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Review: [untitled] Author(s): Catalina Smulovitz Source: Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 34, No.

2 (Summer, 1992), pp. 179-181 Published by: Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Miami Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/166033 . Accessed: 03/07/2011 17:41
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Book Reviews

AND INSTITUTIONS: IDEAS DEVELOPMENTSikkink,Kathryn. IN AND ARGENTINA. ALISM BRAZIL Ithaca, NY: Cornell UniversityPress, 1991. Tables, figures, index, 263 pp.
TDEAS AND INS7Tl TIONS:Developmentalism in Brazil and

Argentina deals with two basic questions: (1) how ideas, those concerned with economic development, were particularly in Argentinaand Brazil,and (2) what factorsdetermined adopted the differentfate of the policy programsbased on those ideas. Inthe 1950's, in Kubitschek Brazil andFrondizi came inArgentina to similarassessmentsas to the causes of underdevelopmentand arrivedat similarpolicy responses to deal with their respective commonpremises, two leaders situations. the Operatingfrom pursued
very similar orientations:(1) to institutepolicies of intensive, vertical,

industrialization focussed upon basic, highimport-substituting priority industrial sectors, (2) to pursue foreign capital, both public and private, in order to acquire needed investment as ofthestateto channel rapidlyas possible, and (3) to use theinfluence into priority areas(p. 33). However, despite these privateinitiative similarities assessmentand response,the politicaland economic of resultsof these developmentprograms Not variedsignificantly. only was Brazil more successfulin promoting both generallyand growth, in the industrial sector(pp. 210-211),butthe Kubitschek govemment was also more successful than Frondizi's in mobilizing the technical and political resources to and necessary implement consolidate the development(pp. 219-235).Kathryn Sikkink explainsthese in differences outcomeas a consequenceofotherdifferences between the two countries: theirinstitutional in in structures, the way each of theseLin American reformers exercised and leadership, inthe degree of politicaloppositioninvolved. In regard to institutionalstructure,Sikkink points out that
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STUDIESAND WORLDAFFAIRS JOURNALOF INTERAMERICAN

the Kubitschek administration in Brazil could count on implementing its policies through the pockets of expertise and administrativeautonomy existing within the state bureaucracy. On the other hand, the Frondizi government in Argentina lacked such an insulated bureaucracy and, in formulating and implementing its policies, attempted to bypass the bureaucracy. The author contends that the differences in the nature of their respective state institutions affected the implementation and, in turn, the success of the development policies. The lack of a stable administrativestructure in Argentina prevented the establishment and accumulation of intellectual talent that would have been possible in a more insulated bureaucracy. As a result, this lack impeded the emergence of institutions capable of reflecting, and implementing, the policy orientation of the executive branch.The response of the Frondiziregime was to create a parallelbureaucracy,which not only failed to increase the state's ability to direct economic policy but also provoked questions as to the legitimacy of its policy procedures. The political context in which these policies took place also affected their success or failure. According to the author, in Brazilthe pro-development policies merged with populism, thus increasing their mass appeal and allowing Kubitschek to mobilize his political resources effectively in support of his program. The situation was very different in Argentina where the new development policies were viewed as a response to, as well as a break with, those of peronist populism. In contrast to Kubitschek, therefore, Frondizi was faced with the need to "win" his populist support. The tension between having to break with peronist policies on the one hand, while wooing its erstwhile supporters on the other, placed the Frondizi government in a difficult position. For a variety of reasons, then, Frondizi ended up alienating all his potential supporters: industrialists, peronists, the military, and opposition parties. Throughout her book, the author develops a complex, but convincing, comparative argumentto explain why the drive for development met with greatersuccess in Brazilthan in Argentina. Although one might question some of her arguments,there is no doubt that she has exhaustively explored the issue of how to

BOOK REVIEWS

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explain differences in policy outcomes. One could argue that, given the nature and intensity of the political conflict that characterizedArgentina'spost-peronist period, no bureaucracy, no matterhow insulated, could have guaranteed the success of a given policy. However, at that point we are only left with the possibility of dealing with contrafactualarguments. Nevertheless, by the end of Ideas andInstitutions, we are left with an unresolved problem. The question of how and why developmentalist ideas were adopted, and their results, is obscured by the assessment of the policy implementation process. Indeed, it never does become clear as to just why certain ideas are/were adopted nor what the relationship is between the adoption of new ideas and political change. Does their significance lie in who (top policymakers) adopts these ideas? If so, then the Argentine experience suggests that adoption of new ideas by top policymakers is by no means a sufficient condition for political change. Does their significance rest in their ability to generate consensus? If that should be the case, then the principal question should not be whether or not policymakers adopt a new set of ideas but how they are able to generate consensus regarding new policies. Indeed, as the comparison between these cases demonstrate, the nexus of the impact of ideas on politics appears to center more on how consensus is generated rather than on why political leaders adopt certain ideas. As politicians and political analysts know, the question of how to generate, and maintain, lasting consensus remains a mystery and ever-elusive political problem. This unresolved problem, then, indicates that the author was right to raise the question of the relationship between ideas and political life. Although her effort may not produce all the answers, it does emphasize the paucity of research in this area and helps to establish the parameters of the problems as well as the central issues that need to be tackled. Catalina Smulovitz Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad (Argentina)

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