108, 141,
32, 38, mental 110, 169,
40, 41, s...171 114, 176,
42, 50, condition 119, 178
55, 56, al 120, continge
58, 67, necess 121, nt
69, 76, ity 171 127, being
87, 88, conjuncti 129, ......41,
89, 92, on of 132, 109,
111, contra 133, 136
113, dictori 134, continge
114, es. .42, 135, nt
120, 43, 47, 136, existe
146, 58, 79, 140, nt....91
147, 80, 81, 141, continge
240
nts. 59, 60, 67, daur...18, 56, 79,
99, 134, 80, 99, 89, 96,
100, 218 119, 99,
101, course of 127 100,
102, descen dawām 103,
103, t....193 .21, 51 104,
104, Crafter decent 106,
105, .......67 conten 107,
109, creation tion 108,
114, 26, 81, .....190 109,
129, 82, 84, Definite 110,
130, 86, 95, shuhū 114,
132, 99, ds. 208 116,
136, 101, Definitio 119,
139, 102, n of 121,
140, 126, philos 124,
152, 129, ophy 125,
153, 133, .......63 127,
162, 134, Deity...5, 134,
187 135, 13, 15, 136,
continuit 166, 66, 75, 140,
y....21, 186, 77, 79, 141,
22, 51, 200, 90, 153,
60, 210 120, 166,
127 Creator 155, 168,
contradic 67, 77, 157, 169,
tories 78, 79, 163, 170,
41, 42, 80, 86, 172, 171,
45, 46, 124, 190, 172,
58, 80, 146, 199, 175,
143 185, 235 176,
copula 33 193, delimitat 178,
copulativ 235 ion172 189,
e Creatorn demonstr 190,
being ess190 ation 196,
.....161 dahr..191 16, 22, 224,
corollary Dāmād. 4 49, 55, 226,
241
228, ation hudūth 171
229, of ....107, dharūra
231, primor 108 aldhāti
233, dial denial of yya
234, nature comm ....152,
235 ....224, ensura 156,
demonstr 226, bility 171,
ation 228, of 174
of 231, faith dharūra
contin 233, with alshart
gency 234 reason iyya
and demonstr .......69 .....171
necess ation designer dharūra
ity. 96, of the ....141, alsidq
100, veraci 182, 33, 35,
103, ous 16, 184, 36, 44,
104, 89, 186, 45, 56
106, 166, 187, dharūra
107, 168, 189 alwasf
108, 170, devil...74 iyya
110, 171, dharūra .....171
114, 172, 33, 35, dharūra
116, 175, 36, 44, bi
119, 178 45, 56, alqiyā
121, Demonst 92, s...224
124, ration 129, dhāt...48,
125, of the 152, 49, 96,
127, Veraci 156, 101,
141, ous 88, 171, 221
189, 165, 174, dhātī..32,
196 166, 224 48, 49,
demonstr 167, dharūra 85,
ation 170, al- 100,
of 178 azaliy 105,
hudūth demonstr ya..93, 132,
.......96 ations 129, 193,
demonstr of 156, 215
242
dhātiyyāt e....84, 210, 125,
......96, 89, 90, 216 126,
112, 108, Dr. 127,
113 123, Ibrahi 132,
differenti 171, m 134,
a....33, 172 Madh 135,
130, Divine kur. 42 177,
132, existe drawing 182,
181, nce 73, attenti 220,
183 77, 86, on..44, 221
differenti 88, 90, 88, efficacy
ae. 130 91 230 ......59,
discursiv Divine dualism 101,
e....30, Will46 .......77 102,
35, 39, Division Durar al- 103,
40, 41, s of Fawā’i 108,
43, 44, Knowl d.....23 119
50, 51, edge e‛tebār efficient
55, 57, .......29 24, 37, ......59,
61, 89, doubt.18, 38, 102,
172, 20, 33, 133, 103,
221, 34, 36, 137, 119,
224, 39, 42, 152, 125,
232, 52, 54, 181, 127,
234 55, 56, 188 129,
discursiv 77, 80, effaced 183,
e 86, 87, ....178, 185,
propos 107, 221 189,
ition 110, effaceme 212
35, 39, 116, nt....85 efficient
40, 44 117, effect.23, cause
Disjuncti 144, 26, 55, ......59,
ve 172, 82, 83, 102,
syllogi 173, 102, 103,
sms 40 174, 103, 119,
Divine 208, 120, 125,
Essenc 209, 122, 127,
243
129, 18, 22, 109, 191,
183, 59, 60 112, 225,
185, Epistemo 113, 228
189, logy 114, Essential
212 in 115, knowl
ehsās. 13, Qur’ā 117, edge
30, 49, n.....22 122, .85, 92
69, equidista 123, essential
184 nce 41, 124, necess
ehtiyāj 58, 80, 127, ity
.....120 96, 97, 131, ....152,
emanatio 98, 99, 132, 156,
n....19, 100, 133, 171,
85, 102, 135, 173
102, 129, 136, essential
133, 187 137, nihilit
135 eshterāk 138, y.....58
Emmanu alma‛n 140, essential
el awī 146, part
Kant lilwuj 147, 32, 33,
.....217 ūd.162 148, 48, 49,
empiricis essence 149, 63, 80,
m..185 21, 23, 150, 96, 99,
encompa 25, 27, 151, 101,
ssment 29, 33, 153, 112,
.....178 48, 49, 154, 113,
epistemo 50, 56, 155, 114,
logical 80, 88, 156, 116,
16, 18, 95, 96, 157, 131,
19, 59, 97, 98, 158, 132,
60, 61, 100, 159, 133,
116 101, 160, 146,
Epistemo 102, 162, 148,
logical 104, 166, 154,
.....116 105, 175, 155,
Epistemo 106, 177, 159,
logy 108, 179, 215
244
Essential n....30, 157, 67, 68,
Part 32 51, 69, 170, 73, 76,
essential 164, 171, 77, 78,
parts 209, 172, 79, 80,
32, 33, 210 173, 81, 82,
63, 80, eternal 174, 83, 86,
96, 99, 46, 47, 175, 87, 88,
112, 66, 68, 179, 89, 90,
113, 89, 92, 214 91, 92,
114, 93, 95, Evangel 95, 96,
131, 97, .....143 97, 98,
132, 105, Ever- 99,
133, 120, Preval 100,
146, 121, ent..67 101,
154, 124, Excellent 102,
155, 125, Religi 103,
159 126, ous 106,
essential 129, State 108,
proper 156, .......86 109,
ties 63, 157, exemplif 110,
110, 170, ication 111,
112, 171, ......53, 112,
113, 172, 211 113,
114, 173, existence 114,
155 174, ..5, 13, 115,
essential 175, 15, 18, 116,
proper 179, 20, 21, 119,
ty...48, 202, 23, 24, 120,
49, 214, 25, 26, 121,
100, 228, 27, 29, 123,
105, 235 30, 31, 124,
132, eternal 32, 41, 126,
215 necess 42, 45, 129,
Essential ity. 89, 46, 50, 130,
unity 92, 93, 54, 55, 131,
.....193 129, 57, 58, 132,
estimatio 156, 59, 66, 133,
245
134, 185, al extensio
135, 186, perfect nal
136, 187, ion119 unity
138, 189, extensio .....160
139, 190, n....23, extensio
140, 193, 28, 29, ns. .22,
143, 196, 57, 66, 111,
144, 199, 92, 156,
145, 200, 109, 160,
146, 203, 112, 162
147, 206, 114, external
148, 207, 115, cause
151, 209, 146, 41, 80,
152, 211, 147, 119
153, 212, 148, external
154, 214, 149, existe
155, 215, 150, nce 23,
156, 216, 151, 24, 25,
157, 217, 152, 26, 28,
158, 218, 153, 50, 96,
159, 219, 154, 97,
160, 220, 156, 110,
161, 224, 157, 111,
162, 225, 159, 114,
163, 226, 160, 115,
166, 227, 161, 132,
169, 230, 162, 166,
170, 231 170, 216,
171, existenti 173, 218,
172, al 175, 231
173, capaci 192, external
174, ty..229 203, extens
175, existenti 227 ion.24,
176, al extensio 26, 28,
177, causes nal 29, 67,
178, .......59 identit 91,
183, existenti y.....90 146,
246
147, 63, 156, ....144,
148, 104 157, 145,
149, fasād. .95 170, 146
150, fasl...181 174, general
153, Faydh 175, prophe
157, al- 178, thood
203, Kāshā 200, ....198,
221 nī..212 202, 199,
external Fayyādhī 209, 204
extens .........5 226, generally
ions fe‛liyya 227, accept
26, 29, .....119 228, ed
146 fideistic 229, subjec
external .......66 230, ts. .190
quiddi figurativ 231, generatio
ty....23 e..103, 232, n....19,
external 105, 234, 46, 50,
unity 123, 235 95, 96,
.......22 138, fiqh......4 104,
fā‛il al- 225, first 122
mūjab 228 philos generatio
....125, final. .54, ophy n and
126 59, 62, 63, corrup
fā‛iliyya 182 66 tion
59, 83, finite. 21, flux...21, ......96,
97, 23, 25, 105, 122
125 51, 96, 189, Generou
faidh. 19, 114, 209 s...185
101, 129, four genus 33,
102 130, figures 112,
Faith. 30, 132, of 130,
31, 36, 134, catego 132,
65, 68, 135, rical 139,
69, 70 136, syllogi 148,
fānī. .178 139, sms 40 181,
Fārābī 140, fusūl.130 183
30, 62, 145, Gaunilo genus
247
unity 86, 87, 201, licity
.....112 88, 89, 202, .....152
ghaib179 90, 91, 203, gradation
Ghazzālī 92, 207, al
.....185 101, 210, reality
Gnostic 104, 211, of
66, 84, 110, 212, existe
85, 114, 215, nce
206, 115, 216, ....130,
209 116, 217, 170
Gnosticis 120, 218, Guide
m...75, 123, 219, ....199,
82, 125, 221, 201
138, 138, 226, Gulshan
170, 139, 228, Raz
183, 143, 229, .....101
191 145, 231, Hādī..49,
Gnostics 146, 232, 97,
75, 76, 147, 233, 106,
81, 149, 234, 158,
150, 153, 235 169,
151, 155, grace. 19, 199
153, 157, 85, hādith..4,
170 167, 101, 46, 47,
God.....3, 168, 102, 95, 97,
13, 14, 171, 104, 119,
16, 42, 172, 105, 120,
46, 51, 178, 125, 121,
63, 66, 183, 126, 122,
67, 68, 190, 176 123,
70, 71, 191, gradation 124,
72, 73, 192, ....169, 127
74, 75, 193, 176, hāfidha
76, 77, 197, 178 .......69
78, 81, 198, gradation haithiyya
82, 83, 199, al alitlāqi
84, 85, 200, multip yya
248
....157, alshā’ neous hikma
172 e‛ al- multip al-
haithiyya sinā‛ī licity nadhar
alta‛līl ......28, .....152 iyya
iyya 109, highest .30, 61
.....172 146, good hikma
haithiyya 148 ....218, al-
altaqyī haphazar 219, sufla
diyya dness 220, .......62
....157, ......79, 221 hikma
172 186, Hijāz. 14, al-ūlā
Hakīm 187, 78, .......62
.....139 199 190 hikma
hāl......41 haqīqa hikma30, al-
halāka almus 61, 62, wustā
aldhāti hakkik 89, .......62
a.....59 a 189 Hillī. 197
Hamīd lilwuj hikma homony
Pārsān ūd.130 al-‛am my152
iyā..15 haraka aliyya hū-
haml..27, ......21, .30, 62 hūwiy
28, 56, 119, hikma ya..27,
109, 123, al-‛uly 112,
112, 124 ā.....62 147
146, haraka hikma hudūth
147, al- al- 15, 16,
148, jawhar ishrāq 46, 81,
176 iyya .....189 82, 95,
haml ....123, hikma 96,
alaww 124 al- 103,
alī hayāt. 89, mashā 106,
aldhātī 91, ’...189 107,
......27, 173 Hikma 108,
109, heteroge al- 119,
146, neity Muta‛ 120,
147 .....152 āliyya 121,
haml heteroge .5, 189 122,
249
123, 218, 89, .42, 62
124, 221, 113, Ilāhiyāt
125, 224, 116 min
126, 226, idol....77 Kitāb
127, 227, idol- al-
134, 228, worshi Shifā’
140, 230, p.....77 .......42
166, 232 idolaters Illuminat
168, Hume 14, 78, ionist
169, ....108, 190 ......54,
183, 110 ifādha19, 127
189, hypostati 85, imaginati
235 zation 133 on..30,
Hujja..16 .......38 ihāna 200 51, 52,
human hypotheti ihāta103, 67, 69,
being cal 178 164,
18, 19, syllogi ihāta 182,
30, 34, sm. .21 alqayū 209,
36, 37, i‛āna.200 miyya 210,
42, 47, ibn al- .....103 231
49, 50, Haka Ihtejāj Imam
55, 57, m....66 .....191 Ali.74,
69, 74, Ibn Ijī 111 75, 82,
80, 81, Rushd ijtemā‛ 83, 86,
87, 89, .....106 al- 91,
91, 96, Ibn Sīnā naqīdh 209
108, 25, 42, ain.41, Imam
125, 47, 54, 47, 58, Khom
126, 55, 63, 79, 81, eini
132, 123, 98 Resear
140, 166, ikhtiyār ch
173, 167, 89, 91, Institu
175, 201, 126 te of
197, 217 Ilāhī Qum.5
198, identity Qums imkān21,
200, 15, 21, ha’ī. .4 33, 41,
217, 31, 68, Ilāhiyāt 82, 92,
250
95, 96, s.....84 mī 158 210
100, impossib individua intellectu
102, ility of l unity al
103, conjun .....112 univer
114, ction induction sals63,
120, and 39, 40, 163
127, negati 48, 49, intermed
129, on of 215, iate
132, contra 218 corpor
133, dictori Infallible eality
134, es. .41, .......53 .......62
169 111 infinitud intuitive/
imkān impossib e....91, presen
alfaqrī ility of 102, tial
....120, conjun 157 knowl
129, ction instrume edge
132, of ntalitie .......29
133, contra s.....19 iqtirāni
134, dictori instrume .......40
169 es. .41, ntality irāda...91
imkān 42, 43, ....101, Irāda. .46
almāh 61, 80, 102 Iran.....4,
ūwī 116, instrume 57,
.....129 151 nts. 83, 159,
Immanen impossib 101, 185
t order le 102, Ishārāt.4,
....182, existe 104, 25, 54,
183 nt...91, 226, 55,
immutab 95 228 166,
ility in‛edām Intellect 167,
21, 22, .......99 .......85 168,
51, 60, inaction intellectu 201,
208, .....125 al 217
214 incorpor realitie Ishārāt
immutab ative s....52, wa al-
le .....158 183, Tanbi
entitie indhimā 209, hāt,..4,
251
54, 167, 82, .....152
168, 191, 162, kaun wa
201, 192, 198 al-
217 203 kalāmi fasād
Ishrāqiyy ja‛l...133 ......90, .....122
ūn.127 jadal. 192 119, khāliqiyy
ishterāk jadal al- 121, a..190,
allafdh ahsan 199 193
ī....152 .....192 kamāl al- khārij al-
Islamic jadalī192 wujūdī mahm
philos jadals .....119 ūl.158,
ophers .....191 Kant153, 159
34, 46, jāmi..175 154, khiyāl52,
62, 89, jauhar.57 156, 53, 69,
90, jidāl al- 157, 163,
106, ahsan 158, 183,
119, .....190 159, 209,
158, jins...181 160, 210
198, jism.121, 161, Khomein
217 123 162, i........4
iste‛dād Judeo- 217, Khurāsā
.....102 Christi 218, n.....46
istehāla an 219, Kifāyat
ijtemā theolo 221 al-
‛ al- gy143, karāma Usūl. 4
naqīdh 196 .....199 kind
ain..61 judgment kathra forms
istishāb al ....112, ....122,
.......80 relatio 152, 123,
it-is- nship 173 124
itness .......31 kathra kindly
......27, Jurjānī altabā exhort
112, .....111 yunī ation
147 justice .....152 ....190,
Ja‛far al- 82, 91, kathra 191,
Sādiq 233 altash 192,
46, 66, kalām54, kīkī 193
252
knower 171, 68, 75 ions
13, 19, 172, kulliyya .....171
23, 24, 178, 20, 51, life 5, 13,
25, 33, 184, 56, 78, 79,
50 185, 100 89, 91,
knowled 186, kulliyyāt 104,
ge....4, 189, al‛aqli 105,
13, 16, 193, yya 173,
18, 19, 206, .....163 197,
20, 21, 211, lā shai’ 198,
22, 23, 212, .....192 215,
24, 25, 219, Lāhijī. 99 221,
26, 27, 227, Latent 226,
29, 30, 229, Skepti 227,
31, 32, 231 cism 230,
33, 35, known ......20, 232,
36, 42, 19, 23, 211 234
45, 46, 24, 25, law of Logic
49, 50, 27, 28, identit ....112,
51, 53, 31, 32, y....29, 113
54, 55, 34, 35, 41, 42, logical
56, 57, 36, 37, 129, 15, 29,
59, 60, 38, 39, 149, 61, 62,
61, 62, 44, 45, 154 110,
66, 68, 47, 48, lawāzai 111,
69, 71, 52, 53, m 112,
72, 74, 54, 57, aldhat 113,
79, 84, 59, 70, .....112 114,
87, 88, 74, 76, lāzim132 115,
89, 92, 83, 88, Legenha 134,
109, 91, 98, usen. 5 144,
113, 147, lexical 149,
116, 199 definit 154,
117, Korah ion.89, 179,
126, .....197 171 186
167, Kulainī lexical low
170, 46, 51, definit wisdo
253
m....62 tasawu aldheh 84, 89,
ma‛ānī riyya niyya 103,
al- ......13, .......23 133,
harfiy 171 māhiyya 137,
ya. 136 mabādī alkhāri 138
ma‛lūl altasdī jiyya mantiq
......83, qiyya .......23 .....112
120, .....171 mahmūl Marmout
138, māddī.39 bi al- ier 144
196 Madīna dhamī Marwazī
ma‛lūliy al- ma .......46
ya..83, Fādhil ....158, masādīq
120, a al- 159, 22, 26,
138, Dīniyy 161 29,
196 a.....86 mahmūl 111,
ma‛lūm Mafātīh min 146,
.23, 50 al- samīm 157,
ma‛na Jinān ihi 158 160
alismī .......95 mahsūra material
.....136 mafhūm alkulli 21, 39,
ma‛qūl aldheh yya. 49 44, 59,
althānī nī....22 majāzī 217
alfalsa Mahajja ....105, materiali
fī. 113, al- 228 st...14,
181 Baydh Majlisī 19, 20
ma‛qūl ā’..212 13, 84, materiali
althānī mahal 85, stic
almant .....123 191 episte
iqī 113 mahdūd Majma‛ molog
ma‛qūlāt .......51 al- y.....22
althāni māhiyya Bayān materials
yya37, 23, 24, .....203 of
160 49, 97, Makāsib propos
Ma‛sūmī 100, .....197 itions
n.....53 133, manifest .......43
mabādī 181 ation mathema
al- māhiyya 13, 83, tics 59,
254
62, 63 231 .......74 ents
Mawāqif mental metaphy ......16,
.....111 mode sician 216,
mawwād of .......20 217,
al- existe middle 224
qadhā nce 23, term Moral
yā...43 24, 53, 22, 33, argum
mediates 150, 35, 54, ents
76, 99, 175 55, 56, .....214
102, mental 96, Moses
104, quiddi 100, 13, 14,
141, ty...23, 108, 197,
166 25 151, 201,
mediatio Merciful 168, 202
n....50, ..3, 67, 185, mostahle
54, 85, 215, k...178
101, 198 226, motion
102, Messeng 235 15, 16,
104, er of middle 21,
136 Allah wisdo 106,
memory ......16, m....62 107,
......69, 203, Miracles 108,
197 204 ....195, 119,
mental meta- 198, 120,
exemp intelle 201, 121,
lificati ctual 202 122,
on.163 realitie misdaq 124,
mental s. .208, .......57 125,
existe 209, mobile 127,
nce 23, 211 entity 140,
24, 26, Metaphy .....119 166,
28, 50, sical Monothe 168,
54, 57, .......19 ism. 86 169,
96, metaphy monothei 179,
109, sical st....91 183,
157, propos moral 184,
175, itions argum 235
255
mover ity Murid ntial
....119, ....112, .....123 necess
121, 130, musalla itation
122, 131, māt 70, 72,
123, 152, .....190 73
124, 160, musānik mystical
140 163, ha. 182 experi
mu‛jiza 173, Musayla ences
....199, 178 ma al- 52, 66,
200, mumkin Kadhd 76,
201 41, 91, hāb 208,
mu‛jiza 95, 98 .....200 210
alfe‛lī mumkin mushrikī nādhim
.....201 al- n.....77 ....182,
mu‛jiza wujūd mutaharr 184,
alqaulī 41, 91, ek. 119 186,
.....201 95 mutakelli 194
Mudabbi mumkinā mūn nadhm
r. . .199 t.....59, 14, 41, ....140,
muhāl 129, 81, 181,
al-‛ād 130 111, 182
dī.202, mumtane 120, nadhm
203 ‛...150 121, al‛illī
muhālāt mumtani 122, .....182
al‛aqli ‛ 123, nadhm
yya alwujū 125, aldākh
.....202 d....91, 126, ilī. 182
Muham 95 134, nadhm
mad mundus 167, alghā’ī
Taqī 4, imagin 198 .....182
22, 23 alis 52, Mutareh nafs al-
muharre 53, āt...56, amr
k...119 163, 57, ......92,
Mullā 183, 159, 174
Sadrā 185, 185 Nahj al-
.....167 209, mutual Balāg
multiplic 210 existe ha..81,
256
83, 84, 33, 48, 217, 121,
85, 86, 62, 90, 218, 124,
87, 91, 91, 92, 224, 132,
98, 97, 99, 234 135,
209 100, necessar 143,
naqīdh 101, y 145,
....131, 102, accide 146,
143, 103, nt..132 149,
149 104, Necessar 155,
naqīdhai 108, y 156,
n....41, 114, Existe 157,
42, 46, 115, nt...91, 163,
58, 116, 102 171,
111 120, necessar 172,
Nasīr al- 121, y truth 173,
Din 129, .34, 35 174,
al- 134, necessity 175,
Tūsī 135, 33, 34, 178,
.....201 139, 35, 36, 179,
Natural 141, 38, 41, 189,
scienc 146, 42, 44, 194,
es. .62, 150, 45, 48, 199,
63 151, 56, 59, 201,
natural 152, 60, 67, 207,
world 154, 82, 86, 208,
19, 46, 156, 89, 91, 210,
105, 162, 92, 96, 214,
124, 166, 104, 218,
163, 170, 105, 221,
183, 177, 107, 235
186, 178, 108, necessity
209 179, 110, of
naturalist 187, 111, existe
ic...14, 190, 112, nce 41,
221 191, 113, 112,
Necessar 196, 114, 114,
y....15, 198, 115, 121,
257
124, 141, 109, 147,
132, 147, 110, 148,
207 159, 111, 154,
necessity 166, 114, 163,
of 169, 115, 164,
truth 178, 123, 192,
.33, 41 184, 129, 198,
need. .15, 187, 132, 203,
27, 33, 198, 133, 209,
34, 35, 219, 143, 215,
41, 47, 220, 145, 221
59, 78, 229 146, notion
79, 82, negative 147, 13, 20,
98, attribu 151, 26, 29,
100, tes. 66, 153, 41, 53,
101, 91 155, 55, 56,
102, Nisba al- 156, 58, 90,
103, hukmi 157, 91, 92,
108, yya. 31 176, 95, 97,
109, nisba 177, 108,
110, alhuk 187 114,
114, miyya nothing 115,
116, .......31 27, 28, 116,
119, nonexist 60, 72, 120,
120, ence 79, 81, 136,
121, 24, 32, 110, 145,
123, 41, 42, 114, 146,
126, 46, 47, 117, 147,
127, 58, 66, 123, 152,
129, 80, 83, 130, 153,
130, 91, 92, 131, 154,
132, 95, 96, 132, 155,
133, 97, 98, 135, 156,
134, 99, 136, 157,
135, 100, 138, 159,
136, 103, 143, 160,
139, 108, 145, 162,
258
170, 153, 197, Peripatet
172, 163 212 ic...54,
173, ontologic particula 121,
175, al r 5, 22, 127,
176, capaci 29, 38, 133,
181, ty....13 39, 40, 141,
192, ontology 47, 49, 185,
231 .18, 20 51, 56, 189
notional open 61, 62, philosop
unity skepti 77, 82, hy4, 5,
....152, cism 96, 15, 26,
160 .......20 100, 28, 59,
nounal oppositio 137, 61, 62,
meani n....86, 149, 79, 82,
ng.136 139, 157, 83,
nubūwa 191 160, 106,
al‛ām Ordainer 170, 110,
ma198 .......82 173, 111,
nubūwa Order 179, 112,
alkhās ....181, 189, 113,
sa. 198 183, 191, 115,
omnipote 184, 198, 120,
nce 82, 186 201, 121,
91, orderer 204, 126,
155, ....182, 216, 130,
192, 184, 220 141,
200, 186, particula 148,
202 189, r 153,
Omnipot 194 prophe 173,
ent185 ordinary thood 174,
ontologic impos ....198, 183,
al sibility 201, 221,
argum ....202, 204 224,
ent.16, 203 particula 232
18, Paradise rity 21, physical
143, 51, 95, 56, form
149, 105, 159 ....121,
259
122 practical 160, rance
Plato 119 reason 161, withou
Platonic 30, 31, 162, ta
.....163 32, 36, 175 prepon
Platonic 37, 38, Predicati derant
archet 68, 69, on as .41, 80
ypes 70, Essenc preponde
.....163 188, e.....27 rance
polytheis 218, predicati withou
m...86, 219, on as ta
191 220, extens prepon
polytheis 221, ion.28, derant
tic 224 29, 56, factor
religio practical 109, .......41
sity. 85 wisdo 115, prepositi
polytheis m....30 116, onal
ts...77, predicati 117, notion
190, on..27, 146, s...136
193 28, 29, 147, presentia
positive 33, 49, 148, l......50
66, 91, 56, 149, primarin
233 109, 150, ess.42,
potentiali 112, 151, 44, 54,
ty.102, 113, 156, 87, 88,
119 114, 157, 92,
power31, 115, 162, 172
82, 89, 117, 176 Primarin
126, 146, Predicati ess.39,
173, 147, on as 40
192, 148, Extens primary
203, 150, ion..27 conce
226, 151, preponde pt...32,
227 153, rance 41, 91
practical 156, 41, 58, primary
miracl 157, 80, knowl
es 201, 158, 109 edge
202 159, preponde 32, 33,
260
34, 87 134, 199, nadhar
primary 135, 200, iyya35
propos 152, 201, qadhiyya
ition 162, 202, alkulli
32, 33, 173 210, yya. 47
34, 35, Principle 211 qaus
38, 39, s of propositi alnuzū
40, 41, Jurispr onal l.....85,
49, 56 udenc premis 193
primary e.....80 es 116, qaus
propos probabili 171, alnuzū
itions ty...36, 172 lī. .193
33, 34, 37, psycholo qaus
35, 38, 186, gical alsu‛ū
39, 40, 187, necess d....85,
49, 56 188, ity. .33 193
principal 215, Psycholo qiyās. 21,
ity. 21, 216 gy of 39, 40
24, 59, Probabili Al- qiyās al-
131, ty...36, Shifā’ iqtirān
133, 37, .......54 ī......21
134, 186, purify.51 qiyās al-
135, 188 Purposer istithn
152, Problem .....123 ā’ī. .21
162, of Evil qadhāyā quantifie
169, .....193 al- d
173, Prophet awwal univer
176 16, 53, iyya sal
Principal 70, 77, 33, 34, propos
ity. .24 191, 35, 38, ition
principal 198, 39, 56 .......49
ity of 202, qadhiyya qudra.89,
existe 203, al- 91,
nce 21, 212 badihi 173
24, propheth yya. 32 quidditat
131, ood qadhiyya ive
133, ....198, al- contin
261
gency 162, 76, 78, ony.83
....102, 169, 81, 82, reality
108, 173, 83, 86, 13, 14,
129, 181 87, 90, 18, 19,
132, Qum4, 5, 92, 20, 21,
133, 15, 22, 114, 23, 24,
134, 23, 42, 116, 28, 31,
135, 49, 97, 121, 32, 36,
146, 106, 124, 37, 38,
169 111, 126, 50, 53,
Quidditat 158, 132, 54, 55,
ive 162, 134, 56, 57,
contin 169, 141, 58, 60,
gency 170, 151, 61, 62,
.....100 176 163, 63, 67,
quiddity Qummī 166, 70, 87,
23, 24, ......95, 184, 88, 91,
25, 26, 105, 186, 92, 95,
27, 29, 140, 187, 96,
33, 48, 230 189, 104,
49, 50, qūwwa 190, 105,
53, 57, .....119 198, 106,
58, 97, Radhī 83, 201, 109,
100, 111 202, 113,
101, ratiocinat 203, 114,
103, ion.30, 206, 116,
105, 69, 210, 117,
109, 206 211, 130,
114, rational 224, 131,
129, 18, 29, 230 132,
131, 31, 33, rational 134,
132, 53, 54, impos 135,
133, 55, 58, sibiliti 136,
134, 63, 66, es 202, 137,
145, 67, 68, 203 138,
152, 70, 73, rational 139,
159, 74, 75, theoph 145,
262
148, 227, ....143, 208
149, 228, 150 respectiv
150, 229, regress ality
151, 230, ......99, of
152, 231, 123, quiddi
153, 232, 137, ty...24,
156, 234 159 133
159, receptive regressiv Responsi
160, .....125 e....99, o...145
161, recipient 106, rest....52,
163, ......79, 119, 88,
166, 101, 120, 125,
169, 105, 121, 229
171, 123, 125, revelatio
172, 226 141 n....13,
173, recipient regressiv 15, 66,
174, cause e and 68,
175, .......79 circula 190,
176, reciproca r 207
177, l...224, causati rhetorica
178, 225, on120, l...192,
179, 226, 121 193
182, 227, reificatio sababiyy
188, 228, n....24, a..101,
203, 230, 37, 102
206, 231, 188 Sabzawā
207, 234 religious rī...48,
208, reciproci experi 49, 66,
209, ty.224, ence 97,
212, 225, ......73, 105,
216, 226, 206, 106,
218, 230, 207, 158,
219, 231 208 169
220, reductio religious Sadr al-
224, ad experi Muta’
225, absurd ences allihīn
226, um ....207, 28, 54,
263
58, secondar shadowy 159,
124, y existe 185
134, philos nce 28, Shaykh
148, ophica 109 al-
153, l shak. . .52 Tūsī
167, intelli shakkāk .....203
169 gible .......42 sheer
Sadūq46, .....113 shakkāki unity
67, 74, self- yya18, .....112
81, eviden 19, 20, Shinakht
167, ce. .40, 42, 52, Shinas
192 44, 55, 54, 73, ī dar
Satan.51, 97, 85, Qur’ā
210, 172 117, n.....22
211 self- 141, Shirāzī
Schleier eviden 172, 54, 58,
march t 211 112,
er..206 knowl Sharh al- 124,
secondar edge Mand 134,
y .......32 hūma 153,
intelli seminary ..4, 49, 168,
gibles ....4, 5, 97, 169,
......37, 15 106, 185
160 sensation 158, shuhūd
secondar 13, 30, 169, 50, 52,
y 44, 69, 170 54, 56,
logical 73, sharīk 75, 76,
intelli 184, alBārī 92,
gibles 185 .....146 206,
.....113 sensation Shawāriq 207,
secondar alism al- 209,
y 73, 75, Ilhām 210,
philos 141 .......99 211,
ophic Sha‛rānī Shaykh 212,
intelli .4, 197 al- 229,
gible Shabistar Ishrāq 232,
.....181 ī....101 ......56, 233,
264
234 m...18, dimen causes
shuhūdi 19, 20, sions ......19,
51, 53, 42, 52, of 103,
54, 56, 54, 56, knowl 104,
66, 70, 57, 59, edge 105,
76, 73, 85, .......20 125
206, 117, Subduer Sūra
208 141, .....139 alHadī
shuhūdi 172, substanc d...191
cogniti 209, e....57, sūra
on..70, 211, 160 alIkhlā
76, 216 substanti s.....84
206 Socrates al Sūra
shuhūdi ......47, motio alTaw
visuali 119 n..123, hīd191
zation sophism 124, sūrī.....39
.......76 60, 73, 140 Sustentat
shuhūds 85, successiv ive
....206, 117, e Autho
207, 166, regres rity
208, 174, s...122 .....103
209 176 Suhrawa suwwar
si‛a al- sophistry rdī. 57, al-
wujūdi ......87, 130, naw‛iy
yya13, 173, 159, ya. 122
229 174, 185 syllogis
sifāt 175, sukūn m...22,
althub 177 .....125 35, 39,
ūtiyya Soul....5, Summa 40, 43,
.......91 53 Theol 44, 45,
simplicit specie ogica 47, 48,
y...169 unity .....120 49, 56,
skeptic .....112 summum 122,
20, 42, spiritual bonum 151,
197, and .....218 184,
207 incorp supplem 185,
skepticis oreal entary 186,
265
220, tajallī.16, .....157 46, 51,
229 83, 88, tasalsul 55, 57,
syllogis 89 ......99, 58, 63,
m du tajallī 106, 67, 68,
pourq al-‛aql 119, 71, 74,
oi..185 ī......83 123 75, 81,
syllogisti tajarrud tasalsul 84, 85,
c....16, albarz al-‛illī 101,
33, 39, akhī62 .....106 112,
40, 47, talāzum tasalsul 139,
58, alwujū alta‛āq 151,
216, dī....70 ubī123 153,
219 tamāthul tasāwi 156,
synonym ......53, al- 159,
y of 163 nisba 167,
existe tamāthul .......58 169,
nce aldheh tasawwu 171,
.....162 nī..163 r al- 178,
ta‛aqqul tamthīl badīhī 185,
.......69 ......40, .......32 191,
ta‛aqul30 182 tawhīd 192,
ta‛ārīf taqābul 67, 78, 201,
allafdh .....139 89, 91, 217
iyya Taqī al- 190, Teleolog
.....171 Āmulī 191, ical
ta‛rīf .........4 193 order
allafdh taqrīr al- Tawhīd .....182
ī......89 tamthī 46, 78, thabāt21,
Tabarsī lī. .182 81, 51
.....203 tarjīh. 41, 190, theology
tabāyun 58, 80 192 .62, 73
.....152 tarjīh tawhīd theophon
tafsīr....4 bilā al- y....16,
taghayyu murajj rūbūbī 84, 88,
r.....21 eh..41, .....190 89
tahlīlī 80 Tehran 4, theoretic
.....158 tarkīb 13, 25, al
266
discipl 21, 54, intelle wahda
ines 75 131, ct....84 22, 24,
theoretic 134, Universa 25, 50,
al 162, l 57,
reason 167, propos 112,
30, 31, 189 ition 152,
32, 33, unity. 24, .47, 48 153,
34, 35, 25, 27, universal 159,
36, 37, 28, 50, realitie 160,
69, 57, 67, s.....51 173
217, 89, 91, universal wahda
218, 112, shuhū al-
219, 130, ds...52 mafhū
224 131, universal miyya
theoretic 147, ity. 20, .....152
al 148, 22, 49, wahda
wisdo 152, 51, 56, aljjinsi
m....30 153, 100, yya
theosoph 159, 189, .....112
ers. 14, 160, 208, wahda
19, 54, 163, 214, almah
141, 166, 215, dha
150, 173, 216 .....112
169 176, universal wahda
Thomas 178, s...175 almisd
Aquin 189, unseen āqiyya
as 106, 190, 77, 84, .....160
120 193, 138, wahda
Tibyān 207 179, alnau‛i
.....203 unity of 196 yya
Tillich 76 the usūl 4, 80 .....112
Torah knowe usūl al- wahda
.....143 r and fiqh. 4, alshak
Transcen the 80 hsiyya
dent known verbal .....112
Wisdo .......25 miracl wahdat
m.....5, universal es. 201 al-‛āli
267
m wa gy..73, 184, 91, 92,
al- 75 187, 95, 96,
ma‛lū will. . .13, 193, 97,
m....25 28, 29, 198, 102,
wahm30, 30, 31, 199, 109,
69, 34, 36, 209, 130,
209 38, 40, 210, 131,
Wajhulla 42, 43, 214, 151,
h...138 44, 52, 215, 157,
Wājib15, 55, 61, 216, 162,
62, 91, 62, 66, 217, 170,
101, 67, 70, 218, 175,
102, 74, 77, 219, 177
114 78, 79, 220, wujūd
Wājib al- 83, 88, 221 al-
Wujūd 91, 92, wisāl. .85 dhillī
.......91 95, 97, wisdom ......28,
wasāta 104, 30, 61, 109
....101, 107, 62, 81, wujūd
102 108, 87, 89, al-
wayfarin 109, 107, khārijī
g.....52 110, 126, 23, 96,
western 116, 189, 97
philos 119, 191, wujūd
ophy 121, 224, aldheh
......69, 123, 227, nī...23,
106, 124, 232 50, 53,
107, 125, world of 57, 96,
143, 126, intelle 157,
150, 134, cts 175
206 145, ....163, wūjud
Western 147, 183 alrābit
Theol 157, wujūb82, .....161
ogians 166, 127 yaqīn
.....198 169, wujūd23, al‛ilmī
western 177, 28, 50, .....207
theolo 181, 53, 57, Yazdī
268
.....156 Āmidī
Āghā Ali 71, 74,
.....139 75
Ākhūnd Āmul....4
al- ījād....99,
Khurā 101
sānī. .4 īmān...30