The

Psychic Life
of Power
Theories in Subjection

Judith Butler

Stanford University Press

Stanford, California
 Acknowledgments

Stanford U n i v e r s i t y Press This w o r k was generously sponsored by a Humanities Re­

Stanford, California
s e a r c h F e l l o w s h i p f r o m the U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a a t B e r k e ­
© 1997 b y t h e B o a r d o f T r u s t e e s o f t h e
ley. I a m g r a t e f u l t o those f r i e n d s a n d c o l l e a g u e s w h o g a v e
Leland Stanford Junior University
incisive readings o f s o m e o f the chapters: Wendy Brown,
P r i n t e d i n the U n i t e d States o f A m e r i c a
W i l l i a m Connolly, D a v i d P a l u m b o ­ L i u , Kaja Silverman, A n n e
C I P data a p p e a r at the e n d of the b o o k
N o r t o n , D e n i s e R i l e y , a n d H a y d e n W h i t e , a s w e l l a s the s t u ­
d e n t s w h o p a r t i c i p a t e d i n " S o c i a l Subjects / P s y c h i c States" a t
B e r k e l e y . I t h a n k A d a m P h i l l i p s for h i s p e r m i s s i o n t o r e p r i n t
o u r e x c h a n g e f r o m Psychoanalytic Dialogues in this context. I
also t h a n k H e l e n T a r t a r for her m e t i c u l o u s , i n t e l l i g e n t , a n d
t h o r o u g h g o i n g e d i t i n g , a n d G a y l e S a l a m o n for her assistance
w i t h the m a n u s c r i p t .
 Contents

Introduction 1

1 Stubborn Attachment, B o d i l y Subjection

Rereading Hegel on the Unhappy Consciousness 31

2 C i r c u i t s of B a d Conscience
Nietzsche and Freud 63

3 Subjection, Resistance, Resignification

Between Freud and Foucault 83

4 " C o n s c i e n c e D o t h M a k e Subjects o f U s A l l "

Althusser's Subjection 106

5 M e l a n c h o l y G e n d e r / Refused Identification 132

Keeping It M o v i n g

Commentary on Judith Butler, by Adam Phillips 151

Reply to A d a m Phillips 160

6 Psychic Inceptions
Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 167

Notes 201

Index 217
The Psychic Life of Power
Theories in Subjection
 Introduction

W e s h o u l d t r y t o g r a s p s u b j e c t i o n i n its m a t e r i a l i n s t a n c e a s
a c o n s t i t u t i o n of s u b j e c t s .
— M i c h e l Foucault, "Two Lectures"

T h e s p l i t t i n g of the subject, w i t h i n w h i c h the self as present

to itself is o n l y one m o m e n t , a n d the c h a r g e d reflexivity of
that m o m e n t , i s the p o i n t o f p u r c h a s e w i t h i n the subject o f
its s u b j e c t i o n . T h e p r o f o u n d a n d c o r p o r e a l g u i l t w i t h w h i c h
t h e s u b j e c t i s i n v e s t e d a s t h e f e b r i l e u n d e r t o n e o f t h a t self­
c o n s c i o u s n e s s , w h i c h t u r n s o u t t o k n o w s o little o f itself, i s
decisive i n s e c u r i n g the d e e p i n n e r c o n t r o l , w h i c h has b e e n
called interpellation.
— F r a n c i s B a r k e r , The Tremulous Private Body:
Essays on Subjection

Subjection . . . T h e a c t or fact of b e i n g s u b j e c t e d , as u n d e r a
m o n a r c h o r o t h e r s o v e r e i g n o r s u p e r i o r p o w e r ; the state o f
b e i n g subject to, or u n d e r the d o m i n i o n of another; hence
gen. s u b o r d i n a t i o n . . . . T h e c o n d i t i o n of b e i n g s u b j e c t ,
e x p o s e d , or l i a b l e to; l i a b i l i t y . . . . Logic. T h e a c t of s u p p l y i n g
a s u b j e c t to a p r e d i c a t e . —Oxford English Dictionary

A s a f o r m o f power, subjection i s paradoxical. T o b e d o m i ­

i l n a t e d b y a p o w e r e x t e r n a l t o o n e s e lf i s a f a m i l i a r a n d
a g o n i z i n g f o r m p o w e r takes. T o f i n d , h o w e v e r , that w h a t " o n e "
 2 Introduction
is, one's v e r y f o r m a t i o n as a subject, is in s o m e sense d e p e n ­
d e n t u p o n that v e r y p o w e r i s q u i t e another. W e are u s e d t o
t h i n k i n g o f p o w e r a s w h a t presses o n the subject f r o m the o u t ­
side, a s w h a t s u b o r d i n a t e s , sets u n d e r n e a t h , a n d relegates t o
a l o w e r o r d e r . T h i s is s u r e l y a f a i r d e s c r i p t i o n of p a r t of w h a t
p o w e r does. B u t if, f o l l o w i n g F o u c a u l t , w e u n d e r s t a n d p o w e r
as forming the subject as w e l l , as p r o v i d i n g the v e r y c o n d i t i o n
o f its existenc e a n d the t r a j e c t o r y o f its d e s i r e , t h e n p o w e r i s
n o t s i m p l y w h a t w e o p p o s e b u t also, i n a s t r o n g sense, w h a t w e
d e p e n d o n f o r o u r existenc e a n d w h a t w e h a r b o r a n d p r e s e r v e
i n the b e i n g s that w e are. T h e c u s t o m a r y m o d e l f o r u n d e r ­
s t a n d i n g t h i s p r o c e s s g o e s a s f o l l o w s : p o w e r i m p o s e s itself o n
us, a n d , w e a k e n e d b y its force, w e c o m e t o i n t e r n a l i z e o r a c ­
cept its t e r m s . W h a t s u c h a n a c c o u n t fails t o note, h o w e v e r ,
i s that the " w e " w h o a c c e p t s u c h t e r m s are f u n d a m e n t a l l y
d e p e n d e n t o n those t e r m s f o r " o u r " existence. A r e there n o t
d i s c u r s i v e c o n d i t i o n s f o r the a r t i c u l a t i o n o f a n y " w e " ? S u b j e c ­
tion consists precisely in this f u n d a m e n t a l d e p e n d e n c y on a
d i s c o u r s e w e n e v e r c h o s e b u t that, p a r a d o x i c a l l y , i n i t i a t e s a n d
s u s t a i n s o u r agency.
" S u b j e c t i o n " s i g n i f i e s the p r o c e s s o f b e c o m i n g s u b o r d i n a t e d
b y p o w e r a s w e l l a s the p r o c e s s o f b e c o m i n g a subject. W h e t h e r
b y i n t e r p e l l a t i o n , i n A l t h u s s e r ' s sense, o r b y d i s c u r s i v e p r o ­
d u c t i v i t y , i n F o u c a u l t ' s , the subject i s i n i t i a t e d t h r o u g h a p r i ­
m a r y s u b m i s s i o n t o p o w e r . A l t h o u g h F o u c a u l t i d e n t i f i e s the
a m b i v a l e n c e i n t h i s f o r m u l a t i o n , h e d o e s n o t elaborate o n the
s p e c i f i c m e c h a n i s m s o f h o w the subject i s f o r m e d i n s u b m i s ­
s i o n . N o t o n l y d o e s the e n t i r e d o m a i n o f the p s y c h e r e m a i n
l a r g e l y u n r e m a r k e d i n h i s theory, b u t p o w e r i n t h i s d o u b l e
valence of subordinating a n d p r o d u c i n g remains unexplored.
T h u s , if s u b m i s s i o n is a c o n d i t i o n of s u b j e c t i o n , it m a k e s sense
t o ask: W h a t i s the p s y c h i c f o r m that p o w e r takes? S u c h a
Introduction
project r e q u i r e s t h i n k i n g the t h e o r y o f p o w e r t o g e t h e r w i t h a
t h e o r y o f the p s y c h e , a task that h a s b e e n e s c h e w e d b y w r i t e r s
in both F o u c a u l d i a n a n d psychoanalytic orthodoxies. T h o u g h
i t offers n o p r o m i s e o f a g r a n d s y n t h e s i s , the p r e s e n t i n q u i r y
seeks t o e x p l o r e the p r o v i s i o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e s f r o m w h i c h e a c h
t h e o r y i l l u m i n a t e s the other. T h e project n e i t h e r b e g i n s n o r
e n d s w i t h F r e u d a n d F o u c a u l t ; the q u e s t i o n o f s u b j e c t i o n , o f
h o w the subject i s f o r m e d i n s u b o r d i n a t i o n , p r e o c c u p i e s the
s e c t i o n of H e g e l ' s Phenomenology of Spirit that traces the slave's
a p p r o a c h t o f r e e d o m a n d h i s d i s a p p o i n t i n g f a l l i n t o the " u n ­
h a p p y c o n s c i o u s n e s s . " T h e m a s t e r , w h o a t first a p p e a r s t o
b e " e x t e r n a l " t o the slave, r e e m e r g e s a s the slave's o w n c o n ­
science. T h e u n h a p p i n e s s o f the c o n s c i o u s n e s s that e m e r g e s i s
its o w n self­beratement, the effect o f t h e t r a n s m u t a t i o n o f t h e
m a s t e r i n t o a p s y c h i c r e a l i t y. T h e s e l f ­ m o r t i f i c a t i o n s that seek
t o r e d r e s s the i n s i s t e n t c o r p o r e a l i t y o f s e l f ­ c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n s t i ­
tute b a d conscience. T h i s figure of consciousness t u r n e d b a c k
u p o n itself p r e f i g u r e s N i e t z s c h e ' s a c c o u n t , in On the Genealogy
o f Morals, n o t o n l y o f h o w r e p r e s s i o n a n d r e g u l a t i o n f o r m t h e
o v e r l a p p i n g p h e n o m e na of conscience a n d bad conscience, but
a l s o o f h o w the latter b e c o m e e s s e n t i a l t o the f o r m a t i o n , p e r ­
sistence, a n d c o n t i n u i t y o f the subject. I n e a c h case, p o w e r that
at first a p p e a r s as e x t e r n a l , p r e s s e d u p o n the subject, p r e s s i n g
the subject i n t o s u b o r d i n a t i o n , a s s u m e s a p s y c h i c f o r m that
c o n s t i t u t e s the subject's s e l f ­ i d e n t i t y .
T h e f o r m t h i s p o w e r takes i s r e l e n t l e s s l y m a r k e d b y a f i g u r e
o f t u r n i n g , a t u r n i n g b a c k u p o n o n e s e lf o r e v e n a t u r n i n g
on oneself. T h i s f i g u r e operates as p a r t of the e x p l a n a t i o n of
h o w a subject i s p r o d u c e d , a n d so there is no subject, s t r i c t l y
s p e a k i n g , w h o m a k e s this t u r n . O n the c o n t r a r y , the t u r n a p ­
p e a r s to f u n c t i o n as a t r o p o l o g i c a l i n a u g u r a t i o n of the subject,
a f o u n d i n g m o m e n t w h o s e o n t o l o g i c a l status r e m a i n s p e r m a ­
 4 Introduction
Introduction

nently uncertain. S u c h a notion, then, appears difficult, if not

i n s t a n c e o f t h i s q u a s i ­ f i c t i v e effort t o g i v e a n a c c o u n t o f h o w
i m p o s s i b l e , t o i n c o r p o r a t e i n t o the a c c o u n t o f subject f o r m a ­
the s o c i a l subject i s p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h l i n g u i s t i c m e a n s . A l t ­
t i o n . W h a t o r w h o i s s a i d t o t u r n , a n d w h a t i s the object o f
h u s s e r ' s d o c t r i n e of i n t e r p e l l a t i o n c l e a r l y sets the stage f o r
s u c h a t u r n ? H o w i s i t that a subject i s w r o u g h t f r o m s u c h a n
F o u c a u l t ' s later v i e w s o n the " d i s c u r s i v e p r o d u c t i o n o f the
o n t o l o g i c a l l y u n c e r t a i n f o r m o f twisting? Perhaps w i t h the ad­
subject." F o u c a u l t , of c o u r s e , i n s i s t s that the subject is n o t " s p o ­
v e n t o f t h i s f i g u r e , w e are n o l o n g e r i n the b u s i n e s s o f " g i v i n g
k e n " i n t o existence a n d that the m a t r i c e s o f p o w e r a n d d i s ­
a n a c c o u n t o f the f o r m a t i o n o f the subject." W e are, rather,
c o u r s e that c o n s t i t u t e the subject are n e i t h e r s i n g u l a r n o r s o v ­
confronted w i t h the t r o p o l o g i c a l p r e s u m p t i o n m a d e b y a n y
e r e i g n i n t h e i r p r o d u c t i v e a c t i o n . Yet A l t h u s s e r a n d F o u c a u l t
s u c h e x p l a n a t i o n , o n e that facilitates the e x p l a n a t i o n b u t a l so
agree that there is a f o u n d i n g s u b o r d i n a t i o n in the p r o c e s s of
m a r k s its l i m i t . T h e m o m e n t w e seek t o d e t e r m i n e h o w p o w e r
assujetissement. I n A l t h u s s e r ' s essay "Ideology and Ideologi­
p r o d u c e s its subject, h o w t h e subject takes i n t h e p o w e r b y
c a l State A p p a r a t u s e s , " the s u b o r d i n a t i o n of the subject takes
w h i c h i t i s i n a u g u r a t e d , w e s e e m t o enter t h is t r o p o l o g i c a l
p l a c e t h r o u g h l a n g u a g e , as the effect of the a u t h o r i t a t i v e v o i c e
q u a n d a r y . W e c a n n o t p r e s u m e a subject w h o p e r f o r m s a n i n ­
that h a i l s the i n d i v i d u a l . I n the i n f a m o u s e x a m p l e that A l t h u s ­
t e r n a l i z a t i o n i f the f o r m a t i o n o f t h e subject i s i n n e e d o f ex­
ser offers, a p o l i c e m a n h a i l s a p a s s e r b y on the street, a n d
p l a n a t i o n . T h e f i g u r e t o w h i c h w e refer has n o t yet a c q u i r e d
the p a s s e r b y t u r n s a n d r e c o g n i z e s h i m s e l f a s the o n e w h o i s
existenc e a n d i s n o t p a r t o f a v e r i f i a b l e e x p l a n a t i o n , yet o u r
h a i l e d . I n the e x c h a n g e b y w h i c h that r e c o g n i t i o n i s p r o f e r r e d
reference c o n t i n u e s t o m a k e a c e r t a i n k i n d o f sense. T h e p a r a ­
a n d a c c e p t e d , i n t e r p e l l a t i o n — t h e d i s c u r s i v e p r o d u c t i o n o f the
dox of subjection i m p l i e s a paradox of referentiality: namely,
s o c i a l s u b j e c t — t a k e s p l a c e . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , A l t h u s s e r does n o t
that w e m u s t refer t o w h a t d o e s n o t yet exist. T h r o u g h a f i g u r e
offer a c l u e a s t o w h y that i n d i v i d u a l t u r n s a r o u n d , a c c e p t i n g
that m a r k s the s u s p e n s i o n o f o u r o n t o l o g i c a l c o m m i t m e n t s ,
the v o i c e a s b e i n g a d d r e s s e d t o h i m o r her, a n d a c c e p t i n g the
w e seek t o a c c o u n t for h o w the subject c o m e s t o be. T h a t t h i s
s u b o r d i n a t i o n a n d n o r m a l i z a t i o n effected b y that v o i c e . W h y
f i g u r e i s i t s e l f a " t u r n " is, r h e t o r i c a l l y , p e r f o r m a t i v e l y s p e c ­
d o e s this subject t u r n t o w a r d the v o i c e o f the l a w , a n d w h a t i s
t a c u l a r ; " t u r n " translates the G r e e k sense o f " t r o p e . " T h u s the
t r o p e o f the t u r n b o t h i n d i c a t e s a n d e x e m p l i f i e s the t r o p o l o g i ­ the effect of s u c h a t u r n in i n a u g u r a t i n g a s o c i a l subject? Is t h is

c a l status o f the gesture. D o e s s u b j e c t i o n i n a u g u r a t e t r o p o l o g y

1
a g u i l t y subject a n d , i f so, h o w d i d i t b e c o m e g u i l t y ? M i g h t

i n s o m e w a y , o r i s the i n a u g u r a t i v e w o r k o f t r o p e s n e c e s s a r i l y the t h e o r y of i n t e r p e l l a t i o n r e q u i r e a t h e o r y of c o n s c i e n c e ?

i n v o k e d w h e n w e t r y t o a c c o u n t f o r the g e n e r a t i o n o f t h e s u b ­ T h e i n t e r p e l l a t i o n o f the subject t h r o u g h the i n a u g u r a t i v e

ject? W e w i l l r e t u r n t o t h i s q u e s t i o n t o w a r d the e n d o f this a d d r e s s o f state a u t h o r i t y p r e s u p p o s e s n o t o n l y that the i n ­

i n q u i r y w h e n w e c o n s i d e r h o w the e x p l a n a t i o n o f m e l a n c h o l i a c u l c a t i o n o f c o n s c i e n c e a l r e a d y has t a k e n p l a c e , b u t that c o n ­

participates in the m e c h a n i s m it describes, p r o d u c i n g p s y c h i c
t o p o g r a p h i e s that are c l e a r l y t r o p o l o g i c a l .
T h e scene o f " i n t e r p e l l a t i o n " o f f e r e d b y A l t h u s s e r i s o n e
science, u n d e r s t o o d as the p s y c h i c o p e r a t i o n of a r e g u l a t o r y
n o r m , constitutes a specifically p s y c h i c a n d social w o r k i n g of
p o w e r o n w h i c h i n t e r p e l l a t i o n d e p e n d s b u t for w h i c h i t c a n
g i v e n o a c c o u n t . M o r e o v e r , the m o d e l o f p o w e r i n A l t h u s ­
 6 Introduction
ser's a c c o u n t a t t r i b u t e s p e r f o r m a t i v e p o w e r t o the a u t h o r i t a ­
t i v e v o i c e , the v o i c e o f s a n c t i o n , a n d h e n c e t o a n o t i o n o f l a n ­
g u a g e f i g u r e d a s s p e e c h . H o w are w e t o a c c o u n t for the p o w e r
of written discourse, or of bureaucratic discourse, w h i c h cir­
culates w i t h o u t v o i c e o r s i g n a t u r e ? F i n a l l y , A l t h u s s e r ' s v i e w ,
u s e f u l as it is, r e m a i n s i m p l i c i t l y c o n s t r a i n e d by a n o t i o n of a
c e n t r a l i z e d state a p p a r a t u s , o n e w h o s e w o r d i s its d e e d , m o d ­
eled on d i v i n e authority. The n o t i o n of discourse emerges in
F o u c a u l t i n p a r t t o c o u n t e r the s o v e r e i g n m o d e l o f i n t e r p e l l a ­
tive speech in theories s u c h as A l t h u s s e r ' s , but also to take
a c c o u n t of the efficacy of d i s c o u r s e a p a r t f r o m its i n s t a n t i a t i o n
a s the s p o k e n w o r d .
Passionate Attachments
T h e i n s i s t e n c e that a subject is p a s s i o n a t e l y a t t a c h e d to h i s
o r h e r o w n s u b o r d i n a t i o n has b e e n i n v o k e d c y n i c a l l y b y those
w h o seek to d e b u n k the c l a i m s of the s u b o r d i n a t e d . If a s u b ­
ject c a n b e s h o w n t o p u r s u e o r s u s t a i n h i s o r h e r s u b o r d i n a t e d
status, the r e a s o n i n g goes, t h e n p e r h a p s f i n a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for
that s u b o r d i n a t i o n r e s i d e s w i t h the subject. O v e r a n d against
t h i s v i e w , I w o u l d m a i n t a i n that the a t t a c h m e n t t o s u b j e c t i o n
i s p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h the w o r k i n g s o f p o w e r , a n d that p a r t o f
the o p e r a t i o n o f p o w e r i s m a d e c l e a r i n t h i s p s y c h i c effect, o n e
o f the m o s t i n s i d i o u s o f its p r o d u c t i o n s . If, i n a N i e t z s c h e a n
sense, the subject i s f o r m e d b y a w i l l that t u r n s b a c k u p o n
itself, a s s u m i n g a r e f l e x i v e f o r m , t h e n the subject is the m o ­
d a l i t y o f p o w e r that t u r n s o n itself; the subject i s the effect o f
power in recoil.
T h e subject w h o i s a t o n c e f o r m e d a n d s u b o r d i n a t e d i s
a l r e a d y i m p l i c a t e d i n the scene o f p s y c h o a n a l y s i s . F o u c a u l t ' s
r e f o r m u l a t i o n o f s u b o r d i n a t i o n a s that w h i c h i s n o t o n l y
Introduction 7
p r e s s e d on a subject b u t f o r m s a subject, that is, is p r e s s e d on
a subject by its f o r m a t i o n , suggests an a m b i v a l e n c e at the site
w h e r e the subject emerges . If the effect of a u t o n o m y is c o n ­
d i t i o n e d b y s u b o r d i n a t i o n a n d that f o u n d i n g s u b o r d i n a t i o n o r
d e p e n d e n c y i s r i g o r o u s l y r e p r e s s e d , the subject e m e r g e s i n
t a n d e m w i t h the u n c o n s c i o u s . T h e F o u c a u l t i a n p o s t u l a t i o n o f
s u b j e c t i o n a s the s i m u l t a n e o u s s u b o r d i n a t i o n a n d f o r m i n g o f
the subject a s s u m e s a s p e c i f i c p s y c h o a n a l y t i c v a l e n c e w h e n w e
c o n s i d e r that no subject e m e r g e s w i t h o u t a p a s s i o n a t e attach­
m e n t t o those o n w h o m h e o r she i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y d e p e n d e n t
(even i f that p a s s i o n i s " n e g a t i v e " i n the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c sense).
A l t h o u g h the d e p e n d e n c y o f the c h i l d i s n o t political s u b o r d i ­
n a t i o n i n a n y u s u a l sense, the f o r m a t i o n o f p r i m a r y p a s s i o n
i n d e p e n d e n c y r e n d e r s the c h i l d v u l n e r a b l e t o s u b o r d i n a t i o n
a n d e x p l o i t a t i o n , a t o p i c that has b e c o m e a p r e o c c u p a t i o n of
recent p o l i t i c a l d i s c o u r s e . M o r e o v e r , t h i s s i t u a t i o n o f p r i m a r y
d e p e n d e n c y c o n d i t i o n s the p o l i t i c a l f o r m a t i o n a n d r e g u l a t i o n
of subjects a n d b e c o m e s the m e a n s of t h e i r s u b j e c t i o n . If there
is no f o r m a t i o n of the subject w i t h o u t a p a s s i o n a t e a t t a c h m e n t
t o t h o s e b y w h o m she o r h e i s s u b o r d i n a t e d , t h e n s u b o r d i ­
n a t i o n p r o v e s c e n t r a l t o the b e c o m i n g o f the subject. A s the 2
c o n d i t i o n o f b e c o m i n g a subject, s u b o r d i n a t i o n i m p l i e s b e i n g
i n a m a n d a t o r y s u b m i s s i o n . M o r e o v e r , the d e s i r e t o s u r v i v e ,
"to be," i s a p e r v a s i v e l y e x p l o i t a b l e d e s i r e . T h e o n e w h o h o l d s
o u t the p r o m i s e o f c o n t i n u e d existenc e p l a y s t o the d e s i r e
t o s u r v i v e . " I w o u l d r a t h e r exist i n s u b o r d i n a t i o n t h a n n o t
e x i s t " i s o n e f o r m u l a t i o n o f t h i s p r e d i c a m e n t ( w h e r e the r i s k
o f " d e a t h " i s also p o s s i b l e ) . T h i s i s o n e r e a s o n w h y debates
a b o u t the r e a l i t y o f the s e x u a l a b u s e o f c h i l d r e n t e n d t o m i s ­
state the c h a r a c t e r of the e x p l o i t a t i o n . It is n o t s i m p l y that a
s e x u a l i t y i s u n i l a t e r a l l y i m p o s e d b y the a d u l t , n o r that a s e x u ­
a l i t y i s u n i l a t e r a l l y f a n t a s i z e d b y the c h i l d , b u t that the c h i l d ' s
 8 Introduction
love, a l o v e that is n e c e s s a r y for its existence , is e x p l o i t e d a n d
a passionate attachment abused.
L e t u s c o n s i d e r that a subject i s n o t o n l y f o r m e d i n s u b ­
o r d i n a t i o n , b u t that t h i s s u b o r d i n a t i o n p r o v i d e s the subject's
c o n t i n u i n g c o n d i t i on of possibility. A child's love is p r i o r to
judgment and decision; a c h i l d tended and nourished in a
" g o o d e n o u g h " w a y w i l l l o v e , a n d o n l y later s t a n d a c h a n c e o f
d i s c r i m i n a t i n g a m o n g those h e o r she loves. T h i s i s t o say, n o t
that the c h i l d l o v e s b l i n d l y (since f r o m e a r l y o n there i s d i s ­
cernment and "knowingness" of an important kind), but only
that i f the c h i l d i s t o p e r s i s t i n a p s y c h i c a n d s o c i a l sense, there
m u s t b e d e p e n d e n c y a n d the f o r m a t i o n o f a t t a c h m e n t : there i s
n o p o s s i b i l i t y o f n o t l o v i n g , w h e r e l o v e i s b o u n d u p w i t h the
r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r life. T h e c h i l d d o e s n o t k n o w t o w h a t he/she
attaches; yet the i n f a n t a s w e l l a s the c h i l d m u s t a t t a c h i n
o r d e r t o p e r s i s t i n a n d a s itself. N o subject c a n e m e r g e w i t h ­
3
o u t t h i s a t t a c h m e n t , f o r m e d i n d e p e n d e n c y , b u t n o subject, i n
t h e c o u r s e o f its f o r m a t i o n , c a n e v e r a f f o r d f u l l y t o "see" it.
T h i s a t t a c h m e n t i n its p r i m a r y f o r m s m u s t b o t h come t o b e a n d
b e denied, its c o m i n g to be m u s t c o n s i s t in its p a r t i a l d e n i a l , for
the subject to e m e r g e .
T h a t a c c o u n t s i n p a r t f o r the a d u l t sense o f h u m i l i a t i o n
w h e n c o n f r o n t e d w i t h the earliest objects o f l o v e — p a r e n t s ,
g u a r d i a n s , s i b l i n g s , a n d s o o n — t h e sense o f b e l a t e d i n d i g n a ­
t i o n in w h i c h one claims, "I c o u l d n ' t p o s s i b l y love s u c h a per­
s o n . " T h e u t t e r a n c e c o n c e d e s the p o s s i b i l i t y i t d e n i e s , estab­
l i s h i n g the "I" a s p r e d i c a t e d u p o n that f o r e c l o s u r e , g r o u n d e d
i n a n d b y that f i r m l y i m a g i n e d i m p o s s i b i l i t y . T h e "I" i s t h u s
f u n d a m e n t a l l y t h r e a t e n e d b y the s p e c t e r o f t h i s ( i m p o s s i b l e )
l o v e ' s r e a p p e a r a n c e a n d r e m a i n s c o n d e m n e d t o r e e n a c t that
l o v e u n c o n s c i o u s l y , r e p e a t e d l y r e l i v i n g a n d d i s p l a c i n g that
s c a n d a l , that i m p o s s i b i l i t y , o r c h e s t r a t i n g that threat t o o n e ' s
Introduction 9
sense of " I . " " T c o u l d n o t be w h o I am if I w e r e to l o v e in the
w a y that I a p p a r e n t l y d i d , w h i c h I m u s t , t o p e r s i s t a s m y s e l f ,
c o n t i n u e t o d e n y a n d yet u n c o n s c i o u s l y reenact i n c o n t e m p o ­
r a r y life w i t h the m o s t t e r r i b l e s u f f e r i n g a s its c o n s e q u e n c e . "
T h e t r a u m a t i c r e p e t i t i o n o f w h a t has b e e n f o r e c l o s e d f r o m
c o n t e m p o r a r y life threaten s the " I . " T h r o u g h that n e u r o t i c
r e p e t i t i o n the subject p u r s u e s its o w n d i s s o l u t i o n , its o w n u n ­
r a v e l i n g , a p u r s u i t that m a r k s an agency, b u t n o t the subject's
a g e n c y — r a t h e r , the a g e n c y of a d e s i r e that a i m s at the d i s s o ­
l u t i o n of the subject, w h e r e the subject s t a n d s as a b a r to that
desire. 4
I f the subject i s p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h f o r e c l o s u r e , t h e n the s u b ­
ject i s p r o d u c e d b y a c o n d i t i o n f r o m w h i c h i t is, b y d e f i n i t i o n ,
s e p a r a t e d a n d d i f f e r e n t i a t e d . D e s i r e w i l l a i m a t u n r a v e l i n g the
subject, b u t b e t h w a r t e d b y p r e c i s e l y the subject i n w h o s e
n a m e it operates. A v e x a t i o n of d e s i r e , o n e that p r o v e s c r u c i a l
to s u b j e c t i o n , i m p l i e s that for the subject to p e r s i s t , the s u b ­
ject m u s t t h w a r t its o w n d e s i r e . A n d for d e s i r e t o t r i u m p h , the
subject m u s t b e t h r e a t e n e d w i t h d i s s o l u t i o n . A subject t u r n e d
a g a i n s t itself (its desire) a p p e a r s , on t h i s m o d e l , to be a c o n d i ­
t i o n of the p e r s i s t e n c e of the subject.
T o d e s i r e the c o n d i t i o n s o f one's o w n s u b o r d i n a t i o n i s t h u s
r e q u i r e d t o p e r s i s t a s oneself. W h a t does i t m e a n t o e m b r a c e
the v e r y f o r m o f p o w e r — r e g u l a t i o n , p r o h i b i t i o n , s u p p r e s s i o n
— that threatens o n e w i t h d i s s o l u t i o n i n a n effort, p r e c i s e l y , t o
p e r s i s t i n o n e ' s o w n existence ? I t i s n o t s i m p l y that o n e r e ­
q u i r e s the r e c o g n i t i o n o f the o t h e r a n d that a f o r m o f r e c o g n i ­
t i o n i s c o n f e r r e d t h r o u g h s u b o r d i n a t i o n , b u t r a t h e r that o n e i s
d e p e n d e n t o n p o w e r for one's v e r y f o r m a t i o n , that that f o r m a ­
t i o n i s i m p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t d e p e n d e n c y , a n d that the p o s t u r e o f
the a d u l t subject c o n s i s t s p r e c i s e l y i n the d e n i a l a n d reenact­
m e n t o f t h i s d e p e n d e n c y . T h e " I " e m e r g e s u p o n the c o n d i t i o n
10 Introduction
that i t d e n y its f o r m a t i o n i n d e p e n d e n c y , the c o n d i t i o n s o f its
o w n p o s s i b i l i t y . T h e "I," h o w e v e r , i s t h r e a t e n e d w i t h d i s r u p ­
t i o n p r e c i s e l y b y t h i s d e n i a l , b y its u n c o n s c i o u s p u r s u i t o f its
o w n d i s s o l u t i o n t h r o u g h n e u r o t i c r e p e t i t i o n s that restage the
p r i m a r y s c e n a r i o s i t n o t o n l y refuses t o see b u t c a n n o t see, i f i t
w i s h e s t o r e m a i n itself. T h i s m e a n s , o f c o u r s e , that, p r e d i c a t e d
o n w h a t i t refuses t o k n o w , i t i s s e p a r a t e d f r o m itself a n d c a n
n e v e r q u i t e b e c o m e o r r e m a i n itself.
Ambivalence
T h e n o t i o n o f the subject has i n c i t e d c o n t r o v e r s y w i t h i n
r e c e n t t h e o r e t i c a l debate, b e i n g p r o m o t e d b y s o m e a s a n e c ­
e s s a r y p r e c o n d i t i o n o f a g e n c y a n d r e v i l e d b y other s a s a s i g n
of "mastery" to be refused. My p u r p o s e is neither to enumer­
ate n o r t o r e s o l v e the c o n t e m p o r a r y i n s t a n c e s o f t h i s debate.
R a t h e r , I p r o p o s e to take a c c o u n t of h o w a p a r a d o x r e c u r r e n t l y
s t r u c t u r e s the debate, l e a d i n g i t a l m o s t a l w a y s t o c u l m i n a t e i n
d i s p l a y s o f a m b i v a l e n c e . H o w c a n i t b e that the subject, t a k e n
t o b e the c o n d i t i o n for a n d i n s t r u m e n t o f agency, i s a t the s a m e
t i m e the effect o f s u b o r d i n a t i o n , u n d e r s t o o d a s the d e p r i v a ­
t i o n o f a g e n c y ? I f s u b o r d i n a t i o n i s the c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y
f o r agency, h o w m i g h t a g e n c y b e t h o u g h t i n o p p o s i t i o n t o the
forces o f s u b o r d i n a t i o n ?
" T h e s u b j e c t" i s s o m e t i m e s b a n d i e d a b o u t a s i f i t w e r e i n t e r ­
c h a n g e a b l e w i t h "the p e r s o n " o r "the i n d i v i d u a l . " T h e g e n e a l ­
o g y of the subject as a c r i t i c a l category, h o w e v e r , suggests that
the subject, r a t h e r t h a n b e i d e n t i f i e d s t r i c t l y w i t h the i n d i ­
v i d u a l , o u g h t to be d e s i g n a t e d as a l i n g u i s t i c category, a p l a c e ­
holder, a structure in formation. Individuals come to occupy
the site of the subject (the subject s i m u l t a n e o u s l y e m e r g e s as
Introduction il
a "site"), a n d t h e y e n j o y i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y o n l y to the extent that
t h e y are, a s i t w e r e , first e s t a b l i s h e d i n l a n g u a g e . T h e subject
i s the l i n g u i s t i c o c c a s i o n for the i n d i v i d u a l t o a c h i e v e a n d r e ­
p r o d u c e i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , the l i n g u i s t i c c o n d i t i o n o f its e x i s t e n c e
a n d agency. N o i n d i v i d u a l b e c o m e s a subject w i t h o u t first b e ­
c o m i n g s ub j e ct ed o r u n d e r g o i n g " s u b j e c t i v a t i o n " ( a t r a n s l a t i o n
of the F r e n c h assujetissement). It m a k e s l i t t l e sense to treat " t h e
i n d i v i d u a l " a s a n i n t e l l i g i b l e t e r m i f i n d i v i d u a l s are s a i d t o ac­
q u i r e t h e i r i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y b y b e c o m i n g subjects. P a r a d o x i c a l l y ,
n o i n t e l l i g i b l e reference t o i n d i v i d u a l s o r t h e i r b e c o m i n g c a n
t a k e p l a c e w i t h o u t a p r i o r reference to t h e i r status as subjects.
T h e s t o r y b y w h i c h s u b j e c t i o n i s t o l d is, i n e v i t a b l y , c i r c u l a r ,
p r e s u p p o s i n g the v e r y subject f o r w h i c h i t seeks t o g i v e a n ac­
c o u n t . O n the o n e h a n d , the subject c a n refer t o its o w n gene­
sis o n l y b y t a k i n g a t h i r d ­ p e r s o n p e r s p e c t i v e o n itself, that is,
b y d i s p o s s e s s i n g its o w n p e r s p e c t i v e i n the act o f n a r r a t i n g its
genesis. O n the o t h e r h a n d , the n a r r a t i o n o f h o w the subject
i s c o n s t i t u t e d p r e s u p p o s e s that the c o n s t i t u t i o n has a l r e a d y
t a k e n p l a c e , a n d t h u s a r r i v e s after the fact. T h e subject loses
itself t o t e l l the s t o r y o f itself, b u t i n t e l l i n g the s t o r y o f i t s e lf
seeks t o g i v e a n a c c o u n t o f w h a t the n a r r a t i v e f u n c t i o n has
a l r e a d y m a d e p l a i n . W h a t does i t m e a n , t h e n , that the s u b ­
ject, d e f e n d e d by s o m e as a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of agency, is a l s o
u n d e r s t o o d to be an effect of s u b j e c t i o n? S u c h a f o r m u l a t i o n
suggests that i n the act o f o p p o s i n g s u b o r d i n a t i o n , the subject
reiterates its s u b j e c t i o n ( a n o t i o n s h a r e d b y b o t h p s y c h o a n a l y ­
sis a n d F o u c a u l d i a n a c c o u n t s ). H o w , t h e n , i s s u b j e c t i o n t o b e
t h o u g h t a n d h o w c a n i t b e c o m e a site o f a l t e r a t i o n ? A p o w e r
exerted on a subject, s u b j e c t i o n is n e v e r t h e l e ss a p o w e r assumed
by the subject, an a s s u m p t i o n that c o n s t i t u t e s the i n s t r u m e n t
of that subject's b e c o m i n g .
 12 Introduction
Subjection / Subordination
T h e d o u b l e aspect o f s u b j e c t i o n a p p e a r s to l e a d t o a v i c i o u s
c i r c l e : the a g e n c y of the subject a p p e a r s to be an effect of its
s u b o r d i n a t i o n . A n y effort t o o p p o s e that s u b o r d i n a t i o n w i l l
n e c e s s a r i l y p r e s u p p o s e a n d r e i n v o k e it. L u c k i l y , the s t o r y s u r ­
v i v e s t h i s i m p a s s e . W h a t d o e s i t m e a n for the a g e n c y o f a s u b ­
ject to presuppose its o w n s u b o r d i n a t i o n ? Is the act of presuppos­
ing the s a m e as the act of reinstating, or is there a d i s c o n t i n u i t y
b e t w e e n the p o w e r p r e s u p p o s e d a n d the p o w e r r e i n s t a t e d ?
C o n s i d e r that i n the v e r y act b y w h i c h the subject r e p r o d u c e s
the c o n d i t i o n s o f its o w n s u b o r d i n a t i o n , the subject e x e m p l i ­
fies a t e m p o r a l l y b a s e d v u l n e r a b i l i t y that b e l o n g s to those c o n ­
d i t i o n s , s p e c i f i c a l l y , t o the e x i g e n c i e s o f t h e i r r e n e w a l . P o w e r
c o n s i d e r e d as a c o n d i t i o n of the subject is n e c e s s a r i l y n o t the
s a m e a s p o w e r c o n s i d e r e d a s w h a t the subject i s s a i d t o w i e l d .
T h e p o w e r that i n i t i a t e s the subject fails t o r e m a i n c o n t i n u ­
o u s w i t h the p o w e r that i s the subject's agency. A s i g n i f i c a n t
a n d p o t e n t i a l l y e n a b l i n g r e v e r s a l o c c u r s w h e n p o w e r shifts
f r o m its status as a c o n d i t i o n of a g e n c y to the subject's " o w n "
a g e n c y ( c o n s t i t u t i n g a n a p p e a r a n c e o f p o w e r i n w h i c h the s u b ­
ject a p p e a r s a s the c o n d i t i o n o f its " o w n " p o w e r ) . H o w are w e
to assess that b e c o m i n g ? Is it an e n a b l i n g b r e a k , a b a d b r e a k ?
H o w i s i t that the p o w e r u p o n w h i c h the subject d e p e n d s f o r
e x i s t e n c e a n d w h i c h the subject i s c o m p e l l e d t o reiterate t u r n s
a g a i n s t itself i n the c o u r s e o f that r e i t e r a t i o n ? H o w m i g h t w e
t h i n k r e s i s t a n c e w i t h i n the t e r m s o f r e i t e r a t i o n ?
S u c h a v i e w suggests that a g e n c y c a n n o t l o g i c a l l y b e d e ­
r i v e d f r o m its c o n d i t i o n s , that n o c o n t i n u i t y i s t o b e a s s u m e d
b e t w e e n (a) w h a t m a k e s p o w e r p o s s i b l e a n d (b) the k i n d s
o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s that p o w e r a s s u m e s . I f i n a c t i n g the subject
Introduction 13
r e t a i n s the c o n d i t i o n s o f its e m e r g e n c e , t h i s d o e s n o t i m p l y
that a l l o f its a g e n c y r e m a i n s t e t h e r e d t o those c o n d i t i o n s
a n d that those c o n d i t i o n s r e m a i n the s a m e i n e v e r y o p e r a t i o n
o f agency. A s s u m i n g p o w e r i s n o t a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d task o f
t a k i n g p o w e r f r o m one place, transferring it intact, a n d then
a n d t h e re m a k i n g i t o n e ' s o w n ; the act o f a p p r o p r i a t i o n m a y
i n v o l v e a n a l t e r a t i o n o f p o w e r s u c h that the p o w e r a s s u m e d
o r a p p r o p r i a t e d w o r k s a g a i n s t the p o w e r that m a d e that as­
s u m p t i o n possible. W h e r e conditions of subordination make
p o s s i b l e the a s s u m p t i o n o f p o w e r , the p o w e r a s s u m e d r e m a i n s
t i e d t o those c o n d i t i o n s , b u t i n a n a m b i v a l e n t w a y ; i n fact, the
p o w e r a s s u m e d m a y a t o n c e r e t a i n a n d resist that s u b o r d i n a ­
t i o n . T h i s c o n c l u s i o n is n o t to be t h o u g h t of as (a) a r e s i s t a n c e
that is really a r e c u p e r a t i o n of p o w e r or (b) a r e c u p e r a t i o n that
is really a resistance. It is b o t h at o n c e , a n d t h i s a m b i v a l e n c e
f o r m s the b i n d o f agency.
A c c o r d i n g t o the f o r m u l a t i o n o f s u b j e c t i o n a s b o t h the s u b ­
o r d i n a t i o n a n d b e c o m i n g o f the subject, p o w e r is, a s s u b o r d i ­
n a t i o n , a set of c o n d i t i o n s that p r e c e d e s the subject, e f f e c t i n g
a n d s u b o r d i n a t i n g the subject f r o m the o u t s i d e . T h i s f o r m u l a ­
t i o n falters, h o w e v e r , w h e n w e c o n s i d e r that t h e re i s n o s u b ­
ject p r i o r to t h i s effect. P o w e r n o t o n l y acts on a subject b u t ,
in a t r a n s i t i v e sense, enacts the subject i n t o b e i n g . As a c o n d i ­
t i o n , p o w e r p r e c e d e s the subject. P o w e r loses its a p p e a r a n c e
o f p r i o r i t y , h o w e v e r , w h e n i t i s w i e l d e d b y the subject, a s i t u a ­
t i o n that g i v e s r i s e t o the r e v e r s e p e r s p e c t i v e that p o w e r i s the
effect of the subject, a n d that p o w e r is w h a t subjects effect. A
c o n d i t i o n d o e s n o t e n a b l e o r enact w i t h o u t b e c o m i n g p r e s e n t .
B e c a u s e P o w e r i s n o t i n t a c t p r i o r t o the subject, the a p p e a r ­
anc e o f its p r i o r i t y d i s a p p e a r s a s p o w e r acts o n the subject,
a n d the subject i s i n a u g u r a t e d ( a n d d e r i v e d ) t h r o u g h t h i s tern­
14 Introduction
p o r a l r e v e r s a l i n the h o r i z o n o f p o w e r . A s the a g e n c y o f the
subject, p o w e r a s s u m e s its p r e s e n t t e m p o r a l d i m e n s i o n . 5
P o w e r acts o n the subject i n a t least t w o w a y s : first, a s w h a t
m a k e s the subject p o s s i b l e , the c o n d i t i o n o f its p o s s i b i l i t y a n d
its f o r m a t i v e o c c a s i o n , a n d s e c o n d , a s w h a t i s t a k e n u p a n d
r e i t e r a t e d i n the subject's " o w n " a c t i n g . A s a subject o f p o w e r
( w h e r e "of" c o n n o t e s b o t h " b e l o n g i n g t o " a n d " w i e l d i n g " ) , the
subject e c l i p s e s the c o n d i t i o n s o f its o w n e m e r g e n c e ; i t e c l i p s e s
p o w e r w i t h p o w e r . T h e c o n d i t i o n s n o t o n l y m a k e p o s s i b l e the
subject b u t enter i n t o the subject's f o r m a t i o n . T h e y are m a d e
p r e s e n t i n the acts o f that f o r m a t i o n a n d i n the acts o f the s u b ­
ject that f o l l o w .
T h e n o t i o n o f p o w e r a t w o r k i n s u b j e c t i o n thus a p p e a r s i n
t w o i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e t e m p o r a l m o d a l i t i e s : first, a s w h a t i s
for the subject a l w a y s p r i o r , o u t s i d e o f itself, a n d o p e r a t i v e
f r o m the start; s e c o n d , a s the w i l l e d effect o f the subject. T h i s
s e c o n d m o d a l i t y c a r r i e s at least t w o sets of m e a n i n g s : as the
w i l l e d effect of the subject, s u b j e c t i o n is a s u b o r d i n a t i o n that
the subject b r i n g s on itself; yet if s u b j e c t i o n p r o d u c e s a subject
a n d a subject is the p r e c o n d i t i o n of agency, t h e n s u b j e c t i o n
i s the a c c o u n t b y w h i c h a subject b e c o m e s the g u a r a n t o r o f
its r e s i s t a n c e a n d o p p o s i t i o n . W h e t h e r p o w e r i s c o n c e i v e d a s
p r i o r to the subject or as its i n s t r u m e n t a l effect, the v a c i l l a ­
t i o n b e t w e e n the t w o t e m p o r a l m o d a l i t i e s o f p o w e r ( " b e f o r e "
a n d "after" the subject) has m a r k e d m o s t o f the debates o n the
subject a n d the p r o b l e m o f agency. M a n y c o n v e r s a t i o n s o n the
t o p i c h a v e b e c o m e m i r e d i n w h e t h e r the subject i s the c o n d i ­
t i o n o r the i m p a s s e o f agency. I n d e e d , b o t h q u a n d a r i e s h a v e
l e d m a n y t o c o n s i d e r the i s s u e o f the subject a s a n i n e v i t a b l e
s t u m b l i n g b l o c k i n s o c i a l theory . P a r t o f t h i s d i f f i c u l t y , I s u g ­
gest, is that the subject is itself a site of t h i s a m b i v a l e n c e in
w h i c h the subject e m e r g e s b o t h as the effect of a p r i o r p o w e r
Introduction 15
a n d as the condition of possibility for a r a d i c a l l y c o n d i t i o n e d
f o r m of agency. A t h e o r y of the subject s h o u l d t a k e i n t o ac­
c o u n t the f u l l a m b i v a l e n c e o f the c o n d i t i o n s o f its o p e r a t i o n .
T h e r e is, a s i t w e r e , n o c o n c e p t u a l t r a n s i t i o n t o b e m a d e b e ­
t w e e n p o w e r a s e x t e r n a l t o the subject, " a c t i n g o n , " a n d p o w e r
as c o n s t i t u t i v e of the subject, "acted by." W h a t o n e m i g h t ex­
pect b y w a y o f a t r a n s i t i o n is, i n fact, a s p l i t t i n g a n d r e v e r ­
s a l c o n s t i t u t i v e o f the subject itself. P o w e r acts o n the s u b ­
ject, a n a c t i n g that i s a n e n a c t i n g : a n i r r e s o l v a b l e a m b i g u i t y
arises w h e n o n e a t t e m p t s t o d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n the p o w e r
that ( t r a n s i t i v e l y ) enacts the subject, a n d the p o w e r e n a c t e d
b y the subject, that is, b e t w e e n the p o w e r that f o r m s the s u b ­
ject a n d the subject's " o w n " p o w e r . W h a t o r w h o i s d o i n g the
" e n a c t i n g " here? Is it a p o w e r p r i o r to the subject or that of
the subject itself ? A t s o m e p o i n t , a r e v e r s a l a n d c o n c e a l m e n t
o c c u r s , a n d p o w e r e m e r g e s a s w h a t b e l o n g s e x c l u s i v e l y t o the
subject ( m a k i n g the subject a p p e a r a s i f i t b e l o n g e d t o n o p r i o r
o p e r a t i o n o f p o w e r ) . M o r e o v e r , w h a t i s e n a c t e d b y the subject
i s e n a b l e d b u t n o t f i n a l l y c o n s t r a i n e d b y the p r i o r w o r k i n g o f
p o w e r . A g e n c y exceed s the p o w e r b y w h i c h i t i s e n a b l e d . O n e
m i g h t say that the p u r p o s e s o f p o w e r are n o t a l w a y s the p u r ­
p o s e s of agency. To the extent that the latter d i v e r g e f r o m the
f o r m e r , a g e n c y is the a s s u m p t i o n of a p u r p o s e unintended by
p o w e r , o n e that c o u l d n o t h a v e b e e n d e r i v e d l o g i c a l l y o r h i s ­
t o r i c a l l y , that o p e r a t e s i n a r e l a t i o n o f c o n t i n g e n c y a n d r e v e r s a l
t o the p o w e r that m a k e s i t p o s s i b l e , t o w h i c h i t n e v e r t h e l e s s
b e l o n g s . T h i s is, as it w e r e , the a m b i v a l e n t scene of agency,
c o n s t r a i n e d b y n o t e l e o l o g i c a l necessity.
P o w e r i s b o t h e x t e r n a l t o the subject a n d the v e r y v e n u e o f
the subject. T h i s a p p a r e n t c o n t r a d i c t i o n m a k e s sense w h e n w e
u n d e r s t a n d that n o subject c o m e s i n t o b e i n g w i t h o u t p o w e r ,
b u t that its c o m i n g i n t o b e i n g i n v o l v e s the d i s s i m u l a t i o n o f
i6 Introduction
p o w e r , a m e t a l e p t i c r e v e r s a l i n w h i c h the subject p r o d u c e d
b y p o w e r b e c o m e s h e r a l d e d a s the subject w h o founds p o w e r .
T h i s f o u n d a t i o n a l i s m of the subject is an effect o f a w o r k i n g
o f p o w e r , a n effect a c h i e v e d b y r e v e r s a l a n d c o n c e a l m e n t o f
that p r i o r w o r k i n g . T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n that the subject c a n
b e reduced t o the p o w e r b y w h i c h i t i s o c c a s i o n e d , n o r does
i t m e a n that the p o w e r b y w h i c h i t i s o c c a s i o n e d i s reducible
to the subject. P o w e r is n e v e r m e r e l y a c o n d i t i o n e x t e r n a l or
p r i o r t o the subject, n o r c a n i t b e e x c l u s i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d w i t h
the subject. I f c o n d i t i o n s o f p o w e r are t o p e r s i s t , t h e y m u s t b e
r e i t e r a t e d ; the subject is p r e c i s e l y the site of s u c h r e i t e r a t i o n ,
a r e p e t i t i o n that i s n e v e r m e r e l y m e c h a n i c a l . A s the a p p e a r ­
anc e o f p o w e r shifts f r o m the c o n d i t i o n o f the subject t o its
effects, the c o n d i t i o n s o f p o w e r ( p r i o r a n d external) a s s u m e
a present a n d f u t u r a l f o r m . But p o w e r assumes this present
c h a r a c t e r t h r o u g h a r e v e r s a l o f its d i r e c t i o n , o n e that p e r f o r m s
a b r e a k w i t h w h a t has c o m e b e f o r e a n d d i s s i m u l a t e s as a self­
i n a u g u r a t i n g agency. T h e r e i t e r a t i o n o f p o w e r n o t o n l y t e m ­
p o r a l i z e s the c o n d i t i o n s o f s u b o r d i n a t i o n b u t s h o w s these c o n ­
d i t i o n s t o be, n o t static s t r u c t u r e s , b u t t e m p o r a l i z e d — a c t i v e
a n d productive. The temporalization performed by reiteration
traces the r o u t e b y w h i c h p o w e r ' s a p p e a r a n c e shifts a n d r e ­
verses: the p e r s p e c t i v e o f p o w e r alters f r o m w h a t i s a l w a y s
w o r k i n g o n u s f r o m the o u t s i d e a n d f r o m the outset t o w h a t
c o n s t i t u t e s the sense o f a g e n c y a t w o r k i n o u r p r e s e n t acts a n d
the f u t u r a l e x p a n s e o f t h e i r effects.
A l t h o u g h this study is indebted to Foucault 's f o r m u l a t i o n
o f the p r o b l e m o f assujetissement i n h i s essays " T h e Subject o f
P o w e r " a n d the " T w o L e c t u r e s " p u b l i s h e d i n Power/Knowledge,
a s w e l l a s t o h i s m a n y d i s c u s s i o n s o f the subject o f d e s i r e a n d
the subject of l a w in History of Sexuality, Volumes 1 and 2 a n d
Discipline and Punish? the f o r m u l a t i o n of the subject at i s s u e
Introduction 17
resonates w i t h a l a r g e r c u l t u r a l a n d p o l i t i c a l p r e d i c a m e n t ,
n a m e l y , h o w t o t a k e a n o p p o s i t i o n a l r e l a t i o n t o p o w e r that is,
a d m i t t e d l y , i m p l i c a t e d i n the v e r y p o w e r o n e o p p o s e s . O f t e n
t h i s p o s t l i b e r a t o r y i n s i g h t has l e d t o the c o n c l u s i o n that a l l
a g e n c y here m e e t s its i m p a s s e . E i t h e r f o r m s o f c a p i t a l o r s y m ­
b o l i c d o m i n a t i o n are h e l d t o b e s u c h that o u r acts are a l w a y s
a l r e a d y " d o m e s t i c a t e d " i n a d v a n c e , o r a set o f g e n e r a l i z e d a n d
t i m e l e s s i n s i g h t s i s o f f e r e d i n t o the a p o r e t i c s t r u c t u r e o f a l l
m o v e m e n t s t o w a r d a f u t u r e . I w o u l d suggest that n o h i s t o r i ­
cal o r l o g i c a l conclusions f o l l o w necessarily f r o m this p r i m a r y
c o m p l i c i t y w i t h s u b o r d i n a t i o n , b u t that s o m e p o s s i b i l i t i e s t e n ­
tatively do. That agency is i m p l i c a t e d in s u b o r d i n a t i o n is not
the s i g n of a fatal s e l f ­ c o n t r a d i c t i o n at the c o r e of the subject
a n d , h e n c e , f u r t h e r p r o o f o f its p e r n i c i o u s o r o b s o l e t e c h a r ­
acter. B u t n e i t h e r d o e s it r e s t o r e a p r i s t i n e n o t i o n of the s u b ­
ject, d e r i v e d f r o m s o m e c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l ­ h u m a n i s t f o r m u l a t i o n ,
w h o s e a g e n c y i s a l w a y s a n d o n l y o p p o s e d t o p o w e r . T h e first
v i e w c h a r a c t e r i z e s p o l i t i c a l l y s a n c t i m o n i o u s f o r m s o f fatal ­
i s m ; the s e c o n d , n a i v e f o r m s o f p o l i t i c a l o p t i m i s m . I h o p e t o
steer c l e a r o f b o t h these a l t e r n a t i v e s .
T h e subject m i g h t yet b e t h o u g h t a s d e r i v i n g its a g e n c y
f r o m p r e c i s e l y the p o w e r i t o p p o s e s , a s a w k w a r d a n d e m b a r ­
r a s s i n g a s s u c h a f o r m u l a t i o n m i g h t be, e s p e c i a l l y f o r those
w h o b e l i e v e that c o m p l i c i t y a n d a m b i v a l e n c e c o u l d b e r o o t e d
o u t o n c e a n d for a l l . I f the subject i s neither f u l l y d e t e r m i n e d b y
p o w e r nor f u l l y d e t e r m i n i n g o f p o w e r (but s i g n i f i c a n t l y a n d
p a r t i a l l y b o t h ) , the subject exceed s the l o g i c o f n o n c o n t r a d i c ­
t i o n , i s a n e x c r e s c e n c e o f l o g i c , a s i t w e r e . T o c l a i m that the
7
subject exceeds e i t h e r / o r i s n o t t o c l a i m that i t l i v e s i n s o m e
free z o n e o f its o w n m a k i n g . E x c e e d i n g i s n o t e s c a p i n g , a n d
the subject exceeds p r e c i s e l y that t o w h i c h i t i s b o u n d . I n t h i s
sense, the subject c a n n o t q u e l l the a m b i v a l e n c e b y w h i c h i t i s
 r
18 Introduction
constituted. P a i n f u l , d y n a m i c , a n d p r o m i s i n g , this v a c i l l a t i o n
b e t w e e n the a l r e a d y ­ t h e r e a n d the y e t ­ t o ­ c o m e is a c r o s s r o a d s
that rejoins e v e r y step b y w h i c h it i s t r a v e r s e d , a r e i t e r a t e d
a m b i v a l e n c e at the heart of agency. P o w e r r e a r t i c u l a t e d is " r e " ­
a r t i c u l a t e d i n the sense o f a l r e a d y d o n e a n d " r e " ­ a r t i c u l a t e d i n
the sense o f d o n e over , d o n e a g a i n , d o n e a n e w . W h a t r e m a i n
t o b e c o n s i d e r e d are: (a) h o w the f o r m a t i o n o f the subject i n ­
v o l v e s the r e g u l a t o r y f o r m a t i o n o f the p s y c h e , i n c l u d i n g h o w
w e m i g h t r e j o i n the d i s c o u r s e o f p o w e r w i t h the d i s c o u r s e
o f p s y c h o a n a l y s i s ; a n d (b) h o w w e m i g h t m a k e s u c h a c o n ­
c e p t i o n o f the subject w o r k a s a n o t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l a g e n c y i n
postliberatory times.
Regulations of the Psyche
I f p o w e r w o r k s n o t m e r e l y t o d o m i n a t e o r o p p r e s s exist­
i n g subjects, b u t a l s o t o f o r m subjects, w h a t i s t h i s f o r m a t i o n ?
O b v i o u s l y , p o w e r d o e s n o t b r i n g p e r s o n s i n t o the w o r l d i n
a n y o r d i n a r y sense. F o u c a u l t l i n k s the f o r m a t i v e o r p r o d u c ­
tive character of p o w e r to regulatory a n d d i s c i p l i n a r y regimes.
In Discipline and Punish, c r i m e p r o d u c e s a class of c r i m i n a l s ,
c r af ted b o d i l y i n the g e s t u r e a n d s t y l e o f i m p r i s o n m e n t . B u t
h o w are w e t o u n d e r s t a n d t h i s sense o f p r o d u c t i o n a n d craft­
ing? The formative d i m e n s i o n of p o w e r is to be u n d e r s t o o d
i n a n o n m e c h a n i s t i c a n d n o n b e h a v i o r i s t i c f a s h i o n . I t does n o t
a l w a y s p r o d u c e a c c o r d i n g t o a p u r p o s e , o r rather, its p r o d u c ­
t i o n i s s u c h that i t o f t e n exceed s o r alters the p u r p o s e s f o r
w h i c h it produces. 8
F o u c a u l t i s n o t o r i o u s l y t a c i t u r n o n the
t o p i c o f the p s y c h e , b u t a n a c c o u n t o f s u b j e c t i o n , i t seems,
m u s t b e t r a c e d i n the t u r n s o f p s y c h i c life. M o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y , i t
m u s t b e t r a c e d i n the p e c u l i a r t u r n i n g o f a subject a g a i n s t itself
that takes p l a c e i n acts o f s e l f ­ r e p r o a c h , c o n s c i e n c e , a n d m e l ­
Introduction 19
a n c h o l i a that w o r k i n t a n d e m w i t h p r o c e s s e s o f s o c i a l r e g u l a ­
t i o n . A n d yet, i f w e refuse the o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i s m that p o s i t s
the s e p a r a t i o n o f the p o l i t i c a l a n d the p s y c h i c , i t s e e ms c r u ­
c i a l t o offer a c r i t i c a l a c c o u n t o f p s y c h i c s u b j e c t i o n i n t e r m s
o f the r e g u l a t o r y a n d p r o d u c t i v e effects o f p o w e r . I f f o r m s
o f r e g u l a t o r y p o w e r are s u s t a i n e d i n p a r t t h r o u g h the f o r m a ­
t i o n o f a subject, a n d i f that f o r m a t i o n takes p l a c e a c c o r d i n g
t o the r e q u i r e m e n t s o f p o w e r , s p e c i f i c a l l y , a s the i n c o r p o r a ­
t i o n o f n o r m s , t h e n a t h e o r y o f subject f o r m a t i o n m u s t g i v e
a n a c c o u n t o f t h i s p r o c e s s o f i n c o r p o r a t i o n , a n d the n o t i o n o f
i n c o r p o r a t i o n m u s t b e i n t e r r o g a t e d t o a s c e r t a i n the p s y c h i c
t o p o g r a p h y i t a s s u m e s . H o w d o e s the s u b j e c t i o n o f d e s i r e r e ­
q u i r e a n d i n s t i t u t e the d e s i r e for s u b j e c t i o n ?
I n c l a i m i n g that s o c i a l n o r m s are i n t e r n a l i z e d , w e h a v e n o t
yet e x p l a i n e d w h a t i n c o r p o r a t i o n or, m o r e g e n e r a l l y , i n t e r n a l ­
i z a t i o n is, w h a t i t m e a n s f o r a n o r m t o b e c o m e i n t e r n a l i z e d
o r w h a t h a p p e n s t o the n o r m i n the p r o c e s s o f i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n .
I s the n o r m first " o u t s i d e , " a n d d o e s i t t h e n enter i n t o a p r e ­
g i v e n p s y c h i c space, u n d e r s t o o d a s a n i n t e r i o r theater o f s o m e
k i n d ? O r d o e s the i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n o f the n o r m c o n t r i b u t e t o
the p r o d u c t i o n o f i n t e r n a l i t y ? D o e s the n o r m , h a v i n g b e c o m e
p s y c h i c , i n v o l v e n o t o n l y the i n t e r i o r i z a t i o n o f the n o r m , b u t
the i n t e r i o r i z a t i o n o f the p s y c h e ? 1 a r g u e that t h i s p r o c e s s o f
9
i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n fabricates the distinction between interior and ex­
terior life, o f f e r i n g us a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n the p s y c h i c a n d the
s o c i a l that differs s i g n i f i c a n t l y f r o m a n a c c o u n t o f the p s y c h i c
i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n o f n o r m s . M o r e o v e r , g i v e n that n o r m s are n o t
i n t e r n a l i z e d i n m e c h a n i c a l o r f u l l y p r e d i c t a b l e w a y s , d o e s the
n o r m a s s u m e a n o t h e r c h a r a c t e r as a psychic p h e n o m e n o n ? In
p a r t i c u l a r , h o w are w e t o a c c o u n t f o r the d e s i r e f o r the n o r m
a n d for subjection m o r e generally in terms of a p r i o r desire
for s o c i a l existence, a d e s i r e e x p l o i t e d b y r e g u l a t o r y p o w e r ?
20 Introduction
W h e r e s o c i a l categories g u a r a n t e e a r e c o g n i z a b l e a n d e n d u r ­
i n g s o c i a l existence, the e m b r a c e o f s u c h categories, e v e n a s
t h e y w o r k i n the s e r v i c e o f s u b j e c t i o n , i s o f t e n p r e f e r r e d t o n o
s o c i a l existenc e a t a l l . H o w i s it, t h e n , that the l o n g i n g for s u b ­
j e c t i o n , b a s e d o n a l o n g i n g for s o c i a l existence, r e c a l l i n g a n d
exploiting p r i m a r y dependencies, emerges as an instrument
a n d effect o f the p o w e r o f subjection?
T o u n d e r s c o r e the abuses o f p o w e r a s r e a l , n o t the c r e a t i o n
or f a n t a s y of the subject, p o w e r is o f t e n cast as u n e q u i v o c a l l y
e x t e r n a l t o the subject, s o m e t h i n g i m p o s e d a g a i n s t the s u b ­
ject's w i l l . B u t i f the v e r y p r o d u c t i o n o f the subject a n d the
f o r m a t i o n o f that w i l l are the c o n s e q u e n c e s o f a p r i m a r y s u b ­
o r d i n a t i o n , t h e n the v u l n e r a b i l i t y of the subject to a p o w e r n o t
o f its o w n m a k i n g i s u n a v o i d a b l e . T h a t v u l n e r a b i l i t y q u a l i f i e s
the subject a s a n e x p l o i t a b l e k i n d o f b e i n g . I f o n e i s t o o p p o s e
the abuses o f p o w e r ( w h i c h i s n o t the s a m e a s o p p o s i n g p o w e r
itself), i t seems w i s e t o c o n s i d e r i n w h a t o u r v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o
that a b u s e consists. T h a t subjects are c o n s t i t u t e d i n p r i m a r y
v u l n e r a b i l i t y d o e s n o t e x o n e r a te the abuses t h e y suffer; o n the
c o n t r a r y , i t m a k e s a l l the m o r e c l e a r h o w f u n d a m e n t a l the v u l ­
n e r a b i l i t y c a n be.
H o w i s i t that the subject i s the k i n d o f b e i n g w h o c a n b e
e x p l o i t e d , w h o is, b y v i r t u e o f its o w n f o r m a t i o n , v u l n e r a b l e
t o s u b j u g a t i o n ? B o u n d t o seek r e c o g n i t i o n o f its o w n existenc e
i n categories, t e r m s , a n d n a m e s that are n o t o f its o w n m a k i n g ,
the subject seeks the s i g n o f its o w n existenc e o u t s i d e itself,
i n a d i s c o u r s e that i s a t o n c e d o m i n a n t a n d i n d i f f e r e n t . S o c i a l
categories s i g n i f y s u b o r d i n a t i o n a n d e x i s t e n c e a t once. I n o t h e r
w o r d s , w i t h i n s u b j e c t i o n the p r i c e o f existenc e i s s u b o r d i n a ­
t i o n . P r e c i s e l y a t the m o m e n t i n w h i c h c h o i c e i s i m p o s s i b l e ,
the subject p u r s u e s s u b o r d i n a t i o n as the p r o m i s e of existence.
T h i s p u r s u i t i s n o t c h o i c e , b u t n e i t h e r i s i t necessity. Subjec­
Introduction 21
t i o n e x p l o i t s the d e s i r e for existence, w h e r e e x i s t e n c e i s a l w a y s
conferred f r o m elsewhere; it m a r k s a p r i m a r y v u l n e r a b i l i t y to
the O t h e r i n o r d e r t o be.
A s s u m i n g t e r m s o f p o w e r that o n e n e v e r m a d e b u t t o w h i c h
one i s v u l n e r a b l e , o n w h i c h o n e d e p e n d s i n o r d e r t o be, a p ­
p e a r s to be a m u n d a n e s u b j e c t i o n at the b a s i s of subject f o r ­
mation. " A s s u m i n g " p o w e r is no s i m p l e process, however, for
p o w e r is not m e c h a n i c a l l y r e p r o d u c e d w h e n it is assumed.
I n s t e a d , o n b e i n g a s s u m e d , p o w e r r u n s the r i s k o f a s s u m i n g
another f o r m a n d direction. If conditions of p o w e r do not u n i ­
l a t e r a l l y p r o d u c e subjects, t h e n w h a t i s the t e m p o r a l a n d l o g i ­
c a l f o r m that the a s s u m p t i o n o f p o w e r takes? A r e d e s c r i p t i o n
o f the d o m a i n o f p s y c h i c s u b j e c t i o n i s n e e d e d t o m a k e c l e a r
h o w s o c i a l p o w e r p r o d u c e s m o d e s o f r e f l e x i v i t y a t the s a m e
t i m e a s i t l i m i t s f o r m s o f s o c i a l i t y . I n o t h e r w o r d s , t o the ex­
tent that n o r m s o p e r a t e a s p s y c h i c p h e n o m e n a , r e s t r i c t i n g a n d
p r o d u c i n g d e s i r e , t h e y also g o v e r n the f o r m a t i o n o f the subject
a n d c i r c u m s c r i b e the d o m a i n o f a l i v a b l e s o c i a l i t y . T h e p s y c h i c
o p e r a t i o n o f the n o r m offers a m o r e i n s i d i o u s r o u t e f o r r e g u ­
l a t o r y p o w e r t h a n e x p l i c i t c o e r c i o n , o n e w h o s e success a l l o w s
its tacit o p e r a t i o n w i t h i n the s o c i a l . A n d yet, b e i n g p s y c h i c ,
the n o r m d o e s n o t m e r e l y r e i n s t a te s o c i a l p o w e r , i t b e c o m e s
formative a n d vulnerable in h i g h l y specific ways. The social
c a t e g o r i z a t i o n s that e s t a b l i s h the v u l n e r a b i l i t y of the subject to
l a n g u a g e are t h e m s e l v e s v u l n e r a b l e t o b o t h p s y c h i c a n d h i s ­
t o r i c a l change. T h i s v i e w c o u n t e r s a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a p s y ­
c h i c o r l i n g u i s t i c n o r m a t i v i t y (as i n s o m e v e r s i o n s o f the S y m ­
b o l i c ) that i s p r i o r t o the s o c i a l o r sets c o n s t r a i n t s o n the s o c i a l .
Just a s the subject i s d e r i v e d f r o m c o n d i t i o n s o f p o w e r that p r e ­
cede it, s o the p s y c h i c o p e r a t i o n o f the n o r m i s d e r i v e d , t h o u g h
not mechanically or predictably, f r o m p r i o r social operations.
P s y c h i c subjection m a r k s a specific m o d a l i t y of subjection.
22 Introduction
I t does n o t s i m p l y reflect o r r e p r e s e n t b r o a d e r r e l a t i o n s o f
social p o w e r — e v e n as it remains importantly tied to them.
F r e u d a n d N i e t z s c h e offer d i f f e r i n g a c c o u n t s o f subject f o r m a ­
t i o n that r e l y o n the p r o d u c t i v i t y o f the n o r m . B o t h a c c o u n t
for the f a b r i c a t i o n of c o n s c i e n c e as the effect of an i n t e r n a l i z e d
p r o h i b i t i o n (thereby establishing " p r o h i b i t i o n " as not o n l y p r i ­
vative, but productive). In F r e u d a n d Nietzsche, a p r o h i b i t i o n
o n a c t i o n o r e x p r e s s i o n i s s a i d t o t u r n "the d r i v e " 1 0
back on
itself, f a b r i c a t i n g a n i n t e r n a l sphere , the c o n d i t i o n for self­
i n s p e c t i o n a n d r e f l e x i v i t y . T h e d r i v e t u r n i n g b a c k u p o n itself
b e c o m e s the p r e c i p i t a t i n g c o n d i t i o n of subject f o r m a t i o n , a
p r i m a r y l o n g i n g i n r e c o i l that i s t r a c e d i n H e g e l ' s v i e w o f the
u n h a p p y c o n s c i o u s n e s s a s w e l l . W h e t h e r the d o u b l i n g b a c k
u p o n itself i s p e r f o r m e d b y p r i m a r y l o n g i n g s , d e s i r e , o r d r i v e s ,
i t p r o d u c e s i n e a c h i n s t a n c e a p s y c h i c h a b i t o f self­beratement,
o n e that is c o n s o l i d a t e d o v e r t i m e as c o n s c i e n c e .
C o n s c i e n c e i s the m e a n s b y w h i c h a subject b e c o m e s a n
object f o r itself, r e f l e c t i n g on itself, e s t a b l i s h i n g itself as r e ­
flectiv e a n d reflexive. T h e "I" i s n o t s i m p l y o n e w h o t h i n k s
a b o u t h i m ­ o r herself; i t i s d e f i n e d b y t h i s c a p a c i t y for r e ­
flectiv e s e l f ­ r e l a t i o n o r r e f l e x i v i t y . F o r N i e t z s c h e , r e f l e x i v i t y i s
a c o n s e q u e n c e o f c o n s c i e n c e ; s e l f ­ k n o w i n g f o l l o w s f r o m self­
p u n i s h m e n t . ( T h u s o n e n e v e r " k n o w s " o n e s e lf p r i o r t o the r e ­
c o i l of desire in question.) In o r d er to c u r b desire, one makes
o f oneself a n object f o r r e f l e c t i o n ; i n the c o u r s e o f p r o d u c ­
i n g one's o w n a l t e r i t y , o n e b e c o m e s e s t a b l i s h e d a s a r e f l e x i v e
b e i n g , o n e w h o c a n take oneself a s a n object. R e f l e x i v i t y b e ­
c o m e s the m e a n s b y w h i c h d e s i r e i s r e g u l a r l y t r a n s m u t e d i n t o
the c i r c u i t o f self­reflection . T h e d o u b l i n g b a c k o f d e s i r e that
culminates in reflexivity produces, however, another order of
d e s i r e : the d e s i r e for that v e r y c i r c u i t , for r e f l e x i v i t y a n d , u l t i ­
m a t e l y , for s u b j e c t i o n .
Introduction 23
W h a t i s the m e a n s b y w h i c h d e s i r e i s u n d e r s t o o d t o b e
curbed, d o u b l e d back, or even prohibited? Reflection on desire
absorbs d e s i r e i n t o r e f l e c t i o n : w e w i l l see h o w this w o r k s i n
H e g e l . B u t there i s a n o t h e r o r d e r o f p r o h i b i t i o n , o n e w h i c h
falls o u t s i d e the c i r c u i t o f s e l f ­ r e f l e c t i o n . F r e u d d i s t i n g u i s h e s
b e t w e e n r e p r e s s i o n a n d f o r e c l o s u r e , s u g g e s t i n g that a r e ­
p r e s s e d d e s i r e m i g h t o n c e h a v e l i v e d a p a r t f r o m its p r o h i b i ­
t i o n , b u t that f o r e c l o s e d d e s i r e i s r i g o r o u s l y b a r r e d , c o n s t i ­
t u t i n g the subject t h r o u g h a c e r t a i n k i n d o f p r e e m p t i v e loss.
E l s e w h e r e I h a v e s u g g e s t e d that the f o r e c l o s u r e of h o m o ­
s e x u a l i t y a p p e a r s to be f o u n d a t i o n a l to a c e r t a i n h e t e r o s e x u a l
v e r s i o n o f the subject. 11
The formula "I have never l o v e d "
someone of similar gender a nd "I have never lost" any such
p e r s o n p r e d i c a t e s the " I " o n the " n e v e r ­ n e v e r " o f that l o v e a n d
loss. I n d e e d , the o n t o l o g i c a l a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f h e t e r o s e x u a l
" b e i n g " i s t r a c e d t o t h i s d o u b l e n e g a t i o n , w h i c h f o r m s its c o n ­
s t i t u t i v e m e l a n c h o l i a , a n e m p h a t i c a n d i r r e v e r s i b l e loss that
f o r m s the t e n u o u s basis o f that " b e i n g . "
Significantly, F r e u d identifies heightened conscience a n d
self­beratemen t a s o n e s i g n o f m e l a n c h o l i a , the c o n d i t i o n o f
u n c o m p l e t e d grief. T h e f o r e c l o s u r e o f c e r t a i n f o r m s o f l o v e
suggests that the m e l a n c h o l i a that g r o u n d s the subject ( a n d
h e n c e a l w a y s threatens t o u n s e t t l e a n d d i s r u p t that g r o u n d )
s i g n a l s a n i n c o m p l e t e a n d i r r e s o l v a b l e grief. U n o w n e d a n d i n ­
c o m p l e t e , m e l a n c h o l i a is the l i m i t to the subject's sense of pou­
voir, its sense o f w h a t i t c a n a c c o m p l i s h a n d , i n that sense, its
p o w e r . M e l a n c h o l i a rifts the subject, m a r k i n g a l i m i t t o w h a t i t
c a n a c c o m m o d a t e . B e c a u s e the subject d o e s n o t , c a n n o t , reflect
o n that loss, that loss m a r k s the l i m i t o f r e f l e x i v i t y , that w h i c h
exceeds ( a n d c o n d i t i o n s ) its c i r c u i t r y . U n d e r s t o o d a s f o r e c l o ­
s u r e , that loss i n a u g u r a t e s the subject a n d threatens i t w i t h
dissolution.
24 Introduction
C o n s i d e r e d a l o n g N i e t z s c h e a n a n d H e g e l i a n l i n e s , the s u b ­
ject engages i n its o w n s e l f ­ t h w a r t i n g , a c c o m p l i s h e s its o w n
s u b j e c t i o n , d e s i r e s a n d crafts its o w n s h a c k l e s , a n d s o t u r n s
a g a i n s t a d e s i r e that i t k n o w s t o b e — o r k n e w t o b e — i t s o w n .
F o r a loss t o p r e d a t e the subject, t o m a k e i t p o s s i b l e ( a n d i m ­
p o s s i b l e ) , w e m u s t c o n s i d e r the p a r t that loss p l a y s i n subject
f o r m a t i o n . Is there a loss that c a n n o t be t h o u g h t , c a n n o t be
o w n e d o r g r i e v e d , w h i c h f o r m s the c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y f o r
the subject? Is t h i s w h a t H e g e l c a l l e d "the loss of the loss," a
f o r e c l o s u r e that c o n s t i t u t e s a n u n k n o w a b i l i t y w i t h o u t w h i c h
the subject c a n n o t e n d u r e , a n i g n o r a n c e a n d m e l a n c h o l i a that
m a k e s p o s s i b l e a l l c l a i m s o f k n o w l e d g e a s one's o w n ? I s t h e re
not a l o n g i n g to g r i e v e — a n d , equivalently, an inabilit y to
g r i e v e — t h a t w h i c h o n e n e v e r w a s able t o l o v e , a l o v e that f a lls
s h o r t of the " c o n d i t i o n s of e x i s t e n c e " ? T h i s is a loss n o t m e r e l y
o f the object o r s o m e set o f objects, b u t o f l o v e ' s o w n p o s s i ­
b i l i t y : the loss o f the a b i l i t y t o l o v e , the u n f i n i s h a b l e g r i e v i n g
f o r that w h i c h f o u n d s the subject. O n the o n e h a n d , m e l a n c h o ­
l i a i s a n a t t a c h m e n t that s u b s t i t u t e s f o r a n a t t a c h m e n t that i s
b r o k e n , gone, o r i m p o s s i b l e ; o n the o t h e r h a n d , m e l a n c h o l i a
c o n t i n u e s the t r a d i t i o n o f i m p o s s i b i l i t y , a s i t w e r e , that b e l o n g s
t o the a t t a c h m e n t f o r w h i c h i t s u b s t i t u t e s .
T h e r e are, o f c o u r s e , v a r i o u s w a y s o f r e f u s i n g t o l o v e , n o t
all of w h i c h qualify as foreclosure. But what happens w h e n
a c e r t a i n f o r e c l o s u r e o f l o v e b e c o m e s the c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i ­
b i l i t y f o r s o c i a l existence ? D o e s this n o t p r o d u c e a s o c i a l i t y
afflicted b y m e l a n c h o l i a , a s o c i a l i t y i n w h i c h l o s s c a n n o t b e
g r i e v e d b e c a u s e i t c a n n o t b e r e c o g n i z e d a s loss, b e c a u s e w h a t
i s los t n e v e r h a d a n y e n t i t l e m e n t t o existence ?
H e r e o n e m i g h t w e l l d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n (a) a n attach­
m e n t that is s u b s e q u e n t l y d i s a v o w e d a n d (b) a f o r e c l o s u r e that
s t r u c t u r e s the f o r m s that a n y a t t a c h m e n t m a y a s s u m e . I n the
Introduction 25
latter case, the f o r e c l o s u r e m i g h t b e u s e f u l l y r e l i n k e d w i t h the
Foucauldia n notion of a regulatory ideal, an ideal according
t o w h i c h c e r t a i n f o r m s o f l o v e b e c o m e p o s s i b l e a n d o t h e r s,
impossible. W i t h i n psychoanalysis, we think of social sanction
a s e n c o d e d i n the e g o ­ i d e a l a n d p a t r o l l e d b y the s u p e r ­ e g o .
But what might it m e an to think of social sanction as w o r k i n g ,
t h r o u g h f o r e c l o s u r e , t o p r o d u c e the p o s s i b l e d o m a i n i n w h i c h
l o v e a n d loss c a n o p e r a t e ? A s f o r e c l o s u r e , the s a n c t i o n w o r k s
not to p r o h i b i t existing desire but to p r o d u c e certain k i n d s of
objects a n d to.bar o t h e r s f r o m the f i e l d o f s o c i a l p r o d u c t i o n . I n
t h i s w a y , the s a n c t i o n d o e s n o t w o r k a c c o r d i n g t o the r e p r e s ­
sive h y p o t h e s i s , a s p o s t u l a t e d a n d c r i t i c i z e d b y F o u c a u l t , b u t
as a m e c h a n i s m of p r o d u c t i o n , o n e that c a n o p e r a t e, h o w e v e r ,
o n the b a s i s o f a n o r i g i n a r y v i o l e n c e . 12
I n the w o r k o f M e l a n i e K l e i n , g u i l t a p p e a r s t o e m e r g e , n o t
in consequence of internalizing an external p r o h i b i t i o n , but as
a w a y o f p r e s e r v i n g the object o f l o v e f r o m one's o w n p o t e n ­
t i a l l y o b l i t e r a t i n g v i o l e n c e . G u i l t serves the f u n c t i o n o f p r e ­
s e r v i n g the object o f l o v e a n d , hence, o f p r e s e r v i n g l o v e itself.
W h at might it mean to understand guilt, then, as a w a y in
w h i c h l o v e p r e s e r v e s the object i t m i g h t o t h e r w i s e d e s t r o y ?
As a s t o p g a p a g a i n s t a s a d i s t i c d e s t r u c t i o n , g u i l t s i g n a l s less
the p s y c h i c p r e s e n c e o f a n o r i g i n a l l y s o c i a l a n d e x t e r n a l n o r m
t h a n a c o u n t e r v a i l i n g d e s i r e to c o n t i n u e the object o n e w i s h e s
d e a d . I t i s i n t h i s sense that g u i l t e m e r g e s i n the c o u r s e o f
m e l a n c h o l i a n o t o n l y , a s the F r e u d i a n v i e w w o u l d h a v e i t , t o
k e e p the d e a d object a l i v e , b u t t o k e e p the l i v i n g object f r o m
"death," w h e r e d e a t h m e a n s the d e a t h o f l o v e , i n c l u d i n g the
o c c a s i o n s o f s e p a r a t i o n a n d loss.
D o e s the K l e i n i a n v i e w suggest, t h e n , that the f u n c t i o n o f
l o v e c a n b e f u l l y e x p l a i n e d w i t h i n a p s y c h i c e c o n o m y that
c a r r i e s n o s o c i a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t r e s i d u e ? O r i s the s o c i a l s i g n i f i ­
26 Introduction
c a n c e o f g u i l t t o b e t r a c e d i n a r e g i s t e r o t h e r t h a n that o f p r o ­
h i b i t i o n , i n the d e s i r e for r e p a r a t i o n ? I n o r d e r t o p r e s e r v e the
object f r o m o n e ' s o w n a g g r e s s i o n , a n a g g r e s s i o n that a l w a y s
a c c o m p a n i e s l o v e (as c o n f l i c t ) , g u i l t enters the p s y c h i c scene
as a necessity. If the object goes, so goes a s o u r c e of l o v e . In
o n e sense, g u i l t w o r k s t o t h w a r t the a g g r e s s i v e e x p r e s s i o n o f
l o v e that m i g h t d o i n the l o v e d object, a n object u n d e r s t o o d t o
b e a s o u r c e o f l o v e ; i n a c o u n t e r sense, h o w e v e r , g u i l t w o r k s
t o p r e s e r v e the object a s a n object o f l o v e (its i d e a l i z a t i o n ) a n d
h e n c e ( v i a i d e a l i z a t i o n ) t o p r e s e r v e the p o s s i b i l i t y o f l o v i n g
a n d b e i n g loved. A g g r e s s i o n — o r hate—is not m e r e l y m i t i ­
g a t e d , b u t r e r o u t e d a g a i n s t the o n e w h o loves, o p e r a t i n g a s
the self­beratements o f the s u p e r ­ e g o . 13
B e c a u s e l o v e a n d ag­
g r e s s i o n w o r k together, the m i t i g a t i o n o f a g g r e s s i o n t h r o u g h
g u i l t i s also the m i t i g a t i o n o f l o v e . G u i l t w o r k s , t h e n , b o t h t o
f o r e c l o s e a n d t o c o n t i n u e l o v e , o r rather, t o c o n t i n u e l o v e (less
p a s s i o n a t e l y, to be sure) as the effect of a f o r e c l o s u r e .
K l e i n ' s s c h e m e raises a n u m b e r o f q u e s t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o the
relation between love a n d aggression. W h y m i g h t one want
d e a d the object o f l o v e ? I s t h i s a p r i m a r y s a d i s m that m i g h t b e
e x p l a i n e d b y r e c o u r s e t o a p r i m a r y d e a t h d r i v e , o r are there
o t h e r w a y s t o a c c o u n t for the d e s i r e t o v a n q u i s h w h a t o n e
l o v e s ? F o l l o w i n g F r e u d , K l e i n situates s.uch a d e s i r e t o v a n ­
q u i s h w i t h i n the p r o b l e m a t i c o f m e l a n c h o l i a , t h u s m a k i n g the
p o i n t that the d e s i r e t o v a n q u i s h c h a r a c t e r i z e s a r e l a t i o n to a n
object a l r e a d y lost: a l r e a d y lost a n d t h u s e l i g i b l e for a c e r t a i n
k i n d of vanquishing.
K l e i n l i n k s g u i l t t o w a r d the object w i t h the d e s i r e t o t r i ­
u m p h o v e r the object, a sense o f t r i u m p h w h i c h , i f p u r s u e d too
far, threatens to d e s t r o y the object as a s o u r c e of love. Yet o n e
m i g h t c o n s i d e r that c e r t a i n f o r m s o f l o v e e n t a i l the loss o f the
object n o t o n l y b e c a u s e o f a n i n n a t e d e s i r e t o t r i u m p h , b u t b e ­
Introduction 27
cause s u c h objects f a i l to q u a l i f y as objects of l o v e : as objects
of love they assume a m a r k of destruction. Indeed, they m a y
threaten one's o w n d e s t r u c t i o n as w e l l : "I w i l l be d e s t r o y e d if
I l o v e in that w a y . " M a r k e d for "death," the object is, as it w e r e ,
a l r e a d y lost, a n d the d e s i r e t o v a n q u i s h the object i s p r e c i s e l y
the d e s i r e t o v a n q u i s h a n object w h i c h , i f l o v e d , w o u l d s p e l l
d e s t r u c t i o n for the o n e w h o loves.
C a n w e r e a d the w o r k i n g s o f s o c i a l p o w e r p r e c i s e l y i n the
d e l i m i t a t i o n o f the f i e l d o f s u c h objects, objects m a r k e d f o r
death? A n d i s this p a r t o f the i r r e a l i t y , the m e l a n c h o l i c aggres­
s i o n a n d the d e s i r e t o v a n q u i s h , that c h a r a c t e r i z e s the p u b l i c
r e s p o n s e t o the d e a t h o f m a n y o f t h o s e c o n s i d e r e d " s o c i a l l y
dead," w h o die f r o m A I D S ? G a y people, prostitutes, d r u g
users, a m o n g o t h e r s ? I f t h e y are d y i n g o r a l r e a d y d e a d , let u s
v a n q u i s h t h e m a g a i n . A n d c a n the sense o f " t r i u m p h " b e w o n
precisely through a practice of social differentiation in w h i c h
one a c h i e v e s a n d m a i n t a i n s " s o c i a l e x i s t e n c e " o n l y b y the p r o ­
d u c t i o n a n d m a i n t e n a n c e o f those s o c i a l l y d e a d ? M i g h t o n e
not also r e a d the p a r a n o i a that s t r u c t u r e s p u b l i c d i s c o u r s e o n
s u c h issues as the i n v e r s i o n of that a g g r e s s i o n : the d e s i r e to
v a n q u i s h the d e a d o t h e r that, t h r o u g h a r e v e r s a l , c o m e s t o
m a r k that o t h e r as the threat of d e a t h , c a s t i n g the o t h e r as the
( u n l i k e l y ) p e r s e c u t o r o f the s o c i a l l y n o r m a l a n d n o r m a l i z e d ?
W h a t is i t , t h e n , that is d e s i r e d in s u b j e c t i o n? Is it a s i m p l e
l o v e of the s h a c k l e s , or is t h e re a m o r e c o m p l e x s c e n a r i o at
w o r k ? H o w i s s u r v i v a l t o b e m a i n t a i n e d i f the t e r m s b y w h i c h
existence i s g u a r a n t e e d are p r e c i s e l y t h o s e that d e m a n d a n d
i n s t i t u t e s u b o r d i n a t i o n ? O n this u n d e r s t a n d i n g , s u b j e c t i o n i s
the p a r a d o x i c a l effect o f a r e g i m e o f p o w e r i n w h i c h the v e r y
" c o n d i t i o n s of existence," the p o s s i b i l i t y of c o n t i n u i n g as a
r e c o g n i z a b l e s o c i a l b e i n g , r e q u i r e s the f o r m a t i o n a n d m a i n t e ­
n a n c e o f the subject i n s u b o r d i n a t i o n . I f o n e accepts S p i n o z a ' s
 28 Introduction
n o t i o n that d e s i r e i s a l w a y s the d e s i r e t o p e r s i s t i n o n e ' s o w n
being, 1 4
a n d recasts the metaphysical s u b s t a n c e that f o r m s the
i d e a l for d e s i r e a s a m o r e p l i a b l e n o t i o n o f s o c i a l b e i n g , o n e
m i g h t t h e n b e p r e p a r e d t o r e d e s c r i b e the d e s i r e t o p e r s i s t
i n one's o w n b e i n g a s s o m e t h i n g that c a n b e b r o k e r e d o n l y
w i t h i n the r i s k y t e r m s o f s o c i a l life. T h e r i s k o f d e a t h i s t h u s c o ­
e x t e n s i v e w i t h the i n s u r m o u n t a b i l i t y o f the s o c i a l . I f the t e r m s
b y w h i c h "existence" i s formulated, sustained, a n d w i t h d r a w n
are the a c t i v e a n d p r o d u c t i v e v o c a b u l a r y o f p o w e r , t h e n t o
p e r s i s t i n one's b e i n g m e a n s t o b e g i v e n o v e r f r o m the start
t o s o c i a l t e r m s that are n e v e r f u l l y one's o w n . T h e d e s i r e t o
p e r s i s t i n one's o w n b e i n g r e q u i r e s s u b m i t t i n g t o a w o r l d o f
others that i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y n o t one's o w n ( a s u b m i s s i o n that
does n o t t a k e p l a c e a t a later date, b u t w h i c h f r a m e s a n d m a k e s
p o s s i b l e the d e s i r e t o be). O n l y b y p e r s i s t i n g i n a l t e r i t y d o e s
o n e p e r s i s t i n one's " o w n " b e i n g . V u l n e r a b l e t o t e r m s that o n e
n e v e r m a d e , o n e p e r s i s t s a l w a y s , t o s o m e degree, t h r o u g h cate­
gories, n a m e s , t e r m s , a n d c l a s s i f i c a t i o ns that m a r k a p r i m a r y
a n d inaugurative alienation in sociality. If such terms institute
a p r i m a r y s u b o r d i n a t i o n or, i n d e e d , a p r i m a r y v i o l e n c e , t h e n
a subject e m e r g e s a g a i n s t itself in o r d e r , p a r a d o x i c a l l y , t o b e
for itself.
W h a t w o u l d i t m e a n for the subject t o d e s i r e s o m e t h i n g
o t h e r t h a n its c o n t i n u e d " s o c i a l e x i s t e n c e " ? I f s u c h a n existenc e
cannot be undone w i t h o u t falling into some k i n d of death, can
existence nevertheless be r i s k e d , death c o u r t e d or p u r s u e d , in
o r d e r t o e x p o s e a n d o p e n t o t r a n s f o r m a t i o n the h o l d o f s o c i a l
p o w e r o n the c o n d i t i o n s o f life's p e r s i s t e n c e ? T h e subject i s
c o m p e l l e d t o repeat the n o r m s b y w h i c h i t i s p r o d u c e d , b u t
that r e p e t i t i o n establishes a d o m a i n of r i s k , f o r if o n e fails to
r e i n s t a te the n o r m " i n the r i g h t w a y , " o n e b e c o m e s subject t o
f u r t h e r s a n c t i o n , o n e feels the p r e v a i l i n g c o n d i t i o n s o f e x i s ­
Introduction 29
tence t h r e a t e n e d . A n d yet, w i t h o u t a r e p e t i t i o n that r i s k s l i f e —
i n its c u r r e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n — h o w m i g h t w e b e g i n t o i m a g i n e
the c o n t i n g e n c y o f that o r g a n i z a t i o n , a n d p e r f o r m a t i v e l y r e ­
c o n f i g u r e the c o n t o u r s of the c o n d i t i o n s of life?
A c r i t i c a l a n a l y s i s of s u b j e c t i o n i n v o l v e s : (1) an a c c o u n t of
the w a y r e g u l a t o r y p o w e r m a i n t a i n s subjects i n s u b o r d i n a t i o n
b y p r o d u c i n g a n d e x p l o i t i n g the d e m a n d for c o n t i n u i t y , v i s i ­
b i l i t y , a n d p l a c e ; (2) r e c o g n i t i o n that the subject p r o d u c e d as
continuous, visible, a n d located is nevertheless h a u n t e d by an
i n a s s i m i l a b l e r e m a i n d e r , a m e l a n c h o l i a that m a r k s the l i m i t s
of s u b j e c t i v a t i o n ; (3) an a c c o u n t of the i t e r a b i l i t y of the s u b ­
ject that s h o w s h o w a g e n c y m a y w e l l c o n s i s t i n o p p o s i n g a n d
t r a n s f o r m i n g the s o c i a l t e r m s b y w h i c h i t i s s p a w n e d .
A l t h o u g h s u c h a f o r m u l a t i o n c a n h a r d l y b e the b a s i s for a n
o p t i m i s t i c v i e w of the subject or of a s u b j e c t ­ c e n t e r e d p o l i t i c s ,
it m a y s t a n d as a p r o v o c a t i o n a n d as a c a u t i o n a g a i n s t t w o
f o r m s o f t h e o r e t i c a l d e s i r e : o n e i n w h i c h a s s u m i n g a n d stat­
i n g a " s u b j e c t ­ p o s i t i o n " i s the c o n s u m m a t e m o m e n t o f p o l i t i c s ;
a n d a n o t h e r i n w h i c h the d i s m i s s a l o f the subject a s a p h i l o ­
s o p h i c a l t r o p e u n d e r e s t i m a t e s the l i n g u i s t i c r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r
e n t e r i n g s o c i a l i t y a t a l l . A s m u c h a s a p e r s p e c t i v e o n the s u b ­
ject r e q u i r e s an e v a c u a t i o n of the first p e r s o n , a s u s p e n s i o n of
the "I" in the interests of an a n a l y s i s of subject f o r m a t i o n , so
a r e a s s u m p t i o n of that f i r s t ­ p e r s o n p e r s p e c t i v e is c o m p e l l e d
b y the q u e s t i o n o f agency. T h e a n a l y s i s o f s u b j e c t i o n i s a l w a y s
d o u b l e , t r a c i n g the c o n d i t i o n s o f subject f o r m a t i o n a n d t r a c ­
i n g the t u r n against those c o n d i t i o n s for the s u b j e c t — a n d its
perspective—to emerge.
A c r i t i c a l e v a l u a t i o n of subject f o r m a t i o n m a y w e l l offer a
better c o m p r e h e n s i o n o f the d o u b l e b i n d s t o w h i c h o u r e m a n ­
c i p a t o r y efforts o c c a s i o n a l l y l e a d w i t h o u t , i n c o n s e q u e n c e ,
e v a c u a t i n g the p o l i t i c a l . Is there a w a y to a f f i r m c o m p l i c i t y
30 Introduction

a s the basis o f p o l i t i c a l agency, y e t i n s i s t that p o l i t i c a l a g e n c y

m a y d o m o r e t h a n reiterate the c o n d i t i o n s o f s u b o r d i n a t i o n ?
If, as A l t h u s s e r i m p l i e s , b e c o m i n g a subject r e q u i r e s a k i n d
o f m a s t e r y i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m s u b m i s s i o n , are there p e r ­
haps p o l i t i c al an d psychic consequences to be w r o u g h t f r o m
Stubborn Attachment,
s u c h a f o u n d i n g a m b i v a l e n c e ? T h e t e m p o r a l p a r a d o x o f the
subject i s s u c h that, o f necessity, w e m u s t lose the p e r s p e c t i v e Bodily Subjection
o f a subject a l r e a d y f o r m e d i n o r d e r t o a c c o u n t f o r o u r o w n
Rereading Hegel on the
b e c o m i n g . T h a t " b e c o m i n g " i s n o s i m p l e o r c o n t i n u o u s affair,
Unhappy Consciousness
b u t a n u n e a s y p r a c t i c e o f r e p e t i t i o n a n d its r i s k s , c o m p e l l e d
yet i n c o m p l e t e , w a v e r i n g o n the h o r i z o n o f s o c i a l b e i n g .

a freedom still enmeshed in servitude

—Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit

T he t r a n s i t i o n in The Phenomenology of Spirit f r o m the sec­

t i o n " L o r d s h i p a n d B o n d a g e " t o " T h e F r e e d o m o f Self­
C o n s c i o u s n e s s : S t o i c i s m , S k e p t i c i s m , a n d the U n h a p p y C o n ­
sciousness" 1
is o n e of the least i n t e r r o g a t e d of H e g e l ' s p h i l o ­
s o p h i c a l m o v e m e n t s . P e r h a p s b e c a u s e the c h a p t e r o n l o r d s h i p
a n d b o n d a g e s e c u r e d a l i b e r a t i o n i s t n a r r a t i v e for v a r i o u s p r o ­
gressive p o l i t i c a l visions, m o s t readers have neglected to p a y
a t t e n t i o n t o the r e s o l u t i o n o f f r e e d o m i n t o s e l f ­ e n s l a v e m e n t a t
the e n d of the chapter. Insofar a s recent t h e o r y has c a l l e d i n t o
q u e s t i o n b o t h the a s s u m p t i o n o f a p r o g r e s s i v e h i s t o r y a n d the
status o f the subject, the d y s t o p i c r e s o l u t i o n o f " L o r d s h i p a n d
B o n d a g e " has p e r h a p s r e g a i n e d a t i m e l y s i g n i f i c a n c e .
F o u c a u l t s u g g e s t e d that the p o i n t o f m o d e r n p o l i t i c s i s n o
32 Stubborn Attachment, Bodil y Subjection
r Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness
l o n g e r to l i b e r a t e a subject, b u t r a t h er to i n t e r r o g a t e the r e g u l a ­
t o r y m e c h a n i s m s t h r o u g h w h i c h "subjects" are p r o d u c e d a n d
maintained. A l t h o u g h Foucault's vocabulary ought not to be
c o n f l a t e d w i t h H e g e l ' s , h i s c o n c e r n w i t h the d o u b l e ­ e d g e d i m ­
p l i c a t i o n s of s u b j e c t i o n (assujetissement: the s i m u l t a n e o u s form­
ing a n d regulating of the subject) is in s o m e w a y s p r e f i g u r e d
i n H e g e l ' s a c c o u n t o f the b o n d s m a n ' s l i b e r a t i o n i n t o v a r i o u s
f o r m s of e t h i c a l self­beratement. In Discipline and Punish, F o u ­
c a u l t l i m i t s the efficacy o f p r i s o n r e f o r m : "the m a n d e s c r i b e d
for u s , w h o m w e are i n v i t e d t o free, i s a l r e a d y i n h i m s e l f the
effect of a s u b j e c t i o n [assujettissement] m u c h m o r e p r o f o u n d
t h a n h i m s e l f . " T h e b o n d s m a n i n H e g e l t h r o w s off the a p p a r ­
2
ently external " L o r d " only to find himself in an ethical w o r l d ,
subjected t o v a r i o u s n o r m s a n d i d e a l s . O r , t o p u t i t m o r e
p r e c i s e l y , the subject e m e r g e s a s a n u n h a p p y c o n s c i o u s n e s s
t h r o u g h the r e f l e x i v e a p p l i c a t i o n o f these e t h i c a l l a w s .
T h e p e r m u t a t i o n s o f s e l f ­ e n s l a v e m e n t that H e g e l d e s c r i b e s
a p p e a r t o take the b o d y a s w h a t m u s t b e n e g a t e d , m o r t i f i e d , o r
s u b o r d i n a t e d t o a n e t h i c a l d e m a n d . T h e " t e r r o r " that seizes the
b o n d s m a n w i t h his recognition of freedom appears to c u l m i ­
nate i n the s i m u l t a n e o u s f a b r i c a t i o n o f e t h i c a l n o r m s a n d the
b e r a t e m e n t o f the b o d i l y c o n d i t i o n o f h i s o w n life. I n this sense,
" T h e U n h a p p y C o n s c i o u s n e s s " establishes a r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n
s e l f ­ e n s l a v e m e n t a s b o d i l y s u b j e c t i o n a n d the f o r m u l a t i o n o f
s e l f ­ i m p o s e d e t h i c a l i m p e r a t i v e s that p r e f i g u r e s N i e t z s c h e ' s
c r i t i q u e of the s a m e in On the Genealogy of Morals a n d F o u ­
c a u l t ' s a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f that c r i t i q u e . I n the f o l l o w i n g c i t a t i o n
f r o m N i e t z s c h e ' s Genealogy of Morals, o n e c a n d i s c e r n a t e m p o ­
r a r y c o n v e r g e n c e b e t w e e n the f i g u r e s o f s e l f ­ e n s l a v e m e n t i n
H e g e l ' s " U n h a p p y C o n s c i o u s n e s s " a n d the m o r a l i z e d " m a n "
of c o n s c i e n c e in N i e t z s c h e : " T h i s instinct for freedom f o r c i b l y
m a d e l a t e n t . . . t h i s i n s t i n c t for f r e e d o m p u s h e d b a c k a n d r e ­
33
p r e s s e d , i n c a r c e r a t e d w i t h i n a n d f i n a l l y able t o d i s c h a r g e a n d
vent itself o n l y on itself: that, a n d that a l o n e , is w h a t the bad
conscience is in its b e g i n n i n g s . " 3
U n d e r s c o r i n g the p a i n f u l r e a l i z a t i o n that " l i b e r a t i o n " f r o m
e x t e r n a l a u t h o r i t i e s d o e s n o t suffice to i n i t i a t e a subject i n t o
freedom, Foucault draws u p o n Nietzsche and, in particular,
u p o n the s e l f ­ i n c a r c e r a t i n g m o v e m e n t that s t r u c t u r e s m o d e r n
f o r m s o f r e f l e x i v i t y . T h e l i m i t s t o l i b e r a t i o n are t o b e u n d e r ­
stood not merely as self­imposed but, more fundamentally,
as the p r e c o n d i t i o n of the subject's v e r y f o r m a t i o n . A c e r t a i n
s t r u c t u r i n g a t t a c h m e n t t o s u b j e c t i o n b e c o m e s the c o n d i t i o n
o f m o r a l s u b j e c t i v a t i o n . C o n s i d e r the e x p a n d e d text o f F o u ­
c a u l t ' s r e m a r k s o n the p r i s o n e r ' s s u b j e c t i o n , p r e v i o u s l y c i t e d ,
i n Discipline and Punish: " T h e m a n d e s c r i b e d for u s , w h o m w e
are i n v i t e d to free, is a l r e a d y in h i m s e l f the effect of a s u b ­
j e c t i o n [assujettissement] m u c h m o r e p r o f o u n d t h a n h i m s e l f . A
' s o u l ' i n h a b i t s h i m a n d b r i n g s h i m t o existence, w h i c h i s itself
a factor i n the m a s t e r y that p o w e r exercises o v e r the b o d y . T h e
s o u l is the effect a n d i n s t r u m e n t of a p o l i t i c a l a n a t o m y ; the
s o u l i s the p r i s o n o f the b o d y . " 4
H o w p r e c i s e l y are w e t o r e a d this " i n h a b i t i n g " o f the b o d y
b y the s o u l ? C a n a r e t u r n t o H e g e l h e l p u s t o r e a d it? W h a t are
the p o i n t s o f c o n v e r g e n c e a n d d i v e r g e n c e i n H e g e l , N i e t z s c h e ,
a n d F o u c a u l t o n the s t r u c t u r e o f subjection? H e g e l ' s a c c o u n t i n
"The U n h a p p y Consciousness" prefigures a critical discourse
o n e t h i c a l p o s i t i o n s that n o t o n l y seek t o i n s t i t u t e the d e n i a l o r
sacrifice o f b o d i l y life, b u t that f a l l i n t o i n s t r u c t i v e p a r a d o x e s
w h e n t h e y do . H e g e l s h o w s that i f the s u p p r e s s i o n o f the b o d y
r e q u i r e s a n i n s t r u m e n t a l m o v e m e n t o f a n d b y the b o d y , t h e n
the b o d y i s i n a d v e r t e n t l y preserved i n a n d b y the i n s t r u m e n t o f
its s u p p r e s s i o n . T h i s f o r m u l a t i o n p r e f i g u r e s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f
a convergence w i t h Nietzschean, F o u c a u l t i a n , a n d , as we shall
34 Stubborn Attachment, Bodily Subjection
see, F r e u d i a n p e r s p e c t i v e s o n self­abasement, w h i c h H e g e l ' s
text, i n the t r a n s i t i o n t o S p i r i t , forecloses. T h e r e a d i n g that f o l ­
l o w s p u r s u e s the p a t h that H e g e l i n t r o d u c e s o n l y t o foreclose.
A r r e s t i n g the text p r i o r t o its r e s o l u t i o n i n t o S p i r i t , t h i s i n q u i r y
seeks t o k n o w w h e t h e r a s u p p r e s s e d l i n k w i t h a N i e t z s c h e a n
a n d F r e u d i a n account of conscience is e m b e d d e d in Hegel's
chapter.
T h e first s e c t i o n of t h i s essay offers a r e a d i n g that a c c o u n t s
for h o w t h is p a r a d o x o f b o d i l y s u b j e c t i o n i s f o r m u l a t e d i n
the t r a n s i t i o n f r o m " L o r d s h i p a n d B o n d a g e " t o " T h e U n h a p p y
C o n s c i o u s n e s s " in The Phenomenology of Spirit. In the s e c o n d
s e c t i o n , I c o n s i d e r the restatements of that p a r a d o x i c a l f o r m u ­
lation i n psychoanalytic a n d F o u c a u l t i a n terms. W i t h o u t pre­
s u m i n g a d i r e c t l i n e of i n f l u e n c e , I suggest b o t h that H e g e l ' s
i n s i g h t s i n " T h e U n h a p p y C o n s c i o u s n e s s " o n the i n e l u c t a b i l i t y
o f the a t t a c h m e n t o f a n d t o the b o d y i n s u b j e c t i o n are r e ­
i t e r a t e d i n F o u c a u l t i a n f r a m e w o r k s , a n d that the F o u c a u l t i a n
a c c o u n t o f s u b j e c t i o n , d e s p i t e its s i g n i f i c a n t m o v e s b e y o n d
d i a l e c t i c a l l o g i c , r e m a i n s u n w i t t i n g l y t e t h e r e d t o the H e g e l i a n
f o r m u l a t i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , H e g e l t a c i t l y p r e s u m e s that subjec­
t i o n is u n d e r s t o o d as a s e l f ­ n e g a t i n g attachment a n d , in t h is
w a y , shares a n o p e r a t i v e a s s u m p t i o n w i t h the F r e u d i a n n o t i o n
of l i b i d i n a l investment.
Hegel and the Production of Self­Enslavement
In H e g e l ' s Phenomenology, b o d i e s are a l m o s t n e v e r to be
f o u n d a s objects o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l r e f l e c t i o n , m u c h less a s sites
o f e x p e r i e n c e , for b o d i e s are, i n H e g e l , a l w a y s a n d o n l y r e ­
f e r r e d t o i n d i r e c t l y a s the e n c a s e m e n t , l o c a t i o n , o r s p e c i f i c i t y
o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s . B y the t i m e w e a r r i v e a t the s e c t i o n o n the
u n h a p p y c o n s c i o u s n e s s , w e , the readers, h a v e a l r e a d y e n c o u n ­
Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 35
t e r e d the l o r d a n d the b o n d s m a n , a n d w e h a v e b e e n g i v e n
t o u n d e r s t a n d these d i s c r e p a n t figures a s d i f f e r e n t i a l l y p o s i ­
t i o n e d w i t h respect t o b o d i l y life. T h e b o n d s m a n a p p e a r s a s
a n i n s t r u m e n t a l b o d y w h o s e l a b o r p r o v i d e s for the m a t e r i a l
c o n d i t i o n s o f the l o r d ' s existence, a n d w h o s e m a t e r i a l p r o d ­
ucts reflect b o t h the s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f the b o n d s m a n a n d the
d o m i n a t i o n of the master. In a sense, the l o r d p o s t u r e s as a d i s ­
e m b o d i e d d e s i r e f o r self­reflection, o n e w h o n o t o n l y r e q u i r e s
the s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f the b o n d s m a n i n the status o f a n i n s t r u ­
m e n t a l b o d y , b u t w h o r e q u i r e s i n effect that the b o n d s m a n b e
the l o r d ' s b o d y , b u t b e i t i n s u c h a w a y that the l o r d forgets o r
d i s a v o w s h i s o w n a c t i v i t y i n p r o d u c i n g the b o n d s m a n , a p r o ­
duction w h i c h we w i l l call a projection.
T h i s forgetting involves a clever trick. It is an action by
w h i c h a n a c t i v i t y i s d i s a v o w e d , yet, a s a n a c t i o n , i t r h e t o r i ­
c a l l y c o n c e d e s the v e r y a c t i v i t y that i t seeks t o negate. T o d i s ­
a v o w one's b o d y , t o r e n d e r i t " O t h e r " a n d t h e n t o e s t a b l i s h the
" O t h e r " a s a n effect o f a u t o n o m y , i s t o p r o d u c e o n e ' s b o d y i n
s u c h a w a y that the a c t i v i t y o f its p r o d u c t i o n — a n d its essen­
t i a l r e l a t i o n t o the l o r d — i s d e n i e d . T h i s t r i c k o r r u s e i n v o l v e s a
d o u b l e d i s a v o w a l a n d a n i m p e r a t i v e that the " O t h e r " b e c o m e
c o m p l i c i t w i t h t h is d i s a v o w a l . I n o r d e r n o t t o b e the b o d y that
the l o r d p r e s u m a b l y is, a n d i n o r d e r t o h a v e the b o n d s m a n
p o s t u r e a s i f the b o d y that h e i s b e l o n g s t o h i m s e l f — a n d n o t b e
the o r c h e s t r a t e d p r o j e c t i o n of the l o r d — t h e r e m u s t be a c e r t a i n
k i n d o f e x c h a n g e , a b a r g a i n o r d e a l , i n w h i c h r u s es are e n a c t e d
a n d t r a n s a c t e d . I n effect, the i m p e r a t i v e t o the b o n d s m a n c o n ­
sists i n the f o l l o w i n g f o r m u l a t i o n : y o u b e m y b o d y f o r m e , b u t
d o n o t let m e k n o w that the b o d y y o u are i s m y b o d y . A n i n ­
j u n c t i o n a n d c o n t r a c t are h e r e p e r f o r m e d i n s u c h a w a y that
the m o v e s w h i c h g u a r a n t e e the f u l f i l l m e n t o f the i n j u n c t i o n
a n d the c o n t r a c t are i m m e d i a t e l y c o v e r e d o v e r a n d f o r g o t t e n .
36 Stubborn Attachment, Bodily Subjection
A t the c l o s e o f the s e c t i o n o n l o r d s h i p a n d b o n d a g e , the
b o n d s m a n l a b o r s a w a y i n a r e p e t i t i v e f a s h i o n o n objects that
b e l o n g t o the l o r d . I n t h i s sense, b o t h h i s l a b o r a n d h i s p r o d u c t s
are p r e s u m e d f r o m the start t o b e o t h e r t h a n h i s o w n , e x p r o ­
p r i a t e d . T h e y are g i v e n a w a y p r i o r t o a n y p o s s i b i l i t y o f g i v i n g
t h e m a w a y , s i n c e t h e y are, s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , n e v e r the b o n d s ­
m a n ' s t o g i v e . A n d yet, t h i s " c o n t r a c t " i n w h i c h the b o n d s ­
m a n s u b s t i t u t e s h i m s e l f f o r the l o r d b e c o m e s c o n s e q u e n t i a l ;
the s u b s t i t u t i o n itself b e c o m e s f o r m a t i v e o f a n d for the b o n d s ­
m a n . A s the b o n d s m a n slaves a w a y a n d b e c o m e s a w a r e o f
h i s o w n s i g n a t u r e o n the t h i n g s that h e m a k e s , h e r e c o g n i z e s
i n the f o r m o f the artifact that h e crafts the m a r k i n g s o f h i s
o w n labor , m a r k i n g s that are f o r m a t i v e o f the object itself. H i s
l a b o r p r o d u c e s a v i s i b l e a n d l e g i b l e set o f m a r k s i n w h i c h the
b o n d s m a n r e a d s b a c k f r o m the object a c o n f i r m a t i o n o f h i s
o w n f o r m a t i v e a c t i v i t y T h i s labor , t h i s a c t i v i t y , w h i c h b e l o n g s
f r o m the start t o the l o r d , i s n e v e r t h e l e s s reflecte d b a c k t o the
b o n d s m a n a s h i s o w n labor , a l a b o r that emanates f r o m h i m ,
e v e n i f i t a p p e a r s t o e m a n a t e f r o m the l o r d .
C a n , t h e n , the l a b o r reflecte d b a c k b e s a i d f i n a l l y t o b e the
b o n d s m a n ' s o w n ? R e m e m b e r that the l o r d has d i s a v o w e d h i s
o w n l a b o r i n g b e i n g , h i s b o d y a s a n i n s t r u m e n t o f labor , a n d
has e s t a b l i s h e d the b o n d s m a n a s the o n e w h o w i l l o c c u p y the
l o r d ' s b o d y for h i m . I n t h i s sense, the l o r d has c o n t r a c t e d the
b o n d s m a n as a surrogate or substitute. The b o n d s m a n thus
b e l o n g s t o the l o r d , b u t w i t h a k i n d o f b e l o n g i n g that c a n n o t
b e a v o w e d , f o r t o a v o w the b e l o n g i n g w o u l d b e t o a v o w the
s u b s t i t u t i o n a n d , hence, t o e x p o s e the l o r d a s b e i n g the b o d y
w h i c h the l o r d a p p a r e n t l y v e r y m u c h does n o t w a n t t o be.
H e n c e , it is as a s u b s t i t u t e in the s e r v i c e of d i s a v o w a l that the
b o n d s m a n l a b o r s ; o n l y b y m i m i n g a n d c o v e r i n g o v e r the m i ­
m e t i c status o f that l a b o r c a n the b o n d s m a n a p p e a r t o b e b o t h
Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 37
a c t i v e a n d a u t o n o m o u s . I n d e e d , the object e m e r g e s a s the o b ­
j e c t i f i c a t i o n o f the b o n d s m a n ' s labor , a n d t h u s a s a n i n s t a n c e
of that labor , a c o n g e a l i n g a n d r e f l e c t i o n of that labor. B u t
w h a t , t h e n , d o e s the object reflect? Is it the a u t o n o m y of the
b o n d s m a n ? O r i s i t the d i s s i m u l a t e d effect o f a u t o n o m y that
r e s u l ts f r o m the c o n t r a c t m a d e b e t w e e n l o r d a n d b o n d s m a n ?
I n o t h e r w o r d s , i f the b o n d s m a n effects a u t o n o m y t h r o u g h a
m i m i n g o f the l o r d ' s b o d y , a m i m i n g w h i c h r e m a i n s h i d d e n
f r o m the l o r d , t h e n the " a u t o n o m y " o f the slave i s the c r e d i b l e
effect of t h i s d i s s i m u l a t i o n . T h e object of l a b o r t h u s reflects
the a u t o n o m y of the b o n d s m a n to the extent that the object,
too, c o v e r s o v e r the d i s s i m u l a t i o n w h i c h i s the a c t i v i t y o f the
b o n d s m a n . I n h i s w o r k , t h e n , the b o n d s m a n d i s c o v e r s o r r e a d s
h i s o w n s i g n a t u r e , b u t w h a t i s i t that m a r k s that s i g n a t u r e a s
h i s o w n ? T h e b o n d s m a n d i s c o v e r s h i s a u t o n o m y , b u t h e does
n o t (yet) see that h i s a u t o n o m y is the d i s s i m u l a t e d effect of
the l o r d ' s . ( N o r d o e s h e see that the l o r d ' s a u t o n o m y i s itself
a d i s s i m u l a t i o n : the l o r d effects the a u t o n o m y o f d i s e m b o d i e d
r e f l e c t i o n a n d delegates the a u t o n o m y o f e m b o d i m e n t t o the
b o n d s m a n , t h u s p r o d u c i n g t w o " a u t o n o m i e s " that a p p e a r a t
the outset r a d i c a l l y t o e x c l u d e o n e another.)
B u t h e r e a q u e s t i o n e m e r g e s : D o e s the b o n d s m a n ' s a c t i v i t y
r e m a i n f u l l y c o n s t r a i n e d b y the d i s s i m u l a t i o n b y w h i c h i t i s
m o b i l i z e d ? O r does t h i s d i s s i m u l a t i o n p r o d u c e effects that ex­
c e e d the c o n t r o l o r d o m i n i o n o f the l o r d ?
I f the b o n d s m a n i s t o r e c o g n i z e the m a r k s m a d e o n the
object a s h i s o w n , t h e n that r e c o g n i t i o n m u s t t a k e p l a c e
t h r o u g h a n act o f r e a d i n g o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n b y w h i c h the m a r k s
(Zeichen) that the b o n d s m a n sees are s o m e h o w u n d e r s t o o d to
r e p r e s e n t the b o n d s m a n . I t i s n o t that the a c t i v i t y m u s t b e w i t ­
n e s s e d , b u t that the signs p r o d u c e d m u s t be r e a d as an effect
o f the e f f e c t i v i t y that d e s i g n a t e s the b o n d s m a n , m u s t i n s o m e
38 Stubborn Attachment, B o d i l y Subjection
w a y b e u n d e r s t o o d t o refer r e t r o a c t i v e l y t o the b o n d s m a n a s
s i g n a t o r y . I f w e are t o u n d e r s t a n d the f o r m i n g o f the object
a s the i n s c r i b i n g o f the b o n d s m a n ' s s i g n a t u r e , the f o r m a t i v e
p r i n c i p l e of the object to be the f o r m a t i o n of h i s s i g n a t u r e , t h e n
the b o n d s m a n ' s s i g n a t u r e d e s i g n a t e s a d o m a i n of c o n t e s t e d
o w n e r s h i p . T h i s i s his m a r k , w h i c h h e c a n r e a d ( w e s h a l l let the
b o n d s m a n o c c u p y the site o f p r e s u m p t i v e m a s c u l i n i t y ) , a n d
s o the object a p p e a r s t o b e l o n g t o h i m . Yet this object m a r k e d
b y h i m , w h i c h has h i s m a r k o n i t , b e l o n g s t o the l o r d , a t least
n o m i n a l l y . T h e b o n d s m a n s i g n s , as it w e r e , for the l o r d , as a
p r o x y s i g n a t o r y , as a d e l e g a t e d s u b s t i t u t e . T h u s the s i g n a t u r e
d o e s n o t seal o w n e r s h i p o f the object b y the b o n d s m a n , b u t
b e c o m e s the site for the r e d o u b l i n g o f o w n e r s h i p a n d , h e n c e ,
sets the stage for a scene of c o n t e s t a t i o n .
T h e m a r k o r s i g n o n the object i s n o t s i m p l y the p r o p e r t y
o f the b o n d s m a n — t h i s object w i t h h i s m a r k o n i t i m p l i e s f o r
h i m that h e i s a b e i n g w h o m a r k s t h i n g s , w h o s e a c t i v i t y p r o ­
d u c e s a s i n g u l a r effect, a s i g n a t u r e , w h i c h is i r r e d u c i b l y h i s .
T h a t s i g n a t u r e i s e r a s e d w h e n the object i s g i v e n o v e r t o the
l o r d , w h o s t a m p s i t w i t h his n a m e , o w n s i t , o r c o n s u m e s i t i n
s o m e w a y . T h e w o r k i n g o f the slave i s t h u s t o b e u n d e r s t o o d
as a m a r k i n g w h i c h r e g u l a r l y u n m a r k s itself, a s i g n a t o r y act
w h i c h p u t s itself u n d e r e r a s u r e a t the m o m e n t i n w h i c h i t i s
circulated, for c i r c u l a t i o n here is a l w a y s a matter of e x p r o p r i a ­
t i o n b y the l o r d . T h e slave, o f c o u r s e , f r o m the start has b e e n
w o r k i n g f o r a n o t h e r , u n d e r the n a m e o r s i g n o f s o m e other,
a n d s o has b e e n m a r k i n g the object w i t h h i s o w n s i g n a t u r e
u n d e r a set o f c o n d i t i o n s i n w h i c h that s i g n a t u r e i s a l w a y s
a l r e a d y e r a s e d , w r i t t e n o v e r , e x p r o p r i a t e d , r e s i g n i f i e d . I f the
b o n d s m a n w r i t e s o v e r the s i g n a t o r y o f the l o r d , t e m p o r a r i l y
r e v e r s i n g the s u b o r d i n a t e p o s i t i o n o f the p r o x y t o the o r i g i ­
n a l , the l o r d r e a p p r o p r i a t e s the object b y w r i t i n g o v e r the s i g ­
Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 39
n a t u r e of the b o n d s m a n . W h a t e m e r g e s is less a p a l i m p s e s t i c
object—like Kafka's topographies—than a m a r k of ownership
p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h a set of c o n s e q u e n t i a l erasures.
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , the b o n d s m a n n e v e r t h e l e s s d e r i v e s a sense of
s e l f ­ r e c o g n i t i o n a t the e n d o f the c h a p t e r , b u t n o t b y r e a d i n g
b a c k h i s s i g n a t u r e f r o m the object. A f t e r a l l , that s i g n a t u r e has
b e e n w r i t t e n o v e r b y the s i g n a t u r e o f the l o r d . H e r e c o g n i z e s
h i m s e l f i n the v e r y f o r f e i t u r e o f the s i g n a t u r e , i n the threat
t o a u t o n o m y that s u c h a n e x p r o p r i a t i o n p r o d u c e s . S t r a n g e l y ,
t h e n , a c e r t a i n s e l f ­ r e c o g n i t i o n i s d e r i v e d f r o m the r a d i c a l l y
t e n u o u s status o f the b o n d s m a n ; i t i s a c h i e v e d t h r o u g h the ex­
p e r i e n c e of absolute fear.
T h i s fear is a fear of a c e r t a i n loss of c o n t r o l , a c e r t a i n t r a n ­
sience a n d e x p r o p r i a b i l i t y p r o d u c e d b y the a c t i v i t y o f labor.
H e r e the l o g i c o f the b o n d s m a n ' s a c t i v i t y a p p e a r s c u r i o u s l y t o
c o n v e r g e w i t h that o f the l o r d . E a r l i e r i t s e e m e d that the l o r d
o c c u p i e d the p l a c e o f p u r e c o n s u m p t i o n , a p p r o p r i a t i n g a n d
e x t i n g u i s h i n g a l l that the b o n d s m a n m a d e . T h e b o n d s m a n , b y
contrast, a c h i e v e d the e x p e r i e n c e o f s e l f ­ r e f l e x i v i t y t h r o u g h
w o r k i n g o n a n d c r e a t i n g a n object that b o r e the m a r k s o f h i s
being, a n d thereby understoo d himself as a being w h o forms
o r creates t h i n g s w h i c h o u t l a s t h i m , a p r o d u c e r o f p e r m a n e n t
t h i n g s . F o r the l o r d , o c c u p y i n g the p o s i t i o n o f p u r e c o n s u m p ­
t i o n , objects w e r e t r a n s i t o r y , a n d h e h i m s e l f w a s d e f i n e d a s a
series o f t r a n s i t o r y desires. F o r the l o r d , t h e n , n o t h i n g s e e m e d
t o last, e x c e p t p e r h a p s h i s o w n c o n s u m i n g a c t i v i t y , h i s o w n
e n d l e s s desire.
T h e s e t w o p o s i t i o n s , h o w e v e r , are n o t r a d i c a l l y o p p o s e d t o
o n e a n o t h e r , for e a c h i n a differen t w a y e x p e r i e n c e s o n l y a n d
a l w a y s the loss o f the object a n d , w i t h that loss, the e x p e r i e n c e
of a f e a r f u l t r a n s i e n c e . W o r k is, f o r H e g e l , a f o r m of d e s i r e ,
a f o r m w h i c h i d e a l l y s u p p r e s s e s the t r a n s i t o r y c h a r a c t e r o f
40 Stubborn Attachment, B o d i l y Subjection
d e s i r e ; i n h i s w o r d s , " w o r k i s d e s i r e h e l d i n c h e c k , fleetingness
s t a v e d off" (118/153). T o w o r k o n a n object i s t o g i v e i t f o r m ,
a n d t o g i v e i t f o r m i s t o g i v e i t a n e x i s t e n c e that o v e r c o m e s
t r a n s i t o r i n e s s . T h e c o n s u m p t i o n o f the object i s the n e g a t i o n o f
that effect of p e r m a n e n c e ; the c o n s u m p t i o n of the object is its
déformation. T h e a c c u m u l a t i o n o f p r o p e r t y , h o w e v e r , r e q u i r e s
that f o r m e d objects b e p o s s e s s e d r a t h e r t h a n c o n s u m e d ; o n l y
a s p r o p e r t y d o objects r e t a i n t h e i r f o r m a n d "stave off fleet­
i n g n e s s . " O n l y a s p r o p e r t y d o objects f u l f i l l the t h e o l o g i c a l
p r o m i s e w i t h w h i c h t h e y are i n v e s t e d .
T h e b o n d s m a n ' s fear, t h e n , c o n s i s t s i n the e x p e r i e n c e o f
h a v i n g w h a t a p p e a r s t o b e h i s p r o p e r t y e x p r o p r i a t e d . I n the
e x p e r i e n c e o f g i v i n g u p w h a t h e has m a d e , the b o n d s m a n
u n d e r s t a n d s t w o i s s u e s: first, that w h a t h e i s i s e m b o d i e d o r
s i g n i f i e d i n w h a t h e m a k e s , a n d s e c o n d , that w h a t h e m a k e s i s
m a d e u n d e r the c o m p u l s i o n t o g i v e i t u p . H e n c e , i f the object
defines h i m , reflects b a c k w h a t h e is, i s the s i g n a t o r y text b y
w h i c h h e a c q u i r e s a sense o f w h o h e is, a n d i f t h o s e objects are
r e l e n t l e s s l y s a c r i f i c e d , t h e n he is a r e l e n t l e s s l y s e l f ­ s a c r i f i c i n g
being. He can recognize his o w n signature o n l y as what is con­
s t a n t l y b e i n g e r a s e d , a s a p e r s i s t e n t site o f v a n i s h i n g . H e has
n o c o n t r o l o v e r w h a t h e p u t s h i s n a m e t o o r o v e r the p u r p o s e s
t o w h i c h h e seeks t o fasten h i s n a m e . H i s s i g n a t u r e i s a n act
o f self­erasure: h e r e a d s that the s i g n a t u r e i s h i s , that h i s o w n
e x i s t e n c e a p p e a r s t o b e i r r e d u c i b l y h i s o w n , that w h a t i s i r r e ­
d u c i b l y h i s o w n i s h i s o w n v a n i s h i n g , a n d that t h i s v a n i s h i n g
is effected by a n o t h e r — t h a t is, that t h i s is a s o c i a l l y c o m p e l l e d
f o r m o f self­erasure. N o t o n l y d o e s h e l a b o r for a n o t h e r , w h o
takes the y i e l d o f h i s l a b o r , b u t h e g i v e s u p h i s s i g n a t u r e for
the s i g n a t u r e o f the other, n o l o n g e r m a r k i n g o w n e r s h i p o f h i s
o w n labor in any way.
Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 41
T h i s e x p r o p r i a t i o n o f the object d o e s n o t negate the b o n d s ­
m a n ' s sense o f h i m s e l f a s a l a b o r i n g b e i n g , b u t i t d o e s i m p l y
that w h a t e v e r h e m a k e s , h e a l s o loses. T h e d e t e r m i n a t e t h i n g
that the b o n d s m a n m a k e s reflects the b o n d s m a n h i m s e l f as a
d e t e r m i n a t e t h i n g . B u t b e c a u s e the object i s g i v e n a w a y , h e b e ­
c o m e s that w h i c h c a n b e f o r f e i t e d . I f the object i s the c o n g e a l ­
i n g o r f o r m i n g o f l a b o r , a n d i f the l a b o r i s that o f the b o n d s ­
m a n , t h e n the d e t e r m i n a t e a n d t r a n s i e n t c h a r a c t e r o f the t h i n g
w i l l i m p l y the d e t e r m i n a t e a n d t r a n s i e n t c h a r a c t e r o f the
b o n d s m a n . T h e l a b o r i n g b o d y w h i c h n o w k n o w s itself t o h a v e
f o r m e d the object also k n o w s that it is transient. T h e b o n d s m a n
not o n l y negates t h i n g s ( i n the sense o f t r a n s f o r m i n g t h e m
t h r o u g h labor) a n d is a n e g a t i n g a c t i v i t y , b u t he is subject to a
full a n d final negation in death. T h i s confrontation of death at
the e n d of the c h a p t e r r e c a l l s the l i f e ­ a n d ­ d e a t h s t r u g g l e at its
b e g i n n i n g. The strategy of d o m i n a t i o n w a s meant to replace
the l i f e ­ a n d ­ d e a t h s t r u g g l e . B u t i n the e a r l i e r v e r s i o n d e a t h
h a p p e n e d t h r o u g h the v i o l e n c e o f the o t h e r ; d o m i n a t i o n w a s
a w a y of f o r c i n g the o t h e r to d i e within the c o n t e x t of life.
T h e f a i l u r e of d o m i n a t i o n as a s t r a t e g y r e i n t r o d u c e s the fear of
d e a t h , b u t locates i t a s the i n e v i t a b l e fate o f a n y b e i n g w h o s e
consciousness is d e t e r m i n e d a n d e m b o d i e d , no longer as a
threat p o s e d b y a n o t h e r . T h e b o n d s m a n v e r g e s o n t h i s shatter­
i n g r e c o g n i t i o n o f h i s o w n d e a t h i n the last p a r a g r a p h o f the
chapter , b u t h e r e c o i l s f r o m r e c o g n i z i n g d e a t h , a t t a c h i n g h i m ­
self i n s t e a d t o v a r i o u s a t t r i b u t e s o f h i s o w n , t a k i n g u p a p o s ­
ture of smugness or stubbornness, c l i n g i n g to what appears to
be f i r m about himself, f i r m l y clinging to himself, in order not
t o k n o w that d e a t h threatens e v e r y aspect o f h i s o w n f i r m n e s s :
"since the e n t i r e content s o f its n a t u r a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s h a v e n o t
b e e n j e o p a r d i z e d , [Indem nicht aile Erfullungen seines naturlichen
42 Stubborn Attachment, Bodil y Subjection
Bewusstseins wankend geworden] d e t e r m i n a t e b e i n g s t i l l in prin­
ciple attaches to it; h a v i n g a m i n d of one's o w n is s e l f ­ w i l l , a
f r e e d o m s t i l l e n m e s h e d i n s e r v i t u d e " (119/155).
T h e u n h a p p y c o n s c i o u s n e s s e m e r g e s h e r e i n the m o v e m e n t
by w h i c h terror is allayed through a resolution of stubborn­
ness or, rather, t h r o u g h the a c t i o n b y w h i c h t e r r o r o f b o d i l y
d e a t h i s d i s p l a c e d b y a s m u g n e s s a n d s t u b b o r n n e s s that, i n the
next chapter, is r e v a l u e d as religiou s self­righteousness. T h i s
s a n c t i m o n i o u s self is n o t without t e r r o r : its r e f l e x i v i t y is self­
t e r r o r i z i n g . T h e b o d y w h i c h the b o n d s m e n e m b l e m a t i z e d a s
a l a b o r i n g i n s t r u m e n t i s recast a t the e n d o f the l o r d s h i p a n d
b o n d a g e c h a p t e r as a t r a n s i e n t object, subject to d e a t h . T h e r e c ­
o g n i t i o n o f the b o d y ' s d e a t h i s a v e r t e d , h o w e v e r , for a m o d e o f
l i v i n g i n w h i c h the b o d y i s ceaselessly d y i n g a w a y : h e n c e , the
m o v e f r o m the s e r v i t u d e o f the b o n d s m a n t o that o f the u n ­
h a p p y c o n s c i o u s n e s s . T h e b o n d s m a n takes the p l a c e o f the l o r d
b y r e c o g n i z i n g h i s o w n f o r m a t i v e c a p a c i t y , b u t o n c e the l o r d
i s d i s p l a c e d , the b o n d s m a n b e c o m e s l o r d o v e r h i m s e l f , m o r e
specifically, l o r d over his o w n b o d y ; this f o r m of reflexivity
s i g n a l s the passage f r o m b o n d a g e t o u n h a p p y c o n s c i o u s n e s s .
It i n v o l v e s s p l i t t i n g the p s y c h e i n t o t w o p a r t s , a l o r d s h i p a n d a
b o n d a g e i n t e r n a l t o a s i n g l e c o n s c i o u s n e s s , w h e r e b y the b o d y
is again d i s s i m u l a t e d as an alterity, b u t w h e r e this alterity is
n o w i n t e r i o r t o the p s y c h e itself. N o l o n g e r subjected a s a n
e x t e r n a l i n s t r u m e n t o f labor , the b o d y i s s t i l l s p l i t off f r o m
c o n s c i o u s n e s s . R e c o n s t i t u t e d a s a n i n t e r i o r a l i e n , the b o d y i s
s u s t a i n e d t h r o u g h its d i s a v o w a l a s w h a t c o n s c i o u s n e s s m u s t
continue to disavow.
W h a t i s the f o r m that t h i s s e l f ­ s u b j e c t i o n takes i n the sec­
t i o n o n the u n h a p p y c o n s c i o u s n e s s ? I n the first i n s t a n c e , i t i s a
f o r m of s t u b b o r n n e s s (eigensinnigkeit). It has a " m i n d of one's
o w n " or "self­will," but one w h i c h is nevertheless s t i l l a f o r m
Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 43
o f s e r v i t u d e . C o n s c i o u s n e s s c l i n g s o r attaches t o itself, a n d
t h i s c l i n g i n g to c o n s c i o u s n e s s is at the s a m e t i m e a d i s a v o w a l
o f the b o d y , w h i c h a p p e a r s t o s i g n i f y the t e r r o r o f d e a t h , "the
a b s o l u t e fear." T h e u n h a p p y c o n s c i o u s n e s s r e q u i r e s a n d e n ­
gages t h i s a t t a c h m e n t b y i n v o k i n g a n i m p e r a t i v e . Its fear i s
a l l a y e d b y l e g i s l a t i n g a n e t h i c a l n o r m . H e n c e , the i m p e r a t i v e
t o c l i n g t o o n e s e lf i s m o t i v a t e d b y t h i s a b s o l u t e fear a n d b y the
n e e d to refuse that fear. I n a s m u c h as it is an ethical i n j u n c t i o n ,
t h i s i m p e r a t i v e is the d i s a r t i c u l a t e d r e f u s a l of a b s o l u t e fear.
T h e s e c t i o n o n the u n h a p p y c o n s c i o u s n e s s e x p l a i n s the
genesis of the s p h e r e of the e t h i c a l as a defense a g a i n s t the
a b s o l u t e fear b y w h i c h i t i s m o t i v a t e d . T h e f a b r i c a t i o n o f n o r m s
o u t o f ( a n d against) fear, a n d the r e f l e x i v e i m p o s i t i o n o f those
n o r m s , subjects the u n h a p p y c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n a d o u b l e sense:
the subject i s s u b o r d i n a t e d t o n o r m s , a n d the n o r m s are s u b ­
j e c t i v a t i n g , that is, t h e y g i v e a n e t h i c a l s h a p e t o the r e f l e x i v i t y
o f t h i s e m e r g i n g subject. T h e s u b j e c t i o n that takes p l a c e u n d e r
the s i g n of the e t h i c a l is a f l i g h t f r o m fear, a n d so is c o n s t i t u t e d
as a k i n d of f l i g h t a n d d e n i a l , a f e a r f u l f l i g h t f r o m fear that
c o v e r s its fear first w i t h s t u b b o r n e s s a n d t h e n w i t h r e l i g i o u s
s e l f ­ r i g h t e o u s n e s s . T h e m o r e a b s o l u t e the e t h i c a l i m p e r a t i v e
b e c o m e s , the m o r e s t u b b o r n or eigensinnig the e n f o r c e m e n t of
its l a w , the m o r e the a b s o l u t e n e s s of the m o t i v a t i n g fear is at
o n c e a r t i c u l a t e d a n d r e f u s e d . A b s o l u t e fear i s t h u s d i s p l a c e d
b y the a b s o l u t e l a w w h i c h , p a r a d o x i c a l l y , r e c o n s t i t u t e d the
fear as a fear of the l a w .
A b s o l u t e fear w o u l d j e o p a r d i z e a l l d e t e r m i n a t e t h i n g s , i n ­
c l u d i n g the d e t e r m i n a t e t h i n g n e s s o f the b o n d s m a n . T h e f l i g h t
f r o m that fear, a fear of d e a t h , vacates the t h i n g l i k e c h a r a c t e r of
the subject. T h i s e n t a i l s v a c a t i n g the b o d y a n d c l i n g i n g t o w h a t
appears to be most disembodied: thought. H e g e l introduces
s t o i c i s m as a k i n d of d e f e n s i v e c l i n g i n g , o n e that separates
 r
44 Stubborn Attachment, Bodily Subjection
the a c t i v i t y o f t h i n k i n g f r o m a n y c o n t e n t. F o r H e g e l , s t o i c i s m
w i t h d r a w s i n t o a subjective a n d r a t i o n a l existenc e that has as
its h i g h e s t a i m the a b s o l u t e w i t h d r a w a l f r o m existenc e p e r se,
i n c l u d i n g its o w n . T h i s task t u r n s o u t t o b e s e l f ­ r e f u t i n g , o f
c o u r s e , i n s o f a r as e v e n s e l f ­ r e f u t a t i o n r e q u i r e s a p e r s i s t e n t self
t o enact the w i t h d r a w a l f r o m its o w n a n d o t h e r existences.
B e c a u s e the c o n c e p t u a l act of n e g a t i o n a l w a y s p r e s u p p o s e s a
p o s i t i o n f r o m w h i c h that n e g a t i o n takes p l a c e , s t o i c i s m e n d s
u p u n d e r s c o r i n g the v e r y p o s i t i v i t y o f the self that i t s o u g h t
t o deny. S k e p t i c i s m f o l l o w s u p o n s t o i c i s m f o r H e g e l b e c a u s e
s k e p t i c i s m b e g i n s b y p r e s u p p o s i n g the i n s u p e r a b i l i t y o f the
t h i n k i n g subject. F o r s k e p t i c i s m , the self is a p e r p e t u a l l y n e ­
g a t i n g a c t i v i t y , a c t i v e l y r e f u t i n g the e x i s t e n c e o f e v e r y t h i n g a s
its o w n c o n s t i t u t i v e a c t i v i t y .
S k e p t i c i s m negates the d o m a i n o f a l t e r i t y b y t r y i n g t o s h o w
that a n y g i v e n d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y t u r n s i n t o its
o p p o s i t e a n d , hence, i s n o t w h a t i t is. T h e s k e p t i c traces a n d
focuses o n t h is c o n s t a n t v a n i s h i n g o f d e t e r m i n a t e a p p e a r a n c e
w i t h o u t t a k i n g i n t o a c c o u n t the d i a l e c t i c a l l o g i c that o r c h e s ­
trates a n d u n i f i e s these v a r i o u s o p p o s i t i o n s . H e n c e , n o t h i n g
i s w h a t i t is, a n d there i s n o l o g i c a l o r e m p i r i c a l g r o u n d ac­
c e s s i b l e t o the s k e p t i c o n w h i c h the d o m a i n o f a l t e r i t y m i g h t
rationally be k n o w n . The skeptic's t h i n k i n g becomes a fran­
tic effort t o m a k e e v e r y g i v e n d e t e r m i n a t i o n d i s a p p e a r i n t o
s o m e o t h e r one, s o that t h is c o n s t a n t a p p e a r i n g a n d v a n i s h i n g
p r o c e e d s a c c o r d i n g t o n o o r d e r o r necessity. T h e s k e p t i c , l i k e
some n e w historicists a m o n g us, ends up p r o d u c i n g contra­
d i c t i o n for its o w n sake: s i g n i f i c a n t l y , H e g e l a r g u e s that t h is
p r o d u c t i o n o f c h a o s ( u n d e r s t o o d a s ceaseless c o n t r a d i c t i o n ) i s
pleasurable i n a s m u c h as the s k e p t i c is a l w a y s able to u n d e r ­
m i n e the p o s i t i o n o f h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l o p p o n e n t .
T h i s k i n d of pleasurable a n d incessant refutation is still a
Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 45
f o r m o f s t u b b o r n n e s s o r eigensinnigkeit: " i t i s i n fact l i k e the
s q u a b b l i n g o f s e l f ­ w i l l e d c h i l d r e n [eigensinniger Jungen] w h o b y
c o n t r a d i c t i n g t h e m s e l v e s b u y for t h e m s e l v e s the p l e a s u r e [die
Freude] of c o n t i n u a l l y c o n t r a d i c t i n g o n e a n o t h e r " (126/162).
The skeptic overrides his o w n contradictoriness in order to
t a k e p l e a s u r e i n f o r c i n g others t o w i t n e s s t h e i r c o n t r a d i c ­
t i o n s. B u t t h i s p l e a s u r e , a f o r m o f s a d i s m , i s s h o r t ­ l i v e d , f o r
the s t u b b o r n a n d p e r s i s t e n t c h a r a c t e r o f the s k e p t i c ' s efforts
w i l l d o u b t l e s s b e c h a l l e n g e d w h e n the s k e p t i c e n c o u n t e r s
a n o t h e r l i k e h i m s e l f . I f a n o t h e r s k e p t i c e x p o s e s the first s k e p ­
tic's c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , t h e n the first s k e p t i c i s f o r c e d t o t a k e ac­
count of his o w n contradictoriness. This u n d e r s t a n d i n g of his
o w n contradictoriness w i l l initiate for h i m a n e w m o d a l i t y
o f t h o u g h t . A t t h i s p o i n t , the s k e p t i c b e c o m e s s e l f ­ c o n s c i o u s
o f the c o n s t i t u t i v e c o n t r a d i c t i o n o f h i s o w n n e g a t i n g a c t i v i t y
a n d the u n h a p p y c o n s c i o u s n e s s e m e r g e s a s a n e x p l i c i t f o r m o f
ethical reflexivity.
I n a sense, the c h i l d i s h a n d s t u b b o r n p l e a s u r e that the s k e p ­
tic takes i n w a t c h i n g a n o t h e r f a l l t u r n s i n t o a p r o f o u n d u n ­
h a p p i n e s s w h e n he is, as it w e r e , f o r c e d to watch himself f a l l i n t o
e n d l e s s c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . H e r e the d i s t a n c e a f f o r d e d b y w a t c h ­
i n g seems e s s e n t i a l l y l i n k e d t o the s a d i s m o f the p l e a s u r e a n d
t o the p o s t u r e o f the s k e p t i c a s o n e w h o e x e m p t s h i m s e l f
t h r o u g h v i s u a l d i s t a n c e f r o m the scene that h e w i t n e s s e s . T h e
s a d i s t i c p l e a s u r e i n v o l v e d i n w a t c h i n g a n o t h e r b e c o m e s , i n the
m o d e of u n h a p p i n e s s , a d i s p l e a s u r a b l e w a t c h i n g of oneself. 5
W i t n e s s i n g i m p l i e s a m i m e t i c r e d u p l i c a t i o n o f the self, a n d its
" d i s p a s s i o n " i s b e l i e d b y the p a s s i o n o f m i m e t i c i s m . T h e self
w h o s h o r e d u p its i d e n t i t y b y e n c o u r a g i n g others t o f a l l i n t o
c o n t r a d i c t i o n s u d d e n l y sees itself as o n e of t h o se o t h e r s ; t h i s
v i e w i n g o f oneself a t a d i s t a n c e n o t o n l y i n i t i a t e s the u n h a p p y
c o n s c i o u s n e s s b u t a ls o i n v e r t s the s k e p t i c ' s p l e a s u r e i n t o p a i n .
46 Stubborn Attachment, Bodil y Subjection
T h e s a d i s m d i r e c t e d t o w a r d the othe r i s n o w t u r n e d b a c k o n
c o n s c i o u s n e s s itself ( p o s t p o n i n g for the m o m e n t w h e t h e r the
p l e a s u r e i n s a d i s m i s a l s o r e r o u t e d against c o n s c i o u s n e s s ) . A s
a d u a l s t r u c t u r e , the u n h a p p y c o n s c i o u s n e s s takes itself as its
o w n object o f s c o r n .
T h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l e l a b o r a t i o n o f t h i s s c o r n takes the f o l ­
l o w i n g f o r m : c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s n o w d i v i d e d i n t o t w o p a r t s , the
" e s s e n t i a l " a n d " u n c h a n g e a b l e , " o n the o n e h a n d , a n d the " i n ­
e s s e n t i a l " a n d "changeable," o n the other. T h e w a t c h i n g self,
d e f i n e d as a k i n d of witnessing a n d scorning, differentiates itself
f r o m the self w i t n e s s e d a s p e r p e t u a l l y f a l l i n g i n t o c o n t r a d i c ­
t i o n . T h i s w a t c h i n g b e c o m e s a w a y o f r e e s t a b l i s h i n g the v i s u a l
d i s t a n c e b e t w e e n a subject a l o o f f r o m the scene a n d the s u b ­
ject i n c o n t r a d i c t i o n . I n t h i s case, h o w e v e r , the w i t n e s s i n g a n d
s c o r n i n g self c a n n o t d e n y that the c o n t r a d i c t o r y self i s its o w n
self; it k n o w s that the c o n t r a d i c t o r y self is itself, b u t in o r d e r to
s h o r e u p a n i d e n t i t y o v e r a n d against i t, i t r e n d e r s t h i s c o n t r a ­
d i c t o r y self i n t o a n i n e s s e n t i a l p a r t o f itself. I t t h u s p a r t s w i t h
itself i n o r d e r t o p u r i f y itself o f c o n t r a d i c t i o n .
A s a r e s u l t , the u n h a p p y c o n s c i o u s n e s s berates itself c o n ­
stantly, s e t t i n g u p o n e p a r t o f itself a s a p u r e j u d g e a l o o f f r o m
c o n t r a d i c t i o n a n d d i s p a r a g i n g its c h a n g e a b l e p a r t a s i n e s s e n ­
t i a l , a l t h o u g h i n e l u c t a b l y t i e d t o it. S i g n i f i c a n t l y , the a c t i v i t y
that i n s k e p t i c i s m b e g i n s a s c h i l d i s h s a d i s m b e c o m e s refor ­
m u l a t e d a s e t h i c a l s e l f ­ j u d g m e n t i n the contex t o f the u n h a p p y
c o n s c i o u s n e s s : a s a d u l t t o c h i l d , t h e n , the u n c h a n g e a b l e c o n ­
s c i o u s n e s s "passes j u d g m e n t " o n the changeable. I m p l i c i t i n
t h i s d u a l s t r u c t u r i n g o f the subject, h o w e v e r , i s the r e l a t i o n b e ­
t w e e n t h o u g h t a n d c o r p o r e a l i t y , for the u n c h a n g e a b l e w i l l b e a
k i n d o f n o n c o n t r a d i c t o r y t h o u g h t , the p u r e t h o u g h t s o u g h t b y
the stoics, a n d the c o n t r a d i c t o r y d o m a i n w i l l b e that o f alter­
n a t i n g q u a l i t i e s , the c h a n g e a b l e d o m a i n o f a p p e a r a n c e , w h a t
Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 47
p e r t a i n s t o the subject's o w n p h e n o m e n a l b e i n g . T h e c h i l d w h o
" w a t c h e s " i s t r a n s f i g u r e d i n t o the j u d g e w h o "passes j u d g ­
m e n t , " a n d the aspect o f the self o n w h i c h i t passes j u d g m e n t
i s s t e e p e d i n the c h a n g e a b l e w o r l d o f b o d i l y s e n s a t i o n .
U n h a p p y c o n s c i o u s n e s s seeks t o o v e r c o m e t h i s d u a l i t y b y
f i n d i n g a b o d y w h i c h e m b o d i e s the p u r i t y o f its u n c h a n g e a b l e
part ; i t seeks t o c o m e i n t o r e l a t i o n w i t h "the U n c h a n g e a b l e i n
its i n c a r n a t e o r e m b o d i e d f o r m . " T o d o this, the subject s u b ­
o r d i n a t e s its o w n b o d y i n the s e r v i c e o f the t h o u g h t o f the
u n c h a n g e a b l e ; t h i s s u b o r d i n a t i n g a n d p u r i f y i n g effort i s that
of devotion (Andacht). Yet, p r e d i c t a b l y , t h i s effort to d e p l o y
the b o d y i n the s e r v i c e o f t h i n k i n g the u n c h a n g e a b l e p r o v e s
i m p o s s i b l e . D e v o t i o n t u r n s o u t t o b e p u r e self­feeling, w h a t
H e g e l d i s p a r a g i n g l y refers t o a s "the c h a o t i c j i n g l i n g o f b e l l s ,
o r a m i s t o f w a r m i n c e n s e , a m u s i c a l t h i n k i n g " (131/168). A s
self­feeling, i t i s the f e e l i n g o f the b o d y c o m p e l l e d t o s i g n i f y
the t r a n s c e n d e n t a n d u n c h a n g e a b l e , a f e e l i n g w h i c h n e v e r ­
theless r e m a i n s e n s c o n c e d i n the b o d i l y f e e l i n g that i t seeks
t o t r a n s c e n d . I n d e e d , self­feeling refers o n l y a n d e n d l e s s l y t o
itself (a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i z e d f o r m of eigensinnigkeit), a n d so is
u n a b l e t o f u r n i s h k n o w l e d g e o f a n y t h i n g o t h e r t h a n itself.
D e v o t i o n , t h e n , w h i c h seeks t o i n s t r u m e n t a l i z e the b o d y i n
the s e r v i c e o f the u n c h a n g e a b l e , t u r n s o u t t o b e a n i m m e r s i o n
i n the b o d y that p r e c l u d e s access t o a n y t h i n g else, i n d e e d , a n
i m m e r s i o n that takes the b o d y t o b e the u n c h a n g e a b l e a n d s o
falls i n t o c o n t r a d i c t i o n .
A l t h o u g h devotion appears to be a f o r m of self­immersion,
it is a l s o a c o n t i n u a t i o n of s e l f ­ b e r a t e m e n t as s e l f ­ m o r t i f i c a t i o n .
T h i s self­feeling, p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e i t d o e s n o t r e a c h the u n ­
c h a n g e a b l e , b e c o m e s itself the object o f d e r i s i o n a n d j u d g m e n t ,
m a r k i n g the c o n t i n u i n g i n a d e q u a c y o f the self i n r e l a t i o n t o
its t r a n s c e n d e n t m e a s u r e . T h e t r a n s c e n d e n t i s w h a t i s a l w a y s
48 Stubborn Attachment, B o d i l y Subjection
m i s s e d , a n d so h a u n t s t h i s c o n s c i o u s n e s s as a figure of w h a t
i s p e r m a n e n t l y i n a c c e s s i b l e , f o r e v e r lost. I n the m o d e o f d e v o ­
t i o n , then, "consciousness . . . can o n l y find as a present reality
the g r a v e of its l i f e " (132/169­70). In a t r a n s p o s i t i o n of fig­
ures, the b o d y s u r v i v e s , a n d a l l that i s left o f the t r a n s c e n d e n t
i d e a l is a "grave." W h e r e a s d e v o t i o n , t h e n , b e g i n s as an effort
to s u b o r d i n a t e the b o d y to a t r a n s c e n d e n t object, it e n d s by
t a k i n g the b o d y , that is, self­feeling, as its object of w o r s h i p ,
a n d l e t t i n g the u n c h a n g e a b l e s p i r i t die.
H e r e w e m i g h t c o n c l u d e that a c e r t a i n f o r m o f s e l f ­ p r e o c c u ­
p a t i o n , u n d e r s t o o d as a r e f o r m u l a t i o n of an i n s u r m o u n t a b l e
eigensinnigkeit, c o n s t i t u t e s a n a r c i s s i s m of the subject that d e ­
feats the s e l f ­ s a c r i f i c i a l project o f d e v o t i o n . T h e subject w h o
w o u l d s u b o r d i n a t e its b o d y t o a n i d e a l , c o m p e l its b o d y t o
e m b o d y a n i d e a l , f i n d s itself m o r e f u l l y a u t o n o m o u s f r o m that
i d e a l , o u t l i v i n g i t altogether. T h e c o l l a p s e o f d e v o t i o n i n t o n a r ­
c i s s i s m , i f w e c a n c a l l i t that, s i g n i f i e s that there c a n b e n o f i n a l
l e a v e ­ t a k i n g o f the b o d y w i t h i n life. F o r c e d , t h e n , t o a c c e p t
t h i s i n e l u c t a b i l i t y of the b o d y as a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n , a n e w f o r m
o f the subject e m e r g e s , w h i c h i s d i s t i n c t l y K a n t i a n . I f there i s
a w o r l d o f a p p e a r a n c e for w h i c h the b o d y i s e s s e n t i a l , t h e n
s u r e l y there i s a w o r l d o f n o u m e n a i n w h i c h the b o d y has n o
p l a c e ; the w o r l d d i v i d e s u p i n t o b e i n g s that are for­itsel f a n d
in­itself.
I n a f o r m u l a t i o n that w i l l p r e f i g u r e K i e r k e g a a r d ' s Philo­
sophical Fragments, H e g e l c l a i m s that the u n c h a n g e a b l e w o r l d
s u r r e n d e r s o r r e n o u n c e s a n e m b o d i e d f o r m , that it, the i n ­
itself, d e l i v e r s a n e m b o d i e d v e r s i o n o f itself i n t o the c h a n g e ­
able w o r l d t o b e s a c r i f i c e d . T h i s reference t o the f i g u r e o f
C h r i s t suggests that the u n c h a n g e a b l e w o r l d b e c o m e s e m ­
b o d i e d , b u t does s o o n l y t o b e s a c r i f i c e d o r r e t u r n e d t o the
u n c h a n g e a b l e w o r l d f r o m w h i c h i t c a m e . A s a m o d e l for the
Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 49
s a c r e d life, C h r i s t i s u n d e r s t o o d a s a n e m b o d i m e n t w h i c h i s
c o n t i n u a l l y i n the m o d e o f g i v i n g t h a n k s . I n its d e s i r e a n d i n
its w o r k , t h i s e m b o d i e d c o n s c i o u s n e s s seeks t o g i v e t h a n k s for
its o w n life, c a p a c i t i e s, f a c u l t i e s, a b i l i t i e s . T h e s e are g i v e n t o
it; its life is e x p e r i e n c e d as a gift; a n d it l i v e s o u t its life in the
m o d e o f gratefulness. A l l o f its acts i t o w e s t o a n o t h e r ; its life
b e c o m e s u n d e r s t o o d a s a k i n d o f e n d l e s s debt.
P r e c i s e l y because , o n the o n e h a n d , t h i s l i v i n g b e i n g o w e s
its life t o a n o t h e r b e i n g , i t i s n o t the seat o r o r i g i n o f its o w n a c ­
t i o n s. Its a c t i o n i s r e f e r r e d t o a n o t h e r ' s a c t i o n ; thus , n o t b e i n g
the g r o u n d o f its o w n a c t i o n , i t i s n o t r e s p o n s i b l e for w h a t i t
does. O n the o t h e r h a n d , its o w n a c t i o n s are t o b e c o n s t r u e d
as a p e r p e t u a l self­sacrifice by w h i c h the self proves or d e m o n ­
strates its o w n t h a n k f u l n e s s . T h i s d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f t h a n k f u l ­
ness t h u s b e c o m e s a k i n d o f s e l f ­ a g g r a n d i z e m e n t , w h a t H e g e l
w i l l c a l l "the e x t r e m e o f i n d i v i d u a l i t y " (134/171).
T h e r e n u n c i a t i o n o f the self a s the o r i g i n o f its o w n a c ­
tions must be p e r f o r m e d repeatedly a n d can never finally be
a c h i e v e d , if o n l y b e c a u s e the demonstration of r e n u n c i a t i o n is
itself a s e l f ­ w i l l e d a c t i o n . T h i s s e l f ­ w i l l e d a c t i o n t h u s r h e t o r i ­
cally confounds precisely what it is s u p p o s e d to show. The
self b e c o m e s a n i n c e s s a nt p e r f o r m e r o f r e n u n c i a t i o n , w h e r e b y
the p e r f o r m a n c e , a s a n a c t i o n , c o n t r a d i c t s the p o s t u l a t i o n o f
/«action that it is m e a n t to s i g n i f y . P a r a d o x i c a l l y , p e r f o r m a n c e
b e c o m e s the occasion f o r a g r a n d a n d e n d l e s s a c t i o n that effec­
t i v e l y a u g m e n t s a n d i n d i v i d u a t e s the self i t seeks t o deny.
T h i s c o n s c i o u s n e s s , l i k e the stoic, seeks t o k n o w a n d s h o w
itself as a " n o t h i n g , " yet i n e v i t a b l y b e c o m e s a doing of n o t h ­
i n g . H e r e the p l e a s u r e w h i c h e a r l i e r a p p e a r e d t o b e l o n g t o
the c h i l d i s h s a d i s m o f the s k e p t i c i s t u r n e d o n the self: t h i s
"doing of n o t h i n g , " H e g e l argues, finds in "its enjoyment a
feeling of wretchedness." T h i s i n t e r m i n g l i n g of pleasure a n d
50 Stubborn Attachment, Bodil y Subjection
p a i n r e s u l t s f r o m a r e n u n c i a t i o n o f the self w h i c h c a n n e v e r
q u i t e a c c o m p l i s h that r e n u n c i a t i o n , w h i c h , a s a n i n c e s s a nt ac­
c o m p l i s h i n g , c a r r i e s w i t h i t the p l e a s u r a b l e a s s e r t i o n o f self.
T h e s e l f ­ a b s o r p t i o n o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s d o e s n o t translate i n t o
s e l f ­ c o n g r a t u l a t i o n o r s i m p l e n a r c i s s i s m . Rather, i t a p p e a r s a s
negative narcissism, an engaged preoccupation w i t h what is
m o s t d e b a s e d a n d d e f i l e d a b o u t it.
H e r e a g a i n the self to be r e n o u n c e d is f i g u r e d as a b o d i l y
self, a s " t h i s a c t u a l i n d i v i d u a l i n the a n i m a l f u n c t i o n s . " H e g e l
a p p e a r s t o i m p l y d e f e c a t i o n a s a n object o f s e l f ­ p r e o c c u p a t i o n :
"these [ a n i m a l f u n c t i o n s ] are n o l o n g e r p e r f o r m e d n a t u r a l l y
a n d w i t h o u t embarrassment, as matters trifling in themselves
w h i c h c a n n o t possess a n y i m p o r t a n c e o r e s s e n t i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e
for S p i r i t ; i n s t e a d , i t i s i n t h e m that the e n e m y r e v e a l s h i m ­
self i n h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s h a p e , t h e y are r a t h e r the object o f
s e r i o u s e n d e a v o r , a n d b e c o m e p r e c i s e l y m a t t e r s o f the u t ­
most importance. Thi s enemy, however, renews himself in his
defeat, a n d c o n s c i o u s n e s s , i n f i x i n g its a t t e n t i o n o n h i m , far
f r o m f r e e i n g itself f r o m h i m , r e a l l y r e m a i n s f o r e v e r i n contact
w i t h h i m , a n d f o r e v e r sees itself a s d e f i l e d " (135­36/174). T h i s
"enemy," as it w e r e , is d e s c r i b e d as "the m e r e s t p a r t i c u l a r of
the m e a n e s t character," o n e w h i c h serves, u n f o r t u n a t e l y , a s a n
object o f i d e n t i f i c a t i o n for t h i s " f a l l e n " c o n s c i o u s n e s s . H e r e ,
c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n its f u l l a b j e c t i o n has b e c o m e l i k e shit, lost i n
a s e l f ­ r e f e r e n t i al a n a l i t y , a c i r c l e of its o w n m a k i n g . In H e g e l ' s
w o r d s , " w e h a v e here o n l y a p e r s o n a l i t y c o n f i n e d t o its o w n
self a n d its p e t t y a c t i o n s , a p e r s o n a l i t y b r o o d i n g o v e r itself, as
w r e t c h e d as it is i m p o v e r i s h e d " (136/174).
R e g a r d i n g itself as a n o t h i n g , as a d o i n g of n o t h i n g , as an
e x c r e m e n t a l f u n c t i o n , a n d h e n c e r e g a r d i n g itself a s e x c r e m e n t ,
t h i s c o n s c i o u s n e s s effectivel y r e d u c e s itself to the c h a n g e a b l e
features o f its b o d i l y f u n c t i o n s a n d p r o d u c t s . Yet, s i n c e i t i s
Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 5i
an e x p e r i e n c e of w r e t c h e d n e s s , there is s o m e c o n s c i o u s n e s s
w h i c h takes s t o c k o f these f u n c t i o n s a n d w h i c h i s n o t t h o r ­
o u g h l y i d e n t i f i e d w i t h t h e m . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , i t i s h e r e, i n the
effort t o differentiate itself f r o m its e x c r e t o r y f u n c t i o n s , i n ­
d e e d , f r o m its e x c r e t o r y i d e n t i t y , that c o n s c i o u s n e s s r e l i e s o n
a " m e d i a t o r , " w h a t H e g e l w i l l c a l l "the p r i e s t . " I n o r d e r t o r e ­
c o n n e c t w i t h the p u r e a n d the u n c h a n g e a b l e , t h i s b o d i l y c o n ­
s c i o u s n e s s offers u p its e v e r y " d o i n g " t o a p r i e s t o r m i n i s t e r .
T h i s m e d i a t i n g a g e n c y r e l i e v e s the abject c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f its
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for its o w n actions . T h r o u g h the i n s t i t u t i o n o f
c o u n s e l a n d a d v i c e , the p r i e s t offers the r e a s o n for the abject
c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' s a c t i o n s . E v e r y t h i n g that the abject c o n s c i o u s ­
ness offers, that is, a l l o f its e x t e r n a l i z a t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g d e s i r e ,
w o r k , a n d e x c r e m e n t , are to be c o n s t r u e d as offerings, as p a y ­
i n g p e n a n c e . T h e p r i e s t i n s t i t u t e s b o d i l y s e l f ­ a b n e g a t i o n a s the
p r i c e o f h o l i n e s s , e l e v a t i n g the r e n u n c i a t o r y g e s t u r e o f e x c r e ­
t i o n t o a r e l i g i o u s p r a c t i c e w h e r e b y the e n t i r e b o d y i s r i t u ­
a l i s t i c a l l y p u r g e d . T h e s a n c t i f i c a t i o n o f a b j e c t i o n takes p l a c e
t h r o u g h r i t u a l s of f a s t i n g a n d m o r t i f i c a t i o n [fasten uni kas­
teien]" (137/175). B e c a u s e the b o d y c a n n o t be f u l l y d e n i e d , as
the stoic t h o u g h t , i t m u s t b e r i t u a l i s t i c a l l y r e n o u n c e d .
I n its fastings a n d m o r t i f i c a t i o n s , the u n h a p p y c o n s c i o u s ­
ness d e n i e s itself the p l e a s u r e s o f c o n s u m p t i o n , f i g u r i n g p e r ­
h a p s that i t w i l l f o r e s t a l l the i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f the e x c r e m e n t a l
m o m e n t . A s s e l f ­ i n f l i c t e d b o d i l y acts, f a s t i n g a n d m o r t i f i c a t i o n
are r e f l e x i v e a c t i o n s , t u r n i n g s o f the b o d y against itself. A t the
l i m i t s o f t h i s s e l f ­ m o r t i f i c a t i o n a n d self­sacrifice, the abjected
c o n s c i o u s n e s s a p p e a r s t o g r o u n d its a c t i o n i n the c o u n s e l o f
the p r i e s t , a n d yet t h i s g r o u n d i n g m e r e l y c o n c e a l s the r e f l e x i v e
o r i g i n s o f its s e l f ­ p u n i s h m e n t .
A t t h i s j u n c t u r e H e g e l d e p a r t s f r o m w h a t has b e e n the pat­
t e r n o f e x p l a n a t i o n , i n w h i c h a self­negating p o s t u r e i s u n d e r ­
52 Stubborn Attachment, Bodil y Subjection
s c o r e d as a posture, a p h e n o m e n a l i z a t i o n that refutes the n e g a ­
t i o n i t seeks t o i n s t i t u t e . I n the p l a c e o f s u c h a n e x p l a n a t i o n ,
H e g e l asserts that the w i l l o f a n o t h e r operates t h r o u g h the self­
s a c r i f i c i a l a c t i o n s of the p e n i t e n t . In effect, self­sacrifice is n o t
r e f u t e d t h r o u g h the c l a i m that self­sacrifice i s itself a w i l l f u l
a c t i v i t y ; rather, H e g e l asserts that i n self­sacrifice one enacts
a n o t h e r ' s w i l l . O n e m i g h t e x p e c t that the p e n i t e n t w o u l d b e
s h o w n to be reveling in himself, self­aggrandizing, narcissis­
t i c , that h i s s e l f ­ p u n i s h m e n t s w o u l d c u l m i n a t e i n a p l e a s u r a b l e
a s s e r t i o n o f self. B u t H e g e l e s c h e w s t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n a n d t h u s
b r e a k s w i t h the p a t t e r n o f e x p l a n a t i o n i n the c h a p t e r i n f a v o r
of a religious solution in Spirit.
I n d e e d , at t h i s j u n c t u r e o n e m i g h t w e l l i m a g i n e a set of
c l o s i n g t r a n s i t i o n s f o r " T h e U n h a p p y C o n s c i o u s n e s s " differ­
ent f r o m the ones H e g e l s u p p l i e s , a set that is, n e v e r t h e l e s s ,
perhaps more p r o p e r l y H e g e l i a n than H e g e l himself. The peni­
tent d i s c l a i m s h i s act a s h i s o w n , a v o w i n g that a n o t h e r ' s w i l l ,
the p r i e s t ' s , operates t h r o u g h h i s self­sacrifice, a n d , further,
that the p r i e s t ' s w i l l i s d e t e r m i n e d b y G o d ' s . I n s t a l l e d t h u s
i n a great c h a i n of w i l l s , the abject c o n s c i o u s n e s s enters i n t o
a c o m m u n i t y o f w i l l s . A l t h o u g h its w i l l i s d e t e r m i n a t e , i t i s
n e v e r t h e l e s s b o u n d t o the p r i e s t ' s ; i n this u n i t y , the n o t i o n o f
S p i r i t i s first d i s c e r n e d . T h e m e d i a t o r o r p r i e s t c o u n s e l s the
p e n i t e n t that h i s p a i n w i l l b e r e p a i d w i t h e v e r l a s t i n g a b u n ­
d a n c e , that h i s m i s e r y w i l l b e r e w a r d e d w i t h e v e r l a s t i n g h a p ­
piness; misery a n d p a i n i m p l y a future transformation into
t h e i r o p p o s i t e s . I n t h i s sense, the m i n i s t e r r e f o r m u l a t e s the
d i a l e c t i c a l r e v e r s a l a n d establishes the i n v e r s i o n o f v a l u e s a s
a n a b s o l u t e p r i n c i p l e . W h e r e a s i n a l l o f the e a r l i e r e x a m p l e s
o f s e l f ­ n e g a t i o n p l e a s u r e w a s u n d e r s t o o d t o inhere i n p a i n
(the p l e a s u r a b l e a g g r a n d i z e m e n t o f the stoic, the p l e a s u r a b l e
s a d i s m o f the s k e p t i c ) , p l e a s u r e i s h e r e t e m p o r a l l y r e m o v e d
Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 53
f r o m p a i n , f i g u r e d a s its f u t u r e c o m p e n s a t i o n . F o r H e g e l , t h i s
e s c h a t o l o g i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f the p a i n o f t h i s w o r l d i n t o
the p l e a s u r e of the n e x t establishes the t r a n s i t i o n f r o m self­
consciousness to reason. A n d self­consciousness's recognition
of itself as p a r t of a r e l i g i o u s c o m m u n i t y of w i l l s effects the
transition f r o m self­consciousness to Spirit.
B u t w h a t are w e t o m a k e o f t h i s f i n a l t r a n s i t i o n , c o n s i d e r i n g
the i m m a n e n t r e l a t i o n o f p l e a s u r e a n d p a i n i n the t r a n s i t i o n s
that p r e c e d e it? B e f o r e the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f the " m e d i a t o r " a n d
the " p r i e s t , " the c h a p t e r o n the u n h a p p y c o n s c i o u s n e s s a p ­
p e a r s to p r o c e e d as if it c o n t a i n e d a t r e n c h a n t c r i t i q u e of e t h i ­
c a l i m p e r a t i v e s a n d r e l i g i o u s ideals , a c r i t i q u e w h i c h p r e f i g ­
u r e s the N i e t z s c h e a n a n a l y s i s that e m e r g e s s o m e s i x t y y e a r s
later. E v e r y effort t o r e d u c e itself t o i n a c t i o n o r t o n o t h i n g ,
t o s u b o r d i n a t e o r m o r t i f y its o w n b o d y , c u l m i n a t e s i n a d v e r ­
t e n t l y in the production of s e l f ­ c o n s c i o u s n e s s as a p l e a s u r e ­
s e e k i n g a n d s e l f ­ a g g r a n d i z i n g agent. E v e r y effort t o o v e r c o m e
the b o d y , p l e a s u r e , a n d a g e n c y p r o v e s t o b e n o t h i n g o t h e r
t h a n the a s s e r t i o n of p r e c i s e l y those features of the subject.
Post­Hegelian Subjections
The Nietzschean critique of ethical norms, prefigured in
"The U n h a p p y Consciousness" and articulated in Nietzsche's
On the Genealogy of Morals a n d Daybreak, has r e c e i v e d m o r e
recent r e f o r m u l a t i o n in F o u c a u l t ' s Discipline and Punish. B o t h
H e g e l ' s p o s i t i o n a n d those i n s p i r e d b y N i e t z s c h e m i g h t a l s o
b e u s e f u l l y c o m p a r e d w i t h F r e u d ' s c r i t i q u e o f the genesis
of m o r a l i m p e r a t i v e s in Civilization and Its Discontents. R e c a l l
that for H e g e l e t h i c a l i m p e r a t i v e s first e m e r g e i n a d e f e n s i v e
r e s p o n s e t o a b s o l u t e fear, a n d t h e i r e m e r g e n c e m u s t b e c o n ­
s t r u e d as a p e r m u t a t i o n a n d r e f u s a l of that fear. T h i s a b s o l u t e
 Stubborn Attachment, B o d i l y Subjection
54
fear w a s the fear of d e a t h , h e n c e a fear c o n d i t i o n e d by the
finite c h a r a c t e r o f the b o d y . T h e e t h i c a l r e f u s a l a n d s u b o r d i ­
n a t i o n o f the b o d y m i g h t t h e n b e u n d e r s t o o d a s a m a g i c a l
effort t o p r e e m p t that e x i s t e n t i a l n e g a t i o n . M o r e o v e r , the i d e a l
o f r a d i c a l self­sufficienc y i s j e o p a r d i z e d b y the b o d y ' s p e r m e ­
a b i l i t y a n d d e p e n d e n c y . I n t h i s sense, e x c r e t i o n i s n o t the o n l y
" a n i m a l f u n c t i o n " that w o u l d s i g n i f y " d e f i l e m e n t " f o r t h i s s u b ­
ject. T h e r e p e a t e d efforts t o sacrifice the b o d y w h i c h b e c o m e
r e p e a t e d a s s e r t i o n s o f the b o d y are a l so efforts t o d e f e n d i t
a g a i n s t e v e r y t h i n g that " j e o p a r d i z e s " it, w h e r e t o b e i n " j e o p ­
a r d y " d e n o t e s a d a n g e r s l i g h t l y less d i r e t h a n d e a t h , a k i n d
o f p e n e t r a t i v e p a r o x y s m that i m p l i e s b e i n g m o v e d o r s h a k e n
s e x u a l l y " t h r o u g h a n d t h r o u g h " (durch und durch angesteckt).
O n e c o u l d t h e n see i n the v a r i o u s f o r m s o f self­beratemen t a n d
self­mortification typologized in "The U n h a p p y Conscious­
n e s s " a p r é f i g u r a t i o n of n e u r o s i s a n d p e r h a p s a l s o a s p e c i f i c
modality of homosexual panic. 6
W e m i g h t t h e n r e r e a d the m o b i l i z i n g fear that i s b o t h r e ­
f u s e d a n d r e r o u t e d b y the e t h i c a l i m p e r a t i v e i n t e r m s o f the
f e a r e d " e x p r o p r i a b i l i t y " o f the b o d y . I f the b o n d s m a n ' s l a b o r ­
i n g a c t i v i t y c o u l d b e e x p r o p r i a t e d b y the l o r d a n d the essence
o f the b o n d s m a n ' s b o d y b e h e l d i n o w n e r s h i p b y that l o r d ,
t h e n the b o d y c o n s t i t u t e s a site of c o n t e s t e d o w n e r s h i p , o n e
w h i c h t h r o u g h d o m i n a t i o n o r the threat o f d e a t h c a n a l w a y s
b e o w n e d b y another. T h e b o d y a p p e a r s t o b e n o t h i n g othe r
t h a n a threat to the project of safety a n d self­sufficienc y that
g o v e r n s the Phenomenology's trajectory. T h e anal preoccupa­
t i o n that d i r e c t l y p r e c e d e s the a s c e n d a n c e i n t o a r e l i g i o u s c o n ­
c e p t o f a n afterlife suggests that b o d i l y p e r m e a b i l i t y c a n o n l y
b e r e s o l v e d b y escape i n t o a n afterlife i n w h i c h n o b o d i e s exist
a t a l l . T h i s a f f i r m a t i o n o f the a b s o l u t e n e g a t i o n o f the b o d y
c o n t r a d i c t s a l l the e a r l i e r efforts t o s u b o r d i n a t e o r m a s t e r the
Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 55
b o d y within life, efforts w h i c h c u l m i n a t e d i n the a s s e r t i o n o f
the i n e l u c t a b i l i t y o f the b o d y . W h e r e a s o t h e r r e l i g i o u s n o t i o n s
t u r n e d o u t t o b e s u r r e p t i t i o u s w a y s o f r e a s s e r t i n g the b o d y ,
t h i s o n e a p p e a r s e x e m p t f r o m the d i a l e c t i c a l r e v e r s a l that i t
resolves.
P s y c h o a n a l y s i s t h e o r i z e s the f a i l u r e t o m a i n t a i n the subjec­
t i o n o f the b o d y a l o n g l i n e s p a r a l l e l t o these e a r l i e r d i a l e c t i c a l
reversals . T h e r e p r e s s i o n o f the l i b i d o i s a l w a y s u n d e r s t o o d
as itself a l i b i d i n a l l y i n v e s t e d r e p r e s s i o n . H e n c e , the l i b i d o is
not absolutely negated t h r o u g h repression, but rather becomes
the i n s t r u m e n t o f its o w n s u b j e c t i o n . T h e r e p r e s s i v e l a w i s
n o t e x t e r n a l t o the l i b i d o that i t represses, b u t the r e p r e s s i v e
l a w represses to the extent that r e p r e s s i o n b e c o m e s a l i b i d i ­
n a l a c t i v i t y . F u r t h e r , m o r a l i n t e r d i c t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y t h o s e that
7
are t u r n e d a g a i n s t the b o d y , are t h e m s e l v e s s u s t a i n e d b y the
b o d i l y a c t i v i t y that t h e y seek t o c u r b :
An idea . . . w h i c h belongs entirely to psychoanalysis and w h i c h
is foreign to people's ordinary way of thinking . . . it tells us that
conscience (or more correctly, the anxiety w h i c h later becomes con­
science) is indeed the cause of instinctual renunciation to begin w i t h ,
but that later that relationship is reversed. Every renunciation of i n ­
stinct n ow becomes a dynamic source of conscience and every fresh
renunciation increases the latter's severity and intolerance. 8
A c c o r d i n g t o F r e u d , t h e n , the s e l f ­ i m p o s e d i m p e r a t i v e s o f c o n ­
s c i e n c e are p u r s u e d a n d a p p l i e d p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e t h e y are
n o w the site o f the v e r y s a t i s f a c t i o n that t h e y seek t o p r o ­
h i b i t . I n o t h e r w o r d s , p r o h i b i t i o n b e c o m e s the d i s p l a c e d site
o f s a t i s f a c t i o n f o r the " i n s t i n c t " o r d e s i r e that i s p r o h i b i t e d ,
a n o c c a s i o n f o r r e l i v i n g the i n s t i n c t u n d e r the r u b r i c o f the
c o n d e m n i n g law. T h i s is, o f c o u r s e , the s o u r c e o f the f o r m o f
c o m e d y i n w h i c h the b e a r e r o f the m o r a l l a w t u r n s o u t t o
56 Stubborn Attachment, Bodil y Subjection
b e the m o s t s e r i o u s t r a n s g r e s s o r o f its p r e c e p t s ( H a w t h o r n e ' s
D i m s d a l e , T o m Stoppard's m o r a l philosopher). Because this
d i s p l a c e d s a t i s f a c t i o n i s e x p e r i e n c e d t h r o u g h the a p p l i c a t i o n
o f the l a w , that a p p l i c a t i o n i s r e i n v i g o r a t e d a n d i n t e n s i f i e d
w i t h the e m e r g e n c e o f e v e r y p r o h i b i t e d desire. T h e p r o h i b i t i o n
d o e s n o t seek t o o b l i t e r a t e p r o h i b i t e d d e s i r e ; o n the c o n t r a r y ,
p r o h i b i t i o n seeks t o r e p r o d u c e p r o h i b i t e d d e s i r e a n d b e c o m e s
i n t e n s i f i e d t h r o u g h the r e n u n c i a t i o n s i t effects. T h e "afterlife"
o f p r o h i b i t e d d e s i r e i s i n the p r o h i b i t i o n itself, w h e r e the p r o ­
h i b i t i o n n o t o n l y s u s t a i n s , b u t is sustained by, the d e s i r e that it
forces the subject to r e n o u n c e . In t h i s sense, t h e n , r e n u n c i a t i o n
takes p l a c e through the v e r y d e s i r e that is r e n o u n c e d , w h i c h is
to say, the d e s i r e is never r e n o u n c e d , b u t b e c o m e s p r e s e r v e d
a n d r e a s s e r t e d i n the v e r y s t r u c t u r e o f r e n u n c i a t i o n .
Nietzsche makes a similar argument, deploying a dialecti­
c a l s t r u c t u r e n o t u n l i k e H e g e l ' s , i n h i s c r i t i q u e o f the ascetic
i d e a l in On the Genealogy of Morals. T h e i n e l u c t a b i l i t y of the
b o d y i n " T h e U n h a p p y C o n s c i o u s n e s s " p a r a l l e l s the i n e l u c t ­
a b i l i t y o f " i n s t i n c t " i n F r e u d a n d that o f the w i l l i n N i e t z s c h e .
F o r N i e t z s c h e , the ascetic i d e a l , u n d e r s t o o d a s a w i l l t o n o t h ­
ingness, is a w a y of interpreting a l l suffering as guilt. A l t h o u g h
g u i l t w o r k s t o d e n y a specific k i n d o f object for h u m a n w a n t s ,
i t c a n n o t o b l i t e r a t e the w a n t i n g c h a r a c t e r o f h u m a n s . A c c o r d ­
i n g t o the dictates o f g u i l t , t h e n , " m a n h a d o n l y t o want s o m e ­
t h i n g — a n d to b e g i n w i t h , it mattered not what, whereto, or
h o w he w a n t e d : the will itself was saved." T h e ascetic i d e a l , v e r y
m u c h like Hegel's u n h a p p y consciousness, is to be under­
s t o o d , t h e n , as:
that hatred against everything human, even more, against everything
animal, everything material, this disgust w i t h the senses, w i t h rea­
son itself, this fear of happiness and beauty, this desire to get away
from all semblance, change, becoming, death, wish, desire itself—the
Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 57
meaning of all this is a w i l l to nothingness, a w i l l running counter
to life, a revolt against the most fundamental presuppositions of life;
yet it is and remains a w i l l ! . . . rather than want nothing, man even
wants nothingness! 9
I d o n o t m e a n t o suggest that F r e u d ' s h i g h l y p r o b l e m a t i c
n o t i o n of instinct, Hegel's inchoate body, a n d Nietzsche's w i l l
are s t r i c t l y e q u i v a l e n t . Yet I do w a n t to suggest that these three
thinkers circumscribe a k i n d of dialectical reversal w h i c h cen­
ters o n the i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f a f u l l o r f i n a l r e f l e x i v e s u p p r e s s i o n
o f w h a t w e m i g h t l o o s e l y c a l l "the b o d y " w i t h i n the c o n f i n e s
o f life. I f the s u p p r e s s i o n o f the b o d y i s itself a n i n s t r u m e n t a l
m o v e m e n t o f a n d b y the b o d y , t h e n the b o d y i s i n a d v e r t e n t l y
p r e s e r v e d i n a n d b y the i n s t r u m e n t o f its s u p p r e s s i o n . T h e self­
d e f e a t i n g effort o f s u c h s u p p r e s s i o n , h o w e v e r , n o t o n l y l e a d s
t o its o p p o s i t e — a s e l f ­ c o n g r a t u l a t o r y o r s e l f ­ a g g r a n d i z i n g as­
s e r t i o n o f d e s i r e , w i l l , the b o d y — i n m o r e c o n t e m p o r a r y for­
m u l a t i o n s i t l e a d s t o the e l a b o r a t i o n o f a n i n s t i t u t i o n o f the
subject w h i c h exceeds the d i a l e c t i c a l f r a m e b y w h i c h i t i s
spawned.
I n H e g e l , the s u p p r e s s i o n o f b o d i l y life i s s h o w n t o r e ­
q u i r e the v e r y b o d y that i t seeks t o s u p p r e s s ; i n t h i s sense,
the b o d y i s p r e s e r v e d i n a n d b y the v e r y act o f s u p p r e s s i o n .
F r e u d u n d e r s t o o d this differently in his analysis of neurosis
as a k i n d o f l i b i d i n a l a t t a c h m e n t t o a p r o h i b i t i o n w h i c h n e v e r ­
theless t h w a r t s l i b i d i n a l g r a t i f i c a t i o n . W h e r e that t h w a r t i n g
c o n s t i t u t e s a r e p r e s s i o n , the s p l i t t i n g off of i d e a t i o n f r o m af­
fect, n e u r o s i s o r s y m p t o m f o r m a t i o n f o l l o w s . O n e m i g h t r e a d
H e g e l ' s references to eigensinnigkeit or s t u b b o r n n e s s as i l l u s ­
t r a t i n g the p r o c e s s o f s p l i t t i n g a n d defense i n the f o r m a t i o n
o f n e u r o s i s . T h a t H e g e l refers t o t h i s " u n h a p p i n e s s " a s a k i n d
o f s t u b b o r n a t t a c h m e n t suggests that, a s i n n e u r o s i s , the e t h i ­
c a l r e g u l a t i o n o f b o d i l y i m p u l s e b e c o m e s the f o c u s a n d a i m
5» Stubborn Attachment, B o d i l y Subjection
o f i m p u l s e itself. I n b o t h cases, w e are g i v e n t o u n d e r s t a n d a n
a t t a c h m e n t t o s u b j e c t i o n w h i c h i s f o r m a t i v e o f the r e f l e x i v e
s t r u c t u r e o f s u b j e c t i o n itself. T h e i m p u l s e o r b o d i l y e x p e r i e n c e
w h i c h w o u l d be negated, to return to H e g e l , is inadvertently
preserved b y the v e r y a c t i v i t y o f n e g a t i o n .
W e c a n see i n b o t h H e g e l a n d F r e u d a c e r t a i n r e l i a n c e o n a
dialectical reversal by w h i c h a b o d i l y experience, b r o a d l y con­
s t r u e d , c o m e s u n d e r the c e n s o r o f the l a w o n l y t o r e e m e r g e a s
the s u s t a i n i n g affect of that law. T h e F r e u d i a n n o t i o n of sub­
limation suggests that d e n i a l o r d i s p l a c e m e n t o f p l e a s u r e a n d
d e s i r e c a n b e c o m e f o r m a t i v e of c u l t u r e ; h i s Civilization and Its
Discontents t h u s l a i d the g r o u n d for M a r c u s e ' s Eros and Civili­
zation. T h e i n a d v e r t e n t l y p r o d u c t i v e effects o f s u b l i m a t i o n i n
the f o r m a t i o n o f c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s a p p e a r t o e x c e e d the d i a l e c ­
t i c a l r e v e r s a l b y w h i c h t h e y are g e n e r a t e d . W h e r e a s f o r M a r ­
cuse, the d r i v e s , o r eros a n d thanatos, p r e c e d e the r e g u l a t o r y
i m p e r a t i v e s b y w h i c h t h e y are r e n d e r e d c u l t u r a l l y l i v a b l e , f o r
F o u c a u l t , the r e p r e s s i v e h y p o t h e s i s , w h i c h a p p e a r s t o i n c l u d e
w i t h i n its s t r u c t u r e the m o d e l o f s u b l i m a t i o n , fails t o w o r k
p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e r e p r e s s i o n generates the v e r y p l e a s u r e s a n d
d e s i r e s i t seeks t o regulate. F o r F o u c a u l t , r e p r e s s i o n d o e s n o t
act o n a p r e g i v e n f i e l d o f p l e a s u r e a n d d e s i r e ; i t c o n s t i t u t e s
that f i e l d a s that w h i c h i s t o b e r e g u l a t e d , that w h i c h i s a l w a y s
p o t e n t i a l l y o r a c t u a l l y u n d e r the r u b r i c o f r e g u l a t i o n . T h e r e ­
p r e s s i v e r e g i m e , a s F o u c a u l t calls it, r e q u i r e s its o w n self­
a u g m e n t a t i o n a n d p r o l i f e r a t i o n . A s s u c h , this r e g i m e r e q u i r e s
the f i e l d o f b o d i l y i m p u l s e t o e x p a n d a n d p r o l i f e r a t e a s a m o r ­
a l i z e d d o m a i n , s u c h that i t w i l l c o n t i n u a l l y h a v e f r e s h m a t e r i a l
t h r o u g h w h i c h t o a r t i c u l a t e its o w n p o w e r . H e n c e , r e p r e s s i o n
produces a field of infinitely moralizable b o d i l y phenomena
i n o r d e r t o facilitat e a n d r a t i o n a l i z e its o w n p r o l i f e r a t i o n .
H e r e w e see that F o u c a u l t d e p a r t s f r o m the k i n d o f d i a l e c t i ­
Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 59
c a l r e v e r s a l w e f o l l o w e d i n H e g e l . I n F o u c a u l t , the s u p p r e s s i o n
o f the b o d y n o t o n l y r e q u i r e s a n d p r o d u c e s the v e r y b o d y i t
seeks t o s u p p r e s s , i t goes f u r t h e r b y e x t e n d i n g the b o d i l y d o ­
m a i n t o b e r e g u l a t e d , p r o l i f e r a t i n g sites o f c o n t r o l , d i s c i p l i n e ,
a n d s u p p r e s s i o n . I n o t h e r w o r d s , the b o d y presumed b y the
Hegelian explanation is incessantly p r o d u c e d and proliferated
i n o r d e r t o e x t e n d the d o m a i n o f j u r i d i c a l p o w e r . I n t h i s sense,
the r e s t r i c t i o n s p l a c e d on the b o d y n o t o n l y require a n d produce
the b o d y t h e y seek to r e s t r i c t , b u t proliferate the d o m a i n of the
b o d i l y b e y o n d the d o m a i n t a r g e t e d b y the o r i g i n a l r e s t r i c t i o n .
In w h a t m a n y h a v e c o m e to see as a f i n a l l y U t o p i a n g e s t u r e
i n F o u c a u l t , t h i s p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f the b o d y b y j u r i d i c a l r e g i m e s
b e y o n d the t e r m s o f d i a l e c t i c a l r e v e r s a l i s a l s o the site o f p o s ­
s i b l e resistance . T h e p s y c h o a n a l y t i c d i s c o u r s e that w o u l d d e ­
scribe a n d pathologize repressed desire ends up p r o d u c i n g a
discursive incitement to desire: i m p u l s e is continually fabri­
c a t e d as a site of c o n f e s s i o n a n d , h e n c e , p o t e n t i a l c o n t r o l , b u t
t h i s f a b r i c a t i o n exceed s the r e g u l a t o r y a i m s b y w h i c h i t i s g e n ­
erated. I n t h i s sense, c r i m i n a l c o d e s w h i c h seek t o c a t a l o g u e
a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e n o r m a l c y b e c o m e the site f o r a contesta­
t i o n o f the c o n c e p t o f the n o r m a l ; s e x o l o g i s t s w h o w o u l d clas­
sify a n d p a t h o l o g i z e h o m o s e x u a l i t y i n a d v e r t e n t l y p r o v i d e the
c o n d i t i o n s for a p r o l i f e r a t i o n a n d m o b i l i z a t i o n o f h o m o s e x u a l
cultures.
W i t h i n the H e g e l i a n f r a m e w o r k , the subject, w h i c h s p l i t s
itself off f r o m its b o d y , r e q u i r e s that b o d y i n o r d e r t o s u s ­
t a i n its s p l i t t i n g a c t i v i t y ; the b o d y t o b e s u p p r e s s e d i s t h u s
m a r s h a l l e d i n the s e r v i c e o f that s u p p r e s s i o n . F o r F o u c a u l t ,
the b o d y t o b e r e g u l a t e d i s s i m i l a r l y m a r s h a l l e d i n the ser­
v i c e o f s u p p r e s s i o n , b u t the b o d y i s n o t c o n s t i t u t e d p r i o r t o
that r e g u l a t i o n . O n the c o n t r a r y , the b o d y i s p r o d u c e d a s a n
object o f r e g u l a t i o n , a n d f o r r e g u l a t i o n t o a u g m e n t itself, the
6o Stubborn Attachment, B o d i l y Subjection
b o d y i s proliferated a s a n object o f r e g u l a t i o n . T h i s p r o l i f e r a t i o n
b o t h m a r k s off F o u c a u l t ' s t h e o r y f r o m H e g e l ' s a n d c o n s t i t u t e s
the site o f p o t e n t i a l r e s i s t a n c e t o r e g u l a t i o n . T h e p o s s i b i l i t y
o f t h i s r e s i s t a n c e i s d e r i v e d f r o m w h a t i s unforeseeable i n p r o ­
liferation. But to understand h o w a regulatory regime c o u l d
p r o d u c e effects w h i c h are n o t o n l y u n f o r e s e e a b l e b u t c o n s t i ­
tute r e s i s t a n c e, i t seems that w e m u s t r e t u r n t o the q u e s t i o n o f
s t u b b o r n a t t a c h m e n t s a n d , m o r e p r e c i s e l y , t o the p l a c e o f that
a t t a c h m e n t i n the s u b v e r s i o n o f the law.
A l t h o u g h Foucault criticizes Freud's hypothesis of repres­
sion, he is i n d e b t e d to this theorization in his o w n account of
the p r o d u c t i o n a n d p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f the r e g u l a t e d b o d y . I n p a r ­
t i c u l a r , the l o g i c o f s u b j e c t i o n i n b o t h H e g e l a n d F r e u d i m p l i e s
that the i n s t r u m e n t o f s u p p r e s s i o n b e c o m e s the n e w s t r u c t u r e
a n d a i m o f d e s i r e , a t least w h e n s u b j e c t i o n p r o v e s effective.
B u t i f a r e g u l a t o r y r e g i m e r e q u i r e s the p r o d u c t i o n o f n e w
sites o f r e g u l a t i o n a n d , h e n c e , a m o r e t h o r o u g h g o i n g m o r a l ­
i z a t i o n o f the b o d y , t h e n w h a t i s the p l a c e o f b o d i l y i m p u l s e ,
d e s i r e , a n d a t t a c h m e n t ? D o e s the r e g u l a t o r y r e g i m e n o t o n l y
p r o d u c e d e s i r e , b u t b e c o m e p r o d u c e d b y the c u l t i v a t i o n o f a
c e r t a i n a t t a c h m e n t to the r u l e of s u b j e c t i o n ? If p a r t of w h a t
r e g u l a t o r y r e g i m e s d o i s t o c o n s t r a i n the f o r m a t i o n a n d at­
t a c h m e n t s of d e s i r e , t h e n it s e e m s that f r o m the start a c e r t a i n
detachability of i m p u l s e is p r e s u m e d , a certain i n c o m m e n s u ­
r a b i l i t y b e t w e e n the c a p a c i t y for a b o d i l y a t t a c h m e n t , o n the
o n e h a n d , a n d the site w h e r e i t i s c o n f i n e d , o n the other. F o u ­
cault appears to p r e s u m e precisely this detachability of desire
i n c l a i m i n g that i n c i t e m e n t s a n d r e v e r s a l s are t o s o m e d e g r e e
unforeseeable, that t h e y h a v e the c a p a c i t y , c e n t r a l to the n o t i o n
o f resistance, t o exceed the r e g u l a t o r y a i m s for w h i c h t h e y w e r e
p r o d u c e d . I f a g i v e n r e g i m e c a n n o t f u l l y c o n t r o l the i n c i t e ­
m e n t s that i t n e v e r t h e l e s s p r o d u c e s , i s that i n p a r t the r e s u l t
Hegel's Unhappy Consciousness 61
of a resistance, at the l e v e l of i m p u l s e , to a f u l l a n d f i n a l d o ­
mestication by any regulatory regime?
What Hegel implies in "The Unhappy Consciousness" is
n o t m e r e l y that m o r a l w r e t c h e d n e s s c a n n o t b e c o h e r e n t l y s u s ­
t a i n e d , that i t i n v a r i a b l y c o n c e d e s the b o d i l y b e i n g that i t
seeks to deny , b u t that the p u r s u i t of w r e t c h e d n e s s , the a t t a c h ­
m e n t t o w r e t c h e d n e s s , i s b o t h the c o n d i t i o n a n d the p o t e n ­
t i a l u n d o i n g o f s u c h s u b j e c t i o n . I f w r e t c h e d n e s s , agony, a n d
p a i n are sites o r m o d e s o f s t u b b o r n n e s s , w a y s o f a t t a c h i n g t o
oneself, n e g a t i v e l y a r t i c u l a t e d m o d e s o f r e f l e x i v i t y , t h e n that
i s b e c a u s e t h e y are g i v e n b y r e g u l a t o r y r e g i m e s a s the sites
a v a i l a b l e f o r a t t a c h m e n t , a n d a subject w i l l attach t o p a i n
rather t h a n n o t attach a t a l l . F o r F r e u d , a n i n f a n t f o r m s a
p l e a s u r e ­ g i v i n g a t t a c h m e n t t o a n y e x c i t a t i o n that c o m e s its
w a y , e v e n the m o s t t r a u m a t i c , w h i c h a c c o u n t s for the f o r m a ­
t i o n o f m a s o c h i s m a n d , for s o m e , the p r o d u c t i o n o f a b j e c t i o n ,
r e j e c t i o n, w r e t c h e d n e s s , a n d s o o n a s the n e c e s s a r y p r e c o n d i ­
t i o n s for l o v e . T h e g e s t u r e o f r e j e c t i o n c a n b e c o m e m a s o c h ­
i s t i c a l l y e r o t i c i z e d o n l y b e c a u s e i t i s a gesture. A l t h o u g h the
rejectin g gesture's a l l e g e d p u r p o s e i s t o t h w a r t a n o n c o m i n g
d e s i r e , it n e v e r t h e l e s s a p p e a r s as a gesture, t h u s making itself
present a n d l e n d i n g itself to b e i n g r e a d as a k i n d of o f f e r i n g or,
m i n i m a l l y , presence. P r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e the g e s t u r e of r e j e c t i o n
is, it r h e t o r i c a l l y d e n i e s the threat of w i t h d r a w a l that it n e v e r ­
theless p u r p o r t s t o signify. F o r the i n f a n t , the p r e s e n c e o r d e ­
t e r m i n a c y o f that object, n o m a t t e r h o w p e r s i s t e n t l y r e j e c t i n g ,
is n e v e r t h e l e ss a site of p r e s e n c e a n d e x c i t a t i o n a n d , h e n c e , is
better t h a n n o object a t a l l . T h i s t r u i s m i s n o t far f r o m N i e t z ­
sche's l i n e that the w i l l w o u l d r a t h e r w i l l n o t h i n g n e s s t h a n n o t
w i l l at a l l . In b o t h cases, the d e s i r e to d e s i r e is a w i l l i n g n e s s to
d e s i r e p r e c i s e l y that w h i c h w o u l d f o r e c l o s e d e s i r e , i f o n l y f o r
the p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n t i n u i n g t o desire.
62 Stubborn Attachment, Bodil y Subjection

T h e q u e s t i o n , t h e n , that H e g e l a n d F r e u d w o u l d a p p e a r
t o p o s e for F o u c a u l t i s w h e t h e r t h i s t e r r a i n o f " s t u b b o r n at­
t a c h m e n t " d o e s n o t i n s o m e w a y f i g u r e i n the s c e n a r i o s o f
s u b j e c t i o n that he d e s c r i b e s . To w h a t extent d o e s a r e g u l a t o r y
r e g i m e e x p l o i t t h i s w i l l i n g n e s s t o a t t a c h b l i n d l y t o w h a t seeks
t o s u p p r e s s o r negate that v e r y a t t a c h m e n t ? A n d t o w h a t ex­
Circuits of Bad
tent does the a t t a c h m e n t that a r e g u l a t o r y r e g i m e r e q u i r e s Conscience
p r o v e t o b e b o t h its c o n s t i t u t i v e f a i l u r e a n d the p o t e n t i a l site
Nietzsche and Freud
of r e s i s t a n c e ? If d e s i r e has as its f i n a l a i m the c o n t i n u a t i o n of
i t s e l f — a n d here one m i g h t l i n k H e g e l , F r e u d , a n d F o u c a u l t a l l
b a c k to S p i n o z a ' s conatus — t h e n the c a p a c i t y of d e s i r e to be
w i t h d r a w n a n d t o r e a t t a c h w i l l c o n s t i t u t e s o m e t h i n g l i k e the
v u l n e r a b i l i t y o f e v e r y s t r a te gy o f s u b j e c t i o n .

N i e t z s c h e offers a v i e w of c o n s c i e n c e as a m e n t a l a c t i v i t y
that n o t o n l y f o r m s v a r i o u s p s y c h i c p h e n o m e n a , b u t i s
itself formed, the c o n s e q u e n c e of a d i s t i n c t i v e k i n d of i n t e r n a l ­
ization. In Nietzsche, w h o distinguishes conscience f r o m bad
c o n s c i e n c e , the w i l l i s s a i d t o t u r n b a c k u p o n itself. B u t w h a t
are w e t o m a k e o f t h i s strang e l o c u t i o n ; h o w are w e b e i n g
a s k e d t o i m a g i n e a w i l l s u c h that i t r e c o i l s a n d r e d o u b l e s u p o n
itself; a n d h o w , m o s t p e r t i n e n t l y , i s t h i s f i g u r e b e i n g o f f e r e d a s
a w a y t o a r t i c u l a t e the k i n d o f r e f l e x i v i t y c e n t r a l t o the o p e r a ­
t i o n of b a d conscience? F r e u d w i l l use a s i m i l a r language in
w r i t i n g o f the f o r m a t i o n o f c o n s c i e n c e , e s p e c i a l l y i n r e l a t i o n t o
p a r a n o i a a n d n a r c i s s i s m . H e d e s c r i b e s c o n s c i e n c e a s the forc e
of a d e s i r e — a l t h o u g h s o m e t i m e s a force of a g g r e s s i o n — a s it
t u r n s b a c k o n itself, a n d h e u n d e r s t a n d s p r o h i b i t i o n , n o t a s a
l a w e x t e r n a l t o d e s i r e , b u t a s the v e r y o p e r a t i o n o f d e s i r e a s
i t t u r n s o n its o w n p o s s i b i l i t y . W h a t sense d o w e m a k e o f the
f i g u r e that e m e r g e s i n the c o n t e x t o f b o t h e x p l a n a t i o n s , that o f
a w i l l that t u r n s b a c k on itself, that of a d e s i r e that t u r n s b a c k
o n itself? W e m u s t ask n o t o n l y h o w t h i s f i g u r e o f r e c o i l i n g a n d
64 Circuits of Bad Conscience
r e d o u b l i n g becomes central to u n d e r s t a n d i n g b a d conscience,
b u t w h a t t h i s f i g u r e suggests a b o u t the b o d i l y p o s i t i o n o r d i s ­
p o s i t i o n e n c o d e d i n the s t r u c t u r e o f r e f l e x i v i t y . W h y d o e s a
b o d y d o u b l e d o v e r o n itself f i g u r e w h a t i t m e a n s t o b e a self­
c o n s c i o u s sort o f b e i n g ?
T h e n o t i o n that m o r a l i t y i s p r e d i c a t e d o n a c e r t a i n k i n d o f
v i o l e n c e i s a l r e a d y f a m i l i a r , b u t m o r e s u r p r i s i n g i s that s u c h
v i o l e n c e f o u n d s the subject. M o r a l i t y p e r f o r m s that v i o l e n c e
a g a i n a n d a g a i n i n c u l t i v a t i n g the subject a s a r e f l e x i v e b e i n g .
T h i s is, i n p a r t , w h a t l e d N i e t z s c h e t o reflect that m o r a l i t y
is a k i n d of i l l n e s s . If this t u r n i n g on o n e s e lf c a n be c a l l e d a
k i n d o f v i o l e n c e , i t c a n n o t s i m p l y b e o p p o s e d i n the n a m e o f
nonviolence, for w h e n a n d where it is opposed, it is o p p o s e d
f r o m a p o s i t i o n that p r e s u p p o s e s t h i s v e r y v i o l e n c e . I do n o t
w i s h s i m p l y t o u n d e r s c o r e the a p o r e t i c s t r u c t u r e i n v o l v e d i n
the a s s u m p t i o n o f m o r a l i t y , n o r s i m p l y t o a f f i r m the g e n e r a l ­
ized violence in any and all m o r a l positioning, although both
insights, furnished by deconstruction, f o r m a point of depar­
t u r e for w h a t I seek to d o . R a t h e r , I w o u l d suggest that the
subject w h o w o u l d o p p o s e v i o l e n c e , e v e n v i o l e n c e t o itself, i s
itself the effect o f a p r i o r v i o l e n c e w i t h o u t w h i c h the subject
c o u l d n o t h a v e e m e r g e d . C a n that p a r t i c u l a r c i r c l e b e b r o k e n ?
H o w a n d w h e n does that b r e a k a g e o c c u r ? A n d w h a t e m e r g e s
a s a s i g n i f i c a n t p o s s i b i l i t y i n w h i c h the subject loses its c l o s e d
c o n t o u r , the c i r c u l a r i t y o f its o w n r e f l e x i v e c l o s u r e ? A p u r e
w i l l , ontologically intact p r i o r to any articulation, does not
s u d d e n l y e m e r g e as a p r i n c i p l e of s e l f ­ a u g m e n t a t i o n a n d self­
a f f i r m a t i o n that exceeds the b o u n d s o f a n y a n d a l l r e g u l a t o r y
s c h é m a s . R a t h e r , the f o r m a t i v e a n d f a b r i c a t i n g d i m e n s i o n o f
p s y c h i c life, w h i c h t r a v e l s u n d e r the n a m e o f the " w i l l , " a n d
w h i c h i s u s u a l l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a r e s t r i c t i v e l y aesthetic d o ­
m a i n , p r o v e s c e n t r a l t o r e f a s h i o n i n g the n o r m a t i v e s h a c k l e s
Nietzsche and Freud 65
that n o subject c a n d o w i t h o u t , b u t w h i c h n o subject i s c o n ­
d e m n e d t o r e p e a t i n e x a c t l y the s a m e w a y .
M y i n q u i r y c o n c e r n s a p e r s i s t e n t p r o b l e m that e m e r g e s
w h e n w e t r y t o t h i n k the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a w i l l that takes i t s e lf
a s its o w n object a n d , t h r o u g h the f o r m a t i o n o f that k i n d o f r e ­
f l e x i v i t y , b i n d s itself t o itself, a c q u i r e s its o w n i d e n t i t y t h r o u g h
r e f l e x i v i t y . T o w h a t extent i s t h i s a p p a r e n t s e l f ­ b o n d a g e f u l l y
o r e x c l u s i v e l y s e l f ­ i m p o s e d ? I s t h i s s t r a n g e p o s t u r e o f the w i l l
i n the s e r v i c e o f a s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n that r e q u i r e s the p r o d u c ­
t i o n o f the subject a c o n s e q u e n c e o r a n e x p r e s s i o n o f b a d
c o n s c i e n c e ? I s u p p o s e that those w h o seek t o r e d e e m N i e t z ­
sche b y c l a i m i n g that h e c a n b e i n v o k e d i n the s e r v i c e o f the
e t h i c a l m i g h t t h i n k that the o n l y a l t e r n a t i v e w o r s e t h a n b a d
c o n s c i e n c e i s its o b l i t e r a t i o n . B u t r e m e m b e r that N i e t z s c h e n o t
o n l y d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n the e t h i c a l a n d m o r a l i t y , b u t asks
a b o u t the value o f m o r a l i t y , t h u s i n s t a t i n g a v a l u e b y w h i c h
m o r a l i t y m i g h t b e assessed, b u t s u g g e s t i n g a s w e l l that t h i s
assessment, this v a l u a t i o n , m a y n o t b e r e d u c i b l e t o m o r a l i t y .
I t a k e it that the j u x t a p o s i t i o n of N i e t z s c h e w i t h the q u e s ­
t i o n o f ethics is, i n d e e d , a q u e s t i o n b e c a u s e N i e t z s c h e a n d v a r i ­
o u s figures w i t h i n the C o n t i n e n t a l t r a d i t i o n h a v e b e e n f o u n d
g u i l t y b y a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h i r r e s p o n s i b l e acts a n d events. W h a t
w i l l b e the r e s p o n s e t o these c h a r g e s? T o t a k e the s i d e o f the
e t h i c a l , t o relate e a c h a n d e v e r y t h i n k e r t o the e t h i c a l ? O r w i l l
this b e a n o c c a s i o n t o t h i n k the p r o b l e m a b i t m o r e c a r e f u l l y ,
to c o n t i n u e to p o s e the e t h i c a l as a q u e s t i o n , o n e w h i c h c a n n o t
b e f r e e d o f its c o m p l i c i t y w i t h w h a t i t m o s t s t r o n g l y o p p o s e s ?
W i l l t h i s , p a r a d o x i c a l l y , b e c o m e a t i m e i n w h i c h w e reflect
u p o n the m o r e p e r v a s i v e d i m e n s i o n s o f c o m p l i c i t y a n d w h a t
might be derived f r o m such a vexed relation to power?
I u n d e r s t a n d the d e s i r e t o r e s i t u a t e N i e t z s c h e w i t h i n the
e t h i c a l d o m a i n a s a n effort t o c o u n t e r the c a r i c a t u r e , w i t h i n
66 Circuits of Bad Conscience
c o n t e m p o r a r y c r i t i c i s m , of N i e t z s c h e as one w h o o n l y de­
s t r o y s the d o m a i n o f v a l u e s ( w h e r e that d e s t r u c t i o n i s n o t itself
a s o u r c e of v a l u e , or a v a l u e in itself). I w a n t i n s t e a d to s u g ­
gest that N i e t z s c h e offers us a p o l i t i c a l i n s i g h t i n t o the f o r m a ­
t i o n o f the p s y c h e a n d the p r o b l e m o f s u b j e c t i o n , u n d e r s t o o d
p a r a d o x i c a l l y n o t m e r e l y as the s u b o r d i n a t i o n of a subject to
a n o r m , b u t as the c o n s t i t u t i o n of a subject t h r o u g h p r e c i s e l y
s u c h a s u b o r d i n a t i o n . I n d e e d , to the extent that b a d c o n s c i e n c e
i n v o l v e s a t u r n i n g a g a i n s t oneself, a b o d y i n r e c o i l u p o n itself,
h o w d o e s t h i s f i g u r e serve the s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n o f the subject,
a n d h o w m i g h t w e u n d e r s t a n d this m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l s u b ­
j e c t i o n , w i t h o u t w h i c h n o p r o p e r subject e m e r g e s ? I w a n t t o
suggest that, a l t h o u g h there i s n o f i n a l u n d o i n g o f the r e f l e x i v e
b i n d , that p o s t u r e of the self b e n t a g a i n s t itself, a p a s s i o n a t e
d e r e g u l a t i o n of the subject m a y p e r h a p s p r e c i p i t a t e a t e n u o u s
u n r a v e l i n g o f that c o n s t i t u t i v e k n o t . W h a t e m e r g e s i s n o t the
unshackle d w i l l or a " b e y o n d " to power, but another direc­
t i o n for w h a t i s m o s t f o r m a t i v e i n p a s s i o n , a f o r m a t i v e p o w e r
w h i c h is at o n c e the c o n d i t i o n of its v i o l e n c e a g a i n s t itself, its
status as a n e c e s s a r y f i c t i o n , a n d the site of its e n a b l i n g p o s s i ­
b i l i t i e s . T h i s r e c a s t i n g o f the " w i l l " i s n o t , p r o p e r l y s p e a k i n g ,
the w i l l o f a subject, n o r i s i t a n effect f u l l y c u l t i v a t e d b y a n d
t h r o u g h s o c i a l n o r m s ; i t is, I w o u l d suggest, the site a t w h i c h
the s o c i a l i m p l i c a t e s the p s y c h i c i n its v e r y f o r m a t i o n — o r , t o
b e m o r e p r e c i s e , a s its v e r y f o r m a t i o n a n d f o r m a t i v i t y .
C o n s i d e r the g e n e r a l c l a i m that the s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n o f the
subject c o m p e l s a p a s s i o n a t e a t t a c h m e n t to r e g u l a t i o n , a n d
that this f o r m a t i o n o f the w i l l takes p l a c e i n p a r t t h r o u g h the
a c t i o n o f a r e p r e s s i o n . A l t h o u g h o n e i s t e m p t e d t o c l a i m that
s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n i s s i m p l y i n t e r n a l i z e d , t a k e n f r o m the out­
s i d e a n d b r o u g h t i n t o the p s y c h e , the p r o b l e m i s m o r e c o m ­
p l i c a t e d a n d , i n d e e d , m o r e i n s i d i o u s . F o r the b o u n d a r y that
Nietzsche and Freud 67
d i v i d e s the o u t s i d e f r o m the i n s i d e i s i n the p r o c e s s o f b e i n g
i n s t a l l e d , p r e c i s e l y t h r o u g h the r e g u l a t i o n o f the subject. T h e
r e p r e s s i o n i s the v e r y t u r n i n g b a c k o n itself w h i c h the p a s ­
sionate a t t a c h m e n t t o s u b j e c t i o n p e r f o r m s . H o w c a n a w i l l b e
e n t i c e d t o m a k e s u c h a t u r n ? A r e w e t o t h i n k that t u r n a s a n
i n t e r n a l b e n d i n g o f the p s y c h e against itself? I f so, w h y i s i t
f i g u r e d a s a b o d y that t u r n s o n a n d a g a i n s t itself ? A r e the p s y ­
c h i c a n d the s o m a t i c a r t i c u l a t e d t h r o u g h o n e a n o t h e r i n s u c h
a w a y that the f i g u r a t i o n of the first is i m p l i c a t e d i n v a r i a b l y
in a c h i a s t i c r e l a t i o n to the s e c o n d ? C l e a r l y , w h a t is at stak e
i s s o m e t h i n g m o r e t h a n a n d differen t f r o m a r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n
a n external d e m a n d offered b y regulatory p o w e r a n d a n i n ­
t e r n a l r e c o i l r e g i s t e r e d as its s e c o n d a r y effect. If p r e s u p p o s e d
in the v e r y n o t i o n of the subject is a p a s s i o n a t e a t t a c h m e n t to
s u b j e c t i o n , t h e n the subject w i l l n o t e m e r g e save a s a n e x e m ­
p l i f i c a t i o n a n d effect of t h i s a t t a c h m e n t . I h o p e to s h o w , first
through a consideration of Nietzsche, then in relation to F r e u d ,
h o w the v e r y n o t i o n o f r e f l e x i v i t y , a s a n e m e r g e n t s t r u c t u r e o f
the subject, is the c o n s e q u e n c e of a " t u r n i n g b a c k on itself," a
r e p e a t e d self­beratemen t w h i c h c o m e s t o f o r m the m i s n o m e r
o f "conscience, " a n d that there i s n o f o r m a t i o n o f the subject
w i t h o u t a p a s s i o n a t e a t t a c h m e n t to s u b j e c t i o n .
Significantly, N i e t z s c h e attributes a creative or formative
p o w e r t o c o n s c i e n c e , a n d the act o f t u r n i n g b a c k u p o n o n e ­
self i s n o t o n l y the c o n d i t i o n o f the p o s s i b i l i t y o f the s u b ­
ject, b u t the c o n d i t i o n o f the p o s s i b i l i t y o f f i c t i o n , f a b r i c a t i o n ,
a n d t r a n s f i g u r a t i o n . I n d e e d , N i e t z s c h e r e m a r k s that b a d c o n ­
s c i e n c e fabricates the s o u l , that e x p a n s e of i n t e r i o r p s y c h i c
space. If the subject is u n d e r s t o o d as a k i n d of n e c e s s a r y fic­
t i o n , t h e n i t i s a l s o o n e o f the first a r t i s t i c a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s
p r e s u p p o s e d by morality. The artistic a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s of b a d
c o n s c i e n c e e x c e e d the p u r v i e w o f the subject; i n d e e d , t h e y
68 Circuits of Bad Conscience
w i l l come to include "all imaginative and ideal phenomena,"
i n c l u d i n g c o n c e p t u a l t h i n k i n g , f i g u r a t i v e w r i t i n g , a n d the c o n ­
j e c t u r e d fables a n d m y t h s w h i c h c o m p o s e the v a r i o u s r e t r o ­
s p e c t i v e i m a g i n i n g s o f genealogy. I n this sense, the c o n d i t i o n
o f p o s s i b i l i t y o f N i e t z s c h e ' s o w n w r i t i n g a p p e a r s t o b e the b a d
c o n s c i e n c e for w h i c h i t seeks t o g i v e a n a c c o u n t .
N i e t z s c h e offers a n a r r a t i v e that seeks to a c c o u n t f o r t h i s
f o r m a t i o n , b u t h i s n a r r a t i v e w i l l b e afflicted f r o m the start b y
the v e r y c o n s c i e n c e that i t seeks t o u n c o v e r f o r us. T h e c l a i m
that c o n s c i e n c e i s a f i c t i o n i s n o t t o b e c o n f u s e d w i t h the c l a i m
that c o n s c i e n c e i s a r b i t r a r y o r d i s p e n s a b l e ; o n the c o n t r a r y , i t
i s a n e c e s s a r y f i c t i o n , o n e w i t h o u t w h i c h the g r a m m a t i c a l a n d
p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l subject c a n n o t exist. B u t i f its f i c t i v e status
d o e s n o t d i s p e l its necessity, h o w are w e t o c o n s t r u e the sense
o f that n e c e s s i t y ? M o r e p r e c i s e l y , w h a t does i t m e a n t o say
that a subject e m e r g e s o n l y t h r o u g h the a c t i o n o f t u r n i n g b a c k
on itself ? If t h i s t u r n i n g b a c k on oneself is a t r o p e , a m o v e ­
m e n t w h i c h i s a l w a y s a n d o n l y figured a s a b o d i l y m o v e m e n t ,
b u t w h i c h n o b o d y l i t e r a l l y p e r f o r m s , i n w h a t w i l l the neces­
s i t y o f s u c h a f i g u r a t i o n c o n s i s t ? T h e t r o p e a p p e a r s t o b e the
s h a d o w of a b o d y , a s h a d o w i n g of that b o d y ' s v i o l e n c e a g a i n s t
itself, a b o d y i n s p e c t r a l a n d l i n g u i s t i c f o r m that i s the s i g n i ­
f y i n g m a r k o f the p s y c h e ' s e m e r g e n c e .
C o n s i d e r e d g r a m m a t i c a l l y , i t w i l l s e e m that there m u s t first
b e a subject w h o t u r n s b a c k o n itself, yet I w i l l a r g u e that there
is no subject e x c e p t as a c o n s e q u e n c e of t h i s v e r y r e f l e x i v i t y .
H o w c a n the subject b e p r e s u m e d a t b o t h e n d s o f t h i s p r o ­
cess, e s p e c i a l l y w h e n i t i s the v e r y f o r m a t i o n o f the subject for
w h i c h t h i s p r o c e s s seeks t o g i v e a n a c c o u n t ?
If, in F r e u d , c o n s c i e n c e is a p a s s i o n a t e a t t a c h m e n t to prohi­
bition, a n a t t a c h m e n t w h i c h takes the f o r m o f a t u r n i n g b a c k
on oneself, d o e s the f o r m a t i o n of the ego t a k e p l a c e as the s e d i ­
Nietzsche and Freud 69
m e n t e d result of this p e c u l i a r f o r m of reflexivity? T h e n o u n
f o r m "ego" w i l l t h e n r e i f y a n d m a s k the i t e r a t e d a c c u m u l a t i o n
of this reflexive m o v e m e n t . Of what is this reflexivity c o m ­
p o s e d ? W h a t i s i t that i s s a i d t o t u r n b a c k u p o n w h a t ? A n d
w h a t c o m p o s e s the a c t i o n o f " t u r n i n g b a c k u p o n " ? I w a n t t o
suggest that t h i s l o g i c a l c i r c u l a r i t y i n w h i c h the subject a p ­
p e a r s a t o n c e t o b e p r e s u p p o s e d a n d n o t yet f o r m e d , o n the
o n e h a n d , o r f o r m e d a n d h e n c e n o t p r e s u p p o s e d , o n the other,
i s a m e l i o r a t e d w h e n o n e u n d e r s t a n d s that i n b o t h F r e u d a n d
N i e t z s c h e t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p o f r e f l e x i v i t y i s a l w a y s a n d o n l y fig­
u r e d , a n d that t h i s f i g u r e m a k e s n o o n t o l o g i c a l c l a i m . T o refer
t o a " w i l l , " m u c h less t o its " t u r n i n g b a c k o n itself," i s a s t r a n g e
w a y t o s p e a k , s t r a n g e b e c a u s e i t figures a p r o c e s s w h i c h c a n ­
n o t b e d e t a c h e d f r o m o r u n d e r s t o o d a p a r t f r o m that v e r y f i g u ­
r a t i o n . I n d e e d , for N i e t z s c h e , the w r i t i n g o f s u c h f i g u r a t i o n s ,
a n d f i g u r a t i o n i n g e n e r a l , are p a r t a n d p a r c e l o f the " i d e a l a n d
i m a g i n a t i v e p h e n o m e n a " w h i c h are the c o n s e q u e n c e s o f b a d
conscience. H e n c e , we do not come to k n o w s o m e t h i n g about
b a d c o n s c i e n c e w h e n w e c o n s i d e r the s t r a n g e f i g u r e o f reflex­
i v i t y that N i e t z s c h e offers us. W e are, a s i t w e r e , c a u g h t u p i n
the l u r i n g effects o f b a d c o n s c i e n c e a t the v e r y t e x t u a l m o m e n t
w h e n w e seek t o k n o w w h a t , p r e c i s e l y , t h i s b a d c o n s c i e n c e is.
I f i t i s c r e d i t e d w i t h b e i n g the g r o u n d o f f i g u r a t i o n , yet c a n
itself o n l y b e f i g u r e d — i n d e e d , f i g u r e d a s that g r o u n d — t h e c i r ­
cularity w h i c h might be lamented from a logical perspective
c o n c e r n e d w i t h e s t a b l i s h i n g c l e a r s e q u e n c e b e c o m e s the c o n ­
s t i t u t i v e feature of b a d c o n s c i e n c e , c o n s i d e r e d b o t h as a f i g u r e
a n d a s the c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y for f i g u r a t i o n itself.
The apparent c i r c u l a r i t y of this account reappears in a re­
l a t e d set o f q u a n d a r i e s . W h a t m o t i v a t e s the w i l l t o t u r n b a c k
o n i t s e l f ? D o e s i t t u r n b a c k o n itself u n d e r the p r e s s u r e o f
a n e x t e r n a l f o r c e o r l a w , u n d e r the a n t i c i p a t e d o r r e c o l l e c t e d
70 Circuits of Bad Conscience
force o f p u n i s h m e n t ? O r d o e s t h i s p e c u l i a r f o r m o f r e f l e x i v i t y
t a k e p l a c e p r i o r to, o r i n s o m e othe r f o r m o f c o m p l i c i t y w i t h ,
a set of e x t e r n a l l y i m p o s e d d e m a n d s ?
T o c l a r i f y t h i s last p o i n t i t i s i m p o r t a n t t o r e c o n s i d e r the
thesis that p u n i s h m e n t p r e c e d e s c o n s c i e n c e , a n d that c o n ­
s c i e n c e c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d a s the u n p r o b l e m a t i c i n t e r n a l i z a ­
t i o n o f p u n i s h m e n t , its m n e m o n i c trace. A l t h o u g h there are
clearly textual moments in w h i c h Nietzsche appears to be
a r g u i n g for s u c h a t e m p o r a l p r i o r i t y o f p u n i s h m e n t t o c o n ­
science, there are a l s o c o m p e t i n g v i e w s i n N i e t z s c h e w h i c h
c a l l this sequential account into question.
I f the w i l l i n N i e t z s c h e i s a t its m o s t p r o d u c t i v e — t h a t is, its
m o s t c o n s c i e n t i o u s — w h e n i t i s t u r n e d b a c k u p o n itself, t h e n i t
a p p e a r s that the s e v e r i t y o f c o n s c i e n c e i s l i n k e d t o the s t r e n g t h
o f the w i l l o f w h i c h i t i s c o m p o s e d . S i m i l a r l y , f o r F r e u d , the
s t r e n g t h o f c o n s c i e n c e i s n o u r i s h e d p r e c i s e l y b y the a g g r e s s i o n
that it f o r b i d s . In t h i s sense, t h e n , the s t r e n g t h of c o n s c i e n c e
c o r r e l a t e s n e i t h e r w i t h the s t r e n g t h o f a p u n i s h m e n t r e c e i v e d
n o r w i t h the s t r e n g t h o f a m e m o r y o f a p u n i s h m e n t r e c e i v e d ,
but with the strength of one's own aggression, o n e w h i c h is s a i d to
h a v e v e n t e d itself e x t e r n a l l y , b u t w h i c h n o w , u n d e r the r u b r i c
o f b a d c o n s c i e n c e , i s s a i d t o v e n t itself i n t e r n a l l y . T h i s latter
v e n t i n g is a l s o at the s a m e t i m e a f a b r i c a t i n g : an i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n
w h i c h is p r o d u c e d or f a b r i c a t e d as the effect of a s u b l i m a t i o n .
T h i s c i r c u l a r i t y a p p e a r s t o b r e a k the l i n e o f c a u s a l i t y o r i n ­
ternalization usually conjectured between an external or his­
t o r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e o f p u n i s h m e n t a n d a n i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n o f the
m n e m o n i c t r a ce o f that p u n i s h m e n t i n the f o r m o f c o n s c i e n c e .
But if conscience is self­derived in this way, a n d not d e r i v e d
unilaterally f r o m an internalization of an external or historical
p u n i s h m e n t , i s there s o m e o t h e r w a y t o u n d e r s t a n d its f u n c ­
t i o n i n the p r o c e s s o f s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n ? I s i t p o s s i b l e t o u n d e r ­
Nietzsche and Freud 71
s t a n d the force o f p u n i s h m e n t o u t s i d e o f the w a y s i n w h i c h i t
e x p l o i t s a n a r c i s s i s t i c d e m a n d , or, t o p u t i t i n a N i e t z s c h e a n
v e i n , i s i t p o s s i b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d the force o f p u n i s h m e n t o u t ­
s i d e o f the w a y s i n w h i c h i t e x p l o i t s the w i l l ' s a t t a c h m e n t t o
itself?
To c l a i m that there is a p a s s i o n a t e a t t a c h m e n t to s u b j e c t i o n
a p p e a r s to p r e s u p p o s e that there is first a p a s s i o n , a n d that its
a i m i s t o attach t o s o m e k i n d o f object. I n N i e t z s c h e , there w i l l
emerge a q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r this p r i m a r y passion, this w i l l ,
p r e c e d e s the a t t a c h m e n t s b y w h i c h i t i s k n o w n , o r w h e t h e r its
a t t a c h m e n t s p r e c e d e its p a s s i o n s o r a c q u i r e t h e i r p a s s i o n a t e
c h a r a c t e r o n l y after a n a t t a c h m e n t i s a s s u m e d . (It m a y i n v a r i ­
a b l y b e b o t h , p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a n i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e set o f t e m ­
p o r a l trajectories. I n s o m e w a y s , w e m i g h t see t h i s q u e s t i o n a s
p e r v a d i n g the debates b e t w e e n L a c a n i a n a n d object­relations
construals of Freud.)
Nietzsche's Account of Bad Conscience
Nietzsche's consideration of b a d conscience in On the
Genealogy of Morals is i n t r o d u c e d in s e c t i o n 16 of the sec­
o n d essay. A t first, the r e l a t i o n o f t h i s n o t i o n t o the n o t i o n
o f c o n s c i e n c e i n t r o d u c e d e a r l i e r i n the s a m e essay i s u n c l e a r .
C o n s c i e n c e i s i n t r o d u c e d v i a the a n i m a l w h o i s b r e d t o k e e p
p r o m i s e s , a n d i n r e l a t i o n t o the " s o v e r e i g n " m a n . T h e o n e w h o
m a k e s a n d k e e p s h i s p r o m i s e i s o n e w h o "has b r e d i n h i m s e l f
a . . . f a c u l t y " o p p o s e d to f o r g e t f u l n e s s , n a m e l y , a m e m o r y ,
w h i c h b e c o m e s "a memory of the will." H e r e N i e t z s c h e refers
1
t o a n " i m p r e s s i o n " that i s a c t i v e l y s u s t a i n e d b y a d e s i r e , o n e
w h i c h is not forgotten, but w h i c h , in being actively r e m e m ­
b e r e d , p r o d u c e s the p r o t r a c t e d c o n t i n u i t y o f the w i l l . B u t t h i s
i m p r e s s i o n i s n o t s p e c i f i e d . A n i m p r e s s i o n f r o m w h e r e ? I n the
72 Circuits of Bad Conscience
s e r v i c e o f w h a t ? N i e t z s c h e t h e n i n s i s t s that the o n e w h o m a k e s
p r o m i s e s w i l l n o t a l l o w a n y t h i n g t o i n t e r r u p t the p r o c e s s b y
w h i c h a n o r i g i n a l statement, " I w i l l " o r " I s h a l l d o this," c u l m i ­
nates i n the d i s c h a r g e o f the d e s i g n a t e d act. T h e o n e w h o t r u l y
p r o m i s e s w i e l d s the p o w e r o f the s o v e r e i g n t o enact w h a t h e
says, t o b r i n g i n t o b e i n g w h a t h e w i l l s . I n o t h e r w o r d s , the
p r o m i s i n g b e i n g establishes a c o n t i n u i t y b e t w e e n a statemen t
a n d a n act, a l t h o u g h the t e m p o r a l d i s j u n c t i o n b e t w e e n the
t w o i s a c k n o w l e d g e d a s a n o p p o r t u n i t y f o r the i n t e r v e n t i o n o f
v a r i o u s c o m p e t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d a c c i d e n t s . I n the face o f
these c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d a c c i d e n t s , the w i l l c o n t i n u e s t o p r o ­
d u c e itself, t o l a b o r o n itself i n the s e r v i c e o f m a k i n g o f itself
a c o n t i n u i t y , w h e r e that c o n t i n u i t y , that " l o n g c h a i n o f w i l l , "
a s N i e t z s c h e p u t s it, establishes its o w n t e m p o r a l i t y o v e r a n d
a g a i n s t a n y o t h e r w h i c h m i g h t seek t o c o m p l i c a t e o r q u a l i f y its
e x e c u t i o n . T h i s p r o m i s i n g b e i n g i s o n e w h o s t a n d s for h i m s e l f
t h r o u g h t i m e a n d w h o s e w o r d continues t h r o u g h time, one
" w h o g i v e s [his] w o r d a s s o m e t h i n g that c a n b e r e l i e d o n b e ­
cause [h]e k n o w [ s ] h i m s e l f t o b e s t r o n g e n o u g h t o m a i n t a i n i t
i n the face o f a c c i d e n t s " (60/294). T h i s p r o t r a c t e d w i l l , w h i c h i s
s e l f ­ i d e n t i c a l t h r o u g h t i m e a n d w h i c h establishes its o w n t i m e ,
c o n s t i t u t e s the m a n o f c o n s c i e n c e . ( O d d l y e n o u g h , t h i s i d e a l o f
the efficacious s p e e c h act p r e s u p p o s e d b y p r o m i s i n g i s u n d e r ­
c u t b y N i e t z s c h e ' s o w n n o t i o n o f the s i g n c h a i n , a c c o r d i n g t o
w h i c h a s i g h i s b o u n d t o s i g n i f y i n w a y s that estrange the s i g n
f r o m the o r i g i n a t i n g i n t e n t i o n s b y w h i c h i t i s m o b i l i z e d . A c ­
c o r d i n g t o the h i s t o r i c i t y o f the s i g n c h a i n , i t w o u l d b e i m p o s ­
s i b l e t o k e e p a p r o m i s e , b e c a u s e i t w o u l d b e i m p o s s i b l e t o safe­
g u a r d a s i g n f r o m the v a r i o u s h i s t o r i c a l a c c i d e n t s b y w h i c h its
m e a n i n g i s a u g m e n t e d i n excess o f its o r i g i n a t i n g i n t e n t i o n s . )
In section 3, w h i c h follows this discussion, Nietzsche recon­
s i d e r s t h i s i d e a l i z a t i o n o f the p r o m i s i n g a n i m a l a n d a s k s h o w
Nietzsche and Freud 73
a m e m o r y c a n be c r e a t e d for a w i l l . T h i s r e t u r n s us to the q u e s ­
t i o n c o n c e r n i n g the status o f the " i m p r e s s i o n " that i s a c t i v e l y
r e a n i m a t e d a n d r e l i v e d , a n d w h i c h , i n a n d t h r o u g h its r e a n i ­
m a t i o n , establishes the p r o t r a c t e d c o n t i n u i t y o f the w i l l . "If
s o m e t h i n g i s t o stay i n the m e m o r y , i t m u s t b e b u r n e d i n ; o n l y
that w h i c h n e v e r ceases t o hurt stays i n the m e m o r y " (61/295).
A n d w e t h e n l e a r n o f the " t e r r o r " that f o r m e r l y a t t e n d e d a l l
p r o m i s e s . I s t h i s " t e r r o r , " t h e n , t o be c o n s t r u e d as the " i m p r e s ­
s i o n " that w o r k s a s the m n e m o n i c d e v i c e w h e r e b y the w i l l
m a k e s itself r e g u l a r a n d c a l c u l a b l e ? B y s e c t i o n 4 , N i e t z s c h e
p o s es the q u e s t i o n o f b a d c o n s c i e n c e e x p l i c i t l y , b u t c o n t i n u e s
t o treat i t a s i f i t w e r e q u i t e separate f r o m c o n s c i e n c e itself. H e
a s k s : H o w d i d "that o t h e r ' s o m b e r t h i n g , ' the c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f
g u i l t , the ' b a d c o n s c i e n c e , ' c o m e i n t o the w o r l d ? " (62/297). B u t
is it other? Is there a w a y for the w i l l to b e c o m e r e g u l a r , to b e ­
c o m e the p r o t r a c t e d c o n t i n u i t y w h i c h u n d e r w r i t e s the p r o m ­
ise, w i t h o u t b e c o m i n g subject t o the l o g i c o f b a d c o n s c i e n c e ?
W e l l ­ k n o w n d i s c u s s i o n s o f the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n d e b t a n d
g u i l t f o l l o w ( 6 2 ­ 6 3 / 2 9 7 ­ 9 8 ) , i n w h i c h the f a i l u r e t o r e p a y a
l o a n a w a k e n s the d e s i r e f o r c o m p e n s a t i o n i n the c r e d i t o r , a n d
i n j u r y i s i n f l i c t e d o n the d e b t o r . T h e a t t r i b u t i o n o f m o r a l ac­
c o u n t a b i l i t y t o the d e b t o r t h u s r a t i o n a l i z e s the d e s i r e o f the
c r e d i t o r t o p u n i s h the d e b t o r . W i t h that n o t i o n o f " a c c o u n t ­
a b i l i t y " emerges a w h o l e p a n o p l y of m o r a l l y saturated psy­
c h i c p h e n o m e n a : i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , e v e n c e r t a i n v e r s i o n s o f the
w i l l itself. B u t the d e s i r e t o p u n i s h c a n n o t b e f u l l y a c c o u n t e d
f o r b y the c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f the b r o k e n c o n t r a c t . W h y d o e s the
c r e d i t o r t a k e p l e a s u r e i n the i n f l i c t i o n o f i n j u r y , a n d w h a t f o r m
does that p l e a s u r e t a k e w h e n i n j u r y i s i n f l i c t e d i n the m o r ­
a l i z e d a c t i o n b y w h i c h the c r e d i t o r h o l d s the d e b t o r m o r a l l y
accountable a n d p r o n o u n c e s h i m g u i l t y ? W h a t strange con­
s u m m a t i o n o f p l e a s u r e takes p l a c e i n that a t t r i b u t i o n o f g u i l t ?
74 Circuits of B a d Conscience
T h i s a c c o u n t o f h o w the a t t r i b u t i o n o f g u i l t o r i g i n a t e s i s n o t
yet the f o r m a t i o n o f b a d c o n s c i e n c e ( w h i c h w o u l d , o f c o u r s e ,
b e the s e l f ­ a t t r i b u t i o n o r s e l f ­ i n f l i c t i o n o f g u i l t ) . I t p r e s u p ­
p o s e s that a c o n t r a c t has b e e n b r o k e n , a n d the existenc e of the
c o n t r a c t p r e s u p p o s e s the i n s t i t u t i o n o f p r o m i s i n g . I n d e e d , the
d e b t o r i s o n e w h o fails t o k e e p h i s p r o m i s e , p r o t r a c t h i s w i l l ,
a n d d i s c h a r g e h i s w o r d i n the e x e c u t i o n o f a n act.
T h e p u n i s h m e n t o f the d e b t o r t h u s p r e s u p p o s e s the m o d e l
o r i d e a l o f the p r o m i s i n g a n i m a l , y e t t h i s p r o m i s i n g a n i m a l
c o u l d n o t c o m e i n t o b e i n g w i t h o u t the i m p r e s s i o n s o f t e r r o r
p r o d u c e d b y p u n i s h m e n t . T h e p u n i s h m e n t o f the d e b t o r a p ­
p e a r s t o e m e r g e i n r e s p o n s e t o a n i n j u r y , the d e b t b e i n g cast
as that i n j u r y , b u t the r e s p o n s e takes on a m e a n i n g that ex­
ceeds the e x p l i c i t p u r p o s e o f a c h i e v i n g c o m p e n s a t i o n . F o r the
p u n i s h m e n t i s p l e a s u r a b l e , a n d the i n f l i c t i o n o f i n j u r y i s c o n ­
s t r u e d as a s e d u c t i o n to life ( 6 6 ­ 6 7 / 3 0 1 ­ 2 ) .
I f t h i s c o m p l i c a t e d scene a n i m a t e s the c r e d i t o r , h o w d o w e
u n d e r s t a n d the f o r m a t i o n o f b a d c o n s c i e n c e i n the d e b t o r ?
N i e t z s c h e w r i t e s , " P u n i s h m e n t i s s u p p o s e d t o h a v e the v a l u e
o f a w a k e n i n g the f e e l i n g o f g u i l t i n the g u i l t y p e r s o n ; o n e
seeks in it the a c t u a l instrumentum of that p s y c h i c a l r e a c t i o n
c a l l e d ' b a d c o n s c i e n c e , ' ' s t i n g o f c o n s c i e n c e ' " (81/318).
B u t N i e t z s c h e takes h i s d i s t a n c e f r o m t h i s f o r m u l a t i o n ,
s i n c e n o t m e r e l y p s y c h i c r e a c t i o n s , b u t the p s y c h e itself i s
the i n s t r u m e n t o f t h i s p u n i s h m e n t . T h e i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n o f i n ­
s t i n c t — w h i c h takes p l a c e w h e n the i n s t i n c t does n o t i m m e d i ­
a t e l y d i s c h a r g e a s the d e e d — i s u n d e r s t o o d t o p r o d u c e the s o u l
o r the p s y c h e i n s t e a d ; the p r e s s u r e e x e r t e d f r o m the w a l l s o f
s o c i e t y forces a n i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n w h i c h c u l m i n a t e s i n the p r o ­
d u c t i o n o f the s o u l , t h i s p r o d u c t i o n b e i n g u n d e r s t o o d a s a p r i ­
m a r y a r t i s t i c a c c o m p l i s h m e n t , the f a b r i c a t i o n o f a n i d e a l . T h i s
f a b r i c a t i o n a p p e a r s t o take the p l a c e o f the p r o m i s e , the w o r d
Nietzsche and Freud 75
a c t u a l i z e d a s d e e d , a n d t o e m e r g e o n the c o n d i t i o n that the
p r o m i s e has b e e n b r o k e n . B u t r e c a l l that the e x e c u t i o n o f the
d e e d w a s n o t w i t h o u t its f a b r i c a t i o n s : o n e effect o f the p r o m ­
ise i s t o p r o d u c e a n "I" w h i c h m i g h t s t a n d f o r itself across
t i m e . T h u s , the f a b r i c a t i o n o f s u c h a n "I" i s the p a r a d o x i c a l r e ­
s u l t o f the p r o m i s e . T h e " I " b e c o m e s c o n t i n u o u s w i t h its d e e d ,
b u t its d e e d is, p a r a d o x i c a l l y , t o create the c o n t i n u i t y of itself.
B a d c o n s c i e n c e w o u l d b e the f a b r i c a t i o n o f i n f e r i o r i t y that
attends the b r e a k i n g o f a p r o m i s e , the d i s c o n t i n u i t y o f the w i l l ,
b u t the " I " w h o w o u l d k e e p the p r o m i s e i s p r e c i s e l y the c u l ­
t i v a t e d effect o f t h i s c o n t i n u o u s f a b r i c a t i o n o f i n f e r i o r i t y . C a n
there e v e n b e a p r o m i s i n g b e i n g , o n e w h o i s able t o d i s c h a r g e
w o r d s i n t o deeds , w i t h o u t the b a d c o n s c i e n c e w h i c h f o r m s
the v e r y " I " w h o m a k e s g o o d h i s w o r d t h r o u g h t i m e , w h o has
a m e m o r y o f the w i l l , a n d f o r w h o m the p s y c h e has a l r e a d y
been produced?
N i e t z s c h e d e s c r i b e s " b a d c o n s c i e n c e i n its b e g i n n i n g s " a s
the "instinct for freedom f o r c i b l y m a d e l a t e n t " (87/325). But
w h e r e i s the trace o f t h i s f r e e d o m i n the s e l f ­ s h a c k l i n g that
N i e t z s c h e d e s c r i b e s ? I t i s t o b e f o u n d i n the p l e a s u r e t a k e n i n
a f f l i c t i n g p a i n , a p l e a s u r e t a k e n i n a f f l i c t i n g p a i n o n oneself
i n the s e r v i c e of, i n the n a m e of, m o r a l i t y . T h i s p l e a s u r e i n af­
f l i c t i o n , a t t r i b u t e d e a r l i e r t o the c r e d i t o r , t h u s b e c o m e s , u n d e r
the p r e s s u r e o f the s o c i a l c o n t r a c t , a n i n t e r n a l i z e d p l e a s u r e ,
the j o y o f p e r s e c u t i n g oneself. T h e o r i g i n o f b a d c o n s c i e n c e is,
thus , the j o y t a k e n i n p e r s e c u t i n g oneself, w h e r e the self p e r s e ­
c u t e d d o e s n o t exist o u t s i d e the o r b i t o f that p e r s e c u t i o n . B u t
the i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n o f p u n i s h m e n t i s the v e r y p r o d u c t i o n o f the
self, a n d i t i s i n t h i s p r o d u c t i o n that p l e a s u r e a n d f r e e d o m are
c u r i o u s l y l o c a t e d . P u n i s h m e n t i s n o t m e r e l y p r o d u c t i v e o f the
self, b u t t h i s v e r y p r o d u c t i v i t y o f p u n i s h m e n t i s the site for
the f r e e d o m a n d p l e a s u r e o f the w i l l , its f a b r i c a t i n g a c t i v i t y .
7 6 Circuits of Bad Conscience
A s a p e c u l i a r d e f o r m a t i o n o f a r t i s t r y ( w h i c h is, o f c o u r s e ,
i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m its p r i m a r y f o r m a t i o n ) , s e l f ­ c o n s c i o u s ­
ness i s the f o r m the w i l l takes w h e n i t i s p r e v e n t e d f r o m
s i m p l e e x p r e s s i o n a s a d e e d . B u t i s the m o d e l b y w h i c h a n i n ­
s t i n c t o r a w i l l expresses o r d i s c h a r g e s itself i n a d e e d i n a n y
sense p r i o r t o t h i s s e l f ­ t h w a r t e d e x p r e s s i o n o f b a d c o n s c i e n c e ?
C a n there b e a m o d e l o f p r o m i s i n g that d o e s n o t f r o m the first
presuppose b a d conscience? The noble is described earlier as
one for w h o m his w o r k i s "an instinctive creation a n d i m p o s i ­
t i o n o f f o r m s . . . the m o s t i n v o l u n t a r y a n d u n c o n s c i o u s artists
[that] there a r e " (86/325). T h e s o u l is p r e c i s e l y w h a t a c e r t a i n
v i o l e n t a r t i s t r y p r o d u c e s w h e n i t takes itself a s its o w n object.
T h e s o u l , the p s y c h e , i s n o t there p r i o r t o t h i s r e f l e x i v e m o v e ,
b u t t h i s r e f l e x i v e t u r n i n g o f the w i l l a g a i n s t itself p r o d u c e s i n
its w a k e the m e t a p h o r i c s o f p s y c h i c life.
If we u n d e r s t a n d the s o u l to be the effect of i m p o s i n g a
f o r m u p o n oneself, w h e r e the f o r m i s t a k e n t o b e e q u i v a l e n t
t o the s o u l , t h e n there c a n b e n o p r o t r a c t e d w i l l , n o " I " that
s t a n d s f o r itself t h r o u g h t i m e , w i t h o u t t h i s s e l f ­ i m p o s i t i o n o f
f o r m , t h i s m o r a l l a b o r i n g o n oneself. T h i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y a r t i s ­
tic p r o d u c t i o n o f b a d c o n s c i e n c e , the p r o d u c t i o n o f a " f o r m "
f r o m a n d o f the w i l l , i s d e s c r i b e d b y N i e t z s c h e a s "the w o m b
o f a l l i d e a l a n d i m a g i n a t i v e p h e n o m e n a " (87/326). B a d c o n ­
s c i e n c e i s f a b r i c a t e d , b u t i t i n t u r n i s c r e d i t e d w i t h the f a b r i ­
c a t i o n o f a l l i d e a l a n d i m a g i n a t i v e p h e n o m e n a . I s there, t h e n ,
a n y w a y t o a n s w e r the q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r a r t i s t r y p r e c e d e s
b a d c o n s c i e n c e o r i s its r e s u l t ? I s there a n y w a y t o p o s t u l a t e
s o m e t h i n g b e f o r e t h i s " t u r n i n g b a c k u p o n itself " w h i c h i s the
t r o p i c f o u n d a t i o n o f the subject a n d a l l a r t i s t r y , i n c l u d i n g a l l
i m a g i n a t i o n a n d c o n c e p t u a l life?
I f b a d c o n s c i e n c e originates imaginative and ideal phe­
Nietzsche and Freud 77
nomena, then it is difficult to imagine w h i c h of Nietzsche's
fabulous genealogical terms w o u l d not finally be attributable
to t h i s b a d c o n s c i e n c e. I n d e e d , h i s p r o j e c t of o f f e r i n g a g e n e a l ­
o g y o f b a d c o n s c i e n c e a p p e a r s t o f o u n d e r w h e n the v e r y t e r m s
h e w i l l u s e t o a c c o u n t for t h i s f o r m a t i o n t u r n o u t t o b e the
effect o f t h i s f o r m a t i o n itself. E l s e w h e r e h e w i l l refuse, for i n ­
stance, t o a c c e p t the n o t i o n o f the w i l l a s a c o n c e p t u a l g i v e n .
In Beyond Good and Evil, he w r i t e s , " w i l l i n g s e e ms to me to
be . . . s o m e t h i n g complicated, s o m e t h i n g that is a u n i t o n l y as a
w o r d . " O n c e w i l l i n g i s e l e v a t e d t o the status o f a p h i l o s o p h i ­
2
cal concept, he writes, it is of necessity a k i n d of fiction. The
s a m e w o u l d c l e a r l y h o l d for the n o t i o n o f " i n s t i n c t , " a n d a l s o
for the effort t o a c c o u n t c h r o n o l o g i c a l l y o r s e q u e n t i a l l y f o r
h o w a n y t h i n g c a n b e d e r i v e d f r o m the w i l l , o r the w i l l f r o m
a n y t h i n g else: "one s h o u l d u s e 'cause' a n d 'effect' o n l y a s p u r e
c o n c e p t s , that is to say, as c o n v e n t i o n a l f i c t i o n s for the p u r p o s e
o f d e s i g n a t i o n a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n — n o t for e x p l a n a t i o n . " 3
In
On the Genealogy of Morals, he reiterates that c o n c e p t u a l i z a ­
t i o n e m e r g e s f r o m the g e n e a l o g y o f t o r t u r e a s the p r o m i s e o f
a c e r t a i n escape: c o n c e p t s , he w r i t e s , are an effort to g a i n r e ­
lease f r o m a t o r t u r e . Is the v e r y c o n c e p t u a l a p p a r a t u s of On
the Genealogy of Morals i m p l i c a t e d in t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n , a n d is
N i e t z s c h e ' s text t h e n a n effort t o escape f r o m the t o r t u r e s o f
b a d c o n s c i e n c e , a l t h o u g h i t o w e s its life, a s i t w e r e , t o that v e r y
source?
I f a l l " i m a g i n a t i v e p h e n o m e n a " are the r e s u l t o f t h i s v i o l e n t
i n t e r i o r i z a t i o n , i t f o l l o w s that the g e n e a l o g i c a l a c c o u n t w i l l b e
o n e of these p h e n o m e n a , a n a r r a t i v e effect of the n a r r a t i v e it
seeks t o t e l l . T h e u n m a s k i n g o f the n a r r a t i v e i s its r e m a s k i n g —
i n e v i t a b l y . I n d e e d , i t seems that the v e r y c r e a t i v i t y o n e seeks
t o o p p o s e t o the i n h i b i t i o n o f s t r e n g t h i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y d e ­
 Circuits of Bad Conscience
78
p e n d e n t o n that v e r y i n h i b i t i o n . I n t h i s sense, r e p r e s s i o n a p ­
p e a r s t o u n d e r w r i t e o r g u a r a n t e e b o t h the b e i n g w h o p r o m i s e s
a n d the w r i t e r o f f i c t i o n , i n c l u d i n g c o n c e p t u a l f i c t i o n s s u c h a s
g e n e a l o g y. T h e u n i t y o f w i l l a t t r i b u t e d t o the p r o m i s i n g i s itself
the effect of a r e p r e s s i o n , a f o r g e t f u l n e s s , a n o t ­ r e m e m b e r i n g
o f the satisfactions w h i c h a p p e a r t o p r e c e d e r e p r e s s i o n , a n d
w h i c h repression makes sure w i l l not appear again.
Freud, Narcissism, and Regulation
I n t h i s f i n a l s e c t i o n , I w o u l d l i k e t o r e t u r n t o the p r o b l e m o f
social regulation, not as acting on a psyche, but as c o m p l i c i ­
t o u s i n the f o r m a t i o n o f the p s y c h e a n d its d e s i r e . T o that e n d ,
I p r o p o s e a d e t o u r t h r o u g h F r e u d ; the N i e t z s c h e a n r e s o n a n c e s
i n h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f c o n s c i e n c e w i l l b e c o m e clear.
The postulation of repression's p r i m a c y brings us directly
t o F r e u d , a n d t o a r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the p r o b l e m o f p u n ­
i s h m e n t i n r e l a t i o n t o the f o r m a t i o n o f c o n s c i e n c e a n d s o c i a l
s u b j e c t i o n . I f t h i s s u b j e c t i o n i s n o t m e c h a n i s t i c , n o t the s i m p l e
effect o f a n i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n , t h e n h o w c a n w e u n d e r s t a n d the
p s y c h i c e n g a g e m e n t w i t h s u b j e c t i o n i n a w a y that d o e s n o t d i s ­
j o i n the d i s c o u r s e o f s e l f ­ s u b j e c t i o n f r o m the p r o b l e m o f s o c i a l
regulation? H o w can cultivating a narcissistic attachment to
p u n i s h m e n t b e the m e a n s b y w h i c h the p o w e r o f s o c i a l r e g u ­
l a t i o n e x p l o i t s a n a r c i s s i s t i c d e m a n d for s e l f ­ r e f l e c t i on w h i c h
is i n d i f f e r e n t to its o c c a s i o n ?
T h i s s u g g e s t i o n o f n a r c i s s i s m is, I w o u l d suggest, a l r e a d y
a t w o r k i n N i e t z s c h e . T h e ascetic i d e a l , u n d e r s t o o d a s a w i l l
to nothingness, is a w a y of i n t e r p r e t i n g a l l suffering as guilt.
W h e r e a s g u i l t w o r k s t o d e n y a s p e c i f i c k i n d o f object f o r
h u m a n w a n t s , i t c a n n o t o b l i t e r a t e the w a n t i n g c h a r a c t e r o f
h u m a n s . A c c o r d i n g t o the dictates o f g u i l t , t h e n , " m a n h a d
Nietzsche and Freud 79
o n l y t o want s o m e t h i n g — a n d t o b e g i n w i t h , i t m a t t e r e d n o t
w h a t , w h e r e t o , or h o w he w a n t e d : the will itself was saved"
(162/411).
I n h i s a n a l y s i s o f n e u r o s i s , F r e u d u n d e r s t o o d t h i s differ­
ently, a s a k i n d o f l i b i d i n a l a t t a c h m e n t t o a p r o h i b i t i o n w h i c h
has a s its p u r p o s e the t h w a r t i n g o f l i b i d i n a l g r a t i f i c a t i o n .
W h e r e that t h w a r t i n g c o n s t i t u t e s a r e p r e s s i o n , the r e p r e s s i o n
i s s u s t a i n e d b y the l i b i d o that i t seeks t o t h w a r t . I n n e u r o ­
sis, the e t h i c a l r e g u l a t i o n o f b o d i l y i m p u l s e b e c o m e s the f o c u s
a n d a i m o f i m p u l s e itself. H e r e w e are g i v e n t o u n d e r s t a n d a n
a t t a c h m e n t t o s u b j e c t i o n w h i c h i s f o r m a t i v e o f the r e f l e x i v e
structure o f subjection. The i m p u l s e w h i c h w o u l d b e negated
i s i n a d v e r t e n t l y preserved b y that v e r y n e g a t i n g a c t i v i t y .
W e c a n hear a r e s o n a n c e o f N i e t z s c h e w h e n F r e u d d e ­
scribe s the p r o c e s s b y w h i c h l i b i d o c o m e s u n d e r the c e n s o r
of the l a w o n l y to r e e m e r g e as the s u s t a i n i n g affect of that
l a w . T h e r e p r e s s i o n o f the l i b i d o i s a l w a y s t o b e u n d e r s t o o d
as itself a l i b i d i n a l l y i n v e s t e d r e p r e s s i o n . H e n c e , the l i b i d o is
n o t a b s o l u t e l y n e g a t e d t h r o u g h r e p r e s s i o n , b u t r a t h er b e c o m e s
the i n s t r u m e n t o f its o w n s u b j e c t i o n . T h e r e p r e s s i v e l a w i s
n o t e x t e r n a l t o the l i b i d o that i t represses, b u t the r e p r e s s i v e
l a w represses t o the extent that r e p r e s s i o n b e c o m e s a l i b i d i ­
n a l a c t i v i t y . F u r t h e r , m o r a l i n t e r d i c t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y t h o s e that
are t u r n e d a g a i n s t the b o d y , are t h e m s e l v e s s u s t a i n e d b y the
b o d i l y a c t i v i t y that t h e y seek t o c u r b .
T h e desire to desire is a w i l l i n g n e s s to desire precisely w h a t
w o u l d foreclos e d e s i r e , i f o n l y for the p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n t i n u i n g
t o d e s i r e . T h i s d e s i r e f o r d e s i r e i s e x p l o i t e d i n the p r o c e s s o f
s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n , f o r i f the t e r m s b y w h i c h w e g a i n s o c i a l r e c ­
o g n i t i o n for o u r s e l v e s are t h o s e b y w h i c h w e are r e g u l a t e d and
g a i n s o c i a l existence, t h e n t o a f f i r m o n e ' s e x i s t e n c e i s t o c a p i t u ­
late t o one's s u b o r d i n a t i o n — a s o r r y b i n d . H o w p r e c i s e l y t h i s
80 Circuits of Bad Conscience
narcissistic attachment to attachment is exploited by mecha­
n i s m s o f s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n i s i n a d v e r t e n t l y m a d e c l e ar i n a set
o f s p e c u l a t i o n s that F r e u d offers o n the r e p r e s s i o n o f h o m o ­
s e x u a l i t y a n d the f o r m a t i o n o f c o n s c i e n c e a n d c i t i z e n s h i p . I n
" O n the M e c h a n i s m o f P a r a n o i a , " h e l i n k s the s u p p r e s s i o n o f
h o m o s e x u a l d r i v e s t o the p r o d u c t i o n o f s o c i a l f e e l i n g . A t the
e n d o f that p i e c e , h e r e m a r k s that " h o m o s e x u a l d r i v e s " h e l p
t o c o n s t i t u t e "the s o c i a l i n s t i n c t s , t h u s c o n t r i b u t i n g a n e r o t i c
factor to f r i e n d s h i p a n d c o m r a d e s h i p , to esprit de corps a n d to
the l o v e o f m a n k i n d i n g e n e r a l . " A t the c l o s e o f the essay " O n
4 conscience) i s i n d e e d the cause o f i n s t i n c t u a l r e n u n c i a t i o n t o
N a r c i s s i s m , " h e m i g h t b e r e a d a s s p e c i f y i n g the l o g i c w h e r e b y
t h i s p r o d u c t i o n o f s o c i a l f e e l i n g takes p l a c e . T h e " e g o ­ i d e a l , "
h e w r i t e s , has a s o c i a l s i d e : " i t i s a l s o the c o m m o n i d e a l o f
a f a m i l y , a class or a n a t i o n . It n o t o n l y b i n d s the n a r c i s s i s t i c
l i b i d o , b u t a l s o a c o n s i d e r a b l e a m o u n t o f the p e r s o n ' s h o m o ­
s e x u a l l i b i d o , w h i c h i n t h i s w a y b e c o m e s t u r n e d b a c k i n t o the
ego. T h e d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n d u e t o the n o n ­ f u l f i l l m e n t o f the i d e a l
liberates h o m o s e x u a l l i b i d o , w h i c h i s t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o sense
o f g u i l t ( d r e a d o f the c o m m u n i t y ) . " 5
This transformation of
h o m o s e x u a l i t y i n t o g u i l t a n d , therefore, i n t o the basis o f s o c i a l
f e e l i n g takes p l a c e w h e n the fear o f p a r e n t a l p u n i s h m e n t b e ­
c o m e s g e n e r a l i z e d a s the d r e a d o f l o s i n g the l o v e o f f e l l o w
m e n . P a r a n o i a i s the w a y i n w h i c h that l o v e i s c o n s i s t e n t l y
r e i m a g i n e d a s a l w a y s a l m o s t w i t h d r a w n , a n d i t is, p a r a d o x i ­
c a l l y , fear o f l o s i n g that l o v e w h i c h m o t i v a t e s the s u b l i m a t i o n
or introversion of homosexuality. Indeed, this s u b l i m a t i o n is
n o t q u i t e a s i n s t r u m e n t a l a s i t m a y s o u n d , for i t i s n o t that o n e
d i s a v o w s h o m o s e x u a l i t y i n o r d e r t o g a i n the l o v e o f f e l l o w
m e n , b u t that a c e r t a i n h o m o s e x u a l i t y c a n o n l y b e a c h i e v e d
a n d c o n t a i n e d through t h i s d i s a v o w a l .
A n o t h e r place in F r e u d w h e r e this becomes v e r y clear is
the d i s c u s s i o n of the f o r m a t i o n of c o n s c i e n c e in Civilization and
Nietzsche and Freud 81
Its Discontents, w h e r e it t u r n s o u t that the p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t
h o m o s e x u a l i t y w h i c h c o n s c i e n c e i s s a i d t o enact o r a r t i c u l a t e
f o u n d s a n d c o n s t i t u t e s c o n s c i e n c e itself a s a p s y c h i c p h e n o m e ­
n o n . T h e p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t the d e s i r e i s that d e s i r e a s i t t u r n s
b a c k u p o n itself, a n d t h i s t u r n i n g b a c k u p o n itself b e c o m e s the
v e r y i n c e p t i o n , the v e r y a c t i o n o f w h a t i s r e n d e r e d e n t i t a t i v e
t h r o u g h the t e r m " c o n s c i e n c e ."
F r e u d w r i t e s in Civilization and Its Discontents "that c o n ­
scienc e (or m o r e c o r r e c t l y , the a n x i e t y w h i c h later b e c o m e s
b e g i n w i t h , b u t that later the r e l a t i o n s h i p i s r e v e r s e d . E v e r y
renunciation of instinct n o w becomes a d y n a m i c source of
c o n s c i e n c e a n d e v e r y f r e s h r e n u n c i a t i o n increase s the latter's
severity a n d intolerance." 6
A c c o r d i n g t o F r e u d , t h e n , the s e l f ­ i m p o s e d i m p e r a t i v e s that
c h a r a c t e r i z e the c i r c u l a r r o u t e o f c o n s c i e n c e are p u r s u e d a n d
a p p l i e d p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e t h e y are n o w the site o f the v e r y sat­
i s f a c t i o n that t h e y seek t o p r o h i b i t . I n o t h e r w o r d s , p r o h i b i t i o n
b e c o m e s the o c c a s i o n for r e l i v i n g the i n s t i n c t u n d e r the r u b r i c
o f the c o n d e m n i n g l a w . P r o h i b i t i o n r e p r o d u c e s the p r o h i b i t e d
d e s i r e a n d b e c o m e s i n t e n s i f i e d t h r o u g h the r e n u n c i a t i o n s i t
effects. T h e "afterlife" o f p r o h i b i t e d d e s i r e takes p l a c e t h r o u g h
the p r o h i b i t i o n itself, w h e r e the p r o h i b i t i o n n o t o n l y s u s t a i n s ,
b u t is sustained by the d e s i r e that it forces i n t o r e n u n c i a t i o n .
I n t h i s sense, t h e n , r e n u n c i a t i o n takes p l a c e t h r o u g h the v e r y
d e s i r e that is r e n o u n c e d : the d e s i r e is never r e n o u n c e d , b u t
b e c o m e s p r e s e r v e d a n d r e a s s e r t e d i n the v e r y s t r u c t u r e o f r e ­
nunciation.
T h i s e x a m p l e l e a d s u s b a c k t o the t r o p e w i t h w h i c h w e
b e g a n , the f i g u r e o f c o n s c i e n c e a s t u r n i n g b a c k o n itself a s i f
it w e r e a b o d y r e c o i l e d on itself, r e c o i l e d at the t h o u g h t of its
d e s i r e , f o r w h o m its d e s i r e i s s y m p t o m a t i z e d a s that p o s t u r e
 r

82 Circuits of Bad Conscience

o f r e c o i l . C o n s c i e n c e i s t h u s f i g u r e d a s a b o d y w h i c h takes
itself as its object, f o r c e d i n t o a p e r m a n e n t p o s t u r e of n e g a ­
t i v e n a r c i s s i s m or, m o r e p r e c i s e l y , a n a r c i s s i s t i c a l l y n o u r i s h e d
self­beratemen t ( t h e n , m i s t a k e n l y , i d e n t i f i e d w i t h a n a r c i s s i s ­
t i c stage).
C o n s i d e r — a s a p a r t i n g s h o t — h o w the c o n t e m p o r a r y efforts
Subjection, Resistance,
t o r e g u l a t e h o m o s e x u a l i t y w i t h i n the U . S . m i l i t a r y are t h e m ­ Resignification
selves the r e g u l a t o r y f o r m a t i o n o f the m a s c u l i n e subject, o n e
Between Freud and Foucault
w h o consecrates h i s i d e n t i t y t h r o u g h renunciation a s a n act o f
s p e e c h : to say "I am a h o m o s e x u a l " is fine as l o n g as o n e
a l s o promises " a n d I d o n ' t i n t e n d to act." T h i s , the s u p p r e s s i o n
a n d s u s t a i n i n g o f h o m o s e x u a l i t y i n a n d t h r o u g h the c i r c u l a r
p o s t u r e b y w h i c h a b o d y utters its o w n r e n u n c i a t i o n , accedes
t o its r e g u l a t i o n t h r o u g h the p r o m i s e . B u t that p e r f o r m a t i v e
M y p r o b l e m i s essentially the d e f i n i t i o n o f the i m p l i c i t
u t t e r a n c e , h o w e v e r c o m p e l l e d , w i l l b e subject t o i n f e l i c i t y , t o systems in w h i c h we find ourselves prisoners; what I w o u l d
s p e a k i n g o t h e r w i s e , t o r e c i t i n g o n l y h a l f the sentence, d e f o r m ­ l i k e t o grasp i s the s y s t e m o f l i m i t s a n d e x c l u s i o n w h i c h

i n g the p r o m i s e , r e f o r m u l a t i n g the c o n f e s s i o n a s d e f i a n c e , r e ­ w e p r a c t i c e w i t h o u t k n o w i n g it; I w o u l d l i k e t o m a k e the

m a i n i n g silent. T h i s o p p o s i t i o n w i l l d r a w f r o m a n d oppose
the p o w e r b y w h i c h i t i s c o m p e l l e d , a n d t h i s s h o r t c i r c u i t i n g
of r e g u l a t o r y p o w e r c o n s t i t u t e s the p o s s i b i l i t y of a postmoral
g e s t u r e t o w a r d a less r e g u l a r f r e e d o m , o n e that f r o m the p e r ­
s p e c t i v e of a less c o d i f i a b l e set of v a l u e s calls i n t o q u e s t i o n the
values of morality.
cultural unconscious apparent.
— Foucault, "Rituals of E x c l u s i o n "
C o n s i d e r , in Discipline and Punish, the p a r a d o x i c a l c h a r a c ­
ter o f w h a t F o u c a u l t d e s c r i b e s a s the s u b j e c t i v a t i o n o f
the p r i s o n e r . T h e t e r m " s u b j e c t i v a t i o n " c a r r i e s the p a r a d o x i n
itself: assujetissement d e n o t e s b o t h the b e c o m i n g of the subject
a n d the p r o c e s s o f s u b j e c t i o n — o n e i n h a b i t s the f i g u r e o f a u ­
t o n o m y o n l y by b e c o m i n g subjected to a power, a subjection
w h i c h i m p l i e s a r a d i c a l dependency. F o r F o u c a u l t , this p r o ­
cess o f s u b j e c t i v a t i o n takes p l a c e c e n t r a l l y t h r o u g h the b o d y .
In Discipline and Punish the p r i s o n e r ' s b o d y n o t o n l y a p p e a r s
as a sign of g u i l t a n d t r a n s g r e s s i o n , as the e m b o d i m e n t of p r o ­
h i b i t i o n a n d the s a n c t i o n for r i t u a l s o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n , b u t i s
 Subjection, Resistance, Resignification
84
f r a m e d a n d f o r m e d t h r o u g h the d i s c u r s i v e m a t r i x o f a j u r i d i ­
c a l subject. T h e c l a i m that a d i s c o u r s e " f o r m s " the b o d y i s n o
s i m p l e one, a n d f r o m the start w e m u s t d i s t i n g u i s h h o w s u c h
" f o r m i n g " is n o t the s a m e as a " c a u s i n g " or " d e t e r m i n i n g , " s t i l l
less is it a n o t i o n that b o d i e s are s o m e h o w m a d e of d i s c o u r s e
pure and simple. 1 t i o n o f gender. T h e p r i s o n t h u s acts o n the p r i s o n e r ' s b o d y ,
F o u c a u l t suggests that the p r i s o n e r i s n o t r e g u l a t e d b y a n
exterior r e l a t i o n of p o w e r , w h e r e b y an i n s t i t u t i o n takes a p r e ­
g i v e n i n d i v i d u a l a s the target o f its s u b o r d i n a t i n g a i m s . O n
the c o n t r a r y , the i n d i v i d u a l i s f o r m e d or, rather, f o r m u l a t e d
t h r o u g h his discursivel y constituted " i d e n t i t y " as prisoner.
S u b j e c t i o n is, l i t e r a l l y , the making of a subject, the p r i n c i p l e
o f r e g u l a t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h a subject i s f o r m u l a t e d o r
p r o d u c e d . S u c h s u b j e c t i o n i s a k i n d o f p o w e r that n o t o n l y
u n i l a t e r a l l y acts on a g i v e n i n d i v i d u a l as a f o r m of d o m i n a ­
t i o n , b u t also activates or f o r m s the subject. H e n c e , s u b j e c t i o n
i s n e i t h e r s i m p l y the d o m i n a t i o n o f a subject n o r its p r o d u c ­
t i o n , b u t designates a c e r t a i n k i n d o f r e s t r i c t i o n i n p r o d u c t i o n ,
a r e s t r i c t i o n w i t h o u t w h i c h the p r o d u c t i o n o f the subject c a n ­
n o t t a k e p l a c e , a r e s t r i c t i o n t h r o u g h w h i c h that p r o d u c t i o n
takes p l a c e . A l t h o u g h F o u c a u l t o c c a s i o n a l l y tries t o a r g u e that
h i s t o r i c a l l y juridical p o w e r — p o w e r a c t i n g o n , s u b o r d i n a t i n g ,
p r e g i v e n subjects—precedes p r o d u c t i v e p o w e r , the c a p a c i t y o f
p o w e r to form subjects, w i t h the p r i s o n e r it is clear that the
subject p r o d u c e d a n d the subject r e g u l a t e d o r s u b o r d i n a t e d
are one, a n d that c o m p u l s o r y p r o d u c t i o n i s its o w n f o r m o f
regulation.
F o u c a u l t w a r n s agains t those w i t h i n the l i b e r a l t r a d i t i o n
w h o w o u l d l i b e r a t e the p r i s o n e r f r o m the p r i s o n ' s o p p r e s s i v e
confines , for the s u b j e c t i o n s i g n i f i e d b y the e x t e r i o r i n s t i t u t i o n
o f the p r i s o n does n o t act a p a r t f r o m the i n v a s i o n a n d m a n a g e ­
m e n t o f the p r i s o n e r ' s b o d y : w h a t F o u c a u l t d e s c r i b e s a s the
Between Freud and Foucault 85
f u l l siege a n d i n v a s i o n o f that b o d y b y the s i g n i f y i n g p r a c t i c e s
o f the p r i s o n — n a m e l y , i n s p e c t i o n , c o n f e s s i o n , the r e g u l a r i z a ­
t i o n a n d n o r m a l i z a t i o n o f b o d i l y m o v e m e n t a n d gesture, the
d i s c i p l i n a r y r e g i m e s o f the b o d y w h i c h h a v e l e d f e m i n i s t s t o
c o n s u l t F o u c a u l t i n o r d e r t o elaborate the d i s c i p l i n a r y p r o d u c ­
2
b u t i t does s o b y f o r c i n g the p r i s o n e r t o a p p r o x i m a t e a n i d e a l ,
a n o r m o f b e h a v i o r , a m o d e l o f o b e d i e n c e . T h i s i s h o w the
p r i s o n e r ' s i n d i v i d u a l i t y i s r e n d e r e d c o h e r e n t, t o t a l i z e d , m a d e
i n t o the d i s c u r s i v e a n d c o n c e p t u a l p o s s e s s i o n o f the p r i s o n ; i t
is, a s F o u c a u l t insists, the w a y i n w h i c h " h e b e c o m e s the p r i n ­
ciple of his o w n subjection." This normative ideal inculcated,
3
a s i t w e r e , i n t o the p r i s o n e r i s a k i n d o f p s y c h i c i d e n t i t y , o r
w h a t F o u c a u l t w i l l c a l l a " s o u l . " B e c a u s e the s o u l i s a n i m p r i s ­
o n i n g effect, F o u c a u l t c l a i m s that the p r i s o n e r i s subjected " i n
a m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l w a y " t h a n b y the s p a t i a l c a p t i v i t y o f the
p r i s o n . I n d e e d , i n the c i t a t i o n that f o l l o w s , the s o u l i s f i g u r e d
as itself a k i n d of s p a t i a l c a p t i v i t y , i n d e e d , as a k i n d of p r i s o n ,
w h i c h p r o v i d e s the e x t e r i o r f o r m o r r e g u l a t o r y p r i n c i p l e o f
the p r i s o n e r ' s b o d y . T h i s b e c o m e s c l e ar i n F o u c a u l t ' s f o r m u ­
l a t i o n that "the m a n d e s c r i b e d for us, w h o m w e are i n v i t e d t o
free, is a l r e a d y in h i m s e l f the effect of a s u b j e c t i o n [assujettisse­
ment] m u c h m o r e p r o f o u n d t h a n h i m s e l f . . . the s o u l is the
p r i s o n o f the b o d y " (30).
A l t h o u g h F o u c a u l t i s s p e c i f y i n g the s u b j e c t i v a t i o n o f the
p r i s o n e r here, h e a p p e a r s a ls o t o b e p r i v i l e g i n g the m e t a ­
p h o r o f the p r i s o n t o t h e o r i z e the s u b j e c t i v a t i o n o f the b o d y .
W h a t are w e t o m a k e o f i m p r i s o n m e n t a n d i n v a s i o n a s the
p r i v i l e g e d f i g u r e s t h r o u g h w h i c h F o u c a u l t a r t i c u l a t e s the p r o ­
cess o f s u b j e c t i v a t i o n , the d i s c u r s i v e p r o d u c t i o n o f i d e n t i t i e s ?
If discourse produces identity by supplying and enforcing
a r e g u l a t o r y p r i n c i p l e w h i c h t h o r o u g h l y i n v a d e s , t o t a l i z e s,
86 Subjection, Resistance, Resignification
a n d r e n d e r s c o h e r e n t the i n d i v i d u a l , t h e n i t s e e ms that e v e r y
" i d e n t i t y , " i n s o f a r as it is t o t a l i z i n g , acts as p r e c i s e l y s u c h
a " s o u l that i m p r i s o n s the b o d y . " I n w h a t sense i s t h i s s o u l
" m u c h m o r e p r o f o u n d " t h a n the p r i s o n e r h i m s e l f ? D o e s t h i s
m e a n that the s o u l p r e e x i s t s the b o d y that a n i m a t e s it? H o w
are w e t o u n d e r s t a n d s u c h a c l a i m i n the c o n t e x t o f F o u c a u l t ' s
theory of power?
R a t h e r t h a n a n s w e r that q u e s t i o n d i r e c t l y , o n e m i g h t f o r the
p u r p o s e s o f c l a r i f i c a t i o n c o u n t e r p o s e the " s o u l , " w h i c h F o u ­
c a u l t a r t i c u l a t e s a s a n i m p r i s o n i n g f r a m e , t o the p s y c h e i n the
p s y c h o a n a l y t i c sense. I n the p s y c h e , the subject's i d e a l c o r r e ­
4 t i q u e , s o m e r o m a n t i c i z e d n o t i o n s o f the u n c o n s c i o u s d e f i n e d
s p o n d s t o the e g o ­ i d e a l , w h i c h the s u p e r ­ e g o i s s a i d t o c o n ­
s u l t , a s i t w e r e , i n o r d e r t o m e a s u r e the ego. L a c a n r e d e s c r i b e s
t h i s i d e a l a s the " p o s i t i o n " o f the subject w i t h i n the s y m b o l i c ,
the n o r m that i n s t a l l s the subject w i t h i n l a n g u a g e a n d h e n c e
w i t h i n available schemes of c u l t u r a l intelligibility. This viable
a n d i n t e l l i g i b l e b e i n g , t h i s subject, i s a l w a y s p r o d u c e d a t a
cost, a n d w h a t e v e r resists the n o r m a t i v e d e m a n d b y w h i c h
subjects are i n s t i t u t e d r e m a i n s u n c o n s c i o u s . T h u s the p s y c h e ,
w h i c h i n c l u d e s the u n c o n s c i o u s , i s v e r y d i f f e r e n t f r o m the
subject: the p s y c h e i s p r e c i s e l y w h a t exceed s the i m p r i s o n i n g
effects of the d i s c u r s i v e d e m a n d to i n h a b i t a c o h e r e n t i d e n ­
tity, to b e c o m e a c o h e r e n t subject. T h e p s y c h e is w h a t resists
the r e g u l a r i z a t i o n that F o u c a u l t a s c r i b e s t o n o r m a l i z i n g d i s ­
c o u r s e s . T h o s e d i s c o u r s e s are s a i d to i m p r i s o n the b o d y in the
soul, t o a n i m a t e a n d c o n t a i n the b o d y w i t h i n that i d e a l f r a m e ,
a n d t o that extent r e d u c e the n o t i o n o f the p s y c h e t o the o p e r a ­
tions of an externally framing a n d n o r m a l i z i n g ideal. 5
This
F o u c a u l t i a n m o v e a p p e a r s t o treat the p s y c h e a s i f i t r e c e i v e d
u n i l a t e r a l l y the effect o f the L a c a n i a n s y m b o l i c . T h e t r a n s p o s i ­
t i o n o f the s o u l i n t o a n e x t e r i o r a n d i m p r i s o n i n g f r a m e f o r the
b o d y vacates, a s i t w e r e , the i n f e r i o r i t y o f the b o d y , l e a v i n g
Between Freud and Foucault 87
that i n f e r i o r i t y as a m a l l e a b l e s u r f a c e for the u n i l a t e r a l effects
of disciplinary power.
I am in part m o v i n g t o w a r d a psychoanalytic criticism of
F o u c a u l t , for I t h i n k that o n e c a n n o t a c c o u n t for s u b j e c t i v a ­
t i o n a n d , i n p a r t i c u l a r , b e c o m i n g the p r i n c i p l e o f o n e ' s o w n
s u b j e c t i o n w i t h o u t r e c o u r s e to a p s y c h o a n a l y t i c a c c o u n t of the
f o r m a t i v e o r g e n e r a t i v e effects o f r e s t r i c t i o n o r p r o h i b i t i o n .
M o r e o v e r , the f o r m a t i o n o f the subject c a n n o t f u l l y b e t h o u g h t
— i f it ever can b e — w i t h o u t recourse to a p a r a d o x i c a l l y en­
a b l i n g set of g r o u n d i n g c o n s t r a i n t s . Yet as I elaborate t h i s c r i ­
as necessary resistance w i l l come u n d e r critical scrutiny, a n d
that c r i t i c i s m w i l l e n t a i l the r e e m e r g e n c e o f a F o u c a u l t i a n p e r ­
s p e c t i v e within p s y c h o a n a l y s i s . T h e q u e s t i o n of a s u p p r e s s e d
p s y c h o a n a l y s i s i n F o u c a u l t — r a i s e d b y F o u c a u l t h i m s e l f i n the
reference t o a " c u l t u r a l u n c o n s c i o u s " q u o t e d i n the e p i g r a p h
t o t h i s c h a p t e r — m i g h t b e r a i s e d m o r e p r e c i s e l y a s the p r o b ­
l e m o f l o c a t i n g o r a c c o u n t i n g f o r resistance. W h e r e d o e s r e s i s ­
tance t o o r i n d i s c i p l i n a r y subject f o r m a t i o n take p l a c e ? D o e s
the r e d u c t i o n o f the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c a l l y r i c h n o t i o n o f the p s y ­
che t o that o f the i m p r i s o n i n g s o u l e l i m i n a t e the p o s s i b i l i t y
of r e s i s t a n c e to n o r m a l i z a t i o n a n d to subject f o r m a t i o n , a r e ­
sistanc e that e m e r g e s p r e c i s e l y f r o m the i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y
b e t w e e n p s y c h e a n d subject? H o w w o u l d w e u n d e r s t a n d s u c h
resistance, a n d w o u l d s u c h a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g e n t a i l a c r i t i c a l
r e t h i n k i n g o f p s y c h o a n a l y s i s a l o n g the w a y ?
I n w h a t f o l l o w s , I w i l l ask t w o differen t k i n d s o f q u e s t i o n s ,
one of F o u c a u l t , a n d another of psychoanalysis ( a p p l y i n g this
term variously to F r e u d and to Lacan). 6
First, if Foucault
u n d e r s t a n d s the p s y c h e t o b e a n i m p r i s o n i n g effect i n the ser­
vice of n o r m a l i z a t i o n , then h o w m i g h t he account for psychic
resistance to n o r m a l i z a t i o n ? Second, w h e n some p r o p o n e n ts
88 Subjection, Resistance, Resignification
of p s y c h o a n a l y s i s i n s i s t that r e s i s t a n c e to n o r m a l i z a t i o n is a
f u n c t i o n o f the u n c o n s c i o u s , i s t h i s g u a r a n t e e o f p s y c h i c resis ­
tance m e r e l y s l e i g h t o f h a n d ? M o r e p r e c i s e l y , i s the r e s i s t a n c e
u p o n w h i c h psychoanalysis insists socially a n d discursively
p r o d u c e d , o r i s i t a k i n d o f r e s i s t a n c e to, a n u n d e r m i n i n g of,
s o c i a l a n d d i s c u r s i v e p r o d u c t i o n a s such? C o n s i d e r the c l a i m
that the u n c o n s c i o u s o n l y a n d a l w a y s resists n o r m a l i z a t i o n ,
that e v e r y r i t u a l o f c o n f o r m i t y t o the i n j u n c t i o n s o f c i v i l i z a ­
t i o n c o m e s at a cost, a n d that a c e r t a i n u n h a r n e s s e d a n d u n ­
s o c i a l i z e d r e m a i n d e r i s t h e r e b y p r o d u c e d , w h i c h contests the
a p p e a r a n c e o f the l a w ­ a b i d i n g subject. T h i s p s y c h i c r e m a i n d e r
s i g n i f i es the l i m i t s o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n . T h a t p o s i t i o n d o e s n o t
i m p l y that s u c h r e s i s t a n c e w i e l d s the p o w e r t o r e w o r k o r r e ­
a r t i c u l a t e the t e r m s o f d i s c u r s i v e d e m a n d , the d i s c i p l i n a r y i n ­
j u n c t i o n s b y w h i c h n o r m a l i z a t i o n o c c u r s . T o t h w a r t the i n j u n c ­
t i o n t o p r o d u c e a d o c i l e b o d y i s n o t the s a m e a s d i s m a n t l i n g
the i n j u n c t i o n o r c h a n g i n g the t e r m s o f subject c o n s t i t u t i o n . I f
the u n c o n s c i o u s , o r the p s y c h e m o r e g e n e r a l l y , i s d e f i n e d a s r e ­
sistance, w h a t d o w e t h e n m a k e o f u n c o n s c i o u s a t t a c h m e n t s t o
s u b j e c t i o n , w h i c h i m p l y that the u n c o n s c i o u s i s n o m o r e free o f
n o r m a l i z i n g d i s c o u r s e t h a n the subject? I f the u n c o n s c i o u s es­
capes f r o m a g i v e n n o r m a t i v e i n j u n c t i o n , t o w h a t o t h e r i n j u n c ­
t i o n d o e s i t f o r m a n a t t a c h m e n t ? W h a t m a k e s u s t h i n k that the
u n c o n s c i o u s i s a n y less s t r u c t u r e d b y the p o w e r r e l a t i o n s that
p e r v a d e c u l t u r a l s i g n i f i e r s t h a n i s the l a n g u a g e o f the subject?
I f w e f i n d a n a t t a c h m e n t t o s u b j e c t i o n a t the l e v e l o f the u n ­
c o n s c i o u s , w h a t k i n d o f r e s i s t a n c e i s t o b e w r o u g h t f r o m that?
E v e n i f w e g r a n t that u n c o n s c i o u s r e s i s t a n c e t o a n o r m a l ­
i z i n g i n j u n c t i o n g u a r a n t e e s the f a i l u r e o f that i n j u n c t i o n f u l l y
t o c o n s t i t u t e its subject, does s u c h r e s i s t a n c e d o a n y t h i n g t o
alter o r e x p a n d the d o m i n a n t i n j u n c t i o n s o r i n t e r p e l l a t i o n s o f
subject f o r m a t i o n ? W h a t d o w e m a k e o f a r e s i s t a n c e that c a n
Between Freud and Foucault 89
o n l y u n d e r m i n e , but w h i c h appears to have no p o w e r to re­
a r t i c u l a t e the t e r m s , the s y m b o l i c t e r m s — t o u s e L a c a n i a n p a r ­
l a n c e — b y w h i c h subjects are c o n s t i t u t e d , b y w h i c h s u b j e c t i o n
i s i n s t a l l e d i n the v e r y f o r m a t i o n o f the subject? T h i s r e s i s t a n c e
establishes the i n c o m p l e t e c h a r a c t e r o f a n y effort t o p r o d u c e
a subject b y d i s c i p l i n a r y m e a n s , b u t i t r e m a i n s u n a b l e t o r e ­
a r t i c u l a t e the d o m i n a n t t e r m s o f p r o d u c t i v e p o w e r .
Before continuing this interrogation of psychoanalysis,
h o w e v e r , let u s r e t u r n t o the p r o b l e m o f b o d i e s i n F o u c a u l t .
H o w a n d w h y i s resistance d e n i e d t o bodies p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h
d i s c i p l i n a r y regimes? W h a t is this n o t i o n of d i s c i p l i n a r y p r o ­
d u c t i o n , a n d does i t w o r k a s e f f i c a c i o u s l y a s F o u c a u l t a p p e a r s
to i m p l y ? In the f i n a l c h a p t e r of the first v o l u m e of The His­
tory of Sexuality, F o u c a u l t calls for a " h i s t o r y of b o d i e s " w h i c h
w o u l d i n q u i r e i n t o "the m a n n e r i n w h i c h w h a t i s m o s t m a ­
t e r i a l a n d v i t a l i n t h e m has b e e n i n v e s t e d . " I n t h i s f o r m u l a ­
7
t i o n , h e suggests that p o w e r acts n o t o n l y o n the b o d y b u t a l s o
in the b o d y , that p o w e r n o t o n l y p r o d u c e s the b o u n d a r i e s of a
subject b u t p e r v a d e s the i n f e r i o r i t y of that subject. In the last
f o r m u l a t i o n , i t a p p e a r s that there i s a n " i n s i d e " t o the b o d y
w h i c h exists b e f o r e p o w e r ' s i n v a s i o n . B u t g i v e n the r a d i c a l ex­
t e r i o r i t y o f the s o u l , h o w are w e t o u n d e r s t a n d " i n f e r i o r i t y "
in F o u c a u l t ? That inferiority w i l l not be a soul, a n d it w i l l
8
n o t be a p s y c h e , b u t w h a t w i l l it be? Is t h i s a space of p u r e
m a l l e a b i l i t y , o n e w h i c h is, a s i t w e r e , r e a d y t o c o n f o r m t o the
d e m a n d s of socialization? Or is this i n f e r i o r i t y to be called,
s i m p l y , the b o d y ? H a s i t c o m e t o the p a r a d o x i c a l p o i n t w h e r e
F o u c a u l t w a n t s t o c l a i m that the s o u l i s the e x t e r i o r f o r m , a n d
the b o d y the i n t e r i o r space?
A l t h o u g h F o u c a u l t w a n t s o n o c c a s i o n t o refute the p o s s i ­
b i l i t y of a b o d y w h i c h is not p r o d u c e d through p o w e r rela­
t i o n s , s o m e t i m e s h i s e x p l a n a t i o n s r e q u i r e a b o d y to m a i n t a i n a
90 Subjection, Resistance, Resignification
m a t e r i a l i t y o n t o l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t f r o m the p o w e r r e l a t i o n s that
t a k e it as a site of i n v e s t m e n t . I n d e e d , the t e r m " s i t e " s e e m ­
9
i n g l y a p p e a r s i n t h i s p h r a s e w i t h o u t w a r r a n t , for w h a t i s the
r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n the b o d y a s site a n d the i n v e s t m e n t s w h i c h
that site i s s a i d t o r e c e i v e o r b e a r ? D o e s the t e r m "site " s t a b i ­
l i z e the b o d y i n r e l a t i o n t o those i n v e s t m e n t s , w h i l e d e f l e c t i n g
the q u e s t i o n o f h o w i n v e s t m e n t s e s t a b l i s h , c o n t o u r , a n d d i s ­
r u p t w h a t the p h r a s e takes for g r a n t e d a s the b o d y ' s "site"
(i.e., d o e s the t e r m "site " deflect the project o f L a c a n ' s " m i r r o r
stage")? W h a t c o n s t i t u t e s a n " i n v e s t m e n t , " a n d w h a t i s its c o n ­
stituting power? Does it have a v i s u a l i z i n g function, a n d can
w e u n d e r s t a n d the p r o d u c t i o n o f the b o d i l y ego i n F r e u d a s
the p r o j e c t e d o r s p a t i a l i z e d m o d a l i t y o f s u c h i n v e s t m e n t s ?
I n d e e d , t o w h a t extent i s the b o d y ' s site s t a b i l i z e d t h r o u g h a
c e r t a i n p r o j e c t i v e i n s t a b i l i t y , one w h i c h F o u c a u l t c a n n o t q u i t e
d e s c r i b e a n d w h i c h w o u l d p e r h a p s engage h i m i n the p r o b ­
l e m a t i c o f the ego a s a n i m a g i n a r y f u n c t i o n ?
Discipline and Punish offers a differen t c o n f i g u r a t i o n of the
r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n m a t e r i a l i t y a n d i n v e s t m e n t . T h e r e the s o u l
i s t a k e n t o b e a n i n s t r u m e n t o f p o w e r t h r o u g h w h i c h the
b o d y is c u l t i v a t e d a n d f o r m e d . In a sense, it acts as a p o w e r ­
l a d e n s c h e m a that p r o d u c e s a n d a c t u a l i z e s the b o d y . W e c a n
u n d e r s t a n d F o u c a u l t ' s references t o the s o u l a s a n i m p l i c i t r e ­
w o r k i n g o f the A r i s t o t e l i a n f o r m u l a t i o n i n w h i c h the s o u l i s
u n d e r s t o o d t o b e the f o r m a n d p r i n c i p l e o f the b o d y ' s m a t t e r .
F o u c a u l t a r g u e s in Discipline and Punish that the s o u l b e c o m e s
a n o r m a t i v e a n d n o r m a l i z i n g i d e a l a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h the
b o d y is trained, shaped, cultivated, a n d invested; it is a his­
t o r i c a l l y s p e c i f i c i m a g i n a r y i d e a l (idéal spéculatif) u n d e r w h i c h
the b o d y i s m a t e r i a l i z e d .
T h i s " s u b j e c t i o n " or assujetissement is n o t o n l y a s u b o r d i ­
nation but a securing a n d maintaining, a putting into place
Between Freud and Foucault
91
of a subject, a s u b j e c t i v a t i o n . T h e " s o u l b r i n g s [the p r i s o n e r ]
t o e x i s t e n c e " ; n o t u n l i k e i n A r i s t o t l e , the s o u l , a s a n i n s t r u ­
m e n t o f p o w e r , f o r m s a n d f r a m e s the b o d y , s t a m p s i t, a n d i n
s t a m p i n g it, b r i n g s i t i n t o b e i n g . I n t h i s f o r m u l a t i o n , there i s
n o b o d y o u t s i d e o f p o w e r , f o r the m a t e r i a l i t y o f the b o d y —
indeed, materiality itself—is p r o d u c e d by a n d in direct rela­
t i o n t o the i n v e s t m e n t o f p o w e r . T h e m a t e r i a l i t y o f the p r i s o n ,
F o u c a u l t w r i t e s , is e s t a b l i s h e d to the extent that (dans la mesure
ou) it is a v e c t o r a n d i n s t r u m e n t of p o w e r . 1 2
H e n c e , the p r i s o n
is materialized to the extent that it is invested with power. To be
g r a m m a t i c a l l y accurate , there i s n o p r i s o n p r i o r t o its m a t e r i ­
a l i z a t i o n ; its m a t e r i a l i z a t i o n i s c o e x t e n s i v e w i t h its i n v e s t i t u r e
1 0
w i t h p o w e r r e l a t i o n s ; a n d m a t e r i a l i t y i s the effect a n d g a u g e
o f t h i s i n v e s t m e n t . T h e p r i s o n c o m e s t o b e o n l y w i t h i n the
f i e l d o f p o w e r r e l a t i o n s , m o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y , o n l y t o the extent
that i t i s s a t u r a t e d w i t h s u c h r e l a t i o n s a n d that s u c h a s a t u ­
r a t i o n i s f o r m a t i v e o f its v e r y b e i n g . H e r e the b o d y — o f the
p r i s o n e r a n d o f the p r i s o n — i s n o t a n i n d e p e n d e n t m a t e r i a l i t y ,
a static s u r f a c e or site, w h i c h a s u b s e q u e n t i n v e s t m e n t c o m e s
t o m a r k , s i g n i f y u p o n , o r p e r v a d e ; the b o d y i s that f o r w h i c h
m a t e r i a l i z a t i o n a n d i n v e s t i t u r e are c o e x t e n s i v e .
A l t h o u g h the s o u l i s u n d e r s t o o d t o f r a m e the b o d y i n Disci­
pline and Punish, F o u c a u l t suggests that the p r o d u c t i o n of the
"subject" takes p l a c e t o s o m e d e g r e e t h r o u g h the s u b o r d i n a ­
11
t i o n a n d e v e n d e s t r u c t i o n o f the b o d y . I n " N i e t z s c h e , G e n e a l ­
ogy, H i s t o r y , " F o u c a u l t r e m a r k s that o n l y t h r o u g h the d e ­
s t r u c t i o n o f the b o d y d o e s the subject a s a " d i s s o c i a t e d u n i t y "
a p p e a r : "the b o d y i s the i n s c r i b e d s u r f a c e o f events ( t r a c e d b y
l a n g u a g e a n d d i s s o l v e d b y ideas), the l o c u s o f a d i s s o c i a t e d
self ( a d o p t i n g the i l l u s i o n of a s u b s t a n t i a l u n i t y ) , a n d a v o l ­
u m e in perpetual disintegration." 1 3
T h e subject a p p e a r s a t the
e x p e n s e o f the b o d y , a n a p p e a r a n c e c o n d i t i o n e d i n i n v e r s e r e ­
9 2 Subjection, Resistance, Resignification
l a t i o n t o the d i s a p p e a r a n c e o f the b o d y . T h e subject n o t o n l y
e f f e c t i v e ly takes the p l a c e of the b o d y b u t acts as the s o u l
w h i c h f r a m e s a n d f o r m s the b o d y i n c a p t i v i t y . H e r e the f o r m ­
i n g a n d f r a m i n g f u n c t i o n o f that e x t e r i o r s o u l w o r k s against
the b o d y ; i n d e e d , i t m i g h t b e u n d e r s t o o d a s the s u b l i m a t i o n
o f the b o d y i n c o n s e q u e n c e o f d i s p l a c e m e n t a n d s u b s t i t u t i o n .
I n t h u s r e d e s c r i b i n g the b o d y i n F o u c a u l t , I h a v e c l e a r l y
w a n d e r e d into a psychoanalytic vocabulary of sublimation.
W h i l e there, let me p o s e a q u e s t i o n to r e t u r n to the i s s u e of
s u b j e c t i o n a n d resistance. I f the b o d y i s s u b o r d i n a t e d a n d t o
s o m e extent d e s t r o y e d a s the d i s s o c i a t e d self emerges, a n d i f
that e m e r g e n c e m i g h t b e r e a d a s the s u b l i m a t i o n o f the b o d y
a n d the self b e r e a d a s the b o d y ' s g h o s t l y f o r m , t h e n i s there
s o m e p a r t o f the b o d y w h i c h i s n o t p r e s e r v e d i n s u b l i m a t i o n ,
s o m e p a r t o f the b o d y w h i c h r e m a i n s u n s u b l i m a t e d ?
T h i s b o d i l y r e m a i n d e r , I w o u l d suggest, s u r v i v e s for s u c h a
subject i n the m o d e o f a l r e a d y , i f n o t a l w a y s , h a v i n g b e e n d e ­
s t r o y e d , i n a k i n d o f c o n s t i t u t i v e loss. T h e b o d y i s n o t a site
on w h i c h a c o n s t r u c t i o n takes p l a c e ; it is a d e s t r u c t i o n on the
o c c a s i o n o f w h i c h a subject i s f o r m e d . T h e f o r m a t i o n o f t h i s
subject i s a t o n c e the f r a m i n g , s u b o r d i n a t i o n , a n d r e g u l a t i o n o f
the b o d y , a n d the m o d e i n w h i c h that d e s t r u c t i o n i s p r e s e r v e d
( i n the sense o f s u s t a i n e d a n d e m b a l m e d ) i n n o r m a l i z a t i o n .
If, t h e n , the b o d y i s n o w t o b e u n d e r s t o o d a s that w h i c h n o t
o n l y c o n s t i t u t e s the subject i n its d i s s o c i a t e d a n d s u b l i m a t e d
state, b u t also exceeds o r resists a n y effort a t s u b l i m a t i o n , h o w
are w e t o u n d e r s t a n d t h i s b o d y that is, a s i t w e r e , n e g a t e d o r
r e p r e s s e d s o that the subject m i g h t l i v e ? O n e m i g h t e x p e c t
the b o d y t o r e t u r n i n a n o n ­ n o r m a l i z a b l e w i l d n e s s , a n d there
are o f c o u r s e m o m e n t s i n F o u c a u l t w h e n s o m e t h i n g l i k e that
h a p p e n s . B u t m o r e o f t e n t h a n n o t , i n F o u c a u l t the p o s s i b i l i t y
of s u b v e r s i o n or r e s i s t a n c e a p p e a r s (a) in the c o u r s e of a s u b ­
Between Freud and Foucault 93
j e c t i v a t i o n that e x c e e d s the n o r m a l i z i n g a i m s b y w h i c h i t i s
m o b i l i z e d , f o r e x a m p l e , i n " r e v e r s e ­ d i s c o u r s e , " o r (b) t h r o u g h
convergence w i t h other discursive regimes, whereby inadver­
t e n t l y p r o d u c e d d i s c u r s i v e c o m p l e x i t y u n d e r m i n e s the teleo­
logical aims of n o r m a l i z a t i o n . 1 4
T h u s r e s i s t a n c e a p p e a r s a s the
effect of p o w e r , as a p a r t of p o w e r , its s e l f ­ s u b v e r s i o n .
I n the t h e o r i z a t i o n o f resistance, a c e r t a i n p r o b l e m arises
w h i c h c o n c e r n s p s y c h o a n a l y s i s a n d , b y i m p l i c a t i o n , the l i m i t s
o f s u b j e c t i v a t i o n . F o r F o u c a u l t , the subject w h o i s p r o d u c e d
t h r o u g h s u b j e c t i o n i s n o t p r o d u c e d a t a n i n s t a n t i n its totality .
Instead, i t i s i n the p r o c e s s o f b e i n g p r o d u c e d , i t i s repeat­
e d l y p r o d u c e d ( w h i c h i s n o t the s a m e a s b e i n g p r o d u c e d
a n e w a g a i n a n d again). It is p r e c i s e l y the p o s s i b i l i t y of a r e p e ­
t i t i o n w h i c h d o e s n o t c o n s o l i d a t e that d i s s o c i a t e d u n i t y , the
subject, b u t w h i c h p r o l i f e r a t e s effects w h i c h u n d e r m i n e the
force o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n . T h e t e r m w h i c h n o t o n l y n a m e s , b u t
f o r m s a n d f r a m e s the s u b j e c t — l e t u s u s e F o u c a u l t ' s e x a m p l e
of h o m o s e x u a l i t y — m o b i l i z e s a r e v e r s e d i s c o u r s e a g a i n s t the
v e r y r e g i m e o f n o r m a l i z a t i o n b y w h i c h i t i s s p a w n e d . T h i s is,
o f c o u r s e , n o t a p u r e o p p o s i t i o n , for the s a m e " h o m o s e x u a l i t y "
w i l l b e d e p l o y e d first i n the s e r v i c e o f n o r m a l i z i n g h e t e r o s e x u ­
a l i t y a n d s e c o n d i n the s e r v i c e o f its o w n d e p a t h o l o g i z a t i o n .
T h i s t e r m w i l l c a r r y the r i s k o f the f o r m e r m e a n i n g i n the
latter, b u t i t w o u l d b e a m i s t a k e t o t h i n k that s i m p l y b y s p e a k­
i n g the t e r m o n e e i t h e r t r a n s c e n d s h e t e r o s e x u a l n o r m a l i z a t i o n
o r b e c o m e s its i n s t r u m e n t .
T h e r i s k o f r e n o r m a l i z a t i o n i s p e r s i s t e n t l y there: c o n s i d e r
the o n e w h o i n d e f i a n t " o u t n e s s " d e c l a r e s h i s / h e r h o m o s e x u ­
a l i t y o n l y t o r e c e i v e the r e s p o n s e , " A h yes, s o y o u are that, a n d
o n l y that." W h a t e v e r y o u say w i l l b e r e a d b a c k a s a n o v e r t
or subtle manifestation of y o u r essential homosexuality. (One
should not underestimate h o w exhausting it is to be expected
94 Subjection, Resistance, Resignification
t o b e a n " o u t " h o m o s e x u a l a l l the t i m e , w h e t h e r the e x p e c ­
t a t i o n c o m e s f r o m g a y a n d l e s b i a n a l l i e s o r t h e i r foes.) H e r e
F o u c a u l t cites a n d r e w o r k s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e s i g n i f i c a t i o n , o f
m o b i l i z i n g p o l i t i c a l l y w h a t N i e t z s c h e , in On the Genealogy of
Morals, c a l l e d the " s i g n c h a i n . " T h e r e N i e t z s c h e a r g u e s that the
uses t o w h i c h a g i v e n s i g n i s o r i g i n a l l y p u t are " w o r l d s a p a r t "
f r o m the uses t o w h i c h i t t h e n b e c o m e s a v a i l a b l e . T h i s t e m p o ­
r a l g a p b e t w e e n usages p r o d u c e s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a r e v e r s a l
o f s i g n i f i c a t i o n , b u t a l so o p e n s the w a y for a n i n a u g u r a t i o n
o f s i g n i f y i n g p o s s i b i l i t i e s that e x c e e d t h o s e t o w h i c h the t e r m
has b e e n p r e v i o u s l y b o u n d .
T h e F o u c a u l t i a n subject i s n e v e r f u l l y c o n s t i t u t e d i n subjec­
tion, then; it is repeatedly constituted in subjection, a n d it is
i n the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a r e p e t i t i o n that repeats agains t its o r i g i n
that s u b j e c t i o n m i g h t b e u n d e r s t o o d t o d r a w its i n a d v e r t e n t l y
enabling power. F r o m a psychoanalytic perspective, however,
w e m i g h t ask w h e t h e r t h is p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e s i s t a n c e t o a c o n ­
stituting or subjectivating p o w e r can be derived f r o m what is
" i n " o r "of" d i s c o u r s e . W h a t c a n w e m a k e o f the w a y i n w h i c h
d i s c o u r s e s n o t o n l y c o n s t i t u t e the d o m a i n s o f the s p e a k a b l e ,
b u t are t h e m s e l v e s b o u n d e d t h r o u g h the p r o d u c t i o n o f a c o n ­
s t i t u t i v e o u t s i d e : the u n s p e a k a b l e , the u n s i g n i f i a b l e ?
F r o m a Lacanian perspective, one m i g h t w e l l question
w h e t h e r the effects o f the p s y c h e c a n b e s a i d t o b e e x h a u s t e d
i n w h a t c a n b e s i g n i f i e d o r w h e t h e r there i s n o t , o v e r a n d
against t h i s s i g n i f y i n g b o d y , a d o m a i n o f the p s y c h e w h i c h
contests l e g i b i l i t y . If, a c c o r d i n g to p s y c h o a n a l y s i s , the subject
i s n o t the s a m e a s the p s y c h e f r o m w h i c h i t e m e r g e s a n d if, f o r
F o u c a u l t , the subject i s n o t the s a m e a s the b o d y f r o m w h i c h i t
emerges, t h e n p e r h a p s the b o d y has c o m e t o s u b s t i t u t e for the
p s y c h e i n F o u c a u l t — t h a t is, a s that w h i c h exceeds a n d c o n ­
f o u n d s the i n j u n c t i o n s of n o r m a l i z a t i o n . Is t h i s a b o d y p u r e
Between Freud and Foucault 95
a n d s i m p l e , o r d o e s "the b o d y " c o m e t o s t a n d for a c e r t a i n
o p e r a t i o n o f the p s y c h e , o n e w h i c h i s d i s t i n c t l y different, i f n o t
d i r e c t l y o p p o s e d to, the s o u l f i g u r e d a s a n i m p r i s o n i n g effect?
P e r h a p s F o u c a u l t h i m s e l f h as i n v e s t e d the b o d y w i t h a p s y ­
c h i c m e a n i n g that h e c a n n o t elaborate w i t h i n the t e r m s that h e
uses. H o w does the p r o c e s s o f s u b j e c t i v a t i o n , the d i s c i p l i n a r y
p r o d u c t i o n o f the subject, b r e a k d o w n , i f i t does, i n b o t h F o u ­
c a u l t i a n a n d p s y c h o a n a l y t i c t h e o r y ? W h e n c e does that f a i l u r e
e m e r g e , a n d w h a t are its c o n s e q u e n c e s ?
C o n s i d e r the A l t h u s s e r i a n n o t i o n o f i n t e r p e l l a t i o n , i n w h i c h
a subject i s c o n s t i t u t e d b y b e i n g h a i l e d , a d d r e s s e d , n a m e d . 1 5
F o r the m o s t p a r t , i t seems, A l t h u s s e r b e l i e v e d that t h i s s o c i a l
d e m a n d — o n e might call it a symbolic injunction—actuall y
p r o d u c e d the k i n d s o f subjects i t n a m e d . H e g i v e s the e x a m p l e
o f the p o l i c e m a n o n the street y e l l i n g " H e y y o u there!," a n d
c o n c l u d e s that t h is c a l l i m p o r t a n t l y c o n s t i t u t e s the o n e i t a d ­
dresses a n d sites. T h e scene is c l e a r l y a d i s c i p l i n a r y o n e ; the
p o l i c e m a n ' s c a l l i s a n effort t o b r i n g s o m e o n e b a c k i n l i n e . Yet
w e m i g h t a l so u n d e r s t a n d i t i n L a c a n i a n t e r m s a s the c a l l o f
s y m b o l i c c o n s t i t u t i o n . A s A l t h u s s e r h i m s e l f i n s i s t s, t h i s p e r ­
f o r m a t i v e effort o f n a m i n g c a n o n l y attempt t o b r i n g its a d ­
dressee i n t o b e i n g : there is a l w a y s the r i s k of a c e r t a i n misrecog­
nition. If o n e m i s r e c o g n i z e s that effort to p r o d u c e the subject,
the p r o d u c t i o n itself falters. T h e o n e w h o i s h a i l e d m a y f a i l t o
hear, m i s r e a d the c a l l , t u r n the o t h e r w a y , a n s w e r t o a n o t h e r
n a m e , i n s i s t o n n o t b e i n g a d d r e s s e d i n that w a y . I n d e e d , the
d o m a i n o f the i m a g i n a r y i s d e m a r c a t e d b y A l t h u s s e r a s p r e ­
c i s e l y the d o m a i n that m a k e s misrecognition p o s s i b l e . T h e n a m e
is called, a n d I am sure it is my name, but it isn't. The name
i s c a l l e d , a n d I a m s u r e that a n a m e i s b e i n g c a l l e d , m y n a m e ,
but it is in someone's incomprehensible speech, or worse, it is
someone c o u g h i n g, or worse, a radiator w h i c h for a m o m e n t
96 Subjection, Resistance, Resignification
a p p r o x i m a t e s a h u m a n v o i c e . O r I a m s u r e that n o one has
n o t i c e d m y t r a n s g r e s s i o n , a n d that i t i s n o t m y n a m e that i s
b e i n g c a l l e d , b u t o n l y a c o u g h i n g passerby, the h i g h p i t c h o f
the h e a t i n g m e c h a n i s m — b u t i t i s m y n a m e , a n d yet I d o n o t
r e c o g n i z e m y s e l f i n the subject that the n a m e , a t t h i s m o m e n t ,
installs. 16
C o n s i d e r the force o f t h i s d y n a m i c o f i n t e r p e l l a t i o n a n d
m i s r e c o g n i t i o n w h e n the n a m e i s n o t a p r o p e r n a m e b u t a
social category, 17
a n d hence a signifier capable of b e i n g inter­
preted in a n u m b er of divergent a n d conflictual ways. To be
hailed as a " w o m a n " or "Jew" or "queer" or "Black" or " C h i ­
cana" may be heard or interpreted as an affirmation or an
i n s u l t , d e p e n d i n g o n the c o n t e x t i n w h i c h the h a i l i n g o c c u r s
( w h e r e contex t i s the effective h i s t o r i c i t y a n d s p a t i a l i t y o f the
s i g n ). I f that n a m e i s c a l l e d , there i s m o r e o f t e n t h a n n o t
s o m e h e s i t a t i o n a b o u t w h e t h e r o r h o w t o r e s p o n d , for w h a t
i s a t stak e i s w h e t h e r the t e m p o r a r y t o t a l i z a t i o n p e r f o r m e d
b y the n a m e i s p o l i t i c a l l y e n a b l i n g o r p a r a l y z i n g , w h e t h e r the
f o r e c l o s u r e , i n d e e d the v i o l e n c e , o f the t o t a l i z i n g r e d u c t i o n
o f i d e n t i t y p e r f o r m e d b y that p a r t i c u l a r h a i l i n g i s p o l i t i c a l l y
strategic o r r e g r e s s i v e or, i f p a r a l y z i n g a n d regressive , also e n ­
abling in some way.
T h e A l t h u s s e r i a n u s e o f L a c a n centers o n the f u n c t i o n o f the
i m a g i n a r y as the p e r m a n e n t p o s s i b i l i t y of misrecognition, that
is, the i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y b e t w e e n s y m b o l i c d e m a n d (the
n a m e that i s i n t e r p e l l a t e d ) a n d the i n s t a b i l i t y a n d u n p r e d i c t ­
a b i l i t y of its a p p r o p r i a t i o n . If the i n t e r p e l l a t e d n a m e seeks to
a c c o m p l i s h the i d e n t i t y to w h i c h it refers, it b e g i n s as a p e r ­
f o r m a t i v e p r o c e s s w h i c h i s n e v e r t h e l e s s d e r a i l e d i n the i m a g i ­
n a r y , f o r the i m a g i n a r y i s s u r e l y p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h the l a w ,
s t r u c t u r e d b y the l a w , b u t does n o t i m m e d i a t e l y o b e y the law.
F o r the L a c a n i a n , t h e n , the i m a g i n a r y s i g n i f i es the i m p o s ­
Between Freud and Foucault 97
s i b i l i t y o f the d i s c u r s i v e — t h a t is, s y m b o l i c — c o n s t i t u t i o n o f
i d e n t i t y . I d e n t i t y c a n n e v e r b e f u l l y t o t a l i z e d b y the s y m b o l i c ,
for w h a t i t fails t o o r d e r w i l l e m e r g e w i t h i n the i m a g i n a r y a s
a d i s o r d e r , a site w h e r e i d e n t i t y is c o n t e s t e d .
H e n c e , i n a L a c a n i a n v e i n , J a c q u e l i n e R o s e f o r m u l a t e s the
u n c o n s c i o u s a s that w h i c h t h w a r t s a n y effort o f the s y m b o l i c
to constitute sexed identity coherently a n d fully, an u n c o n ­
s c i o u s i n d i c a t e d b y the s l i p s a n d g a p s that c h a r a c t e r i z e the
w o r k i n g s of the i m a g i n a r y in l a n g u a g e . I q u o t e a passage
w h i c h has b e n e f i t t e d m a n y o f u s w h o h a v e s o u g h t t o f i n d
in psychoanalysis a p r i n c i p l e of resistance to g i v e n forms of
social reality:
The unconscious constantly reveals the "failure" of identity. Because
there is no continuity of psychic life, so there is no stability of sexual
identity, no position for w o m e n (or for men) w h i c h is ever simply
achieved. N o r does psychoanalysis see such "failure" as a special­
case inability or an i n d i v i d u a l deviancy from the norm. "Failure" is
not a moment to be regretted in a process of adaptation, or devel­
opment into normality,. . . "failure" is something endlessly repeated
and relived moment by moment throughout our i n d i v i d u a l histories.
It appears not only in the symptom, but also in dreams, in slips of
the tongue and in forms of sexual pleasure w h i c h are pushed to the
sidelines of the norm. . . . there is a resistance to identity at the very
heart of psychic life. 18
In Discipline and Punish, F o u c a u l t p r e s u m e s the efficacy of
the s y m b o l i c d e m a n d , its p e r f o r m a t i v e c a p a c i t y t o c o n s t i t u t e
the subject w h o m it n a m e s . In The History of Sexuality, Vol­
ume l, h o w e v e r , there is b o t h a r e j e c t i o n of "a s i n g l e l o c u s
o f R e v o l t " — w h i c h w o u l d p r e s u m a b l y i n c l u d e the p s y c h e , the
i m a g i n a r y , o r the u n c o n s c i o u s w i t h i n its p u r v i e w — a n d a n
affirmation of m u l t i p l e possibilities of resistance enabled by
p o w e r itself. F o r F o u c a u l t , r e s i s t a n c e c a n n o t b e outside the l a w
98 Subjection, Resistance, Resignification
i n a n o t h e r r e g i s t e r (the i m a g i n a r y ) o r i n that w h i c h e l u d e s the
c o n s t i t u t i v e p o w e r o f the l a w .
there is no single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, source of
all rebellions, or pure law of the revolutionary. Instead there is a p l u ­
rality of resistances, each of them a special case: resistances that are
possible, necessary, improbable; others that are spontaneous, savage,
solitary, concerted, rampant, or violent; still others that are quick to
compromise, interested, or sacrificial; by definition, they can only
exist in the strategic field of power relations. But this does not mean
that they are only a reaction or rebound, forming w i t h respect to
the basic domination an underside that is in the end always passive,
doomed to perpetual defeat. 19
T h i s last c a r i c a t u r e o f p o w e r , a l t h o u g h c l e a r l y w r i t t e n w i t h
M a r c u s e i n m i n d , r e c a l l s the effect o f the L a c a n i a n l a w , w h i c h
p r o d u c e s its o w n " f a i l u r e " a t the l e v e l o f the p s y c h e , b u t w h i c h
c a n n e v e r b e d i s p l a c e d o r r e f o r m u l a t e d b y that p s y c h i c r e ­
sistance. T h e i m a g i n a r y t h w a r t s the efficacy o f the s y m b o l i c
l a w b u t c a n n o t t u r n b a c k u p o n the l a w , d e m a n d i n g o r effect­
i n g its r e f o r m u l a t i o n . I n t h i s sense, p s y c h i c r e s i s t a n c e t h w a r t s
the l a w i n its effects, b u t c a n n o t r e d i r e c t the l a w o r its effects.
R e s i s t a n c e i s t h u s l o c a t e d i n a d o m a i n that i s v i r t u a l l y p o w e r ­
less t o alter the l a w that i t o p p o s e s . H e n c e , p s y c h i c r e s i s t a n c e
p r e s u m e s the c o n t i n u a t i o n o f the l a w i n its a n t e r i o r , s y m b o l i c
f o r m a n d , i n that sense, c o n t r i b u t e s t o its status q u o . I n s u c h a
v i e w , r e s i s t a n c e a p p e a r s d o o m e d t o p e r p e t u a l defeat.
I n contrast , F o u c a u l t f o r m u l a t e s r e s i s t a n c e a s a n effect o f
the v e r y p o w e r that i t i s s a i d t o o p p o s e . T h i s i n s i s t e n c e o n
the d u a l p o s s i b i l i t y o f b e i n g b o t h constituted b y the l a w a n d
an effect of resistance to the l a w m a r k s a d e p a r t u r e f r o m the
L a c a n i a n f r a m e w o r k , f o r w h e r e L a c a n r e s t r i c t s the n o t i o n o f
s o c i a l p o w e r t o the s y m b o l i c d o m a i n a n d delegates r e s i s t a n c e
to the i m a g i n a r y , F o u c a u l t recasts the s y m b o l i c as r e l a t i o n s of
Between Freud and Foucault 99
p o w e r a n d u n d e r s t a n d s r e s i s t a n c e a s a n effect o f p o w e r . F o u ­
c a u l t ' s c o n c e p t i o n i n i t i a t e s a shift f r o m a d i s c o u r s e o n l a w , c o n ­
c e i v e d a s j u r i d i c a l ( a n d p r e s u p p o s i n g a subject s u b o r d i n a t e d
by power), to a discourse on power, w h i c h is a field of p r o d u c ­
t i v e , r e g u l a t o r y , a n d c o n t e s t a t o r y r e l a t i o n s . F o r F o u c a u l t , the
s y m b o l i c p r o d u c e s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f its o w n s u b v e r s i o n s , a n d
these s u b v e r s i o n s are u n a n t i c i p a t e d effects o f s y m b o l i c i n t e r ­
pellations.
T h e n o t i o n o f "the s y m b o l i c " d o e s n o t a d d r e s s the m u l t i ­
p l i c i t y o f p o w e r v e c t o r s u p o n w h i c h F o u c a u l t i n s i s t s , for
p o w e r i n F o u c a u l t n o t o n l y c o n s i s t s i n the r e i t e r a t e d e l a b o r a ­
tion of norms or interpellating demands, but is formative or
productive, malleable, multiple, proliferative, a n d conflictual.
M o r e o v e r , i n its r e s i g n i f i c a t i o n s , the l a w itself i s t r a n s m u t e d
i n t o that w h i c h o p p o s e s a n d exceed s its o r i g i n a l p u r p o s e s . I n
t h i s sense, d i s c i p l i n a r y d i s c o u r s e d o e s n o t u n i l a t e r a l l y c o n s t i ­
tute a subject in F o u c a u l t , or rather, if it does, it simultaneously
c o n s t i t u t e s the c o n d i t i o n for the subject's d e ­ c o n s t i t u t i o n .
W h a t i s b r o u g h t i n t o b e i n g t h r o u g h the p e r f o r m a t i v e effect o f
the i n t e r p e l l a t i n g d e m a n d i s m u c h m o r e t h a n a "subject," f o r
the "subject" c r e a t e d i s n o t for that r e a s o n f i x e d i n p l a c e : i t
b e c o m e s the o c c a s i o n for a f u r t h e r m a k i n g . I n d e e d , I w o u l d
a d d , a subject o n l y r e m a i n s a subject t h r o u g h a r e i t e r a t i o n or
r e a r t i c u l a t i o n of itself as a subject, a n d t h i s d e p e n d e n c y of the
subject o n r e p e t i t i o n for c o h e r e n c e m a y c o n s t i t u t e that s u b ­
ject's i n c o h e r e n c e , its i n c o m p l e t e character. T h i s r e p e t i t i o n or,
better, i t e r a b i l i t y t h u s b e c o m e s the n o n ­ p l a c e o f s u b v e r s i o n ,
the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a r e ­ e m b o d y i n g o f the s u b j e c t i v a t i n g n o r m
that c a n r e d i r e c t its n o r m a t i v i t y .
C o n s i d e r the i n v e r s i o n s o f " w o m a n " a n d " w o m a n , " d e ­
p e n d i n g o n the s t a g i n g a n d a d d r e s s o f t h e i r p e r f o r m a n c e , o f
" q u e e r " a n d "queer," d e p e n d i n g o n p a t h o l o g i z i n g o r contes ­
100 Subjection, Resistance, Resignification
T Between
tatory modes. B o t h examples concern, not an o p p o s i t i o n be­
t w e e n r e a c t i o n a r y a n d p r o g r e s s i v e usage, b u t r a t h e r a p r o ­
g r e s s i v e u sa ge that r e q u i r e s a n d r e p e a ts the r e a c t i o n a r y i n
o r d e r to effect a s u b v e r s i v e r e t e r r i t o r i a l i z a t i o n . F o r F o u c a u l t ,
t h e n , the d i s c i p l i n a r y a p p a r a t u s p r o d u c e s subjects, b u t as a
c o n s e q u e n c e o f that p r o d u c t i o n , i t b r i n g s i n t o d i s c o u r s e the
c o n d i t i o n s for s u b v e r t i n g that a p p a r a t u s itself. I n o t h e r w o r d s ,
the l a w t u r n s a g a i n s t itself a n d s p a w n s v e r s i o n s o f itself w h i c h
o p p o s e a n d p r o l i f e r a t e its a n i m a t i n g p u r p o s e s . T h e strategic
q u e s t i o n for F o u c a u l t is, t h e n , h o w c a n w e w o r k the p o w e r
r e l a t i o n s b y w h i c h w e are w o r k e d , a n d i n w h a t d i r e c t i o n ?
I n h i s later i n t e r v i e w s , F o u c a u l t suggests that i d e n t i t i e s are
formed w i t h i n contemporary political arrangements in rela­
t i o n t o c e r t a i n r e q u i r e m e n t s o f the l i b e r a l state, ones w h i c h
p r e s u m e that the a s s e r t i o n o f r i g h t s a n d c l a i m s t o e n t i t l e m e n t
c a n o n l y b e m a d e o n the basis o f a s i n g u l a r a n d i n j u r e d i d e n ­
tity. T h e m o r e specific i d e n t i t i e s b e c o m e , the m o r e t o t a l i z e d
a n i d e n t i t y b e c o m e s b y that v e r y s p e c i f i c i t y . I n d e e d , w e m i g h t
u n d e r s t a n d t h i s c o n t e m p o r a r y p h e n o m e n o n a s the m o v e m e n t
b y w h i c h a j u r i d i c a l a p p a r a t u s p r o d u c e s the f i e l d o f p o s s i b l e
p o l i t i c a l subjects. B e c a u s e for F o u c a u l t the d i s c i p l i n a r y a p p a ­
r a t u s o f the state operates t h r o u g h the t o t a l i z i n g p r o d u c t i o n
o f i n d i v i d u a l s , a n d b e c a u s e t h i s t o t a l i z a t i o n o f the i n d i v i d u a l
e x t e n d s the j u r i s d i c t i o n o f the state (i.e., b y t r a n s f o r m i n g i n d i ­
v i d u a l s i n t o subjects o f the state), F o u c a u l t w i l l c a l l for a r e ­
m a k i n g o f s u b j e c t i v i t y b e y o n d the s h a c k l e s o f the j u r i d i c a l law.
I n t h i s sense, w h a t w e c a l l i d e n t i t y p o l i t i c s i s p r o d u c e d b y a
state w h i c h c a n o n l y a l l o c a t e r e c o g n i t i o n a n d r i g h t s t o s u b ­
jects t o t a l i z e d b y the p a r t i c u l a r i t y that c o n s t i t u t e s t h e i r p l a i n ­
tiff status. I n c a l l i n g for a n o v e r t h r o w , a s i t w e r e , o f s u c h a n
a r r a n g e m e n t , F o u c a u l t i s n o t c a l l i n g f o r the release o f a h i d ­
d e n o r r e p r e s s e d s u b j e c t i v i t y , b u t rather, for a r a d i c a l m a k i n g
Freud and Foucault 101
o f s u b j e c t i v i t y f o r m e d i n a n d against the h i s t o r i c a l h e g e m o n y
of the j u r i d i c a l subject:
Maybe the target nowadays is not to discover what we are, but to
refuse what we are. We have to imagine and b u i l d up what we
could be to get r i d of this k i n d of political "double b i n d , " w h i c h is
the simultaneous individualization and totalization of modern power
structures. . . . The conclusion w o u l d be that the political, ethical,
social, philosophical problem of our days is not to try to liberate us
both from the state, and from the state's institutions, but to liberate
us from the state and the type of individualizatio n w h i c h is linked to
the state. We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the
refusal of this k i n d of individuality w h i c h has been imposed on us
for several centuries. 20
T w o sets o f q u e s t i o n s e m e r g e f r o m the a b o v e a n a l y s i s . F i r s t ,
w h y c a n F o u c a u l t f o r m u l a t e r e s i s t a n c e i n r e l a t i o n t o the d i s c i ­
p l i n a r y p o w e r of s e x u a l i t y in The History of Sexuality, w h e r e a s
in Discipline and Punish d i s c i p l i n a r y p o w e r a p p e a r s to deter­
m i n e d o c i l e b o d i e s i n c a p a b l e o f resistance ? I s there s o m e t h i n g
a b o u t the r e l a t i o n s h i p of sexuality to p o w e r that c o n d i t i o n s the
p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e s i s t a n c e i n the f i r s t text, a n d a n o t e d absence
o f a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f s e x u a l i t y f r o m the d i s c u s s i o n o f p o w e r
a n d b o d i e s in the s e c o n d ? N o t e that in the History of Sexuality
the r e p r e s s i v e f u n c t i o n o f the l a w i s u n d e r m i n e d p r e c i s e l y
t h r o u g h b e c o m i n g itself the object o f e r o t i c i n v e s t m e n t a n d ex­
c i t a t i o n . D i s c i p l i n a r y a p p a r a t u s fails t o r e p r e s s s e x u a l i t y p r e ­
c i s e l y b e c a u s e the a p p a r a t u s i s itself e r o t i c i z e d , b e c o m i n g the
o c c a s i o n for the incitement of sexuality a n d , therefore, u n d o i n g
its o w n r e p r e s s i v e a i m s .
S e c o n d , w i t h t h i s t r a n s f e r a b l e p r o p e r t y o f s e x u a l i n v e s t­
m e n t s i n m i n d , w e m i g h t ask w h a t c o n d i t i o n s the p o s s i b i l i t y
F o u c a u l t i n v i t e s , that o f r e f u s i n g the t y p e o f i n d i v i d u a l i t y c o r ­
r e l a t e d w i t h the d i s c i p l i n a r y a p p a r a t u s o f the m o d e r n state?
 r
102 Subjection, Resistance, Resignification
A n d h o w d o w e a c c o u n t for attachment t o p r e c i s e l y the k i n d
o f s t a t e ­ l i n k e d i n d i v i d u a l i t y that r e c o n s o l i d a t e s the j u r i d i c a l
l a w ? T o w h a t extent h a s the d i s c i p l i n a r y a p p a r a t u s that at­
tempts to produce a n d totalize identity become an abiding
object o f p a s s i o n a t e a t t a c h m e n t ? W e c a n n o t s i m p l y t h r o w off
the i d e n t i t i e s w e h a v e b e c o m e , a n d F o u c a u l t ' s c a l l t o " r e f u s e "
those i d e n t i t i e s w i l l c e r t a i n l y b e m e t w i t h resistance. I f w e r e ­
ject t h e o r e t i c a l l y the s o u r c e o f r e s i s t a n c e i n a p s y c h i c d o m a i n
that i s s a i d t o p r e c e d e o r e x c e e d the s o c i a l , 21
as we must, can
we r e f o r m u l a t e p s y c h i c r e s i s t a n c e in terms of the social w i t h o u t
that r e f o r m u l a t i o n b e c o m i n g a d o m e s t i c a t i o n o r n o r m a l i z a ­
t i o n ? ( M u s t the s o c i a l a l w a y s b e e q u a t e d w i t h the g i v e n a n d
the n o r m a l i z a b l e ? ) I n p a r t i c u l a r , h o w are w e t o u n d e r s t a n d ,
n o t m e r e l y the d i s c i p l i n a r y p r o d u c t i o n o f the subject, b u t the
d i s c i p l i n a r y c u l t i v a t i o n of an attachment to subjection?
S u c h a p o s t u l a t i o n m a y raise the q u e s t i o n o f m a s o c h i s m —
i n d e e d , the q u e s t i o n o f m a s o c h i s m i n s u b j e c t ­ f o r m a t i o n — y e t
i t d o e s n o t a n s w e r the q u e s t i o n o f the status o f " a t t a c h m e n t "
o r " i n v e s t m e n t . " H e r e e m e r g e s the g r a m m a t i c a l p r o b l e m b y
w h i c h a n a t t a c h m e n t a p p e a r s t o p r e c e d e the subject w h o
m i g h t b e s a i d t o " h a v e " it. Yet i t s e e m s c r u c i a l t o s u s p e n d the
usual grammatical requirements a n d consider an inversion of
t e r m s s u c h that c e r t a i n a t t a c h m e n t s p r e c e d e a n d c o n d i t i o n the
f o r m a t i o n o f subjects (the v i s u a l i z a t i o n o f l i b i d o i n the m i r r o r
stage, the s u s t a i n i n g of that p r o j e c t e d i m a g e t h r o u g h t i m e as
the d i s c u r s i v e f u n c t i o n o f the n a m e ) . I s t h i s t h e n a n o n t o l o g y
o f l i b i d o o r i n v e s t m e n t that i s i n s o m e sense p r i o r t o a n d sepa­
r a b l e f r o m a subject, o r i s e v e r y s u c h i n v e s t m e n t f r o m the start
b o u n d u p w i t h a r e f l e x i v i t y that i s s t a b i l i z e d ( w i t h i n the i m a g i ­
n a r y ) as the ego? If the ego is c o m p o s e d of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s , a n d
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n is the r e s o l u t i o n of d e s i r e , t h e n the ego is the
Between Freud and Foucault 103
r e s i d u e o f d e s i r e , the effect o f i n c o r p o r a t i o n s w h i c h , F r e u d ar­
gues in The Ego and the Id, trace a l i n e a g e of a t t a c h m e n t a n d
loss.
I n F r e u d ' s v i e w , the f o r m a t i o n o f c o n s c i e n c e enacts a n at­
t a c h m e n t t o p r o h i b i t i o n w h i c h f o u n d s the subject i n its reflex­
i v i t y . U n d e r the p r e s s u r e of the e t h i c a l l a w , a subject e m e r g e s
w h o i s c a p a b l e o f r e f l e x i v i t y , that is, w h o takes h i m / h e r s e l f
a s a n object, a n d s o m i s t a k e s h i m / h e r s e l f , s i n c e he/she is, b y
v i r t u e o f that f o u n d i n g p r o h i b i t i o n , a t a n i n f i n i t e d i s t a n c e f r o m
h i s / h e r o r i g i n . O n l y o n the c o n d i t i o n o f a s e p a r a t i o n e n f o r c e d
t h r o u g h p r o h i b i t i o n d o e s a subject e m e r g e , f o r m e d t h r o u g h
the a t t a c h m e n t t o p r o h i b i t i o n ( i n o b e d i e n c e t o i t, b u t a l s o e r o t i ­
c i z i n g it). A n d t h i s p r o h i b i t i o n i s a l l the m o r e s a v o r y p r e c i s e l y
b e c a u s e i t i s b o u n d u p i n the n a r c i s s i s t i c c i r c u i t that w a r d s off
the d i s s o l u t i o n o f the subject i n t o p s y c h o s i s . 22
F o r F o u c a u l t , a subject i s f o r m e d a n d t h e n i n v e s t e d w i t h a
s e x u a l i t y by a r e g i m e of p o w e r . If the v e r y p r o c e s s of subject­
f o r m a t i o n , h o w e v e r , r e q u i r e s a p r e e m p t i o n of s e x u a l i t y , a
f o u n d i n g p r o h i b i t i o n that p r o h i b i t s a c e r t a i n d e s i r e b u t itself
b e c o m e s a f o c u s of d e s i r e , t h e n a subject is f o r m e d t h r o u g h the
p r o h i b i t i o n of a s e x u a l i t y , a p r o h i b i t i o n that at the s a m e t i m e
f o r m s t h i s s e x u a l i t y — a n d the subject w h o i s s a i d t o b e a r it.
T h i s v i e w d i s p u t e s the F o u c a u l t i a n n o t i o n that p s y c h o a n a l y s i s
p r e s u m e s the e x t e r i o r i t y o f the l a w t o d e s i r e , f o r i t m a i n t a i n s
that there i s n o d e s i r e w i t h o u t the l a w that f o r m s a n d s u s ­
t a i n s the v e r y d e s i r e i t p r o h i b i t s . I n d e e d , p r o h i b i t i o n b e c o m e s
a n o d d f o r m o f p r e s e r v a t i o n , a w a y o f e r o t i c i z i n g the l a w that
w o u l d abolish eroticism, but w h i c h only works by compelling
e r o t i c i z a t i o n . In t h i s sense, a " s e x u a l i d e n t i t y " is a p r o d u c t i v e
contradiction in terms, for identity is f o r m e d t h r o u g h a p r o ­
h i b i t i o n o n s o m e d i m e n s i o n o f the v e r y s e x u a l i t y i t i s s a i d t o
104 Subjection, Resistance, Resignification Between Freud and Foucault 105

bear, a n d s e x u a l i t y , w h e n i t i s t i e d t o i d e n t i t y , i s a l w a y s i n i d e n t i t y t h r o u g h i n j u r y . T h i s i s n o t the s a m e a s s a y i n g that

s o m e sense u n d e r c u t t i n g itself. s u c h a n i d e n t i t y w i l l r e m a i n a l w a y s a n d f o r e v e r r o o t e d i n its
T h i s is n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a static c o n t r a d i c t i o n , f o r the s i g n i ­ i n j u r y a s l o n g a s i t r e m a i n s a n i d e n t i t y , b u t i t does i m p l y that
fiers o f i d e n t i t y are n o t s t r u c t u r a l l y d e t e r m i n e d i n a d v a n c e . I f the p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f r e s i g n i f i c a t i o n w i l l r e w o r k a n d u n s e t t l e the
F o u c a u l t c o u l d a r g u e that a s i g n c o u l d b e t a k e n u p , u s e d f o r p a s s i o n a t e a t t a c h m e n t t o s u b j e c t i o n w i t h o u t w h i c h subject for­
p u r p o s e s c o u n t e r t o t h o s e for w h i c h i t w a s d e s i g n e d , t h e n h e m a t i o n — a n d r e ­ f o r m a t i o n — c a n n o t succeed.
u n d e r s t o o d that e v e n the m o s t n o x i o u s t e r m s c o u l d b e o w n e d ,
that the m o s t i n j u r i o u s i n t e r p e l l a t i o n s c o u l d also b e the site
o f r a d i c a l r e o c c u p a t i o n a n d r e s i g n i f i c a t i o n . B u t w h a t lets u s
o c c u p y the d i s c u r s i v e site o f i n j u r y ? H o w are w e a n i m a t e d
a n d m o b i l i z e d b y that d i s c u r s i v e site a n d its i n j u r y , s u c h that
o u r v e r y a t t a c h m e n t t o i t b e c o m e s the c o n d i t i o n for o u r r e ­
s i g n i f i c a t i o n o f it? C a l l e d b y a n i n j u r i o u s n a m e , I c o m e i n t o
s o c i a l b e i n g , a n d b e c a u s e I h a v e a c e r t a i n i n e v i t a b l e attach­
m e n t t o m y existence, b e c a u s e a c e r t a i n n a r c i s s i s m takes h o l d
o f a n y t e r m that confers existence, I a m l e d t o e m b r a c e the
t e r m s that i n j u r e m e b e c a u s e t h e y c o n s t i t u t e m e s o c i a l l y . T h e
s e l f ­ c o l o n i z i n g trajectory o f c e r t a i n f o r m s o f i d e n t i t y p o l i t i c s
are s y m p t o m a t i c o f this p a r a d o x i c a l e m b r a c e o f the i n j u r i o u s
term. As a further paradox, then, only by o c c u p y i n g — b e i n g
o c c u p i e d b y — t h a t i n j u r i o u s t e r m c a n I resist a n d o p p o s e i t,
r e c a s t i n g the p o w e r that c o n s t i t u t e s me as the p o w e r I o p p o s e .
I n t h i s w a y , a c e r t a i n p l a c e for p s y c h o a n a l y s i s i s s e c u r e d i n
that a n y m o b i l i z a t i o n against s u b j e c t i o n w i l l t a k e s u b j e c t i o n
a s its r e s o u r c e , a n d that a t t a c h m e n t t o a n i n j u r i o u s i n t e r p e l l a ­
tion w i l l , by w a y of a necessarily alienated narcissism, become
the c o n d i t i o n u n d e r w h i c h r e s i g n i f y i n g that i n t e r p e l l a t i o n b e ­
comes possible. This w i l l not be an unconscious outside of
p o w e r , b u t rather s o m e t h i n g l i k e the u n c o n s c i o u s o f p o w e r
itself, i n its t r a u m a t i c a n d p r o d u c t i v e i t e r a b i l i t y .
If, t h e n , w e u n d e r s t a n d c e r t a i n k i n d s o f i n t e r p e l l a t i o n s t o
c o n f e r i d e n t i t y , those i n j u r i o u s i n t e r p e l l a t i o n s w i l l c o n s t i t u t e

'Conscience Doth Make
Subjects of Us A l l "
Althusser's Subjection
A l t h u s s e r ' s d o c t r i n e of i n t e r p e l l a t i o n c o n t i n u e s to s t r u c t u r e
c o n t e m p o r a r y debate o n subject f o r m a t i o n , o f f e r i n g a
w a y to account for à subject w h o c o m e s i n t o b e i n g as a c o n s e ­
q u e n c e o f l a n g u a g e , yet a l w a y s w i t h i n its t e r m s . T h e t h e o r y o f
i n t e r p e l l a t i o n a p p e a r s to stage a s o c i a l scene in w h i c h a s u b ­
ject i s h a i l e d , the subject t u r n s a r o u n d , a n d the subject t h e n
accepts the t e r m s b y w h i c h h e o r she i s h a i l e d . T h i s is, n o
d o u b t , a scene b o t h p u n i t i v e a n d r e d u c e d , for the c a l l i s m a d e
b y a n officer o f "the L a w , " a n d t h i s officer i s cast a s s i n g u l a r
a n d s p e a k i n g . C l e a r l y w e m i g h t object that the " c a l l " a r r i v e s
s e v e r a l l y a n d i n i m p l i c i t a n d u n s p o k e n w a y s , that the scene
i s n e v e r q u i t e a s d y a d i c a s A l t h u s s e r c l a i m s , b u t these objec­
tions have been rehearsed, a n d " i n t e r p e l l a t i o n " as a doctrine
c o n t i n u e s t o s u r v i v e its c r i t i q u e . I f w e a c c e p t that the scene
i s e x e m p l a r y a n d a l l e g o r i c a l , t h e n i t n e v e r needs t o h a p p e n
for its e f f e c t i v i t y t o b e p r e s u m e d . I n d e e d , i f i t i s a l l e g o r i c a l i n
B e n j a m i n ' s sense, t h e n the p r o c e s s l i t e r a l i z e d b y the a l l e g o r y
i s p r e c i s e l y w h a t resists n a r r a t i o n , w h a t exceeds the n a r r a ­
t i v i z a b i l i t y o f events. I n t e r p e l l a t i o n , o n t h i s a c c o u n t , i s n o t a n
1
Althusser's Subjection 107
event, b u t a c e r t a i n w a y of staging the call, w h e r e the c a l l , as
staged, b e c o m e s d e l i t e r a l i z e d i n the c o u r s e o f its e x p o s i t i o n o r
darstellung. T h e c a l l itself is a l s o f i g u r e d as a d e m a n d to a l i g n
oneself w i t h the l a w , a t u r n i n g a r o u n d (to face the l a w , t o f i n d
a face for the l a w ? ) , a n d an e n t r a n c e i n t o the l a n g u a g e of self­
a s c r i p t i o n — " H e r e I a m " — t h r o u g h the a p p r o p r i a t i o n o f g u i l t .
W h y d o e s subject f o r m a t i o n a p p e a r t o t a k e p l a c e o n l y u p o n
the a c c e p t a n c e o f g u i l t , s o that there i s n o " I " w h o m i g h t as­
c r i b e a p l a c e t o itself, w h o m i g h t b e a n n o u n c e d i n s p e e c h ,
w i t h o u t first a s e l f ­ a t t r i b u t i o n of g u i l t , a s u b m i s s i o n to the l a w
t h r o u g h a n a c c e p t a n c e o f its d e m a n d for c o n f o r m i t y ? T h e o n e
w h o t u r n s a r o u n d i n r e s p o n s e t o the c a l l does n o t r e s p o n d t o
a d e m a n d t o t u r n a r o u n d . T h e t u r n i n g a r o u n d i s a n act that
is, a s i t w e r e , c o n d i t i o n e d b o t h b y the " v o i c e " o f the l a w a n d
b y the r e s p o n s i v e n e s s o f the o n e h a i l e d b y the law. T h e " t u r n ­
i n g a r o u n d " i s a s t r a n g e sort o f m i d d l e g r o u n d ( t a k i n g p l a c e ,
p e r h a p s , i n a s t r a n g e sort o f " m i d d l e v o i c e " ) , 2
w h i c h is de­
t e r m i n e d b o t h b y the l a w a n d the a d d r e s s e e, b u t b y n e i t h e r
u n i l a t e r a l l y o r e x h a u s t i v e l y . A l t h o u g h there w o u l d b e n o t u r n ­
i n g a r o u n d w i t h o u t first h a v i n g b e e n h a i l e d , n e i t h e r w o u l d
there b e a t u r n i n g a r o u n d w i t h o u t s o m e r e a d i n e s s t o t u r n .
B u t w h e r e a n d w h e n d o e s the c a l l i n g o f the n a m e s o l i c i t the
t u r n i n g a r o u n d , the a n t i c i p a t o r y m o v e t o w a r d i d e n t i t y ? H o w
a n d w h y does the subject t u r n , a n t i c i p a t i n g the c o n f e r r a l o f
i d e n t i t y t h r o u g h the s e l f ­ a s c r i p t i o n o f g u i l t ? W h a t k i n d o f r e ­
l a t i o n a l r e a d y b i n d s these t w o s u c h that the subject k n o w s t o
t u r n , k n o w s that s o m e t h i n g i s t o b e g a i n e d f r o m s u c h a t u r n ?
H o w m i g h t w e t h i n k o f t h i s " t u r n " a s p r i o r t o subject f o r m a ­
t i o n , a p r i o r c o m p l i c i t y w i t h the l a w w i t h o u t w h i c h n o subject
e m e r g e s ? T h e t u r n t o w a r d the l a w i s t h u s a t u r n a g a i n s t o n e ­
self, a t u r n i n g b a c k o n o n e s e lf that c o n s t i t u t e s the m o v e m e n t
o f c o n s c i e n c e. B u t h o w d o e s the reflex o f c o n s c i e n c e p a r a l y z e
io8 "Conscience D o t h M a k e Subjects o f U s A l l "
the c r i t i c a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n o f the l a w a t the s a m e t i m e that i t
figures the subject's u n c r i t i c a l r e l a t i o n to the l a w as a c o n d i ­
t i o n of subjectivation? T h e one addressed is c o m p e l l e d to t u r n
t o w a r d the l a w p r i o r t o a n y p o s s i b i l i t y o f a s k i n g a set o f c r i t i ­
cal questions: W h o is speaking? W h y s h o u l d I t u r n around?
W h y s h o u l d I a c c e p t the t e r m s b y w h i c h I a m h a i l e d ?
T h i s m e a n s that p r i o r t o a n y p o s s i b i l i t y o f a c r i t i c a l u n d e r ­
s t a n d i n g o f the l a w i s a n o p e n n e s s o r v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o the l a w ,
e x e m p l i f i e d i n the t u r n t o w a r d the l a w , i n the a n t i c i p a t i o n o f
c u l l i n g a n i d e n t i t y t h r o u g h i d e n t i f y i n g w i t h the o n e w h o has
b r o k e n the law. I n d e e d , the l a w i s b r o k e n p r i o r t o a n y p o s ­
s i b i l i t y o f h a v i n g access t o the l a w , a n d s o " g u i l t " i s p r i o r t o
k n o w l e d g e o f the l a w a n d is, i n t h i s sense, a l w a y s s t r a n g e l y
i n n o c e n t . T h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a c r i t i c a l v i e w o f the l a w i s t h u s
l i m i t e d b y w h a t m i g h t b e u n d e r s t o o d a s a p r i o r d e s i r e for the
law, a passionate c o m p l i c i t y w i t h law, w i t h o u t w h i c h no sub­
ject c a n exist. F o r the "I" to l a u n c h its c r i t i q u e , it m u s t first
u n d e r s t a n d that the "I" itself i s d e p e n d e n t u p o n its c o m p l i c i ­
t o u s d e s i r e for the l a w t o m a k e p o s s i b l e its o w n existence. A
c r i t i c a l r e v i e w o f the l a w w i l l n o t, therefore, u n d o the force o f
c o n s c i e n c e u n l e s s the o n e w h o offers that c r i t i q u e i s w i l l i n g , a s
i t w e r e , t o b e u n d o n e b y the c r i t i q u e that h e o r she p e r f o r m s .
I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o r e m e m b e r that the t u r n t o w a r d the l a w i s
n o t necessitated b y the h a i l i n g ; i t i s c o m p e l l i n g , i n a less t h a n
l o g i c a l sense, b e c a u s e i t p r o m i s e s i d e n t i t y . I f the l a w speaks i n
the n a m e of a s e l f ­ i d e n t i c a l subject ( A l t h u s s e r cites the utter­
anc e o f the H e b r e w G o d : " I a m that I a m " ) , h o w i s i t that c o n ­
s c i e n c e m i g h t d e l i v e r or restore a self to oneness w i t h itself, to
the p o s t u l a t i o n o f s e l f ­ i d e n t i t y that b e c o m e s the p r e c o n d i t i o n
o f the l i n g u i s t i c c o n s o l i d a t i o n " H e r e I a m " ?
Yet h o w m i g h t w e site the v u l n e r a b i l i t y o f s u b j e c t i v a t i o n
p r e c i s e l y i n that t u r n ( t o w a r d the l a w , a g a i n s t the self), w h i c h
Althusser's Subjection 109
p r e c e d e s a n d a n t i c i p a t e s the a c c e p t a n c e o f g u i l t , a t u r n that
e l u d e s s u b j e c t i v a t i o n e v e n a s i t c o n d i t i o n s it? H o w d o e s t h i s
" t u r n " f i g u r e a c o n s c i e n c e that m i g h t b e r e n d e r e d less c o n ­
s c i e n t i o u s t h a n A l t h u s s e r w o u l d r e n d e r it? A n d h o w d o e s
A l t h u s s e r ' s s a n c t i f i c a t i o n o f the scene o f i n t e r p e l l a t i o n m a k e
the p o s s i b i l i t y o f b e c o m i n g a " b a d " subject m o r e r e m o t e a n d
less i n c e n d i a r y t h a n i t m i g h t w e l l b e ?
The doctrine of interpellation appears to presuppose a p r i o r
a n d unelaborated doctrine of conscience, a t u r n i n g back u p o n
o n e s e lf in the sense that N i e t z s c h e d e s c r i b e d in On the Geneal­
ogy of Morals. T h i s r e a d i n e s s to accept g u i l t to g a i n a p u r c h a s e
3
on identity is l i n k e d to a h i g h l y religious scenario of a n o m i ­
n a t i n g c a l l that c o m e s f r o m G o d a n d that c o n s t i t u t e s the s u b ­
ject b y a p p e a l i n g t o a n e e d f o r the l a w , a n o r i g i n a l g u i l t that
the l a w p r o m i s e s t o assuage t h r o u g h the c o n f e r r a l o f i d e n t i t y .
H o w does t h i s r e l i g i o u s f i g u r a t i o n o f i n t e r p e l l a t i o n r e s t r a i n i n
a d v a n c e a n y p o s s i b i l i t y o f c r i t i c a l i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the w o r k ­
i n g s o f the l a w , a n y u n d o i n g o f the subject w i t h o u t w h i c h the
l a w cannot proceed?
The m e n t i o n of conscience in Althusser's "Ideology a n d
I d e o l o g i c a l State A p p a r a t u s e s " has r e c e i v e d l i t t l e c r i t i c a l at­
4
t e n t i o n , e v e n t h o u g h the t e r m , t a k e n together w i t h the ex­
a m p l e o f r e l i g i o u s a u t h o r i t y t o i l l u s t r a t e the force o f i d e o l ­
ogy, suggests that the t h e o r y of i d e o l o g y is s u p p o r t e d by a
c o m p l i c a t e d set o f t h e o l o g i c a l m e t a p h o r s . A l t h o u g h A l t h u s ­
ser e x p l i c i t l y i n t r o d u c e s "the C h u r c h " m e r e l y a s a n example o f
i d e o l o g i c a l i n t e r p e l l a t i o n , i t a p p e a r s that i d e o l o g y i n h i s t e r m s
c a n n o t b e t h o u g h t e x c e p t t h r o u g h the m e t a p h o r i c s o f r e l i g i o u s
authority. The final section of "Ideology" is entitled " A n Ex­
ample: The Christian Religious Ideology" and makes explicit
the e x e m p l a r y status that r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n s h a v e o c c u p i e d
i n the p r e c e d i n g s e c t i o n o f the essay. T h o s e e x a m p l e s i n c l u d e :
110 "Conscience Doth M a k e Subjects of Us A l l "
the p u t a t i v e " e t e r n i t y " o f i d e o l o g y ; the e x p l i c i t a n a l o g y b e ­
t w e e n the " o b v i o u s n e s s o f i d e o l o g y " a n d St. P a u l ' s n o t i o n o f
the " L o g o s " i n w h i c h w e are s a i d t o " l i v e , m o v e a n d h a v e o u r
b e i n g " ; P a s c a l ' s p r a y e r a s a n i n s t a n c e o f r i t u a l i n w h i c h as­
s u m i n g the p o s t u r e o f k n e e l i n g g i v e s r i s e o v e r t i m e t o belief;
b e l i e f i t s e lf a s the i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y r e p r o d u c e d c o n d i t i o n o f i d e ­
o l o g y ; a n d the d e i f y i n g c a p i t a l i z a t i o n o f " F a m i l y , " " C h u r c h , "
" S c h o o l , " a n d "State."
A l t h o u g h the last s e c t i o n o f the essay seeks t o e x p l i c a t e
a n d e x p o s e the e x a m p l e o f r e l i g i o u s a u t h o r i t y , t h i s e x p o s u r e
l a c k s the p o w e r t o defuse the f o r c e o f i d e o l o g y . A l t h u s s e r ' s
o w n w r i t i n g , h e c o n c e d e s , i n v a r i a b l y enacts w h a t i t t h e m a ­
tizes, a n d t h u s p r o m i s e s n o e n l i g h t e n e d escape f r o m i d e o l o g y
5 I n d e e d , " P e t e r " d o e s n o t exist w i t h o u t the n a m e that s u p ­
t h r o u g h t h i s a r t i c u l a t i o n . T o i l l u s t r a t e the p o w e r o f i d e o l o g y
t o c o n s t i t u t e subjects, A l t h u s s e r has r e c o u r s e t o the e x a m p l e
o f the d i v i n e v o i c e that n a m e s , a n d i n n a m i n g , b r i n g s its s u b ­
jects i n t o b e i n g . I n c l a i m i n g that s o c i a l i d e o l o g y o p e r a t e s i n
an analogous way, A l t h u s s e r inadvertently assimilates social
i n t e r p e l l a t i o n t o the d i v i n e p e r f o r m a t i v e . T h e e x a m p l e o f i d e ­
o l o g y t h u s a s s u m e s the status o f a p a r a d i g m for t h i n k i n g i d e ­
o l o g y a s s u c h , w h e r e b y the i n e v i t a b l e s t r u c t u r e s o f i d e o l o g y
are e s t a b l i s h e d t e x t u a l l y t h r o u g h r e l i g i o u s m e t a p h o r : the a u ­
t h o r i t y o f the " v o i c e " o f i d e o l o g y , the " v o i c e " o f i n t e r p e l l a t i o n ,
is f i g u r e d as a v o i c e a l m o s t i m p o s s i b l e to refuse. T h e f o r c e of
i n t e r p e l l a t i o n i n A l t h u s s e r i s d e r i v e d f r o m the e x a m p l e s b y
w h i c h it is ostensibly illustrated, most notably, G o d ' s voice in
the n a m i n g o f Peter ( a n d M o s e s ) a n d its s e c u l a r i z a t i o n i n the
p o s t u l a t e d v o i c e o f the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f state a u t h o r i t y : the
p o l i c e m a n ' s v o i c e i n the h a i l i n g o f the w a y w a r d p e d e s t r i a n
w i t h " H e y y o u there!"
I n o t h e r w o r d s , the d i v i n e p o w e r o f n a m i n g s t r u c t u r e s
the t h e o r y o f i n t e r p e l l a t i o n that a c c o u n t s for the i d e o l o g i c a l
Althusser's Subjection m
c o n s t i t u t i o n o f the subject. B a p t i s m e x e m p l i f i e s the l i n g u i s t i c
m e a n s b y w h i c h the subject i s c o m p e l l e d i n t o s o c i a l b e i n g .
G o d n a m e s "Peter," a n d t h i s a d d r e s s establishes G o d a s the
o r i g i n o f P e t e r ; the n a m e r e m a i n s a t t a c h e d t o Peter p e r m a ­
6
n e n t l y b y v i r t u e o f the i m p l i e d a n d c o n t i n u o u s p r e s e n c e i n the
n a m e o f the o n e w h o n a m e s h i m . W i t h i n the t e r m s o f A l t h u s ­
ser's e x a m p l e s , h o w e v e r , t h i s n a m i n g c a n n o t b e a c c o m p l i s h e d
w i t h o u t a c e r t a i n r e a d i n e s s o r a n t i c i p a t o r y d e s i r e o n the p a r t
o f the o n e a d d r e s s e d . T o the extent that the n a m i n g i s a n a d ­
dress, there i s a n a d d r e s s e e p r i o r t o the a d d r e s s ; b u t g i v e n that
the a d d r e s s i s a n a m e w h i c h creates w h a t i t n a m e s , there a p ­
p e a r s t o b e n o " P e t e r " w i t h o u t the n a m e "Peter."
p l i e s the l i n g u i s t i c g u a r a n t e e of existence. In t h i s sense, as a
p r i o r a n d e s s e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n o f the f o r m a t i o n o f the subject,
there i s a c e r t a i n r e a d i n e s s t o b e c o m p e l l e d b y the a u t h o r i t a ­
t i v e i n t e r p e l l a t i o n , a r e a d i n e s s w h i c h suggests that o n e is, as
i t w e r e , a l r e a d y i n r e l a t i o n t o the v o i c e b e f o r e the r e s p o n s e ,
a l r e a d y i m p l i c a t e d i n the t e r m s o f the a n i m a t i n g m i s r e c o g ­
n i t i o n b y a n a u t h o r i t y t o w h i c h one subsequently yields. O r
perhaps one has already y i e l d e d before one turns a r o u n d , a n d
that t u r n i n g i s m e r e l y a s i g n o f a n i n e v i t a b l e s u b m i s s i o n b y
w h i c h o n e i s e s t a b l i s h e d a s a subject p o s i t i o n e d i n l a n g u a g e a s
a p o s s i b l e addressee. I n t h i s sense, the scene w i t h the p o l i c e
i s a b e l a t e d a n d r e d o u b l e d scene, o n e w h i c h r e n d e r s e x p l i c i t
a f o u n d i n g s u b m i s s i o n for w h i c h n o s u c h scene w o u l d p r o v e
a d e q u a t e . I f that s u b m i s s i o n b r i n g s the subject i n t o b e i n g , t h e n
the n a r r a t i v e that seeks t o t e l l the s t o r y o f that s u b m i s s i o n c a n
p r o c e e d o n l y b y e x p l o i t i n g g r a m m a r f o r its f i c t i o n a l effects.
T h e n a r r a t i v e that seeks t o a c c o u n t f o r h o w the subject c o m e s
i n t o b e i n g p r e s u m e s the g r a m m a t i c a l "subject" p r i o r t o the
a c c o u n t o f its genesis. Yet the f o u n d i n g s u b m i s s i o n that has
112 "Conscience Doth M a k e Subjects of Us A l l "
n o t yet r e s o l v e d i n t o the subject w o u l d b e p r e c i s e l y the n o n ­
n a r r a t i v i z a b l e p r e h i s t o r y o f the subject, a p a r a d o x w h i c h calls
the v e r y n a r r a t i v e o f subject f o r m a t i o n i n t o q u e s t i o n . I f there
is no subject e x c e p t as a c o n s e q u e n c e of this s u b j e c t i o n , the
n a r r a t i v e that w o u l d e x p l a i n t h is r e q u i r e s that the t e m p o r a l i t y
n o t b e t r u e , for the g r a m m a r o f that n a r r a t i v e p r e s u p p o s e s
that there i s n o s u b j e c t i o n w i t h o u t a subject w h o u n d e r g o e s it.
I s t h is f o u n d i n g s u b m i s s i o n a k i n d o f y i e l d i n g p r i o r t o a n y
q u e s t i o n o f p s y c h o l o g i c a l m o t i v a t i o n ? H o w are w e t o u n d e r ­
s t a n d the p s y c h i c d i s p o s i t i o n a t w o r k a t the m o m e n t i n w h i c h
the p e d e s t r i a n r e s p o n d s t o the l a w ? W h a t c o n d i t i o n s a n d i n ­
f o r m s that r e s p o n s e ? W h y w o u l d the p e r s o n o n the street r e ­
s p o n d t o " H e y y o u t h e r e ! " b y t u r n i n g a r o u n d ? W h a t i s the
s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t u r n i n g to face a v o i c e that calls f r o m b e h i n d ?
T h i s t u r n i n g t o w a r d the v o i c e of the l a w is a s i g n of a c e r t a i n
d e s i r e t o b e b e h e l d b y a n d p e r h a p s also t o b e h o l d the face o f
authority, a visual rendering of an auditory scene—a m i r r o r
stage or, p e r h a p s m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e l y , a n " a c o u s t i c m i r r o r " — 7
that p e r m i t s the m i s r e c o g n i t i o n w i t h o u t w h i c h the s o c i a l i t y
o f the subject c a n n o t b e a c h i e v e d . T h i s s u b j e c t i v a t i o n is, ac­
c o r d i n g to A l t h u s s e r , a m i s r e c o g n i t i o n , a false a n d p r o v i s i o n a l
t o t a l i z a t i o n ; w h a t p r e c i p i t a t e s t h i s d e s i r e for the l a w , t h is l u r e
o f m i s r e c o g n i t i o n o f f e r e d i n the r e p r i m a n d that establishes
s u b o r d i n a t i o n a s the p r i c e o f s u b j e c t i v a t i o n ? T h i s a c c o u n t a p ­
p e a r s to i m p l y that s o c i a l existence, existenc e as a subject, c a n
b e p u r c h a s e d o n l y t h r o u g h a g u i l t y e m b r a c e o f the l a w , w h e r e
g u i l t g u a r a n t e e s the i n t e r v e n t i o n o f the l a w a n d , hence, the
c o n t i n u a t i o n of the subject's existence. If the subject c a n o n l y
assure h i s / h e r existenc e i n t e r m s o f the l a w , a n d the l a w r e ­
quires subjection for subjectivation, then, perversely, one m a y
( a l w a y s a l r e a d y ) y i e l d t o the l a w i n o r d e r t o c o n t i n u e t o as­
s u r e o n e ' s o w n existence. T h e y i e l d i n g t o the l a w m i g h t t h e n
Althusser's Subjection 113
be r e a d as the c o m p e l l e d c o n s e q u e n c e of a n a r c i s s i s t i c a t t a c h ­
m e n t t o one's c o n t i n u i n g existence.
A l t h u s s e r takes u p g u i l t e x p l i c i t l y i n the n a r r a t i v e , h o w e v e r
reliable, of his m u r d e r of Hélène, his wife, in w h i c h he nar­
rates, i n a t e l l i n g r e v e r s a l o f the p o l i c e scene i n " I d e o l o g y , "
h o w h e r u s h e d i n t o the street c a l l i n g for the p o l i c e i n o r d e r
t o d e l i v e r h i m s e l f u p t o the law. T h i s c a l l i n g for the p o l i c e i s
8
a peculiar inversion of hailing w h i c h "Ideology" presupposes
w i t h o u t e x p l i c i t l y t h e m a t i z i n g . W i t h o u t e x p l o i t i n g the b i o ­
g r a p h i c a l , I w a n t t o p u r s u e the t h e o r e t i c a l i m p o r t a n c e o f t h i s
r e v e r s a l o f the scene w i t h the p o l i c e , i n w h i c h the m a n o n the
street calls f o r the p o l i c e r a t h er t h a n r e s p o n d i n g t o the p o l i c e ' s
call. In "Ideology," guilt a n d conscience operate i m p l i c i t l y in
relation to an ideological demand, an animating r e p r i m a n d , in
the a c c o u n t o f subject f o r m a t i o n . T h e p r e s e n t c h a p t e r a tt em p ts
t o r e r e a d that essay t o u n d e r s t a n d h o w i n t e r p e l l a t i o n i s essen­
t i a l l y f i g u r e d t h r o u g h the r e l i g i o u s e x a m p l e . T h e e x e m p l a r y
status o f r e l i g i o u s a u t h o r i t y u n d e r s c o r e s the p a r a d o x o f h o w
the v e r y p o s s i b i l i t y o f subject f o r m a t i o n d e p e n d s u p o n a p a s ­
sionate p u r s u i t o f a r e c o g n i t i o n w h i c h , w i t h i n the t e r m s o f the
religious example, is inseparable f r o m a c o n d e m n a t i o n.
A n o t h e r w a y o f p o s i n g t h is q u e s t i o n w o u l d b e t o ask: H o w
i s A l t h u s s e r ' s text i m p l i c a t e d i n the " c o n s c i e n c e " that i t seeks
to e x p l a i n ? To w h a t extent is the p e r s i s t e n c e of the t h e o ­
l o g i c a l m o d e l a s y m p t o m , o n e that c o m p e l s a s y m p t o m a t i c
r e a d i n g ? In h i s i n t r o d u c t o r y essay to Reading Capital, A l t h u s ­
ser suggests that e v e r y text m u s t b e r e a d f o r the " i n v i s i b l e "
that a p p e a r s w i t h i n the w o r l d that t h e o r y r e n d e r s v i s i b l e . I n 9
a recent c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f A l t h u s s e r ' s n o t i o n o f " s y m p t o m a t i c
r e a d i n g , " J e a n ­ M a r i e V i n c e n t r e m a r k s that " a text i s n o t i n t e r ­
e s t i n g o n l y b e c a u s e i t i s o r g a n i z e d l o g i c a l l y , b e c a u s e o f the
a p p a r e n t l y r i g o r o u s w a y i n w h i c h i t d e v e l o p s its a r g u m e n t s ,
ii 4
"Conscience D o t h M a k e Subjects of Us A l l "
T Althusser's
b u t a ls o b e c a u s e o f w h a t d i s o r g a n i z e s its o r d e r , b e c a u s e o f
a l l that w e a k e n s i t . " 1 0
Neither Althusser nor Vincent considers
the p o s s i b i l i t y that the e x e m p l a r y status o f c e r t a i n m e t a p h o r s
m a y o c c a s i o n a s y m p t o m a t i c r e a d i n g that " w e a k e n s " r i g o r o u s
a r g u m e n t . Yet i n A l t h u s s e r ' s o w n text, r e c o n s i d e r i n g the c e n ­
t r a l r e l i g i o u s t r o p e s o f the v o i c e o f the l a w a n d c o n s c i e n c e e n ­
ables o n e t o q u e s t i o n w h a t has b e c o m e , w i t h i n recent l i t e r a r y
s t u d i e s , a n u n n e c e s s a r y t e n s i o n b e t w e e n the r e a d i n g o f m e t a ­
p h o r a n d the r e a d i n g o f i d e o l o g y . T o the extent that A l t h u s s e r ' s
r e l i g i o u s a n a l o g i e s are u n d e r s t o o d a s m e r e l y i l l u s t r a t i v e , t h e y
are set a p a r t f r o m the r i g o r o u s a r g u m e n t a t i o n of the text itself,
o f f e r e d i n p e d a g o g i c a l p a r a p h r a s i s . Yet the p e r f o r m a t i v e force
o f the v o i c e o f r e l i g i o u s a u t h o r i t y b e c o m e s e x e m p l a r y f o r the
t h e o r y o f i n t e r p e l l a t i o n , t h u s e x t e n d i n g t h r o u g h e x a m p l e the
p u t a t i v e force o f d i v i n e n a m i n g t o the s o c i a l a u t h o r i t i e s b y
w h i c h the subject i s h a i l e d i n t o s o c i a l b e i n g . I d o n o t m e a n t o
suggest that the " t r u t h " o f A l t h u s s e r ' s text c a n b e d i s c o v e r e d
i n h o w the f i g u r a i d i s r u p t s " r i g o r o u s " c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n . S u c h
a n a p p r o a c h r o m a n t i c i z e s the f i g u r a i a s e s s e n t i a l l y d i s r u p t i v e ,
whereas figures m a y w e l l c o m p o u n d a n d intensify concep­
t u a l c l a i m s . T h e c o n c e r n here has a m o r e s p e c i f i c t e x t u a l a i m ,
namely, to show h o w figures—examples and analogies—in­
f o r m a n d e x t e n d c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s , i m p l i c a t i n g the text i n a n
ideological sanctification of religious authority w h i c h it can
e x p o s e o n l y b y r e e n a c t i n g that a u t h o r i t y .
F o r A l t h u s s e r , the efficacy o f i d e o l o g y consists i n p a r t i n
the f o r m a t i o n of conscience, w h e r e the n o t i o n " c o n s c i e n c e " is
u n d e r s t o o d t o p l a c e r e s t r i c t i o n s o n w h a t i s s p e a k a b l e or, m o r e
generally, representable. Conscienc e cannot be conceptualize d
as a s e l f ­ r e s t r i c t i o n , if that r e l a t i o n is c o n s t r u e d as a p r e g i v e n
r e f l e x i v i t y , a t u r n i n g b a c k u p o n itself p e r f o r m e d b y a r e a d y ­
m a d e subject. I n s t e a d , it d e s i g n a t e s a k i n d of t u r n i n g b a c k —
Subjection "5
a r e f l e x i v i t y — w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s the c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y
for the subject t o f o r m . R e f l e x i v i t y i s c o n s t i t u t e d t h r o u g h t h i s
m o m e n t o f c o n s c i e n c e , t h i s t u r n i n g b a c k u p o n oneself, w h i c h
i s s i m u l t a n e o u s w i t h a t u r n i n g t o w a r d the law. T h i s self­
r e s t r i c t i o n d o e s n o t i n t e r n a l i z e a n e x t e r n a l l a w : the m o d e l o f
i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n takes for g r a n t e d that a n " i n t e r n a l " a n d "exter­
n a l " h a v e a l r e a d y b e e n f o r m e d . Instead, t h is s e l f ­ r e s t r i c t i o n i s
p r i o r to the subject. It c o n s t i t u t e s the i n a u g u r a t i n g r e f l e x i v e
t u r n o f the subject, e n a c t e d i n a n t i c i p a t i o n o f the l a w a n d
hence d e t e r m i n e d by, h a v i n g p r e j u d i c a t i v e f o r e k n o w l e d g e of,
the l a w . C o n s c i e n c e i s f u n d a m e n t a l t o the p r o d u c t i o n a n d
r e g u l a t i o n o f the c i t i z e n ­ s u b j e c t , for c o n s c i e n c e t u r n s the i n d i ­
v i d u a l a r o u n d , m a k e s h i m / h e r a v a i l a b l e t o the s u b j e c t i v a t i n g
r e p r i m a n d . T h e l a w r e d o u b l e s that r e p r i m a n d , h o w e v e r : the
t u r n i n g b a c k i s a t u r n i n g t o w a r d . H o w are these t u r n s t o b e
t h o u g h t together, w i t h o u t r e d u c i n g o n e t o the o t h e r ?
B e f o r e the p o l i c e o r the c h u r c h a u t h o r i t i e s a r r i v e o n the
A l t h u s s e r i a n scene, there is a reference to p r o h i b i t i o n w h i c h ,
i n a L a c a n i a n v e i n , i s l i n k e d w i t h the v e r y p o s s i b i l i t y o f
s p e e c h . A l t h u s s e r l i n k s the e m e r g e n c e o f a c o n s c i o u s n e s s —
a n d a c o n s c i e n c e ("la c o n s c i e n c e c i v i q u e et p r o f e s s i o n e l l e " ) —
w i t h the p r o b l e m of s p e a k i n g p r o p e r l y (bien parler)} 1
"Speak­
i n g p r o p e r l y " a p p e a r s t o b e a n i n s t a n c e o f the i d e o l o g i c a l
w o r k o f a c q u i r i n g s k i l l s , a p r o c e s s c e n t r a l t o the f o r m a t i o n o f
the subject. T h e " d i v e r s e s k i l l s " o f l a b o r p o w e r m u s t b e r e p r o ­
d u c e d , a n d increasingly this r e p r o d u c t i o n happens "outside
the f i r m " a n d i n school, that is, o u t s i d e p r o d u c t i o n a n d i n e d u ­
c a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . T h e s k i l l s t o b e l e a r n e d are, a b o v e a l l , the
skills of speech. T h e first m e n t i o n of "conscience," w h i c h w i l l
t u r n o u t t o b e c e n t r a l t o the success o r efficacy o f i n t e r p e l l a ­
t i o n , i s l i n k e d t o the a c q u i s i t i o n o f m a s t e r y , t o l e a r n i n g h o w t o
"speak p r o p e r l y . " T h e r e p r o d u c t i o n o f the subject takes p l a c e
n6 "Conscience D o t h M a k e Subjects o f U s A l l "
t h r o u g h the r e p r o d u c t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c s k i l l s , c o n s t i t u t i n g , a s i t
w e r e , the r u l e s a n d a t t i t u d es o b s e r v e d " b y e v e r y agent i n the
d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r . " I n t h i s sense the r u l e s o f p r o p e r s p e e c h
are also the r u l e s b y w h i c h respect i s p r o f e r r e d o r w i t h h e l d .
W o r k e r s are t a u g h t t o speak p r o p e r l y a n d m a n a g e r s l e a r n t o
s p e a k to w o r k e r s " i n the r i g h t w a y [bien commander]" (131­
32/72).
L a n g u a g e s k i l l s are s a i d t o b e m a s t e r e d a n d m a s t e r a b l e , yet
this mastery is figured by A l t h u s s e r quite clearly as a k i n d
o f s u b m i s s i o n : "the r e p r o d u c t i o n o f l a b o r p o w e r r e q u i r e s n o t
o n l y a r e p r o d u c t i o n of (the l a b o r e r ' s ) s k i l l s , b u t also, at the
s a m e t i m e , a r e p r o d u c t i o n of its s u b m i s s i o n to the r u l e s of the
established order [soumission à l'idéologie dominante]" (132/72).
T h i s s u b m i s s i o n t o the r u l e s o f the d o m i n a n t i d e o l o g y l e a d s
i n the n e x t p a r a g r a p h t o the p r o b l e m a t i c o f subjection, w h i c h
c a r r i e s the d o u b l e m e a n i n g o f h a v i n g s u b m i t t e d t o these r u l e s
a n d b e c o m i n g constituted w i t h i n sociality b y v i r t u e o f this
submission.
A l t h u s s e r w r i t e s that "the s c h o o l . . . teaches ' k n o w ­ h o w '
[ s k i l l s ; des 'savoir­faire'] . . . in f o r m s w h i c h e n s u r e subjection to
the ruling ideology [l'assujetissement à l ' i d é o l o g i e d o m i n a n t e ]
or [ou] the m a s t e r y of its ' p r a c t i c e ' " (133/73). C o n s i d e r the
l o g i c a l effect o f the d i s j u n c t i v e " o r " i n the m i d d l e o f t h i s for­
m u l a t i o n : " s u b j e c t i on t o the r u l i n g i d e o l o g y o r " — p u t i n differ­
ent, yet e q u i v a l e n t t e r m s — " t h e m a s t e r y o f its ' p r a c t i c e ' " ( m y
e m p h a s i s ) . T h e m o r e a p r a c t i c e i s m a s t e r e d , the m o r e f u l l y
subjection is achieved. S u b m i s s i o n a n d mastery take place
simultaneously, a n d this p a r a d o x i c a l s i m u l t a n e i t y constitutes
the a m b i v a l e n c e o f s u b j e c t i o n . T h o u g h o n e m i g h t e x p e c t s u b ­
m i s s i o n to consist in y i e l d i n g to an externally i m p o s e d d o m i ­
n a n t o r d e r a n d t o b e m a r k e d b y a loss o f c o n t r o l a n d m a s t e r y ,
p a r a d o x i c a l l y , i t i s itself m a r k e d b y m a s t e r y . T h e b i n a r y f r a m e
Althusser's Subjection 117
o f m a s t e r y / s u b m i s s i o n i s f o r f e i t e d b y A l t h u s s e r a s h e recasts
submission precisely a n d p a r a d o x i c a l l y as a k i n d of mastery.
In t h is v i e w , n e i t h e r s u b m i s s i o n n o r m a s t e r y is performed by a
subject; the l i v e d s i m u l t a n e i t y o f s u b m i s s i o n a s m a s t e r y , a n d
m a s t e r y a s s u b m i s s i o n , i s the c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y for the
e m e r g e n c e of the subject.
The conceptual p r o b l e m here is u n d e r s c o r e d by a g r a m ­
m a t i c a l o n e i n w h i c h there c a n b e n o subject p r i o r t o a s u b m i s ­
s i o n , a n d yet there i s a g r a m m a t i c a l l y i n d u c e d " n e e d t o k n o w "
who u n d e r g o e s t h is s u b m i s s i o n in o r d e r to b e c o m e a subject.
A l t h u s s e r i n t r o d u c e s the t e r m " i n d i v i d u a l " a s a p l a c e ­ h o l d e r
t o satisfy p r o v i s i o n a l l y t h i s g r a m m a t i c a l n e e d , b u t w h a t m i g h t
u l t i m a t e l y fit the g r a m m a t i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t w i l l n o t b e a static
g r a m m a t i c a l subject. T h e g r a m m a r o f the subject e m e r g e s o n l y
as a c o n s e q u e n c e of the p r o c e s s we are t r y i n g to d e s c r i b e .
B e c a u s e w e are, a s i t w e r e , t r a p p e d w i t h i n the g r a m m a t i c a l
t i m e o f the subject (e.g., " w e are t r y i n g t o d e s c r i b e , " " w e are
t r a p p e d " ) , it is a l m o s t i m p o s s i b l e to ask after the g e n e a l o g y
o f its c o n s t r u c t i o n w i t h o u t p r e s u p p o s i n g that c o n s t r u c t i o n i n
a s k i n g the q u e s t i o n .
W h a t , p r i o r t o the subject, a c c o u n t s f o r its f o r m a t i o n ? A l ­
t h u s s e r b e g i n s " I d e o l o g y a n d I d e o l o g i c a l State A p p a r a t u s e s "
b y r e f e r r i n g t o the r e p r o d u c t i o n o f s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , s p e c i f i e d
a s the r e p r o d u c t i o n o f s o c i a l s k i l l s . H e t h e n d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e ­
t w e e n s k i l l s r e p r o d u c e d i n the f i r m a n d those r e p r o d u c e d i n
e d u c a t i o n . T h e subject i s f o r m e d w i t h respect t o the latter. In a
sense, t h is r e p r o d u c t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s i s p r i o r t o the subject w h o
i s f o r m e d i n its c o u r s e . Yet the t w o c a n n o t , s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g ,
b e t h o u g h t w i t h o u t e a c h other.
T h e r e p r o d u c t i o n o f s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , the r e p r o d u c t i o n o f
s k i l l s , i s the r e p r o d u c t i o n o f s u b j e c t i o n . B u t the r e p r o d u c t i o n
o f l a b o r i s not c e n t r a l h e r e — t h e c e n t r a l r e p r o d u c t i o n i s o n e
ii8 "Conscience Doth M a k e Subjects of Us A l l "
p r o p e r t o the subject a n d takes p l a c e i n r e l a t i o n t o l a n g u a g e
a n d t o the f o r m a t i o n o f c o n s c i e n c e . F o r A l t h u s s e r , t o p e r f o r m
tasks " c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y " i s t o p e r f o r m t h e m , a s i t w e r e , a g a i n
a n d a g a i n , t o r e p r o d u c e those s k i l l s a n d , i n r e p r o d u c i n g t h e m ,
to acquire mastery. A l t h u s s e r places "conscientiously" in q u o ­
tation m a r k s ("pour s'acquitter 'consciencieusement' de leur
tâche," 73), t h u s b r i n g i n g i n t o r e l i e f the w a y i n w h i c h l a b o r
i s m o r a l i z e d . T h e m o r a l sense o f s'acquitter i s lost i n its t r a n s ­
l a t i o n as "to p e r f o r m " : if the m a s t e r y of a set of s k i l l s is to
be c o n s t r u e d as an acquitting of oneself, t h e n t h i s m a s t e r y of
savoir­faire d e f e n d s o n e agains t an a c c u s a t i o n ; q u i t e l i t e r a l l y ,
it is the a c c u s e d ' s d e c l a r a t i o n of i n n o c e n c e . To a c q u i t oneself
" c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y " is, t h e n , to c o n s t r u e l a b o r as a c o n f e s s i o n of
i n n o c e n c e , a d i s p l a y o r p r o o f o f g u i l t l e s s n e s s i n the face o f the
d e m a n d for confession i m p l i e d by an insistent accusation.
" S u b m i s s i o n " t o the r u l e s o f the d o m i n a n t i d e o l o g y m i g h t
t h e n be u n d e r s t o o d as a s u b m i s s i o n to the n e c e s s i t y to p r o v e
i n n o c e n c e i n the face o f a c c u s a t i o n , a s u b m i s s i o n t o the d e ­
m a n d f o r p r o o f , a n e x e c u t i o n o f that p r o o f , a n d a c q u i s i t i o n o f
the status o f the subject i n a n d t h r o u g h c o m p l i a n c e w i t h the
t e r m s of the i n t e r r o g a t i v e law. To b e c o m e a "subject" is t h u s
to have been p r e s u m e d guilty, then trie d a n d declared i n n o ­
cent. B e c a u s e t h is d e c l a r a t i o n is n o t a s i n g l e act b u t a status
i n c e s s a n t l y reproduced, to b e c o m e a "subject" is to be c o n t i n u ­
o u s l y i n the p r o c e s s o f a c q u i t t i n g oneself o f the a c c u s a t i o n o f
g u i l t . It is to h a v e b e c o m e an e m b l e m of l a w f u l n e s s , a c i t i z e n
i n g o o d s t a n d i n g , b u t o n e for w h o m that status i s t e n u o u s ,
i n d e e d , one w h o has k n o w n — s o m e h o w , s o m e w h e r e — w h a t i t
is not to h a v e that s t a n d i n g a n d h e n c e to h a v e b e e n cast o u t
a s g u i l t y Yet b e c a u s e t h i s g u i l t c o n d i t i o n s the subject, i t c o n ­
stitutes the p r e h i s t o r y o f the s u b j e c t i o n t o the l a w b y w h i c h
the subject i s p r o d u c e d . H e r e o n e m i g h t u s e f u l l y conjectur e
Althusser s Subjection 119
that the r e a s o n there are so f e w references to " b a d subjects"
i n A l t h u s s e r i s that the t e r m t e n d s t o w a r d the o x y m o r o n i c . T o
be " b a d " is not yet to be a subject, n o t yet to h a v e a c q u i t t e d
oneself o f the a l l e g a t i o n o f g u i l t . 12
T h i s p e r f o r m a n c e is n o t s i m p l y in accord w i t h these s k i l l s ,
for there i s n o subject p r i o r t o t h e i r p e r f o r m i n g ; p e r f o r m i n g
s k i l l s l a b o r i o u s l y w o r k s the subject i n t o its status as a s o c i a l
being. There is guilt, a n d then a repetitive practice by w h i c h
s k i l l s are a c q u i r e d , a n d t h e n a n d o n l y t h e n a n a s s u m p t i o n o f
the g r a m m a t i c a l p l a c e w i t h i n the s o c i a l as a subject.
To say that the subject p e r f o r m s a c c o r d i n g to a set of s k i l l s
is, as it w e r e , to t a k e g r a m m a r at its w o r d : there is a subject
w h o e n c o u n t e r s a set o f s k i l l s t o b e l e a r n e d , l e a r n s t h e m o r
fails t o l e a r n t h e m , a n d t h e n a n d o n l y t h e n c a n i t b e s a i d e i t h e r
to h a v e m a s t e r e d those s k i l l s or n o t . To m a s t e r a set of s k i l l s is
n o t s i m p l y t o accept a set o f s k i l l s , b u t t o r e p r o d u c e t h e m i n
a n d a s one's o w n a c t i v i t y . T h i s i s no t s i m p l y t o act a c c o r d i n g
to a set of r u l e s , b u t to e m b o d y r u l e s in the c o u r s e of a c t i o n
a n d t o r e p r o d u c e t h o se r u l e s i n e m b o d i e d r i t u a l s o f a c t i o n . 13
W h a t leads t o t h i s r e p r o d u c t i o n ? C l e a r l y , i t i s n o t m e r e l y
a m e c h a n i s t i c a p p r o p r i a t i o n of n o r m s , n o r is it a v o l u n t a r i s t i c
a p p r o p r i a t i o n . It is neither s i m p l e b e h a v i o r i s m n o r a delib­
erate project. To the extent that it p r e c e d e s the f o r m a t i o n of
the subject, it is n o t yet of the o r d e r of c o n s c i o u s n e s s , a n d
yet t h i s i n v o l u n t a r y c o m p u l s i o n i s n o t a m e c h a n i s t i c a l l y i n ­
d u c e d effect. T h e n o t i o n o f r i t u a l suggests that i t i s p e r f o r m e d ,
a n d that i n the r e p e t i t i o n o f p e r f o r m a n c e a b e l i e f i s s p a w n e d ,
w h i c h i s t h e n i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o the p e r f o r m a n c e i n its subse­
quent operations. But inherent to any performance is a c o m ­
p u l s i o n t o " a c q u i t oneself," a n d s o p r i o r t o a n y p e r f o r m a n c e i s
an anxiety a n d a knowingness w h i c h becomes articulate a n d
a n i m a t i n g o n l y o n the o c c a s i o n o f the r e p r i m a n d .
120 "Conscience D o t h M a k e Subjects of Us A H "
I s i t p o s s i b l e t o separate the p s y c h i c d i m e n s i o n o f t h is r i t u ­
a l i s t i c r e p e t i t i o n f r o m the "acts" b y w h i c h i t i s a n i m a t e d a n d
reanimated? The v e r y n o t i o n of r i t u a l is meant to render be­
lief a n d p r a c t i c e i n s e p a r a b l e . Yet the S l o v e n i a n c r i t i c M l a d e n
D o l a r a r g u e s that A l t h u s s e r fails t o a c c o u n t for the p s y c h e a s
a separate d i m e n s i o n . D o l a r c o u n s e l s a r e t u r n t o L a c a n , m u c h
i n the s a m e w a y that S l a v o j Z i z e k suggests a n e c e s s a r y c o m ­
plementarity between Althusser and Lacan. 1 4
T o insist o n the
s e p a r a b i l i t y o f the p s y c h e f r o m s o c i a l p r a c t i c e i s t o i n t e n s i f y
the r e l i g i o u s m e t a p h o r i c s i n A l t h u s s e r , that is, t o f i g u re the
p s y c h e as p u r e i d e a l i t y , not u n l i k e the i d e a l i t y of the s o u l . I
turn, then, to D o l a r ' s reading of Althusser in order to consider
the t e n s i o n b e t w e e n the p u t a t i v e i d e a l i t y o f s u b j e c t i v i t y a n d
the c l a i m that i d e o l o g y , i n c l u d i n g p s y c h i c r e a l i t y , i s p a r t o f the
e x p a n d e d d o m a i n o f m a t e r i a l i t y i n the A l t h u s s e r i a n sense.
M l a d e n D o l a r ' s essay " B e y o n d I n t e r p e l l a t i o n " 1 5
suggests
that A l t h u s s e r , d e s p i t e h i s o c c a s i o n a l u s e o f L a c a n ' s t h e o r y o f
the i m a g i n a r y , fails t o a p p r e c i a t e the d i s r u p t i v e p o t e n t i a l o f
p s y c h o a n a l y s i s , i n p a r t i c u l a r , the n o t i o n o f the R e a l a s d e s i g ­
n a t i n g that w h i c h n e v e r b e c o m e s a v a i l a b l e t o s u b j e c t i v a t i o n .
D o l a r w r i t e s , " T o p u t it the s i m p l e s t w a y , there is a p a r t of the
i n d i v i d u a l that c a n n o t s u c c e s s f u l l y pass i n t o the subject, a n
e l e m e n t of ' p r e ­ i d e o l o g i c a l ' a n d ' p r e s u b j e c t i v e ' materia prima
that c o m e s t o h a u n t s u b j e c t i v i t y o n c e i t i s c o n s t i t u t e d a s s u c h "
(75). T h e u s e of "materia prima" h e r e is s i g n i f i c a n t , for w i t h
t h i s p h r a s e D o l a r e x p l i c i t l y contests the s o c i a l a c c o u n t o f m a ­
t e r i a l i t y that A l t h u s s e r p r o v i d e s . In fact, t h is "materia prima"
n e v e r materializes in the A l t h u s s e r i a n sense, n e v e r e m e r g e s as
a p r a c t i c e , a r i t u a l , or a s o c i a l r e l a t i o n ; f r o m the p o i n t of v i e w
o f the s o c i a l , the " m a t e r i a p r i m a " i s r a d i c a l l y immaterial. D o l a r
t h u s c r i t i c i z e s A l t h u s s e r for e l i d i n g the d i m e n s i o n o f subjec­
t i v i t y that r e m a i n s r a d i c a l l y i m m a t e r i a l , b a r r e d f r o m a p p e a r ­
Althusser's Subjection 121
ance w i t h i n m a t e r i a l i t y . A c c o r d i n g t o D o l a r , i n t e r p e l l a t i o n c a n
o n l y e x p l a i n the f o r m a t i o n o f the subject i n a p a r t i a l w a y :
"for A l t h u s s e r , the subject i s w h a t m a k e s i d e o l o g y w o r k ; for
p s y c h o a n a l y s i s , the subject e m e r g e s w h e r e i d e o l o g y fails. . . .
T h e r e m a i n d e r p r o d u c e d b y s u b j e c t i v a t i o n i s a ls o i n v i s i b l e
f r o m the p o i n t o f v i e w o f i n t e r p e l l a t i o n . " " I n t e r p e l l a t i o n " h e
w r i t e s , " i s a w a y o f a v o i d i n g [that r e m a i n d e r ] " (76). A t stake
for D o l a r i s the n e e d t o s t r e n g t h e n the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n the
d o m a i n o f the s y m b o l i c , u n d e r s t o o d a s c o m m u n i c a b l e s p e e c h
a n d s o c i a l b o n d s , a n d that o f the p s y c h i c , w h i c h i s o n t o l o g i ­
c a l l y d i s t i n c t f r o m the s o c i a l a n d i s d e n n e d a s the r e m a i n d e r
that the n o t i o n o f the s o c i a l c a n n o t t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t .
Dolar distinguishes between materiality and inferiority,
t h e n l o o s e l y a l i g n s that d i s t i n c t i o n w i t h the A l t h u s s e r i a n d i v i ­
s i o n b e t w e e n the m a t e r i a l i t y o f the state a p p a r a t u s a n d the
putative ideality of subjectivity. In a f o r m u l a t i o n w i t h strong
C a r t e s i a n r e s o n a n c e, D o l a r defines s u b j e c t i v i t y t h r o u g h the
n o t i o n o f i n f e r i o r i t y a n d i d e n t i f i e s a s m a t e r i a l the d o m a i n o f
e x t e r i o r i t y (i.e., e x t e r i o r t o the subject). H e p r e s u p p o s e s that
s u b j e c t i v i t y consists i n b o t h i n f e r i o r i t y a n d i d e a l i t y , w h e r e a s
m a t e r i a l i t y b e l o n g s t o its o p p o s i t e , the c o u n t e r v a i l i n g e x t e r i o r
world.
This manner of distinguishing interior f r o m exterior m a y
w e l l s e e m strange as a c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of or e x t r a p o l a t i o n
from Althusser's position. Althusser's distinctive contribution
is, after a l l , t o u n d e r m i n e the o n t o l o g i c a l d u a l i s m p r e s u p p o s e d
b y the c o n v e n t i o n a l M a r x i s t d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n a m a t e r i a l
base a n d a n i d e a l o r i d e o l o g i c a l s u p e r s t r u c t u r e . H e d o e s s o
b y a s s e r t i n g the m a t e r i a l i t y o f the i d e o l o g i c a l : "a n i d e o l o g y
a l w a y s exists i n a n a p p a r a t u s , a n d its p r a c t i c e , o r p r a c t i c e s .
T h i s existenc e i s m a t e r i a l . " 1 6
T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of the subject is material to the extent that
122 "Conscience D o t h M a k e Subjects of Us A l l "
t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n takes p l a c e t h r o u g h rituals, a n d these r i t u a l s
m a t e r i a l i z e "the i d e a s o f the subject" (169). W h a t i s c a l l e d "sub ­
j e c t i v i t y , " u n d e r s t o o d a s the l i v e d a n d i m a g i n a r y e x p e r i e n c e o f
the subject, i s itself d e r i v e d f r o m the m a t e r i a l r i t u a l s b y w h i c h
subjects are c o n s t i t u t e d . P a s c a l ' s b e l i e v e r k n e e l s m o r e t h a n
once , n e c e s s a r i l y r e p e a t i n g the gestur e b y w h i c h b e l i e f i s c o n ­
j u r e d . T o u n d e r s t a n d , m o r e b r o a d l y , "the r i t u a l s o f i d e o l o g i c a l
r e c o g n i t i o n " ' (173) b y w h i c h the subject i s c o n s t i t u t e d i s c e n ­
t r a l t o the v e r y n o t i o n o f i d e o l o g y . B u t i f b e l i e f f o l l o w s f r o m
the p o s t u r e o f p r a y e r , i f that p o s t u r e c o n d i t i o n s a n d reiterates
belief, t h e n h o w are w e t o separate the i d e a t i o n a l s p h e r e f r o m
the r i t u a l p r a c t i c e s b y w h i c h i t i s i n c e s s a n t l y r e i n s t i t u t e d ?
A l t h o u g h the q u e s t i o n of the subject is n o t the s a m e as
the q u e s t i o n o f s u b j e c t i v i t y , i n D o l a r ' s essay i t n e v e r t h e l e s s
r e m a i n s u n c l e a r h o w t h o s e t w o n o t i o n s are t o b e t h o u g h t
together. T h e n o t i o n o f " s u b j e c t i v i t y " d o e s n o t h a v e m u c h p l a y
i n A l t h u s s e r , e x c e p t p e r h a p s i n the c r i t i q u e o f s u b j e c t i v i s m ,
a n d i t i s u n c l e a r h o w that t e r m m i g h t b e t r a n s p o s e d o n t o
the t e r m s h e uses. T h i s m a y b e D o l a r ' s c r i t i c a l p o i n t , n a m e l y ,
that there i s n o t e n o u g h o f a p l a c e f o r s u b j e c t i v i t y i n A l t h u s ­
ser's text. D o l a r ' s p r i m a r y c r i t i c a l c o n c e r n i s that A l t h u s s e r
c a n n o t f u l l y t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t the " r e m a i n d e r " p r o d u c e d b y
s u b j e c t i v a t i o n , the n o n ­ p h e n o m e n a l " k e r n e l o f i n f e r i o r i t y . "
I n fact, D o l a r w i l l a r g u e that the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n the i n ­
t e r i o r a n d the e x t e r i o r i s p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h "the i n t r o j e c t i o n
of the object" (79). H e n c e , a p r i m a r y object is i n t r o j e c t e d , a n d
that i n t r o j e c t i o n b e c o m e s the c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y for the
subject. T h e i r r e c o v e r a b i l i t y o f that object is, thus, n o t o n l y the
s u p p o r t i n g c o n d i t i o n o f the subject b u t the p e r s i s t e n t threat
to its coherence. T h e L a c a n i a n n o t i o n of the R e a l is cast as the
first act of i n t r o j e c t i o n as w e l l as the subject's r a d i c a l l i m i t .
I n D o l a r , the i d e a l i t y o f t h i s k e r n e l o f i n f e r i o r i t y sets the
Althusser's Subjection 123
l i m i t to b o t h materialization a n d subjectivation; it constitutes
the c o n s t i t u t i v e l a c k o r the n o n ­ s y m b o l i z a b l e R e a l . A s fore­
c l o s e d o r i n t r o j e c t e d , the p r i m a r y object i s lost a n d i d e a l i z e d a t
once; the i d e a l i t y a c q u i r e d b y t h i s object t h r o u g h i n t r o j e c t i o n
c o n s t i t u t e s the f o u n d i n g i d e a l i t y o f s u b j e c t i v i t y . T h i s i n s i g h t
i s the o n e that A l t h u s s e r a p p e a r s t o m i s s , a n d yet D o l a r a p ­
p e a r s t o a t t r i b u t e t o h i m the v e r y d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n m a t e r i ­
a l i t y a n d i d e a l i t y that i s i n s u f f i c i e n t l y r e a l i z e d i n A l t h u s s e r ' s
theory:
there is a step in the emergence of both the subject and the Other
that Althusser leaves out and that can perhaps be best illustrated by
Althusser's o w n example. To elucidate the transition between the ex­
ternal materiality of state apparatuses (institutions, practices, rituals,
etc.) and the inferiority of ideological subjectivity, Althusser borrows
a famous suggestion from Pascal, namely his scandalous piece of ad­
vice that the best way to become a believer is to follow the religious
rituals. (88)
D o l a r refers to t h i s as a "senseless r i t u a l , " a n d t h e n reverses
the A l t h u s s e r i a n a c c o u n t i n o r d e r t o e s t a b l i s h that the c r e e d
a n d the r i t u a l are the effects o f " a s u p p o s i t i o n , " that r i t u a l
f o l l o w s belief, b u t i s n o t its c o n d i t i o n o f p r o d u c t i o n . D o l a r
u n d e r s c o r e s the i n a b i l i t y o f A l t h u s s e r ' s t h e o r y o f r i t u a l p r a c ­
1 7
tice t o a c c o u n t for the m o t i v a t i o n t o p r a y : " W h a t m a d e h i m
f o l l o w the r i t u a l ? W h y d i d he/she c o n s e n t t o repeat a series o f
senseless g e s t u r e s ? " (89).
D o l a r ' s q u e s t i o n s are i m p o s s i b l e t o satisfy i n A l t h u s s e r ' s
t e r m s , b u t the v e r y p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f D o l a r ' s q u e s t i o n s c a n
be countered w i t h an Althusserian explanation. That D o l a r
p r e s u m e s a c o n s e n t i n g subject p r i o r to the p e r f o r m a n c e of
a r i t u a l suggests that he p r e s u m e s a v o l i t i o n a l subject m u s t
already be in place to give an account of motivation. But h o w
d o e s this c o n s e n t i n g subject c o m e t o be? T h i s s u p p o s i n g a n d
124 "Conscience D o t h M a k e Subjects of Us A l l "
c o n s e n t i n g subject a p p e a r s t o p r e c e d e a n d c o n d i t i o n the "en­
t r a n c e " i n t o the s y m b o l i c a n d , hence, the b e c o m i n g o f a s u b ­
ject. T h e c i r c u l a r i t y i s clear, b u t h o w i s i t t o b e u n d e r s t o o d ? I s
it a f a i l i n g of A l t h u s s e r n o t to p r o v i d e the subject p r i o r to the
f o r m a t i o n o f the subject, o r d o e s h i s " f a i l u r e " i n d i c a t e o n l y that
the g r a m m a t i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t s o f the n a r r a t i v e w o r k agains t
the a c c o u n t of subject f o r m a t i o n that the n a r r a t i v e a t t em pts to
p r o v i d e ? T o l i t e r a l i z e o r t o a s c r i b e a n o n t o l o g i c a l status t o the
g r a m m a t i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t o f "the subject" i s t o p r e s u m e a m i ­
metic relation between g r a m m a r a n d ontology w h i c h misses
the p o i n t , b o t h A l t h u s s e r i a n a n d L a c a n i a n , that the a n t i c i p a ­
t i o n s o f g r a m m a r are a l w a y s a n d o n l y r e t r o a c t i v e l y i n s t a l l e d .
T h e g r a m m a r that g o v e r n s the n a r r a t i o n o f subject f o r m a ­
t i o n p r e s u m e s that the g r a m m a t i c a l p l a c e f o r the subject has
a l r e a d y b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d . I n a n i m p o r t a n t sense, t h e n , the
g r a m m a r that the n a r r a t i v e r e q u i r e s r e s u l t s f r o m the n a r r a t i v e
itself. T h e a c c o u n t of subject f o r m a t i o n is t h u s a d o u b l e fic­
t i o n a t c r o s s ­ p u r p o s e s w i t h itself, r e p e a t e d l y s y m p t o m a t i z i n g
w h a t resists n a r r a t i o n .
W i t t g e n s t e i n r e m a r k s , " W e s p e a k, w e utter w o r d s , a n d o n l y
later get a sense of t h e i r l i f e ." A n t i c i p a t i o n of s u c h sense g o v ­
erns the " e m p t y " r i t u a l that i s s p e e c h , a n d e n s u r e s its iter ­
a b i l i t y . I n t h is sense, t h e n , w e m u s t n e i t h e r first b e l i e v e b e f o r e
w e k n e e l n o r k n o w the sense o f w o r d s b e f o r e w e speak. O n the
c o n t r a r y , b o t h are p e r f o r m e d " o n f a i t h " that sense w i l l a r r i v e
i n a n d t h r o u g h a r t i c u l a t i o n i t s e l f — a n a n t i c i p a t i o n that i s n o t
t h e r e b y g o v e r n e d by a g u a r a n t e e of n o e m a t i c s a t i s f a c t i o n. If
s u p p o s i n g a n d c o n s e n t i n g are u n t h i n k a b l e o u t s i d e o f the l a n ­
g u a g e o f s u p p o s i n g a n d c o n s e n t i n g , a n d t h i s l a n g u a g e i s itself
a sedimentation of ritual forms —the rituals of C a r t e s i a n i s m —
t h e n the act b y w h i c h w e m i g h t " c o n s e n t " t o k n e e l i s n o m o r e
a n d n o less r i t u a l i s t i c t h a n the k n e e l i n g itself.
Althusser's Subjection 125
D o l a r m a k e s h i s o b j e c t i o n e x p l i c i t l y t h e o l o g i c a l b y suggest­
i n g that A l t h u s s e r ' s r e f o r m u l a t i o n o f the n o t i o n o f m a t e r i a l i t y
t o i n c l u d e the d o m a i n o f i d e o l o g y i s t o o i n c l u s i v e , that i t leaves
n o r o o m for a n o n ­ m a t e r i a l i z a b l e i d e a l i t y , the lost a n d i n t r o ­
jecte d object that i n a u g u r a t e s the f o r m a t i o n of the subject. It
remains unclear, however, precisely h o w D o l a r reads "materi­
a l i t y " i n A l t h u s s e r , a n d w h e t h e r the r i t u a l a n d h e n c e temporal
d i m e n s i o n o f m a t e r i a l i t y i n A l t h u s s e r i s effaced i n f a v o r o f a
r e d u c t i o n o f m a t e r i a l i t y t o the e m p i r i c a l l y o r s o c i a l l y g i v e n :
This is also w h y Althusser's ardent insistence on materiality is i n ­
sufficient: the Other that emerges here, the Other of the symbolic
order, is not material, and Althusser covers up this non­materiality
by talking about the materiality of institutions and practices. If sub­
jectivity can spring up from materially following certain rituals, it is
only insofar as those rituals function as a symbolic automatism, that
is, insofar as they are governed by an "immaterial" logic supported
by the Other. That Other cannot be discovered by scrutinizing ma­
teriality . . . what counts is ultimately not that they are material, but
that they are ruled by a code and by a repetition. (89)
T h i s last r e m a r k f o r m u l a t e s a n o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n m a t e r i ­
a l i t y a n d r e p e t i t i o n that a p p e a r s t o b e i n d i r e c t t e n s i o n w i t h
A l t h u s s e r ' s o w n a r g u m e n t a t i o n . I f i d e o l o g y i s m a t e r i a l t o the
extent that it consists in a set of p r a c t i c e s , a n d p r a c t i c e s are
governed by rituals, then materiality is defined as m u c h by
ritual and repetition as it is by more narrowly empiricist con­
c e p t i o n s . M o r e o v e r , the r i t u a l s o f i d e o l o g y are m a t e r i a l t o the
extent that t h e y a c q u i r e a productive c a p a c i t y a n d , in A l t h u s ­
ser's text, w h a t r i t u a l s p r o d u c e are subjects.
D o l a r e x p l a i n s that r i t u a l s p r o d u c e n o t subjects, b u t subjec­
t i v i t y , a n d c a n d o s o o n l y t o the extent that t h e y are t h e m s e l v e s
governed by a s y m b o l i c or reiterative logic, a logic w h i c h is
i m m a t e r i a l . S u b j e c t i v i t y for D o l a r i s s a i d t o " s p r i n g u p f r o m
126 "Conscience D o t h M a k e Subjects of Us A l l "
m a t e r i a l l y f o l l o w i n g c e r t a i n r i t u a l s , " w h e r e the " s p r i n g i n g u p "
i s n o t itself m a t e r i a l , b u t w h e r e the n o t i o n o f " f o l l o w i n g " a
r i t u a l does h a v e a m a t e r i a l d i m e n s i o n . S u b j e c t i v i t y arises i m ­
m a t e r i a l l y f r o m a materia l r i t u a l p e r f o r m a n c e, but this can
h a p p e n o n l y o n the c o n d i t i o n that a l o g i c p r e c e d e s a n d s u p ­
ports this r i t u a l performance, a n i m m a t e r i a l logic, one w h i c h
e n c o d e s a n d reenacts the i d e a l i z i n g effects o f i n t r o j e c t i o n . B u t
h o w are w e t o d i s t i n g u i s h the r e p e t i t i o n p r o p e r t o r i t u a l a n d
the r e p e t i t i o n p r o p e r t o the " s y m b o l i c a u t o m a t i s m " ?
C o n s i d e r the i n s e p a r a b i l i t y o f t h o s e t w o r e p e t i t i o n s i n A l ­
t h u s s e r ' s d e s c r i p t i o n o f the m a t e r i a l i t y o f i d e a s a n d the i d e a l
in ideology:
Ideas have disappeared as such (insofar as they are endowed w i t h an
ideal or spiritual existence), to the precise extent that it has emerged
that their existence is inscribed in the actions of practices governed
by rituals defined in the last instance by an ideological apparatus. It
therefore appears that the subject acts insofar as he is acted by the
following system (set out in the order of its real determination): ideol­
ogy existing in a material ideological apparatus, prescribing material
practices governed by a material ritual, w h i c h practices exist in the
material actions of a subject acting in all consciousness according to
his belief. 18
Ideas exist " i n s c r i b e d " i n acts that are p r a c t i c e s r e g u l a t e d
by rituals. C a n they appear any other way, a n d can they have
an "existence" outside of ritual? W h a t m i g h t it m e a n to re­
t h i n k the m a t e r i a l n o t o n l y as r e g u l a t e d r e p e t i t i o n , b u t as a
r e p e t i t i o n that p r o d u c e s a subject a c t i n g i n f u l l c o n s c i o u s n e s s
a c c o r d i n g t o h i s b e l i e f ? T h e subject's b e l i e f i s n o differen t f r o m
P a s c a l ' s ; t h e y are b o t h the r e s u l t o f the r e p e t i t i o u s c o n j u r i n g
that A l t h u s s e r calls " m a t e r i a l i t y . "
D o l a r a r g u e s that A l t h u s s e r fails t o t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t the
d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n m a t e r i a l i t y a n d the s y m b o l i c , b u t w h e r e
Althusser's Subjection 127
w o u l d w e p l a c e " i n t e r p e l l a t i o n " o n t h is m a p p i n g o f the d i v i d e ?
Is it the v o i c e of the s y m b o l i c , is it the r i t u a l i z e d v o i c e of the
state, o r h a v e the t w o b e c o m e i n d i s s o l u b l e ? If, t o u s e D o l a r ' s
t e r m , the s y m b o l i c a c q u i r e s its "existence " o n l y i n r i t u a l , t h e n
w h a t establishes the i d e a l i t y o f that s y m b o l i c d o m a i n a p a r t
f r o m the v a r i o u s m o d e s o f its a p p e a r a n c e a n d i t e r a b i l i t y ?
R i t u a l takes p l a c e t h r o u g h r e p e t i t i o n , a n d r e p e t i t i o n i m p l i e s
the d i s c o n t i n u i t y o f the m a t e r i a l , the i r r e d u c i b i l i t y o r m a t e r i ­
ality to phenomenality. The interval by w h i c h any repetition
takes p l a c e d o e s not, s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g , appear; it is, as it w e r e ,
the absence b y w h i c h the p h e n o m e n a l i s a r t i c u l a t e d . B u t t h i s
n o n ­ a p p e a r a n c e o r absence i s n o t f o r that r e a s o n a n " i d e a l i t y , "
for it is b o u n d to the a r t i c u l a t i o n as its c o n s t i t u t i v e a n d absent
necessity.
T h e o l o g i c al resistance to m a t e r i a l i sm is exemplified in D o ­
l a r ' s e x p l i c i t defense o f L a c a n ' s C a r t e s i a n i n h e r i t a n c e , 19
his i n ­
sistance u p o n the p u r e i d e a l i t y o f the s o u l , yet the t h e o l o g i c a l
i m p u l s e a ls o s t r u c t u r e s A l t h u s s e r ' s w o r k i n the f i g u r e o f the
p u n i t i v e law. D o l a r suggests that, t h o u g h the l a w s u c c e s s f u l l y
regulates its subjects, it c a n n o t t o u c h a c e r t a i n i n t e r i o r r e g i s ­
ter o f l o v e : "there i s a r e m a i n d e r i n v o l v e d i n the m e c h a n i s m
of i n t e r p e l l a t i o n , the left­over of the c l e a n c u t , a n d . . . t h i s r e ­
m a i n d e r c a n b e p i n p o i n t e d i n the e x p e r i e n c e o f l o v e " (85). A
b it f u r t h e r o n , h e asks, " C o u l d o n e say that l o v e i s w h a t w e
find beyond interpellation?"
H e r e l o v e is, i n D o l a r ' s w o r d s , a " f o r c e d c h o i c e , " s u g g e s t i n g
that w h a t h e e x p e c t e d f r o m the n o t i o n o f a subject w h o " c o n ­
sents" t o k n e e l a n d p r a y i s a n a c c o u n t o f a " f o r c e d c o n s e n t " o f
some k i n d . L o v e is b e y o n d interpellation precisely because it
is understood to be compelled by an immaterial law —the sym­
b o l i c — o v e r a n d a b o v e the r i t u a l i s t i c l a w s that g o v e r n the v a r i ­
o u s p r a c t i c e s o f l o v e : " T h e O t h e r that e m e r g e s here, the O t h e r
128 "Conscience Doth M a k e Subjects of Us A l l "
o f the s y m b o l i c o r d e r , i s n o t m a t e r i a l , a n d A l t h u s s e r c o v e r s u p
t h i s n o n ­ m a t e r i a l i t y b y t a l k i n g a b o u t the m a t e r i a l i t y o f i n s t i ­
t u t i o n s a n d p r a c t i c e s " (89). T h e O t h e r w h o i s lost, i n t r o j e c t e d ,
w h o i s s a i d t o b e c o m e the i m m a t e r i a l c o n d i t i o n o f the subject,
i n a u g u r a t e s the r e p e t i t i o n specific t o the s y m b o l i c , the p u n c ­
t u a t e d fantas y o f a r e t u r n that n e v e r i s o r c o u l d b e c o m p l e t e d .
Let us p r o v i s i o n a l l y accept this p s y c h o a n a l y t ic account of
subject f o r m a t i o n , c o n c e d e that the subject c a n n o t f o r m e x c e p t
t h r o u g h a b a r r e d r e l a t i o n t o the O t h e r , a n d e v e n c o n s i d e r t h i s
b a r r e d O t h e r t o r e a p p e a r a s the i n t r o j e c t e d c o n d i t i o n o f s u b ­
ject f o r m a t i o n , s p l i t t i n g the subject at its i n c e p t i o n . E v e n so,
are there o t h e r f o r m s o f " l o s i n g " the O t h e r that are n o t i n t r o ­
j e c t i o n , a n d are there v a r i o u s w a y s o f i n t r o j e c t i n g that O t h e r ?
A r e these t e r m s n o t c u l t u r a l l y e l a b o r a t e d , i n d e e d , r i t u a l i z e d ,
to s u c h a degree that no m e t a ­ s c h e m e of s y m b o l i c l o g i c es­
capes the h e r m e n e u t i c s o f s o c i a l d e s c r i p t i o n ?
S i g n i f i c a n t l y , t h o u g h s o c i a l i n t e r p e l l a t i o n s are d e s c r i b e d b y
D o l a r a s a l w a y s " f a i l i n g " f u l l y t o c o n s t i t u t e subjects, n o s u c h
" f a i l u r e " seems a t w o r k i n the c o m p u l s o r y c h a r a c t er o f l o v e .
To the extent that p r i m a r y i n t r o j e c t i o n is an act of l o v e , it is,
I w o u l d suggest, n o t a n act p e r f o r m e d o n l y once , b u t a r e ­
i t e r a t ed a n d i n d e e d r i t u a l affair. B u t w h a t i s t o k e e p u s f r o m
m a k i n g the a n a l o g y that w e f a l l i n l o v e i n m u c h the s a m e w a y
w e k n e e l a n d p r a y , o r that w e m a y w e l l b e d o i n g o n e w h e n w e
t h i n k w e are d o i n g the o t h e r ?
Yet D o l a r ' s s u g g e s t i o n that l o v e m i g h t b e " b e y o n d " i n t e r ­
p e l l a t i o n i s a n i m p o r t a n t one. A l t h u s s e r w o u l d h a v e b e n e f i t e d
f r o m a better u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f h o w the l a w b e c o m e s the o b ­
ject of p a s s i o n a t e a t t a c h m e n t , a s t r a n ge scene of l o v e . F o r the
c o n s c i e n c e w h i c h c o m p e l s the w a y w a r d p e d e s t r i a n t o t u r n
a r o u n d u p o n h e a r i n g the p o l i c e m a n ' s a d d r e s s o r u r g e s the
m u r d e r e r i n t o the streets i n s e a r c h o f the p o l i c e a p p e a r s t o b e
Althusser's Subjection 129
d r i v e n b y a l o v e o f the l a w w h i c h c a n b e satisfied o n l y b y r i t u a l
p u n i s h m e n t . T o the extent that A l t h u s s e r gestures t o w a r d t h is
a n a l y s i s , h e b e g i n s t o e x p l a i n h o w a subject i s f o r m e d t h r o u g h
the passionat e p u r s u i t o f the r e p r i m a n d i n g r e c o g n i t i o n o f the
state. T h a t the subject t u r n s r o u n d o r r u s h e s t o w a r d the l a w
suggests that the subject l i v e s in p a s s i o n a t e e x p e c t a t i o n of the
law. S u c h l o v e i s n o t b e y o n d i n t e r p e l l a t i o n ; rather, i t f o r m s the
passionat e c i r c l e i n w h i c h the subject b e c o m e s e n s n a r e d b y its
o w n state.
The failure of interpellation is clearly to be v a l u e d , but
to f i g u r e that f a i l u r e in t e r m s that r e h a b i l i t a t e a s t r u c t u r e of
l o v e o u t s i d e the d o m a i n o f the s o c i a l r i s k s r e i f y i n g p a r t i c u ­
l a r s o c i a l f o r m s of l o v e as e t e r n a l p s y c h i c facts. It a ls o leaves
u n e x p l a i n e d the p a s s i o n that p r e c e d e s a n d f o r m s c o n s c i e n c e ,
that p r e c e d e s a n d f o r m s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f l o v e , o n e that ac­
c o u n t s for the f a i l u r e o f i n t e r p e l l a t i o n f u l l y t o c o n s t i t u t e the
subject i t n a m e s . I n t e r p e l l a t i o n i s " b a r r e d " f r o m success n o t
b y a s t r u c t u r a l l y p e r m a n e n t f o r m o f p r o h i b i t i o n (or f o r e c l o ­
sure), b u t b y its i n a b i l i t y t o d e t e r m i n e the c o n s t i t u t i v e h e l d o f
the h u m a n . If c o n s c i e n c e is one f o r m that the p a s s i o n a t e at­
t a c h m e n t t o existenc e takes, t h e n the f a i l u r e o f i n t e r p e l l a t i o n
i s t o b e f o u n d p r e c i s e l y i n the p a s s i o n a t e a t t a c h m e n t that a ls o
a l l o w s i t t o w o r k . A c c o r d i n g t o the l o g i c o f c o n s c i e n c e , w h i c h
f u l l y c o n s t r a i n s A l t h u s s e r , the subject's existence c a n n o t b e
l i n g u i s t i c a l l y g u a r a n t e e d w i t h o u t p a s s i o n a t e a t t a c h m e n t t o the
l a w . T h i s c o m p l i c i t y a t o n c e c o n d i t i o n s a n d l i m i t s the v i a b i l i t y
o f a c r i t i c a l i n t e r r o g a t i o n o f the l a w . O n e c a n n o t c r i t i c i z e t o o
far the t e r m s b y w h i c h one's existenc e i s s e c u r e d .
B u t i f the d i s c u r s i v e p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r existenc e e x c e e d the
r e p r i m a n d v o i c e d b y the l a w , w o u l d that n o t l e s s e n the n e e d
t o c o n f i r m one's g u i l t a n d e m b a r k o n a p a t h o f c o n s c i e n t i o u s ­
ness as a w a y to g a i n a p u r c h a s e on i d e n t i t y ? W h a t are the
 T

130 "Conscience Doth M a k e Subjects of Us A l l " Althusser's Subjection 131

c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h o u r v e r y sense o f l i n g u i s t i c s u r v i v a l I n c o n c l u s i o n , A g a m b e n offers u s one d i r e c t i o n f o r r e t h i n k ­

depends u p o n our willingness to t u r n back u p o n ourselves, i n g ethics a l o n g the l i n e s of the d e s i r e to be, h e n c e , at a d i s ­
that is, i n w h i c h a t t a i n i n g r e c o g n i z a b l e b e i n g r e q u i r e s self­ tance f r o m a n y p a r t i c u l a r f o r m a t i o n o f c o n s c i e n c e :
negation, requires existing as a self­negating b e i n g in order to
if human beings were or had to be this or that substance, this or that
a t t a i n a n d p r e s e r v e a status as " b e i n g " at a l l ?
destiny, no ethical experience w o u l d be p o s s i b l e . . . .
I n a N i e t z s c h e a n v e i n , s u c h a slave m o r a l i t y m a y b e p r e d i ­ This does not mean, however, that humans are not, and do not
cate d u p o n the s o b e r c a l c u l a t i o n that i t i s better t o " b e " e n ­ have to be, something, that they are simply consigned to nothingness
s l a v e d i n s u c h a w a y t h a n n o t t o " b e " a t a l l . B u t the t e r m s and therefore can freely decide whether to be or not to be, to adopt or
that c o n s t r a i n the o p t i o n t o b e i n g v e r s u s n o t b e i n g " c a l l f o r " not to adopt this or that destiny (nihilism and decisionism coincide
a n o t h e r k i n d o f r e s p o n s e . U n d e r w h a t c o n d i t i o n s does a l a w at this point). There is in effect something that humans are and have
to be, but this is not an essence nor properly a thing: It is the simple
m o n o p o l i z e the t e r m s o f existenc e i n s o t h o r o u g h a w a y ? O r
fact of one's own existence as possibility or potentiality. 20

is t h is a t h e o l o g i c a l fantas y of the l a w ? Is there a p o s s i b i l i t y of

b e i n g elsewhere or otherwise, w i t h o u t d e n y i n g our c o m p l i c i t y A g a m b e n m i g h t b e r e a d a s c l a i m i n g that t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y
i n the l a w that w e o p p o s e ? S u c h p o s s i b i l i t y w o u l d r e q u i r e m u s t r e s o l v e itself i n t o s o m e t h i n g , b u t c a n n o t u n d o its o w n
a differen t k i n d o f t u r n , o n e that, e n a b l e d b y the l a w , t u r n s status a s p o s s i b i l i t y t h r o u g h s u c h a r e s o l u t i o n . O r , rather, w e
a w a y f r o m the l a w , r e s i s t i n g its l u r e o f i d e n t i t y , a n a g e n c y that m i g h t r e r e a d " b e i n g " a s p r e c i s e l y the p o t e n t i a l i t y that r e m a i n s
o u t r u n s a n d c o u n t e r s the c o n d i t i o n s o f its e m e r g e n c e . S u c h unexhausted by any particular interpellation. S u c h a failure of
a t u r n d e m a n d s a w i l l i n g n e s s not to b e — a c r i t i c a l desubjec­ i n t e r p e l l a t i o n m a y w e l l u n d e r m i n e the c a p a c i t y o f the subject
t i v a t i o n — i n o r d e r t o e x p o s e the l a w a s less p o w e r f u l t h a n i t t o " b e " i n a s e l f ­ i d e n t i c a l sense, b u t i t m a y a l so m a r k the p a t h
seems. W h a t f o r m s m i g h t l i n g u i s t i c s u r v i v a l t a k e i n t h i s d e ­ t o w a r d a m o r e o p e n , even m o r e ethical, k i n d of b e i n g , one of
s u b j e c t i v i z e d d o m a i n ? H o w w o u l d one k n o w one's existence ? o r for the f u t u r e .
T h r o u g h what terms w o u l d it be recognized a n d recognizable?
S u c h q u e s t i o n s c a n n o t b e a n s w e r e d here, b u t t h e y i n d i c a t e
a d i r e c t i o n for t h i n k i n g that i s p e r h a p s p r i o r t o the q u e s t i o n
o f c o n s c i e n c e , n a m e l y , the q u e s t i o n that p r e o c c u p i e d S p i n o z a ,
N i e t z s c h e , a n d m o s t r e c e n t l y , G i o r g i o A g a m b e n : H o w are w e
to u n d e r s t a n d the d e s i r e to be as a c o n s t i t u t i v e d e s i r e ? R e s i t u ­
ating conscience a n d interpellation w i t h i n such an account,
we m i g h t then a d d to this question another: H o w is such a
d e s i r e e x p l o i t e d n o t o n l y b y a l a w i n the s i n g u l a r , b u t b y l a w s
o f v a r i o u s k i n d s s u c h that w e y i e l d t o s u b o r d i n a t i o n i n o r d e r
t o m a i n t a i n s o m e sense o f s o c i a l " b e i n g " ?
 Refused Identification 133

c h o l i c i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s c e n t r a l t o the p r o c e s s w h e r e b y the ego

a s s u m e s a g e n d e r e d character. S e c o n d , I w a n t to e x p l o r e h o w
t h i s a n a l y s i s o f the m e l a n c h o l i c f o r m a t i o n o f g e n d e r sheds
l i g h t o n the p r e d i c a m e n t o f l i v i n g w i t h i n a c u l t u r e w h i c h c a n
m o u r n the loss o f h o m o s e x u a l a t t a c h m e n t o n l y w i t h great dif­
Melancholy Gender / ficulty.
Refused Identification Reflecting on his speculations in " M o u r n i n g a n d M e l a n c h o ­
l i a , " F r e u d w r i t e s in The Ego and the Id that in the e a r l i e r essay
h e h a d s u p p o s e d that "a n object w h i c h w a s lost has b e e n set
u p a g a i n i n s i d e the e g o — t h a t is, that a n object­cathexis h a d
b e e n r e p l a c e d b y a n i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . A t that t i m e , h o w e v e r , " h e
c o n t i n u e d , " w e d i d n o t a p p r e c i a t e the f u l l s i g n i f i c a n c e o f this
I n grief the w o r l d b e c o m e s p o o r a n d e m p t y ; i n m e l a n c h o l i a
p r o c e s s a n d d i d n o t k n o w h o w c o m m o n a n d h o w t y p i c a l i t is.
i t i s the ego itself. — Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia"
S i n c e t h e n w e h a v e c o m e t o u n d e r s t a n d that t h i s k i n d o f s u b ­
H o w i s i t t h e n that i n m e l a n c h o l i a the s u p e r ­ e g o c a n
s t i t u t i o n has a great shar e i n d e t e r m i n i n g the f o r m t a k e n b y the
b e c o m e a gathering­place for the death instincts?
ego a n d that i t m a k e s a n e s s e n t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n t o w a r d b u i l d ­
— F r e u d , The Ego and the Id
i n g u p w h a t i s c a l l e d its ' c h a r a c t e r ' " (p. 28). S l i g h t l y later i n the
s a m e text, F r e u d e x p a n d s t h is v i e w : " w h e n i t h a p p e n s that a

I
p e r s o n has to g i v e up a s e x u a l object, there q u i t e o f t en ensues
t m a y at first s e e m strange to t h i n k of g e n d e r as a k i n d
an a l t e r a t i o n of h i s ego w h i c h c a n o n l y be d e s c r i b e d as a set­
of m e l a n c h o l y , or as o n e of m e l a n c h o l y ' s effects. B u t let us
t i n g u p o f the object i n s i d e the ego, a s i t o c c u r s i n m e l a n c h o l i a "
r e m e m b e r that in The Ego and the Id F r e u d h i m s e l f a c k n o w l ­
(29). H e c o n c l u d e s t h i s d i s c u s s i o n b y s p e c u l a t i n g that " i t m a y
e d g e d that m e l a n c h o l y , the u n f i n i s h e d p r o c e s s o f g r i e v i n g , i s
b e that t h is i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s the sole c o n d i t i o n u n d e r w h i c h
c e n t r a l t o the f o r m a t i o n o f the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s that f o r m the
the i d c a n g i v e u p its objects . . . i t m a k e s i t p o s s i b l e t o s u p ­
ego. I n d e e d , i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s f o r m e d f r o m u n f i n i s h e d g r i e f are
p o s e that the c h a r a c t er of the ego is a p r e c i p i t a t e of a b a n d o n e d
the m o d e s i n w h i c h the lost object i s i n c o r p o r a t e d a n d p h a n ­
object­cathexes a n d that i t c o n t a i n s the h i s t o r y o f t h o s e object­
t a s m a t i c a l l y p r e s e r v e d i n a n d a s the ego. C o n s i d e r i n c o n j u n c ­
c h o i c e s " (29). W h a t F r e u d h e r e calls the "character o f the e g o "
t i o n w i t h t h is i n s i g h t F r e u d ' s f u r t h e r r e m a r k that "the ego i s
a p p e a r s t o b e the s e d i m e n t a t i o n o f objects l o v e d a n d lost, the
first a n d f o r e m o s t a b o d i l y e g o , " 1
not m e r e l y a surface, b u t
a r c h a e l o g i c a l r e m a i n d e r , as it w e r e , of u n r e s o l v e d grief.
"the p r o j e c t i o n of a surface." F u r t h e r , t h i s b o d i l y ego a s s u m e s
W h a t i s p e r h a p s m o s t s t r i k i n g a b o u t h i s f o r m u l a t i o n here i s
a g e n d e r e d m o r p h o l o g y , so that the b o d i l y ego is a ls o a g e n ­
h o w i t reverses h i s p o s i t i o n i n " M o u r n i n g a n d M e l a n c h o l i a "
d e r e d ego. I h o p e first to e x p l a i n the sense in w h i c h a m e l a n ­
o n w h a t i t m e a n s t o r e s o l v e grief. I n the e a r l i e r essay, F r e u d
134 Melancholy Gender
a s s u m e s that g r i e f c a n be r e s o l v e d t h r o u g h a d e ­ c a t h e x i s , a
b r e a k i n g o f a t t a c h m e n t , a s w e l l a s the s u b s e q u e n t m a k i n g o f
n e w a t t a c h m e n t s . In The Ego and the Id, he m a k e s r o o m f o r
the n o t i o n that m e l a n c h o l i c i d e n t i f i c a t i o n m a y be a prerequisite
for l e t t i n g the object go. B y c l a i m i n g t h i s , h e change s w h a t i t
m e a n s t o "let a n object go," for there i s n o f i n a l b r e a k i n g o f the
a t t a c h m e n t . T h e r e is, rather, the i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f the attach­
m e n t as i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , w h e r e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n b e c o m e s a m a g i c a l ,
a p s y c h i c f o r m of p r e s e r v i n g the object. Insofar as i d e n t i f i c a ­
t i o n i s the p s y c h i c p r e s e r v e o f the object a n d s u c h i d e n t i f i c a ­
t i o n s c o m e t o f o r m the ego, the lost object c o n t i n u e s t o h a u n t
a n d i n h a b i t the ego a s o n e o f its c o n s t i t u t i v e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s .
T h e lost object is, i n that sense, m a d e c o e x t e n s i v e w i t h the ego
itself. I n d e e d , o n e m i g h t c o n c l u d e that m e l a n c h o l i c i d e n t i f i c a ­
t i o n p e r m i t s the loss o f the object i n the e x t e r n a l w o r l d p r e ­
c i s e l y b e c a u s e it p r o v i d e s a w a y to preserve the object as p a r t
of the ego a n d , h e n c e , to avert the loss as a c o m p l e t e loss. H e r e
w e see that l e t t i n g the object g o m e a n s , p a r a d o x i c a l l y , n o t f u l l
a b a n d o n m e n t of the object b u t t r a n s f e r r i n g the status of the
object f r o m e x t e r n a l t o i n t e r n a l . G i v i n g u p the object b e c o m e s
p o s s i b l e o n l y o n the c o n d i t i o n o f a m e l a n c h o l i c i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n
or, w h a t m i g h t f o r o u r p u r p o s e s t u r n o u t t o b e e v e n m o r e i m ­
p o r t a n t , a m e l a n c h o l i c incorporation.
If in m e l a n c h o l i a a loss is r e f u s e d , it is n o t f o r that r e a s o n
a b o l i s h e d . I n t e r n a l i z a t i o n p r e s e r v e s loss i n the p s y c h e ; m o r e
p r e c i s e l y , the i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n o f loss i s p a r t o f the m e c h a n i s m
o f its r e f u s a l . I f the object c a n n o l o n g e r exist i n the e x t e r n a l
w o r l d , i t w i l l t h e n exist i n t e r n a l l y , a n d that i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n w i l l
be a w a y to d i s a v o w the loss, to k e e p it at bay, to stay or p o s t ­
p o n e the r e c o g n i t i o n a n d s u f f e r i n g o f loss.
Is there a w a y in w h i c h gender i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s or, rather,
the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s that b e c o m e c e n t r a l t o the f o r m a t i o n o f
Refused Identification 135
g e n d e r , are p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h m e l a n c h o l i c i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ? I t
s e e ms clear that the p o s i t i o n s o f " m a s c u l i n e " a n d " f e m i n i n e , "
w h i c h F r e u d , in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905),
u n d e r s t o o d a s the effects o f l a b o r i o u s a n d u n c e r t a i n a c c o m ­
p l i s h m e n t , are e s t a b l i s h e d i n p a r t t h r o u g h p r o h i b i t i o n s w h i c h
demand the loss of c e r t a i n s e x u a l a t t a c h m e n t s , a n d d e m a n d as
w e l l that those losses not be a v o w e d , a n d not be g r i e v e d . If the
a s s u m p t i o n o f f e m i n i n i t y a n d the a s s u m p t i o n o f m a s c u l i n i t y
p r o c e e d t h r o u g h the a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f a n a l w a y s t e n u o u s
h e t e r o s e x u a l i t y , w e m i g h t u n d e r s t a n d the force o f t h i s a c­
c o m p l i s h m e n t a s m a n d a t i n g the a b a n d o n m e n t o f h o m o s e x u a l
a t t a c h m e n t s or, p e r h a p s m o r e t r e n c h a n t l y , preempting the p o s ­
s i b i l i ty of h o m o s e x u a l attachment, a foreclosure of p o s s i b i l i t y
w h i c h produces a d o m a i n of homosexuality understood as
u n l i v a b l e p a s s i o n a n d u n g r i e v a b l e loss. T h i s h e t e r o s e x u a l i t y
i s p r o d u c e d n o t o n l y t h r o u g h i m p l e m e n t i n g the p r o h i b i t i o n
o n incest b u t , p r i o r t o that, b y e n f o r c i n g the p r o h i b i t i o n o n
h o m o s e x u a l i t y . T h e o e d i p a l c o n f l i c t p r e s u m e s that h e t e r o ­
s e x u a l d e s i r e has a l r e a d y b e e n accomplished, that the d i s t i n c t i o n
b e t w e e n h e t e r o s e x u a l a n d h o m o s e x u a l has b e e n e n f o r c e d ( a
d i s t i n c t i o n w h i c h , after a l l , has n o n e c e s s i t y ) ; i n t h i s sense, the
p r o h i b i t i o n o n incest p r e s u p p o s e s the p r o h i b i t i o n o n h o m o ­
s e x u a l i t y , f o r it p r e s u m e s the h e t e r o s e x u a l i z a t i o n of desire.
T o a c c e p t t h i s v i e w w e m u s t b e g i n b y p r e s u p p o s i n g that
m a s c u l i n e a n d f e m i n i n e are n o t d i s p o s i t i o n s , a s F r e u d s o m e ­
t i m e s a r g u e s , b u t i n d e e d a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s , ones w h i c h e m e r g e
i n t a n d e m w i t h the a c h i e v e m e n t o f h e t e r o s e x u a l i t y . Here
F r e u d articulates a c u l t u r al logic w h e r e b y gender is achieved
a n d stabilized through heterosexual positioning, and where
threats to h e t e r o s e x u a l i t y t h u s b e c o m e threats to g e n d e r itself.
T h e p r e v a l e n c e o f t h i s h e t e r o s e x u a l m a t r i x i n the c o n s t r u c t i o n
o f g e n d e r e m e r g e s n o t o n l y i n F r e u d ' s text, b u t i n the c u l t u r a l
i 6
3
Melancholy Gender
f o r m s o f life that h a v e a b s o r b e d t h i s m a t r i x a n d are i n h a b ­
i t e d b y e v e r y d a y f o r m s o f g e n d e r a n x i e t y H e n c e , the fear o f
h o m o s e x u a l d e s i r e i n a w o m a n m a y i n d u c e a p a n i c that she i s
l o s i n g h e r f e m i n i n i t y , that she is n o t a w o m a n , that she is no
l o n g e r a p r o p e r w o m a n , that if she is n o t q u i t e a m a n , she is
l i k e one, a n d h e n c e m o n s t r o u s i n s o m e w a y . O r i n a m a n , the
terror of h o m o s e x u a l desire m a y lead to a terror of being con­
strued as feminine, f e m i n i z e d , of no longer b e i n g p r o p e r l y a
m a n , o f b e i n g a " f a i l e d " m a n , o r b e i n g i n s o m e sense a f i g u r e
o f m o n s t r o s i t y o r abjection.
I w o u l d a r g u e that p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l l y there are m a n y
w a y s o f e x p e r i e n c i n g g e n d e r a n d s e x u a l i t y that d o n o t r e d u c e
t o t h i s e q u a t i o n , that d o n o t p r e s u m e that g e n d e r i s s t a b i l i z e d
t h r o u g h the i n s t a l l a t i o n of a f i r m h e t e r o s e x u a l i t y , b u t for the
m o m e n t I w a n t to i n v o k e this stark a n d h y p e r b o l i c construc­
t i o n o f the r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n g e n d e r a n d s e x u a l i t y i n o r d e r t o
t h i n k t h r o u g h the q u e s t i o n o f u n g r i e v e d a n d u n g r e i v a b l e loss
i n the f o r m a t i o n o f w h a t w e m i g h t c a l l the g e n d e r e d c h a r a c t e r
of the ego.
C o n s i d e r that g e n d e r i s a c q u i r e d a t least i n p a r t t h r o u g h
the r e p u d i a t i o n o f h o m o s e x u a l a t t a c h m e n t s ; the g i r l b e c o m e s
a g i r l t h r o u g h b e i n g subject t o a p r o h i b i t i o n w h i c h b a r s the
m o t h e r a s a n object o f d e s i r e a n d i n s t a l l s that b a r r e d object a s
a p a r t of the ego, i n d e e d , as a m e l a n c h o l i c i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . T h u s
the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n c o n t a i n s w i t h i n i t b o t h the p r o h i b i t i o n a n d
the d e s i r e , a n d s o e m b o d i e s the u n g r i e v e d loss o f the h o m o ­
s e x u a l cathexis. If o n e is a g i r l to the extent that one does n o t
want a girl, then wanting a g i r l w i l l bring being a girl into
question; w i t h i n this m a t r i x , h o m o s e x u a l desire thus panics
gender.
Heterosexuality is cultivated through prohibitions, and
these p r o h i b i t i o n s t a k e as one of t h e i r objects h o m o s e x u a l at­
Refused Identification 137
t a c h m e n t s , t h e r e b y f o r c i n g the loss of those a t t a c h m e n t s . 2
If
the g i r l is to t r a n s f er l o v e f r o m he r father to a s u b s t i t u t e o b ­
ject, she m u s t , a c c o r d i n g t o F r e u d i a n l o g i c , first r e n o u n c e l o v e
for he r m o t h e r , a n d r e n o u n c e i t i n s u c h a w a y that b o t h the
a i m a n d the object are f o r e c l o s e d . She m u s t n o t transfer that
h o m o s e x u a l l o v e o n t o a s u b s t i t u t e f e m i n i n e figure, b u t r e ­
n o u n c e the p o s s i b i l i t y o f h o m o s e x u a l a t t a c h m e n t itself. O n l y
o n t h i s c o n d i t i o n does a h e t e r o s e x u a l a i m b e c o m e e s t a b l i s h e d
a s w h a t s o m e c a l l a s e x u a l o r i e n t a t i o n . O n l y o n the c o n d i t i o n
o f t h i s f o r e c l o s u r e o f h o m o s e x u a l i t y c a n the father a n d s u b s t i ­
tutes for h i m b e c o m e objects o f d e s i r e , a n d the m o t h e r b e c o m e
the u n e a s y site of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n .
B e c o m i n g a " m a n " w i t h i n this l o g i c r e q u i r e s r e p u d i a t i n g
f e m i n i n i t y as a p r e c o n d i t i o n for the h e t e r o s e x u a l i z a t i o n of
s e x u a l d e s i r e a n d its f u n d a m e n t a l a m b i v a l e n c e . I f a m a n b e ­
c o m e s h e t e r o s e x u a l b y r e p u d i a t i n g the f e m i n i n e , w h e r e c o u l d
that r e p u d i a t i o n l i v e e x c e p t i n a n i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w h i c h h i s
h e t e r o s e x u a l career seeks t o d e n y ? I n d e e d , the d e s i r e for the
f e m i n i n e i s m a r k e d b y that r e p u d i a t i o n : h e w a n t s the w o m a n
h e w o u l d n e v e r be. H e w o u l d n ' t b e c a u g h t d e a d b e i n g her:
t h e r e f o re he w a n t s her. She is h i s r e p u d i a t e d i d e n t i f i c a t i o n (a
r e p u d i a t i o n he s u s t a i n s as at o n c e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n a n d the object
o f h i s desire). O n e o f the m o s t a n x i o u s a i m s o f h i s d e s i r e w i l l
b e t o elaborate the d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n h i m a n d her, a n d h e
w i l l seek t o d i s c o v e r a n d i n s t a l l p r o o f o f that difference. H i s
w a n t i n g w i l l be haunted by a dread of being what he wants,
s o that h i s w a n t i n g w i l l a l s o a l w a y s b e a k i n d o f d r e a d . P r e ­
c i s e l y b e c a u s e w h a t i s r e p u d i a t e d a n d h e n c e los t i s p r e s e r v e d
as a r e p u d i a t e d identification, this desire w i l l attempt to over­
come an identification w h i c h can never be complete.
I n d e e d , h e w i l l n o t i d e n t i f y w i t h her, a n d h e w i l l n o t d e s i r e
a n o t h e r m a n . T h a t r e f u s a l t o d e s i r e , that sacrific e o f d e s i r e
i 8
3 Melancholy Gender
u n d e r the force o f p r o h i b i t i o n , w i l l i n c o r p o r a t e h o m o s e x u a l i t y
as an identification w i t h m a s c u l i n i t y But this m a s c u l i n i t y w i l l
b e h a u n t e d b y the l o v e i t c a n n o t g r i e v e , a n d b e f o r e I suggest
h o w t h i s m i g h t b e t r u e , I ' d l i k e t o situate the k i n d o f w r i t i n g
that I h a v e b e e n o f f e r i n g as a c e r t a i n c u l t u r a l e n g a g e m e n t w i t h
p s y c h o a n a l y t i c t h e o r y that b e l o n g s n e i t h e r t o the fields o f p s y ­
c h o l o g y n o r t o p s y c h o a n a l y s i s , b u t w h i c h n e v e r t h e l e s s seeks
t o e s t a b l i s h a n i n t e l l e c t u a l r e l a t i o n s h i p t o those e n t e r p r i s e s .
T h u s far, I h a v e b e e n o f f e r i n g s o m e t h i n g l i k e a n exegesis
o f a c e r t a i n p s y c h o a n a l y t i c l o g i c , o n e that a p p e a r s i n s o m e
p s y c h o a n a l y t i c texts b u t w h i c h these texts a n d others a l s o
s o m e t i m e s contest. I m a k e n o e m p i r i c a l c l a i m s , n o r a t t e m p t a
survey of current psychoanalytic scholarship on gender, sexu­
a l i t y , or m e l a n c h o l y . I w a n t m e r e l y to suggest w h a t I t a k e to be
some p r o d u c t i v e convergences between Freud's t h i n k i n g on
u n g r i e v e d a n d u n g r i e v a b l e loss a n d the p r e d i c a m e n t o f l i v i n g
i n a c u l t u r e w h i c h c a n m o u r n the loss o f h o m o s e x u a l attach­
m e n t o n l y w i t h great d i f f i c u l t y
T h i s p r o b l e m a t i c i s m a d e a l l the m o r e a c u t e w h e n w e c o n ­
s i d e r the r a v a g e s o f A I D S , a n d the task o f f i n d i n g a p u b l i c
occasion a n d language in w h i c h to grieve this seemingly end­
less n u m b e r o f deaths. M o r e g e n e r a l l y , t h i s p r o b l e m m a k e s
itself felt i n the u n c e r t a i n t y w i t h w h i c h h o m o s e x u a l l o v e a n d
loss is r e g a r d e d : is it r e g a r d e d as a " t r u e " l o v e , a " t r u e " loss,
a l o v e a n d loss w o r t h y a n d c a p a b l e o f b e i n g g r i e v e d , a n d t h u s
w o r t h y a n d capable of h a v i n g been lived? Or is it a love a n d
a loss h a u n t e d by the specte r of a c e r t a i n u n r e a l i t y , a c e r t a i n
u n t h i n k a b i l i t y , the d o u b l e d i s a v o w a l o f the " I n e v e r l o v e d her,
a n d I n e v e r lost her," u t t e r e d b y a w o m a n , the " I n e v e r l o v e d
h i m , I n e v e r los t h i m , " u t t e r e d b y a m a n ? I s t h i s the "never ­
n e v e r " that s u p p o r t s the n a t u r a l i z e d s u r f a c e o f h e t e r o s e x u a l
life as w e l l as its p e r v a s i v e m e l a n c h o l i a ? Is it the d i s a v o w a l of
Refused Identification 139
loss b y w h i c h s e x u a l f o r m a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g g a y s e x u a l f o r m a ­
tion, proceeds?
I f w e a c c e p t the n o t i o n that the p r o h i b i t i o n o n h o m o s e x u ­
a l i t y operates t h r o u g h o u t a l a r g e l y h e t e r o s e x u a l c u l t u r e as
one o f its d e f i n i n g o p e r a t i o n s , t h e n the loss o f h o m o s e x u a l o b ­
jects a n d a i m s (not s i m p l y t h i s p e r s o n o f the s a m e g e n d e r ,
b u t any p e r s o n o f the s a m e g e n d e r ) w o u l d a p p e a r t o b e f o r e ­
c l o s e d f r o m the start. I say " f o r e c l o s e d " to suggest that t h i s is
a p r e e m p t i v e loss, a m o u r n i n g for u n l i v e d p o s s i b i l i t i e s . If t h i s
l o v e i s f r o m the start o u t o f the q u e s t i o n , t h e n i t c a n n o t h a p ­
p e n , a n d i f i t does, i t c e r t a i n l y d i d n o t . I f i t does, i t h a p p e n s
o n l y u n d e r the o f f i c i a l s i g n o f its p r o h i b i t i o n a n d d i s a v o w a l . 3
W h e n c e r t a i n k i n d s o f losses are c o m p e l l e d b y a set o f c u l ­
t u r a l l y prevalent p r o h i b i t i o n s , we m i g h t expect a c u l t u r a l l y
p r e v a l e n t f o r m o f m e l a n c h o l i a , o n e w h i c h s i g n a l s the i n t e r ­
n a l i z a t i o n o f the u n g r i e v e d a n d u n g r i e v a b l e h o m o s e x u a l ca­
thexis. A n d w h e r e there i s n o p u b l i c r e c o g n i t i o n o r d i s c o u r s e
t h r o u g h w h i c h s u c h a loss m i g h t b e n a m e d a n d m o u r n e d ,
t h e n m e l a n c h o l i a takes o n c u l t u r a l d i m e n s i o n s o f c o n t e m p o ­
r a r y c o n s e q u e n c e . O f c o u r s e , i t c o m e s a s n o s u r p r i s e that the
m o r e h y p e r b o l i c a n d d e f e n s i v e a m a s c u l i n e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , the
m o r e fierce the u n g r i e v e d h o m o s e x u a l cathexis. I n t h i s sense,
we might understand both "masculinity" and "femininity" as
f o r m e d a n d c o n s o l i d a t e d t h r o u g h i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s w h i c h are i n
p a r t c o m p o s e d o f d i s a v o w e d grief.
I f w e a c c e p t the n o t i o n that h e t e r o s e x u a l i t y n a t u r a l i z e s
itself b y i n s i s t i n g o n the r a d i c a l o t h e r n e s s o f h o m o s e x u a l i t y ,
then heterosexual identity is p u r c h a s ed through a melancholic
i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f the l o v e that i t d i s a v o w s : the m a n w h o i n s i s t s
u p o n the c o h e r e n c e o f h i s h e t e r o s e x u a l i t y w i l l c l a i m that h e
n e v e r l o v e d a n o t h e r m a n , a n d hence n e v e r lost a n o t h e r m a n .
T h a t l o v e , that a t t a c h m e n t b e c o m e s subject to a d o u b l e d i s ­
140 Melancholy Gender
a v o w a l , a n e v e r h a v i n g l o v e d , a n d a n e v e r h a v i n g lost. T h i s
" n e v e r ­ n e v e r " t h u s f o u n d s the h e t e r o s e x u a l subject, as it w e r e ;
i t i s a n i d e n t i t y b a s e d u p o n the r e f u s a l t o a v o w a n a t t a c h m e n t
a n d , h e n c e , the r e f u s a l t o g r i e v e .
There is perhaps a more culturally instructive w a y of de­
s c r i b i n g this scenario, for it is not s i m p l y a matter of an
i n d i v i d u a l ' s u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o a v o w a n d hence t o g r i e v e h o m o ­
s e x u a l a t t a c h m e n t s . W h e n the p r o h i b i t i o n against h o m o s e x u ­
a l i t y i s c u l t u r a l l y p e r v a s i v e , t h e n the " l o s s " o f h o m o s e x u a l
love is precipitated through a p r o h i b i t i o n w h i c h is repeated
a n d r i t u a l i z e d t h r o u g h o u t the c u l t u r e . W h a t ensues i s a c u l t u r e
of gender melancholy in w h i c h masculinity and femininity
e m e r g e a s the traces o f a n u n g r i e v e d a n d u n g r i e v a b l e l o v e ;
i n d e e d , w h e r e m a s c u l i n i t y a n d f e m i n i n i t y w i t h i n the h e t e r o ­
s e x u a l m a t r i x are s t r e n g t h e n e d t h r o u g h the r e p u d i a t i o n s that
they p e r f o r m. In o p p o s i t i o n to a conception of sexuality w h i c h
is s a i d to " e x p r e s s " a g e n d e r , g e n d e r itself is h e r e u n d e r s t o o d
to be c o m p o s e d of precisely what remains inarticulate in sexu­
ality.
If we u n d e r s t a n d gender m e l a n c h o l y in this way, then per­
h a p s w e c a n m a k e sense o f the p e c u l i a r p h e n o m e n o n w h e r e b y
h o m o s e x u a l desire becomes a source of guilt. In " M o u r n i n g
a n d M e l a n c h o l i a " F r e u d a r g u e s that m e l a n c h o l y i s m a r k e d
b y the e x p e r i e n c e o f self­beratement . H e w r i t e s , "If o n e l i s ­
tens c a r e f u l l y t o the m a n y a n d v a r i o u s self­accusations o f the
m e l a n c h o l i c , o n e c a n n o t i n the e n d a v o i d the i m p r e s s i o n that
often the m o s t v i o l e n t o f t h e m are h a r d l y a t a l l a p p l i c a b l e t o
the p a t i e n t h i m s e l f , b u t that w i t h i n s i g n i f i c a n t m o d i f i c a t i o n s
t h e y d o fit s o m e o n e else, s o m e p e r s o n w h o m the p a t i e n t l o v e s ,
has l o v e d or o u g h t to l o v e . . . the self­reproache s are r e ­
p r o a c h e s a g a i n s t a l o v e d object w h i c h h a v e b e e n s h i f t e d o n t o
the p a t i e n t ' s o w n e g o . " 4
Refused Identification 141
F r e u d goes o n t o c o n j e c t u r e that the c o n f l i c t w i t h the o t h e r
w h i c h r e m a i n s u n r e s o l v e d a t the t i m e the o t h e r i s lost r e ­
e m e r g e s i n the p s y c h e a s a w a y o f c o n t i n u i n g the q u a r r e l . I n ­
d e e d , anger a t the o t h e r is d o u b t l e s s e x a c e r b a t e d by the d e a t h
o r d e p a r t u r e w h i c h o c c a s i o n s the loss. B u t t h i s anger i s t u r n e d
i n w a r d a n d b e c o m e s the s u b s t a n c e o f self­beratement .
I n " O n N a r c i s s i s m , " F r e u d l i n k s the e x p e r i e n c e o f g u i l t w i t h
the t u r n i n g b a c k i n t o the ego o f h o m o s e x u a l l i b i d o . P u t t i n g
5
a s i d e the q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r l i b i d o c a n b e h o m o s e x u a l o r
heterosexual, we m i g h t rephrase F r e u d a n d consider guilt as
the t u r n i n g b a c k i n t o the ego of h o m o s e x u a l a t t a c h m e n t . If the
loss b e c o m e s a r e n e w e d scene of c o n f l i c t , a n d if the a g g r e s s i o n
that f o l l o w s f r o m that loss c a n n o t b e a r t i c u l a t e d o r e x t e r n a l ­
i z e d , t h e n i t r e b o u n d s u p o n the ego itself, i n the f o r m o f a
super­ego. T h i s w i l l eventually lead F r e u d t o l i n k melancholic
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h the a g e n c y of the s u p e r ­ e g o in The Ego and
the Id, b u t a l r e a d y i n " O n N a r c i s s i s m " w e h a v e s o m e sense o f
h o w guilt is wrought f r o m ungrievable homosexuality.
T h e ego i s s a i d t o b e c o m e i m p o v e r i s h e d i n m e l a n c h o l i a ,
b u t i t a p p e a r s a s p o o r p r e c i s e l y t h r o u g h the w o r k i n g s o f self­
b e r a t e m e n t . T h e e g o ­ i d e a l , w h a t F r e u d calls the " m e a s u r e "
a g a i n s t w h i c h the ego i s j u d g e d b y the s u p e r ­ e g o , i s p r e c i s e l y
the i d e a l o f s o c i a l r e c t i t u d e d e n n e d o v e r a n d against h o m o ­
s e x u a l i t y. " T h i s i d e a l , " F r e u d w r i t e s , "has a s o c i a l s i d e : i t i s
a l s o the c o m m o n i d e a l of a f a m i l y , a class or a n a t i o n . It
n o t o n l y b i n d s the n a r c i s s i s t i c l i b i d o , b u t a l s o a c o n s i d e r a b l e
a m o u n t o f the p e r s o n ' s h o m o s e x u a l l i b i d o , w h i c h i n t h i s w a y
b e c o m e s t u r n e d b a c k i n t o the ego. T h e d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n d u e t o
the n o n ­ f u l f i l l m e n t o f t h i s i d e a l liberates h o m o s e x u a l l i b i d o ,
w h i c h i s t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a sense o f g u i l t ( d r e a d o f the c o m ­
m u n i t y ) " (81).
B u t the m o v e m e n t o f t h i s " t r a n s f o r m a t i o n " i s n o t a l t o g e t h er
142 Melancholy Gender Refused Identification 143

clear. A f t e r a l l , F r e u d w i l l a r g u e in Civilization and Its Dis­ tion, but is paradoxically strengthened ("renunciation breeds
contents that these s o c i a l i d e a l s are t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a sense i n t o l e r a n c e " ) . R e n u n c i a t i o n d o e s n o t a b o l i s h the i n s t i n c t ; i t
6

of guilt t h r o u g h a k i n d of internalization w h i c h is not, u l t i ­ d e p l o y s the i n s t i n c t for its o w n p u r p o s e s , s o that p r o h i b i t i o n ,

m a t e l y , m i m e t i c . I n " O n N a r c i s s i s m , " i t i s n o t that o n e treats a n d the l i v e d e x p e r i e n c e o f p r o h i b i t i o n a s r e p e a t e d r e n u n c i a ­

oneself as h a r s h l y as o n e w a s t r e a t e d b u t r a t h er that the ag­ t i o n , i s n o u r i s h e d p r e c i s e l y b y the i n s t i n c t that i t r e n o u n c e s .

g r e s s i o n t o w a r d the i d e a l a n d its u n f u l f i l l a b i l i t y i s t u r n e d i n ­ I n this s c e n a r i o , r e n u n c i a t i o n r e q u i r e s the v e r y h o m o s e x u a l i t y

w a r d , a n d t h i s s e l f ­ a g g r e s s i on b e c o m e s the p r i m a r y s t r u c t u r e that i t c o n d e m n s , n o t a s its e x t e r n a l object, b u t a s its o w n m o s t

o f c o n s c i e n c e : " b y m e a n s o f i d e n t i f i c a t i o n [the c h i l d ] takes the t r e a s u r e d s o u r c e o f sustenance. T h e act o f r e n o u n c i n g h o m o ­

u n a t t a c k a b l e a u t h o r i t y i n t o h i m s e l f " (86). sexuality thus paradoxicall y strengthens homosexuality, but it

s t r e n g t h e n s h o m o s e x u a l i t y p r e c i s e l y a s the p o w e r o f r e n u n ­
I n this sense, i n m e l a n c h o l i a the s u p e r ­ e g o c a n b e c o m e a
c i a t i o n . R e n u n c i a t i o n b e c o m e s the a i m a n d v e h i c l e o f satisfac­
g a t h e r i n g p l a c e f o r the d e a t h i n s t i n c t s . A s s u c h , i t i s n o t n e c ­
t i o n . A n d i t is, w e m i g h t conjecture, p r e c i s e l y the fear o f set­
e s s a r i l y the s a m e as those i n s t i n c t s or t h e i r effect. In t h i s
t i n g h o m o s e x u a l i t y l o o s e f r o m t h i s c i r c u i t o f r e n u n c i a t i o n that
w a y , m e l a n c h o l i a attracts the d e a t h i n s t i n c t s t o the s u p e r ­ e g o ,
s o terrifies the g u a r d i a n s o f m a s c u l i n i t y i n the U . S . m i l i t a r y .
the d e a t h i n s t i n c t s b e i n g u n d e r s t o o d as a r e g r e s s i v e s t r i v i n g
W h a t w o u l d m a s c u l i n i t y " b e " w i t h o u t this aggressive circuit
t o w a r d o r g a n i c e q u i l i b r i u m , a n d the self­beratemen t o f the
o f r e n u n c i a t i o n f r o m w h i c h i t i s w r o u g h t ? G a y s i n the m i l i t a r y
s u p e r ­ e g o b e i n g u n d e r s t o o d t o m a k e u s e o f that r e g r e s s i v e
threaten to u n d o m a s c u l i n i t y o n l y because this m a s c u l i n i t y is
s t r i v i n g for its o w n p u r p o s e s . M e l a n c h o l y i s b o t h the r e f u s a l
made of repudiated homosexuality. 7

o f g r i e f a n d the i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f loss, a m i m i n g o f the d e a t h i t

c a n n o t m o u r n . Yet the i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f d e a t h d r a w s u p o n the S o m e s u g g e s t i o n s I m a d e in Bodies That Matter c a n f a c i l i ­6

d e a t h i n s t i n c t s t o s u c h a d e g r e e that w e m i g h t w e l l w o n d e r tate the t r a n s i t i o n f r o m the c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f m e l a n c h o l i a a s

w h e t h e r the t w o c a n b e s e p a r a t e d f r o m o n e a n o t h e r , w h e t h e r a s p e c i f i c a l l y p s y c h i c e c o n o m y t o the p r o d u c t i o n o f the c i r ­
analytically or phenomenologically. c u i t r y o f m e l a n c h o l i a a s p a r t o f the o p e r a t i o n o f r e g u l a t o r y

T h e p r o h i b i t i o n o n h o m o s e x u a l i t y p r e e m p t s the p r o c e s s o f p o w e r . If m e l a n c h o l i a d e s i g n a t e s a s p h e r e of a t t a c h m e n t that

g r i e f a n d p r o m p t s a m e l a n c h o l i c i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w h i c h effec­ i s n o t e x p l i c i t l y p r o d u c e d a s a n object o f d i s c o u r s e , t h e n i t

t i v e l y t u r n s h o m o s e x u a l d e s i r e b a c k u p o n itself. T h i s t u r n ­ e r o d e s the o p e r a t i o n o f l a n g u a g e that n o t o n l y p o s i t s objects,

i n g b a c k u p o n itself i s p r e c i s e l y the a c t i o n o f self­beratemen t b u t regulate s a n d n o r m a l i z e s objects t h r o u g h that p o s i t i n g .

If m e l a n c h o l i a a p p e a r s at first to be a f o r m of c o n t a i n m e n t ,
a n d g u i l t . S i g n i f i c a n t l y , h o m o s e x u a l i t y i s not a b o l i s h e d b u t
a w a y o f i n t e r n a l i z i n g a n a t t a c h m e n t that i s b a r r e d f r o m the
p r e s e r v e d , t h o u g h p r e s e r v e d p r e c i s e l y i n the p r o h i b i t i o n o n
w o r l d , i t a l s o establishes the p s y c h i c c o n d i t i o n s for r e g a r d i n g
h o m o s e x u a l i t y . In Civilization and Its Discontents, F r e u d m a k e s
"the w o r l d " itself a s c o n t i n g e n t l y o r g a n i z e d t h r o u g h c e r t a i n
c l e ar that c o n s c i e n c e r e q u i r e s the c o n t i n u o u s sacrifice o r r e ­
k i n d s of foreclosures. 9

n u n c i a t i o n o f i n s t i n c t t o p r o d u c e the p e c u l i a r s a t i s f a c t i o n that
conscience requires; conscience is never assuaged by renuncia­ H a v i n g d e s c r i b e d a m e l a n c h o l y p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h the c o m ­
144 Melancholy Gender
p u l s o r y p r o d u c t i o n o f h e t e r o s e x u a l i t y , thus , a h e t e r o s e x u a l
m e l a n c h o l y that o n e m i g h t r e a d i n the w o r k i n g s o f g e n d e r
itself, I w a n t n o w t o suggest that r i g i d f o r m s o f g e n d e r a n d
sexual identification, whether homosexua l or heterosexual,
a p p e a r t o s p a w n f o r m s o f m e l a n c h o l y . I w o u l d l i k e first t o re­
c o n s i d e r the t h e o r y of g e n d e r as p e r f o r m a t i v e that I e l a b o r a t e d
i n Gender Trouble, a n d t h e n t o t u r n t o the q u e s t i o n o f g a y m e l ­
a n c h o l i a a n d the p o l i t i c a l c o n s e q u e n c e s o f u n g r i e v a b l e loss.
T h e r e I a r g u e d that g e n d e r is p e r f o r m a t i v e , by w h i c h I
m e a n t that n o g e n d e r i s " e x p r e s s e d " b y a c t i o n s , gestures, o r
s p e e c h , b u t that the p e r f o r m a n c e o f g e n d e r p r o d u c e s r e t r o ­
a c t i v e l y the i l l u s i o n that there i s a n i n n e r g e n d e r core. T h a t is,
the p e r f o r m a n c e of g e n d e r r e t r o a c t i v e l y p r o d u c e s the effect of
s o m e t r u e o r a b i d i n g f e m i n i n e essence o r d i s p o s i t i o n , s o that
o n e c a n n o t use a n e x p r e s s i v e m o d e l f o r t h i n k i n g a b o u t gen­
der. M o r e o v e r , I a r g u e d that g e n d e r is p r o d u c e d as a r i t u a l i z e d
r e p e t i t i o n o f c o n v e n t i o n s , a n d that t h i s r i t u a l i s s o c i a l l y c o m ­
p e l l e d i n p a r t b y the force o f a c o m p u l s o r y h e t e r o s e x u a l i t y . I n
t h i s c o n t e x t , I w o u l d l i k e t o r e t u r n t o the q u e s t i o n o f d r a g t o
e x p l a i n i n clearer t e r m s h o w I u n d e r s t a n d p s y c h o a n a l y s i s t o
b e l i n k e d w i t h g e n d e r p e r f o r m a t i v i t y , a n d h o w I take p e r f o r ­
mativity to be linked w i t h melancholia.
It is n o t e n o u g h to say that g e n d e r is p e r f o r m e d , or that
the m e a n i n g o f g e n d e r c a n b e d e r i v e d f r o m its p e r f o r m a n c e ,
w h e t h e r o r n o t one w a n t s t o r e t h i n k p e r f o r m a n c e a s a c o m ­
p u l s o r y s o c i a l r i t u a l . C l e a r l y there are w o r k i n g s o f g e n d e r that
d o n o t " s h o w " i n w h a t i s p e r f o r m e d a s g e n d e r, a n d t o r e d u c e
the p s y c h i c w o r k i n g s o f g e n d e r t o the l i t e r a l p e r f o r m a n c e o f
g e n d e r w o u l d b e a m i s t a k e . P s y c h o a n a l y s i s i n s i s t s that the
o p a c i t y o f the u n c o n s c i o u s sets l i m i t s t o the e x t e r i o r i z a t i o n o f
the p s y c h e . It also a r g u e s — r i g h t l y , I t h i n k — t h a t w h a t is ex­
t e r i o r i z e d o r p e r f o r m e d c a n o n l y b e u n d e r s t o o d b y reference
Refused Identification 145
to what is barred f r o m performance, what cannot or w i l l not
be performed.
The relation between drag performances a n d gender per­
f o r m a t i v i t y in Gender Trouble goes s o m e t h i n g l i k e t h i s : w h e n a
m a n i s p e r f o r m i n g d r a g a s a w o m a n , the " i m i t a t i o n " that d r a g
i s s a i d t o b e i s t a k e n a s a n " i m i t a t i o n " o f f e m i n i n i t y , b u t the
" f e m i n i n i t y " that h e i m i t a t e s i s n o t u n d e r s t o o d a s b e i n g itself
a n i m i t a t i o n . Yet i f o n e c o n s i d e r s that g e n d e r i s a c q u i r e d , that
i t i s a s s u m e d i n r e l a t i o n t o i d e a l s w h i c h are n e v e r q u i t e i n ­
habited by anyone, then f e m i n i n i t y is an ideal w h i c h everyone
a l w a y s a n d o n l y " i m i t a t e s . " T h u s , d r a g i m i t a t e s the i m i t a t i v e
s t r u c t u r e o f g e n d e r , r e v e a l i n g g e n d e r itself t o b e a n i m i t a ­
tion. H o w e v e r attractive this f o r m u l a t i o n m a y have seemed, it
d i d n ' t a d d r e s s the q u e s t i o n o f h o w c e r t a i n f o r m s o f d i s a v o w a l
a n d r e p u d i a t i o n c o m e t o o r g a n i z e the p e r f o r m a n c e o f gender.
H o w i s the p h e n o m e n o n o f g e n d e r m e l a n c h o l i a t o b e r e l a t e d
t o the p r a c t i c e o f g e n d e r p e r f o r m a t i v i t y ?
M o r e o v e r , g i v e n the i c o n o g r a p h i e f i g u r e o f the m e l a n c h o l i c
d r a g q u e e n , o n e m i g h t ask w h e t h e r there i s n o t a d i s s a t i s f i e d
l o n g i n g i n the m i m e t i c i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f g e n d e r that i s d r a g .
H e r e o n e m i g h t ask also after the d i s a v o w a l w h i c h o c c a s i o n s
the p e r f o r m a n c e a n d w h i c h p e r f o r m a n c e m i g h t b e s a i d t o
enact, w h e r e p e r f o r m a n c e engages " a c t i n g o u t " i n the p s y c h o ­
a n a l y t i c sense. If m e l a n c h o l i a in F r e u d ' s sense is the effect of
an ungrieved loss, 10
performance, understoo d as "acting out,"
m a y b e r e l a t e d t o the p r o b l e m o f u n a c k n o w l e d g e d loss. I f there
i s a n u n g r i e v e d loss i n d r a g p e r f o r m a n c e , p e r h a p s i t i s a loss
that i s r e f u s e d a n d i n c o r p o r a t e d i n the p e r f o r m e d i d e n t i f i c a ­
t i o n , o n e w h i c h reiterates a g e n d e r e d i d e a l i z a t i o n a n d its r a d i ­
c a l u n i n h a b i t a b i l i t y . T h i s is, t h e n , n e i t h e r a t e r r i t o r i a l i z a t i o n o f
the f e m i n i n e b y the m a s c u l i n e n o r a s i g n o f the e s s e n t i a l p l a s ­
t i c i t y of gender . It suggests that the p e r f o r m a n c e a l l e g o r i z e s a
146 Melancholy Gender
loss i t c a n n o t g r i e v e , a l l e g o r i z e s the i n c o r p o r a t i v e f a n t a s y o f
m e l a n c h o l i a w h e r e b y a n object i s p h a n t a s m a t i c a l l y t a k e n i n
or on as a w a y of r e f u s i n g to let it go. G e n d e r itself m i g h t be
u n d e r s t o o d i n p a r t a s the " a c t i n g o u t " o f u n r e s o l v e d grief.
T h e a b o v e a n a l y s i s is a r i s k y o n e b e c a u s e it suggests that
f o r a " m a n " p e r f o r m i n g f e m i n i n i t y , o r for a " w o m a n " p e r f o r m ­
i n g m a s c u l i n i t y (the latter is a l w a y s , in effect, to p e r f o r m a
l i t t l e less, g i v e n that f e m i n i n i t y is cast as the s p e c t a c u l a r g e n ­
d e r ) , there i s a n a t t a c h m e n t t o — a n d a loss a n d r e f u s a l o f — t h e
f i g u r e o f f e m i n i n i t y b y the m a n , o r the f i g u r e o f m a s c u l i n i t y b y
the w o m a n . I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o u n d e r s c o r e that, a l t h o u g h d r a g
i s a n effort t o n e go tia t e c r o s s ­ g e n d e r e d i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , c r o s s ­
g e n d e r e d i d e n t i f i c a t i o n i s n o t the o n l y p a r a d i g m for t h i n k i n g
a b o u t h o m o s e x u a l i t y , m e r e l y o n e a m o n g others . D r a g a l l e g o ­
r i z e s s o m e set of m e l a n c h o l i c i n c o r p o r a t i v e fantasies that sta­
b i l i z e gender. N o t o n l y are a vas t n u m b e r o f d r a g p e r f o r m e r s
s t r a i g h t , b u t i t w o u l d b e a m i s t a k e t o t h i n k that h o m o s e x u ­
a l i t y i s best e x p l a i n e d t h r o u g h the p e r f o r m a t i v i t y that i s d r a g .
W h a t d o e s s e e m u s e f u l i n t h i s a n a l y s i s , h o w e v e r , i s that d r a g
e x p o s e s o r a l l e g o r i z e s the m u n d a n e p s y c h i c a n d p e r f o r m a t i v e
practices by w h i c h heterosexualized genders f o r m themselves
t h r o u g h r e n o u n c i n g the possibility of h o m o s e x u a l i t y , a fore­
c l o s u r e w h i c h p r o d u c e s b o t h a f i e l d o f h e t e r o s e x u a l objects
a n d a d o m a i n o f those w h o m i t w o u l d b e i m p o s s i b l e t o l o v e .
D r a g t h u s a l l e g o r i z e s heterosexual melancholy, the m e l a n c h o l y
b y w h i c h a m a s c u l i n e g e n d e r i s f o r m e d f r o m the r e f u s a l t o
g r i e v e the m a s c u l i n e as a p o s s i b i l i t y of l o v e ; a f e m i n i n e g e n ­
d e r i s f o r m e d ( t a k e n o n , a s s u m e d ) t h r o u g h the i n c o r p o r a t i v e
f a n t a s y b y w h i c h the f e m i n i n e i s e x c l u d e d a s a p o s s i b l e object
of love, an exclusion never grieved, but "preserved" t h r o u gh
h e i g h t e n e d f e m i n i n e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . I n t h i s sense, the " t r u e s t "
Refused Identification 147
l e s b i a n m e l a n c h o l i c i s the s t r i c t l y s t r a i g h t w o m a n , a n d the
" t r u e s t " g a y m a l e m e l a n c h o l i c i s the s t r i c t l y s t r a i g h t m a n .
W h a t d r a g d o e s e x p o s e , h o w e v e r , i s that i n the " n o r m a l "
c o n s t i t u t i o n o f g e n d e r p r e s e n t a t i o n , the g e n d e r that i s p e r ­
f o r m e d i s c o n s t i t u t e d by a set of d i s a v o w e d a t t a c h m e n t s ,
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e a differen t d o m a i n o f the
" u n p e r f o r m a b l e . " I n d e e d , w h a t c o n s t i t u t e s the sexually u n p e r ­
f o r m a b l e m a y — b u t n e e d n o t — b e p e r f o r m e d as gender identifi­
cation. T o the extent that h o m o s e x u a l a t t a c h m e n t s r e m a i n u n ­
11
a c k n o w l e d g e d w i t h i n n o r m a t i v e h e t e r o s e x u a l i t y , t h e y are n o t
m e r e l y constituted as desires w h i c h emerge a n d subsequently
b e c o m e p r o h i b i t e d ; rather, these d e s i r e s are p r o s c r i b e d f r o m
the start. A n d w h e n t h e y d o e m e r g e o n the far s i d e o f the
censor, t h e y m a y w e l l c a r r y the m a r k o f i m p o s s i b i l i t y w i t h
t h e m , p e r f o r m i n g , a s i t w e r e , a s the i m p o s s i b l e w i t h i n the p o s ­
sible. A s s u c h , t h e y w i l l n o t b e a t t a c h m e n t s that c a n b e o p e n l y
g r i e v e d . T h i s is, t h e n , less a refusal to g r i e v e (the M i t s c h e r l i c h
f o r m u l a t i o n that accents the c h o i c e i n v o l v e d ) t h a n a p r e e m p ­
t i o n o f g r i e f p e r f o r m e d b y the absence o f c u l t u r a l c o n v e n t i o n s
for a v o w i n g the loss o f h o m o s e x u a l l o v e . A n d this absence
p r o d u c e s a c u l t u r e o f h e t e r o s e x u a l m e l a n c h o l y , one w h i c h c a n
b e r e a d i n the h y p e r b o l i c i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s b y w h i c h m u n d a n e
heterosexual m a s c u l i n i t y a n d f e m i n i n i t y c o n f i r m themselves.
T h e s t r a i g h t m a n becomes ( m i m e s , cites, a p p r o p r i a t e s , a s s u m e s
the status of) the m a n h e " n e v e r " l o v e d a n d " n e v e r " g r i e v e d ;
the s t r a i g h t w o m a n becomes the w o m a n she " n e v e r " l o v e d a n d
" n e v e r " g r i e v e d . I t i s i n t h i s sense, t h e n , that w h a t i s m o s t a p ­
p a r e n t l y p e r f o r m e d a s g e n d e r i s the s i g n a n d s y m p t o m o f a
pervasive disavowal.
G a y m e l a n c h o l i a , h o w e v e r , also c o n t a i n s a n g e r that c a n b e
t r a n s l a t e d i n t o p o l i t i c a l e x p r e s s i o n . It i s p r e c i s e l y t o c o u n t e r
148 Melancholy Gender
t h i s p e r v a s i v e c u l t u r a l r i s k o f gay m e l a n c h o l i a ( w h a t the n e w s ­
p a p e r s g e n e r a l i z e a s " d e p r e s s i o n " ) that there has b e e n a n i n ­
sistent p u b l i c i z a t i o n a n d p o l i t i c i z a t i o n o f g r i e f o v e r t h o s e w h o
h a v e d i e d f r o m A I D S . T h e N a m e s Project Q u i l t is e x e m p l a r y ,
r i t u a l i z i n g a n d r e p e a t i n g the n a m e itself a s a w a y o f p u b l i c a l l y
a v o w i n g limitless loss. 12
Insofar as the g r i e f r e m a i n s u n s p e a k a b l e , the rage o v e r
the loss c a n r e d o u b l e b y v i r t u e o f r e m a i n i n g u n a v o w e d . A n d
i f that rage i s p u b l i c a l l y p r o s c r i b e d , the m e l a n c h o l i c effects
of such a p r o s c r i p t i on can achieve suicidal proportions. The
e m e r g e n c e o f c o l l e c t i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s for g r i e v i n g are t h u s c r u ­
cial to s u r v i v a l , to reassembling c o m m u n i t y , to rearticulat­
i n g k i n s h i p , t o r e w e a v i n g s u s t a i n i n g r e l a t i o n s. Insofar a s t h e y
i n v o l v e the p u b l i c i z a t i o n a n d d r a m a t i z a t i o n o f d e a t h — a s i n
the case o f " d i e ­ i n s " b y Q u e e r N a t i o n — t h e y c a l l for b e i n g
r e a d a s l i f e ­ a f f i r m i n g r e j o i n d e r s t o the d i r e p s y c h i c c o n s e ­
quences of a g r i e v i n g process c u l t u r a l l y thwarted a n d p r o ­
scribed.
M e l a n c h o l y can work, however, w i t h i n homosexuality in
specific w a y s that c a l l for r e t h i n k i n g . W i t h i n the f o r m a t i o n o f
g a y a n d l e s b i a n i d e n t i t y , there m a y b e a n effort t o d i s a v o w
a c o n s t i t u t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p t o h e t e r o s e x u a l i t y . W h e n t h is d i s ­
a v o w a l is u n d e r s t o o d as a p o l i t i c a l n e c e s s i t y in o r d e r to specify
g a y a n d l e s b i a n i d e n t i t y o v e r a n d against its o s t e n s i b l e o p p o ­
site, h e t e r o s e x u a l i t y , that c u l t u r a l p r a c t i c e p a r a d o x i c a l l y c u l ­
m i n a t e s i n a w e a k e n i n g o f the v e r y c o n s t i t u e n c y i t i s m e a n t
to u n i t e . N o t o n l y does s u c h a strategy a t t r i b u t e a false a n d
m o n o l i t h i c status t o h e t e r o s e x u a l i t y , b u t i t m i s s e s the p o l i t i ­
c a l o p p o r t u n i t y t o w o r k o n the w e a k n e s s i n h e t e r o s e x u a l
s u b j e c t i v a t i o n a n d t o refute the l o g i c o f m u t u a l e x c l u s i o n b y
w h i c h heterosexism proceeds. M o r e o v e r , a full­scale d e n i a l of
the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p c a n c o n s t i t u t e a r e j e c t i on of h e t e r o s e x u ­
Refused Identification 149
a l i t y that is to s o m e d e g r e e an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with a rejected
h e t e r o s e x u a l i t y . I m p o r t a n t t o t h is e c o n o m y , h o w e v e r , i s the r e ­
f u s a l to r e c o g n i z e t h is i d e n t i f i c a t i o n that is, as it w e r e , a l r e a d y
m a d e , a r e f u s a l w h i c h a b s e n t l y designates the d o m a i n of a
s p e c i f i c a l l y g a y m e l a n c h o l i a , a loss w h i c h c a n n o t b e r e c o g ­
n i z e d a n d , hence, c a n n o t b e m o u r n e d . F o r a g a y o r l e s b i a n
i d e n t i t y p o s i t i o n t o s u s t a i n its a p p e a r a n c e a s c o h e r e n t, h e t e r o ­
s e x u a l i t y m u s t r e m a i n i n that rejected a n d r e p u d i a t e d p l a c e .
P a r a d o x i c a l l y , its h e t e r o s e x u a l remains m u s t be sustained p r e ­
c i s e l y t h r o u g h i n s i s t i n g o n the seamless c o h e r e n c e o f a s p e c i f i ­
c a l l y g a y i d e n t i t y . H e r e i t s h o u l d b e c o m e c l e ar that a r a d i c a l
r e f u s a l t o i d e n t i f y suggests that o n s o m e l e v e l a n i d e n t i f i c a t i o n
has a l r e a d y t a k e n p l a c e , a n i d e n t i f i c a t i o n h as b e e n m a d e a n d
d i s a v o w e d , w h o s e s y m p t o m a t i c a p p e a r a n c e i s the i n s i s t e n c e ,
the o v e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n that is, as it w e r e ,
w o r n o n the b o d y that s h o w s .
T h i s raises the p o l i t i c a l q u e s t i o n o f the cost o f a r t i c u l a t ­
i n g a coherent i d e n t i t y p o s i t i o n by p r o d u c i n g , e x c l u d i n g , a n d
r e p u d i a t i n g a d o m a i n of abjected specters that t h r e a t e n the
a r b i t r a r i l y c l o s e d d o m a i n o f subject p o s i t i o n s . P e r h a p s o n l y
by r i s k i n g the incoherence of i d e n t i t y is c o n n e c t i o n p o s s i b l e , a
p o l i t i c a l p o i n t that c o r r e l a t e s w i t h L e o B e r s a n i ' s i n s i g h t that
o n l y the d e c e n t e r e d subject i s a v a i l a b l e t o d e s i r e . 13
W h a t can­
not be a v o w e d a s a c o n s t i t u t i v e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n for a n y g i v e n
subject p o s i t i o n r u n s the r i s k n o t o n l y o f b e c o m i n g e x t e r n a l ­
ized in a degraded form, but repeatedly repudiated a n d sub­
ject to a p o l i c y of d i s a v o w a l .
T h e l o g i c o f r e p u d i a t i o n that I've c h a r t e d h e r e i s i n s o m e
w a y s a h y p e r b o l i c t h e o r y, a l o g i c i n d r a g , a s i t w e r e , w h i c h
overstates the case, b u t overstates it f o r a r e a s o n . T h e r e is
n o n e c e s s a r y r e a s o n for i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t o o p p o s e d e s i r e , o r
for d e s i r e t o b e f u e l e d b y r e p u d i a t i o n . T h i s r e m a i n s t r u e for
150 Melancholy Gender

heterosexuality a n d h o m o s e x u a l i t y alike, a n d for forms of b i ­

s e x u a l i t y that t a k e t h e m s e l v e s t o b e c o m p o s i t e f o r m s o f e a c h .
I n d e e d , w e are m a d e a l l the m o r e f r a g i l e u n d e r the p r e s s u r e o f
s u c h r u l e s , a n d a l l the m o r e m o b i l e w h e n a m b i v a l e n c e a n d loss
are g i v e n a d r a m a t i c l a n g u a g e i n w h i c h to d o t h e i r a c t i n g o u t . | Keeping It M o v i n g
Commentary on Judith Butler's
"Melancholy Gender / Refused
Identification"

A D A M PHILLIPS

E n d s o f sentences a n d other pauses o n l y c o m e w h e n w e r u n

out of time or hope.
—Carolyn Creedon, The Best American Poetry

I f , a s F r e u d suggests, c h a r a c t e r i s c o n s t i t u t e d b y i d e n t i f i c a ­
t i o n — t h e ego l i k e n i n g itself t o w h a t i t o n c e l o v e d — t h e n
character is close to caricature, an i m i t a t i o n of an i m i t a t i o n . 1

L i k e the artists P l a t o w a n t e d t o b a n , w e are m a k i n g c o p i e s o f

c o p i e s , b u t u n l i k e P l a t o ' s artists w e h a v e n o o r i g i n a l , o n l y a n
infinite succession of likenesses to someone w h o , to a l l intents
a n d p u r p o s e s , does n o t exist. F r e u d ' s n o t i o n o f c h a r a c t e r i s a
p a r o d y o f a P l a t o n i c w o r k o f art; h i s t h e o r y o f c h a r a c t e r for­
m a t i o n t h r o u g h identification makes a m o c k e r y of character
a s i n a n y w a y s u b s t a n t i v e . T h e ego i s a l w a y s d r e s s i n g u p for
s o m e w h e r e t o go. Insofar a s b e i n g i s b e i n g l i k e , there c a n b e
152 Melancholy Gender
n o p l a c e for T r u e selves o r c o r e g e n d e r i d e n t i t i e s . A f t e r a l l ,
m y sense o f a u t h e n t i c i t y c a n c o m e o n l y f r o m the senses o f a u ­
t h e n t i c i t y i n m y c u l t u r e . I n t h i s context, m y T r u e Self i s m o r e
a c c u r a t e l y d e s c r i b e d a s m y P r e f e r r e d Self (or Selves). I a m the
p e r f o r m e r o f m y c o n s c i o u s a n d u n c o n s c i o u s preferences .
L a c a n ' s m i r r o r ­ s t a g e is a t e s t a m e n t to the h a v o c w r e a k e d
by m i m e t i c forms of development; a n d M i k k e l Borch­Jacobsen
a n d L e o B e r s a n i i n p a r t i c u l a r h a v e e x p o s e d the v i o l e n c e a n d
t a u t o l o g y o f F r e u d ' s t h e o r y o f i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , the m u t u a l i m ­
plication and complicity involved in being like. As Judith 2
B u t l e r ' s s o b e r i n g essay s h o w s , t h i s c r i t i c a l c o n c e p t o f i d e n t i f i ­
c a t i o n i s the n e x u s for a n u m b e r o f c o n t e n t i o u s issues i n c o n ­
t e m p o r a r y theory; it invites us to w o n d e r what we use other
p e o p l e for a n d h o w o t h e r t h e y are. I n fact, i t forces u s t o c o n ­
f r o n t the q u e s t i o n that e x e r c i s e d F r e u d a n d that object r e l a ­
t i o n s a n d r e l a t i o n a l p s y c h o a n a l y s i s take for g r a n t e d ; i n w h a t
sense d o w e h a v e w h a t w e p r e f e r t o c a l l r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h
each other?
W h e n F r e u d p r o p o s e d that the object w a s m e r e l y " s o l ­
d e r e d " o n t o the i n s t i n c t , that o u r p r i m a r y c o m m i t m e n t w a s
t o o u r d e s i r e a n d n o t t o its target, h e i m p l i e d that w e are
n o t a t t a c h e d t o e a c h o t h e r i n the w a y s w e l i k e t o t h i n k .
F r e u d g l i m p s e d in the Interpretation of Dreams the ego's p o t e n ­
tial for p r o m i s c u o u s m o b i l i t y ; dreams in particular revealed
that p s y c h i c life w a s a s t o n i s h i n g l y m o b i l e a n d a d v e n t u r o u s
e v e n i f l i v e d life w a s n o t . ( V e r y f e w p e o p l e are a c t i v e l y b i ­
sexual yet everyone is p s y c h i c a l l y bisexual.) F r e u d h a d b o t h
t o e x p l a i n t h i s d i s p a r i t y — t h a t w e d o n o t h a v e the c o u r a g e ,
as it were, of o u r p r i m a r y p r o c e s s — a n d also to f i n d a way,
i n theory, o f g r o u n d i n g the F a u s t i a n ego, d e f i n i n g its l o y a l t i e s
w h e n t h e y s o m e t i m e s s e e m e d u n r e l i a b l e . T h e ego c e r t a i n l y
s e e m e d s h i f t y i n its a l l e g i a n c e s , a n d s o i t w a s w i t h s o m e r e ­
Refused Identification 153
lief that F r e u d t u r n e d t o m o u r n i n g , w h i c h s e e m e d t o r e v e a l
that the ego i s g r o u n d e d i n its r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h l o v e d a n d
hated others. M o u r n i n g is i m m e n s e l y reassuring because it
4
c o n v i n c e s u s o f s o m e t h i n g w e m i g h t o t h e r w i s e d o u b t ; o u r at­
t a c h m e n t t o others. T h e p r o t r a c t e d p a i n f u l n e s s o f m o u r n i n g
c o n f i r m s s o m e t h i n g that p s y c h o a n a l y s i s h a d p u t i n t o q u e s t i o n :
h o w i n t r a n s i g e n t l y d e v o t e d w e are t o the p e o p l e w e l o v e a n d
hate. D e s p i t e the e v i d e n c e o f o u r d r e a m s , o u r c a p a c i t y for i n ­
finite s u b s t i t u t i o n i s meager. I n t h i s sense, m o u r n i n g has b e e n
a b a l l a s t for the m o r e r a d i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s of p s y c h o a n a l y s i s . It
i s the r o c k , s o t o s p e a k , o n w h i c h P r o m e t h e u s f o u n d e r s .
It m i g h t at first s e e m m o r e a c c u r a t e t o say that, f o r F r e u d , it
w a s the O e d i p u s c o m p l e x that b o t h c o n s t i t u t e d a n d set l i m i t s
t o the e x o r b i t a n c e o f the ego. B u t i t is, a s K l e i n has s h o w n ,
the m o u r n i n g e n t a i l e d i n the s o ­ c a l l e d r e s o l u t i o n o f the O e d i ­
p u s c o m p l e x that c o n s o l i d a t e s the ego. W i t h o u t m o u r n i n g f o r
p r i m a r y objects t h e re i s n o w a y o u t o f the m a g i c c i r c l e o f the
f a m i l y . I n d e e d , p a r t l y t h r o u g h the w o r k o f K l e i n , m o u r n i n g
has p r o v i d e d the f o u n d a t i o n f o r d e v e l o p m e n t i n m o s t v e r s i o n s
o f p s y c h o a n a l y s i s ; s o m u c h so, i n fact, that m o u r n i n g has ac­
q u i r e d the status o f a q u a s i ­ r e l i g i o u s c o n c e p t i n p s y c h o a n a l y ­
3 sis. A n a l y s t s b e l i e v e i n m o u r n i n g ; i f a p a t i e n t w e r e t o c l a i m ,
a s E m e r s o n o n c e d i d , that m o u r n i n g w a s " s h a l l o w " h e o r she
w o u l d b e c o n s i d e r e d t o b e " o ut o f t o u c h " w i t h s o m e t h i n g o r
other. It is as t h o u g h a c a p a c i t y f o r m o u r n i n g , w i t h a l l that it
i m p l i e s , c o n s t i t u t e s the h u m a n c o m m u n i t y . W e c a n n o m o r e
imagine a w o r l d w i t h o u t bereavement than we can imagine a
w o r l d without punishment.
I t h i n k that, s o m e w h a t a l o n g these l i n e s , J u d i t h B u t l e r i s
t r y i n g t o u s e m o u r n i n g t o g i v e s o m e g r a v i t y , i n b o t h senses,
t o he r e x h i l a r a t i n g n o t i o n o f g e n d e r a s p e r f o r m a t i v e . W h a t
is r e m a r k a b l e a b o u t h e r essay i s that she m a n a g e s t o d o t h i s
154 M e l a n c h o ly Gender
w i t h o u t the a r g u m e n t ' s d e g e n e r a t i n g i n t o the m o r e c o e r c i v e
p i e t i e s that t a l k a b o u t g r i e f u s u a l l y b r i n g s i n its w a k e . M o u r n ­
ing makes moralists of us all. There w i l l never be m o r e gender
identities than we can invent a n d p e r f o r m . We s h o u l d not be
c e l e b r a t i n g t h o s e p e o p l e , m a n y o f w h o m are p s y c h o a n a l y s t s ,
w h o , i n the n a m e o f T r u t h , o r P s y c h i c H e a l t h , o r M a t u r i t y ,
seek t o l i m i t the r e p e r t o i r e .
I t i s n o w a c l i c h é , i n t h e o r y i f n o t i n p r a c t i c e , that a l l v e r ­
s i o n s o f g e n d e r i d e n t i t y are c o n f l i c t u a l a n d t h e r e f o re p r o b l e m ­
atic. W h a t B u t l e r i s p r o p o s i n g w i t h h e r n o t i o n o f a m e l a n c h o l i c
identification, a "culture of gender melancholy in w h i c h mas­
c u l i n i t y a n d f e m i n i n i t y e m e r g e a s the trace s o f a n u n g r i e v e d
a n d ungrievable love," is a n e w version of an o l d question
a b o u t g e n d e r i d e n t i t y . W h y are h o m o s e x u a l a t t a c h m e n t s —
the i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y n a m e d " n e g a t i v e " O e d i p u s c o m p l e x — d e ­
scribed, even if not o r i g i n a l l y experienced, aversively? W h y
are these m a n i f e s t l y p a s s i o n a t e l o v e s d i s a v o w e d , m a d e u n ­
mournable, repudiated, a n d then punished w h e n witnessed
i n others? A t the least, i t s e e m s c l e a r f r o m B u t l e r ' s c o n v i n c ­
i n g a c c o u n t that the c u l t u r a l l y p e r v a s i v e h o s t i l i t y — b o t h i n t e r ­
a n d i n t r a p s y c h i c a l l y — t o h o m o s e x u a l i t y i s b a s e d o n envy. I f
some heterosexuals in p r e ­ A i D S times w e re e x p l i c i t ly envious
o f the p r o m i s c u i t y o f h o m o s e x u a l s — w h y c a n ' t W E c r u i s e ? —
h e t e r o s e x u a l s n o w m a y b e m o r e l i k e l y t o e n v y s i m p l y the i n t i ­
m a c y that s o m e p e o p l e are free t o i n d u l g e a n d elaborat e w i t h
p e o p l e o f the s a m e sex. B u t if, a s B u t l e r suggests, " m a s c u ­
l i n i t y " a n d " f e m i n i n i t y " are f o r m e d a n d c o n s o l i d a t e d t h r o u g h
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s that are c o m p o s e d i n p a r t o f d i s a v o w e d grief,
w h a t w o u l d i t b e l i k e t o l i v e i n a w o r l d that a c k n o w l e d g e d
a n d s a n c t i o n e d s u c h grief, that a l l o w e d us, a s i t w e r e , the f u l l
course of our bereavement of d i s o w n e d or renounce d gen­
d e r i d e n t i t i e s ? W h a t w o u l d h a v e t o h a p p e n i n the s o ­ c a l l e d
Refused Identification *55
p s y c h o a n a l y t i c c o m m u n i t y f o r a n ethos t o b e c r e a t e d i n w h i c h
p a t i e n t s w e r e e n c o u r a g e d t o m o u r n the loss o f a l l t h e i r r e ­
pressed gender identities?
T h e s e s e e m t o m e t o b e q u e s t i o n s o f c o n s i d e r a b l e interest,
p r o v i d e d t h e y d o n o t e n t a i l the i d e a l i z a t i o n o f m o u r n i n g — i t s
u s e as a s p u r i o u s r e d e m p t i v e p r a c t i c e , as a k i n d of ersatz c u r e
for r e p r e s s i o n o r the a n g u i s h e s o f u n c e r t a i n t y . I f the c o n v i n c e d
h e t e r o s e x u a l m a n , i n B u t l e r ' s w o r d s , " b e c o m e s subject t o a
double disavowal, a never­having­loved and a never­having­
lost," the h o m o s e x u a l a t t a c h m e n t , i s i t t h e r e f o re t o b e c o m e
i n t e g r a l t o the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c p r o j e c t t o a n a l y z e , o r e n g i n e e r
the u n d o i n g o f t h i s d i s a v o w a l i f the h e t e r o s e x u a l m a n c l a i m s
t o b e r e l a t i v e l y u n t r o u b l e d b y it? T o m e , the a b s o l u t e p l a u s i ­
b i l i t y of Butler's argument poses some telling c l i n i c a l q u a n ­
d a r i e s . W h o , for e x a m p l e , d e c i d e s w h a t c o n s t i t u t e s a p r o b l e m
f o r the p a t i e n t ? A n d b y w h a t c r i t e r i a ? A s s u m e d h e t e r o s e x u ­
ality is every bit as m u c h of a " p r o b l e m " as any other assume d
p o s i t i o n (all s y m p t o m s , after a l l , are states o f c o n v i c t i o n ) . C e r ­
t a i n l y B u t l e r ' s p a p e r r e m i n d s u s o f the cost, the d e p r i v a t i o n , i n
a l l g e n d e r i d e n t i t i e s , n o t t o m e n t i o n the t e r r o r i n f o r m i n g these
desperate measures. "There is," Butler writes, "no necessary
r e a s o n for i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t o o p p o s e d e s i r e , o r f o r d e s i r e t o b e
f u e l e d b y r e p u d i a t i o n . " B u t t h e r e is, o f c o u r s e , a n e c e s s a r y r e a ­
son by a certain k i n d of psychoanalytic logic. In Freud's view,
we become what we cannot have, a n d we desire (and punish)
w h a t w e are c o m p e l l e d t o d i s o w n . B u t w h y these c h o i c e s —
w h y c a n ' t w e d o b o t h a n d s o m e t h i n g else a s w e l l ? — a n d w h y
are t h e y the c h o i c e s ?
T h e s e are the issue s o p e n e d u p i n B u t l e r ' s Gender Trouble.
The essentially performative, constructed nature of gender
i d e n t i t y m a k e s a l l c o n s t r a i n t s o f the r e p e r t o i r e s e e m f a c t i t i o u s
a n d u n n e c e s s a r i l y o p p r e s s i v e . B u t just a s e v e r y p e r f o r m a n c e i s
154 M e l a n c h o ly Gender
w i t h o u t the a r g u m e n t ' s d e g e n e r a t i n g i n t o the m o r e c o e r c i v e
p i e t i e s that t a l k a b o u t g r i e f u s u a l l y b r i n g s i n its w a k e . M o u r n ­
i n g makes moralists of us all. There w i l l never be m o r e gender
identities than we can invent a n d p e r f o r m . We s h o u l d not be
c e l e b r a t i n g t h o s e p e o p l e , m a n y o f w h o m are p s y c h o a n a l y s t s ,
w h o , i n the n a m e o f T r u t h , o r P s y c h i c H e a l t h , o r M a t u r i t y ,
seek t o l i m i t the r e p e r t o i r e .
I t i s n o w a c l i c h é , i n t h e o r y i f n o t i n p r a c t i c e , that a l l v e r ­
s i o n s o f g e n d e r i d e n t i t y are c o n f l i c t u a l a n d t h e r e f o re p r o b l e m ­
atic. W h a t B u t l e r i s p r o p o s i n g w i t h h e r n o t i o n o f a m e l a n c h o l i c
identification, a "culture of gender melancholy in w h i c h mas­
c u l i n i t y a n d f e m i n i n i t y e m e r g e a s the traces o f a n u n g r i e v e d
a n d ungrievable love," is a n e w version of an o l d question
a b o u t g e n d e r i d e n t i t y . W h y are h o m o s e x u a l a t t a c h m e n t s —
the i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y n a m e d " n e g a t i v e " O e d i p u s c o m p l e x — d e ­
scribed, even if not o r i g i n a l l y experienced, aversively? W h y
are these m a n i f e s t l y p a s s i o n a t e l o v e s d i s a v o w e d , m a d e u n ­
mournable, repudiated, a n d then punished w h e n witnessed
i n o t h e r s ? A t the least, i t s e e m s c l e a r f r o m B u t l e r ' s c o n v i n c ­
i n g a c c o u n t that the c u l t u r a l l y p e r v a s i v e h o s t i l i t y — b o t h i n t e r ­
a n d i n t r a p s y c h i c a l l y — t o h o m o s e x u a l i t y i s b a s e d o n envy. I f
some heterosexuals in p r e ­ A i D S times were explicitly envious
o f the p r o m i s c u i t y o f h o m o s e x u a l s — w h y c a n ' t W E c r u i s e ? —
h e t e r o s e x u a l s n o w m a y b e m o r e l i k e l y t o e n v y s i m p l y the i n t i ­
m a c y that s o m e p e o p l e are free t o i n d u l g e a n d elaborat e w i t h
p e o p l e o f the s a m e sex. B u t if, a s B u t l e r suggests, " m a s c u ­
l i n i t y " a n d " f e m i n i n i t y " are f o r m e d a n d c o n s o l i d a t e d t h r o u g h
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s that are c o m p o s e d i n p a r t o f d i s a v o w e d grief,
w h a t w o u l d i t b e l i k e t o l i v e i n a w o r l d that a c k n o w l e d g e d
a n d s a n c t i o n e d s u c h grief, that a l l o w e d u s , a s i t w e r e , the f u l l
course of our bereavement of d i s o w n e d or renounced gen­
d e r i d e n t i t i e s ? W h a t w o u l d h a v e t o h a p p e n i n the s o ­ c a l l e d
Refused Identification *55
p s y c h o a n a l y t i c c o m m u n i t y for a n ethos t o b e c r e a t e d i n w h i c h
p a t i e n t s w e r e e n c o u r a g e d t o m o u r n the loss o f a l l t h e i r r e ­
pressed gender identities?
T h e s e s e e m t o m e t o b e q u e s t i o n s o f c o n s i d e r a b l e interest,
p r o v i d e d t h e y d o n o t e n t a i l the i d e a l i z a t i o n o f m o u r n i n g — i t s
u s e as a s p u r i o u s r e d e m p t i v e p r a c t i c e , as a k i n d of ersatz c u r e
for r e p r e s s i o n o r the a n g u i s h e s o f u n c e r t a i n t y . I f the c o n v i n c e d
h e t e r o s e x u a l m a n , i n B u t l e r ' s w o r d s , " b e c o m e s subject t o a
double disavowal, a never­having­loved a n d a never­having­
lost," the h o m o s e x u a l a t t a c h m e n t , i s i t t h e r e f o re t o b e c o m e
i n t e g r a l t o the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c p r o j e c t t o a n a l y z e , o r e n g i n e e r
the u n d o i n g o f t h i s d i s a v o w a l i f the h e t e r o s e x u a l m a n c l a i m s
t o b e r e l a t i v e l y u n t r o u b l e d b y it? T o m e , the a b s o l u t e p l a u s i ­
b i l i t y of Butler's argument poses some telling c l i n i c a l q u a n ­
daries. W h o , for example, decides w h a t constitutes a p r o b l e m
for the p a t i e n t ? A n d b y w h a t c r i t e r i a ? A s s u m e d h e t e r o s e x u ­
a l i t y is every bit as m u c h of a " p r o b l e m " as any other a s s u m e d
p o s i t i o n (all s y m p t o m s , after a l l , are states o f c o n v i c t i o n ) . C e r ­
t a i n l y B u t l e r ' s p a p e r r e m i n d s u s o f the cost, the d e p r i v a t i o n , i n
a l l g e n d e r i d e n t i t i e s , n o t t o m e n t i o n the t e r r o r i n f o r m i n g these
desperate measures. "There is," Butler writes, "no necessary
r e a s o n for i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t o o p p o s e d e s i r e , o r f o r d e s i r e t o b e
f u e l e d b y r e p u d i a t i o n . " B u t there is, o f c o u r s e , a n e c e s s a r y r e a ­
son by a certain k i n d of psychoanalytic logic. In Freud's view,
we become what we cannot have, a n d we desire (and punish)
w h a t w e are c o m p e l l e d t o d i s o w n . B u t w h y these c h o i c e s —
w h y c a n ' t w e d o b o t h a n d s o m e t h i n g else a s w e l l ? — a n d w h y
are t h e y the c h o i c e s ?
T h e s e are the issue s o p e n e d u p i n B u t l e r ' s Gender Trouble.
The essentially performative, constructed nature of gender
i d e n t i t y m a k e s a l l c o n s t r a i n t s o f the r e p e r t o i r e s e e m f a c t i t i o u s
a n d u n n e c e s s a r i l y o p p r e s s i v e . B u t just a s e v e r y p e r f o r m a n c e i s
i 6
5 Melancholy Gender
s u b s i d i z e d b y a n i n h i b i t i o n e l s e w h e r e , s o there i s n o i d e n t i t y ,
h o w e v e r c o m p e l l i n g the p e r f o r m a n c e , w i t h o u t s u f f e r i n g . I f the
i d e a o f p e r f o r m a n c e frees i d e n t i t y i n t o states o f ( s o m e t i m e s
w i l l e d ) p o s s i b i l i t y , m o u r n i n g refers those s a m e i d e n t i t i e s b a c k
to their unconscious histories, w i t h their repetitions a n d their
w a s t e ; those p a r a m e t e r s that s e e m i n g l y t h w a r t o u r o p t i o n s .
M o u r n i n g a n d p e r f o r m a n c e — a n d the p e r f o r m a n c e s that c o n ­
s t i t u t e o u r sense o f m o u r n i n g — s e e m u s e f u l l y t w i n n e d . W i t h ­
o u t the i d e a o f p e r f o r m a n c e , m o u r n i n g b e c o m e s l i t e r a l i z e d a s
T r u t h — o u r d e e p e s t act; w i t h o u t the i d e a o f m o u r n i n g , p e r ­
f o r m a n c e b e c o m e s a n e x c e s s i v e d e m a n d — p r e t e n d there's n o
unconscious, then pretend what y o u like. "I believe in all sin­
cerity," V a l é r y w r o t e , "that i f e a c h m a n w e r e n o t able t o l i v e a
n u m b e r o f l i v e s b e s i d e h i s o w n , h e w o u l d n o t b e able t o l i v e h i s
o w n life." Valéry 's ironic s i n c e r i t y — f r o m w h i c h of his lives is
5
he s p e a k i n g ? — i n v i t e s us, l i k e Butler, to m u l t i p l y o u r versions
o f self a s s o m e k i n d o f p s y c h i c n e c e s s i t y ; a s t h o u g h w e m i g h t
n o t b e able t o bear the loss o f n o t d o i n g so. B u t h o w m a n y
l i v e s c a n the a n a l y s t r e c o g n i z e i n , o r d e m a n d of, h i s p a t i e n t ,
a n d w h a t are the c o n s t r a i n t s o n t h i s r e c o g n i t i o n that s o e a s i l y
becomes a demand?
I n a n a l y s i s , o f c o u r s e , i t i s n o t o n l y the p a t i e n t ' s g e n d e r
i d e n t i t i e s that are a t stake. B o t h the a n a l y s t a n d h e r p a t i e n t are
w o r k i n g t o sustain their desire, a n d d e s i r e — b o t h i n t r a ­ a n d
i n t e r p s y c h i c a l l y — d e p e n d s o n difference. T h e r e a l w a y s has
t o b e s o m e t h i n g else, s o m e t h i n g s u f f i c i e n t l y (or a p p a r e n t l y )
other. T h e specte r o f A p h a n i s i s , Jones's r e p r e s s e d c o n c e p t o f
the d e a t h o f d e s i r e , h a u n t s the p r o c e s s . B u t t h o u g h d e s i r e d e ­
p e n d s o n difference, w e o n l y l i k e the d i f fer en ces w e l i k e ; the
set of d e s i r a b l e or t o l e r a b l e differences, d e s i r e ­ s u s t a i n i n g dif­
ference, i s n e v e r i n f i n i t e for a n y o n e . P s y c h o a n a l y s i s i s a b o u t
w h e r e w e d r a w these c o n s t i t u t i v e l i n e s . A n y c l i n i c i a n i s o n l y
Refused Identification
*57
too c o n s c i o u s o f the c o n s t r a i n t s , the u n c o n s c i o u s c o n s t r a i n t s ,
o n p o s s i b i l i t y that are c a l l e d s y m p t o m s ( a n d f r o m a differen t
p e r s p e c t i v e are c a l l e d the O e d i p u s c o m p l e x ) . B u t , o f c o u r s e ,
w h a t i s p o s s i b l e i n a n a l y s i s , o r a n y w h e r e else, i s d i c t a t e d
b y o u r t h e o r e t i c a l p a r a d i g m s , b y the l a n g u a g e s w e c h o o s e
t o s p e a k a b o u t o u r p r a c t i c e . D e s p i t e boasts t o the c o n t r a r y
— p s y c h o a n a l y s i s , the I m p o s s i b l e P r o f e s s i o n a n d the l i k e —
p s y c h o a n a l y s i s i s o n l y a s d i f f i c u l t a s w e m a k e it.
F r o m a clinical point of view, Butler's initial political vol­
u n t a r i s m i n Gender Trouble w o u l d h a v e m a d e a n a l y s t s w a r y .
B u t there i s n o o b v i o u s r e a s o n w h y a n a l y s t s i n t h e i r p r a c t i c e
h a v e t o b e less i m a g i n a t i v e t h a n B u t l e r i s a s k i n g t h e m t o b e
i n " M e l a n c h o l y G e n d e r . " T h e a n a l y s t w h o b e l i e v e s i n the u n ­
c o n s c i o u s c a n h a r d l y set h i m s e l f up as a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the
a u t h e n t i c life e v e n t h o u g h the l a n g u a g e h e uses t o t a l k a b o u t
h i s job i s f u l l o f the j a r g o n o f a u t h e n t i c i t y ( i n t e g r i t y , h o n e s t y ,
t r u t h , self, i n s t i n c t ) . T h e l a n g u a g e o f p e r f o r m a n c e m a y b e too
easy t o d i s m i s s c l i n i c a l l y a s e v a s i v e , i n a w a y that i s b l i n d t o
the t h e a t r i c a l i t y o f the a n a l y t i c s i t u a t i o n . B u t l e r ' s u s e o f i d e n t i ­
f i c a t i o n p u t s the n o t i o n o f the p e r f o r m a t i v e b a c k i n t o the a n a ­
l y t i c f r a m e ; w h a t i s m o r e s u r p r i s i n g i s that she has b e e n able
to use m o u r n i n g as a w a y of n u a n c i n g the t h e a t r i c a l i t y that
is integral to our m a k i n g of identities, our m a k i n g ourselves
u p t h r o u g h loss. I t i s f o r t u n a t e that w r i t e r s are i n t e r e s t e d i n
p s y c h o a n a l y s i s because , u n l i k e a n a l y s t s , t h e y are free t o t h i n k
u p t h o u g h t s u n c o n s t r a i n e d b y the h y p n o t i c effect o f c l i n i c a l
practice. G o o d performers, like musicians or sportspeople or
a n a l y s t s , are often n o t that g o o d a t t a l k i n g a b o u t w h a t t h e y d o ,
p a r t l y b e c a u s e they are the ones w h o d o it.
A n d the d o i n g i t , o f c o u r s e , l i k e the l i v i n g o f a n y life, i n ­
v o l v e s a c k n o w l e d g i n g , i n o n e w a y o r a n o t h e r , that there are
o n l y t w o sexes. T h o u g h this, i n a n d o f itself, says n o t h i n g a b o u t
158 Melancholy Gender
the p o s s i b l e r e p e r t o i r e o f g e n d e r i d e n t i t i e s . T h e l o g i c o f B u t ­
l e r ' s a r g u m e n t , the k i n d o f i n s t r u c t i v e i n c o h e r e n c e she f i n d s
i n F r e u d , r e c u p e r a t e s a sense o f p o s s i b i l i t y for a n a l y t i c p r a c ­
tice. A n d y e t the v e r y l u c i d i t y o f B u t l e r ' s essay a l s o p r o m p t s
a n o t h e r k i n d o f r e f l e c t i o n . I t c a n s o m e t i m e s s e e m a s h a m e that
there are o n l y t w o sexes, n o t least b e c a u s e w e u s e t h i s differ­
ence a s a p a r a d i g m t o d o s o m u c h w o r k for u s (the differences
b e t w e e n the sexes are, o f c o u r s e , m o r e e x c i t i n g , o r m o r e ar­
t i c u l a b l e , t h a n the differences b e t w e e n a l i v e b o d y a n d a d e a d
b o d y ) . T h e r e i s a k i n d o f i n t e l l e c t u a l m e l a n c h o l y i n the loss o f a
t h i r d sex that n e v e r e x i s t e d a n d s o c a n n e v e r b e m o u r n e d ; t h i s
t h i r d , i r r a t i o n a l sex that w o u l d b r e a k the s p e l l (or the l o g i c ) o f
the t w o , a n d that i s o n e o f the c h i l d ' s f o r m a t i v e a n d r e p r e s s e d
fantasies a b o u t h i m s e l f o r herself. ( T h e r e i s a l i n k b e t w e e n t h i s
m a g i c a l s o l u t i o n t o the p r i m a l scene a n d fantasies o f s y n t h e s i s
a n d r e d e m p t i o n . ) W h a t F r e u d c a l l e d p r i m a r y p r o c e s s is, after
a l l , the e r a s i n g o f m u t u a l e x c l u s i o n , a l o g i c d e f y i n g l o g i c . T h i s
f o r m of generosity (and radicalism) is not always available, it
seems, t o o u r s e c o n d a r y ­ p r o c e s s selves.
S t a r t i n g w i t h t w o sexes, a s w e m u s t — d e s c r i b e d a s o p p o ­
sites or a l t e r n a t i v e s or c o m p l e m e n t s — l o c k s us i n t o a l o g i c , a
b i n a r y s y s t e m that o f t e n s e e ms r e m o t e f r o m l i v e d a n d s p o ­
k e n e x p e r i e n c e a n d i s c o m p l i c i t w i t h the o t h e r b i n a r y p a i r s —
inside/outside, p r i m a r y process/secondary process, sadism/
m a s o c h i s m , a n d s o o n — t h a t are s u c h a m i s l e a d i n g p a r t o f
psychoanalytic language. We s h o u l d be speaking of para­
doxes a n d spectrums, not contradictions a n d m u t u a l exclu­
s i o n . E v e r y c h i l d r i g h t l y w a n t s t o k n o w w h e t h e r there i s a
p o s i t i o n b e y o n d exclusion or difference or separateness—a
w o r l d i n w h i c h l e a v i n g a n d b e i n g left o u t d i s a p p e a r s , a n i d e a
taken up at a different level in U t o p i a n s o c i a l i s m , w h i c h a i ms at
a s o c i e t y w i t h o u t m a r g i n s a n d therefore w i t h o u t h u m i l i a t i o n .
Refused Identification 159
I n t h i n k i n g a b o u t g e n d e r , o r a n y o f the s o ­ c a l l e d i d e n t i t i e s ,
it seems to be e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t to f i n d a p i c t u r e or a s t o r y
that n o l o n g e r n e e d s the i d e a o f e x c l u s i o n . A n d B u t l e r ' s t h e o ­
r e t i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n s reflect this. T h e r e s e em s t o b e s o m e t h i n g
b e w i t c h i n g , c e r t a i n l y i n p s y c h o a n a l y t i c theory, a b o u t the i d e a
— a n d the e x p e r i e n c e — o f e v a c u a t i o n a n d o f the k i n d s o f d e f i ­
n i t i o n that the i d e a o f i n s i d e a n d o u t s i d e c a n g i v e u s ( i n r e l a ­
t i v e ly recent p s y c h o a n a l y t ic h i s t o r y Balint w a s a s k i n g w h e t h e r
the f i s h w a s i n the w a t e r o r the w a t e r i n the fish). O b v i o u s l y ,
the v o c a b u l a r y o f d i f f e r e n c e — t h e m e a n s o f e s t a b l i s h i n g those
intra­ and interpsychic boundaries and limits w h i c h psycho­
a n a l y s i s p r o m o t e s — i s , b y d e f i n i t i o n , far m o r e e x t e n s i v e t h a n
the l a n g u a g e o f s a m e n e s s (the s a m e , o f c o u r s e , i s n o t o n l y
the i d e n t i c a l ) . W e c a n t a l k a b o u t d i f f e r e n c e — i n a sense, that's
w h at talk is a b o u t — b u t sameness makes us mute, d u l l , or re­
petitive. A n d t o talk about h o m o s e x u a l i t y exclusively i n terms
o f s a m e n e s s i s t o c o m p o u n d the m u d d l e . S a m e n e s s , l i k e differ­
ence, is a ( m o t i v a t e d ) fantasy, n o t a n a t u r a l fact. T h e l a n g u a g e
o f b o u n d a r i e s that p s y c h o a n a l y s i s i s s o i n t e n t o n , a n d that
makes possible notions of identification and m o u r n i n g , p r o ­
m o t e s a specific set of a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t w h a t a p e r s o n is a n d
c a n be. It is a p i c t u r e of a p e r s o n i n f o r m e d by the l a n g u a g e s of
p u r i t y and property, what M a r y Douglas more exactly called
p u r i t y a n d danger. I t m a y b e m o r e u s e f u l t o t a l k a b o u t g r a ­
d a t i o n s a n d b l u r r i n g r a t h er t h a n c o n t o u r s a n d o u t l i n e s w h e n
w e p l o t o u r stories a b o u t g e n d e r . 6
Butler's language of per­
f o r m a n c e k e e p s d e f i n i t i o n o n the m o v e , w h i c h i s w h e r e i t i s
anyway. M o u r n i n g slows things d o w n .

Reply to A d a m Phillips's
Commentary on
"Melancholy Gender /
Refused Identification"
A d a m P h i l l i p s ' s w e l c o m e c o m m e n t a r y c o n f i r m s that there
i l m i g h t b e a d i a l o g u e , e v e n p e r h a p s a p s y c h o a n a l y t i c one,
between a c l i n i c al a n d a speculative perspective on questions
o f g e n d e r , m e l a n c h o l i a , a n d p e r f o r m a t i v i t y . C l e a r l y the p o s i ­
t i o n s here are n o t as " s t a k e d o u t " as is o f t e n the case, f o r
P h i l l i p s is himself b o t h a c l i n i c i a n a n d a speculative thinker,
a n d t h u s f u r t h e r s the d o u b l y d i m e n s i o n e d w r i t i n g i n a u g u r a t e d
b y F r e u d . I n d e e d , w h a t m i g h t a t first s e e m a s t r i c t o p p o s i ­
t i o n — t h e c l i n i c i a n , o n the o n e h a n d , a n d the c u l t u r a l t h e o r i s t
o f g e n d e r , o n the o t h e r — i s b r o k e n d o w n a n d r e c o n f i g u r e d i n
the c o u r s e o f t h i s e x c h a n g e , a n d i t i s a s m u c h the content o f
h i s c l a i m s a s the m o v e m e n t o f his o w n t h i n k i n g w h i c h m a k e s
m e w a n t t o r e c o n s i d e r the o p p o s i t i o n a l f r a m i n g a n d t h i n k i n g
w h i c h seems, l u c k i l y , n o t t o b e able t o s u s t a i n itself here. M y
r e p l y w i l l f o c u s first o n the q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r m e l a n c h o l y
is r i gh t ly u n d e r s t o o d to oppose or to temper notions of gen­
Refused Identification 161
der performativity, a n d second, on whether sexual difference
is an o p p o s i t i o n that is as stable as it m i g h t a p p e a r .
P h i l l i p s suggests that the c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f m e l a n c h o l i c i n ­
c o r p o r a t i o n t e m p e r s the v o l u n t a r i s m o f the p o s i t i o n a s s o c i a t e d
w i t h g e n d e r p e r f o r m a t i v i t y that has e m e r g e d i n the r e c e p t i o n
of Gender Trouble. On the o n e h a n d , there a p p e a r s to be a r e ­
p u d i a t e d a n d u n r e s o l v e d k n o t o f grief, a n d o n the other, a self­
c o n s c i o u s subject w h o , i n a S a r t r i a n v e i n , creates itself a n e w
a g a i n a n d a g a i n . B u t w h a t i f the t e r m s o f t h i s o p p o s i t i o n are
n o t q u i t e a s stable a s t h e y seem? C o n s i d e r that the i r r e s o l u ­
t i o n o f m e l a n c h o l i a i s t i e d t o the c h e c k p l a c e d u p o n a g g r e s s i o n
against the lost other, that the i d e a l i z a t i o n of the o t h e r that
a c c o m p a n i e s self­beratemen t i n m e l a n c h o l i a i s p r e c i s e l y the
r o u t i n g a g a i n s t the ego o f a g g r e s s i o n t o w a r d the o t h e r w h i c h
is prohibited f r o m being expressed directly. The p r o h i b i t i o n
w o r k s i n the s e r v i c e o f a n i d e a l i z a t i o n , b u t i t a l s o w o r k s i n the
s e r v i c e o f an i d e a l i z a t i o n o f grie f a s a p u r e o r s a c r e d p r a c t i c e .
The melancholic, b a r r e d f r o m aggressive expression, begins to
m i m e a n d i n c o r p o r a t e the lost one, r e f u s i n g the loss t h r o u g h
that i n c o r p o r a t i v e strategy, " c o n t i n u i n g the q u a r r e l " w i t h the
other, b u t n o w i n the f o r m o f a n i n t r a p s y c h i c self­beratement .
B u t t h i s p r o c e s s i s n o t o n l y i n t r a p s y c h i c , f o r s y m p t o m a t i c ex­
p r e s s i o n i s p r e c i s e l y the r e t u r n o f w h a t i s e x c l u d e d i n the
p r o c e s s o f i d e a l i z a t i o n . W h a t i s the p l a c e o f " a c t i n g o u t " i n
r e l a t i o n t o s y m p t o m a t i c e x p r e s s i o n , e s p e c i a l l y w h e n berate­
m e n t escapes the i n t r a p s y c h i c c i r c u i t t o e m e r g e i n d i s p l a c e d
a n d externalized forms? Is this k i n d of "acting out," w h i c h
often takes the f o r m o f a p a n t o m i m e , n o t the v e r y v e n u e f o r
a n a g g r e s s i o n that refuses t o r e m a i n l o c k e d u p i n the c i r c u i t o f
self­beratement, a n a g g r e s s i o n that b r e a k s o u t o f that c i r c u i t
o n l y t o h e a p itself, t h r o u g h d i s p l a c e m e n t , o n objects w h i c h
1Ô2 Melancholy Gender
s i g n i f y the r e s o n a n c e , the r e m a i n s , of the lost o t h e r ? In t h i s
sense, w h a t is p e r f o r m e d as a c o n s e q u e n c e of m e l a n c h o l i a is
n o t a v o l u n t a r y act, b u t a n a c t i n g o u t m o t i v a t e d — i n p a r t — b y
an u n o w n e d aggression.
H o w d o e s t h i s a c c o u n t w o r k i n the c o n t e x t o f g e n d e r m e l ­
ancholia? If I acquire my gender by r e p u d i a t i n g my love for
o n e o f m y o w n g e n d e r , t h e n that r e p u d i a t i o n l i v e s o n i n the
a c t i n g o u t o f m y g e n d e r a n d a s k s t o b e r e a d a s r i v a l r y , ag­
gression, i d e a l i z a t i o n , a n d m e l a n c h o l i a . If I am a w o m a n to
the extent that I h a v e n e v e r l o v e d o n e, b o t h a g g r e s s i o n a n d
s h a m e a r e l o c k e d i n t o that "never," that " n o w a y , " w h i c h s u g ­
gests that w h a t e v e r g e n d e r I a m i s t h r e a t e n e d f u n d a m e n t a l l y
b y the r e t u r n o f the l o v e r e n d e r e d u n t h i n k a b l e b y that d e f e n ­
s i v e "never." T h e r e f o r e w h a t I act, i n d e e d , w h a t I "choose,"
has s o m e t h i n g p r o f o u n d l y u n c h o s e n i n i t that r u n s t h r o u g h
the c o u r s e o f that " p e r f o r m a n c e . " H e r e the n o t i o n o f g e n d e r
p e r f o r m a t i v i t y c a l l s f o r p s y c h o a n a l y t i c r e t h i n k i n g t h r o u g h the
n o t i o n o f " a c t i n g o u t , " a s i t e m e r g e s i n the a r t i c u l a t i o n o f m e l ­
a n c h o l i a a n d i n the p a n t o m i m i c r e s p o n s e t o loss w h e r e b y the
lost o t h e r i s i n c o r p o r a t e d i n the f o r m a t i v e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s o f
the ego.
P h i l l i p s is right to w a r n psychoanalysi s against an idealiza­
t i o n o f m o u r n i n g itself, the s a c r a l i z a t i o n o f m o u r n i n g a s the
c o n s u m m a t e p s y c h o a n a l y t ic r i t u a l . It is as if p s y c h o a n a l y s i s
a s a p r a c t i c e r i s k s b e c o m i n g a f f li ct ed w i t h the v e r y s u f f e r i n g
i t seeks t o k n o w . T h e r e s o l u t i o n o f g r i e f b e c o m e s u n t h i n k a b l e
i n a s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h o u r v a r i o u s losses b e c o m e the c o n d i ­
t i o n for p s y c h o a n a l y s i s a s a p r a c t i c e o f i n t e r m i n a b l e m o u r n ­
i n g . B u t w h a t b r e a k s the h o l d o f g r i e f e x c e p t the c u l t i v a t i o n o f
the a g g r e s s i o n g r i e f h o l d s a t b a y against the m e a n s b y w h i c h
i t i s h e l d a t b a y ? P a r t o f w h a t s u s t a i n s a n d e x t e n d s the p e r i o d
o f m o u r n i n g i s p r e c i s e l y the p r o h i b i t i o n a g a i n s t e x p r e s s i n g
Refused Identification 163
a g g r e s s i o n t o w a r d w h a t i s l o s t — i n p a r t because that lost o n e
has a b a n d o n e d u s , a n d i n the s a c r a l i z a t i o n o f the object, w e
e x c l u d e the p o s s i b i l i t y o f r a g i n g a g a i n s t that a b a n d o n m e n t .
W h a t are the a f f i r m a t i v e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f m i m e t i c a c t i n g o u t
as it w o r k s , w i t h i n a p s y c h o a n a l y t i c f r a m e , to t h e a t r i c a l i z e that
a g g r e s s i o n w i t h o u t e t h i c a l c o n s e q u e n c e , a n d t o a r t i c u l a t e , for
the p u r p o s e s of s e l f ­ r e f l e c t i o n, t h r o u g h a set of "acts" the l o g i c
o f r e p u d i a t i o n b y w h i c h t h e y are m o t i v a t e d ? Isn't i t t h e n the
case that s u c h t h e a t r i c a l i t y m i g h t w o r k a s a p s y c h o a n a l y t i c
n o t i o n a n d n o t o n l y a s that w h i c h m u s t b e c o r r e c t e d o r t e m ­
p e r e d b y p s y c h o a n a l y s i s ? W o u l d n ' t that b e o n e w a y t o c o u n t e r
the i d e a l i z a t i o n o f m o u r n i n g (itself a s y m p t o m o f m o u r n i n g )
w h i c h c o m m i t s p s y c h o a n a l y s i s t o the s o b e r w o r k o f p e r m a ­
n e n t m o u r n i n g ? T o w h a t extent i s that effect o f " p e r m a n e n c e "
the r e s u l t o f the forc e o f r e p u d i a t i o n itself, a g g r e s s i o n i n the
service of a self­berating b i n d t y p i c a l of melancholia?
P h i l l i p s asks a n o t h e r set o f q u e s t i o n s , w h i c h s e e m a l s o t o
w o r k w i t h i n a c e r t a i n o p p o s i t i o n a l f r a m e w h i c h m a y b e less
o p p o s i t i o n a l t h a n a t first a p p e a r s . H e r e p h r a s e s m y q u e s t i o n
a p p r o p r i a t e l y w h e n h e q u e r i e s w h e t h e r there i s a n e c e s s a r y
r e a s o n for i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t o o p p o s e d e s i r e o r for d e s i r e t o b e
f u e l e d b y r e p u d i a t i o n . H e c l a i m s that w i t h i n the p s y c h o a n a ­
l y t i c f r a m e w o r k there are g o o d reasons , a n d that e v e r y p o s i ­
t i o n t a k e n u p a n d e v e r y d e s i r e d e t e r m i n e d engages a p s y c h i c
c o n f l i c t . T h i s f o l l o w s f r o m the fact that there are a l w a y s losses,
refusals, a n d sacrifices t o b e m a d e a l o n g the w a y t o h a v i n g the
ego o r c h a r a c t e r f o r m e d o r h a v i n g d e s i r e d i s p o s e d i n a n y d e ­
t e r m i n a t e d i r e c t i o n . T h i s s e ems r i g h t . B u t p e r h a p s there i s a
w a y o f d e v e l o p i n g a t y p o l o g y o f " r e f u s a l " a n d " e x c l u s i o n " that
might help us distinguish between what is rigorously repudi­
ate d a n d f o r e c l o s e d , a n d w h a t h a p p e n s t o b e less r i g i d l y o r
p e r m a n e n t l y d e c l i n e d . S u r e l y there is, say, a w a y o f a c c o u n t ­
164 Melancholy Gender
i n g for h o m o s e x u a l i t y w h i c h p r e s u p p o s e s that i t i s r o o t e d i n
an unconscious repudiation of heterosexuality a n d w h i c h , in
m a k i n g that p r e s u m p t i o n , d e t e r m i n e s r e p u d i a t e d h e t e r o s e x u ­
a l i t y t o b e the u n c o n s c i o u s " t r u t h " o f l i v e d h o m o s e x u a l i t y .
B u t i s s u c h a p r e s u m p t i o n a b o u t r e p u d i a t i o n n e c e s s a r y t o ac­
c o u n t for the trajector y o f l i v e d h o m o s e x u a l i t y ? C o u l d there
be equally compellin g accounts of unconscious motivations
that a c c o u n t for h o m o s e x u a l i t y w h i c h d o n o t a s s u m e the r e ­
p u d i a t e d status o f h e t e r o s e x u a l i t y i n its f o r m a t i o n ? A n d w h a t
o f those h o m o s e x u a l s w h o d o n o t r i g o r o u s l y o p p o s e h e t e r o ­
s e x u a l i t y either i n t r a p s y c h i c a l l y o r i n t e r p s y c h i c a l l y , b u t w h o
are n e v e r t h e l e s s r e l a t i v e l y d e t e r m i n e d i n the d i r e c t i o n a l i t y o f
t h e i r d e s i r e ? P e r h a p s the e c o n o m y o f d e s i r e a l w a y s w o r k s
t h r o u g h r e f u s a l a n d loss o f s o m e k i n d , b u t i t i s n o t a s a c o n s e ­
quence an economy structured by a logic of non­contradiction.
Isn't t h i s k i n d o f p o s t c o n t r a d i c t o r y p s y c h i c m o b i l i t y w h a t i s
desired psychoanalytically, a n d what F r e u d sought to c i r c u m ­
s c r i b e t h r o u g h reference to the b i s e x e d n e s s of the p s y c h e ? Is
t h i s m o b i l i t y n o t a s i g n that a r i g o r o u s l y i n s t i t u t e d l o g i c of r e ­
p u d i a t i o n i s n o t , after a l l , n e c e s s a r y for p s y c h i c s u r v i v a l ?
I t s e e ms t o m e that w e m u s t accept, a s P h i l l i p s r i g h t l y c o u n ­
sels u s t o d o , that there i s n o " p o s i t i o n b e y o n d e x c l u s i o n — o r
difference, o r separateness" a n d n o " w o r l d i n w h i c h l e a v i n g
a n d b e i n g left o u t d i s a p p e a r s . " B u t d o e s t h i s a c c e p t a n c e c o m ­
m i t us to the p o s i t i o n that "sex" is a stable c a t e g o r y or that
objects o f h o m o s e x u a l l o v e m u s t d i s a p p e a r t h r o u g h the force
o f r e p u d i a t i o n a n d p r o h i b i t i o n ? T o w h a t extent m u s t w e a l i g n
this m o r e g e n e r a l a n d i n e v i t a b l e s e p a r a t i o n a n d loss w i t h a
repudiation of homosexual love w h i c h makes gender melan­
c h o l i e s o f u s all? T h e " g i v e n n e s s " o f s e x u a l differenc e i s c l e a r l y
n o t to b e d e n i e d , a n d I agree that there is no " t h i r d s e x " to b e
f o u n d o r p u r s u e d . B u t w h y i s s e x u a l differenc e the p r i m a r y
Refused Identification 165
guarantor o f loss i n o u r p s y c h i c l i v e s ? A n d c a n a l l s e p a r a t i o n
a n d loss b e t r a c e d b a c k t o that s t r u c t u r i n g loss o f the o t h e r sex
b y w h i c h w e e m e r g e a s t h i s s e x e d b e i n g i n the w o r l d ?
P e r h a p s t h i s a s s u m p t i o n i s t r o u b l e d i f w e take s e r i o u s l y the
n o t i o n that sex i s a t o n c e g i v e n a n d a c c o m p l i s h e d — g i v e n a s
that w h i c h i s (always) yet t o b e a c c o m p l i s h e d — a n d that i t i s
accomplished in part throug h a heterosexualization of l i b i d i ­
n a l a i m s . T h i s a p p e a r e d t o b e F r e u d ' s a r g u m e n t i n the o p e n i n g
c h a p t e r s of Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. To w h a t ex­
tent does the h e t e r o s e x u a l f r a m e for d e s i r e a n d loss cast the
p r o b l e m o f s e p a r a t i o n a n d loss first a n d f o r e m o s t a s a p r o b ­
l e m o f s e x u a l difference ?
C o n s i d e r the f o l l o w i n g p r o b l e m a t i c , w h i c h i s n o t q u i t e i n
P h i l l i p s ' s l a n g u a g e , b u t t o u c h e s o n the f r a m e w o r k that h e es­
p o u s e s . D o e s it f o l l o w that if o n e d e s i r e s a w o m a n , o n e is
d e s i r i n g f r o m a m a s c u l i n e d i s p o s i t i o n , o r i s that d i s p o s i t i o n
r e t r o a c t i v e l y a t t r i b u t e d to the d e s i r i n g p o s i t i o n as a w a y of r e ­
t a i n i n g h e t e r o s e x u a l i t y a s the w a y o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g the s e p a ­
rateness o r a l t e r i t y that c o n d i t i o n s d e s i r e ? F o r i f that c l a i m
were true, every w o m a n w h o desires another w o m a n desires
her f r o m a m a s c u l i n e d i s p o s i t i o n a n d i s " h e t e r o s e x u a l " t o
that degree ; o d d l y , t h o u g h , i f the o t h e r w o m a n desires h e r i n
r e t u r n , the e c o n o m y b e c o m e s o n e o f m a l e h o m o s e x u a l i t y ^ ) .
D o e s t h i s t h e o r e t i c a l f r a m e n o t m i s u n d e r s t a n d the m o d e s o f
a l t e r i t y that p e r s i s t w i t h i n h o m o s e x u a l i t y , r e d u c i n g the h o m o ­
s e x u a l t o a p u r s u i t o f s a m e n e s s w h i c h is, i n fact, v e r y r a r e l y
the case (or is as often the case in h e t e r o s e x u a l p u r s u i t ) ?
Is this explanation t h r o u g h recourse to masculine disposi­
t i o n n o t a n i n s t a n c e o f the t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n o f " m a s c u ­
l i n i t y " o r o f the m a s c u l i n e "sex" w h i c h c o v e r s o v e r — o r f o r e ­
closes—the possibility o f another t e r m i n o l o g y w h i c h w o u l d
a v o w a r i c h p s y c h i c w o r l d o f a t t a c h m e n t a n d loss w h i c h i s
i66 Melancholy Gender

n o t f i n a l l y r e d u c i b l e t o a g i v e n n o t i o n o f s e x u a l difference ? I n ­
d e e d , t o w h a t extent are o u r n o t i o n s o f the m a s c u l i n e a n d the
f e m i n i n e f o r m e d t h r o u g h the los t a t t a c h m e n t s w h i c h t h e y are
s a i d t o o c c a s i o n ? C a n w e f i n a l l y e v e r r e s o l v e the q u e s t i o n o f
w h e t h e r s e x u a l differenc e is the a c c o m p l i s h m e n t of a m e l a n ­
c h o l i c h e t e r o s e x u a l i t y , s a c r a l i z e d a s t h e o r y , o r w h e t h e r i t i s the Psychic Inceptions
g i v e n c o n d i t i o n o f loss a n d a t t a c h m e n t i n a n y set o f h u m a n Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage
r e l a t i o n s ? It seems clear that in s o m e cases it is b o t h , b u t that
w e w o u l d los e a v i t a l t e r m i n o l o g y for u n d e r s t a n d i n g loss a n d
its f o r m a t i v e effects i f w e w e r e t o a s s u m e f r o m the outset that
w e o n l y a n d a l w a y s lose the o t h e r sex, for i t i s a s o f t e n the
case that w e are often i n the m e l a n c h o l i c b i n d o f h a v i n g lost
o u r o w n sex i n o r d e r , p a r a d o x i c a l l y , t o b e c o m e it. C o n f l i c t s b e t w e e n the ego a n d the i d e a l . . . u l t i m a t e l y reflect
the contrast b e t w e e n w h a t is real a n d w h a t is p s y c h i c a l ,
b e t w e e n the e x t e r n al w o r l d a n d the i n t e r n a l w o r l d .
— F r e u d , The Ego and the Id

I n " M o u r n i n g a n d M e l a n c h o l i a , " m e l a n c h o l y a t first a p p e a r s

to be an aberrant f o r m of m o u r n i n g , in w h i c h one denies
the loss o f a n object (an o t h e r o r a n i d e a l ) a n d refuses the task
o f grief, u n d e r s t o o d a s b r e a k i n g a t t a c h m e n t t o the o n e w h o i s
lost. T h i s lost object i s m a g i c a l l y r e t a i n e d a s p a r t o f o n e ' s p s y ­
c h i c life. T h e s o c i a l w o r l d a p p e a r s t o b e e c l i p s e d i n m e l a n c h o l y ,
a n d an internal w o r l d structured in ambivalence emerges as
the c o n s e q u e n c e . I t i s n o t i m m e d i a t e l y clear h o w m e l a n c h o l y
m i g h t b e r e a d , t h e n , i n t e r m s o f s o c i a l life, i n p a r t i c u l a r , i n
1

t e r m s o f the s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n o f p s y c h i c life. Yet the a c c o u n t o f

melancholy is an account of h o w psychic and social domains
are p r o d u c e d i n r e l a t i o n t o o n e another . A s s u c h , m e l a n c h o l y
offers p o t e n t i a l i n s i g h t i n t o h o w the b o u n d a r i e s o f the s o c i a l
are i n s t i t u t e d a n d m a i n t a i n e d , n o t o n l y a t the e x p e n s e o f p s y ­
i68 Psychic Inceptions
c h i c life, b u t t h r o u g h b i n d i n g p s y c h i c life i n t o f o r m s o f m e l a n ­
cholic ambivalence.
M e l a n c h o l i a t h u s r e t u r n s us to the f i g u r e of the " t u r n " as a
f o u n d i n g t r o p e i n the d i s c o u r s e o f the p s y c h e . I n H e g e l , t u r n ­
i n g b a c k u p o n oneself c o m e s t o s i g n i f y the ascetic a n d s k e p t i ­
c a l m o d e s o f r e f l e x i v i t y that m a r k the u n h a p p y c o n s c i o u s n e s s ;
i n N i e t z s c h e , t u r n i n g b a c k o n oneself suggests a r e t r a c t i n g o f
w h a t o n e h a s s a i d o r d o n e , o r a r e c o i l i n g i n s h a m e i n the face
o f w h a t o n e has done. I n A l t h u s s e r , the t u r n that the p e d e s ­
t r i a n m a k e s t o w a r d the v o i c e o f the l a w i s a t o n c e r e f l e x i v e
(the m o m e n t of b e c o m i n g a subject w h o s e s e l f ­ c o n s c i o u s n e s s
i s m e d i a t e d b y the l a w ) a n d s e l f ­ s u b j u g a t i n g.
A c c o r d i n g t o the n a r r a t i v e o f m e l a n c h o l i a that F r e u d p r o ­
v i d e s , the ego i s s a i d t o " t u r n b a c k u p o n i t s e l f " o n c e l o v e fails
t o f i n d its object a n d i n s t e a d takes itself a s n o t o n l y a n object o f
l o v e , b u t o f a g g r e s s i o n a n d hate a s w e l l . B u t w h a t i s t h i s "self"
that takes itself as its o w n object? Is the o n e w h o " t a k e s " itself
a n d the o n e w h o i s " t a k e n " the s a m e ? T h i s s e d u c t i o n o f reflex­
i v i t y s e e ms t o f o u n d e r l o g i c a l l y , s i n c e i t i s u n c l e a r that t h i s ego
c a n exist p r i o r t o its m e l a n c h o l i a . T h e " t u r n " that m a r k s the
m e l a n c h o l i c r e s p o n s e t o loss a p p e a r s t o i n i t i a t e the r e d o u b l i n g
o f the ego a s a n object; o n l y b y t u r n i n g b a c k o n itself d o e s the
ego a c q u i r e the status of a p e r c e p t u a l object. M o r e o v e r , the at­
t a c h m e n t t o the object that i s u n d e r s t o o d i n m e l a n c h o l i a t o b e
r e d i r e c t e d t o w a r d the ego u n d e r g o e s a f u n d a m e n t a l t r a n s f o r ­
m a t i o n i n the c o u r s e o f that r e d i r e c t i o n . N o t o n l y i s the attach­
m e n t s a i d t o g o f r o m l o v e t o hate a s i t m o v e s f r o m the object
to the ego, b u t the ego itself is p r o d u c e d as a psychic object; in
fact, the v e r y a r t i c u l a t i o n o f t h i s p s y c h i c space, s o m e t i m e s f i g ­
u r e d as " i n t e r n a l ," depend s on this m e l a n c h o l i c t u r n .
T h e t u r n f r o m the object t o the ego p r o d u c e s the ego, w h i c h
s u b s t i t u t e s for the object lost. T h i s p r o d u c t i o n is a t r o p o l o g i c a l
Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 169
g e n e r a t i o n a n d f o l l o w s f r o m the p s y c h i c c o m p u l s i o n t o s u b ­
s t i t u te f o r objects lost. T h u s , i n m e l a n c h o l i a n o t o n l y d o e s the
ego s u b s t i t u t e for the object, b u t t h i s act of s u b s t i t u t i o n insti­
tutes the ego as a n e c e s s a r y r e s p o n s e to or "defense" a g a i n s t
loss. To the extent that the ego is "the p r e c i p i t a t e of its a b a n ­
d o n e d object­cathexes," it is the c o n g e a l m e n t of a h i s t o r y of
loss, the s e d i m e n t a t i o n o f r e l a t i o n s o f s u b s t i t u t i o n o v e r t i m e ,
the r e s o l u t i o n o f a t r o p o l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n i n t o the o n t o l o g i c a l
effect of the self.
M o r e o v e r , t h i s s u b s t i t u t i o n o f ego for object d o e s n o t q u i t e
w o r k . T h e ego i s a p o o r s u b s t i t u t e for the lost object, a n d its
f a i l u r e t o s u b s t i t u t e in a w a y that satisfies (that is, t o o v e r c o m e
its status as a s u b s t i t u t i o n ) , l e a d s to the a m b i v a l e n c e that d i s ­
t i n g u i s h e s m e l a n c h o l i a . T h e t u r n f r o m the object t o the ego c a n
n e v e r q u i t e b e a c c o m p l i s h e d ; i t i n v o l v e s f i g u r i n g the ego o n
the m o d e l o f the object (as s u g g e s t e d i n the i n t r o d u c t o r y p a r a ­
g r a p h s o f " O n N a r c i s s i s m " ) ; i t a l so i n v o l v e s the u n c o n s c i o u s
b e l i e f that the ego m i g h t c o m p e n s a t e f o r the loss that is suf­
fered. T o the extent that the ego fails t o p r o v i d e s u c h c o m p e n ­
s a t i o n , i t e x p o s e s the f a u l t l i n e s i n its o w n t e n u o u s f o u n d a t i o n s .
A r e w e t o accept that the ego t u r n s f r o m the object t o the
ego, or that the ego t u r n s its p a s s i o n , as o n e m i g h t r e d i r e c t a
w h e e l , f r o m the object to itself 1 D o e s the s a m e ego t u r n its i n ­
v e s t m e n t f r o m the object t o itself, o r i s the ego f u n d a m e n t a l l y
a l t e r e d b y v i r t u e o f b e c o m i n g the object o f s u c h a t u r n ? W h a t
i s the status o f " i n v e s t m e n t " a n d " a t t a c h m e n t " ? D o t h e y i n d i ­
cate a f r e e ­ f l o a t i n g d e s i r e that r e m a i n s the s a m e r e g a r d l e s s of
the k i n d o f object t o w h i c h i t i s d i r e c t e d ? D o e s the t u r n n o t
o n l y p r o d u c e the ego b y w h i c h i t i s o s t e n s i b l y i n i t i a t e d b u t
a l s o s t r u c t u r e the a t t a c h m e n t i t i s s a i d t o r e d i r e c t ?
I s s u c h a t u r n o r r e d i r e c t i o n e v e n p o s s i b l e ? T h e loss f o r
w h i c h the t u r n seeks t o c o m p e n s a t e i s n o t o v e r c o m e , a n d the
 Psychic Inceptions
object i s n o t r e s t o r e d ; rather, the loss b e c o m e s the o p a q u e c o n ­
d i t i o n f o r the e m e r g e n c e of the ego, a loss that h a u n t s it f r o m
the start a s c o n s t i t u t i v e a n d a v o w a b l e . F r e u d r e m a r k s that i n
m o u r n i n g the object i s " d e c l a r e d " lost o r d e a d , b u t i n m e l a n ­
cholia, it follows, no such declaration is possible. M e l a n c h o ­ 2
l i a is p r e c i s e l y the effect of u n a v o w a b l e loss. A loss p r i o r to
s p e e c h a n d d e c l a r a t i o n , i t i s the l i m i t i n g c o n d i t i o n o f its p o s ­
s i b i l i t y : a w i t h d r a w a l o r r e t r a c t i o n f r o m s p e e c h that m a k e s
s p e e c h p o s s i b l e . I n this sense, m e l a n c h o l i a m a k e s m o u r n i n g
p o s s i b l e , a v i e w that F r e u d c a m e to a c c e p t in The Ego and the Id.
T h e i n a b i l i t y t o d e c l a r e s u c h a loss s i g n i f i es the " r e t r a c t i o n "
o r " a b s o r p t i o n " o f the loss by the ego. C l e a r l y , the ego d o e s n o t
l i t e r a l l y t a k e a n object i n s i d e itself, a s i f the ego w e r e a k i n d o f
shelter p r i o r t o its m e l a n c h o l y . T h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l d i s c o u r s e s
that p r e s u m e the t o p o g r a p h i c a l s t a b i l i t y o f a n " i n t e r n a l w o r l d "
a n d its v a r i o u s " p a r t s " m i s s the c r u c i a l p o i n t that m e l a n c h o l y
i s p r e c i s e l y w h a t i n t e r i o r i z e s the p s y c h e , that is, m a k e s i t p o s ­
s i b l e t o refer t o the p s y c h e t h r o u g h s u c h t o p o g r a p h i c a l t r o p e s .
T h e t u r n f r o m object t o ego i s the m o v e m e n t that m a k e s the
d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e m p o s s i b l e , that m a r k s the d i v i s i o n ,
the s e p a r a t i o n o r loss, that f o r m s the ego t o b e g i n w i t h . I n t h i s
sense, the t u r n f r o m the object to the ego fails s u c c e s s f u l l y to
s u b s t i t u t e the latter f o r the f o r m e r , b u t d o e s s u c c e e d i n m a r k ­
i n g a n d p e r p e t u a t i n g the p a r t i t i o n b e t w e e n the t w o . T h e t u r n
t h u s p r o d u c e s the d i v i d e b e t w e e n ego a n d object, the i n t e r n a l
a n d e x t e r n a l w o r l d s that i t a p p e a r s t o p r e s u m e .
If a p r e c o n s t i t u t e d ego w e r e able to m a k e s u c h a t u r n f r o m
an object to itself, it a p p e a r s that it w o u l d h a v e to t u r n f r o m a
p r e c o n s t i t u t e d e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y t o a n i n t e r n a l one. B u t s u c h a n
e x p l a n a t i o n c o u l d n o t a c c o u n t for the v e r y d i v i s i o n b e t w e e n
internal a n d external on w h i c h it depends. Indeed, it is unclear
Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 171
that s u c h a d i v i s i o n c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d a p a r t f r o m its c o n t e x t
in melancholia. In what follows, I hope to clarify h o w m e l ­
a n c h o l i a i n v o l v e s the p r o d u c t i o n o f a n i n t e r n a l w o r l d a s w e l l
as a t o p o g r a p h i c a l set of f i c t i o n s that s t r u c t u r e s the p s y c h e . If
the m e l a n c h o l i c t u r n i s the m e c h a n i s m b y w h i c h the d i s t i n c ­
tion between internal a n d external w o r l ds is instituted, then
m e l a n c h o l i a i n i t i a t e s a v a r i a b l e b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n the p s y c h i c
a n d the s o c i a l , a b o u n d a r y , I h o p e to s h o w , that d i s t r i b u t e s a n d
r e g u l a t e s the p s y c h i c s p h e r e i n r e l a t i o n t o p r e v a i l i n g n o r m s o f
social regulation.
That a love or desire or l i b i d i n a l attachment is under­
s t o o d to take itself as its object, a n d to do t h i s t h r o u g h the
f i g u r e o f the t u r n , suggests o n c e a g a i n the t r o p o l o g i c a l b e g i n ­
n i n g s o f subject f o r m a t i o n . F r e u d ' s essay p r e s u m e s that l o v e
o f the object c o m e s first, a n d o n l y u p o n the loss o f the o b ­
ject does m e l a n c h o l y e m e r g e . C o n s i d e r e d closely, h o w e v e r ,
F r e u d ' s essay m a k e s c l e a r that there c a n b e n o ego w i t h o u t
m e l a n c h o l i a , that the ego's loss i s c o n s t i t u t i v e . T h e n a r r a t i v e
g r a m m a r that m i g h t a c c o u n t for this r e l a t i o n s h i p i s n e c e s s a r i l y
c o n f o u n d e d f r o m the start.
M e l a n c h o l i a does n o t n a m e a p s y c h i c p r o c e s s that m i g h t b e
recounted t h r o u g h an adequate explanatory scheme. It tends
t o c o n f o u n d a n y e x p l a n a t i o n o f p s y c h i c p r o c e s s that w e m i g h t
b e i n c l i n e d t o offer. A n d the r e a s o n i t c o n f o u n d s a n y s u c h
effort is that it m a k e s c l e a r that o u r a b i l i t y to refer to the
p s y c h e t h r o u g h t r o p e s o f i n t e r n a l i t y are t h e m s e l v e s effects o f
a m e l a n c h o l i c c o n d i t i o n . M e l a n c h o l i a p r o d u c e s a set of s p a ­
t i a l i z i n g t r o p e s f o r p s y c h i c life, d o m i c i l e s o f p r e s e r v a t i o n a n d
s h e l t er a s w e l l a s arenas for s t r u g g l e a n d p e r s e c u t i o n . S u c h
tropes do not " e x p l a i n " m e l a n c h o l i a : they constitute some of
its t a b u l a r d i s c u r s i v e effects. In a m a n n e r that r e c a l l s N i e t z ­
3
172 Psychic Inceptions
sche's a c c o u n t of the f a b r i c a t i o n of c o n s c i e n c e , F r e u d offers a
v i e w of conscience as an agency a n d " i n s t i t u t i o n " p r o d u c e d
and maintained by melancholy.
A l t h o u g h F r e u d seeks t o d i s t i n g u i s h m o u r n i n g a n d m e l a n ­
c h o l i a in t h i s essay, he offers a p o r t r a i t of m e l a n c h o l i a that
c o n t i n u a l ly blurs into his v i e w of m o u r n i n g . He begins his de­
s c r i p t i o n , for i n s t a n c e , b y r e m a r k i n g that m o u r n i n g m a y b e a
" r e a c t i o n to the loss of a l o v e d p e r s o n , or to the loss of s o m e
a b s t r a c t i o n that has t a k e n the p l a c e o f o n e , s u c h a s one's c o u n ­
try, l i b e r t y , a n i d e a l , a n d s o o n " (243). A t first, m o u r n i n g seems
t o h a v e t w o f o r m s , o n e i n w h i c h s o m e o n e i s lost, s o m e o n e r e a l
i s lost, a n d a n o t h e r , i n w h i c h w h a t i s lost i n the s o m e o n e r e a l
i s i d e a l , the loss o f a n i d e a l . A s the essay p r o g r e s s e s , i t a p p e a r s
that the loss o f the i d e a l , "the loss o f a m o r e i d e a l k i n d " i s
correlated w i t h melancholia. A l r e a d y w i t h i n m o u r n i n g , h o w ­
ever, the loss m a y b e o f a n a b s t r a c t i o n o r a n i d e a l , o n e that
has t a k e n the p l a c e o f the o n e w h o i s lost. A f e w p a r a g r a p h s
later, h e notes that " m e l a n c h o l i a t o o m a y b e the r e a c t i o n t o
the loss of a l o v e d object " a n d that " w h e r e the e x c i t i n g causes
are d i f f e r e n t [ f r o m m o u r n i n g ] o n e c a n r e c o g n i z e that there i s
a loss of a m o r e i d e a l k i n d . " If o n e m o u r n s f o r the loss of
a n i d e a l , a n d that i d e a l m a y s u b s t i t u t e for a p e r s o n w h o has
b e e n lost, o r w h o s e l o v e i s b e l i e v e d t o b e lost, t h e n i t m a k e s
no sense to c l a i m that m e l a n c h o l i a is d i s t i n g u i s h e d as a loss
o f " a m o r e i d e a l k i n d . " A n d yet, a differen t k i n d o f d i s t i n c t i o n
b e t w e e n the t w o e m e r g e s w h e n F r e u d c l a i m s , w i t h reference
t o m o u r n i n g , that the i d e a l m a y h a v e s u b s t i t u t e d for the p e r ­
s o n a n d , w i t h reference t o m e l a n c h o l i a , that the m e l a n c h o l i c
" k n o w s w h o m h e has lost b u t n o t what h e h a s lost i n h i m . " I n
m e l a n c h o l i a , the i d e a l that the p e r s o n r e p r e s e n t s a p p e a r s t o b e
u n k n o w a b l e ; i n m o u r n i n g , the p e r s o n , o r the i d e a l that s u b s t i ­
Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 173
tutes for the p e r s o n a n d that, p r e s u m a b l y , r e n d e r s the p e r s o n
lost, i s u n k n o w a b l e .
F r e u d says m e l a n c h o l i a i s r e l a t e d t o " a n object­loss w i t h ­
d r a w n f r o m c o n s c i o u s n e s s , " b u t t o the extent that m o u r n i n g
is related to substitute ideals a n d abstractions such as "coun­
t r y a n d l i b e r t y , " i t t o o i s c l e a r l y c o n s t i t u t e d t h r o u g h the loss o f
the object, a d o u b l e loss that i n v o l v e s b o t h the s u b s t i t u t e i d e a l
a n d the p e r s o n . W h e r e a s i n m e l a n c h o l i a the i d e a l i s o c c l u d e d
a n d o n e does n o t k n o w w h a t o n e has lost " i n " the p e r s o n lost,
i n m o u r n i n g o n e r i s k s n o t k n o w i n g w h o m o n e has lost " i n "
l o s i n g the i d e a l .
L a t e r i n the essay F r e u d specifies the p s y c h i c s y s t e m s i n
w h i c h m e l a n c h o l y takes p l a c e a n d w h a t i t m e a n s for m e l a n ­
c h o l y t o b e r e l a t e d t o " a n object­loss w i t h d r a w n f r o m c o n ­
s c i o u s n e s s . " H e w r i t e s that "the u n c o n s c i o u s [ t h i n g ­ ] p r e s e n ­
t a t i o n [Dingvorstellung] of the object has b e e n a b a n d o n e d by
the l i b i d o " (256)." T h e " t h i n g ­ p r e s e n t a t i o n " of the object is
n o t the object itself, b u t a c a t h e c t e d trace, o n e that is, in r e ­
l a t i o n to the object, a l r e a d y a s u b s t i t u t e a n d a d e r i v a t i v e . In
m o u r n i n g , the traces o f the object, its i n n u m e r a b l e " l i n k s , " are
o v e r c o m e p i e c e m e a l o v e r t i m e . I n m e l a n c h o l i a , the p r e s e n c e
o f a m b i v a l e n c e i n r e l a t i o n t o the object m a k e s a n y s u c h p r o ­
g r e s s i v e d e ­ l i n k i n g o f l i b i d i n a l a t t a c h m e n t i m p o s s i b l e . Rather,
"countles s separate s t r u g g l e s are c a r r i e d o n o v e r the object, i n
w h i c h l o v e a n d hate c o n t e n d w i t h e a c h other ; the o n e seeks
t o d e t a c h the l i b i d o f r o m the object, the o t h e r t o m a i n t a i n this
p o s i t i o n o f the l i b i d o a g a i n s t the assault. " T h i s s t r a n g e battle­
f i e l d i s t o b e f o u n d , F r e u d m a i n t a i n s , i n "the r e g i o n o f the
m e m o r y ­ t r a c e s of things."
A m b i v a l e n c e m a y b e a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c feature o f e v e r y l o v e
a t t a c h m e n t that a p a r t i c u l a r ego m a k e s , o r i t m a y " p r o c e e d
174 Psychic Inceptions
p r e c i s e l y f r o m those e x p e r i e n c e s that i n v o l v e d the threat o f
l o s i n g the object " (256). T h i s last r e m a r k suggests, h o w e v e r ,
that ambivalence may well be a result of loss, that the loss of an
object p r e c i p i t a t e s a n a m b i v a l e n c e t o w a r d i t a s p a r t o f the
p r o c e s s of l e t t i n g it go. If so, t h e n m e l a n c h o l i a , d e n n e d as the
5
a m b i v a l e n t r e a c t i o n t o loss, m a y b e c o e x t e n s i v e w i t h loss, s o
that m o u r n i n g i s s u b s u m e d i n m e l a n c h o l i a . F r e u d ' s s t a t e m e n t
that m e l a n c h o l i a arises f r o m " a n object­loss w i t h d r a w n f r o m
consciousness" is thus specified in relation to ambivalence:
" e v e r y t h i n g t o d o w i t h these s t r u g g l e s d u e t o a m b i v a l e n c e r e ­
m a i n s w i t h d r a w n f r o m c o n s c i o u s n e s s , u n t i l the o u t c o m e c h a r ­
a c t e r i s t i c o f m e l a n c h o l i a h a s set i n . " T h e a m b i v a l e n c e r e m a i n s
entzogen—withdrawn—only to take on a s p e c i f i c f o r m in m e l ­
a n c h o l i a , o n e i n w h i c h differen t aspects o f the p s y c h e a r e a c ­
c o r d e d o p p o s i n g p o s i t i o n s w i t h i n the r e l a t i o n o f a m b i v a l e n c e .
F r e u d offers t h i s p s y c h i c a r t i c u l a t i o n o f a m b i v a l e n c e a s " a c o n ­
flict b e t w e e n o n e p a r t o f the ego a n d the c r i t i c a l a g e n c y " a s a n
a c c o u n t o f the f o r m a t i o n o f the s u p e r ­ e g o i n its c r i t i c a l r e l a t i o n
t o the ego. A m b i v a l e n c e t h u s p r e c e d e s the p s y c h i c t o p o g r a ­
p h y o f s u p e r ­ e g o / e g o ; its m e l a n c h o l i c a r t i c u l a t i o n i s offered
a s the c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y o f that v e r y t o p o g r a p h y . T h u s ,
i t w o u l d m a k e n o sense t o seek r e c o u r s e t o s u c h a t o p o g r a p h y
to explain m e l a n c h o l i a , if the a m b i v a l e n c e that is s a i d to d i s ­
tinguish melancholia is what then becomes articulated—after
a p e r i o d o f b e i n g w i t h d r a w n f r o m c o n s c i o u s n e s s — a s ego a n d
super­ego. T h e internal topography by w h i c h me la n cho li a is
p a r t i a l l y e x p l a i n e d i s itself the effect o f that m e l a n c h o l i a . W a l ­
ter B e n j a m i n r e m a r k s that m e l a n c h o l i a s p a t i a l i z e s , a n d that
its effort t o r e v e r s e o r s u s p e n d t i m e p r o d u c e s " l a n d s c a p e s " a s
its s i g n a t u r e effect. O n e m i g h t p r o f i t a b l y r e a d the F r e u d i a n
6
t o p o g r a p h y that m e l a n c h o l y o c c a s i o n s as p r e c i s e l y s u c h a s p a ­
t i a l i z e d l a n d s c a p e o f the m i n d .
Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 175
T h e a m b i v a l e n c e that i s w i t h d r a w n f r o m c o n s c i o u s n e s s r e ­
m a i n s w i t h d r a w n " n o t u n t i l the o u t c o m e characteristic o f
m e l a n c h o l y h a s set i n " (257; " b i s n i c h t d e r f u r d i e M e l a n c h o l i e
c h a r a k t e r i s t i s c h e A u s g a n g e i n g e t r e t e n i s t " [211]). W h a t i s t h i s
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c " e x i t " o r " p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e " that m e l a n c h o l y
takes? F r e u d w r i t e s , " t h i s , a s w e k n o w , consists i n the threat­
e n e d l i b i d i n a l cathexi s a t l e n g t h a b a n d o n i n g the object, o n l y ,
h o w e v e r , t o d r a w b a c k t o the p l a c e i n the ego f r o m w h i c h i t
has p r o c e e d e d . " A m o r e p r e c i s e t r a n s l a t i o n w o u l d c l a r i f y that
m e l a n c h o l i a i n v o l v e s a n a t t e m p t t o s u b s t i t u t e the ego f o r that
cathexis, o n e that i n v o l v e s a r e t u r n of the cathexis to its p o i n t
o f o r i g i n : the t h r e a t e n e d cathexi s i s a b a n d o n e d , b u t o n l y t o
pull itself back onto the place of the ego ("aber n u r , um s i c h a u f
d i e S t e l l e des Ichs . . . z u r ù c k z u z i e h e n " ) , a p l a c e f r o m w h i c h
the t h r e a t e n e d a t t a c h m e n t has d e p a r t e d ( " v o n d e r sie a u s g e ­
gangen war").
I n m e l a n c h o l i a , cathexi s i s u n d e r s t o o d t o engage reflex­
i v e l y w i t h itself ( " u m s i c h a u f d i e Stelle des Ichs . . . z u r ù c k ­
z u z i e h e n " ) a n d , s p e c i f i c a l l y , t o d r a w o r p u l l itself i n a n d b a c k
t o the p l a c e o f its o w n d e p a r t u r e o r g o i n g ­ o u t . T h i s " p l a c e "
of the ego is n o t q u i t e the s a m e as the ego itself, b u t s e e ms
to r e p r e s e n t a p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e , an Ausgangspunkt, for the
l i b i d o , a s w e l l a s the m e l a n c h o l i c site o f its r e t u r n . I n t h i s r e ­
t u r n of l i b i d o to its p l a c e of d e p a r t u r e , a p l a c e of the ego, a
m e l a n c h o l i c c i r c u m s c r i p t i o n o f l i b i d o takes p l a c e .
T h i s r e t u r n is described as a w i t h d r a w a l , a d r a w i n g or p u l l ­
i n g b a c k (zuriickziehung), b u t also, in the n e x t l i n e , as a flight :
" D i e L i e b e hat s i c h s o d u r c h i h r e F l u c h t i n s I c h d e r A u f h e b u n g
e n t z o g e n " (210). A l t h o u g h t h i s l i n e i s t r a n s l a t e d i n f a m o u s l y
7
a s " S o b y t a k i n g f l i g h t i n t o the ego l o v e escapes e x t i n c t i o n "
(257), the sense o f e s c a p i n g e x t i n c t i o n i s n o t p r e c i s e l y r i g h t .
T h e w o r d entzogen, for i n s t a n c e , w a s p r e v i o u s l y t r a n s l a t e d a s
176 Psychic Inceptions
" w i t h d r a w n " a n d Aufhebung c a r r i e s a n o t o r i o u s l y a m b i g u o u s
set o f m e a n i n g s f r o m its c i r c u l a t i o n w i t h i n H e g e l i a n d i s c o u r s e :
cancellation but not quite extinction; suspension, preserva­
t i o n , a n d o v e r c o m i n g . T h r o u g h its f l i g h t i n t o the ego, o r i n the
ego, l o v e has w i t h d r a w n o r t a k e n a w a y its o w n o v e r c o m i n g ,
w i t h d r a w n a transformation, rendered it psychic. H e r e it is
not a question of love "escaping an extinction" mandated f r o m
e l s e w h e r e ; rather, l o v e i t s elf w i t h d r a w s o r takes a w a y the d e ­
s t r u c t i o n o f the object, takes i t o n a s its o w n d e s t r u c t i v e n e s s .
I n s t e a d o f b r e a k i n g w i t h the object, o r t r a n s f o r m i n g the object
t h r o u g h m o u r n i n g , t h i s Aufhebung—this a c t i v e , n e g a t i n g , a n d
t r a n s f o r m a t i v e m o v e m e n t — i s t a k e n i n t o the ego. T h e " f l i g h t "
of l o v e i n t o the ego is t h i s effort to s q u i r r e l the Aufhebung a w a y
inside, to w i t h d r a w it f r o m external reality, a n d to institute an
i n t e r n a l t o p o g r a p h y i n w h i c h the a m b i v a l e n c e m i g h t f i n d a n
altered articulation. The w i t h d r a w a l of ambivalence thus p r o ­
d u c e s the p o s s i b i l i t y of a p s y c h i c t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , i n d e e d , a
fabulation of psychic topography.
T h i s f l i g h t a n d w i t h d r a w a l i s n a m e d , i n the n e x t l i n e , a s a
r e g r e s s i o n , o n e that m a k e s p o s s i b l e the c o n s c i o u s r e p r e s e n t a ­
t i o n o f m e l a n c h o l i a : " A f t e r t h i s r e g r e s s i o n o f the l i b i d o the p r o ­
cess c a n b e c o m e c o n s c i o u s , and it is represented to consciousness
as a conflict between one part of the ego and the critical agency [ u n d
r e p r a s e n t i e r t s i c h d e m B e w u s s t s e i n als e i n K o n f l i k t z w i s c h e n
e i n e m T e i l des Ichs a n d d e r k r i t i s c h e n I n s t a n z ; m y e m p h a s i s ] . "
W h e r e a s o n e m i g h t e x p e c t that the r e g r e s s i o n o f the l i b i d o ,
its b e i n g w i t h d r a w n i n t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s (as w e l l a s the w i t h ­
d r a w a l o f a m b i v a l e n c e i n t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s ) i s the f a i l u r e o f its
a r t i c u l a t i o n , the o p p o s i t e a p p e a r s t o b e the case. O n l y u p o n
the c o n d i t i o n o f s u c h a w i t h d r a w a l d o e s m e l a n c h o l i a t a k e
a conscious f o r m . The w i t h d r a w a l or regression of libido is
Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 177
r e p r e s e n t e d to c o n s c i o u s n e s s as a c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n p a r t s of the
ego; i n d e e d , the ego c o m e s t o b e r e p r e s e n t e d i n p a r t s o n l y o n
the c o n d i t i o n that s u c h a w i t h d r a w a l o r r e g r e s s i o n has t a k e n
p l a c e . I f m e l a n c h o l i a c o n s t i t u t e s the w i t h d r a w a l o r r e g r e s s i o n
o f a m b i v a l e n c e , a n d i f that a m b i v a l e n c e b e c o m e s c o n s c i o u s
t h r o u g h b e i n g r e p r e s e n t e d a s o p p o s i t i o n a l p a r t s o f the ego,
a n d that r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s m a d e p o s s i b l e o n the c o n d i t i o n o f
that w i t h d r a w a l , t h e n i t f o l l o w s that t h i s p r é f i g u r a t i o n o f the
t o p o g r a p h i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n ego a n d s u p e r ­ e g o i s i t s e lf
d e p e n d e n t u p o n m e l a n c h o l i a . M e l a n c h o l i a p r o d u c e s the p o s ­
s i b i l i t y for the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of p s y c h i c life. T h e Aufhebung
that i s w i t h d r a w n — o n e that m i g h t h a v e m e a n t the o v e r c o m i n g
of loss t h r o u g h a t t a c h m e n t to a s u b s t i t u t e o b j e c t — i s an Auf­
hebung that r e e m e r g e s w i t h i n a n d as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , a c a n c e l ­
l a t i o n a n d p r e s e r v a t i o n of the object, a set of " w o r d ­ t r a c e s " (to
u s e F r e u d ' s t e r m ) that b e c o m e s the p s y c h o a n a l y t i c r e p r e s e n ­
t a t i o n o f p s y c h i c life.
T o w h a t extent d o e s m e l a n c h o l i a r e p r e s e n t a n o t h e r w i s e
unrepresentable ambivalence by fabulating psychic topogra­
p h i e s ? R e p r e s e n t a t i o n i s itself i m p l i c a t e d i n m e l a n c h o l i a , that
is, the effort to r e ­ p r e s e n t that is at an i n f i n i t e d i s t a n c e f r o m its
object. M o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y , m e l a n c h o l i a p r o v i d e s the c o n d i t i o n
o f p o s s i b i l i t y for the a r t i c u l a t i o n o f p s y c h i c t o p o g r a p h i e s , o f
the ego i n its c o n s t i t u t i v e r e l a t i o n t o the s u p e r ­ e g o a n d t h u s o f
the ego itself. A l t h o u g h the ego i s s a i d t o b e the p o i n t o f d e p a r ­
t u r e for a l i b i d o that i s s u b s e q u e n t l y w i t h d r a w n i n t o the ego,
i t n o w a p p e a r s that o n l y u p o n s u c h a w i t h d r a w a l c a n the ego
e m e r g e a s a n object for c o n s c i o u s n e s s , s o m e t h i n g that m i g h t
be r e p r e s e n t e d at a l l , w h e t h e r as a p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e or a site
o f r e t u r n . I n d e e d , the p h r a s e " w i t h d r a w n i n t o the e g o " i s the
r e t r o a c t i v e p r o d u c t o f the m e l a n c h o l i c p r o c e s s i t p u r p o r t s t o
178 Psychic Inceptions
describe. T h u s it does not, strictly speaking, describe a pre­
constituted psychic process but emerges in a belated fashion
as a representation c o n d i t i o n e d by m e l a n c h o l ic w i t h d r a w a l .
T h i s last p o i n t raises the q u e s t i o n o f the status o f the p s y ­
c h i c t o p o g r a p h i e s that p r e d o m i n a t e i n this a n d o t h e r essays
b y F r e u d . A l t h o u g h o n e m i g h t e x p e c t that s u c h t o p o g r a p h i e s
are to be r e a d as the e x p l a n a t o r y a p p a r a t u s of p s y c h o a n a l y ­
sis a n d n o t, a s i t w e r e , o n e o f its t e x t u a l i z e d s y m p t o m s , F r e u d
suggests that the v e r y d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n ego a n d s u p e r ­ e g o
c a n b e t r a c e d t o a n a m b i v a l e n c e that i s first w i t h d r a w n f r o m
consciousness a n d then reemerges as a p s y c h i c topography
i n w h i c h " c r i t i c a l a g e n c y " i s s p l i t off f r o m the ego. S i m i l a r l y ,
i n h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f the self­beratements o f the s u p e r ­ e g o , h e
refers t e l l i n g l y to c o n s c i e n c e as "one of the m a j o r i n s t i t u t i o n s
of the ego."
C l e a r l y p l a y i n g on a metaphor of a socially constructed d o ­
m a i n o f p o w e r , F r e u d ' s reference t o c o n s c i e n c e a s " a m o n g the
m a j o r i n s t i t u t i o n s of the ego [Ichinstitutionen]" (247) suggests
n o t o n l y that c o n s c i e n c e i s i n s t i t u t e d , p r o d u c e d , a n d m a i n ­
t a i n e d w i t h i n a l a r g e r p o l i t y a n d its o r g a n i z a t i o n , b u t that the
ego a n d its v a r i o u s p a r t s are accessible t h r o u g h a m e t a p h o r i c a l
l a n g u a g e that attributes a s o c i a l c o n t e n t a n d s t r u c t u r e to these
p r e s u m a b l y psychic phenomena. A l t h o u g h F r e u d begins his
essay b y i n s i s t i n g o n the i n d i s p u t a b l y " p s y c h o g e n i c n a t u r e "
(243) o f the m e l a n c h o l i a a n d m o u r n i n g u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n
i n the essay, h e also p r o v i d e s s o c i a l m e t a p h o r s that n o t o n l y
g o v e r n the t o p o g r a p h i c d e s c r i p t i o n s o f m e l a n c h o l y ' s o p e r a ­
tion, but i m p l i c i t l y u n d o his o w n c l a i m to p r o v i d e a specifi­
c a l l y p s y c h o g e n i c e x p l a n a t i o n o f these p s y c h i c states. F r e u d
d e s c r i b e s "one p a r t of the ego [that] sets itself o v e r against the
other, j u d g e s it c r i t i c a l l y , a n d , as it w e r e , takes it as its object."
A c r i t i c a l a g e n c y is s a i d to be " s p l i t off" (abgespalten) f r o m the
Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 179
ego, s u g g e s t i n g that i n s o m e p r i o r state, t h i s c r i t i c a l f a c u l t y
w a s n o t yet separate. H o w , p r e c i s e l y , this s p l i t t i n g o f the ego
i n t o p a r t s o c c u r s is, i t seems, p a r t o f the strange, f a b u l a t i n g
scene i n i t i a t e d b y m e l a n c h o l y , the w i t h d r a w a l o f cathexi s f r o m
the object to the ego, a n d the s u b s e q u e n t e m e r g e n c e of a r e p ­
r e s e n t a t i o n o f the p s y c h e i n t e r m s o f s p l i t s a n d parts, a r t i c u l a t ­
i n g ambivalence a n d internal antagonism. Is this t o p o g r a p h y
n o t s y m p t o m a t i c o f w h a t i t seeks t o e x p l a i n ? H o w else d o w e
e x p l a i n this i n t e r i o r i z a t i o n o f the p s y c h e a n d its e x p r e s s i o n
h e r e as a scene of p a r t i t i o n a n d c o n f r o n t a t i o n ? Is there an i m ­
p l i c i t s o c i a l text i n this t o p o g r a p h i c a l r e n d i t i o n o f p s y c h i c life,
o n e that i n s t a l l s a n t a g o n i s m (the threat of j u d g m e n t ) as the
s t r u c t u r a l n e c e s s i t y o f the t o p o g r a p h i c a l m o d e l , o n e that f o l ­
lows f r o m melancholia a n d f r o m a w i t h d r a w a l of attachment?
M e l a n c h o l i a d e s c r i b e s a p r o c e s s b y w h i c h a n o r i g i n a l l y ex­
t e r n a l object i s lost, o r a n i d e a l i s lost, a n d the r e f u s a l t o b r e a k
the a t t a c h m e n t t o s u c h a n object o r i d e a l l e a d s t o the w i t h ­
d r a w a l of the object i n t o the ego, the r e p l a c e m e n t of the object
b y the ego, a n d the s e t t i n g u p o f a n i n n e r w o r l d i n w h i c h a
c r i t i c a l a g e n c y i s s p l i t off f r o m the ego a n d p r o c e e d s t o take
the ego as its object. In a w e l l ­ k n o w n passage, F r e u d m a k e s
c l e ar that the a c c u s a t i o n s that the c r i t i c a l a g e n c y is s a i d to l e v e l
against the ego t u r n o u t t o b e v e r y m u c h l i k e the a c c u s a t i o n s
that the ego w o u l d h a v e l e v e l e d a g a i n s t the object o r the i d e a l .
T h u s , the ego a b s o r b s b o t h l o v e a n d rage a g a i n s t the object.
M e l a n c h o l i a appears to be a process of internalization, a n d one
m i g h t w e l l r e a d its effects as a p s y c h i c state that has e f f e c t i v e ly
s u b s t i t u t e d itself for the w o r l d i n w h i c h i t d w e l l s . T h e effect o f
m e l a n c h o l i a , t h e n , a p p e a r s t o b e the loss o f the s o c i a l w o r l d ,
the s u b s t i t u t i o n o f p s y c h i c p a r t s a n d a n t a g o n i s m s f o r e x t e r n a l
r e l a t i o n s a m o n g s o c i a l actors: " a n object­loss w a s t r a n s f o r m e d
i n t o a n ego­loss a n d the c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n the ego a n d the l o v e d
180 Psychic Inceptions
p e r s o n i n t o a c l e a v a ge b e t w e e n the c r i t i c a l a c t i v i t y o f the ego
a n d the ego a s a l t e r e d b y i d e n t i f i c a t i o n " (249).
T h e object i s lost, a n d the ego i s s a i d t o w i t h d r a w the o b ­
ject i n t o itself. T h e "object" t h u s w i t h d r a w n i s a l r e a d y m a g i c a l ,
a trace of s o m e k i n d , a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the object, b u t n o t
the object itself, w h i c h is, after a l l , gone. T h e ego i n t o w h i c h
t h i s r e m n a n t is " b r o u g h t " is n o t e x a c t l y a s h e l t er f o r lost p a r t ­
objects, a l t h o u g h i t i s s o m e t i m e s d e s c r i b e d that w a y . T h e ego
i s " a l t e r e d b y i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , " that is, a l t e r e d b y v i r t u e o f ab­
s o r b i n g the object o r p u l l i n g b a c k its o w n cathexi s o n t o itself.
T h e " p r i c e " o f s u c h a n i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , h o w e v e r , i s that the ego
s p l i t s i n t o the c r i t i c a l a g e n c y a n d the ego a s object o f c r i t i c i s m
a n d j u d g m e n t . T h u s the r e l a t i o n t o the object r e a p p e a r s " i n "
the ego, n o t m e r e l y as a m e n t a l even t or s i n g u l a r r e p r e s e n ­
t a t i o n , b u t as a scene of s e l f ­ b e r a t e m e n t that r e c o n f i g u r e s the
t o p o g r a p h y o f the ego, a f a n t a s y o f i n t e r n a l p a r t i t i o n a n d j u d g ­
m e n t that c o m e s t o s t r u c t u r e the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f p s y c h i c life
tout court. T h e ego n o w s t a n d s for the object, a n d the c r i t i c a l
a g e n c y c o m e s to r e p r e s e n t the ego's d i s o w n e d rage, r e i f i e d as
a p s y c h i c a g e n c y separate f r o m the ego itself. T h a t rage, a n d
the a t t a c h m e n t i t i m p l i e s , are " t u r n e d b a c k u p o n " the ego, b u t
from where?
Yet c e r t a i n s o c i a l l y i d e n t i f i a b l e features o f the m e l a n c h o l i c ,
i n c l u d i n g " c o m m u n i c a t i v e n e s s , " suggest that m e l a n c h o l i a i s
n o t a n a s o c i a l p s y c h i c state. I n fact, m e l a n c h o l i a i s p r o d u c e d
t o the extent that the s o c i a l w o r l d i s e c l i p s e d b y the p s y c h i c ,
that a c e r t a i n transfer of a t t a c h m e n t f r o m objects to ego takes
p l a c e , n o t w i t h o u t a c o n t a m i n a t i o n o f the p s y c h i c s p h e r e b y
the s o c i a l s p h e r e that i s a b a n d o n e d . F r e u d suggests a s m u c h
w h e n h e e x p l a i n s that the lost o t h e r i s n o t s i m p l y b r o u g h t i n ­
s i d e the ego, a s o n e m i g h t shelter a w a y w a r d d o g . T h e act o f
i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n (to be c o n s t r u e d as a f a n t a s y r a t h e r t h a n as a
Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 181
p r o c e s s ) t r a n s f o r m s the object (one m i g h t e v e n u s e the t e r m
8
Aufhebung for s u c h a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n ) ; the o t h e r is t a k e n in
a n d t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a n ego, b u t a n ego t o b e r e v i l e d , t h e r e b y
b o t h p r o d u c i n g a n d s t r e n g t h e n i n g the c r i t i c a l " a g e n c y . . .
c o m m o n l y called conscience." A f o r m of m o r a l reflexivity is
p r o d u c e d i n w h i c h the ego s p l i t s itself t o f u r n i s h a n i n t e r ­
n a l p e r s p e c t i v e b y w h i c h t o j u d g e itself. T h i s r e f l e x i v e r e l a ­
t i o n b y w h i c h the ego b e c o m e s a n object f o r itself t u r n s o u t
to be a w i t h d r a w n a n d t r a n s f o r m e d (entzogen a n d aufgehoben)
r e l a t i o n t o the lost other ; i n t h i s sense, r e f l e x i v i t y a p p e a r s t o
d e p e n d u p o n the p r i o r o p e r a t i o n o f m e l a n c h o l i a . T h e ego i s
a l s o f i g u r e d as h a v i n g a voice t h r o u g h this p r o c e s s , a n d it a p ­
p e a r s i m p e r a t i v e w i t h i n m e l a n c h o l i a that s e l f ­ b e r a t e m e n t b e
v o i c e d , n o t m e r e l y t o oneself, b u t i n the p r e s e n c e o f others.
T h e s e l f ­ r e p r o a c h e s o f the ego are n o t s i m p l y the i m i t a t i o n
o f r e p r o a c h e s o n c e l e v e l e d a g a i n s t the ego f r o m the o n e lost,
a s i s c o m m o n l y a s s u m e d ; rather, t h e y are r e p r o a c h e s l e v e l e d
a g a i n s t the o t h e r that n o w t u r n b a c k u p o n the ego.
Before we consider m o r e closely what it means for some­
t h i n g t o " t u r n b a c k u p o n itself " i n t h i s w a y , i t s e e ms i m p o r ­
tant t o n o t e that the p s y c h i c f o r m o f r e f l e x i v i t y m e l a n c h o l i a
elaborates c a r r i e s the trace of the o t h e r w i t h i n it as a d i s s i m u ­
l a t e d s o c i a l i t y , a n d that the p e r f o r m a n c e o f m e l a n c h o l i a a s the
s h a m e l e s s v o i c i n g o f self­beratemen t i n f r o n t o f o t h e r s effects
a d e t o u r that rejoins m e l a n c h o l i a t o its lost o r w i t h d r a w n s o c i ­
ality. I n m e l a n c h o l i a , n o t o n l y i s the loss o f a n o t h e r o r a n i d e a l
lost t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s , b u t the s o c i a l w o r l d i n w h i c h s u c h a loss
b e c a m e p o s s i b l e i s a l s o lost. T h e m e l a n c h o l i c d o e s n o t m e r e l y
w i t h d r a w the lost object f r o m c o n s c i o u s n e s s , b u t w i t h d r a w s
i n t o the p s y c h e a c o n f i g u r a t i o n o f the s o c i a l w o r l d a s w e l l . T h e
ego thus b e c o m e s a " p o l i t y " a n d c o n s c i e n c e o n e of its " m a j o r
i n s t i t u t i o n s , " p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e p s y c h i c life w i t h d r a w s a s o c i a l
182 Psychic Inceptions
w o r l d i n t o itself i n a n effort t o a n n u l the losses that w o r l d d e ­
m a n d s . W i t h i n m e l a n c h o l i a , the p s y c h e b e c o m e s the t o p o s i n
w h i c h there i s n o loss a n d , i n d e e d , n o n e g a t i o n . M e l a n c h o l i a
refuses t o a c k n o w l e d g e loss, a n d i n t h i s sense " p r e s e r v e s " its
lost objects as p s y c h i c effects.
F r e u d r e m a r k s the s o c i a l c o n d u c t o f the m e l a n c h o l i c , e m ­
p h a s i z i n g h i s o r her s h a m e l e s s s e l f ­ e x p o s u r e : "the m e l a n c h o l i c
does n o t b e h a v e i n q u i t e the sam e w a y a s a p e r s o n w h o i s
crushed by remorse a n d self­reproach in a n o r m a l fashion.
F e e l i n g s o f s h a m e are l a c k i n g . . . o r . . . are n o t p r o m i n e n t . . . .
O n e m i g h t e m p h a s i z e the p r e s e n c e i n h i m o f a n a l m o s t o p p o ­
site t r a i t o f i n s i s t e n t c o m m u n i c a t i v e n e s s w h i c h f i n d s satisfac­
t i o n i n s e l f ­ e x p o s u r e " (247). T h e m e l a n c h o l i c s u s t a i n s a n i n ­
d i r e c t a n d d e f l e c t e d r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the s o c i a l i t y f r o m w h i c h
he or she has w i t h d r a w n . O n e would have d e n o u n c e d the lost
other if one c o u l d — f o r departing, if for no other reason. F u l ­
f i l l i n g a w i s h w h o s e f o r m , the past s u b j u n c t i v e , p r e c l u d e s
a n y s u c h f u l f i l l m e n t , the m e l a n c h o l i c seeks n o t o n l y t o r e ­
verse t i m e , r e i n s t a t i n g the i m a g i n a r y past a s the p r e s e n t , b u t
t o o c c u p y e v e r y p o s i t i o n a n d t h e r e b y t o p r e c l u d e the loss o f
the addressee. T h e m e l a n c h o l i c w o u l d h a v e said something, if
h e o r she c o u l d , b u t d i d n o t, a n d n o w b e l i e v e s i n the s u s ­
t a i n i n g p o w e r o f the v o i c e . V a i n l y , the m e l a n c h o l i c n o w says
w h a t h e o r she w o u l d h a v e s a i d , a d d r e s s e d o n l y t o h i m s e l f , a s
o n e w h o i s a l r e a d y s p l i t off f r o m h i m s e l f , b u t w h o s e p o w e r
o f self­address d e p e n d s u p o n this self­forfeiture. T h e m e l a n ­
c h o l i c t h u s b u r r o w s i n a d i r e c t i o n o p p o s i t e t o that i n w h i c h h e
m i g h t f i n d a fresher trace of the lost other, a t t e m p t i n g to r e ­
s o l v e the loss t h r o u g h p s y c h i c s u b s t i t u t i o n s a n d c o m p o u n d i n g
the loss as he goes. A f a i l u r e of address, a f a i l u r e to s u s t a i n the
o t h e r t h r o u g h the v o i c e that addresses, m e l a n c h o l i a e m e r g e s
as a c o m p e n s a t o r y f o r m of n e g a t i v e n a r c i s s i s m : I r e v i l e m y ­
Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 183
self a n d r e h a b i l i t a t e the o t h e r i n the f o r m o f m y o w n i n t e r n a l
a m b i v a l e n c e . I refuse to s p e a k to or of the other, b u t I s p e a k
v o l u m i n o u s l y a b o u t m y s e l f , l e a v i n g a r e f r a c t e d t r a i l of w h a t I
d i d n o t say t o o r a b o u t the other. T h e s t r o n g e r the i n h i b i t i o n
a g a i n s t e x p r e s s i o n , the s t r o n g e r the e x p r e s s i o n o f c o n s c i e n c e .
H o w d o e s t h i s p r o b l e m o f the u n c o n s c i o u s loss, the r e f u s e d
loss, that m a r k s m e l a n c h o l i a r e t u r n u s t o the p r o b l e m o f the r e ­
l a t i o n b e t w e e n the p s y c h i c a n d the s o c i a l ? I n m o u r n i n g , F r e u d
tells us, there is n o t h i n g a b o u t the loss that is u n c o n s c i o u s . In
m e l a n c h o l i a , h e m a i n t a i n s , "the object­loss i s w i t h d r a w n f r o m
c o n s c i o u s n e s s " : the object i s n o t o n l y lost, b u t that loss itself i s
lost, w i t h d r a w n a n d p r e s e r v e d i n the s u s p e n d e d t i m e o f p s y ­
c h i c life. I n o t h e r w o r d s , a c c o r d i n g t o the m e l a n c h o l i c , " I h a v e
lost n o t h i n g . "
T h e u n s p e a k a b i l i t y a n d u n r e p r e s e n t a b i l i t y o f t h i s loss t r a n s ­
lates d i r e c t l y i n t o a h e i g h t e n i n g o f c o n s c i e n c e . W h e r e o n e
m i g h t e x p e c t that c o n s c i e n c e w o u l d w a x a n d w a n e a c c o r d i n g
t o the s t r e n g t h o f e x t e r n a l l y i m p o s e d p r o h i b i t i o n s , i t a p p e a r s
that its s t r e n g t h has m o r e t o d o w i t h m a r s h a l l i n g aggres­
s i o n i n the s e r v i c e o f r e f u s i n g t o a c k n o w l e d g e a loss that h a s
a l r e a d y t a k e n p l a c e , a r e f u s a l to lose a t i m e that is a l r e a d y
gone. O d d l y , the p s y c h e ' s m o r a l i s m a p p e a r s t o b e a n i n d e x o f
its o w n t h w a r t e d grie f a n d i l l e g i b l e rage. T h u s , i f the r e l a t i o n
b e t w e e n m e l a n c h o l i a a n d s o c i a l life i s t o b e r e e s t a b l i s h e d , i t i s
n o t t o b e m e a s u r e d b y r e g a r d i n g the self­beratements o f c o n ­
science a s m i m e t i c i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n s o f the b e r a t e m e n t s l e v e l e d
b y s o c i a l agencies o f j u d g m e n t o r p r o h i b i t i o n . R a t h e r , f o r m s
o f s o c i a l p o w e r e m e r g e that r e g u l a t e w h a t losses w i l l a n d w i l l
n o t b e g r i e v e d ; i n the s o c i a l f o r e c l o s u r e o f g r i e f w e m i g h t f i n d
w h a t fuels the i n t e r n a l v i o l e n c e o f c o n s c i e n c e.
A l t h o u g h s o c i a l p o w e r regulate s w h a t losses c a n b e g r i e v e d ,
it is n o t a l w a y s as effective as it a i m s to be. T h e loss c a n ­
184 Psychic Inceptions
n o t f u l l y b e d e n i e d , b u t n e i t h e r does i t a p p e a r i n a w a y that
c a n d i r e c t l y b e a f f i r m e d . T h e " p l a i n t s " o f the m e l a n c h o l i c are
i n v a r i a b l y m i s d i r e c t e d , yet i n t h i s m i s d i r e c t i o n r e s i d e s a n a ­
scent p o l i t i c a l text. T h e p r o h i b i t i o n on grie f registers as a loss
o f s p e e c h for its addressee. T h e p a i n o f loss i s " c r e d i t e d " t o
the o n e w h o suffers it, a t w h i c h p o i n t the loss i s u n d e r s t o o d
as a f a u l t or i n j u r y d e s e r v i n g of redress; o n e seeks r e d r e s s f o r
h a r m s d o n e t o oneself, b u t f r o m n o o n e e x c e p t oneself.
T h e v i o l e n c e o f s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n i s n o t t o b e f o u n d i n its
u n i l a t e r a l a c t i o n , b u t i n the c i r c u i t o u s r o u t e b y w h i c h the p s y ­
che accuses itself o f its o w n w o r t h l e s s n e s s . N o d o u b t , t h i s i s a
strange a n d o p a q u e s y m p t o m o f u n r e s o l v e d grief. W h y does
the r e t r a c t i o n of the lost o t h e r i n t o the ego, the r e f u s a l to ac­
k n o w l e d g e loss, c u l m i n a t e in a d e p r i v a t i o n of the ego? Is the
loss r e s i t u a t e d i n a w a y that n u l l i f i e s the ego i n o r d e r , p s y ­
c h i c a l l y , to save the object? T h e decrease in self­esteem that is
said to distinguish melancholia f r o m m o u r n i n g appears to re­
sult f r o m p r o d i g i o u s efforts b y the c r i t i c a l a g e n c y t o d e p r i v e
the ego of its esteem. B u t o n e c o u l d e q u a l l y say that there is no
q u e s t i o n o f h i g h o r l o w self­esteem p r i o r t o the o p e r a t i o n o f
t h i s c r i t i c a l agency, n o " e s t e e m " that b e l o n g s t o the ego p r i o r t o
its p a r t i t i o n i n t o ego a n d s u p e r ­ e g o . P r i o r t o the o p e r a t i o n o f
a c r i t i c a l agency, it w o u l d be d i f f i c u l t to g a u g e the ego against
an i d e a l , a j u d g m e n t that p r e s u p p o s e s a c r i t i c a l a g e n c y that
m i g h t a p p r o v e o r d i s a p p r o v e o f the ego's m o r a l state. I n t h i s
sense, self­esteem a p p e a r s t o b e p r o d u c e d b y the v e r y c r i t i c a l
agency by w h i c h it is potentially destroyed.
F r e u d d o e s refer t o t h i s r e s i t u a t i n g o f loss i n the ego w h e n
he refers to the ego as i m p o v e r i s h e d , as h a v i n g b e c o m e p o o r ,
a n d " a n object­loss . . . t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o an e g o ­ l o s s " (249).
T h i s loss i n the ego i s a p p a r e n t l y a loss o f a n i d e a l o f itself, a n d
i n F r e u d ' s later w o r k , h e specifies that the j u d g m e n t s o f c o n ­
Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 185
scienc e w o r k i n s u c h a w a y that the s u p e r ­ e g o gauges the ego
against the " e g o ­ i d e a l . " T h e ego i s f o u n d t o b e i m p o v e r i s h e d
b e s i d e t h i s i d e a l , a n d the " l o s s " that the ego suffers is a loss
o f c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y b e t w e e n itself a n d the i d e a l b y w h i c h i t
is judged. W h e r e does this i d e a l emerge from? Is it a r b i t r a r i l y
m a n u f a c t u r e d b y the ego, o r d o s u c h i d e a l s r e t a i n the t r a ce o f
s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n a n d n o r m a t i v i t y ? F r e u d r e m a r k s that m e l a n ­
c h o l i a is a r e s p o n s e n o t just to d e a t h , b u t to o t h e r o r d e r s of
loss, i n c l u d i n g "slights a n d d i s a p p o i n t m e n t s " (250). A n d w h e n
h e i n t r o d u c e s the n o t i o n that b o t h m o u r n i n g a n d m e l a n c h o l i a
c a n b e r e s p o n s e s t o the loss o f a n i d e a l , s u c h a s " c o u n t r y " o r
" l i b e r t y , " h e m a k e s c l e a r b y h i s e x a m p l e s that s u c h i d e a l s are
s o c i a l i n character.
T h e i d e a l s b y w h i c h the ego j u d g e s itself c l e a r l y are ones b y
w h i c h the ego w i l l b e f o u n d w a n t i n g . T h e m e l a n c h o l i c c o m ­
p a r e s h i m ­ o r herself i n v i d i o u s l y w i t h s u c h s o c i a l i d e a l s . I f
t h e y are the p s y c h i c s a n c t i f i c a t i o n o f o n c e ­ e x t e r n a l objects o r
ideals , t h e n they are s e e m i n g l y a l s o the target o f a g g r e s s i o n .
I n d e e d , w e m i g h t w e l l ask w h e t h e r the s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h the
ego is, as it w e r e , b e r a t e d by the i d e a l is n o t the i n v e r s i o n of
a p r i o r s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h the ego w o u l d , i f i t c o u l d , h a v e b e ­
r a t e d the i d e a l . Is the p s y c h i c v i o l e n c e of c o n s c i e n c e n o t a r e ­
f r a c t e d i n d i c t m e n t o f the s o c i a l f o r m s that h a v e m a d e c e r t a i n
k i n d s o f losses u n g r i e v a b l e ?
T h u s , a loss i n the w o r l d that c a n n o t b e d e c l a r e d enrages,
generates a m b i v a l e n c e , a n d b e c o m e s the loss " i n " the ego that
i s n a m e l e s s a n d d i f f u s e a n d that p r o m p t s p u b l i c r i t u a l s o f self­
b e r a t e m e n t . O f m o u r n i n g , F r e u d w r i t e s that i t " i m p e l s the
ego to g i v e up the object by declaring the object to be d e a d "
(257, m y e m p h a s i s ) . M e l a n c h o l i a , i t w o u l d f o l l o w , refuses t o
m a k e a n y s u c h d e c l a r a t i o n , d e c l i n e s s p e e c h , s u s p e n d i n g the
" v e r d i c t o f r e a l i t y that the object n o l o n g e r e x i s t s " (255). W e
 •
i86 Psychic Inceptions
k n o w , h o w e v e r , that the m e l a n c h o l i c i s also " c o m m u n i c a t i v e , "
w h i c h suggests that h i s o r h e r s p e e c h i s n e i t h e r v e r d i c t i v e
n o r d e c l a r a t i v e (assertoric), b u t i n e v i t a b l y i n d i r e c t a n d c i r c u ­
i t o u s . W h a t c a n n o t b e d e c l a r e d b y the m e l a n c h o l i c i s n e v e r ­
theless w h a t g o v e r n s m e l a n c h o l i c s p e e c h — a n u n s p e a k a b i l i t y
that o r g a n i z e s the f i e l d of the speakable .
" T h e loss o f the m e l a n c h o l i c seems p u z z l i n g t o u s b e c a u s e
we cannot see what it is that is a b s o r b i n g h i m so e n t i r e l y " (247).
W h a t c a n n o t b e d i r e c t l y s p o k e n i s also w h a t i s o c c l u d e d f r o m
sight, absent f r o m the v i s u a l f i e l d that o r g a n i z e d m e l a n c h o ­
lia. Melancholia is kept from view; it is an absorption by
s o m e t h i n g that c a n n o t b e a c c o m m o d a t e d b y v i s i o n , that re­
sists b e i n g b r o u g h t i n t o the o p e n , n e i t h e r seen n o r d e c l a r e d .
A s p r i v a t e a n d i r r e c o v e r a b l e a s t h i s loss seems, the m e l a n ­
cholic is strangely outgoing, p u r s u i n g an "insistent c o m m u n i ­
cativeness w h i c h f i n d s s a t i s f a c t i o n i n s e l f ­ e x p o s u r e " (247). T h e
w o r t h l e s s n e s s o f the ego i s i n s i s t e n t l y c o m m u n i c a t e d . M e l ­
ancholic speech, neither verdictive nor declarative, remains
u n a b l e t o s p e a k its loss. W h a t the m e l a n c h o l i c does d e c l a r e ,
n a m e l y , h i s o w n w o r t h l e s s n e s s , i d e n t i f i e s the loss a t the s i g h t
of the ego a n d , hence, c o n t i n u e s to f a i l to i d e n t i f y the loss.
Self­beratemen t takes the p l a c e o f a b a n d o n m e n t , a n d b e c o m e s
the t o k e n of its r e f u s a l .
The heightening of conscience under such circumstances
attests to the u n a v o w e d status of the loss. T h e ego b e c o m e s
m o r a l i z e d o n the c o n d i t i o n o f u n g r i e v e d loss. B u t w h a t c o n d i ­
t i o n s m a k e i t p o s s i b l e t o g r i e v e , o r n o t t o g r i e v e , loss?
T h e ego n o t o n l y b r i n g s the object i n s i d e b u t b r i n g s ag ­
g r e s s i o n against the object a l o n g w i t h it. T h e m o r e t h i s object
is b r o u g h t i n s i d e , as it w e r e , the h i g h e r the s e l f ­ d e b a s e m e n t ,
the p o o r e r the ego b e c o m e s : d e l u s i o n a l self­abasement "over­
c o m e s the i n s t i n c t w h i c h c o m p e l s e v e r y l i v i n g t h i n g t o l i f e "
Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 187
(246). T h e a g g r e s s i o n t u r n e d against the ego has the p o w e r
t o contest a n d o v e r c o m e the d e s i r e t o l i v e . A t t h i s p o i n t i n
F r e u d ' s theory, a g g r e s s i o n against o n e s e lf i s d e r i v e d f r o m a n
o u t w a r d l y d i r e c t e d a g g r e s s i o n against a n other. B u t o n e c a n
d i s c e r n i n this f o r m u l a t i o n the b e g i n n i n g s o f r e f l e c t i o n o n a
d r i v e that m i g h t b e s a i d t o c o u n t e r the p l e a s u r e p r i n c i p l e ,
w h a t is later r e f e r r e d to as the d e a t h d r i v e .
I n m e l a n c h o l i a , the ego c o n t r a c t s s o m e t h i n g o f the loss o r
a b a n d o n m e n t b y w h i c h the object i s n o w m a r k e d , a n a b a n ­
d o n m e n t that i s r e f u s e d a n d , a s r e f u s e d , i s i n c o r p o r a t e d . I n
this sense, to refuse a loss is to b e c o m e it. If the ego c a n n o t
accep t the loss of the other, t h e n the loss that the o t h e r c o m e s
t o r e p r e s e n t b e c o m e s the loss that n o w c h a r a c t e r i z e s the ego:
the ego b e c o m e s p o o r a n d i m p o v e r i s h e d . A loss s u f f e r ed i n
the w o r l d b e c o m e s n o w the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c l a c k i n the ego ( a
s p l i t that is, a s i t w e r e , i m p o r t e d t h r o u g h the n e c e s s a ry w o r k
of internalization).
I n t h i s w a y , m e l a n c h o l i a operates i n a d i r e c t i o n d i r e c t l y
c o u n t e r t o n a r c i s s i s m . E c h o i n g the b i b l i c a l c a d e n c e o f "the
s h a d o w o f d e a t h , " a w a y i n w h i c h d e a t h i m p o s e s its p r e s e n c e
o n life, F r e u d r e m a r k s that i n m e l a n c h o l i a "the s h a d o w o f the
object fell u p o n the e g o " (249). I n L a c a n ' s essays o n n a r c i s ­
s i s m , the f o r m u l a t i o n i s i m p o r t a n t l y r e v e r s e d : the s h a d o w o f
the ego falls u p o n the object. N a r c i s s i s m c o n t i n u e s t o c o n t r o l
9
l o v e , e v e n w h e n that n a r c i s s i s m a p p e a r s t o g i v e w a y t o object­
l o v e : it is s t i l l m y s e l f that I f i n d there at the site of the object,
m y absence. I n m e l a n c h o l i a t h i s f o r m u l a t i o n i s r e v e r s e d : i n the
p l a c e of the loss that the o t h e r c o m e s to r e p r e s e n t , I f i n d m y ­
self t o b e that loss, i m p o v e r i s h e d , w a n t i n g . I n n a r c i s s i s t i c l o v e ,
the o t h e r c o n t r a c t s m y a b u n d a n c e . I n m e l a n c h o l i a , I c o n t r a c t
the o t h e r ' s absence.
T h i s o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n m e l a n c h o l i a a n d n a r c i s s i s m ges­
i88 Psychic Inceptions
t u r e s t o w a r d the d u a l ­ d r i v e theory. F r e u d i s c l e ar that m e l a n ­
cholia must be u n d e r s t o o d in part as a narcissistic disturbance.
S o m e o f its features c o m e f r o m n a r c i s s i s m , b u t s o m e c o m e
f r o m m o u r n i n g . I n m a k i n g t h is c l a i m , F r e u d a p p e a r s t o set
m o u r n i n g as a l i m i t to n a r c i s s i s m , or p e r h a p s , as its c o u n t e r ­
d i r e c t i o n . W h a t e r o d e s the ego i n m e l a n c h o l i a i s u n d e r s t o o d
to be a loss that w a s o r i g i n a l l y e x t e r n a l , b u t by The Ego and
the Id F r e u d c o m e s to r e c o g n i z e that the w o r k of m e l a n c h o ­
l i a m a y w e l l b e i n the s e r v i c e o f the d e a t h d r i v e . H e asks,
" H o w i s i t t h e n that i n m e l a n c h o l i a the s u p e r ­ e g o c a n b e ­
c o m e a g a t h e r i n g ­ p l a c e for the d e a t h i n s t i n c t s ? " 1 0
H o w is it
that the e g o ­ e r o d i n g effects of m e l a n c h o l i a , the ones that o v e r ­
c o m e "the i n s t i n c t w h i c h c o m p e l s e v e r y l i v i n g t h i n g t o life,"
c o m e t o w o r k i n the s e r v i c e o f a d r i v e that seeks t o o v e r c o m e
life? F r e u d goes f u r t h e r a n d r e m a r k s that the " m e r c i l e s s v i o ­
l e n c e " o f c o n s c i e n c e s h o w s that " w h a t i s n o w h o l d i n g s w a y
in the s u p e r ­ e g o is, as it w e r e , a p u r e c u l t u r e of the d e a t h
i n s t i n c t [Todestrieb]" (53). In m e l a n c h o l i a , t h e n , a c c o r d i n g to
this r e v i s e d t h e o r y p u b l i s h e d in The Ego and the Id, it w o u l d
b e i m p o s s i b l e t o separate the d e a t h d r i v e f r o m the c o n s c i e n c e
h e i g h t e n e d t h r o u g h m e l a n c h o l i a . I n e i t h e r case, the ego r i s k s
its life i n the face o f its f a i l u r e t o l i v e u p t o the s t a n d a r d s e n ­
c o d e d i n the e g o ­ i d e a l . A n d the a g g r e s s i o n i t takes u p o n itself
i s i n p a r t p r o p o r t i o n a l t o the a g g r e s s i o n against the other that
i t has m a n a g e d t o b r i n g u n d e r c o n t r o l .
In t h is a c c o u n t of m e l a n c h o l i a , r e f l e x i v i t y e m e r g e s , as it
does for N i e t z s c h e , a s a t r a n s p o s e d a g g r e s s i v i t y . A s w e h a v e
seen, for F r e u d i n " M o u r n i n g a n d M e l a n c h o l i a , " a g g r e s s i o n
is p r i m a r i l y a r e l a t i o n to others a n d o n l y s e c o n d a r i l y a r e l a ­
t i o n t o oneself. H e r e m a r k s that the s u i c i d a l p e r s o n m u s t first
h a v e u n d e r g o n e m u r d e r o u s i m p u l s e s , a n d suggests that self­
t o r m e n t satisfies s a d i s m a n d hate. B o t h o f these i m p u l s e s h a v e
Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 189
b e e n e x p e r i e n c e d a s " t u r n e d a r o u n d u p o n the subject's o w n
self" (251) — " e i n e W e n d u n g g e g e n d i e eigene P e r s o n e r f a h r e n
h a b e n . " T h e a m b i v a l e n c e that c o n t a i n s t h i s a g g r e s s i o n s p l i t s
the cathexis, w h i c h i s t h e n d i s t r i b u t e d i n t o "parts" : p a r t o f
the e r o t i c cathexis regresses to i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ; the other p a r t to
s a d i s m . Set up as i n t e r n a l p a r t s of the ego, the s a d i s t i c p a r t
takes a i m a t the p a r t that i d e n t i f i e s , a n d the p s y c h i c a l l y v i o l e n t
d r a m a o f the s u p e r ­ e g o p r o c e e d s . F r e u d a p p e a r s t o a s s u m e
a m b i v a l e n c e at the scene of loss: a w i s h for the o t h e r to d i e or
to go (a w i s h that is s o m e t i m e s i n s t i g a t e d by the d e s i r e of the
ego t o l i v e a n d , hence, b r e a k its a t t a c h m e n t t o w h a t has gone
o r d i e d ) . F r e u d i n t e r p r e t s t h is a m b i v a l e n c e a s a t o n c e a n i n ­
stance of s a d i s m a n d a w i s h to p r e s e r v e the other as oneself.
S e l f ­ t o r m e n t i s t h is s a d i s m t u r n e d b a c k o n the ego, e n c o d i n g
a n d d i s s i m u l a t i n g the d u a l d e s i r e t o v a n q u i s h a n d t o save the
object. S e l f ­ p u n i s h m e n t , h e notes, i s "the c i r c u i t o u s p a t h " o f
s a d i s m ; w e m i g h t a d d , i t i s the c i r c u i t o u s p a t h o f i d e n t i f i c a ­
tion as w e l l .
F r e u d a p p e a r s clear h e r e that s a d i s m p r e c e d e s m a s o c h i s m .
( H i s later e m p h a s i s o n the d e a t h d r i v e w i l l i n v e r t t h is p r i o r i t y . )
R e f l e x i v e a r t i c u l a t i o n s o f a g g r e s s i o n are a l w a y s d e r i v e d f r o m
o u t w a r d l y d i r e c t e d ones. W e h a v e k n o w n f o r s o m e t i m e , h e
w r i t e s , that "no n e u r o t i c h a r b o r s t h o u g h t s o f s u i c i d e w h i c h h e
has n o t t u r n e d b a c k u p o n h i m s e l f [auf sich zuruckwendet] f r o m
m u r d e r o u s i m p u l s e s t o w a r d o t h e r s " (252). T h e ego takes itself
as an object in the p l a c e of t a k i n g the other as an object. I n d e e d ,
the ego first takes itself as an object on the c o n d i t i o n that it has
already t a k e n the other as an object, a n d that the other b e c o m e s
the m o d e l b y w h i c h the ego a s s u m e s its b o u n d a r y a s a n o b ­
ject for i t s e l f — a k i n d o f m i m e s i s , n o t u n l i k e that d e s c r i b e d b y
M i k k e l Borch­Jacobsen, 11
in w h i c h mimetic activity produces
the ego a s a n object o n the m o d e l o f the other. M i m e s i s w i t h i n
190 Psychic Inceptions Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 191

m e l a n c h o l i a p e r f o r m s t h i s a c t i v i t y a s the i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f the social a n d psychic instrument. This super­egoic conscience is

other " i n t o the ego." T h i s i s a n effort t o p r e s e r v e the other a n d n o t s i m p l y a n a l o g o u s t o the state's m i l i t a r y p o w e r o v e r its c i t i ­
a t the s a m e t i m e t o d i s s i m u l a t e a g g r e s s i o n t o w a r d the other. z e n r y ; the state c u l t i v a t e s m e l a n c h o l i a a m o n g its c i t i z e n r y p r e ­
C l e a r l y n o F r e u d i a n t h e o r y that takes the ego a s p r i m a r y c i s e l y a s a w a y o f d i s s i m u l a t i n g a n d d i s p l a c i n g its o w n i d e a l
o r p r e g i v e n c a n a c c o u n t for the w a y i n w h i c h the ego first a u t h o r i t y . T h i s is n o t to suggest that c o n s c i e n c e is a s i m p l e

b e c o m e s a n object o n the c o n d i t i o n o f the i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n o f i n s t a n t i a t i o n of the state; o n the c o n t r a r y , it is the v a n i s h i n g

a g g r e s s i o n a n d the r e f u s a l o f loss. M e l a n c h o l i a establishes the p o i n t o f the state's a u t h o r i t y , its p s y c h i c i d e a l i z a t i o n , a n d , i n

t e n u o u s basis of the ego, a n d i n d i c a t e s s o m e t h i n g of its status that sense, its d i s a p p e a r a n c e as an e x t e r n a l object. T h e p r o c e s s

as an i n s t r u m e n t of containment. T h e s i g n i f i c a n c e of the ego of f o r m i n g the subject is a p r o c e s s of r e n d e r i n g the t e r r o r i z ­

a s c o n t a i n i n g a g g r e s s i o n b e c o m e s clear w h e n w e c o n s i d e r i n g p o w e r o f the state i n v i s i b l e — a n d e f f e c t i v e — a s the i d e a l i t y

o f c o n s c i e n c e . F u r t h e r m o r e , the i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f the i d e a l o f
F r e u d ' s e x p l i c i t l y s o c i a l m e t a p h o r i c s i n these d e s c r i p t i o n s .
" L a w " u n d e r s c o r e s the c o n t i n g e n t r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n a g i v e n
O n e passage, n o t e d b y H o m i B h a b h a , 12
suggests s o m e t h i n g o f
state a n d the i d e a l i t y o f its p o w e r . T h i s i d e a l i t y c a n a l w a y s b e
the p o l i t i c a l a n a l o g y at issue. " M e l a n c h o l i c . . . r e a c t i o n . . .
incorporated elsewhere a n d remains incommensurable w i t h
p r o c e e d s f r o m a m e n t a l c o n s t e l l a t i o n of r e v o l t [seelischen Kon­
a n y o f its g i v e n i n c o r p o r a t i o n s . T h a t t h i s i d e a l i t y c a n n o t b e
stellation der Auflehnung], w h i c h has t h e n , by a c e r t a i n p r o c e s s ,
r e d u c e d t o a n y o f its i n c o r p o r a t i o n s does n o t m e a n , h o w e v e r ,
p a s s e d o v e r i n t o the c r u s h e d state of m e l a n c h o l i a [die melan­
that i t subsists i n a n o u m e n a l s p h e r e b e y o n d a l l e m b o d i m e n t s .
cholische Zerknirschung]" (248).
R a t h e r , the i n c o r p o r a t i o n s are sites o f r e a r t i c u l a t i o n , c o n d i ­
B h a b h a a r g u e s that m e l a n c h o l i a is n o t a f o r m of p a s s i v i t y ,
tions for a " w o r k i n g t h r o u g h " a n d , potentially, a " t h r o w i n g
b u t a f o r m o f r e v o l t that takes p l a c e t h r o u g h r e p e t i t i o n a n d
off" (Auflehnung).
m e t o n y m y . T h e m e l a n c h o l i c i n v e r t s against itself the i n d i c t ­
m e n t i t w o u l d l e v e l against the other; t h is " i n c o r p o r a t i o n " o f The revolt in melancholia can be distilled by marshalling
the o t h e r is also, B h a b h a notes, a " d i s i n c o r p o r a t i o n of the M a s ­ a g g r e s s i o n i n the s e r v i c e o f m o u r n i n g , b u t also, n e c e s s a r i l y , o f
ter." U n d e r s c o r i n g that "the L a w is e n t o m b e d as loss at the life. A s a n i n s t r u m e n t o f p s y c h i c t e r r o r , c o n s c i e n c e w i e l d s the
p o i n t o f its i d e a l a u t h o r i t y , " h e a r g u e s that m e l a n c h o l i a c o n ­ p o w e r of c o n d e m n a t i o n that, q u i t e l i t e r a l l y , p o s e s a threat to
tests the i d e a l i t y o f that a u t h o r i t y p r e c i s e l y b y i n c o r p o r a t i n g one's life. F r e u d notes that i t "often e n o u g h s u c c e e d s i n d r i v ­

it. 1 3
A u t h o r i t y ' s ideality is incorporable elsewhere, no longer i n g the ego i n t o d e a t h , if the latter d o e s n o t fend off its tyrant in

t i e d i n a n y a b s o l u t e sense t o one f i g u r e o f the l a w . t i m e b y the c h a n g e r o u n d i n t o m a n i a . " 1 4

M a n i a appears to be

M e l a n c h o l i a i s a r e b e l l i o n that has b e e n p u t d o w n , c r u s h e d . the e n e r g e t i c t h r o w i n g off of the a t t a c h m e n t to the lost object,

e n s h r i n e d i n the w o r k i n g s o f c o n s c i e n c e . Yet i n m a n i a , " w h a t
Yet it is n o t a static affair; it c o n t i n u e s as a k i n d of " w o r k " that
the ego has s u r m o u n t e d a n d w h a t i t i s t r i u m p h i n g o v e r r e ­
takes p l a c e b y d e f l e c t i o n . F i g u r e d w i t h i n the w o r k i n g s o f the
main hidden from it." 1 5
I n m a n i a , the t y r a n t i s f e n d e d off, b u t
p s y c h e i s the p o w e r o f the state t o p r e e m p t a n i n s u r r e c t i o n ­
n o t t h r o w n off o r o v e r c o m e . M a n i a m a r k s a t e m p o r a r y s u s ­
a r y rage. T h e " c r i t i c a l a g e n c y " of the m e l a n c h o l i c is at o n c e a
192 Psychic Inceptions
p e n s i o n o r m a s t e r i n g o f the t y r a n t b y the ego, b u t the t y r a n t
r e m a i n s s t r u c t u r a l l y e n s c o n c e d f o r that p s y c h e — a n d u n k n o w ­
able. F o r a r e s o l u t i o n o f m e l a n c h o l i a that i s m o r e t h o r o u g h
t h a n a n y m a n i a c a n p r o v i d e , F r e u d suggests that " a v e r d i c t o f
r e a l i t y " m u s t b e a c c e p t e d for m e l a n c h o l i a t o b e c o m e m o u r n ­
i n g , a n d f o r the a t t a c h m e n t t o the lost object t o b e s e v e r e d .
I n d e e d , the a g g r e s s i o n i n s t r u m e n t a l i z e d b y c o n s c i e n c e a g a i n s t
the ego i s p r e c i s e l y w h a t m u s t b e r e a p p r o p r i a t e d i n the ser­
v i c e of the d e s i r e t o l i v e : "the l i b i d o ' s a t t a c h m e n t to the lost
object i s m e t b y the v e r d i c t o f r e a l i t y that the object n o l o n g e r
exists; a n d the ego, c o n f r o n t e d a s i t w e r e w i t h the q u e s t i o n
w h e t h e r i t s h a l l s h a r e t h i s fate, i s p e r s u a d e d b y the s u m o f the
n a r c i s s i s t i c s a t i s f a c t i o ns i t d e r i v e s f r o m b e i n g a l i v e t o sever its
a t t a c h m e n t to the object that has b e e n a b o l i s h e d " (255).
F o r the m e l a n c h o l i c , b r e a k i n g the a t t a c h m e n t c o n s t i t u t e s
a s e c o n d loss of the object. If the object los t its e x t e r n a l i t y
w h e n i t b e c a m e a p s y c h i c i d e a l , i t n o w loses its i d e a l i t y a s the
ego t u r n s a g a i n s t c o n s c i e n c e , t h u s d e c e n t e r i n g itself. T h e j u d g ­
m e n t s o f c o n s c i e n c e are e x c h a n g e d f o r the v e r d i c t o f r e a l i t y ,
a n d t h i s v e r d i c t p o s e s a d i l e m m a for the m e l a n c h o l i c , n a m e l y ,
w h e t h e r t o f o l l o w the los t object i n t o d e a t h o r t o s e i ze the
o p p o r t u n i t y t o l i v e . L a t e r , F r e u d r e m a r k s that there c a n b e
no s e v e r i n g of t h i s a t t a c h m e n t to the object w i t h o u t a d i r e c t
" d e c l a r a t i o n " o f loss a n d the d e s a n c t i f i c a t i o n o f the object b y
e x t e r n a l i z i n g a g g r e s s i o n against it: "Just a s m o u r n i n g i m p e l s
the ego t o g i v e u p the object b y d e c l a r i n g the object t o b e
d e a d a n d o f f e r i n g the ego the i n d u c e m e n t t o l i v e , s o d o e s e a c h
s i n g l e s t r u g g l e o f a m b i v a l e n c e l o o s e n the f i x a t i o n o f the l i b i d o
t o the object b y d i s p a r a g i n g i t , d e n i g r a t i n g i t a n d e v e n a s i t
w e r e k i l l i n g it off [entwertet, herabsetzt, gleichsam audi erschlagt]"
(257). " K i l l i n g off" the c r i t i c a l a g e n c y reverses a n d d i s p l a c e s
the i n t e r i o r i z e d scene o f c o n s c i e n c e a n d c l e a r s the w a y f o r
Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 193
psychic survival. Whereas melancholia involves a "delusional
s e l f ­ a b a s e m e n t . . . that o v e r c o m e s the i n s t i n c t w h i c h c o m p e l s
e v e r y l i v i n g t h i n g t o l i f e , " the b r e a k w i t h m e l a n c h o l i a i n v o l v e s
t u r n i n g against the a l r e a d y " t u r n e d b a c k " a g g r e s s i o n that c o n ­
stitutes c o n s c i e n c e . S u r v i v a l , n o t p r e c i s e l y the o p p o s i t e o f m e l ­
ancholia, but what melancholia puts in suspension—requires
r e d i r e c t i n g rage a g a i n s t the lost other, d e f i l i n g the s a n c t i t y o f
the d e a d f o r the p u r p o s e s o f life, r a g i n g a g a i n s t the d e a d i n
order not to join them.
A l t h o u g h s u c h rage m a y b e r e q u i r e d t o b r e a k the m e l ­
a n c h o l i c b i n d , t h e re i s n o f i n a l r e p r i e v e f r o m the a m b i v a ­
lence a n d no final separation of m o u r n i n g f r o m m e l a n c h o l i a .
F r e u d ' s v i e w that m o u r n i n g a n d m e l a n c h o l i a m i g h t b e d i s t i n ­
g u i s h e d i s c h a l l e n g e d n o t o n l y i n h i s o w n essay b y that n a m e ,
b u t e x p l i c i t l y in The Ego and the Id. A m b i v a l e n c e , w h i c h is first
i d e n t i f i e d a s a p o s s i b l e r e s p o n s e t o loss i n " M o u r n i n g a n d M e l ­
a n c h o l i a , " b e c o m e s , t o w a r d the e n d o f the essay, the s t r u g g l e
that loss o c c a s i o n s b e t w e e n the d e s i r e t o l i v e a n d the d e s i r e
t o die. A s s u c h , b o t h a m b i v a l e n c e a n d the s t r u g g l e o f life a n d
d e a t h , t o b o r r o w H e g e l i a n p a r l a n c e , are o c c a s i o n e d b y loss,
i n d e e d , i n s t i g a t e d b y loss. I f a m b i v a l e n c e d i s t i n g u i s h e s m e l ­
ancholia f r o m m o u r n i n g , a n d i f m o u r n i n g entails a m b i v a l e n c e
a s p a r t o f the p r o c e s s o f " w o r k i n g t h r o u g h , " t h e n t h e re i s n o
w o r k o f m o u r n i n g that d o e s n o t engage m e l a n c h o l i a . A s w a s
r e m a r k e d i n the p r e v i o u s chapter , F r e u d a r g u e s i n The Ego
and the Id that the ego is c o m p o s e d of its los t a t t a c h m e n t s a n d
that there w o u l d b e n o ego w e r e there n o i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n o f
loss a l o n g m e l a n c h o l i c l i n e s . T h e i n v e r s e o f t h i s p o s i t i o n , h o w ­
ever, i s n o t p u r s u e d b y F r e u d , a l t h o u g h h i s t h e o r y p o i n t s the
w a y : i f the ego c o n t a i n s a g g r e s s i o n a g a i n s t the o t h e r w h o i s
gone, t h e n i t f o l l o w s that r e e x t e r n a l i z i n g that a g g r e s s i o n " u n ­
c o n t a i n s " the ego. T h e d e s i r e t o l i v e i s n o t the d e s i r e o f the
194 Psychic Inceptions
ego, b u t a d e s i r e that u n d o e s the ego in the c o u r s e of its e m e r ­
gence. T h e " m a s t e r y " o f the ego w o u l d t h e n b e i d e n t i f i e d a s
the effect of the d e a t h d r i v e , a n d life, i n a N i e t z s c h e a n sense,
w o u l d b r e a k a p a r t that m a s t e r y , i n i t i a t i n g a l i v e d m o d e o f b e ­
c o m i n g that contests the stasis a n d d e f e n s i v e status o f the ego.
B u t the s t o r y o f m o u r n i n g c a n n o t b e r e d u c e d t o o n e i n
w h i c h life t r i u m p h s o v e r d e a t h . T h e d y n a m i c i s m o r e c o m ­
p l i c a t e d . A l t h o u g h i n 1917 F r e u d does n o t yet d i s t i n g u i s h b e ­
t w e e n the p l e a s u r e p r i n c i p l e a n d the d e a t h d r i v e , h e d o e s note
that m e l a n c h o l y has the p o w e r t o force the ego i n t o d e a t h .
B y 1923, h e e x p l i c i t l y c l a i m s that c o n s c i e n c e , a s i t f u n c t i o n s
i n m e l a n c h o l i a , i s " a g a t h e r i n g p l a c e " for the d e a t h d r i v e s . I n
m o u r n i n g , the c l a i m o f life does n o t t r i u m p h o v e r the l u r e o f
d e a t h ; o n the c o n t r a r y , the "death d r i v e s " are m a r s h a l l e d i n the
s e r v i c e o f b r e a k i n g w i t h the object, " k i l l i n g " the object i n o r d e r
to l i v e . F u r t h e r , i n s o f a r as the object r e s i d e s as the i d e a l i t y of
c o n s c i e n c e , a n d the ego i s s i t u a t e d w i t h i n that t o p o g r a p h i c a l
scene, b o t h c o n s c i e n c e a n d the ego are n e c e s s a r i l y u n d o n e b y
that m u r d e r o u s c l a i m o n life. T h e "death d r i v e " i s t h u s p a r a ­
d o x i c a l l y n e c e s s a r y for s u r v i v a l ; i n m o u r n i n g , the b r e a k i n g o f
a t t a c h m e n t i n a u g u r a t e s life. B u t t h i s " b r e a k " i s n e v e r f i n a l o r
f u l l . O n e does n o t r e t r a c t a q u a n t i t y o f l i b i d o f r o m o n e object
i n o r d e r t o i n v e s t i t i n another. T o the extent that m e l a n c h o l y
establishes the p o s i t i o n a l i t y o f the ego, the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n
the p s y c h i c a n d the s o c i a l , i t also f u n c t i o n s t o m a k e p o s s i b l e
a n e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l e n c o u n t e r w i t h alterity. T h e c o n c l u s i o n o f
g r i e f m a y u n d o the ego ( i n the sense o f " u n b i n d i n g " i t f r o m its
c a t h e x i s i n c o n s c i e n c e ) , b u t i t does n o t d e s t r o y it. T h e r e i s n o
b r e a k w i t h the c o n s t i t u t i v e h i s t o r i c i t y o f loss t o w h i c h m e l a n ­
c h o l y attests (except p e r h a p s i n the m a n i c r e s p o n s e , w h i c h i s
a l w a y s t e m p o r a r y ) . T h e h i s t o r i c i t y o f loss i s t o b e f o u n d i n
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n a n d , h e n c e , i n the v e r y f o r m s that a t t a c h m e n t
Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage
195
i s b o u n d t o take. " L i b i d o " a n d " a t t a c h m e n t " i n s u c h a v i e w
c o u l d n o t b e c o n c e i v e d a s free­floatin g e n e r g i e s , b u t a s h a v i n g
a h i s t o r i c i t y that c o u l d n e v e r f u l l y b e r e c o v e r e d .
I f i n " M o u r n i n g a n d M e l a n c h o l i a , " F r e u d t h o u g h t that o n e
m u s t s e v er o n e a t t a c h m e n t to m a k e a n o t h e r , in The Ego and the
Id, he is clear that o n l y u p o n the c o n d i t i o n that the lost o t h e r
b e c o m e s i n t e r n a l i z e d c a n m o u r n i n g ever b e a c c o m p l i s h e d a n d
n e w attachments begun. H e r e , of course, an u n e x p l o r e d p o i n t
d e s e r v e s r e m a r k : i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n does n o t h a v e t o t a k e the
f o r m of a mercilessly violent conscience, a n d certain k i n d s of
i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n , w h i c h are n o t a l w a y s i n c o r p o r a t i o n s , are n e c ­
essary f o r s u r v i v a l . 1 6
I n d e e d , D e r r i d a insists, w i t h the later
F r e u d , that " m o u r n i n g i s the a f f i r m a t i v e i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f the
O t h e r " a n d that, i n p r i n c i p l e , there c a n b e n o e n d t o m o u r n ­
ing. 1 7
I n d e e d , o n e m a y rage a g a i n s t one's a t t a c h m e n t t o s o m e
o t h e r s ( w h i c h i s s i m p l y t o alter the t e r m s o f the a t t a c h m e n t ) ,
b u t n o rage c a n s e v e r the a t t a c h m e n t t o alterity, e x c e p t p e r ­
h a p s a s u i c i d a l rage that u s u a l l y s t i l l leaves b e h i n d a note, a
f i n a l a d d r e s s , t h u s c o n f i r m i n g that a l l o c u t o r y b o n d . S u r v i v a l
d o e s n o t t a k e p l a c e b e c a u s e a n a u t o n o m o u s ego exercises a u ­
t o n o m y i n c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h a c o u n t e r v a i l i n g w o r l d ; o n the
c o n t r a r y , n o ego c a n e m e r g e except t h r o u g h a n i m a t i n g ref­
e r e n c e to s u c h a w o r l d . S u r v i v a l is a m a t t e r of a v o w i n g the
trace o f loss that i n a u g u r a t e s one's o w n e m e r g e n c e . T o m a k e
of m e l a n c h o l i a a s i m p l e " r e f u s a l " to g r i e v e its losses c o n j u r es
a subject w h o m i g h t a l r e a d y b e s o m e t h i n g w i t h o u t its losses,
that is, o n e w h o v o l u n t a r i l y e x t e n d s a n d retracts h i s o r he r
w i l l . Yet the subject w h o m i g h t g r i e v e i s i m p l i c a t e d i n a loss
o f a u t o n o m y that i s m a n d a t e d b y l i n g u i s t i c a n d s o c i a l life; i t
c a n n e v e r p r o d u c e itself a u t o n o m o u s l y . F r o m the start, t h i s
ego i s o t h e r t h a n itself; w h a t m e l a n c h o l i a s h o w s i s that o n l y
196 Psychic Inceptions
b y a b s o r b i n g the o t h e r a s o n e s e lf does o n e b e c o m e s o m e t h i n g
at all. The social terms w h i c h m a k e s u r v i v a l possible, w h i c h
i n t e r p e l l a t e s o c i a l existence, n e v e r reflect the a u t o n o m y o f the
one w h o comes to recognize h i m ­ or herself in t h e m arid, thus,
s t a n d s a c h a n c e "to b e " w i t h i n l a n g u a g e . I n d e e d , b y f o r f e i t i n g
that n o t i o n o f a u t o n o m y s u r v i v a l b e c o m e s p o s s i b l e ; the "ego"
i s r e l e a s e d f r o m its m e l a n c h o l i c f o r e c l o s u r e o f the s o c i a l . T h e
ego c o m e s i n t o b e i n g o n the c o n d i t i o n o f the " t r a c e " o f the
other, w h o is, at that m o m e n t of e m e r g e n c e , a l r e a d y at a d i s ­
tance. To a c c e p t the a u t o n o m y of the ego is to forget that trace;
a n d t o a c c e p t that trace i s t o e m b a r k u p o n a p r o c e s s o f m o u r n ­
i n g that c a n n e v e r b e c o m p l e t e , for n o f i n a l s e v e r a n c e c o u l d
t a k e p l a c e w i t h o u t d i s s o l v i n g the ego.
T h i s i n s i g h t that m e l a n c h o l i a offers i n t o the p o w e r o f the
trace of a l t e r i t y to p r o d u c e the ego " a l o n g a f i c t i o n a l l i n e , " as
L a c a n has p u t i t, i s n o t r e s t r i c t e d t o the trace o f s o m e s p e c i f i c
set o f others, that is, t o the c h i l d a n d its m o t h e r o r t o o t h e r
d y a d i c p a i r s . I n d e e d , the " o t h e r " m a y b e a n i d e a l , a c o u n t r y , a
c o n c e p t o f l i b e r t y , i n w h i c h the loss o f s u c h i d e a l s i s c o m p e n ­
sated b y the i n t e r i o r i z e d i d e a l i t y o f c o n s c i e n c e . A n o t h e r o r a n
i d e a l m a y b e " l o s t " b y b e i n g r e n d e r e d u n s p e a k a b l e , that is, lost
through p r o h i b i t i o n or foreclosure: unspeakable, impossible
t o d e c l a r e , b u t e m e r g i n g i n the i n d i r e c t i o n o f c o m p l a i n t a n d
the h e i g h t e n e d j u d g m e n t s o f c o n s c i e n c e . C o n t a i n e d w i t h i n the
p s y c h i c t o p o g r a p h y o f a m b i v a l e n c e , the f a d e d s o c i a l text r e ­
q u i r e s a d i f f e r e n t sort o f g e n e a l o g y in the f o r m a t i o n of the
subject, o n e w h i c h takes i n t o a c c o u n t h o w w h a t r e m a i n s u n ­
s p e a k a b l y absent i n h a b i t s the p s y c h i c v o i c e o f the o n e w h o r e ­
m a i n s . T h e v i o l e n c e o f the loss i s r e d o u b l e d a n d r e f r a c t e d i n a
v i o l e n c e o f the p s y c h i c a g e n c y that threatens d e a t h ; the s o c i a l
i s " t u r n e d b a c k " i n t o the p s y c h i c , o n l y t o leave its trace i n the
v o i c e o f c o n s c i e n c e . C o n s c i e n c e t h u s fails t o i n s t a n t i a t e s o c i a l
Melancholy, Ambivalence, Rage 197
r e g u l a t i o n ; rather, i t i s the i n s t r u m e n t o f its d i s s i m u l a t i o n . T o
c l a i m life i n s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s i s t o contest the r i g h t e o u s p s y ­
che, n o t b y a n act o f w i l l , b u t b y s u b m i s s i o n t o a s o c i a l i t y a n d
l i n g u i s t i c life that m a k e s s u c h acts p o s s i b l e , o n e that exceeds
the b o u n d s o f the ego a n d its " a u t o n o m y . " T o p e r s i s t i n one's
b e i n g m e a n s t o b e g i v e n o v e r f r o m the start t o s o c i a l t e r m s
that are n e v e r f u l l y o n e ' s o w n . T h o s e t e r m s i n s t i t u t e a l i n g u i s ­
tic life f o r the " o n e " w h o s p e a k s p r i o r t o a n y act o f agency,
a n d t h e y r e m a i n b o t h i r r e d u c i b l e t o the o n e w h o s p e a k s a n d
the n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s o f s u c h s p e e c h . I n t h i s sense, i n t e r ­
p e l l a t i o n w o r k s b y f a i l i n g , that is, i t i n s t i t u t e s its subject a s a n
agent p r e c i s e l y to the extent that it fails to d e t e r m i n e s u c h a
subject e x h a u s t i v e l y i n t i m e .
T h e i n a u g u r a t i v e scene o f i n t e r p e l l a t i o n i s o n e i n w h i c h a
c e r t a i n f a i l u r e t o b e c o n s t i t u t e d b e c o m e s the c o n d i t i o n o f p o s ­
s i b i l i t y for c o n s t i t u t i n g oneself. S o c i a l d i s c o u r s e w i e l d s the
p o w e r t o f o r m a n d r e g u l a t e a subject t h r o u g h the i m p o s i t i o n
o f its o w n t e r m s . T h o s e t e r m s , h o w e v e r , are n o t s i m p l y ac­
c e p t e d o r i n t e r n a l i z e d ; t h e y b e c o m e p s y c h i c o n l y t h r o u g h the
m o v e m e n t b y w h i c h t h e y are d i s s i m u l a t e d a n d " t u r n e d . " I n
the absence of e x p l i c i t r e g u l a t i o n , the subject e m e r g e s as o n e
for w h o m p o w e r h a s b e c o m e v o i c e , a n d v o i c e , the r e g u l a t o r y
i n s t r u m e n t o f the p s y c h e . T h e s p e e c h acts o f p o w e r — t h e d e c ­
l a r a t i o n o f g u i l t , the j u d g m e n t o f w o r t h l e s s n e s s , the v e r d i c t s o f
reality—are topographically rendered as psychic instruments
a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s w i t h i n a p s y c h i c l a n d s c a p e that d e p e n d s o n
its m e t a p h o r i c i t y f o r its p l a u s i b i l i t y . R e g u l a t o r y p o w e r b e ­
c o m e s " i n t e r n a l " o n l y t h r o u g h the m e l a n c h o l i c p r o d u c t i o n o f
the f i g u r e o f i n t e r n a l space, o n e that f o l l o w s f r o m the w i t h ­
d r a w i n g of resources —a w i t h d r a w a l a n d t u r n i n g of language,
a s w e l l . B y w i t h d r a w i n g its o w n p r e s e n c e , p o w e r b e c o m e s a n
object l o s t — " a loss o f a m o r e i d e a l k i n d . " E l i g i b l e f o r m e l a n ­
198 Psychic Inceptions

c h o l i c i n c o r p o r a t i o n , p o w e r n o l o n g e r acts u n i l a t e r a l l y o n its
subject. R a t h e r , the subject i s p r o d u c e d , p a r a d o x i c a l l y , t h r o u g h
t h i s w i t h d r a w a l o f p o w e r , its d i s s i m u l a t i o n a n d f a b u l a t i o n o f
the p s y c h e as a s p e a k i n g t o p o s . S o c i a l p o w e r v a n i s h e s , b e ­
c o m i n g the object lost, o r s o c i a l p o w e r m a k e s v a n i s h , effecting
a m a n d a t o r y set of losses. T h u s , it effects a m e l a n c h o l i a that r e ­
p r o d u c e s p o w e r a s the p s y c h i c v o i c e o f j u d g m e n t a d d r e s s e d t o
( t u r n e d u p o n ) oneself, t h u s m o d e l i n g r e f l e x i v i t y o n s u b j e c t i o n .
S o m e p s y c h o a n a l y t i c t h e o r i s t s o f the s o c i a l h a v e a r g u e d
that s o c i a l i n t e r p e l l a t i o n a l w a y s p r o d u c e s a p s y c h i c excess i t
c a n n o t c o n t r o l . Yet the p r o d u c t i o n of the p s y c h i c as a d i s t i n c t
d o m a i n c a n n o t o b l i t e r a t e the s o c i a l o c c a s i o n o f t h i s p r o d u c ­
t i o n . T h e " i n s t i t u t i o n " o f the ego c a n n o t f u l l y o v e r c o m e its
s o c i a l r e s i d u e , g i v e n that its " v o i c e " i s f r o m the start b o r r o w e d
f r o m e l s e w h e r e , a r e c a s t i n g of a s o c i a l " p l a i n t " as p s y c h i c self­
judgment.
T h e p o w e r i m p o s e d u p o n o n e i s the p o w e r that a n i m a t e s
one's e m e r g e n c e , a n d t h e re a p p e a r s t o b e n o e s c a p i n g t h i s
a m b i v a l e n c e . I n d e e d , there a p p e a r s t o b e n o " o n e " w i t h o u t
a m b i v a l e n c e , w h i c h i s t o say that the f i c t i v e r e d o u b l i n g neces­
s a r y to b e c o m e a self r u l e s o u t the p o s s i b i l i t y of strict i d e n t i t y .
F i n a l l y , t h e n , there i s n o a m b i v a l e n c e w i t h o u t loss a s the v e r ­
d i c t of s o c i a l i t y , o n e that leaves the t r a c e of its t u r n at the scene
of one's e m e r g e n c e .
 Notes

INTRODUCTION

I. H a y d e n White remarks i n Tropics of Discourse (Baltimore: Johns

H o p k i n s University Press, 1978) that "the w o r d tropic derives from
tropikos, tropos, w h i c h i n classical Greek meant 'turn' and i n Koine
'way' or 'manner.' It comes into modern Indo­European languages by
way of tropus, w h i c h i n Classical Latin meant 'metaphor' or 'figure
of speech' and in Late L a t i n , especially as applied to music theory,
'mood' or 'measure' " (p. 2). White goes on to associate the notion of
trope w i t h style, a term that he understands to distinguish the study
of discourse from both the study of fiction and logic. Tropes are "de­
viations" from customary language, but they also generate figures of
speech or thought (a distinction crucial to Quintillian's account as
well). In this sense, a trope can produce a connection between terms
that is not considered either customary or logical. For our purposes,
this means that a trope operates in a way that is not restricted to ac­
cepted versions of reality. At the same time, a trope cannot operate,
that is, generate new meanings or connections, if its departure from
custom and logic is not recognized as such a departure. In this sense,
a trope presupposes an accepted version of reality for its operation.
For Nietzsche, however, the recirculation and sedimentation of
tropes is the condition of possibility for the customary use of lan­
guage. Indeed, he argues that tropes are the stuff out of w h i c h literal
and conceptual language emerges. O n l y through a k i n d of forgetful­
ness of the tropological status of language does something like cus­
tomary language take hold. Customary language is the sedimentation
 202 Notes to Pages 7­14 Notes to Pages 16­28 203

or "deadening" effect of tropes. This suggestion is made clear, both in its persistence and instability" (p. 9). This statement was not meant
argumentatively and rhetorically, in his essay " O n Truth and Lie in an to suggest that power acts without the subject. On the contrary, for
Extra­Moral Sense," in Friedrich Nietzsche, On Rhetoric and Language, power to act, there must be a subject, but that necessity does not
ed. Sander G i l m a n et al. (New York: O x f o r d University Press, 1989). make the subject into the origin of power.
" T u r n " was an English term for "trope" in the seventeenth and 6. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison
eighteenth centuries, used in referring to several syntactical figures (New York: Pantheon, 1977), Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la prison
of speech. Richard L a n h a m writes that a trope is a specific k i n d of (Paris: Gallimard, 1975); The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Intro­
figure, one w h i c h changes the meaning of a w o r d (A Handlist of Rhe­ duction, trans. Robert H u r l e y (New York: Vintage, 1978), Histoire de
torical Terms, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). Some ar­ la sexualité 1: Volonté de savoir (Paris: Gallimard, 1978); The Use of
gue for retaining the term "figure" for terms that change the meaning Pleasure: Volume 2 of The History of Sexuality (New York: Pantheon,
of more than one w o r d . Quintillian objects to this distinction, insist­ 1985), L'usage des plaisirs, (Paris: G a l l i m a r d , 1984); "Two Lectures,"
ing that this change of meaning happens in ways that are not redu­ Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 19J2­J7, ed.
cible to single or plural words, and then defines a trope as a change C o l i n G o r d o n (New York: Pantheon, 1980), pp. 78­108.
of meaning, whereas "figure" is used for a change in form (i.e., the 7. Lacan refers to the subject as excrescence.
form of a pattern of speech or even a genre of writing). That this turn 8. Nietzsche develops the notion of the sign­chain (Zeichenkette) in
is considered generative or productive seems especially relevant to On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter K a u f m a n n (New York: R a n ­
our consideration of the production or generation of the subject. Not d o m House, 1967), pp. 77­78; Zur Généalogie der Moral, i n Nietzsche,
only is generation what a trope does, but the explanation of gen­ Samtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Einzelbànden, ed. Giorgio
eration seems to require the use of tropes, an operation of language C o l l i and M a z z i n o Montinari, vol. 5 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988), pp.
that both reflects and enacts the generativity it seeks to explain, irre­ 314­15. H e remarks that the origin of a w o r d or an instrument may
ducibly mimetic and performative. come to assume purposes and produce effects for w h i c h it was never
2. My discussion of "attachment" is indebted to W e n d y Brown's originally intended or fashioned.
essay " W o u n d e d Attachments," in her States of Injury: Freedom and 9. I distinguish between internal and interior, according to conven­
Power in Late Modernity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). tions within phenomenology: "internal" designates a contingent rela­
3. In " O n Narcissism," F r e u d distinguishes between narcissistic tion; "interior," a constitutive relation. This terminology also under­
and anaclitic forms of love, arguing that the former enhance or i n ­ scores the phenomenological register of the latter.
flate the ego, and the latter lead to its diminution or impoverishment. 10. Both authors use the w o r d Trieb for drive. In addition, both
4. On the notion that repetition, signifying the death drive, marks figure this drive as what can and does turn back u p o n itself.
the limit of the ego's mastery, see Jacques Lacan, Four Fundamental 11. See Chapter 5 for a more detailed examination of this notion.
Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ed. J.­A. Miller, trans. A l a n Sheridan (New 12. For a discussion of the lack of originary violence in F o u ­
York: Norton, 1978), pp. 40­49. F r e u d makes the argument i n Beyond cauldian notions of discursive productivity, see Gayatri Chakravorty
the Pleasure Principle (The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Spivak's provocative essay " M o r e on Power/Knowledge," in her Out­
Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. and trans. James Strachey, 24 vols. [Lon­ side in the Teaching Machine (New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 33.
don: H o g a r t h , 1953­74], Ï8: 20­23). 13. Freud's reflections on " M o u r n i n g and Melancholia" in The Ego
5. This discussion continues arguments that I made in Bodies That and the Id become important for Melanie Klein's observations on i n ­
Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex" ( N ew York: Routledge, 1993): corporation.
"There is no power that acts, but only a reiterated acting that is power 14. Spinoza argues that "everything insofar as it is in itself, en­
204 Notes to Pages 31­54 Notes to Pages 55­81 205

deavors to persist in its o w n being" (p. 135), even as he insists that ed. a n d trans. James Strachey, 24 vols. (London: Hogarth, 1953­74),
"a thing, w h i c h is conditioned to act in a particular manner, has nec­ 14: 73­104, for a discussion of the origins of conscience in the repres­
essarily been conditioned by G o d " (p. 61). A u t o n o m y is thus always sion of homosexuality.
conditioned and, to that extent, subverted by the conditions of its 7. H e r e one can see that Foucault's critique of F r e u d in The His­
o w n possibility. ("The Ethics," Philosophy of Spinoza, trans. R. H. M. tory of Sexuality, Volume 1 is partially wrong. Foucault's view that
Elwes [New York: Tudor Publishing House], 1934.) psychoanalysis fails to understand how law produces desire is itself
a failure to understand the way in w h i c h prohibition is productive.
Foucault reserves the term "power" for a productive operation that is
CHAPTER 1
understood not to apply to "law." Yet we see that an insurmountable
N O T E : This chapter originally appeared in D a v i d C l a r k e and Tilot­ equivocation between the two terms is p r o d u c e d once law is under­
tama Rajan, eds., Intersections: Nineteenth­Century Philosophy and Con­ stood as productive.
temporary Theory (Buffalo: S U N Y Press, 1995). I w o u l d like to thank 8. S i g m u n d Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. James
W i l l i a m C o n n o l l y a n d Peter Fenves for comments on earlier versions Strachey (New York: N o r t o n , 1977), p. 84.
of this essay. 9. Nietzsche, Zur Généalogie der Moral, 411­12; my translation.
1. In the following text I refer to this chapter in abbreviated form Kaufman's equivalent is on pp. 162­63.
as "The U n h a p p y Consciousness." English citations are from The Phe­
nomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. M i l l e r (Oxford: O x f o r d University CHAPTER 2
Press, 1977); G e r m a n citations are from G . W. F Hegel, Werke in zwan­
zig Bdnden, vol. 3 (Frankfurt a m M a i n : Suhrkamp, 1980). Page n u m ­ 1. F r i e d r i c h Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter
bers for later citations w i l l appear in the text. K a u f m a n n (New York: R a n d o m House, 1967), p. 58; Zur Généalogie
2. M i c h e l Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison der Moral, in Nietzsche, Sdmtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe in 15

(New York: Pantheon, 1977), p. 30; Surveiller et punir: Naissance de la Einzelbànden, ed. G i o r g i o C o l l i and M a z z i n o M o n t i n a r i , vol. 5 (Berlin:
prison (Paris: G a l l i m a r d , 1975), p. 30. de Gruyter, 1988), p. 292.
3. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter 2. F r i e d r i c h Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Walter Kauf­
K a u f m a n n (New York: R a n d o m House, 1967), p. 87; Zur Généalogie m a n n ( N e w York: R a n d o m House, 1966), p. 25; fenseits von Gut und
der Moral, in Nietzsche, Sdmtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Base, in Nietzsche, Sdmtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Einzel­
Einzelbànden, ed. G i o r g i o C o l l i and M a z z i n o M o n t i n a r i , vol. 5 (Berlin: bànden, ed. G i o r g i o C o l l i a n d M a z z i n o M o n t i n a r i , 5: 32.
de Gruyter, 1988), p. 325. 3. Ibid., p. 29/36.
4. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 30/34. 4. S i g m u n d F r e u d , " O n the M e c h a n i s m of Paranoia," third sec­
5. T h e relevance of the psychoanalytic understanding of the "phan­ tion of "Psycho­Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical A c c o u nt of a
tasmatic" and, in particular, the view of Laplanche a n d Pontalis that Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)," The Standard Edition of the
the subject is dissimulated in the scene of phantasy. We might con­ Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. and trans. James
sider the various stages of progress in the Phenomenology as succes­ Strachey, 24 vols. (London: Hogarth, 1953­74) 12: 31.
sive forms of the phantasmatic, that is, successive ways in w h i c h the 5. S i g m u n d F r e u d , " O n Narcissism: An Introduction," Standard
subject becomes dissimulated in and as the scene of its action. Edition, 14: 73­104.
6. See S i g m u n d F r e u d , " O n Narcissism: An Introduction," The 6. S i g m u n d Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. James
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Strachey (New York: N o r t o n , 1977), p. 84.
2o6 Notes to Pages 84­89 Notes to Pages 90­101 207

It is also taken up in an interesting way by W i l l i a m C o n n o l l y in his

CHAPTER 3
The Augustinian Imperative ( N e w b u r y Park, Calif.: Sage Press, 1993).
9. See my "Foucault and the Paradox of Bodily Inscriptions," Jour­
N O T E : T h i s essay was previously published in John Rajchman, ed.,
nal of Philosophy 86, no. 11 (November 1989): 257­79.
The Question of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1995).
10. See discussions of the bodily ego in F r e u d , "The Ego a n d the
1. T h e following discussion borrows from a n d expands u p o n
Id," The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund
Chapter 1 of my Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"
Freud, ed. a n d trans. James Strachey, 24 vols. (London: Hogarth , 1953­
( N e w York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 33­36.
74), 19: 26, and in Margaret Whitford , Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the
2. See Sandra Bartky, Femininity and Domination (New York: Rout­
Feminine (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 53~74­
ledge, 1990).
11. F o r a fuller explanation of Foucault's reworking of Aristotle,
3. M i c h e l Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison,
see "Bodies that Matter" i n m y Bodies that Matter, pp. 32­36.
trans. A l a n Sheridan (New York: R a n d o m House, 1979), p. 203; Sur­
12. "What was at issue was not whether the prison environment
veiller et punir: Naissance de la prison (Paris: G a l l i m a r d , 1975), p. 202.
was too harsh or too aseptic, too primitive or too efficient, but its
4. It is important to distinguish between the notion of the psyche,
very materiality as an instrument and vector of power," Discipline and
w h i c h includes the notion of the unconscious, and that of the subject,
Punish, p. 30; Surveiller et punir, p. 35.
whose formation is conditioned by the exclusion of the unconscious.
13. See Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in The Foucault
5. For an extended and rich discussion of how norms work to
subjectivate and, in particular, how norms are to be understood
Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984).
14. See Z a k i a Pathak a n d Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, "Shahbano," in
as transitive actions, see Pierre Macherey, "Towards a Natural H i s ­
Judith Butler and Joan Scott, eds., Feminists Theorize the Political ( N e w
tory of N o r m s " in T i m o t h y J. A r m s t r o n g , trans, and ed., Michel Fou­
York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 257­79.
cault/Philosopher (Routledge: N e w York, 1992), p p . 176­91. In the
same volume, for a discussion of Foucault as writing indirectly about 15. Louis Althusser, "Ideology a n d Ideological State Apparatuses

Lacan, see Jacques­Alain Miller, " M i c h e l Foucault a n d Psychoanaly­ (Notes Towards an Investigation)," Lenin and Philosophy and Other

sis," pp. 58­63. On the proble m of the dynamic relation between Essays, trans. Ben Brewster ( N e w York: M o n t h l y Review Press, 1971),
ethical demands a n d the subjectivity to w h i c h they are addressed, pp. 170­77.
see the very useful comparative discussion of Foucault and Lacan 16. For an excellent book that appropriates this Althusserian p r o b ­
in John Rajchman, Truth and Eros: Foucault, Lacan, and the Question of lematic for feminism, see Denise Riley, "Am I That Name? ": Feminism
Ethics (New York: Routledge, 1991). and the Category of 'Women in History (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesot a Press, 1988).
6. This is not to suggest that psychoanalysis is only to be repre­
sented by these two figures, although in this analysis it w i l l be. 17. See Slavoj Z i z e k on the social interpellation of the proper name

7. M i c h e l Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduc­

in The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989), pp. 87­102.

tion, tr. Robert H u r l e y (New York: R a n d o m House, 1978), p. 152; F o u ­ 18. Jacqueline Rose, Sexuality in the Field of Vision (London: Verso,

cault, La volonté de savoir (Paris: G a l l i m a r d , 1978), p. 200. 1987), pp. 90­91.

8. T h i s question is raised in a different way by Charles Taylor w h e n 19. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, pp. 95­96.
he asks whether there is a place for Augustinian "inwardness" in F o u ­ 20. Foucault, "The Subject and Power," Michel Foucault: Beyond

cault; see his "Foucault on Freedo m and Truth," in D a v i d C o u z e n s Structuralism and Hermeneutics, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabi­

H o y , éd., Foucault: A Critical Reader (New York: Blackwell, 1986), p. 99. now (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 212.
208 Notes to Pages 102­9 Notes to Pages 109­12 209

21. See the preface to Victor Burgin, James D o n a l d , and C o r a in On the Genealogy of Morals, linking the first with the capacity to
Kaplan, eds., Formations of Fantasy (London: Methuen, 1986), for a promise and the second to the problem of internalization and of debt.
psychoanalytic warning against "collapsing" the psychic and the The distinction appears not to be sustained, as it becomes apparent
social. that the being who promises can only stand for his/her future by first
22. In the above, the terms "attachment" and "investment" might becoming regular, that is, by internalizing the law or, to be precise,
be understood as intentional in the phenomenological sense, that is, "burning it into the will." Internalization, introduced in the second
as libidinal movements or trajectories w h i c h always take an object. essay, section 16, involves the turning of the w i l l (or instincts) against
There is no free­floating attachment w h i c h subsequently takes an itself. In section fifteen, Nietzsche introduces freedom as that w h i c h
object; rather, an attachment is always an attachment to an object, turns against itself in the making of bad conscience: "This instinct for
where that to w h i c h it is attached alters the attachment itself. T h e freedom forcibly made l a t e n t . . . this instinct for freedom pushed back
transferability of attachment presupposes that the object to w h i c h an and repressed, incarcerated within and finally able to discharge and
attachment is made may change, but that the attachment w i l l per­ vent itself only on itself: that, and that alone, is what the bad conscience
sist and w i l l always take some object, and that this action of binding is in its beginnings" (Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals,
to (tied always to a certain warding off) is the constitutive action of trans. Walter K a u f m a n n and R. J. Hollingdale [New York: R a n d o m
attachment. This notion of attachment seems close to certain efforts House, 1967], p. 87).
to account for drives in non­biologistic terms (to be distinguished 4. Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses
from efforts that take the biological seriously). Here one might seek (Notes Towards an Investigation)," Lenin and Philosophy and Other
recourse to Gilles Deleuze's reading of drives in Masochism: An In­ Essays, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: M o n t h l y Review Press, 1971),
terpretation of Coldness and Cruelty (New York: Braziller, 1971; Presen­ pp. 127­88; "Idéologie et appareils idéologiques d'etat," Positions
tation de Sacher­Masoch [Paris: Minuit, 1967]), in w h i c h he suggests (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1976), pp. 67­126.
that drives may be understood as the pulsionality of positing or 5. Althusser implicates his o w n writing in the version of ideologi­
valuation. See also Jean Laplanche's recent discussions in w h i c h "the cal interpellation that he explains: "it is essential to realize that both
drive" becomes indissociable from its cultural articulation: "we think he who is writing these lines and the reader who reads them are
it necessary to conceive of a dual expository stage: on the one hand, themselves subjects, and therefore ideological subjects (a tautologi­
the preliminary stage of an organism that is b o u n d to homeostasis cal proposition, i.e. that the author and the reader of these lines both
and self­preservation, and, on the other hand, the stage of the adult live 'spontaneously' or 'naturally' in ideology" (ibid., p. 171; p. 110).
cultural w o r l d in w h i c h the infant is immediately and completely i m ­ In this remark, Althusser presumes the authoritative capacities of the
mersed," }ean Laplanche: Seduction, Translation, Drives, ed. John Fletcher voice and insists that his writing, to the extent that it is ideological,
and M a r t i n Stanton (London: Institute of Contemporary Arts, 1992), addresses its reader as w o u l d a voice.
p. 187.
6. Ibid., p. 177.
7. See Kaja Silverman, The Acoustic Mirror: The Female Voice in
Psychoanalysis and Cinema (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
CHAPTER 4
1988). Silverman notes the "theological" dimension of the "voice­
1. See Walter Benjamin, On the Origins of German Tragic Drama, over" in film, w h i c h always escapes the viewer's gaze (p. 49). Silver­
trans. Peter Osborne (Cambridge: M I T Press, 1987). m a n also makes clear that the voice recognized in the cinematic pre­
2. I thank H a y d e n White for this suggestion. sentation of voice is not only the maternal voice, but a repudiated
3. Nietzsche distinguishes between conscience and bad conscience dimension of the masculine subject's o w n voice (pp. 80­81). Silver­
210 Notes to Pages 113­19 Notes to Pages 120­39 211

man's analysis sheds light on the "voice" of ideology insofar as the tence) from the ideas of the i n d i v i d u a l concerned, i.e. from h i m as a
subject w h o turns aroun d already knows the voice to w h i c h he re­ subject with a consciousness w h i c h contains the ideas of his belief.
sponds, suggesting an irreducible ambiguity between the "voice" of In this way, i.e. by means of the absolutely ideological 'conceptual'
conscience a n d the "voice" of the law. device (dispositif) thus set up (a subject endowed with a conscious­
8. See section I in Louis Althusser, L'avenir dure longtemps, suivi les ness in w h i c h he freely forms or freely recognizes ideas in w h i c h he
faits (Paris: Éditions S T O C K / I M E C , 1992). believes), the (material) attitude of the subject concerned naturally
9. Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar, Reading Capital, trans. Ben follows" (p. 167).
Brewster (London: Verso, 1970), p. 26; Lire le Capital (Paris: François 14. See Slavoj Zizek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso,
M a s p e r o , 1968). 1989), pp. 1­2.
10. Jean­Marie Vincent, " L a lecture symptomale chez Althusser," 15. M l a d e n Dolar, " B e y o n d Interpellation," Qui Parle 6, no. 2
in Futur Antérieur, éd., Sur Althusser: Passages (Paris: Éditions L ' H a r ­ (Spring­Summe r 1993): 73­96. T h e English version is a revision of the
mattan, 1993), p. 97 (my translation). original, "Jenseits der A n r u f u n g , " in Slavoj Zizek, ed., Gestalten der
11. Althusser, "Ideology a n d Ideological State Apparatuses," p. 132; Autoritt (Vienna: H o r a Verlag, 1991).
"Idéologie," p. 72. 16. Althusser, "Ideology a n d Ideological State Apparatuses," p. 166.
12. O n e might usefully compare M a x Weber's The Protestant Ethic 17. Dolar, "Beyond Interpellation," p. 76.
w i t h Althusser on this point. In both, labor is effectively guaranteed 18. Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," pp.
through a C h r i s t i a n ethic, although in Althusser the religious inflec­ 169­70; "Idéologie," p. 109.
tion appears to be more Catholic than Protestant. 19. Dolar, "Beyond Interpellation," p. 78.
13. Pierre B o u r d i e u elaborates the concept of the habitus in The 20. G i o r g i o Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. Michael
Logic of Practice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), pp. 66­79, H a r d t (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 43.
where he analyzes the embodied rituals of everydayness by w h i c h a
given culture produces and sustains belief in its o w n "obviousness."
CHAPTER 5
B o u r d i e u underscores the place of the body, its gestures, its stylistics,
its unconscious "knowingness" as the site for the reconstitution of a N O T E : T h i s paper was first presented at the D i v i s i o n 39 Meetings of
practical sense without w h i c h social reality c o u l d not be constituted. the A m e r i c a n Psychological Association i n N e w York C i t y i n A p r i l
Bourdieu's notion of the habitus might well be read as a reformula­ 1993. It was subsequently published wit h the replies from a n d to
tion of Althusser's notion of ideology. Whereas Althusser writes that Adam Phillips in Psychoanalytic Dialogues: A journal of Relational Per­
ideology constitutes the "obviousness" of the subject, but that this spectives 5 no. 2 (1995): 165­94.
obviousness is the effect of a dispositif, the same term reemerges in 1. Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, in The Standard Edition of the
Bourdie u to describe the way in w h i c h a habitus generates certain Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. and trans. James
beliefs. F o r B o u r d i e u, dispositions are generative and transposable. Strachey, 24 vols. (London: H o g a r t h , 1953­74), 9 x :

Note in Althusser's "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses"
the inception of this latter reappropriation: " A n i n d i v i d u a l believes in
G o d , or Duty, or Justice, etc. This belief derives (for everyone, i.e. for
all those w h o live in an ideological representation of ideology, w h i c h
reduces ideology to ideas endowed by definition with a spiritual exis­
2. Presumably, sexuality must be trained away from things, ani­
mals, parts of all of the above, a n d narcissistic attachments of vari­
ous kinds.
3. The notion of foreclosure has become Lacanian terminology for
Freud's notion of Verwerfung. Distinguished from repression under­
 212 Notes to Pages 140­53 Notes to Pages 156­74. 213

stood as an action by an already­formed subject, foreclosure is an act 5. Q u o t e d i n S. D u n n , Walking Light (New York: N o r t o n , 1993).
of negation that founds and forms the subject. See the entry " F o r c l u ­ 6. M a r y Douglas, Purity and Danger (London, Routledge, 1966).
sion" in J. Laplanche and J.­B. Pontalis, Vocabulaire de la psychanalyse
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1967), pp. 163­67.
CHAPTER 6
4. Sigmund F r e u d , " M o u r n i n g and Melancholia," Standard Edition,
14: 169. 1. See Eric Santner, Stranded Objects: Mourning, Memory, and Film in
5. S i g m u n d F r e u d , " O n Narcissism: An Introduction," Standard Postwar Germany (Ithaca: C o r n e l l University Press, 1990), and Alex­
Edition, 14: 81­82. ander and Margarate Mitscherlich, The Inability to Mourn: Principles
6. See F r e u d , Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. James Strachey, of Collective Behavior, trans. Beverley R. Placzek ( N ew York: G r o v e
(New York: Norton, 1977), pp. 81­92. Press, 1975). See also, for a feminist account that situates melancho­
7. See "Contagious W o r d : 'Homosexuality' and the Military," in lia within the production of sexual difference, Juliana Schiesari, The
m y Excitable Speech (New York: Routledge, 1996). Gendering of Melancholia: Feminism, Psychoanalysis, and the Symbolics of

8. See m y Bodies That Matter (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 169­ Loss in Renaissance Literature (Ithaca: C o r n e l l University Press, 1992).
77­ 2. S i g m u n d F r e u d , " M o u r n i n g and Melancholia," The Standard Edi­
9. T h e following argument is taken from my Bodies That Matter, pp. tion of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed. and trans.

233­36. James Strachey, 24 vols. (London: Hogarth, 1953­74), 14: 256.

10. See " F r e u d and the Melancholia of G e n d e r " in my Gender 3. H e r e Melanie Klein's trenchant intervention on the relation of
Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, melancholia to paranoia and manic­depressive states does not carry
1990). the analysis far enough. H e r theory tends to rely on tropes of inter­
11. This is not to suggest that an exclusionary matrix rigorously nality without asking whether such tropes are the effects of a melan­
distinguishes between how one identifies and how one desires; it is cholia that they seek to explain. See "A Contribution to the Psycho­
quite possible to have overlapping identification and desire in hetero­ genesis of Manic­Depressive States" (1935) and " M o u r n i n g and Its
sexual or homosexual exchange, or in a bisexual history of sexual Relation to Manic­Depressive States" (1935) i n The Selected Melanie
practice. Furthermore, "masculinity" and "femininity" do not ex­ Klein, ed. Juliet Mitchell (London: Penguin, 1986). F o r an excellent
haust the terms for either eroticized identification or desire. essay on K l e i n and the p r i m a r y status of aggression, see Jacqueline
12. See Douglas C r i m p , " M o u r n i n g and Militancy," October 51 Rose's "Negativity in the W o r k of Melanie Klein," in Why War? —
(Winter 1989): 97­107. Psychoanalysis, Politics, and the Return to Melanie Klein (Oxford: Basil

13. L eo Bersani, The Freudian Body: Psychoanalysis and Art (New Blackwell, 1993), pp. 137­90.
York: C o l u m b i a University Press, 1986), pp. 64­66,112­13. 4. H e r e F r e u d replaces the term Sachvorstellung, used in his essay
"The Unconscious" (Standard Edition, 14: 201), by Dingvorstellung.
Notes to Phillips Reply In the Standard Edition, James Strachey notes that Dingvorstellung

1. F r e u d , The Ego and the Id, 19: 12­59. appears in The Interpretation of Dreams in the discussion of jokes.
The distinction is that between a word­presentation and a thing­
2. M i k k e l Borch­Jacobsen, The Emotional Tie (Stanford: Stanford
presentation. Strachey explains that the latter consists in "the ca­
University Press, 1993); Leo Bersani, The Freudian Body.
thexis, if not of the direct memory­images of the thing, at least of
3. Freud, Three Essays on the History of Sexuality, Standard Edition, 7:
125­243. remoter memory­traces derived from these" (ibid.).

4. F r e u d , " M o u r n i n g and Melancholia." 5. F r e u d concedes as m u c h earlier in the essay w h e n he remarks

214 Notes to Pages 174­95 Notes to Page 195 215

that "the loss of a love object is an excellent opportunity for the a m ­ for "heteropathic identification" in The Threshold of the Visible World
bivalence in love­relationships to make itself effective and come into (New York: Routledge, 1996). Based in quite different psychoanalytic
the open" (250­51). Toward the end of the essay, F r e u d remarks u p o n views, each has contested the centrality of incorporation and super­
"an essential analogy between m o u r n i n g and melancholia": m o u r n ­ egoic functions in the account of internalization.
ing impels the ego to detach from its lost object in order to continue to 17. Jacques Derrida, remarks, Humanities Research Institute, U n i ­
live, and melancholia, through "the struggle of ambivalence loosen(s) versity of California, Irvine, A p r i l 5,1995.
the fixation of the libido to the object by disparaging it" (257).
6. Walter Benjamin, The Origin of the German Tragic Drama, trans.
John Osborne (London: N L B , 1977), pp. 92­97.
7. S i g m u n d F r e u d , "Trauer u n d Melancholie," Psychologie des Un­
bewussten, Studienausgabe (Frankfurt a. M . : S. Fischer, 1982), 193­212.
8. See Roy Schaefer, A New Language for Psychoanalysis (New
H a v e n : Yale University Press, 1976), p. 177. For a view of fantasy
that operates within melancholia, see chapter one of Nicolas A b r a ­
ham and Maria Torok, The Shell and the Kernel: Renewals of Psycho­
analysis, tr. and ed. Nicholas T. Rand (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1994).
9. "The image of man's body is the principle of every unity he
perceives in objects . . . all the objects of his w o r l d are always struc­
tured a r o u nd the wandering shadow of his o w n ego [l'ombre errante de
son propre moi]" (Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II,
trans. Sylvana Tomaselli [ N e w York: W. W. N o r t o n , 1991], p. 166; Le
Séminaire, livre II [Paris: Seuil, 1978], p. 198).
10. Sigmund Freud , The Ego and the Id, The Standard Edition, 19: 54.
("Wie kommt es nun, dass bei der Melancholie das der Ich zu einer
A r t Sammelstàtte der Todestriebe werden kann?")
11. On p r i m a r y mimesis, see M i k k e l Borch­Jacobsen, The Emotional
Tie: Psychoanalysis, Mimesis, and Affect (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1993).
12. H o m i K. Bhabha, "Postcolonial Authority and Postmodern
Guilt," in Lawrence Grossberg et al., eds., Cultural Studies: A Reader
( N e w York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 65­66.
13. Ibid., p. 66.
14. F r e u d , The Ego and the Id, p. 253.
15. F r e u d , " M o u r n i n g and Melancholia," p. 254.
16. Jessica Benjamin has argued something similar in Bonds of Love
(New York: Pantheon, 1988), and Kaja Silverman has made the case
 Index
Abraham, Nicolas, 214118
Agamben, Giorgio, 130­31, 2111120
agency, 10,13­16
AIDS, 27, 138,148, 154
Althusser, Louis, 2, 5­6, 30, 95­
96, 106­31, 207ni5, 20904­6,
21008­9, 2 i o n n
Aristotle, 90­91, 207ml
Bartky, Sandra, 2o6n2
Bhabha, Homi, 190, 214012
Benjamin, Jessica, 2i4ni6
Benjamin, Walter, 174, 208m,
21406
Bersani, Leo, 2i2n3
body, 35­36, 42­43, 47­48, 51,
54­55­ 57, 59­ 68, 83­87, 89­91
Borch­Jacobsen, Mikkel, 152, 189,
212n2
Bourdieu, Pierre, 2ion3
Brown, Wendy, 202n2
Connolly, William, 20708
conscience, 18, 22­24, 63­64, 67­
69, 71, 107, 109, 114, 115, 118,
129, 132­33, 172, 181, 183, 185,
188,191­97
Crimp, Douglas, 212012
death, 27, 41­43,142
Deleuze, Gilles, 2o8n22
Derrida, Jacques, 195, 215017
desire, 22­23, 39~4°< 61­62,103,
108, 193­94
Dolar, Mladen, 120­26, 2 i m i 5
Douglas, Mary, 159
foreclosure, 8­9, 23
Foucault, Michel, 2­3, 5­7, 16, 18,
25» 31­33* 53/ 58­60, 83­105,
203n6, 204n2, 20404, 20507,
20603, 20607, 207019­20
Freud, Sigmuod, 22, 34, 53, 55­
58, 60­61, 63, 69, 78­82,132­52,
167­95, 20406, 20504­8
grief, 24, 138­40, 145­47
guilt, 25, 73­74,107­9, 118­19,141
Hegel, G. W. F., 3, 23, 24, 31­61,
176,193
homosexuality, 23, 80, 82, 93­94,
133­50, 163­66
ioterpellatioo, 106­11,128­29, 1­97
Jones, Eroest, 156
218
Kierkegaard, Soren, 48
Klein, Melanie, 25, 153, 170,
203ni3, 21303
Lacan, Jacques, 87, 94­98, 115, 122,
124,127, 152, 187, 202n2, 203n7,
2 i i n 3 , 21409
Laplanche, Jean, 2 0 4 ^ , 2o8n22
love, 7­8, 25­27, 127­28,168, 171
Macherey, Pierre, 2o6n5
Marcuse, Herbert, 58
masochism, 102
melancholia, 19, 23,133­97
Miller, Jacques­Alain, 2o6n5
Mitscherlich, Alexander and
Margarete, 213m
norms, 19, 21, 25, 28, 32, 99
paranoia, 27, 80
Pathak, Zakia, 207ni4
performatives, 110,114
Phillips, Adam, 151­65
Pontalis, J.­B., 2 0 4 ^
psychoanalysis, 6­7, 11, 25, 55,
86­87, !38/144­46,156­65,198
Quintillian, Marcus, 201m
rage, 180­81,183,190,193,195
Rajan, Rajeswari Sunder, 207ni4
Rajchman, John, 2o6n5
Riley, Denise, 207ni6
Index
Rose, Jacqueline, 97, 207ni8
sadism, 46
Santner, Eric, 213m
Schaefer, Roy, 2i4n8
Silverman, Kaja, 20907, 2i4ni6
sociality, 21, 29, 165, 178­79,
181­82, 185, 196, 198
soul, 76, 85­86, 89­91
Spinoza, Benedict de, 27, 62,
203~4ni4
Spivak, Gayatry Chakravorty,
203ni2
sublimation, 92
survival, 7, 28, 193,195­96
Taylor, Charles, 2o6n8
Torok, Maria, 2i4n8
turn, trope of the, 3­4, 68, 76,
81,106­7, H4 5> !30/140­42,
_1
168­69, 189, 193,197­98
Valéry, Paul, 156
Vincent, Jean­Marie, 113­14,
2ionio
Weber, Max, 2ioni2
White, Hayden, 201m, 2o8n2
Whitford, Margaret, 207nio
will, 63­66, 69­70, 72­73, 76­77
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 124
Zizek, Slavoj, 207ni7, 2 i m i 4
Library of Congress Cataloging­in­Publication Data

Butler, Judith P.
T h e psychic life of power : theories in subjection / Judith
Butler.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references a n d index.
ISBN 0­8047­2811­9 (cl.) : ISBN 0­8047­2812­7 (pbk.)
1. Self (Philosophy) 2. Power (Philosophy) 3. Self—Social
aspects. 4. Power (Social sciences) I. Title.
BD438.5.B88 1997
126—dc21 96­40851
CIP

® T h i s book is printed on acid­free, recycled paper.

O r i g i n a l printing 1997
Last figure below indicates year of this printing:
07 06 05 04 03 02 01
CRITICAL THEORY; PHILOSOPHY

T H E PSYCHIC LIFE OF P O W E R
Theories in Subjection

JUDITH BUTLER

As a form of power, subjection is paradoxical. To be dominated by a power

external to oneself is a familiar a n d agonizing form power takes. To find, h o w ­
ever, that what "one" is, one's very formation as a subject, is dependent u p o n
that very power is quite another. If, following Foucault, we understand power
as forming the subject as well, it provides the very condition of its existence
and the trajectory of its desire. Power is not s i m p l y what we d e p e n d on for
our existence but that w h i c h forms reflexivity as well. D r a w i n g u p o n Hegel,
Nietzsche, Freud, Foucault, and Althusser, this challenging and lucid work
offers a theory of subject formation that illuminates as ambivalent the psychic
effects of social power.
If we take Hegel a n d Nietzsche seriously, then the "inner life" of conscious­
ness a n d , indeed, of conscience, not only is fabricated by power, but becomes
one of the ways in w h i c h power is anchored in subjectivity. The author con­
siders the way in w h i c h psychic life is generated by the social operation of
power, a n d how that social operation of power is concealed a n d fortified by
the psyche that it produces. Power is no longer understood to be "internal­
i z e d " by an existing subject, but the subject is spawned as an ambivalent effect
of power, one that is staged through the operation of conscience.
To claim that power fabricates the psyche is also to claim that there is a fic­
tional and fabricated quality to the psyche. The figure of a psyche that "turns
against itself" is crucial to this study, and offers an alternative to describing
power as "internalized." A l t h o u g h most readers of Foucault eschew psycho­
analytic theory, and most thinkers of the psyche eschew Foucault, the author
seeks to theorize this ambivalent relation between the social a n d the psychic
as one of the most d y n a m i c a n d difficult effects of power.
This w o r k combines social theory, philosophy, and psychoanalysis in novel
ways, offering a more sustained analysis of the theory of subject formation
implicit in such other works of the author as Bodies That Matter: On the
Discursive Limits of "Sex" and Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of
Identity.

Judith Butler is Chancellor's Professor of Rheti

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