PSV Manual

Safety and Relief Valve Testing and Maintenance Guide
R I A L
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Technical Report
Effective December 6, 2006, this report has been made publicly available in accordance with Section 734.3(b)(3) and published in accordance with Section 734.7 of the U.S. Export Administration Regulations. As a result of this publication, this report is subject to only copyright protection and does not require any license agreement from EPRI. This notice supersedes the export control restrictions and any proprietary licensed material notices embedded in the document prior to publication.
EPRI
Powering Progress
R E P O R T
S U M M A R Y

This guide gives a broad overview of self actuated and power operated pressure relief devices (PRDs) safety, relief, safety relief, and power-operated relief valves and their application and maintenance. The non-reclosing devices, like the rupture discs, are outside the scope of this guide. The information in this guide, though directed towards the nuclear power plant personnel, will assist all power plant personnel responsible for the maintenance of PRDs. This guide can also be used by training instructors to develop course materials.
INTEREST CATEGORIES Nuclear Plant Operations and Maintenance Nuclear plant life extension Engineering and Technical Support Maintenance support KEYWORDS Maintenance Relief valves Valves Maintainability
BACKGROUND In nuclear power plant applications, a high demand of reliability is placed on safety and relief valves. These valves might be required to open for accident mitigation and reseat after system pressure is reduced and returned to normal operating conditions. Certain recent incidents involving improper operation of the relief valves in nuclear power plants have raised concern about their operability within the specified limits. This guide has been developed to provide utility personnel with a background on valve design, selection, application, maintenance, repair, refurbishment, and testing to gain a thorough understanding of the principles and operating mechanisms of PRDs. OBJECTIVES To provide general information on PRDs To provide necessary guidance to power plant personnel responsible for selection, maintenance and testing of PRDs. APPROACH EPRI organized a Technical Advisory Group (TAG) consisting of PWR and BWR utility personnel, leading relief valve manufacturers and USNRC to provide input and review the guide. Plant visits were conducted and personnel from the manufacturers and various utilities were interviewed for detailed information. The Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS) and Licensee Event Report (LER) databases provided information on reported failures and their causes by valve type. Highlights of ASME Code requirements for testing of safety valves along with guidelines on bench testing with auxiliary-lift devices are also included, as well as recommendations on predictive and preventive maintenance. RESULTS This guide attempts to address the concerns of the operating nuclear utilities as expressed in various documents (SERs & SOERs) issued by the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), and the USNRC in its report AEOD/S92-02. This guide is divided in 10 sections that progress as information builds from previous sections. Persons being introduced into the field of safety and relief valves should approach this guide beginning to end. Experienced technicians looking for specific information should refer to specific topical sections. Appendices provide advanced information.
EPRI TR-105872s
Electric Power Research Institute
August 1996
EPRI PERSPECTIVE During the period 19801982, EPRI and General Electric conducted extensive research on pressurized water reactor and boiling water reactor safety and relief valves. Summary of this research is published in the EPRI report EPRI NP-4306SR. This NMAC document has drawn information from this report as well as other sources. This guide is designed to help utilities understand the root causes of any PRD problems, and mitigate them. Certain aspects of the PRD problems (for example, setpoint drift) are not well understood and are still being studied by the manufacturers and the various owners groups. These aspects have been identified and temporary remedies have been suggested. This guide can also be effectively adapted for training of plant personnel. PROJECT Work Order 2814-82 EPRI Project Manager: Vic Varma Nuclear Maintenance Applications Center Nuclear Power Group Contractor: QES, Inc. For further information on EPRI research programs, call EPRI Technical Information Specialists 415/855-2411.

TR-105872 Work Order 2814-82 Final Report, August 1996
Prepared by QES Inc. One Shell Square New Orleans, LA 70139
Edited by J.R. (Dick) Zahorsky 32 Quince Island Road Franklin, MA 02038 Engineering Consultant (Chief Engineer-Retired) Crosby Valve and Gage Company
Prepared for Nuclear Maintenance Applications Center 1300 Harris Boulevard Charlotte, North Carolina 28262 Operated by Electric Power Research Institute 3412 Hillview Avenue Palo Alto, California 94304 EPRI Project Manager V. Varma
DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES AND LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES

THIS REPORT WAS PREPARED BY THE ORGANIZATION(S) NAMED BELOW AS AN ACCOUNT OF WORK SPONSORED OR COSPONSORED BY THE ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INC. (EPRI). NEITHER EPRI, ANY MEMBER OF EPRI, ANY COSPONSOR, THE ORGANIZATION(S) BELOW, NOR ANY PERSON ACTING ON BEHALF OF ANY OF THEM: A) MAKES ANY WARRANTY OR REPRESENTATION WHATSOEVER, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, (I) WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF ANY INFORMATION, APPARATUS, METHOD, PROCESS, OR SIMILAR ITEM DISCLOSED IN THIS REPORT, INCLUDING MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR (II) THAT SUCH USE DOES NOT INFRINGE ON OR INTERFERE WITH PRIVATELY OWNED RIGHTS, INCLUDING ANY PARTYS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, OR (III) THAT THIS REPORT IS SUITABLE TO ANY PARTICULAR USERS CIRCUMSTANCE; OR (B) ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY WHATSOEVER (INCLUDING ANY CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF EPRI OR ANY EPRI REPRESENTATIVE HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES) RESULTING FROM YOUR SELECTION OR USE OF THIS REPORT OR ANY INFORMATION, APPARATUS, METHOD, PROCESS, OR SIMILAR ITEM DISCLOSED IN THIS REPORT. ORGANIZATION(S) THAT PREPARED THIS REPORT QES Inc.
ORDERING INFORMATION
Price: $25,000.00 Requests for copies of this report should be directed to the Nuclear Power Maintenance Applications Center (NMAC), 1300 Harris Boulevard, Charlotte, NC 28262, 800/356-7448. There is no charge for reports requested by NMAC member utilities.
Electric Power Research Institute and EPRI are registered service marks of Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. Copyright 1995 Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. All rights reserved.
EPRI Licensed Material Safety and Relief Valve Testing and Maintenance Guide
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The NMAC Safety and Relief Valve Guide was developed with the help of many organizations and individuals. We specially wish to recognize the following individuals who volunteered to form the Technical Advisory Group and freely contributed their time and knowledge in molding this guide into its present form. Robert Wright David Thibault Rolland Huffman Steve Hart Jack Wade Willard Roit William Phillips Richard Langseder Richard Simmons Barry Catanese Peter Seniuk John ONeil Mary Wegner Tom Nederostek Kerry Craft Patrick Turrentine Crosby Valve & Gage Co. Crosby Valve & Gage Co. Dresser Industries Duke Power Co. Entergy Operations General Electric Company Omaha Public Power District Target Rock Corporation Tennessee Valley Authority Toledo Edison Co. Toledo Edison Co. Toledo Edison Co. USNRC Westinghouse Electric Wisconsin Electric Co. Wyle Laboratories
Robert Gwinn and Jim Petro at the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station were instrumental in providing technical input and relief valve failure analysis. Particular thanks are extended to the staff of the following plants for their time and effort in support of the site visits performed during this project: North Atlantic Energy Service Co., Seabrook Nuclear Power Station Toledo Edison, Davis-Besse Niagara Mohawk, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Baltimore Gas & Electric, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Finally, the support of the following utilities, manufactures, and test facilities was invaluable both for technical clarifications, supplying the technical manuals, drawings, procedures and information, and/or allowing on site visits to support the guides development and content. Omaha public Power District, Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station Tennessee Valley Authority, Corporate Maintenance Support Crosby Valve & Gage Company Dresser Industries
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EPRI Licensed Material Nuclear Maintenance Applications Center
Furmanite, Inc. G. E. Nuclear Energy Target Rock Corporation The National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors Westinghouse Electric Wyle Laboratories
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CONTENTS
Section No. 1.0 2.0 3.0 Page No.
SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................ 1-1 SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................................... 2-1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................. 3-1 3.1 3.2 Purpose ............................................................................................................................... 3-1 Organization of This Guide ................................................................................................ 3-2
4.0
TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF PRVS ......................................................................................... 4-1 4.1 Types of PRVs and Functional Descriptions ................................................................... 4-1 4.1.1 General Description ................................................................................................. 4-1 4.1.2 PRV Design Theory ................................................................................................. 4-5 4.1.3 Safety Relief and Relief Valves .............................................................................. 4-14 4.1.4 Operational Characteristics of PRDs ..................................................................... 4-21 Nuclear Power Plant PRVs ............................................................................................... 4.2.1 Pressurizer PRVs .................................................................................................. 4.2.2 BWR Main Steam Service PRVs ........................................................................... 4.2.3 PWR Pressurizer Power-Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) ................................... 4.2.4 PWR Secondary System Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) ............................. 4.2.5 Auxiliary and Secondary System/BOP Safety Relief and Relief Valves ................ 4-24 4-25 4-37 4-47 4-56 4-60
4.2
5.0
FAILURE MODES AND FAILURE CAUSE ANALYSIS ................................................................. 5-1 5.0 5.1 5.2 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 5-1 Failure Mode and Cause Analysis ..................................................................................... 5-1 Failure Mode and Cause Classification ............................................................................ 5-3 5.2.1 Failure Modes .......................................................................................................... 5-3 5.2.2 Failure Mode Causes ............................................................................................... 5-4 Safety 5.3.1 5.3.2 5.3.3 5.3.4 5.3.5 and Relief Valve Failure Data ................................................................................. 5-6 BWR MSS/Relief Valve Failures .............................................................................. 5-7 PWR Pressurizer Safety Valve Failures ................................................................ 5-10 PWR MSSV Failures ............................................................................................. 5-12 PWR PORV Failures ............................................................................................. 5-14 Relief Valve Failures .............................................................................................. 5-14
5.3
5.4 5.5
Failure Modes Analysis .................................................................................................... 5-16 Causes of Failure Analysis .............................................................................................. 5-17 5.5.1 Aging ...................................................................................................................... 5-18 5.5.2 Disc-to-Seat Bonding ............................................................................................. 5-18 Failure Significance on Outage Durations ..................................................................... 5-19
5.6
EPRI Licensed Material Nuclear Maintenance Applications Center Section No. 6.0 Page No.
PRD TESTING ................................................................................................................................ 6-1 6.1 6.2 6.3 Codes Governing Safety-Related PRV Testing ................................................................ 6-1 Codes Governing Non-Safety-Related PRV Testing ........................................................ 6-2 6.2.1 Allowable Overpressure ............................................................................................... 6-2 General Test Requirements ............................................................................................... 6.3.1 Test Methods ........................................................................................................... 6.3.2 On-Site Bench Testing ............................................................................................. 6.3.3 Auxiliary Lift Devices (ALDs) ................................................................................... 6.3.4 Developing a Repeatable Test ................................................................................. 6-3 6-3 6-4 6-5 6-6
6.4 6.5
In Situ Testing .................................................................................................................... 6-11 6.4.1 ALDs ....................................................................................................................... 6-11 Testing for Ambient Temperature Conditions ................................................................ 6-15 6.5.1 Thermal Profile Mapping ........................................................................................ 6-15 6.5.2 Temperature Profile ............................................................................................... 6-17 Pilot-Operated Relief Valves ............................................................................................ 6-17 Setpoint Drift ..................................................................................................................... 6-18
6.6 6.7 7.0
HANDLING AND SHIPPING OF SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVES ............................................... 7-1 7.1 Handling of Safety and Relief Valves ................................................................................ 7-1 7.1.1 Typical Rigging and Handling Instructions: Target Rock Safety and Relief Valves (Including Valve Auxiliary Equipment Removal) .......................... 7-2 7.1.2 Typical Rigging and Handling Instructions: Consolidated, Crosby, and Dresser Safety and Relief Valves ............................................................................ 7-8 7.1.3 PRD Cleanliness Control Instructions (at Workstation or Maintenance Shop) ...... 7-13 7.1.4 PRD Storage .......................................................................................................... 7-14 PRD Shipping to an Off-Site Vendor for Inspection and Testing ................................. 7.2.1 PRD Preparation for Shipment .............................................................................. 7.2.2 PRD Valve Receipt (Typical) .................................................................................. 7.2.3 PRD Packaging and Return Shipment Preparation ............................................... 7.2.4 PRD Documentation and Procedures .................................................................... 7.2.5 PRD QA Requirements .......................................................................................... 7-14 7-15 7-18 7-19 7-20 7-21
7.2
8.0
MAINTENANCE AND PERFORMANCE TRENDING .................................................................... 8-1 8.1 Predictive Maintenance and Inspection ........................................................................... 8.1.1 Parts Control ............................................................................................................ 8.1.2 Visual Inspection ...................................................................................................... 8.1.3 Acoustic Monitoring ................................................................................................. 8.1.4 Temperature Monitoring ........................................................................................... Trending Safety and Relief Valve Performance and Maintenance History .................... 8.2.1 Safety and Safety Relief Valve Performance and Maintenance Trending ............... 8.2.2 NPRDS Trending and Failure Codes ....................................................................... 8.2.3 Trending and Analysis of Adverse Conditions ......................................................... 8-1 8-1 8-2 8-4 8-4 8-6 8-6 8-8 8-9
8.2
8.3
Preventive Maintenance (PM) and Inspection .................................................................. 8-9 8.3.1 Valve External ........................................................................................................ 8-10 8.3.2 Valve Internals ....................................................................................................... 8-13 Generic Corrective Maintenance ..................................................................................... 8-33 8.4.1 Lapping .................................................................................................................. 8-33
8.4
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EPRI Licensed Material Safety and Relief Valve Testing and Maintenance Guide Section No. 8.5 8.6 Page No.
PRV Control Rings and Their Settings .......................................................................... 8-42 Disassembling and Assembling Typical PRVs .............................................................. 8-43 8.6.1 Disassembling and Assembling Pressurizer Safety Valve ..................................... 8-43 8.6.2 General Information ............................................................................................... 8-45 Pressurizer Valve Disassembly ....................................................................................... 8.7.1 Remove the Cap .................................................................................................... 8.7.2 Record Ring Settings ............................................................................................. 8.7.3 Disassembly Retaining Spring Compression ......................................................... 8.7.4 Disassembly without Retaining Spring Compression ............................................ Pressurizer Valve Assembly ............................................................................................ 8.8.1 General .................................................................................................................. 8.8.2 Assembly of Valve with Spring Compression Retained ......................................... 8.8.3 Assembling a Pressurizer PRV .............................................................................. 8-45 8-45 8-45 8-45 8-48 8-49 8-49 8-49 8-51
8.7
8.8
8.9
Disassembly and Assembly of MSSVs ........................................................................... 8-52 8.9.1 General Information ............................................................................................... 8-54 8.9.2 MSSV Disassembly ............................................................................................... 8-54 MSSV Assembly ................................................................................................................ 8.10.1 General .................................................................................................................. 8.10.2 Assembly of Valve (Spring Compression Not Retained) ....................................... 8.10.3 Assembly of Valve (Spring Compression Retained) .............................................. Auxiliary PRVs .................................................................................................................. 8.11.1 General Information ............................................................................................... 8.11.2 Disassembling Auxiliary PRVs .............................................................................. 8.11.3 Assembling Auxiliary PRVs .................................................................................... 8.11.4 Assembly ............................................................................................................... 8.11.5 Troubleshooting ..................................................................................................... 8-59 8-59 8-60 8-61 8-62 8-63 8-64 8-67 8-67 8-69
8.10
8.11
8.12 9.0
Summary ........................................................................................................................... 8-70
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS ........................................................................ 9-1 9.1 Codes and Standards for Training .................................................................................... 9-1 9.1.1 PTC-25.3 Training and Qualification Requirements ................................................ 9-1 9.1.2. OM-1 Training and Qualification Requirements ....................................................... 9-2 The NBBI.............................................................................................................................. 9-2 9.2.1 NB-65 Training and Personnel Qualifications .......................................................... 9-3 9.2.2 Repair Facility Certification ...................................................................................... 9-3 Site Training and Personnel Qualifications ...................................................................... 9.3.1 Program Elements ................................................................................................... 9.3.2 Training Aids ............................................................................................................ 9.3.3 On-the-Job Training (OJT) ....................................................................................... 9-4 9-4 9-5 9-6
9.2
9.3
10.0 INDUSTRY DATA AND CONTACTS ............................................................................................. 10-1 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 Safety and Relief Valve Testing Facilities ....................................................................... 10-1 Safety and Relief Valve Manufacturers ........................................................................... 10-2 ALD Manufacturers ........................................................................................................... 10-4 Safety and Relief Valve Types, Applications, and Distribution .................................... 10-5
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EPRI Licensed Material Nuclear Maintenance Applications Center Section No. Page No.
APPENDIX A: SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVE MAINTENANCE GUIDELINE REFERENCES ............. A-1 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Documents .................................................... A-1 Information Notices ............................................................................................................... A-1 Generic Letters ..................................................................................................................... A-2 Bulletins and Reports ................................................................................................................... A-2 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Documents ....................................................... A-2 Significant Operating Experience Report (SOER) ................................................................ A-2 Significant Experience Report (SER) .................................................................................... A-2 Codes and Standards.................................................................................................................... A-3 American Society of Mechanical Engineers ......................................................................... A-3 Vendor Technical Manuals ............................................................................................................ A-4 EPRI Reports .................................................................................................................................. A-4 Miscellaneous Publications .......................................................................................................... A-5 APPENDIX B: SELECTION, SIZING, AND INSTALLATION OF PRVS ................................................ B-1 1.0 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 3.0 4.0 5.0 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... B-1 Overpressure Protection.................................................................................................... B-1 Determining Required Relieving Capacity ....................................................................... B-1 System Allowable Valve for Overpressure (Certified Relieving) .................................... B-2 Determining Set Pressure .................................................................................................. B-2 Set Pressure Tolerances .................................................................................................... B-3 Determining Blowdown ...................................................................................................... B-7 Selecting PRVs ................................................................................................................... B-7 Installation ........................................................................................................................... B-9 Sizing Relief Devices .......................................................................................................... B-9
APPENDIX C: ASME CODE TESTING REQUIREMENTS .................................................................... C-1 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 Code Requirements ............................................................................................................ C-1 Test Frequencies ................................................................................................................ C-2 Test Methods ....................................................................................................................... C-2 Test Types ........................................................................................................................... C-3 1.3.1 Set Pressure ............................................................................................................ C-3 1.3.2 Blowdown ................................................................................................................ C-4 1.3.3 Capacity ................................................................................................................... C-4 1.3.4 Seat Tightness Testing ............................................................................................. C-5 ASME OM Code Mandatory Appendix I ............................................................................ C-6 Seat Leakage ....................................................................................................................... C-7 Setpoint Tolerance .............................................................................................................. C-8 Bellows Testing ................................................................................................................... C-9
2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3
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EPRI Licensed Material Safety and Relief Valve Testing and Maintenance Guide Section No. 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.9 2.10 2.11 3.0 3.1 Page No.
Testing Sequence ............................................................................................................. C-10 Testing Frequencies ......................................................................................................... C-11 Requirements for Testing Additional Valves .................................................................. C-13 Test Media ......................................................................................................................... C-13 Testing at Inservice Ambient Temperature ..................................................................... C-13 ALDs .................................................................................................................................. C-14 Personnel Requirements ................................................................................................. C-14 Test Instrument Requirements ........................................................................................ C-14 Documentation, Records and Record Keeping ............................................................. C-14 Records and Record Keeping ......................................................................................... C-14
APPENDIX D: AUXILIARY LIFT DEVICES ........................................................................................... D-1 1.0 1.1 1.2 Auxiliary Lift Devices ......................................................................................................... D-1 ALDs Used in the Industry ................................................................................................. D-2 Crosby ALD Devices .......................................................................................................... D-3 1.2.1 Crosby ASPD ........................................................................................................... D-4 1.2.2 Crosby SPVD Model ................................................................................................ D-6 1.2.3 Dresser Hydroset ALD ............................................................................................. D-8 1.2.4 Trevitest Furmanite ALD .......................................................................................... D-9 1.2.5 AVK Industries ....................................................................................................... D-13
APPENDIX E: TEST BENCHES AND TEST SYSTEMS ....................................................................... E-1 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... E-1 Testing Techniques ............................................................................................................ E-1 Test Benches ....................................................................................................................... E-5 Test Bench Arrangement ................................................................................................... E-5 Test System Design ............................................................................................................ E-8 Test Vessel Sizing ............................................................................................................. E-13 Typical Test Procedure ..................................................................................................... E-13
APPENDIX F: GLOSSARY .................................................................................................................... F-1 1.0 1.1 Terms, Abbreviations, and Symbols ................................................................................. F-1 Glossary of Terms .............................................................................................................. F-1
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LIST OF FIGURES
Figure No. 4-1 4-2 4-3a 4-3b Page No.
Typical Safety, Safety Relief, and Relief Valve ....................................................................... 4-2 Typical Safety, Safety Relief, and Relief Valve ....................................................................... 4-3 Simple PRV Disc with Bevel Seat ........................................................................................... 4-6 Simple PRV with Enlarged Disc Area Outside of Velvel Seat that Provides an Additional Lifting Force ...................................................................................................... 4-6 Simple PRV with Huddle Chamber to Provide Pop Action and Enlarged Disc Area Outside of Bevel Seat that Provides an Additional Lifting Force ............................ 4-6 Typical Low-Lift Valve Design with Huddle Chamber and Adjusting Ring ............................... 4-8 Typical Curtain Areas of Pressure Relief Valves ..................................................................... 4-9
4-3c
4-4 4-5
4-6 (a-b) Pressure Relief Valve Control Rings ...................................................................................... 4-11 4-7 Typical Disc Lift Curve Crosby Style HC/HCA Safety Valve ................................................. 4-13
4-8 (a-b) Typical Safety Relief and Relief Valves ................................................................................. 4-14 4-9 4-10 Typical Control and Huddle Chamber for Safety Relief and Relief Valves ............................ 4-15 Effect of Backpressure on Set Pressure of a Conventional Safety Relief and Relief Valve ............................................................................................... 4-16 Piston-Type Pilot-Operated PRV .......................................................................................... 4-18 Diaphragm-Type Pilot-Operated PRV ................................................................................... 4-19 Power-Actuated Pressure Relief Valve (PORV) ................................................................... 4-20 Crosby Safety Valve .............................................................................................................. 4-26 Dresser Safety Valve ............................................................................................................ 4-27 Crosby Pressurizer Safety Valve, Style HB-BP .................................................................... 4-29 Dresser 31700 Safety Valve ................................................................................................. 4-31 Dresser Detail Showing Force Balance ................................................................................ 4-32
4-11 4-12 4-13 4-14 4-15 4-16 4-17 4-18
4-19(a-b) Target Rock Pilot-Operated Valve (Open) (a) and (Closed) (b) ............................................ 4-36
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EPRI Licensed Material Nuclear Maintenance Applications Center Figure No. Page No.
4-20(a-b) Crosby Safety/Relief Valve (a) and Detail (b) ....................................................................... 4-39 4-21 (a-b) Dikkers Safety/Relief Valve (a) and Detail (b) ....................................................................... 4-42 4-22 (a-b) Target Rock Two-Stage Safety/Relief Valve (closed) ............................................................ 4-43 4-23 4-24 4-25 4-26 4-27 4-28 4-29 4-30 4-31 Target Rock Three-Stage Pilot-Operated Valve .................................................................... 4-46 Crosby (Model HPV-SN) PORV ............................................................................................ 4-48 Dresser Electromatic Relief Valve (Model 1525VX) .............................................................. 4-50 Control Components PORV .................................................................................................. 4-51 Copes-Vulcan PORV ............................................................................................................ 4-52 Target Rock PORV ................................................................................................................ 4-54 Crosby (Garrett), Right Angle PORV .................................................................................... 4-55 Crosby (Garrett), Straight Through PORV ............................................................................ 4-55 Crosby (Garrett), PORV Schematic Diagram ....................................................................... 4-56
4-32 (a-b) Typical Crosby Model HAFN MSSVs .................................................................................... 4-58 4-33 4-34 4-35 4-36 Typical Dresser Type 1700 MSSV ........................................................................................ 4-59 A Soft Seat in a Dresser PRV ............................................................................................... 4-62 Crosby Style JO and JB Safety Relief and Safety Valve ...................................................... 4-63 Crosby Style JOS and JBS Safety Relief and Relief Valve (Conventional and Balanced) ............................................................................................... 4-64 Crosby Style JMAK Liquid Relief Valve (Water Ring Design) ............................................................................................................. 4-65 Crosby Style JMB-WR Liquid Relief Valve ............................................................................ 4-66
4-37
4-38
4-39 (a-b) Crosby Series 800 and 900, Omni Trim with Screwed Inlet and Outlet (Valve Is Also Supplied with Flanged Connections) .............................................................. 4-67 4-39 (c-d) Crosby Series 800 and 900, Omni Trim with Screwed Inlet and Outlet (Valve Is Also Supplied with Flanged Connections) .............................................................. 4-68 4-40 (a-b) Typical Dresser 1900 Series Safety Relief/Relief Valve ........................................................ 4-69 4-41 5-1 (a-c) Typical Farris 2600 Series Safety Relief/Relief Valve ........................................................... 4-70 BWR Safety Relief Valve, Failure Modes and Causes ........................................................... 5-8
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EPRI Licensed Material Safety and Relief Valve Testing and Maintenance Guide Figure No. Page No.
5-1 (d-e) BWR Safety Relief Valve, Failure Modes and Causes ........................................................... 5-9 5-2 (a-b) PWR Pressurizer Safety Valve Failure Modes and Causes ................................................. 5-10 5-2 (c-d) PWR Pressurizer Safety Valve Failure Modes and Causes .................................................. 5-11
5-3 (a-b) PWR MSSV, Failure Modes and Causes .............................................................................. 5-12 5-3 (c-d) 5-4 PWR MSSV, Failure Modes and Causes .............................................................................. 5-13 PWR PORV Failure Modes ................................................................................................... 5-14
5-5 (a-b) Relief Valve, Failure Modes and Causes .............................................................................. 5-15 5-5 (c-d) 6-1 6-2 6-3 6-4 7-1 7-2 7-3 7-4 7-5 7-6 7-7 7-8 7-9 7-10 7-11 7-12 7-13 8-1 Relief Valve, Failure Modes and Causes .............................................................................. 5-16 Force vs. DP Curve for an ALD ............................................................................................. 6-13 Typical Thermocouple Placement ......................................................................................... 6-16 IR Thermography .................................................................................................................. 6-17 Schematic for Test Pilot Operated Relief Valves In Situ ....................................................... 6-18 Target Rock (Typical), Valve Assembly Hoisting (Valve on Header or Work Area) ................. 7-3 Target Rock (Typical), Pilot Assembly Hoisting (Valve on Header or Work Area) ................... 7-4 Target Rock (Typical), Pilot Valve Hoisting ............................................................................. 7-5 Target Rock (Typical), Base Assembly Hoisting (Valve on Header) ........................................ 7-6 Target Rock (Typical), Base Assembly Hoisting (Work Area) ................................................. 7-7 Target Rock (Typical), Main Valve Hoisting (Work Area) ........................................................ 7-8 Typical Safety and Relief Valve Lifting Locations ............................................................... 7-10 Typical Consolidated Electromatic Valve with Lifting Eyebolt ................................................ 7-11 Typical Crosby 6R10 Safety Valve with Hoisting Bracket ..................................................... 7-12 Crosby Hoisting Arrangement for Crosby 6R10 HB-BP Safety Valve ................................... 7-13 Typical Utility Design PRD Transport/Storage Container ...................................................... 7-16 Typical Utility Design PRD Transport/Storage Container ...................................................... 7-17 Typical Crosby PRD Packing Crate Construction for Crosby Pressurizer and MSSVs ........ 7-18 Lever Assembly Design ........................................................................................................ 8-12
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EPRI Licensed Material Nuclear Maintenance Applications Center Figure No. 8-2 8-3 8-4 8-5 8-6 8-7 8-8 8-9 8-10 8-11 8-12 8-13 8-14 8-15 8-16 8-17 8-18 8-19 8-20 8-21 D-1 D-2 D-3 D-4 D-5 D-6 Page No.
Match Marks ......................................................................................................................... 8-15 Typical Thrust Bearing Design .............................................................................................. 8-17 Typical Disc Assembly .......................................................................................................... 8-21 Typical Retainer Ring for Disc Insert .................................................................................... 8-22 Typical Disc Tolerances ........................................................................................................ 8-24 Typical Critical Dimension for Nozzle Seat ........................................................................... 8-25 Full-Nozzle Removal ............................................................................................................. 8-27 Stem Inspection .................................................................................................................... 8-29 Typical Disc/Top Guided System .......................................................................................... 8-30 Typical Spindle-Guided Bellows Valve and Bellows Testing ................................................. 8-32 Nozzle Relief Step ................................................................................................................ 8-34 Reconditioning Block ............................................................................................................ 8-38 Crosby Pressurizer Safety Valve .......................................................................................... 8-44 Hydraulic Jacking Device and Jacked Valve ......................................................................... 8-47 Typical Crosby MSSV ........................................................................................................... 8-53 Illustrations of Nozzle Ring Setting and Guide Ring Level ................................................... 8-55 Illustration of MSSV (Jacked) and Location of Ring Setting Marking ................................... 8-56 Crosby Style JB-TD PRV ...................................................................................................... 8-63 Measurement for Spindle Nut and Adjusting Bolt ................................................................. 8-65 Typical Bonnet Assembly Torque Sequence ......................................................................... 8-68 ALD Principle of Operation ..................................................................................................... D-2 Crosby Air Set Pressure Device ............................................................................................. D-4 Generic Crosby Graph for Air Set Pressure Device ................................................................ D-5 Crosby Set Pressure Verification Device (SPVD) ................................................................... D-7 Dresser Hydroset .................................................................................................................... D-8 Furmanite Trevitest Apparatus .............................................................................................. D-11
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EPRI Licensed Material Safety and Relief Valve Testing and Maintenance Guide Figure No. D-7 E-1 E-2 E-3 E-4 E-5 E-6 E-7 E-8 E-9 Page No.
Mean Seat Diameter ............................................................................................................. D-12 Seat Tightness Test Setup ...................................................................................................... E-2 Set Pressure Test Setup ......................................................................................................... E-3 Solenoid Valve Test Setup ...................................................................................................... E-4 Actuator Test Setup ................................................................................................................. E-5 Typical Air/N2 Test Bench Arrangement .................................................................................. E-7 Typical PRD Thermocouple Locations .................................................................................. E-10 Typical PRD Thermocouple Arrangement ............................................................................. E-11 Small Test Source ................................................................................................................. E-12 Large Capacity Test Source .................................................................................................. E-12
xv
LIST OF TABLES
Table No. 4-1 5-1 5-2 6-1 6-2 8 -1 8-2 8-3 8-4 8-5 8-6 8-7 8-8 8-9 8-10a 8-10b 10-1 10-2 10-3 10-4 10-5 10-6 Page No. PWR Safety Valve Sizes and Flow Rates ............................................................................. 4-34 PRD Failure Modes and Causes ............................................................................................ 5-2 NPRDS and LER Safety and Relief Valve Failures (19741993) ........................................... 5-7 Typical Valve Testing/Refurbishment Sequence ..................................................................... 6-4 Thermal Profile for a Pressurizer Valve (F) .......................................................................... 6-17 Basic Principles of Parts Control ............................................................................................ 8-2 Test Results Useful for Determining PRV Maintenance ........................................................ 8-13 Spring Assembly Inspection .................................................................................................. 8-19 Disc Removal Restrictions, Causes, and Effects .................................................................. 8-21 Disc Holder Failure Causes and Effect on PRV Performance .............................................. 8-23 Typical Improper Nozzle Tolerance Effects on Valve Performance and Tightness ............... 8-26 Full Nozzle Removal Criteria ................................................................................................ 8-26 Guiding System Troubleshooting Guide ............................................................................... 8-31 Lapping Compounds ............................................................................................................. 8-37 Operational Problems for Auxiliary Relief Valves .................................................................. 8-69 Seat Leak Problems for Auxiliary Relief Valves .................................................................... 8-70 Safety and Relief Valve Testing Facilities ............................................................................. 10-2 Safety and Relief Valve Manufacturers ................................................................................. 10-3 ALD Suppliers ....................................................................................................................... 10-4 Pressurizer Safety Valves and Distribution in PWR Plants ................................................... 10-5 Power-Operated Relief Valve Distribution in PWR Plants .................................................... 10-6 Crosby MSSV and PSV Installations at Domestic and International Utilities ........................ 10-7
xvii
EPRI Licensed Material Nuclear Maintenance Applications Center Table No. 10-7 10-8 B-1 Page No. Nuclear Power Plants with Dresser Pressurizer Safety Valves .......................................... 10-12 Nuclear Power Plants Using Target Rock Safety Valves .................................................... 10-13 PRD Operating Requirements ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Summary ............................................................... B-4 Class I - Safety Valve Performance Tolerances ...................................................................... C-1 Seat Tightness Testing Methods for Pressure Relief Devices ................................................ C-8 Manufacturers Setpoint TolerancesSafety Valves .............................................................. C-9 Manufacturers Setpoint TolerancesSafety Relief Valves and Relief Valves ....................... C-9 Test Requirements and Sequence ........................................................................................ C-11 Section XI / PTC 25.3 and OM CodeGeneral Comparison Chart ..................................... C-16 ALDs Used by the Industry ..................................................................................................... D-3
C-1 C-2 C-3 C-4 C-5 C-6 D-1
xviii
1
SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
ADS ASME B&PV BTU/hr BWR CFR DEG. DOT xxx In. ID INPO lbs lbs/cu.ft. lb/hr kHz. MW NRC NMAC NUREG PM PORV psi psia psig PWR QC QTY R RCS RMS sq. ft. Automatic Depressurization System American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel British Thermal Units per Hour Boiling Water Reactor Code of Federal Regulations Degree Department of Transportation Degree (circumference) Inches Identification Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Pounds (Weight) Pounds per Cubic Foot Pounds per Hour Kilohertz Megawatt Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Maintenance Applications Center Nuclear Regulations Preventive Maintenance Power Operated (Actuated) Relief Valve Pounds per Square Inch (Pressure) Pounds per Square Inch Absolute (Pressure) Pounds per Square Inch Gage (Pressure) Pressurized Water Reactor Quality Control Quantity Degree Rankine Reactor Coolant System Root Mean Square Square Feet
1-1
2
SUMMARY
This guide is designed as an aide for power plant personnel responsible for the maintenance of safety and relief valves. The guide can also be effectively used by training instructors to develop course materials. The technical description section defines the various types of safety devices used in the nuclear industry and details their operating principles and applications. Specifically, the operational characteristics of Crosby Valve and Gage Company (Crosby), Dresser Industries (Dresser), and Target Rock Corporation (Target Rock) valves used in the primary and the balance-of-plant (BOP) systems of boiling water reactor (BWR) and pressurized water reactor (PWR) type power plants are covered in detail. Vacuum breakers and nonreclosing-type devices (rupture discs, fusible plugs, etc.,) are not included in this document. A failure mode and cause analysis section provides information on the reported failures from the Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System (NPRDS) and License Event Report (LER) databases by valve types and their causes. A generic table identifies the various valve failure modes and probable causes. The section on testing provides a review of ASME Code requirements along with guidelines on bench testing and testing with auxiliary-lift devices (ALDs). Effect of environment on the test results is highlighted. A section on maintenance provides recommendations on predictive and preventive maintenance (PM). Recommended methods of disassembly, corrective repair, inspection, re-assembly, and performance monitoring are included. In addition, the guide includes other useful sections and appendices on topics like shipping and handling, valve sizing, ASME Code requirements, types of valves used in various nuclear power plants, manufacturers of valves and testing equipment.
2-1
3
INTRODUCTION
Safety and relief valves are pressure relief devices (PRDs) used for overpressure protection of equipment in power plants. In nuclear power plant applications a high demand of reliability is placed on these devices. The valves may be required to open for accident (overpressure) mitigation and reseat after the system pressure is reduced and returned to normal operating conditions. Because it is critical for these valves to operate within certain specifications, this guide has been developed to provide background on the design, selection, application, maintenance, repair, refurbishment and testing of PRDs. 3.1 Purpose
This guide provides general information on the following types of PRDs, namely pressure relief valves (PRVs): Safety valves Power-operated relief valves (PORVs)direct-acting and pilot-actuated Safety relief valvessafety valves with auxiliary-actuating devices Relief valves
NOTE: The terms valve, PRV, and/or PRD have been used in the generic sense throughout this guide. When referring to specific valve types, the designations given in the glossary have been used.
This guide is written to provide necessary general information and guidance to plant personnel responsible for PRVs. Maintenance engineers, system engineers, and maintenance support personnel should also find this document to be an important resource in preparing and updating plant procedures, and providing technical direction to those who perform these activities. Training staff should also find this guide useful in preparing training material. This guide also contains information on a variety of PRVs used in nuclear power plant applications. It is realized that when a guide of this type is prepared, it cannot cover all types of PRVs manufactured and used for nuclear power plant applications. It is the intent, however, that this guide will provide a broad overview of PRDs, their application, and maintenance.
3-1
Further, it is cautioned that this document is a guide. When specific information is needed the manufacturers information should always be used. 3.2 Organization of This Guide
This guide is divided into ten sections with the information from the previous sections leading into the development of the later sections. Therefore, persons being introduced into the field of safety and relief valves should read this manual from the beginning. It is important to note that this guide is designed to provide a general overview on PRDs, and the reader is reminded that when maintenance and testing is being performed on a PRD, the instruction manual provided by the manufacturer must be used. Experienced technicians looking for specific information may go to the topical chapter on the subject. Several appendices are included and provide additional advanced information. The reference section provides an exhaustive listing of various documents on this topic published by the industry, manufacturers, and regulatory bodies. Section 1 Section 2 Section 3 Section 4 Symbols and Abbreviations Summary Introduction and purpose of this guide Generic technical description of the different types of PRVs addressed in this guide and an overview of the types of PRVs and their applications. Specific detail technical information for any valve should always be obtained from the valve manufacturer. Detailed failure modes and cause analysis that addresses the important failure modes for safety valves in the nuclear industry. The results of this analysis are used to focus attention on the significant testing and maintenance issues that adversely affect the performance of safety valves. Methods used to test PRDs for set pressure, seat leakage, and blowdown. General information on the handling and shipping of PRDs. General information on the maintenance of typical PRVs. This section is designed to give the reader a general overview of typical maintenance activity. Guidelines for the training of personnel and also for personnel and facility qualifications for testing and maintaining safety valves.
Section 5
Section 6 Section 7 Section 8
Section 9
Section 10 Industry data and vendor contacts that are useful in acquiring and exchanging information relating to safety valve maintenance and testing.
3-2
Appendix A Safety and Relief Valve Maintenance Guideline References Appendix B Selection and Sizing of Safety Valves Appendix C ASME Code Testing Requirements Appendix D Auxiliary Lift Devices Appendix E Test Benches and Test Systems Appendix F Glossary lists and defines PRD terms used in the guide that are consistent with current ASME Code terminology to establish a consistent starting point.
3-3
4
TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION OF PRVS
Section 4.0 is designed to assist engineers and plant maintenance personnel understand the basic principles and operating mechanisms of different types of PRVs. The term valve and pressure relief valve (PRV) and pressure relief device (PRD) will be used generically throughout this guide to describe all types of safety and relief valves. A thorough understanding of principles and operating mechanisms of the PRVs will help with the interpretation and understanding of the subsequent sections on failure mechanisms, valve applications, maintenance, and testing recommendations. Nonreclosing type PRDs, like rupture discs and relief valves used for vacuum, are not included in the scope of this guide. Readers of this section will receive the most benefit by first perusing the general description section and then proceeding to the section(s) most applicable to their need. 4.1 Types of PRVs and Functional Descriptions
4.1.1
General Description
A PRV is designed to prevent internal fluid pressure from rising above a predetermined maximum in a pressure vessel. PRDs can be reclosing or non-reclosing types. As the name implies, a reclosing type device is expected to open to relieve excess pressure and then automatically reclose allowing the vessel pressure to return to normal operating pressure and system operation to resume. Spring-loaded, safety relief valves are used as reclosing type pressure relieving devices. The terms safety valves and PRVs are generally used interchangeably. A spring-actuated, reclosing-type device may also be used to prevent excessive internal vacuum in a vessel. These are known as vacuum relief valves (vacuum breaker valves). A non-reclosing PRD is designed to remain open after relieving excess pressure. Fusible plugs and ruptured discs are examples of this type of device. The scope of this guide will be limited to the reclosing type of pressure relieving devices or PRVs. As such, nonreclosing devices or vacuum relief valves will not be discussed. PRVs are critical devices for power plant operation, and in a nuclear plant they may be safety-related or non-safety-related. Personnel assigned to maintain the valves should fully understand valve construction, operation, and maintenance to ensure that the devices perform intended overpressure protection functions when needed.
4-1
The different types of self-actuated PRVs are described below and shown in Figures 4-1 and 4-2. (Note that these figures are identical to the PRVs shown in ASME Section III Subsection NB; NC; and ND in Figure NX-3591.1-1 and NX3591.2.)
Cap
Yoke or Bonnet
Adjusting Screw
Bonnet (closed)
Spring Washers Spring Open Bonnet Spindle (stem) Balancing Piston (if required) Bellows (if required) Guide OUTLET Secondary Pressure Zone Control Rings Body Primary Pressure Zone Nozzle INLET Disk
VALVE SEAT
Figure 4-1 Typical Safety, Safety Relief, and Relief Valve
4-2
Cap Adjusting Screw Bonnet (closed)
OUTLET VALVE SEAT

Spring Spring Washers
Spindle (stem)
Guide
INLET OUTLET
Secondary pressure zone Control rings Disk VALVE SEAT Body
Primary pressure zone Nozzle
INLET
Figure 4-2 Typical Safety, Safety Relief, and Relief Valve To ensure the reader uses ASME Code terminology, a review of terms begins below. Safety Valve. An automatic PRD actuated by the inlet static pressure and characterized by a rapid opening pop action. The valve is used for gas and vapor service. Generally this type of valve is used for steam service and is of an exposed spring design (open bonnet or housing) similar to the main steam safety valve (MSSV) on a PWR. This valve may also be an enclosed spring design (closed bonnet or housing) similar to a pressurizer safety valve on a PWR plant. Operational criteria (set pressure and overpressure) and blowdown for these valves by the ASME Code is more stringent than other PRVs.
4-3
Safety Relief Valve. A PRV characterized by a rapid opening pop action or by opening in proportion to the increase in pressure over the opening pressure depending on the application. The valve may be used for liquid or compressible fluids. In nuclear power plants, a safety relief valve is generally used on secondary or auxiliary systems to protect vessels and systems from overpressure. The design is such that the spring is enclosed inside the valve housing or bonnet, and the valve outlet typically discharges into a closed system such as a suppression pool, collection tank, or receiver. Conventional Safety Relief Valve: A PRV that has its spring housing vented to the discharge side of the valve. The operational characteristics (opening and closing pressure and relieving capacity) are directly affected by changes of backpressure on the valve. Balanced Safety Relief Valve: A PRV that incorporates a means to minimize the effects of backpressure on the operational characteristics. Relief Valve. A PRV actuated by inlet static pressure having a gradual lift generally in proportion with the increase in pressure over the set pressure. It is used primarily for liquid service. As the inlet pressure increases, a liquid relief valve gradually opens to relieve the excess fluid. The valve then gradually recloses as the pressure decays below the opening pressure. In nuclear power plants, a relief valve is usually used for the same types of systems as a safety relief valve except the inlet fluid is a liquid. It can be supplied in a conventional or balanced design. Typical external pieces of a PRV (Figure 4-1 and 4-2) consist of a body, bonnet (or yoke), and a cap. Pieces located inside the body and bonnet and cap, include a spindle (or stem), a spring, spring washers, and adjusting screw. The adjusting screw determines the spring tension for the desired set pressure. The pieces located inside the valve are the guide, disc, disc holder, nozzle and control rings, and if required, a bellows and balancing piston. PRVs characteristically have multipressure zones within the valve, that is, a primary pressure zone and secondary pressure zone (see Figure 4-1 and 4-2). The inlet is the primary pressure zone and is part of the valve that is in actual contact with the pressure media in the pressure vessel and are called the pressure containing parts (nozzle to the valve seat and disc). The outlet (beyond the valve seat) is the secondary pressure zone. Parts in this zone are: 1) pressure retaining members, parts that are stressed due to their function of holding one or more pressure containing members in position and 2) parts that have no structural function but are required to achieve performance The most common element in all PRVs is the spring. The spring applies the force required to keep the disc seat in contact with the nozzle seat. It also establishes the required force that determines the valve set pressure (based on the seat area). The spring also provides a resisting force that, when combined with the forces developed in the huddle and control chamber, which is beyond the valve seat, controls the disc lift and valve closing.
4-4
4.1.2
PRV Design Theory
Thus far in this guide, one critical part of the valve, namely the spring, has been reviewed. Other pieces in a PRV are also critical as they control (in combination with the spring) the operational characteristics and rated capacity. To better understand of the controls of the PRV types discussed, a review of the design features of the pieces that make up the valves huddle/control chamber follows. Figure 4-3 is an illustration of simple PRVs: Figure 4-3a is a valve with a bevel seat. Figure 4-3b shows a valve identical to Figure 4-3a but with an enlarged disc area that provides an additional lifting force after opening. Figure 4-3c shows a combination of Figures 4-3a and 4-3b but with a huddle chamber located beyond the valve seat for the purpose of generating a pop action (on compressible fluids).
4-5
Valve Seat (Bevel)
INLET
Figure 4-3a Simple PRV Disc with Bevel Seat
Enlarged Disc Area
DISC
DISC
INLET
INLET
Figure 4-3b Simple PRV with Enlarged Disc Area Outside of Bevel Seat that Provides an Additional Lifting Force
Huddle Chamber
DISC
DISC
INLET Valve Closed
INLET Valve Opened
Figure 4-3c Simple PRV with Huddle Chamber to Provide Pop Action and Enlarged Disc Area Outside of Bevel Seat that Provides an Additional Lifting Force
4-6
Control features of this type are incorporated in most PRV/SV designs that are generally categorized as follows: Low-Lift Safety Valve: A safety valve in which the actual discharge area (used to determine the valve capacity) is determined by the position of the disc (see glossary for definition of curtain area). Full-Lift Safety Valve: A safety valve where the actual discharge area is not determined by the position of the disc (see glossary for definition of actual discharge area).
Full-Bore (Nozzle Type) Safety Valve: A safety valve where there is no protrusion into the bore of the valve and where the disc lifts sufficiently so that the minimum area at any section at or below the disc seat does not become the controlling orifice. Generally this type of valve is defined as reaction type since the flow path of the fluid when the disc is in the open position reverses direction. The three basic types of valve designs, low-lift, full-lift, and full-bore have been described. A review of each basic design, how it incorporates the features described in Figure 4-3, and how they operate follows. 4.1.2.1 Low-Lift Valve Designs
In a low-lift valve design, the disc travel (lift) is generally less than the nozzle bore area. As a result, the flow rate (capacity) of the valve is determined by the disc lift. Low-lift designs usually have a huddle chamber located past the valve seat (see Figure 4-3c and 4-4). The huddle chamber entraps fluid as it escapes past the seat, thus, exposing the larger disc area to pressure. The escaping fluid entrapped prior to the valve opening/ popping causes an incremental upward force unbalance (pressure is now acting over a larger area of the disc than when it was fully seated). This additional upward force causes the valve to open (pop on a compressible fluid). The huddle chamber controls the pop action of the valve and can be fixed or varied through a moveable valve piece (such as an moveable ring). The design of this chamber and the contour of the flow path in these pieces and the spring are combined to establish the valve operational characteristics (opening, lift, closing/blowdown). These designs generally achieve a low-lift as the secondary area increases with disc lift. The certified rated capacity, therefore, is determined based on disc lift at the rated overpressure. This lift is used to calculate the curtain area and the curtain area which is then used in the flow rate formula to determine the rated capacity for the valve design. Typical curtain areas of a PRV are shown in Figure 4-5.
4-7
VALVE CLOSED
DISK
pressure causing force unbalance VALVE SEAT
RING
SEAT DIAMETER
(a)
HUDDLE CHAMBER
NOZZLE
FLOW VALVE INLET
DISK
DISC LIFT
RING
(b)
Figure 4-4 Typical Low-Lift Valve Design with Huddle Chamber and Adjusting Ring
4-8
NOZZLE
Flat-Seated Valve Curtain area = surface of cylinder = DL
Bevel-Seated Valve D + DB Curtain area = surface of frustrum of cone = B 2
Radial-Seated Valve D + DB Curtain area = surface of frustrum of cone = B 2
Radial-Seated Valve D + DB Curtain area = surface of frustrum of cone = B 2
L D B R
= = = = =
lift seat diameter = smallest diameter at which seat touches disk other diameter of frustrum of cone slant height of frustrum of cone seat angle = angle of seating surface with axis of valve radius
DB =
GENERAL NOTE: Curtain area is the discharge area unless the disk attains sufficient lift for the valve bore to become the controlling area.
Figure 4-5 Typical Curtain Areas of Pressure Relief Valves
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4.1.2.2
Full-Lift Safety Valve Designs and Full-Bore Safety Valves
In full-lift and full-bore safety valves, the huddle chamber and the enlarged disc area are used to achieve the opening pop action. The actual discharge area, however, is not determined by the disc lift since the disc lift area exceeds the actual nozzle discharge area. These generally reaction-type designs (Figure 4-6) use a single-ring or two-ring control construction to achieve the desired valve performance (opening, disc lift, and closing characteristic). 4.1.2.2.1 Reaction Type Design PRVs In a reaction-type design PRV (see Figures 4-6a and 4-6b), the discharged fluid reverses direction (approximately 180) from the position of entry into the valve. As in low-lift designs, fluid initially escapes into the huddle chamber exposing a larger area of the disc to system pressure. This causes an incremental change in the upward force and overcompensates the spring force and the valve opens/pops. Disc lift at pop is dependent upon the valve control chamber contour, flow path, and spring force. With the disc in the open position, the flow path of the fluid is reversed (turning approximately 180). Consequently, the momentum (reaction force) effect from the change in flow direction combined with the pressure (force) of the fluid acting across the disc surface further enhances the disc lift. These effects combine to allow the disc to achieve maximum lift and the valve to achieve maximum flow within allowable overpressure limits. Final disc lift is determined at the overpressure at which the valve is capacity rated. 4.1.2.2.2 Two-Ring and Single-Ring Controls in Reaction-Type Design PRVs Performance characteristics of reaction-type PRVs is determined by the huddle/control chamber contour (flow passage) past the valve seat and the valve spring. This flow passage contour is commonly combined with an adjustment feature called rings (see Figure 4-6) (i.e., blowdown (upper) ring and/or nozzle ring). The PRV can be of a single-ring or two-ring design. The nozzle ring in the two-ring design controls the valve opening characteristics. In the single-ring design, the nozzle ring also controls the valve blowdown. On a two-ring valve, the blowdown is controlled by the blowdown ring.
4-10
Blowdown Ring
Blowdown Ring
SAFETY VALVE CLOSED Disk
PRIOR TO POP
Disk
Nozzle
Nozzle Ring
HUDDLE CHAMBER
Nozzle Ring
VALVE SEAT (FLAT)
INLET
Blowdown Ring
Nozzle
OPEN Disk
INLET
Nozzle Ring
Nozzle
INLET
(a)
Closed
Open
Disk
Disk
Nozzle Ring
Nozzle
Nozzle Ring
VALVE SEAT (FLAT)
HUDDLE CHAMBER
INLET
Nozzle
INLET
(b)
Figure 4-6 (a-b) Pressure Relief Valve Control Rings

4-11
Valve performance on a compressible fluid (steam, gas) with the rings set in the proper location would cause the valve to open with minimum warning and close with a sharp action and blowdown would be within the requirements of the Code or specification to which it was manufactured. Adjustments to the rings would have one or a combination of the following effects: Blowdown Ring: Lowering: Increases blowdown (reseat at a lower inlet pressure) Raising: Decreases blowdown (reseat at a higher inlet pressure) Nozzle Ring: Lowering: Increases warning, reduces blowdown (on single-ring control) Raising: Decreases warning, increases blowdown (on single-ring control), causes hang on close. The two-ring type control is primarily used in safety valves in steam service where the ASME or other codes and standards require valve operation for set pressure, overpressure, and blowdown to be within close limits. The independent adjustment of each ring will provide this performance. In the single-ring control, the disc (or disc ring) contour becomes a fixed blowdown ring limiting the valve adjustment for performance. This type of control is generally used where the ASME or other codes or standards to which the valve is manufactured permit broader operational requirements for set pressure, overpressure, and blowdown. With the above background of PRV designs and understanding of the valve controls, a review of a typical opening and closing cycle of a PRV on steam can be discussed. Figure 4-6(a-1) shows a two-ring control safety valve in the closed position. When inlet pressure is increased to the set pressure, inlet fluid escapes across the valve seat and into the huddle chamber. This escaped fluid pressure now acts over a larger area on the disc ((see prior to pop Figure 4-6(a-2)). The additional upward force caused by this fluid pressure now exceeds the downward force of the spring. At this point the valve will pop and the disc will move vertically upward away from the nozzle (seat). The valve will now be in the open position with the inlet fluid reversing direction and flowing between the inside diameter (ID) of the blowdown ring and the outside diameter (OD) of the nozzle ring ((Figure 4-6(a-3)). If the inlet pressure increases above the set pressure to the rated overpressure, the valve disc will lift further and at this rated overpressure, discharge its rated capacity. As pressure in the vessel and in the valve inlet decay, the valve disc lift will decrease slightly. When the inlet pressure is at the reseat pressure, the disc will reestablish a contact with the nozzle seat. The difference between the valve actual popping pressure and actual closing reseat pressure is defined as blowdown.
4-12
A typical lift curve for a Crosby style HC/HCA safety valve is shown in Figure 4-7. It is important to note that the lift characteristics (curves) for different PRVs may change. This is because of : The valve manufacturer The design The fluid (compressible or non-compressible) at the valve inlet Note that for this Crosby safety valve on steam service the disc lift: At pop (set pressure) is approximately 70% of full capacity lift. Disc lift continues to increase as inlet pressure increases until it moves through a secondary lift at approximately 3% overpressure where it achieves 100% capacity. On closing the disc moves downward through two closing steps (the initial and final) prior to reseat.
FULL CAPACITY LIFT
100% CLOSES SECONDARY LIFT 80%
% O F C A P A C I T Y L I F T
INITIAL CLOSING
OPENS 60% POP LIFT 40%
4% MAX BLOWDOWN FINAL CLOSING
3% ACCUMULATION
20%
0 4% BELOW SET PRESSURE -3% -2& -1% SET PRESSURE +1% +2%
PRESSURE
Figure 4-7 Typical Disc Lift Curve Crosby Style HC/HCA Safety Valve
4-13
4.1.3
Safety Relief and Relief Valves
Safety relief and relief valves covered in the definition section of this maintenance guide are self-actuated PRVs and are generally provided with an enclosed spring housing suitable for closed discharged system applications. The construction of a spring-loaded PRV consists of a valve inlet or nozzle mounted on the pressurized system, a disc held against the nozzle to prevent flow under normal system operating conditions, a spring to hold the disc closed, and a body/bonnet to contain the operating elements. The spring load is adjustable to vary the pressure at which the valve will open (see Figure 4-8).
Bonnet Spring Bonnet Vent Plugged Body Bonnet Vent Open
Disc
Bellows
Nozzle CONVENTIONAL (a) BALANCED (b)
Figure 4-8 (a-b) Typical Safety Relief and Relief Valves 4.1.3.1 Safety Relief Valves (Primarily used for Compressible Fluids) and Relief Valves (Use for Non-Compressible Fluids)
The design of the control and/or huddle chamber involves a series of tradeoffs. If the design maximizes lift effort, then blowdown will be long. If the design minimizes blowdown, then the lift effort will be diminished. Many PRVs are, therefore, equipped with a nozzle ring that can be adjusted to vary the geometry of the control chamber to
4-14
meet a particular system operating requirement. Relief valves may also, for liquid applications, use a different control and huddling chamber contour. For the control and huddling chamber see Figure 4-9 illustrating the difference in the control and huddle chamber of a Crosby safety relief valve (gas and vapor service) and relief valve (liquid service).
Control Chamber
Nozzle Ring
Disc Holder Disc
Set Screw Nozzle
CONTROL AND HUDDLE CHAMBER SAFETY RELIEF VALVE GAS AND VAPOR SERVICE (a) RELIEF VALVE LIQUID SERVICE (b)
Figure 4-9 Typical Control and Huddle Chamber for Safety Relief and Relief Valves The safety relief valve is primarily used for gas and vapor service (compressible fluids) and the relief valve for liquid service (non-compressible fluids). Each PRV type is manufactured as: 1) a conventional safety relief valve (Figure 4-8a) or 2) a balanced safety relief valve (Figure 4-8b). The major difference is that the balanced valve incorporates a means (such as a bellows) to minimize the effect of backpressure on the operational characteristics (opening pressure, closing pressure and relieving capacity). In the illustration shown in Figure 4-8b, the means used to minimize the effect of backpressure is the bellows. To better understand the application and operation of a conventional (non-bellows) and balanced (bellows) PRV, a review of the valves, their applications, and the effects of backpressure follows.
4-15
PRVs on clean non-toxic, non-corrosive systems may be directly vented to the atmosphere. Valves that vent to the atmosphere, either directly or through short vent stacks, are not subjected to elevated backpressure conditions. In this application, a conventional PRV can be used. PRVs on corrosive, toxic or valuable recoverable fluids are vented into closed systems. On installations where the PRV discharges into a closed system, or when a long vent pipe is used, there is a possibility of developing high backpressure. The backpressure on a PRV must always be evaluated. In this case, a balance PRV is used. A review of a force balance on the disc (Figure 4-10) with the valve closed shows that the force of fluid pressure acting on the inlet side of the disc will be balanced by the force of the spring. If pressure exists on the outlet side of the valve, the valve set pressure will increase. If pressure in the valve outlet varies while the valve is closed, the valve set pressure will change. If backpressure varies while the valve is open and flowing, valve lift and flow rate through the valve can be affected. Care must be taken in the design and application of PRVs to compensate for these variations. Additional details of conventional and balanced valves are discussed in the following sections.
Disk Guide
Spring Bonnet Spring FS
P2
P2 P2
OUTLET
DISK P P2
INLET P 1 A N = FS + P2 A N
P1
Backpressure Increases Set Pressure
Figure 4-10 Effect of Backpressure on Set Pressure of a Conventional Safety Relief and Relief Valve
4-16
4.1.3.2
Conventional (Non-Bellows) Safety Relief Valves
Backpressure that may occur in the downstream system while the valve is closed is called superimposed backpressure. This backpressure may be a result of the valve outlet being connected to a normally pressurized system or may also be caused by other PRVs venting into a common header. Compensation for superimposed backpressure that is constant may be provided by reducing the spring force. Under this condition, the force of the spring plus the backpressure acting on the disc equals the force of the inlet set pressure acting to open the disc. It must be remembered, however, that the value of the set pressure will directly vary with any change in backpressure. 4.1.3.3 Balanced (Bellows) Safety Relief Valves
When superimposed backpressure is variable, a balanced bellows design is recommended. A typical balanced bellows style valve is shown in Figure 4-8b. The bellows is designed with an effective pressure area equal to the seat area of the disc. The bonnet is vented to ensure that the pressure area of the bellows will always be exposed to atmospheric pressure and to provide a telltale sign should the bellows begin to leak. Variations in backpressure, therefore, will have no effect on set pressure. Backpressure may, however, affect flow. Backpressure that may occur after the valve is open and flowing is called dynamic or built up backpressure. This type of backpressure is caused by fluid flowing from the PRV through the downstream piping system. Built up backpressure will not affect the valve opening pressure, but may have an effect on valve lift and flow. Valve manufacturers recommend that on applications of 10% overpressure, a balanced bellows design be used when built-up backpressure is expected to exceed 10% of set pressure. In addition to offsetting the effects of variable backpressure, the bellows acts to seal process fluid from escaping into atmosphere and isolates the spring, bonnet and guiding surfaces from contact with the process fluid. This is especially important for corrosive services. 4.1.3.4 Pilot-Operated Pressure Relief Valves
Pilot-operated PRVs are not as commonly used as direct acting PRVs, but they have been applied in a wide variety of applications for many years. The primary difference between a pilot-operated PRV and a self-actuated PRV is that process pressure instead of a spring is used to cause the main valve disc to stay closed or to open. A pilot or controller is used to sense process pressure and to pressurize or vent the dome pressure chamber causing the main valve to open or close. There are two types of pilot-operated PRVs, piston (main valve discFigure 4-11) and diaphragm (Figure 4-12). Both valve types consist of a main valve and a pilot. The pilot
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controls the pressure on the top side of the piston (main valve disc). A seat is part of or is attached to the lower end of this disc. The operation features are as follows: When the main valve is closed and inlet pressure is below the set pressure, the pressure on opposite (top) side of the main valve disc is equal. When the inlet pressure is increased to the pilot valve set pressure, the pilot opens, the cavity on the top side and the main valve disc is depressurized, and it strokes upward. This causes the main valve to relieve the inlet fluid pressure. When the inlet pressure decreases, the pilot closes causing the cavity on the top of the main valve disc to be repressurized, and the valve closes. A piston-type, pilot-operated relief valve (Figure 4-11) uses a piston for the main valve disc that has an O-ring or similar type seal at the upper end to maintain pressure in the cavity or dome above the main valve disc. The piston type valve can be used for pressure 15 psig to 10,000 psig.
Pilot Dome
Piston Seal Main Valve Disc (Piston) Seat
Outlet
Pressure Pickup
Inlet Main Valve
Figure 4-11 Piston-Type Pilot-Operated PRV The diaphragm type, pilot-operated relief valve (Figure 4-12) is similar to the piston type except a flexible diaphragm is used to form a seal at the upper end of the main valve disc and to maintain pressure in the dome cavity (instead of a sliding O-ring seal). This diaphragm reduces the sliding friction force and permits valve operation at much
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lower inlet and set pressures than would be possible with a sliding seal. The diaphragm type valve can be used from pressures of 2-inch water column (0.072 psig) up to 50 psig. Pilot-operated valves are used for compressible and non-compressible fluids depending upon the limits permitted by the ASME and/or other codes and should only be used on clean systems.
Pilot Valve
Dome (Process Pressure Valve Closed)
Diaphragm Outlet Seat and Main Valve Disc Main Valve
Inlet Pressure Pickup
Figure 4-12 Diaphragm-Type Pilot-Operated PRV 4.1.3.5 Power-Actuated PRVs (PORVs)
As covered in the definition section, the power-actuated PRV is a PRV in which the major relieving device is combined with and controlled by a device that requires an external source of energy such as electrical, pneumatic or hydraulic. This PRV can be remotely operated by plant personnel or in response to signals from pressure or temperature-sensing devices. It offers the benefit of a wide variety of control systems, but
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has the disadvantage of relying on an external source of power that may fail under emergency conditions. Descriptions of the various types of power-actuated PRVs are presented in Section 4.1.4. Figure 4-13 shows a typical schematic of a power-actuated PRV with the plug and vent seat in the closed position. With the plug and vent seat closed, inlet fluid pressure is in the actuator head chamber and is acting on the top surface of the plug piston area. This fluid enters past the supply seat.
Electrical Solenoid Actuator Head Chamber Solenoid Spring
Vent Seat
Piston Area Supply Seat Plug Inlet Flow
Valve Seat Discharge Flow
Figure 4-13 Power-Actuated Pressure Relief Valve (PORV) When the solenoid is energized, the vent seat moves downward and seals against the supply steam. This prevents the entry of inlet fluid pressure into the actuator head chamber. The actuator chamber pressure is at the same time vented past the vent seat and into the discharge. The plug now has higher pressure acting on the inlet piston area and moves upward away from its seat. This action permits inlet fluid to flow to the valve discharge. Plug closure is the reverse of the opening sequence.
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4.1.4
Operational Characteristics of PRDs
In the previous sections, different types of valve designs were reviewed and the ASME Codes were used to define valve types. Valve operations were also reviewed. The next section explains the operational characteristics, Code definitions, and how they are applied to these valve designs. 4.1.4.1 Set Pressure and Lift (Disc)
The set pressure (opening pressure, popping pressure) is pressure where the valve disc has measurable movement in the opening direction to (lift) due to an inlet pressure. The valve lift begins when the inlet fluid pressure has increased to the point where the upward fluid force begins to exceed the downward force on the disc. In a springloaded, self-actuated PRV, the set pressure or opening characteristics of a PRV will vary depending upon the service fluid. For compressible fluid such as air, gas and steam, the valve will open with a pop action. For a non-compressible fluid, such as water, opening will occur with minimal disc lift, causing the valve to discharge a small, steady stream of liquid that increases with the inlet pressure. Depending upon the design of the huddle chamber and the control passage, the disc lift may increase substantially at a pressure value above the opening pressure with an equally substantial increase in flow rate and then increase further to the rated lift at the desired overpressure. The ASME Codes, Section I and VIII and Subsections of ASME Section III NB, NC, ND and NE and valve design specifications require that PRVs open within certain set pressure tolerance limits depending upon valve service requirements and set pressure value. It would be prudent for the user to understand these requirements prior to a test procedure. Ambient temperatures can affect the valves normal temperature profile. Large ambient temperature transients may cause the valve to open outside expected lift set pressure tolerance. The valve setpoint should be tested at the opening ambient conditions of the valve or if the valve is tested at room ambient conditions (inlet fluid and ambient). Correction in the valve set pressure for these conditions and for backpressure on a conventional valve must be made. This correction is called Cold Differential Test Pressure (CDTP). Other variables that may affect the actual set pressure of the valve include: The physical condition of the valve and its parts including the condition of the valve seat The maintenance practices related to the valve The testing practices related to the valve The physical environment of the installed condition of the valve (such as ambient and fluid temperature, vibration, backpressure on conventional non-balanced valves, etc.)
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4.1.4.2
Reseat Pressure and Blowdown
PRVs, after opening normally, close at a pressure that is below its setpoint and/or actual opening pressure and above the systems normal operating pressure. Closing pressure is a value of inlet static pressure at which the disc reestablishes contact with the seat. The actual value of closing or reseat pressure is used with the actual valve opening pressure to calculate blowdown. Blowdown can be expressed in pressure units or percent and is calculated as follows:
actual set pressure actual closing pressure x 100 set pressure Blowdown (pressure units) = actual set pressure actual closing pressure Percent ( Blowdown) =
The blowdown requirements and/or reseating requirements for PRVs vary depending upon the valve set pressure value and the valve service conditions. Consequently, the user should understand these requirements. Factors that can affect valve reseat pressure and blowdown are: Improper setting of valve control ring Changes in fluid and fluid temperature Improper testing practices Improper installation of the valve 4.1.4.3 Overpressure and Capacity
Overpressure is a pressure increase at the valve inlet that exceeds the set pressure of a PRV and is usually expressed as a percent of set pressure. Example: If a PRV opened at 1000 psig to relieved fluid at 10% overpressure, the inlet fluid pressure at the valve inlet would be 1100 psig. The relieving capacity of PRVs is determined and rated at an overpressure permitted by the applicable code or regulation to which the valve is rated capacity certified. Codes and standards credit each valve design with a portion of the actual measured capacity. PRVs used in nuclear power plants are usually manufactured to ASME Codes Section I, III and VIII. These Codes specify the overpressure at which the valve design is capacity rated and provides formulas for establishing the portion of the actual measured flow that is used as its rated capacity. It is this capacity (rated relieving or nameplate marked capacity) that is used as a basis for the selection and application of a PRD for overpressure protection of a vessel or system. To obtain a capacity certification such as ASME, the manufacturer submits the information on the valve design advising the ASME of the Code section (Section I, III, or VIII,
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etc.) and the fluid to be used. The valve design is then performance and capacity tested to the requirements of this Code and in accordance with safety and relief valve performance and test code ASME/ANSI PTC-25.3. After tests are successfully completed on that fluid, a coefficient of discharge is established. This coefficient may be derated depending upon the Code requirements. It is this value that is used with the ASME formula to calculate the rated capacity. Note: ASME PTC 25.3 has been revised as ASME PTC-25 in 1994. The following is a typical formula for an ASME Section III Class 1 full-lift safety valve on steam service (below 1500 psig). The formula is used to determine the valves rated capacity after being certified (see ASME Section III, SubSection NB, Article NB-7000). W = 51.45 APK
where: W A P K K
KD
= = = = =
rated flow lbs/hr. saturated steam (certified capacity) actual discharge area through the valve developed lift, sq. in. (set pressure x 1.03) plus atmospheric pressure, psia coefficient of discharge (certified) .9 KD
Actual Flow Theoretical Flow
NOTE: Users of PRVs are cautioned that when calculating PRV capacities, the code or standard under which the valve is manufactured must be used to determine the rated capacity.
4.1.4.4
Chatter and Flutter
PRVs are designed to operate without chatter and flutter. Chatter is defined as the rapid reciprocating motion of the movable parts where the disc contacts the seat. Flutter is the same as chatter, but the disc does not contact the seat. Chatter or flutter during valve operation can cause damage to the valve internals and can occur on opening or closing. This malfunction of a PRV can be system or mechanically caused.
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System caused malfunctions are usually a result of poor inlet piping design or installation of the valve in a poor location. A PRV on open will cause a rapid pressure decay at the valve inlet. Since the valve is a force-balanced device, the combined pressure (dynamic and acoustic) decay rapidly below the valves normal closing pressure, causing the disc lift to be reduced and the disc to move to the closed position. Because system pressure has not been reduced to a level that will permit complete disc closure, increased pressure at the valve inlet will cause the valve to reopen. When this occurs, the inlet piping to the valve should be reviewed for pressure losses and restrictions. Mechanically caused malfunctions vary from: The incorrect PRV selection for the fluid and service condition, i.e. liquid valve for gas service or, conventional valve rather than a balanced valve for a backpressure condition Poor valve maintenance practices that result in improper: Valve set pressure setting Setting of control/adjusting rings Valve assembly that could cause mechanical interference with the moving parts 4.2 Nuclear Power Plant PRVs
In the US, PWRs use self-actuated, spring-loaded valve design for the pressurizer safety valves. BWRs use either a self-actuated, pilot-operated safety valve design or a selfactuated, spring-loaded safety valve with a pneumatic cylinder that allows the valve to be opened below the self-actuated set pressure for the main steam primary system overpressure protection. The pressurizer spring-loaded safety valves are manufactured by Crosby Valve and Gage Company (Crosby) and Dresser Industries, Incorporated (Dresser). In addition to the spring-loaded, self-actuated safety valves, a self-actuated, pilot-operated valve is also used in pressurizer applications. The main steam PRVs on a BWR are pilot-operated safety valves manufactured by Target Rock or spring-loaded safety valves manufactured by Crosby. These valves are generally designed and manufactured to the requirements of ASME Section III Subsection NB Article NB-7000. In addition to the self-actuated type of PRVs, PWR plants use power-actuated PRVs produced by a variety of valve manufactures. These valves are manufactured to ASME Section III, Subsection NB, Class 1 design requirements. For the secondary system of PWR plants, self-actuated safety valves are used for overpressure protection. These valves, as the pressurizer safety valves, are typically manufactured by Crosby or Dresser. Finally, for the auxiliary and secondary systems and BOP applications, safety relief and relief valves are used. These PRVs (main steam safety and auxiliary/secondary system) may be produced by a variety of manufacturers and are usually manufactured to the requirements of ASME Section III, Subsection NB, NC or ND, Class 2 or 3 or ASME Section VIII depending upon the system requirements to which they provide overpressure protection. The following section is an overview of these valve types.
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4.2.1
4.2.1.1
Pressurizer PRVs
General Description - Spring-Loaded PSVs
The Crosby and Dresser self-actuated, spring-loaded safety valves used for PWR pressurizers are similar in design. A sketch of a typical Crosby safety valve is shown in Figure 4-14, and a typical Dresser safety valve is shown in Figure 4-15. A general operational description of both valve designs and the design differences are discussed below. PWR self-actuated, spring-loaded safety valves are mounted directly on the top of the pressurizer and are attached by flanged end connections. The inlet side of the valve is designed for reactor coolant system pressure and temperature. The outlet flange and piping are designed for the lower outlet discharge pressure. The valve is maintained in the closed position by the mechanical force of a compressed spring. This force is transmitted through the valve spindle to the valve disc. The disc seat in contact with the seat on the top of the valve nozzle forms the pressure boundary. The valve pressure boundary is maintained at the valve disc and nozzle seat that consists of circumferential, narrow metal surfaces. The valve seat is machined and optically lapped flat to maintain a tight seal when the valve is closed.
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Spring Lifting Lever
Bellows Adjusting Ring (upper ring) Outlet Nozzle Ring (lower ring) Nozzle Seat Body
Disc Seat
Inlet
Figure 4-14 Crosby Safety Valve
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Lifting Lever
Spring
Bellows Middle Ring Upper Ring Disc Seat Nozzle Seat Outlet Lower Ring
Body
Figure 4-15 Dresser Safety Valve
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As the reactor coolant system (RCS) pressure at the valve inlet increases, it causes an increase in the upward force acting on the wetted disc area. Therefore, the net force keeping the valve closed is reduced. When the inlet steam pressure reaches the valve opening pressure, the lifting force overcomes the spring force and increased steam leakage occurs across the disc to seat interface. This opening pressure is referred to as the valve lift setpoint or lift set pressure. The leakage then expands into a huddling chamber beyond the valve disc to the nozzle seat interface formed by the disc enlarged area and adjusting rings. The pressure builds rapidly in the huddle chamber and causes a sudden additional lifting force on the exposed disc/disc holder surfaces. This, in turn, causes the valve to lift and relieve system pressure. The valve opening is characterized by a popping action as the steam rapidly expands through the valve. If the inlet pressure continues to rise, the flow force and increasing inlet pressure continue to lift the valve to a full-lift position. The valves are designed to achieve the full rated lift position at a steady state inlet pressure of 3% above the valve popping pressure (as required by the ASME Code). The value at which the valve achieves full rated lift, expressed as a percent of lift setpoint is called overpressure. At this pressure, the valve is designed to discharge rated steam flow. The system inlet pressure may continue to increase up to a maximum pressure that is 10% above the valve lift set pressure, the system design upset limit as defined by Section III of the ASME Code. When the overpressure transient has been relieved by the safety valves, the inlet pressure begins to decay. This allows the spring force to overcome the upward lifting forces and results in the valve reseating. These valves are typically designed to re-close at a pressure less than or equal to 5% below the valve set pressure. The difference between the valve lift setpoint and closing pressure, expressed as a percentage of the lift set pressure, is called the valve blowdown.
NOTE: The following discussions are not intended to present all of the operational details of the Crosby and Dresser PRVs. The manufacturers technical manuals should be used for a complete description of these valves.
4.2.1.2
Description and Operation of Crosby Pressurizer Safety Valves
Figure 4-16 shows a typical Crosby-style HB-BP safety valve in cross-section. The following information covers the essential elements of the valve. Inside the body (1) is housed the upper portion of the nozzle (2), the nozzle ring (3), the disc ring (7), the adjusting ring (12), the eductor (guide) (11), and the bellows assembly consisting of the bellows (8), a disc holder (5) and a disc ring (7). The disc insert is held in place in the disc holder by an insert pint (10). The eductor (guide) (11) and the bellows assembly and the bonnet adapter (15) are retained between the valve body (1) and the bonnet (18) by bonnet studs (38) and bonnet stud nuts (39).
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Housed in the bonnet (18) is the spring (19) and spring washers (20) carried by the spindle assembly (14), the lower end of which is positioned on the bushing (6) in the disc holder (5). The spindle assembly also carries a piston (40). The adjusting bolt (29) is locked in place by the adjusting bolt nut (30) at the top of the bonnet (18) within the cap (21). Manual lifting means is provided by a lift lever (28).
21
29
30 20 28 14 VENT 38 39 19
40 15
18
11 8 12 6 5 10 9 7 3
1 2
Figure 4-16 Crosby Pressurizer Safety Valve, Style HB-BP
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The operation of the Crosby pressurizer valve is functionally the same as covered in the general description. A few features are added to enhance the valve performance. The design uses an eductor to minimize the effects of backpressure when the valve is opened. Fluid, after entering the huddle chamber, has 1) the direction reversed so as to pass between the lower inside surface of the adjusting ring and the outer surface of the nozzle ring and 2) upward through an annular orifice between the disc ring OD and guide ring ID, then through a second annular orifice between the eductor OD and adjusting ring ID. The fluid finally enters the body bowl when exiting through holes in the upper end of the guide ring. Flow through these passages controls the pressure in the chamber external to the bellows and the effects of backpressure while the valve is open. It also assists the spring force during disc closure (reseating). Crosby changes valve disc and nozzle seating materials and seat designs as a function of the valve installed condition. With the valve installed on 1) a loop seal (cold water at the valve seat), a standard Crosby flat seat design is used with Stellite as the seating material and 2) when installed so the seating surfaces are exposed to steam, Crosby uses a standard or a flexi-disc seat design with a material selection that varies depending upon the seat configuration. 4.2.1.3 Description and Operation of Dresser Pressurizer Safety Valves
A typical Dresser safety valve Series 31700 is shown in Figure 4-17. The valve consists of a nozzle (1C) that is threaded into the valve body. The valve disc (5) is held in the closed position against the nozzle seat by the force of a compressed helical spring (8A). The spring force is applied to the disc from the spring through the spindle (7). This force maintains the disc/seat interface with the valve in the closed position. The bellows (6A) is designed to reduce the effects of backpressure. The bellows can be damaged if subjected to extreme conditions or severe cycling. Since the bellows performs such a necessary function in the valve, a balancing piston is required. Should the bellows fail, backpressure would enter the bellows internal chamber and act upon the piston area thus negating the effects of backpressure on the valve set pressure and operation. The piston accomplishes the same function as the bellows except for maintaining leak tightness between the valve outlet and bonnet. Flow will vent into the valve bonnet area through the clearance between the piston and floating washer (17), and this will be vented out of the valve bonnet. It is necessary that the valve bonnet vent connection always be left open to atmospheric pressure. When the inlet steam pressure reaches the lift set pressure, the vertical force counterbalances the spring force and a slight leakage of steam develops across the valve disc-toseat interface and is directed into the huddle chamber. The huddle chamber beyond the seat to disc interface that is formed by the disc and disc holder enlarged area and the position of the adjusting ring. Pressure builds up rapidly in the huddle chamber developing an additional vertical lifting force on the disc and disc holder. This additional force in conjunction with the expansive characteristics of steam causes the valve to pop open to almost full-lift. The steam is directed through the secondary orifice and
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the adjusting ring flow gap. Steam momentum and the exposure of the larger area of the disc holder to steam pressure causes the valve to continue to full-lift until the lift stop comes in contact with the support plate. In addition, steam leaks through the clearance at the lower guide-to-disc holder interface generating an additional lifting force on the upper portion of the disc holder. The static and dynamic force balance when the valve is open and flowing is shown in Figure 4-18 and described below.
Lifting Lever
Spindle 7
Spring 8A Vent
6A Bellows Middle Ring Disc Seat Nozzle Seat Valve Disc 5 Lower Ring Upper Ring Outlet
Body
1C
Inlet
Figure 4-17 Dresser 31700 Safety Valve
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Nozzle-disc seat interface
Huddle chamber Secondary orifice
Section A-A
Lower adjusting ring point diameter Lift stop Support plate Upper guide disc holder interface Disc holder
Guide upper portholes
Upper adjusting ring Lower guide-disc holder interface Valve body bowl Middle adjusting ring
Guide lower portholes
Valve body bowl Lower adjusting ring Nozzle
Figure 4-18 Dresser Detail Showing Force Balance A vertical upward force (F1) results from the steam pressure against the disc. A vertical upward force (F2) results in pressure acting on the increase in the effective area of the huddle chamber. This force is controlled by the position of the lower and middle adjusting rings directly affecting the function of the huddle chamber. A vertical downward force (F3) due to the spring force is defined by the lift set pressure times the seat area. A vertical downward force (F4) is due to steam leaking through the clearances between the guide-to-disc holder interface, the disc-to-disc holder interface, and the bellows disc nut-to-disc holder thread interface and the upper compensator ports. A vertical upward force (F5) is created due to steam passing through the lower guide-todisc holder interface and expanding into the chamber under the upper portion of the disc holder. Steam flow out of this chamber is affected by the position of the upper adjusting ring body pressures near the lower port holes in the guide and also by the upper guide to disc holder interface.
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When the inlet pressure decays, the upward pressures (F1, F2, F5) decrease allowing the spring force (F3) plus the pressure at the top of the disc holder (F4) to reseat the valve. 4.2.1.4 Design Comparison - Crosby and Dresser Safety Valve
The following is a brief comparison of a few of the more important features of the Crosby and Dresser safety valves. This comparison should aid in understanding the various aspects of each valve design. The first difference between the Crosby and Dresser safety valves is the design features that control the backpressure above the valve disc. Crosby valves control main disc backpressure by an educator design. Leakage past the disc ring is directed by the educator through ports in the guide ring. In the Dresser valves, valve disc backpressure is controlled by the upper adjusting ring. Adjusting the upper ring up or down closes or opens up flow paths in the disc guide. Blocking the holes traps fluid that leaks past the disc holder. Exposing the holes allows leakage to escape into the valve body. The guide also has upper portholes that control backpressure into and out of the chamber above the disc holder. Upper ring position is selected and fixed by Dresser for all its valves. Crosby valves control main disc backpressure by an eductor design. Leakage past the disc ring is directed by the eductor through ports in the guide ring. The Crosby and Dresser safety valves have different seat designs: The Crosby seat designs were discussed in Section 4.2.1.2 and, as stated previously, vary the seat configuration and material based on the installation. On some earlier designed nuclear plants, valve seat leakage was experienced. Loop seals were installed to eliminate these seat leakage problems. The leakage was due to valve seats being exposed to entrained hydrogen gas in the pressurizer and high ambient temperatures that affected valve set pressures not compensated for during testing. The combination of Stellite seating materials on a cool-water interface eliminated the seat leak problem. Further improvement in valve seat designs and seat materials as well as a review of the valves installed conditions such as ambient temperatures and discharge piping loads helped resolve seat leakage problems when the valve was installed without a loop seal. Dresser valve seats are flat and use the thermodisc design on the disc insert. The Dresser valves are typically installed in plants without loop seals leaving the seats exposed to steam instead of subcooled water. Thermodisc design permits the disc seat, as in the Crosby flexi-disc, to give temperature stability and flexibility that enhance seat tightness as the inlet pressure approaches the valve set pressure. The Crosby and Dresser valves both have a bellows attached to the disc or disc assembly, exposed externally to the outlet pressure, and internally exposed to the atmosphere pressure in the bonnet. The purpose of the bellows is to minimize the effect of backpressure. Without a bellows, backpressure on the disc would cause a downward force in addition to the spring force. This higher force would cause an increase in the valve opening pressure. Both manufacturers include a piston as a backup to the bellows, an ASME Section III Code design requirement for these valves. In the event of a bellows failure, the piston provides a counterbalancing lifting force if pressure is present in the bellows area.
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Both valve manufacturers supply one basic valve design for PWR plant applications. They also supply a range of valve sizes in order to meet the rated relieving capacity requirements specified by the Nuclear Supply System manufacturers. These size increments vary as a function of both valve inlet size and by the valve orifice designations listed in Table 4 - 1. Each orifice has a design flow area with a certified flow coefficient and a rated relieving capacity at the certified overpressure that is the minimum flow area through the valve when it is fully open. Table 4-1 PWR Safety Valve Sizes and Flow Rates
Valve Designation Orifice Size 2 (in. ) Rated Capacity at 3% Overpressure (lbs/hr Saturated Steam @ 2575 psia)* 298,000 504,103 423,467 508,000 212,000 295,000 347,000 420,000 505,000 345,000
Dresser 31739A Dresser 31749A Dresser 31759A Dresser 31709NA Crosby 3K6 Crosby 3K26 Crosby 6M16 Crosby 6M6 Crosby 6N8 Target Rock 69C
3 4 5 N K K2 M1 M N --
2.55 3.98 3.34 4.34 1.84 2.54 2.99 2.64 4.38 3.51
*Note: Rated capacity can vary based on year of valve manufacture due to the use of the correction factor in ASME Section III, Subsection NB, Article NB70000 for valves with set pressures above 1500 psig.
4.2.1.5
Description and Operation of Target Rock Pressurizer Pilot-Operated Valve
The Target Rock pilot-operated PRVs used for PWR application has two main assemblies: a pilot valve section and a main valve section. These two sections are constructed as one unit to provide a self-actuated relief valve. The pilot valve section is the pressure sensing and control element, and the main valve is actuated by the system fluid. The main valve provides the pressure relief function. The pilot section is a low flow pressure sensing element that actuates the main valve. Pilot incorporates a machined bellows that acts as a combination piston, spring, and hermetic seal in the pilot valve. As shown in Figures 4-19(a) and (b), the top of the bellows is connected to the pilot valve disc through a stem and disc yoke. Between these components there is an adjustable clearance or abutment gap. The pilot valve works as follows: 1. During assembly, the bellows is extended a small amount to provide a pre-load force on the pilot valve disc. This seals the disc tightly and prevents reverse leakage.
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2. During operation, as system pressure increases, the pre-load force is reduced to zero. The pilot valve disc is held closed by the internal pressure acting over the pilot valve seat area. This seating force increases with increased system pressure. 3. As system pressure increases, the expanding bellows reduces the abutment gap between the stem and disc yoke. When the stem contacts the yoke, a further pressure increase will reduce the net pilot seating force to zero and the disc lifts from its seat. 4. At a higher pressure, the pilot valve starts to open and the hydraulic seating force is eliminated, resulting in a net increase in force that opens the pilot valve. The main valve operates as follows: 1. In the normally closed position, the main valve disc is seated by the combined forces exerted by the main valve pre-load spring and by the system internal pressure acting over the area of the main valve disc. 2. When the system pressure increases to the pilot valve (lift) set pressure, the pilot valve opens. This admits the fluid pressure to the area above the main valve piston. This flow creates a differential pressure across the main valve piston in a direction that tends to open the valve. The main valve piston is sized so that the resultant opening force is greater than the combined pre-load and hydraulic seating forces. Therefore, opening the pilot opens the main valve. 3. Similar to the pilot valve, when the main valve disc starts to open, the hydraulic seating force is reduced. This causes a significant increase in opening force and the characteristic full opening or popping sound. 4. When the pressure has reduced until the pilot valve closes, leakage of system fluid past the main valve piston decreases the pressure over the piston. This eliminates the hydraulic opening force and permits the pre-load spring to close the valve. Once closed, this additional hydraulic seating force due to system pressure acting on the main valve disc seats the main valve.
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Abutment gap (closed)
Pilot valve disc (open)
Outlet
High-pressure fluid
Main valve disc (open)
Inlet (a)
Abutment Gap Bellows Main valve piston Main valve preload spring Main valve disc (closed) Pilot preload setpoint adjustment spring
Pilot Valve Disc closed
Yoke portion of pilot valve disc
Outlet
Pilot sensing port
High-pressure fluid
Inlet (b)
Figure 4-19(a-b) Target Rock Pilot-Operated Valve (Open) (a) and (Closed) (b)
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In addition to the flow over the main disc and the pilot valve, there are other differences worth noting for the pilot-operated design compared with the spring-loaded design. The Target Rock pilot-operated valve does not contain adjustment rings. Valve adjustments are machined into the pilot assembly by the valve manufacturer, not adjusted later. The main disc does not have a secondary pressure chamber exposed to system steam pressure and the resulting additional pressure forces. It is important to note that pilot valves are a sequential opening device and therefore as in any sequential, step function, opening device there is a delay time (see Glossary, Appendix F) in the opening of the valve that causes release of inlet pressure. This opening time can vary as a function of system pressure rise rate and system fluid/condition. This is unlike the opening of a self-actuated safety/safety relief/relief valve which opens in direct response to (inlet static) system pressure. Opening times of about 200 milliseconds are typical compared to spring-loaded valves with 10 to 20 milliseconds opening times. 4.2.1.6 Summary
PWRs have one or more safety valves mounted on the pressurizer to protect the plant from potential overpressurization transients. Although other system pressure control equipment is also available, the self-actuated safety valves are used as the last resort of overpressure protection as required by the ASME Code Section III Subsection NB. Typical PWR plants have two to four safety valves designed to open automatically at 2500 psia. They pass steam flow rates from 210,000 to 600,000 lbs/hr. per valve and reclose automatically at pressures about 5% below the valve opening pressure.
4.2.2
BWR Main Steam Service PRVs
The BWR main steam system uses PRVs to protect the reactor primary system from overpressure. The valves are also used to depressurize the reactors primary system, if necessary, when the primary system pressure is below the PRV set pressure. These pressure relief designs may be a safety valve that is self-actuated by the system inlet static pressure or a pilot-operated valve that may have a direct acting or indirect acting pilot that self-actuates by the system static pressure to open the main valve disc. Both valve designs incorporate a secondary system to open the valve. The secondary system requires an external power source, electromagnetic or electropneumatic, that, in turn, mechanically causes the valve to open and relieve system pressure. In this mode of operation, the PRD stays open until the external power source has been de-energized. PRVs having this type of operating capability are generally categorized as dual-function PRVs. This section reviews typical manufacturer designs of BWR PRVs.
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4.2.2.1
General Description of BWR Safety Relief Valves
There are two types of self-actuated, spring-loaded, dual-function safety valve designs currently used on BWRs. These valves are manufactured by Crosby and Dikkers. This valve design is also described as safety valves with an auxiliary actuating device. Each of these manufacturers valve designs will 1) operate by self actuationopen at a preset value upon an inlet static pressure rise or 2) open in the relief mode of operation when an external electrical signal is applied to a solenoid that opens and permits pressurization of a pneumatic cylinder that mechanically opens the valve. In many plant applications, these PRVs are automatically opened in the relief mode of operation by a pressure signal initiated by a pressure transducer or transmitter located in the reactor vessel. Using a pressure value corresponding to a preset pressure value of a control device, the valve is mechanically actuated. In this relief mode, the valve can be opened by the plant operator transmitting an electrical signal as required by plant operating procedures. Two other types of dual-function, pilot-operated PRVs are also used in some BWRs. They are Target Rocks two-stage and three-stage PRVs. The pilot-operated valve designs of these PRVs require the pilot section to open before the main valve. 4.2.2.2 Crosby Safety/Relief Valve
The Crosby safety relief valve as shown in Figure 4-20a automatically opens when increasing static inlet steam pressure acting as the disc exerts an upward force sufficient to overcome the spring set load. When the disc begins to lift, a small amount of steam flows past the nozzle and disc seating surfaces and is deflected through an angle created by the nozzle ring and disc ring. The steam acts upward on the enlarged exposed area of the disc ring and increases the upward force causing an incremental change in the upward force that overcompensates the spring force and causes the disc to lift. As the disc lift increases, the flow increases and the total upward-generated force pops the valve open to the full-lift position. The inlet pressure value at which the pop action occurs is termed the popping pressure and corresponds to the set pressure value stamped on the nameplate attached to the valve. Figure 4-20b is a cross section of the valve internals when the valve is opened and discharging. Note that the primary flow reverses direction to flow between the nozzle ring and the adjusting ring. The secondary flow (eductor flow) is upward and passes through a series of annular orifices, A and B, that control the pressure developed in chambers C and D. Steam flows through slots in the eductor at H and into chambers C and D. Steam that bypasses the eductor exhausts into the valve body cavity through openings in the adjusting ring. Pressure in chambers C and D and opening E is greater than the body discharge cavity pressure.
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Lifting Mechanism Set Pressure Adjusting Bolt
Lever
Upper Spring Washer Balancing Piston Set-Point Spring (Compression) Bellows Eductor C Lower Spring Washer Balancing Piston Bellows A Primary Flow H Blowdown Adjusting Ring Disc Nozzle Body Discharge Eductor Flow Nozzle Nozzle Ring B D E Disc Ring Disc Insert Adjusting Ring Spindle Rod Assembly Bonnet
EPRI Licensed Material
Piston-type pneumatic actuator
Solenoid and air control valve assembly
Nozzle Ring
Inlet
(a)
(b)
Figure 4-20(a-b) Crosby Safety/Relief Valve (a) and Detail (b)
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As the inlet pressure decays to a value below the actual lift set pressure, the upward force on the lower face of the disc and the disc ring decreases and the valve disc begins to close. The closing action, produced by the difference between the upward forces and the downward spring force, is also assisted by a downward force produced by the pressures in chambers C and D. Closure (blowdown) for the valve is controlled by adjusting the position of the adjusting and nozzle rings. Their set locations are determined by manufacturer tests. Their position controls the net upward force produced by the steam on the lower face of the disc insert and disc ring. Proper adjustment will result in a sharp pop at open and a precise reseat pressure blowdown. Blowdown can be varied within the design limitations for a given service application. The characteristic blowdown setting established by the manufacturer for BWR PRVs ranges between 2 to 11%. To assure stable valve performance and mitigate the effects of backpressure in the valve body discharge cavity, a bellows as shown in Figures 4-20(a) and (b) is used. The bellows, sized to be approximately equivalent to the valve seat area, balances the downward force produced by static flow-induced backpressure. A balancing piston is also provided as a backup to the bellows in case the bellows fails. An electropneumatic actuator assembly and associated linkage is attached to the valve to provide an independent and separate means to open the valve when the system inlet steam pressure is less than the valves spring set pressure value. This method of operating the valve is referred to as the relief mode. The auxiliary actuating device permits opening the valve to: Depressurize the reactor under accident conditions. Control reactor operating pressure within designated values. This function is actuated by an external logic system controlled by redundant pressure sensors that monitor reactor steam dome pressure. The electropneumatic actuator assembly consists of a piston-type pneumatic cylinder and two or three solenoid and air valve assemblies (for redundancy) attached to the cylinder manifold. The actuator assembly is interconnected to the valve using a lever and lifting mechanism. When the solenoid is energized; the air valve is stroked into position permitting air pressure to enter the area below the piston in the cylinder. Pressure in the cylinder then pushes the piston upward, which in turn actuates the lever and lifting mechanism. This, in turn, mechanically moves the spindle upward causing the disc insert to lift from the nozzle seat. When the solenoid is de-energized, the air valve returns to the exhaust position. The pressure under the piston in the cylinder exhausts to the atmosphere through the exhaust porting. As the cylinder pressure decreases, the valve spring causes the disc insert to reestablish nozzle seat contact, and the valve closes.
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4.2.2.3
Dikkers Safety Relief Valve
The Dikkers PRV as shown in Figure 4-21(a) operates on the same principle as the Crosby PRV. One key difference is that in the safety mode of operation, the effect of the flow-induced backpressure that tends to close the valve is controlled by venting the pressure in the body bowl cavity behind the disc and piston as shown in Figure 4-21(b). This type of backpressure control scheme eliminates the need for a bellows. However, it incorporates a graphite-type packing ring to minimize backpressure leakage to the atmosphere while ensuring minimal frictional effects on the valve lift setpoint. For the Dikkers valves, the spring force is provided through the use of Belleville spring washers instead of a conventional spring. In the relief mode, the Dikkers PRV operates in the same manner as the Crosby PRV which is through the use of an actuator assembly. 4.2.2.4 Target Rock Pilot-Operated Relief Valves
The second type of PRV used in BWR plants is the pilot-operated valve. These valves, installed in several BWR plants, are either two-stage or three-stage designs. Figures 4-22 (a) and (b) are cross-sectional schematics of a two-stage Target Rock pilot-operated relief valve. The operational characteristics of the valve are different from those of the direct spring actuated valves, but similar to the Target Rock pilot-operated relief valve used for PWR applications. 4.2.2.4.1 Target Rock Two-Stage, Pilot-Operated Relief Valve The Target Rock two-stage, pilot-operated relief valve consists of two principle assemblies: a pilot stage assembly and the main stage assembly as shown in Figures 4-22 (a) and (b). These two assemblies are directly coupled to provide the dual-function relief operation modes as in the Crosby and Dikkers safety/relief valve. The pilot assembly is the pressure sensing and control element, and the main assembly is actuated by the pilot valve and provides overpressure protection and pressure relief. In the self-actuation mode, the pilot assembly (lift) set pressure vents the main piston chamber permitting the main disc to fully open. This results in system depressurization due to inlet fluid discharge. Operation of the pilot assembly and main assembly is described below.
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Nuclear Maintenance Applications Center
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Lifting Mechanism Piston Liner Packing Gland Packing Ring Spindle Set-Point Spring (Belleville Washers) (Compression) Spindle Bonnet Orifice Packing Gland Vent Piston Adjusting Ring Discharge Adjusting Ring Nozzle Ring Nozzle Body Inlet Nozzle Inlet (System Pressure) Discharge Disc (a) (b)
Lever
Piston-type pneumatic actuator assembly
Solenoid and air control valve assembly
Piston Liner
Piston
Body
Figure 4-21 (a-b) Dikkers Safety/Relief Valve (a) and Detail (b)
Diaphragm-type Pneumatic Actuator Solenoid Piston Chamber Plant Air Inlet Pilot Assembly Set-Point Spring (Compression) Pilot Rod Bonnet Pilot Disc Pilot Discharge Port Pilot Assembly Pilot Disc (Seated) Main Piston Bellows Set-Point Adjustment Nut Pneumatic Actuator Diaphragm-type piston Air Actuator Stem Lock Nut
Solenoid
Plant Air Inlet
Main Disc
Discharge
Main Piston
Body See Figure 4-22(b) for detail
Main Stage Assembly
Stabilizer Disc (Unseated) Main Piston Chamber Piston Rings Main Spring
Inlet (System Pressure)
(a)
(b)
Figure 4-22 (a-b) Target Rock Two-Stage Safety/Relief Valve (closed)
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Self-Actuation Mode: The pilot stage operates as follows: 1. The pilot assembly consists of two low flow pressure sensing elements. The springloaded pilot disc senses the (lift) set pressure, and the pressure loaded stabilizer disc senses the reseat pressure. Using the pilot rod, spring force is applied to the pilot disc. The adjustment of the spring creates a pre-load force to establish the (lift) set pressure value of the valve. 2. When system pressure increases at the valve inlet and reaches the adjusted (lift) set pressure, the net downward force acting on the pilot disc is reduced to zero, causing the pilot disc to lift from the seat. Pilot disc lift results in the depressurization of the main piston chamber volume through the pilot stage discharge port. Initial depressurization of the main piston chamber creates a differential pressure across the stabilizer disc in an upward direction, causing the stabilizer disc to seat. The system pressure, which acts on the stabilizer disc via the internal porting, maintains the pilot disc in the open position. This permits the main piston chamber to vent until the required differential pressure across the main piston is achieved. The main disc then opens to permit flow from the system inlet side to be relieved. When the system pressure has decreased to the valve reseat pressure, the pressure-sensing stabilizer disc unseats. This permits the pilot disc to reseat causing the main piston chamber to repressurize and close the main stage. 3. The main stage assembly of the Target Rock PRV is a reverse pressure seated-system fluid actuated angle globe valve. Actuation of the main valve disc permits the discharge of fluid from the system at rated capacity and provides the system with an overpressure protection pressure relief function. The major components of the main stage are the valve body, main disc/piston, and the main spring. 4. In the closed position, the main (stage) disc is seated by the combined forces of the main spring and the system internal pressure acting over the area of the main disc. In the closed position, the static pressures in the valve inlet nozzle and in the chamber over the main stage piston are equal. This pressure equalization is made possible by internal passages. 5. When the system pressure at the valve inlet increases to the valve (lift) set pressure, the pilot disc opens and vents the main piston chamber via internal porting to the pilot stage discharge port and to the discharge side of the valve. As discussed previously, this venting creates a differential pressure across the main piston in a direction that tends to open the main disc. The main piston is sized such that the net opening force is greater than the combination of the main spring pre-load and system pressure forces acting on the main disc. Once the main disc starts to open, the seating force is rapidly reduced, causing the main disc to fully open with the characteristic pop action. 6. Once the system pressure at the valve inlet is reduced to the reseat pressure, the pilot disc reseats. This permits the repressurization of the main piston chamber. The flow of system fluid through the main piston ring gap and stabilizer disc seating area repressurizes the chamber over the piston. The repressurization of the piston
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chamber equalizes system pressure forces and permits the main spring and flow forces to close the main valve disc. Relief-Actuation Mode: A diaphragm type pneumatic actuator is attached to the pilot stage assembly to provide operation of the valve at system pressures ranging from 50 psig to the valve set pressure. It is actuated by means of a solenoid control valve that admits air to the air operator piston chamber and strokes the air operator stem upward. This action compresses the spring and lifts the pilot rod to permit the pilot disc to lift to its open position. The main stage then opens as previously discussed. De-energizing the solenoid vents the diaphragm chamber, causing the air operator stem to return to its closed position. The pilot stage then reseats if the system pressure is at or below the reseat pressure. When the pilot stage reseats, it causes the main stage to reseat as previously discussed. 4.2.2.4.2 Target Rock Three-Stage Safety Relief Valve The Target Rock three-stage, pilot-operated PRV consists of two principal assemblies: a two-stage pilot valve section and the main valve section as shown in Figure 4-23. The two sections are coupled to provide a self-actuated PRV. The pilot valve section is the pressure-sensing and control element, and the main valve provides overpressure protection pressure relief. Self-actuation of the pilot valve at the valve (lift) set pressure vents the main piston chamber, permitting the main valve disc to fully open allowing fluid pressure from the valve inlet to be relieved. Self-Actuation Mode: 1. The pilot valve section of the Target Rock three-stage PRV is a low flow pressure sensing and control element that actuates the main valve. A component in the pilot valve is the bellows that acts as a combination piston, spring and seal. As shown in Figure 4-23, the top of the bellows is connected to the pilot stage disc through the stem and disc yoke. There is an adjustable clearance, or abutment gap at this connection point. 2. During assembly, the bellows is slightly extended to provide a pre-load force on the pilot stage disc, sealing the disc tightly and preventing leakage at low system pressure or high backpressure. 3. As the system pressure increases, the pre-load force is reduced to zero, and the pilot stage disc is held closed by the internal pressure acting over the pilot stage seat area. As system pressure increases, the bellows expansion reduces the abutment gap between the stem and disc yoke. When the stem contacts the yoke, an additional pressure increase reduces the net pilot seating force to zero and lifts the disc from its seat. 4. When the pilot stage starts to open, the fluid seating force is reduced. This results in a net increase in the force that tends to extend the bellows. This increase in net force produces a pop action during the pilot opening. Opening of the pilot admits fluid to the operating piston of the second stage, causing it to open. Then the opening of the main valve (third stage) follows.
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Remote Air Actuator Abutment Gap
Bellows Bellows Leakage Alarm Port Preload Spacer Pilot Stem Pilot Preload and Set-Point Adjustment Spring Yoke Portion of Valve Disc Pilot Sensing Port Main Valve Preload Spring Main Valve Piston Bonnet
Pilot Disc (closed) Second Stage Piston Orifice Second Stage Piston Second Stage Preload Spring Second Stage Disc (closed)
Inlet (System Pressure)
Main Valve Piston Orifice
Main Valve Disc (Closed) High Pressure Fluid Outlet
Figure 4-23 Target Rock Three-Stage Pilot-Operated Valve The main valve (third-stage) operation is as follows: 1. The main valve section of the Target Rock PRV is a reverse-seated, hydraulicallyactuated, angle-globe valve. Actuation of the main valve permits the discharge of inlet fluid to provide overpressure protection to the system. The parts of the main valve are the valve body, disc/piston assembly and main spring. 2. In the normally closed position, the main valve disc is seated by the combined forces of the system pressure acting over the area of the main valve disc and the main valve spring. In the closed position, the static pressures are equal at the valve inlet and in the chamber over the main valve piston. This pressure equalization is made possible by leakage past the piston, via the piston ring gap, piston orifice, and internal drain and vent grooves.
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3. When the system pressure increases at the valve inlet to the pilot (lift) set pressure, the pilot and second stage of the pilot valve open. This action vents the chamber over the main valve piston to the outlet side of the valve. This venting creates a differential pressure across the main valve piston in a direction that causes it to open. The main valve piston is sized such that the net opening force is greater than the combined spring pre-load and fluid seating forces. 4. When the main valve disc starts to open, the fluid seating force is reduced, creating a significant increase in opening force that causes the disc to fully open with a pop action. 5. When the inlet fluid pressure has been sufficiently reduced, the pilot reseats. The second stage also reseats after depressurization of the second-stage piston chamber. This is accomplished by leakage past the piston rings and piston orifice. The leakage of system fluid past the main valve piston repressurizes the chamber over the piston and permits the main spring and fluid pressure to force close the main valve disc. Relief-Actuation Mode: A diaphragm-type pneumatic operator is attached to the pilot valve assembly to provide operation of the valve at other than the self-actuated (lift) set pressure. It is actuated by means of a solenoid control valve that admits air to the air operator piston chamber and also strokes the air plunger which strokes the second-stage disc. The main valve disc then opens as described above. De-energizing the solenoid vents the air operator and permits the second stage disc to close. The main valve then reseats as described above.
4.2.3
4.2.3.1
PWR Pressurizer Power-Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)

Application and Typical Types of PORVs
The primary system components in PWRs are protected against overpressure by PORVs and self-actuated, spring-loaded safety valves. The PRVs are designed to open and relieve the system pressure during a transient that results in pressure surges above the specified limits. The PORVs are actuated by an external power source that is either electromagnetic or electropneumatic. This external power source acts directly on the main valve (directacting) or on a pilot valve (pilot-operated) that causes the main valve to open. PORVs used in PWR plants can be divided into two major categories: direct-acting and pilot-operated. In the direct-acting valves, the external power source acts directly on the main valve causing the plug or disc to be lifted off from the seat. The direct-acting valves usually contain a pneumatic operator. The pilot-operated valves contain a secondary or pilot valve that is opened by the external power source through a solenoid or electromagnet. Opening of the pilot valve reduces the pressure behind the main disc. This causes the main disc to lift from the seat and results in the valve relieving system pressure. Direct-acting valves include those manufactured by Control Components and Copes-Vulcan. Pilot-operated valves include those manufactured by Crosby, Dresser and Garrett (serviced by Crosby). The Garrett valve employs a three-way pilot system
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(similar to a pilot valve) to reduce the pressure on the main valve disc (plug). An exception to the above two categories is the internally piloted, solenoid-operated relief valve manufactured by Target Rock. This Target Rock valve contains an internal pilot disc that is lifted by a solenoid. This causes the pressure behind the main disc to reduce and the disk to be hydraulically lifted off the main seat. 4.2.3.2 Description of Manufacturers Relief Valves
Each type of PORV mentioned above is described below. Typically the Crosby PORVs used in PWRs are model HPV-SN pilot-operated valves as shown in Figure 4-24. They are externally actuated by an electrical power source. Inside the main valve body (1) are housed the lower portion of the nozzle disc (4) and the guide and the spring (6). The pilot valve body (2) is welded to the main valve body (1). The pilot valve (nozzle) is retained between the pilot valve body and the bonnet by the bonnet studs (12) and nuts. The disc (14), spring (21), spring washer and retaining ring are housed in the nozzle and bonnet. Also contained within the bonnet by the bellows top adapter is the bellows (17) and the disc actuator (19). The solenoid bracket (28), solenoid (35) and solenoid cover (41) are attached to the main valve body by the bracket studs (27) and nuts (26). The adjusting bolt (31) is threaded into the lever (33) and held in place by the adjusting bolt lock nut (32). The link (29) connects the lever (33) and solenoid (35).
41
Solenoid 35 Outlet
12 33 32 31 26 27
5 Nozzle 4 Disc 6 Spring 17 21 23 25 29
1 Body 2
Pilot Valve 19 Disc Aculator
Pilot Valve Disc 14 Inlet
Figure 4-24 Crosby (Model HPV-SN) PORV

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Under normal operating conditions, the inlet port A, cavities B and C, and the pilot valve connecting cavity D are at the same fluid pressure. Since the pressure in cavity C is greater than the pressure in the discharge port E, the main valve disc seats against the nozzle seat. The pilot valve disc seats against the nozzle (pilot valve) seat since the pressure in the connecting cavity D is greater than the pressure in the pilot valve discharge port F. When the solenoid is energized, the solenoid plunger actuates the lever (solenoid), causing the adjusting bolt to strike the top end of the disc actuator (pilot valve). This action unseats the pilot valve disc and allows steam to pass through the vent holes in the nozzle (pilot valve) to the pilot valve discharge port F. When the pilot valve opens, pressure in cavity C is reduced and the greater pressure in cavity B causes the main valve disc to open. When the solenoid is de-energized, the solenoid plunger returns to the original free position. The pilot valve closes, causing pressure to build up again in cavities C and D, thereby closing the main valve disc. 4.2.3.3 Dresser PORVs
The PORVs supplied by Dresser are pilot-operated, electrical push-action solenoid (Electromatic) and electromagnetic PRVs externally actuated by an electrical power source. The Dresser Electromatic relief valve consists of a body assembly, pilot valve, and an electromagnetic solenoid assembly. It is normally installed in the vertical position as shown in Figure 4-25. When the valve is de-energized, system inlet pressure is sensed in chamber areas A, B, C, D and F. The disc is held closed by the disc spring and the steam pressure in chamber C. The pilot disc is held closed by the pilot spring and the steam pressure in chamber F. The steam pressure assists in seating both the disc and the pilot disc, referred to as a reverse seated design. When the solenoid is energized, the solenoid plunger moves downward and strikes the operating lever with sufficient force to cause downward motion of the pilot disc stem compressing the pilot spring and opening the pilot disc. As the pilot disc moves off its seated position, steam in chamber F is released across the seat and exhausted through the pilot valve vent. This pilot action causes depressurization of chambers C and E and results in a pressure differential of sufficient magnitude across chambers B and C to open the disc from its seated position. This permits steam to flow from the inlet to the outlet side of the valve at its rated flow capacity. Portings D, E, and F, and the pilot valve vent, G, are sized to permit the steam pressure in chamber C to be exhausted faster than it is being pressurized. The steam flow exhausting through the pilot valve vent is small compared with flow through the valve. Therefore, as long as the solenoid is energized, the valve will remain open. When the solenoid is de-energized, the pilot disc is seated by the pilot spring and the pressure in chamber F shuts off flow to the pilot valve vent. This permits chambers C, E, and F to be pressurized through chamber D and by leakage past the piston rings and disc guide. This, in turn, permits the disc spring to overcome the unbalanced forces across chambers B and C and seat the disc. After the disc is seated, pressures in chambers B, C, D, E, and F, equalize to the inlet pressure value at chamber A as described above.
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Figure 4-25 Dresser Electromatic Relief Valve (Model 1525VX) 4.2.3.4 Control Components PORV
The PORV made by Control Components is a globe-style body shown in Figure 4-26. The valve operator is a double-acting piston air-operated cylinder. Two springs are used above the operator piston to close the valve in the event of air loss. The operator is controlled by two three-way solenoid valves. The main internal components of the valve are the plug, seat ring, and disc stack. The disc stack assembly consists of many discs layered together. Flow through the valve is restricted because the disc stack varies the number of turns and the area of flow passages on the individual discs. As the valve opens, the plug lifts off the seat and travels up the disc stack bore. Fluid then enters the valve body and flows from the outside of the disc stack into the disc stack bore area, past the seat ring, and out of the valve discharge.
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Spring
Plug
Disc Stack As Seat Ring
Figure 4-26 Control Components PORV 4.2.3.5 Copes-Vulcan PORV
All Copes-Vulcan PORVs have globe-style valve bodies, and the actuator uses a reverseacting diaphragm operator. Figure 4-27 shows the components of the Copes-Vulcan valve mode. The valve consists of a 3-inch cast or forged straight-through valve body, and all valves have a bolted style body-bonnet joint. This joint has a mechanical centering feature that uses a metal-to-metal shoulder to control gasket deformation. The gaskets are enclosed in the valve body and compressed as required by the design. In the reverse-acting operator, a large compression spring provides the seating force for the stem and plug. Air pressure is used to load the diaphragm chamber which overcomes the spring force and strokes the valve. The trim supplied for all Copes-Vulcan PORVs is of the unbalanced, single-seat, and plug-throttling design. This trim modulates with a plug that has a contour on the lower end, and its motion varies the annular flow clearance between the plug and cage.
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Actuator Spring
Stem
Plug
Cage Spacer Cage
Flow
Figure 4-27 Copes-Vulcan PORV The cage is a cylindrical spool piece surrounding the plug. It has flow ports that uniformly distribute the flow around the plug. The cage also contains the seat joint. This combination of cage, cage spacer, and plug provides the following principal advantages: Stable throttling at any pressure drop Reduction in the side load and friction due to the uniform flow distribution through the ports Longer seat life by eliminating chatter at low lifts Ease of maintenance due to quick change design 4.2.3.6 Target Rock
The Target Rock PORV model is a direct-acting, solenoid-operated globe valve that uses an internal pilot within the main disc as shown in Figure 4-28. This valves main disc is pressure-seated by the fluid on the upstream side of the valve. A pilot disc is contained within the main disc. Energizing the solenoid coil lifts the pilot disc off the seat in the main disc and drops the pressure from chamber above the main disc. When the pressure in this chamber drops to approximately half the inlet (upstream) pressure, the main disc is lifted from its seat.
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When the solenoid is de-energized, the pilot disc is reseated in the main disc. This allows the upstream pressure to enter the chamber above the main disc. The buildup of pressure in this chamber recloses the main disc. A push rod and magnet are attached via several connecting members to the main disc. When the main disc moves, the magnet is moved a distance equal to the main disc lift. The magnets motion is detected by reed switches that provide a positive indication of main disc position. For system checkouts, the main disc with the attached magnet can be magnetically opened and closed. In the absence of a pressure differential across the valve, the solenoid force is sufficient to lift the main disc against the force of its return spring. The fluid force lifting the main disc is aided by a solenoid force which, acting on the movable core, contributes a sufficient force to lift the main disc against the force of its return spring. 4.2.3.7 Crosby (Garrett) Pneumatic Systems1
Crosby (Garrett) PORVs used in PWRs are pilot-operated, solenoid-controlled relief valves. The two basic designs, shown in Figures 4-29 and 4-30, are similar in operation and differ mainly in the configuration of the body. The simplified schematic in Figure 4-31 shows the basic components of these valves, with the solenoid de-energized and the valve in the closed position. Inlet pressure flows through the valve inlet and is ported through the supply seat to the actuator head chamber of the valve. The inlet pressure is also ported below the piston and through the cage holes to surround the plug. The forces holding the valve closed include the pressure in the actuator head chamber acting on the entire piston area and the actuator spring load. (Note that the actuator spring load is primarily used to keep the valve closed at low inlet pressures.) Inlet pressure also acts on the annular area of the plug outside the seat diameter in a direction that opens the valve. Since this total annular area to open the valve is less than the total piston area, the closing force is higher and the plug is held down against the seat. When the solenoid is energized, the magnetic force acts on the solenoid armature to move the valve seat ball from the vent seat as shown in Figure 4-31 to the opposite supply seat. This seals off inlet pressure to the actuator head chamber. The actuator head pressure is vented to discharge through the vent seat. With the actuator head chamber vented to discharge, inlet pressure acting on the annular piston and plug area is sufficient to overcome the actuator chamber pressure. The plug then moves off the valve seat in the direction that opens the valve. As the valve opens, pressure inside the cage builds up below the portion of the plug exposed to discharge pressure, causing the plug to continue to move to the full-lift position.
This product was originally manufactured by Garrett Pneumatic Systems. Presently the installed base is manufactured by Garrett and any new product is manufactured by Crosby Valve and Gage Company.
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When the solenoid is de-energized, the ball moves back to the vent seat and seals the flow path to discharge. The actuator head chamber is thus repressurized with inlet pressure through the supply seat and the plug moves to make contact with the valve seat and then closes. The closing forces of the plug consist of the inlet pressure acting in the actuator head chamber.
Flow
Pilot Disc Pilot Seat
Solenoid Assembly
Main Disc
Plug
Figure 4-28 Target Rock PORV
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Solenoid
Cage Seal Body Plug
Figure 4-29 Crosby (Garrett), Right Angle PORV
Solenoid
Cage
Plug Seat Body
Figure 4-30 Crosby (Garrett), Straight Through PORV

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Three-way solenoid Solenoid spring
Actuator head chamber Actuator spring Piston area Inlet flow
Vent seal
Supply seal
Plug
Valve seat Discharge flow
Figure 4-31 Crosby (Garrett), PORV Schematic Diagram
4.2.4
PWR Secondary System Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs)
The secondary steam system for PWR power plants is protected from overpressure by self-actuated safety valves. Typically, a PWR secondary main steam system will have a quantity of 12 to 16 main steam self-actuated safety valves installed on the main steam header. These valves may vary in inlet size depending upon plant size. Larger plants generally use a 6-inch nominal pipe size inlet (6- or 10-inch single or dual outlets) with a set pressure ranging from 1000 to 1350 psig and with rated capacities of approximately 500,000 lbs/hr. saturated steam. The valves are manufactured to the requirements of ASME Section III, Subsection NC (Class 2) and Article NC7000. These safety valves, typically manufactured by Crosby or Dresser, are shown in Figures 4-32 and 4-33. A general description of these PRVs follows. Crosby PWR Main Steam Safety Valve The Crosby Style HA-FN safety valve is shown in Figure 4-32(a) and (b). This figure shows the safety valve assembly in cross-section and covers the essential elements of the valve. Housed inside the body (1) is the upper portion of the nozzle (that has a flat seat) (2), nozzle ring (3), guide ring (10) and guide (8A). The disc insert (6) (which has a flat seat) is held in place in the disc holder (5A) by the disc insert pin (7). The nozzle and guide rings are held in place by the nozzle ring set screw (4) and guide ring set screw (11) threaded into the body.
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The guide (8A) is retained between the body (1) and bonnet (20) by the bonnet studs (21) and bonnet stud nuts (22). The bonnet (20) contains the spring (13), spring washers (14 and 15), bearing adapter and bearing (18 and 17) and the spindle assembly (12), the lower end of which is positioned on the disc bushing (5B) in the disc holder. The adjusting bolt (33) is locked in place by the adjusting bolt lock nut (19) on top of the bonnet within the cap (23). Manual lifting means is provided by the lever (25), lever pin (26), forked lever (28), forked lever pin (29), and spindle nut (31). The operation of the valve is identical to that covered in Section 4.1.2.2.1 for two-ringcontrol safety valves and will not be repeated.
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31
23 33 26 27 15 25
28 29
19
18 17 13 20
14 21 22 12 11 4 3 6 2 1 8A 10 7 5A 5B
(a) Crosby Single Outlet 6R10 HA-FN Safety Valve
(b) Crosby Dual Outlet 6R8X8 Safety Valve
Figure 4-32 (a-b) Typical Crosby Model HAFN MSSVs
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16A 16 17A 19 7A
4 2 CONSOLIDATED
17 18A 19 2 7 15A
6A
18 3
3A
6C
6B
1C 1D 3A BB 13A
OUTLET FLANGE REMOVED
BA 14 12 13
11 9
5 11A 10
DUAL OUTLET
1B
1A
SINGLE OUTLET
Figure 4-33 Typical Dresser Type 1700 MSSV
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The Crosby main steam safety valve is manufactured in a variety of inlet (welded, flanged and studded) and body configurations (cast body and forged). The valve seat design, as in the pressurizer safety valve, is also supplied in a variety of seat designs and material configurations that are dependent upon the inlet fluid conditions. Dresser MSSVs The Dresser Type 1700 safety valve is shown in Figure 4-33. This figure shows the dual outlet safety valve in cross section and covers the essential elements of the valve with a full nozzle construction. It also shows the body (base) shape for a single outlet valve with a semi-nozzle construction. The basic elements of the safety valve consist of the valve body (base) (1A) which contains the nozzle (1B). Within the body (1A) is the disc (5), disc holder (12) guide (14) and spindle (8). Above the body is the yoke rod support (3A), the spring (6C), and the top and bottom spring washers (6A and 6B). Spring load is transmitted to the disc (5) through the spindle and retained by the compression screw (7). The yoke (2) and yoke rods (3) are fixed in place at the body (1A) and yoke (2) by the yoke rod nuts (4). The performance characteristics of the valve are similar to that of the full-lift, reaction-type, two-ring-control safety valve discussed previously. Design Comparison/Crosby and Dresser MSSVs The following is a brief comparison of a few of the important features of the Crosby and Dresser safety valve. The comparison should aid in the understanding of various aspects of each valve design. Both valve designs have an inlet nozzle type construction with a flat seat. In the Dresser design, the spring load is directly transmitted to the disc insert through the spindle point. In the Crosby design, the spring load is transmitted through the spindle point that has a hardened ball, then to a hardened bushing, and finally to the disc insert. In the Dresser valve, the spring load is retained through the use of (side) yoke rods that are fixed at the lower end by the valve body and at the top of the valve by a yoke. Crosby retains the spring load in a more conventional exposed spring safety valve bonnet design that is bolted to the valve body. This bonnet is called an open bonnet construction (as compared to the closed bonnet used in safety relief and relief valve designs). Both valve designs have the full-lift, full-nozzle, two-ring control that uses a huddle chamber and reaction principle to achieve the desired valve operation.
4.2.5
Auxiliary and Secondary System/BOP Safety Relief and Relief Valves
General Description Safety relief and relief valves used on auxiliary and secondary systems are as varied in design and applications as are valve manufacturers. Such valves are manufactured in a broad scope of design sizes, inlet and outlet connections, construction materials, and service conditions (namely fluid, inlet design pressures, set pressure, outlet design
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pressure, and backpressure). Typically these valves are manufactured by Crosby, Dresser, Farris, Lonergan (now Kunkle Valve), Target Rock and Anderson Greenwood. Manufacturers produce these valves with inlet connections that range in size from 1/2to 10-inch nominal pipe size. The flange inlet connections are ANSI Class 150 to Class 2500 and, depending upon valve size and set pressure. Welded inlets can be socket or butt welded. Screwed connections are also available. However, flanged connections are popular because they permit the valve to be easily removed from the system for maintenance or repair. Depending upon the system requirements and location on the nuclear plant, these valves can be manufactured to one of the following standards: ASME Section III, Subsection NB, NC or ND and Article NX7000 or to ASME Section VIII. Materials of construction of the valve enclosure (body and bonnet) and the valve internals (nozzle, disc, disc holder, spindle, adjusting rings) may be, for example, carbon steel, stainless steel, Monel and bronze. Material selections will vary as a function of the PRV service conditions. Most PRVs use metal seats that are beveled or at a flat seat angle. Soft seat safety relief and relief valve applications can be installed on systems where improved seat tightness over that obtained from standard metal-to-metal seats is desired. Examples of service applications where a soft-seat design valve could be used to improve seat tightness are: Where the system operating conditions for a safety relief valve (gas service) are less than 10% below the valve set pressure. (This is a standard design condition.) On systems where light gases are used. On gas systems that could expose the valve seat to foreign material such as pipe scale, sand, or dust particles that may damage a metal-to-metal seating surface during relief. The O-ring seat seal will preclude the damage that could occur from foreign particles. When the valve closes on this type of foreign material, or if it is embedded in the resilient O-ring, the valve tightness may not be impaired. If it is, it will only be necessary to change the O-ring to stop the leakage. All of the valve manufacturers mentioned above use what is generically called a soft seat design. This seat design may use an elastomeric (resembling or containing rubber) seat material or a polymeric material such as Teflon. The major difference is the design of the valve disk which now has the O-ring to assist in effecting the seat seal. The valve still has all of the same internals as the conventional valve or balanced valve. A typical Dresser 1900 Series A, 45 metal-to-metal and O-ring seat is shown in Figure 4-34.
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DISC RETAINING RING
DISC
RETAINER SCREW O-RING RETAINER O-RING SEAT SEAL
Figure 4-34 A Soft Seat in a Dresser PRV All of the above valves are manufactured as a conventional or balanced type design and have a beveled, flat, or O-ring seat. The control/huddle chambers employ a fix or adjustable (two-ring or single-ring)/low-lift or reaction-type design. Since the designs of these PRVs are so varied, all the manufacturers and their valve types cannot be covered. However Figures 4-35 through Figure 4-41 identify some manufacturers designs.
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Cap Adjusting Bolt Adjusting Bolt Locknut Cap Gasket Cap Cap Gasket Spring Washer Bonnet Spring Spring Washer Body Guide Guide Ring Disc with Bushing Bonnet Stud Nut Bonnet Stud Spring Washer Spring Spindle Bonnet
Adjusting Bolt
Adjusting Bolt Lock Nut
Gaskets
Spindle
Spindle Lockclip
Guide Ring Set Screw
Gaskets Nozzle Ring Set Screw Nozzle Ring
Set Screw Pin Nozzle
Spindle Guide Guide Gasket Protector Gasket Bellows Protector Bellows Bellows Tailpiece Plug Plug Gasket Tailpiece Gasket Disc Ring Disc Nozzle Ring Set Screw Set Screw Gasket Nozzle Ring Body Nozzle
Set Screw Rod
Style JO
Figure 4-35 Crosby Style JO and JB Safety Relief and Safety Valve
Style JB
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Figure 4-36 Crosby Style JOS and JBS Safety Relief and Relief Valve (Conventional and Balanced)
4-64
Finger Tight Only
24
VIEW SHOWING VALVE GAGGED
23 18 20 16 17 29 28 19 10 21 22
8A 12 13 14
15 4 6
10
OUTLET
PC. NO. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8A* 8B* 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
DESCRIPTION BODY BODY STUD NOZZLE DISC GUIDE & RING SET SCREW SET SCREW GASKET SPINDLE SPINDLE BALL SPRING SPRING WASHER BONNET BONNET STUD BONNET STUD NUT BONNET GASKET ADJUSTING BOLT ADJUSTING BOLT NUT CAP CAP GASKET CAP PLUG CAP PLUG GASKET CAP PLUG CHAIN CAP PLUG CLIP TEST ROD IDENTIFICATION PLATE NAME PLATE DRIVE SCREW SEAL & WIRE SEAL CLIP
* Furnished as sub-assembly only
7 8B 1 3 2 5
INLET
Figure 4-37 Crosby Style JMAK Liquid Relief Valve (Water Ring Design)
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LIST OF PARTS
PC.NO 1 2 3 3A* 3B* 3C* 3D* DESCRIPTION BASE BASE GASKET DISC DISC DISC COLLAR DISC COLLAR PIN "O" RING GUIDE & RING SET SCREW SET SCREW GASKET SPINDLE SPINDLE BALL SPRING SPRING WASHER CYLINDER ADJUSTING BOLT ADJUSTING BOLT NUT CAP CAP GASKET DOG CAM DOG CAM BEARING DOG CAM BEARING O-RING LEVER LEVER PIN LEVER SPACER SPINDLE NUT SPINDLE NUT COTTER CAP PLUG CAP PLUG GASKET SEAL & WIRE SEAL CLIP TEST ROD DATA PLATE NAMEPLATE IDENTIFICATION PLATE DRIVE SCREW
32 25 24 27 28 23 29 26 35 34 14 17 15 3 34 10 11
13B
33
21 30 31
13A
9 10 11 13A* 13B* 14 15 17 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 GKST 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
19 20 22 15
9 2
45
3A 3C 3B 3D 1
Figure 4-38 Crosby Style JMB-WR Liquid Relief Valve
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SERIES 800 ADJUSTABLE BLOWDOWN PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE (a)
SERIES 900 OMNI-TRIM FIXED BLOWDOWN PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE (b)
Figure 4-39 (a-b) Crosby Series 800 and 900, Omni Trim with Screwed Inlet and Outlet (Valve Is Also Supplied with Flanged Connections)
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4-68
Adjusting Ring Set Screw Gasket Adjusting Ring Series 900 Bolted Cylinder
O-RING SOFT SEAT
METAL-TO-METAL SEAT
METAL-TO-METAL SEAT SERIES 800 ADJUSTABLE BLOWDOWN PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
SERIES 900 FIXED BLOWDOWN OMNI-TRIM PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE
(c)
(d)
Figure 4-39 (c-d) Crosby Series 800 and 900, Omni Trim with Screwed Inlet and Outlet (Valve Is Also Supplied with Flanged Connections)
Packed Cap Release Nut Release Lock Nut Plain Cap Top Lever Pin Top Lever Drop Lever Pin Adj. Screw Nut Adj. Screw Top Spring Washer Assembly Spring Spindle Assembly Drop Lever Vent Bottom Spring Washer Eductor Tube Bonnet Disc Holder Base Stud Stud Nut Release Nut Lever Shaft Packing Packing Nut Lifting Fork Adj. Screw Nut Cap Bolt Cap Gasket
Release Lock Nut Lever
Adj. Screw
Top Spring Washer Assembly
Spring
Spindle Assembly
Bonnet
Bottom Spring Washer
Disc Holder Assembly
Base Stud Stud Nut Bonnet Gasket Guide Guide Gasket Holder Ring Retainer Holder Ring Adj. Ring Pin Assembly Ring Pin Gasket Disc Adj. Ring Nozzle Drain Base
Guide
Bonnet Gasket
Guide Gasket
Bellows
Bellows Gasket
Holding Ring Retainer
Holder Ring
Adj. Pin Adj. Ring Pin Gasket Disc
1/2 NPT Drain
Adj. Ring
Nozzle
Base
(a) Conventional Safety Relief/Relief Valve
(b) Balanced (Bellows Safety Relief/Relief Valve
Figure 4-40 (a-b) Typical Dresser 1900 Series Safety Relief/Relief Valve
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CAP, PLAIN SCREWED STEM SPRING ADJUSTING SCREW JAM NUT (SPR. ADJ. SCR.) CAP GASKET UPPER SPRING BUTTON BONNET SPRING LOWER SPRING BUTTON STEM RETAINER PIPE PLUG (BONNET) SLEEVE GUIDE BODY STUD HEX NUT (BODY) BONNET GASKET BODY GASKET LOCK SCREW (D.H.) DISC DISC HOLDER WIRE SEAL LOCK SCREW GASKET LOCK SCREW (B.D.R.) HEX. NUT (B.D.R.L.S.) LOCK SCREW STUD BLOW DOWN RING PIPE PLUG (BODY) 1/2 M.N.P.T. BODY NOZZLE
FARRIS SAFETY RELIEF/VALVE CONVENTIONAL DESIGN
TYPICAL INTERNALS OF CONVENTIONAL SAFETY RELIEF/RELIEF VALVE DESIGN
TYPICAL INTERNALS OF BALANCED SAFETY RELIEF/RELIEF VALVE DESIGN
Figure 4-41 Typical Farris 2600 Series Safety Relief/Relief Valve
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5
FAILURE MODES AND FAILURE CAUSE ANALYSIS
5.0 Introduction
This section discusses the failure mode and cause analysis (FMCA) performed in support of the other sections of this manual. The FMCA is based on PRV failure information gathered from USNRC LERs and the INPO NPRDS data bases. Additional industry information was used when available. This section presents the failure mechanisms and cause categories for valves installed in both BWRs and PWRs. The intent of the analysis is to identify failure causes where maintenance resources can be applied to enhance the performance of safety and relief valves. Safety and relief valve maintenance information was collected for three principal vendors: Crosby, Dresser, and Target Rock. These vendors represent the predominant valves used in ASME, Section III applications. The valves are typically used in reactor coolant system (RCS), main steam system (MSS), and as automatic depressurization system (ADS) valves. 5.1 Failure Mode and Cause Analysis
This section presents failure modes and causes for safety and relief valves used at both PWR and BWR reactor facilities. Industry failure information was individually reviewed to categorize each reported failure mode and cause. This provided a common analytical base for each reported failure. A failure mode refers to the way a PRV fails, e.g., lift high, lift low. A failure cause refers to the physical cause of the failure. Failure causes can be related to human errors, mechanical defects, service stresses, and wearout. The identified fundamental failure modes for PRVs are listed below. Failure causes for each failure mode are listed in Table 5-1. The failure modes and their associated causes are discussed in more detail in Section 5.2, Failure Mode and Cause Classification. Failure to lift (stuck shut) Lift high Lift low Seat leakage Failure to reseat Blowdown External leakage
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Table 5-1 PRD Failure Modes and Causes

Failure Causes Failure to Lift Adjusting Ring Retainer Pin Failure Adjusting Ring Settings Aging Assembly Auxiliary Lift Device Failure Bellows Failure Bent Stem Binding Body Leakage Bonding Broken Springs Corrosion Cotter Pin/ Broken Lockwire Design Excessive seat Leakage Foreign Material Gagged Shut Improper Blowdown Ring Adjustment Inlet Flange Leakage Loop Seal Maintenance/Testing Manufacturing Defect (Seat) Material Deficiency Nozzle Loading Outlet Flange Leakage Pilot Failure Pilot Leakage Pipe Loading Procedural Plugged Inlet Shipping & Handling Spring Relaxation Test Conditions Thermal Stress X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Lift High Lift Low Failure Modes Seat Leakage Failure to Reseat Blowdown X X External Leakage
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5.2
Failure Mode and Cause Classification
PRV failures were reviewed to uniquely classify each failure mode and cause category. This classification was necessary to provide a common reference from which the body of valve failure information could be analyzed. All incomplete failure data was substantiated by the use of other supporting information. In most cases, USNRC LER information was used to verify the extent of the failure(s) and number of valves identified in the report. Failure mode grouping uses similar failure causes, e.g., aging, test conditions, procedures, etc. This failure mode grouping provides a common link between the USNRC LER and INPO NPRDS information. Table 5-1 presents each failure mode with the predominate failure causes. 5.2.1 Failure Modes The following are descriptions of the important failure modes: Failure to Lift (Stuck Shut): This failure mode deals with valves that did not open when required. Causes that lead to this type of failure are the installation of the valve stem gag, valve disc physically restrained by corrosion products, or a plugged inlet. Lift High: This failure mode deals with the valve lifting at a pressure greater than the allowable pressure as established by licensees Technical Specifications or by procedure acceptance criteria. Failures in this category are reported regardless of valve name plate tolerance. Lift Low: This failure mode deals with the valve lifting at a pressure less than the allowable pressure as established by the licensees Technical Specifications or by procedural acceptance criteria. Failures in this category are reported regardless of valve name plate tolerance. Seat Leakage: This failure mode refers to the condition where the valve exhibits process fluid leakage specifically past the valve disc and seat with normal system pressure applied. Leakage outside the valve body is categorized as external leakage. Failure to Reseat: This failure mode refers to the condition where the valve does not reseat after lifting. This is attributed to the shifting of the valve internal components during the lifting process resulting in binding of the sealing surfaces. Blowdown: This failure mode refers to the condition where the valve reseats after lifting but reseats lower than the desired reseating pressure. This is attributed to nozzle ring adjustments or mechanical weakening or shifting of the valve components such that the valve fails to reseat within the desired band.
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External Leakage: This failure mode refers to leakage other than seat leakage. External leakage includes body-to-bonnet leakage, inlet and outlet flange leakage, and bellows leakage.
5.2.2 Failure Mode Causes The following list identifies each failure mode cause and its effect on the valve.
Adjusting Ring Retaining Pin Failure: allows the adjusting ring(s) to move from their set position which affects accumulation and blowdown Adjustment Ring Settings: improper ring settings provided by the vendor for the application or applied during maintenance Aging: assigned to valves which remained in service for extended periods of time with little or no PM performed Assembly: installation of wrong valve part(s) and/or incorrect assembly procedure Auxiliary-Lift Device Failure or Associated Inputs: 1) includes pressure inputs for ADS valves such as pressure switches; 2) inputs that are stuck and/or prevent the valve from closing after lifting Bellows Failure: 1) mechanical damage or failure of the bellows that causes system fluid to leak from down stream sources; 2) internal bellows failure that interferers with the ability of the valve to reseat Bent Stem: 1) valve stem mechanical damage; 2) valve stem is bent causing inadequate disc and seat contact; 3) sufficient bending to prevent reclosure after opening Binding: 1) physical rubbing of the valve stem and other components; 2) internal or external binding of the stem, disc, or other internals Body Leakage: porosity of the valve body Bonding: physical surface bonding of the disc and seat seating surfaces (typical where disc and seat materials are similar) Broken Spring: main spring weakening or failure Corrosion: 1) corrosion of the upper spring housing and chamber; 2) corrosion preventing the valve stem/disc from lifting within the required pressure range; 3) valve disc and/or seat surface corrosion resulting in seat leakage; 4) valve corrosion that interferers with the ability of the disc and seating surfaces to provide a leak-tight seal Cotter Pin / Broken Lockwire: a condition where a valve locking nut can reposition during valve lift and interfere with valve closure after opening Design: applications where system operating pressure range and valve lift setpoint are very close causing improper valve operation
5-4
Excessive Seat Leakage: conditions where the lift setpoint could not be determined due to excessive valve main seat leakage Foreign Material: 1) material left or remaining in the valve chamber preventing stem and/or disc lift; 2) material left or remaining in the valve chamber preventing stem lift within the desired pressure range; 3) material left or remaining in the valve chamber allowing process fluid to escape between the seat and disc; 4) material that becomes lodged in the valve during lift and prevents valve seating Gagged Shut: valve stem gag not removed after installation Improper Blowdown Ring Adjustment: mechanical adjustment that prevents the valve from reseating after opening Inlet Flange Leakage: improper inlet flange torque, gasket installation, or alignment Loop Seal: 1) applications were inlet loop seals affect valve performance; 2) the influence of the loop seal causes valve body heating and/or thermal expansion of valve components Maintenance/Testing: the ineffective maintenance techniques and testing program and/ or testing controls Manufacturing Defect: defects in seating materials that result in stress cracking or corrosion failures Material Deficiency: porosity in the disc, seat, or nozzle Nozzle Loading: inlet and outlet valve flange loading due to thermal growth of valve structural support components Outlet Flange Leakage: improper outlet flange torque, gasket installation, or alignment Pilot Failure: 1) applicable for all pilot actuated valves that are not lift device or pressure sensor input failures; 2) applicable to valves with pilot operation where the pilot causes the valve to open above the desired pressure range; 3) leakage of the pilot causing valve actuation below allowable tolerance band; 4) input from the pilot that prevents the valve reseating Pilot Leakage: 1) pilot seat leakage; 2) external leakage from the pilot interconnections Pipe Loading: similar to nozzle loading where support members thermally grow causing valve body distortion that results in seat leakage Procedural: 1) inadequate incorporation of vendor instructions in approved station maintenance procedures, programs, or test procedures; 2) maintenance procedures that result in poor sealing surfaces Plugged Inlet: covers physical solidification of the inlet fluid
5-5
Shipping and Handling: sealing damage as a result of shipping or handling Spring Relaxation: main valve spring weakening causing reduced seating forces Test Conditions: cases where plant test conditions were not stable Thermal Stress: as a result of unplanned valve body heat up or operating environment. 5.3 Safety and Relief Valve Failure Data
Many sources of information were available for review. However, the primary sources of raw data used were obtained from the INPO NPRDS and the USNRC LER data bases. The PRV failure data was combined into one data base. Other referenced sources of information provided a summary of the raw information in the form of regulatory concerns, recent industry topics, and helpful operational and maintenance reminders. These industry reviews were used to determine if data trends were consistent. Additionally, vendor site visits and select utility interviews were performed to discuss opinions on the principal failure modes, mechanisms, causes, and the efforts to improve safety and relief valve performance. The information review was performed for all reported failures involving primary system safety valves, pilot operated relief valves, main steam system safety valves (including ADS valves), and relief valves. It is recognized that there are other failures that may have occurred that were not reported. However, these non-reported failures are not considered significant for the purposes and conclusions presented by this guide. Failure information was included from the earliest available data beginning in 1974 and ending on March 1993. Table 5-3, NPRDS and LER Safety and Relief Valves Failures (1974-1993), illustrates data for each of the seven failure modes. This information is presented by plant type for BWR and PWR applications. In total there are 3,418 reported failures, consisting of: 272 primary safety valves 1,374 main steam safety and ADS valves 1,749 relief valve failures The safety and relief valve population includes PWR primary valves and MSSVs and BWR MSSVs and ADS valves. The relief valve population includes systems ranging from diesel generator starting air and jacket cooling water, heat exchanger, and component cooling water relief valves.
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Table 5-2 NPRDS and LER Safety and Relief Valve Failures (19741993)
Failure Category Plant Type Valve Type Failure to Lift LiftHigh LiftLow Seat Leakage Failure to Reseat Improper Blowdown External Leakage Totals PSV 0 55 82 116 1 3 15 272 Number or Reported Failures by Valve Type PWR MSSV 2 204 209 213 26 3 8 665 PORV 5 0 2 11 5 0 0 23 BWR MSSV + ADSV 63 351 62 163 18 23 29 709 PWR + BWR BOP Relief Valves 28 231 386 756 154 5 189 1749 Totals 98 841 741 1259 204 34 241 3418
PSV: Pressurizer safety valve PORV: Power-operated relief valve BWR: Boiling water reactor MSSV: Main steam safety valve
ADS: Automatic depressurization safety valve PWR: Pressurized water reactor BOP: Balance-of-plant
5.3.1 BWR MSS/Relief Valve Failures Figure 5-1(a) illustrates the most frequent BWR MSSV/relief valve failure modes. The most frequent failure causes associated with lifting higher than setpoint, seat leakage, failure to lift, and lift low are shown in Figure 5-1(b) through 5-1(e). The remaining failure modes, failure to reseat, improper blowdown, and external leakage, are almost equally represented among the failure causes listed in Table 5-1.
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 5-1 (a-c) BWR Safety Relief Valve, Failure Modes and Causes
5-8
(d)
(e)
Figure 5-1 (cont.) (d-e) BWR Safety Relief Valve, Failure Modes and Causes
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5.3.2 PWR Pressurizer Safety Valve Failures

The most frequent failure modes for PWR pressurizer safety valves are shown in Figure 5-2(a). The highest seat leakage causes are shown in Figure 5-2(b). The second highest failure mode, lift low, was caused most frequently by aging as shown in Figure 5-2(c). The third highest failure mode was lift high (see Figure 5-2(d)) with aging again being the most frequently reported failure. The data indicates that for all pressurizer safety valve failures the single largest failure cause was aging. If time-directed PM was scheduled more frequently, the potential to affect 93% of all of the reported failures appears feasible. Although a total reduction of failures is improbable, a significant reduction in the total number of failures could be obtained. The other significant failure mode, external valve leakage, was primarily caused by inlet flange leakage attributed to improper gasket installation or improper inlet flange torque. Other failures such as failure to reseat and improper blowdown were not found to be dominant failure modes.
(a)
(b)
Figure 5-2 (a-b) PWR Pressurizer Safety Valve Failure Modes and Causes
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(c)
(d)
Figure 5-2 (cont.) (c-d) PWR Pressurizer Safety Valve Failure Modes and Causes
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5.3.3 PWR MSSV Failures

Figure 5-3(a) shows the most frequent MSSV failure modes in PWRs. Major failure causes are shown in Figures 5-3(b) through 5-3(d). The remaining failure modes, failure to lift, failure to reseat, improper blowdown, and external leakage, are minor in the number of reported failures. Failure related to aging is the dominant cause of MSSV performance problems. A detailed review of aging and bonding related failures was performed to determine if these cause categories were being used as the most reasonable causes when there where no other identifiable causes. The review determined that there were reports that identified failure cause codes as aging when there was no other identifiable cause. Consequently, this review classified age related failures of less than 24 months as being indeterminate. These were assumed to have been categorized with aging when there was no obvious failure cause. However, this category of indeterminate failures represented only 19 out of a total of 665 reported MSSV failures.
(a)
(b)
Figure 5-3 (a-b) PWR MSSV, Failure Modes and Causes

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(c)
(d)
Figure 5-3 (cont.) (c-d) PWR MSSV, Failure Modes and Causes
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5.3.4 PWR PORV Failures

The PWR PORV failure modes are included in this report to recognize that there are PORV failures. However, the total number of reported failures was small for the number of PORVs in service and the number of years included in this review, with only 23 reported failures over the past 19 years. Figure 5-4 illustrates the distribution of the reported failure modes. The failure causes are fairly low in number with a similar distribution to that of the PWR pressurizer safety/relief valves. The most frequent failure mode is seat leakage which had a primary failure cause identified as aging. Most aging failure causes were closely grouped with age at failure being reported in excess of 120 months. All age related failure cause codes were greater than 48 months. The second most frequent failure mode was split between failure to lift and failure to reseat. The failure causes associated with these failure modes were mixed between foreign material, ALD failure, broken stem, binding, and pilot failure.
Figure 5-4 PWR PORV Failure Modes
5.3.5 Relief Valve Failures

Relief valve failures represent the largest number of reported failures. Figure 5-5(a) is a chart of the most frequent relief valve failure modes. These reported failures represent relief valves typically found at both BWRs and PWRs. As previously mentioned these relief valves include thermal reliefs, pump suction and discharge, and air system relief valves. The most frequent failure mode was seat leakage with the primary failure cause being aging as shown in Figure 5-5(b). The average age at failure was 112 months. There were 81 reports where the failure cause was indeterminate. The next most frequent failure mode, lift low, also had aging as the primary failure cause as shown in Figure 55(c). The average age at failure was 104 months. There were 44 reports where the failure cause was indeterminate. The next most frequent failure mode was lift high and again the primary failure cause was aging shown in Figure 5-5(d). The average age for lift
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high failure mode was 115 months. There were seven indeterminate reports with the majority of these reports identifying bonding as the failure mechanism.
(a)
(b)
Figure 5-5 (a-b) Relief Valve, Failure Modes and Causes
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(c)
(d)
Figure 5-5 (cont.) (c-d) Relief Valve, Failure Modes and Causes 5.4 Failure Modes Analysis
The predominant failure mode for all valve types is lifting outside the desired pressure range. There were approximately 1,580 cases reported for all valve types (pressurizer, main steam, and relief valves). The major contributor for this failure mode includes MSSV with 826 reported failures outside the required pressure range (high and low). Relief valves (all types) are the next largest contributor with 617 reported failures outside the required pressure range. The pressurizer safety valve is next with 137 reported failures. The predominant failure mode for all safety valves is the MSSV lifting higher than the setpoint value. A review of the specific data indicates that most of these failures are outside the 1% allowable but within the 3% vendor design tolerance. These lift
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setpoint failures are principally driven by the close tolerance between Technical Specification requirements and the actual ability of the valve to perform within the required pressure band. This was identified in the Special Report AEOD/S92-20. This report identified that approximately 70% of all the reported safety valve malfunctions are attributed to the condition called setpoint drift. The term setpoint drift should be changed to setpoint variance in most cases. The reason for distinction between the two terms is associated with the results of continued valve testing after the first lift of the valve. Often the first lift of the valve is outside the 1% range but is normally within the 3% range. Then, in many cases, the second, third and fourth lift tests result in the valve lifting within the 1% range without valve adjustment. This lifting phenomenon appears to be normal for the type of valves being used by the industry. Tests are being conducted by the BWR Owners Group and others to understand this phenomenon. A survey was conducted to gain a better understanding of the industrys response to the setpoint variance problem. This survey found that 50% of those responding had requested relief from technical specifications that require corrective action and a 30 day report when a code safety valve has an as-found set pressure outside a 1% tolerance. However, if this relief is granted, it is recommended that safety valves going into service should be set to within the 1% tolerance and the ASME/ANSI OM-1987 Part 1 allowance of a tolerance of 3% for valves should be used as the acceptance criteria for inservice valves. It should be kept in mind that an engineering review of the relieving capacity versus the associated valve lifting setpoints be considered as part of any request for changing the setpoint limits. The next major failure mode for all valve types is seat leakage with 1259 identified cases. Relief valves are the major single contributor for this failure mode followed by main steam and pressurizer safety valves. Failure data analysis indicates that during the mid-80s safety valve performance was more closely followed then in previous years. Failure reporting increased substantially as a result of uniform reporting criteria provided by 10CFR 50.73 and after the results of EPRIs PWR Safety and Relief Valve Test Program and EPRIs Safety and Relief Valve Test Report (EPRI NP-2628-SR) were published. Also, many facilities only tested their PRVs and performed corrective maintenance when required. This practice allowed PRVs to remain in service until age related failures started to occur. These aging failures could be reduced by performing routine scheduled maintenance on the valves. This maintenance can be accomplished by valve rotation, and/or by periodic PM inspection and testing. 5.5 Causes of Failure Analysis
The following discussion addresses the most reported failure causes. Each failure cause was reviewed to ensure that the reporting was based on an actual determination rather than reaching this conclusion because no other failure cause could be determined.
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5.5.1 Aging
The population of PRDs assigned the aging cause category was based on the cause narrative and the component age at failure. Failures reported as aging that were less than 24 months were reclassified as indeterminate. Those failures that are identified with ages greater than 25 months were left as originally categorized. There were 14 out of 116 reported PRV seat leakage failures that were reclassified as indeterminate. There were 77 out of 376 reported MSSV seat leakage failures that were reclassified as indeterminate using this criteria. Based on the above numbers only, about 10% of the reported failures appeared to be reported incorrectly. Valve testing and actual valve lifting due to service conditions is a form of aging in that the valve seat can experience wear and/or minor damage. The resulting damage can cause minor seat leakage which over time leads to valve failure both from an open pipe boundary concern and from the leakage effect on the valves setpoint. Testing of a leaking valve will not provide reliable results and thus should be avoided. Other components of a valve such as the bellows, stem, guides, or spring can also be damaged depending on the type of overpressure event that has occurred. This internal damage may not be readily apparent using external inspection techniques. Valve internal inspections are required during the next scheduled outage for valves that have experienced an overpressure event during the operating cycle. The aging process is not just a time dependent mechanism but the result of the sum total of events the valve has experienced within its operating environment. For example, if a valve is in a high temperature corrosive environment with all moving parts exposed, the valve can experience corrosion resulting in wear or binding when actuated. The binding can cause fasteners to be fractured resulting in pin loosening or breakage. The data suggests that valve aging and resulting service wear are often hidden type failures that only testing or valve inspection can find. Many of the reported valve testing failures can be avoided by a more routine schedule of valve inspection/maintenance and not waiting for a valve testing failure to occur prior to repair. Keep in mind that since aging of a PRV is associated with the sum total of events either from testing or from inservice actuation, valve failure can be avoided if refurbishment is performed prior to actual failure. Also, keep in mind that valve testing is designed as a failure finding task and valve test failures should not necessarily be looked upon as a bad outcome.
5.5.2 Disc-to-Seat Bonding

Corrosion bonding of the disc to the seat is caused by the formation of a black, hard, tightly adherent oxide film that covers the exposed disc and seat area. If there is no metallurgical indication that an oxide film is present bonding is probably not the reason for a valves failure. If bonding is determined as the reason for valve failure, a metallurgical determination should be conducted that decides to either prevent the corrosion from occurring or the necessary maintenance actions needed to maintain the valves operating performance.
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The bonding cause category was assigned when the reported failure cause is described as bonding by the narrative and when associated with the lift high failure mode. All reported failures were individually reviewed to determine if physical bonding was identified. Those reports that did not specifically discuss actual findings were categorized as indeterminate. There were only a few cases where the bonding cause was reclassified as indeterminate. It should be understood that bonding studies are being conducted by owners groups, vendors, and individual utilities, and no definite conclusion can be made at this time. Also, most reported bonding problems have been associated with the pilot section of pilot operated valves. 5.6 Failure Significance on Outage Durations
An evaluation was conducted on information collected from 1988 to 1992 on plant outage time caused by PRV maintenance. The data indicates that BWRs experience approximately 16 days per year of unplanned plant outage time as a result of safety and relief valve maintenance activities. PWRs experienced the following unplanned plant outage durations: MSSVs 7 days per year PSVs 42 days per year PORVs 11 days per year ( small sample size) Relief Valves 4 days per year (for both BWRs and PWRs) Since unplanned outage durations represent lost generation time, a plant experiencing these failures could improve its capacity factor by preforming planned maintenance on those valves experiencing aging as the main cause of failure. PRD failures from 1988 to 1992 caused each plant the following average lost generation revenue each year: BWRs PWRs $16,000,000 $64,000,000
Each maintenance organization is encouraged to review their safety and relief valve maintenance schedules and consider the following planned maintenance schedule: Rebuild MSSVs at least every 36-48 months Rebuilding PSVs every second fuel cycle PORV rebuilding every second to third fuel cycle RV rebuilding every 60 to 72 months This increased valve maintenance can prevent most failure modes associated with age related valve failures and seat leakage. Section 8 of the guide address the type of maintenance actions that should be considered to enhance your safety and relief valve maintenance program.
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6
PRD TESTING
The purpose of this section is to examine practical testing methods that meet the different test requirements for PRVs in nuclear power plants. Appendix C summarizes the requirements of the test codes that govern inservice inspection (ISI) and testing of safety-related and non-safety-related relief valves in the nuclear industry. Prior to writing any valve test procedure, the current federal, state and insurance requirements for valve testing should be reviewed and understood. Plant ISI organizations should have this information available or have the ability to obtain it from the plants assigned authorized nuclear inspector. Section 6 is a general overview of ASME Codes that address fired and unfired vessels. These overviews are not meant to cover all aspects of the Code but to provide important aspects of each code. ASME Code requirements can change, so it is important to know the ASME Code year and addenda that govern the requirements of each plant. This section on testing uses the 1994 edition with the February 1995 addenda. The remaining subsections discuss general testing guidance that has been used by various utilities to enhance safety valve testing programs. 6.1 Codes Governing Safety-Related PRV Testing
All nuclear power plants are required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50.55a (10CFR 50.55a) to establish an ISI program in accordance with Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Division 1 of Section XI deals strictly with light-water-cooled plants, such as PWR plants and BWR plants built in the U.S. Division II and III deal with gas-cooled and liquid-metal-cooled plants, respectively, and are not covered by this manual. The purpose of an ISI program is to detect failures, defects, or discontinuities in the pressure retaining components essential for safety-related equipment and their supports. An ISI program establishes the scope and frequency of inspections/testing that will ensure that plant equipment functions as designed. While the overall program is defined in Section XI, it states that PRVs included in the ISI program should be tested in accordance with one of two documents, depending on the edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code that a plant has adopted: (1) the American National Standard, ASME/ANSI PTC-25.3 or (2) the Code for Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants, ASME OM Code. Although both documents stipulate mandatory testing requirements for PRVs contained in the ISI program, they differ substantially in several areas. See Appendix C for a detailed discussion of the ASME OM Code Appendix I 1994 Edition and a comparison of these two documents.
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Note: ASME PTC-25.3 has been revised as ASME PTC-25 in 1994. 6.2 Codes Governing Non-Safety-Related PRV Testing
Because the Code covers the largest variety of vessels, most BOP safety valves are governed by Section VIII, Pressure Vessels. Section VIII is comprised of two volumes, Divisions 1 and 2. Division 2 has alternative rules for the construction of pressure vessels based on the design-by-analysis methods of Section M. However, the overpressure protection requirements of both divisions are virtually identical. Section X, Fiberglass Reinforced Plastic Vessels, adopts the same basic overpressure rules as Section VIII, but is somewhat more restrictive as to the types of non-reclosing PRDs permitted.
6.2.1 Allowable Overpressure

Most PRDs, particularly PRVs, require an increase in pressure above set pressure defined as overpressure to achieve capacity lift. It is at this overpressure that the PRVs rated capacity is determined and specified. Because some are allowed to be set above the maximum allowable working pressure (MAWP), vessels with multiple valves may require an even greater increase over the MAWP for all the relieving valves to open fully. Accordingly, each book section provides its own rules as to the percentage of pressure allowed to increase above MAWP or design pressure during an overpressure event. The Section VIII limits on overpressure depend on the type of installation. In general Section VIII mandates that pressure not be allowed to rise more than 10% or 3 psig (whichever is greater) above MAWP. When multiple devices are used or additional devices are provided to protect against exposure to fire, overpressures of 16% or 21% respectively, are allowed. For valves that protect liquefied compressed gas storage vessels against exposure to fire, 20% overpressure is allowed. Section X has the same overpressure requirements as Section VIII except that special rules for protection of liquefied compressed gas storage vessels exposed to fire are not considered. Each code section specifies various operational and performance requirements for PRVs. Some apply during testing and service, while others apply only during product provisional and production certification testing. For example, Section VIII imposes a five percent blowdown requirement during provisional certification testing and then only if the blowdown is adjustable. During production certification testing, this blowdown limit is increased to 7%. When the manufacturer produces the product for shipment to a customer no limit is invoked. It is therefore important that the user understand the specified Code requirements for PRVs prior to performing any testing. This will assure that when procedures for testing are written, requirements more stringent that those required by the Code to which the valves were manufactured are not invoked.
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6.3
General Test Requirements
The main focus of any PRD testing program is to ensure that the measurements obtained during testing will permit accurate setpoint verification. It is equally important to eliminate any variables present during the testing process that could affect the set pressure measurements. Tight control of the testing parameters and equipment helps eliminate the introduction of errors and will ensure an accurate, repeatable test. The following sections provide a general discussion of the factors that should be considered for a proactive PRV test program.
6.3.1 Test Methods

The test method will depend on a valves type of service, location and type of attachment (welded or bolted) to the system being protected. The ASME Code allows two other types of testing: Bench testing on- or off-site test facility testing for large PRDs In situ testing with an ALD
Since testing is a failure finding type task, it is conducted as part of the valve repair process. First, to determine if any changes had occurred when the valve was on the system, and second, after a repair to confirm set pressure prior to reinstallation. Table 6-1 is a general outline of the refurbishment and testing process for both on-site and offsite testing. The most accurate method for testing the set pressure of a valve is to test it in the exact condition that it is required to function. However, this requires the system to be taken to the conditions its designed to protect against. In this method, the system pressure is increased until the installed valve opens (i.e. self actuates). The system pressure is then decreased until the valve reseats. If the valve set pressure is not within the required pressure tolerance the valve set pressure is adjusted and the test repeated until the set pressure is within tolerance. This testing technique is the most accurate because all of the factors that effect the valve such as system pressure, temperature, fluid characteristics, location and environment are actual valve service conditions. This is easily done for valves on steam or a compressible fluid systems where valve open and close is easily detected. It is difficult on liquid systems where visual observations of the valve opening cannot usually be done. Set pressure test should generally be performed as the operating system is coming offline. This will allow the testing to have minimal effect on plant operations and identify the need for valve maintenance during the plant outage. The main disadvantage in this test method is that it is time consuming, expensive, resource intensive and results in the discharge of system fluid either to the atmosphere or to a safe disposal area. Further, this test method is not a recommended practice for testing PRVs installed on hazardous fluid systems. (For these applications, bench testing is the preferred testing technique.)
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Table 6-1 Typical Valve Testing/Refurbishment Sequence

ACTIVITY PRD Receipt at Off-site Test Facility SEQUENCE (a) (b) (c) (d) Removal from shipping container Radiation survey and initial decontamination Receipt inspection PRD preparation for test
As-found Steam Test
(a) Pre-test leakage (b) Set Pressure actuation (c) Post-test leakage (a) (b) (c) (d) (a) (b) (c) (d) PRD fully disassembled Component decontamination Rework & dimensional inspection PRD reassembled OR PRD partially disassembled Component decontamination Seating surfaces polished (Jack & Lap) PRD reassembled
Refurbishment (if required)
Recertification Test (After Full Disassembly)
Note: On some valve types, Item B may (if required) be performed following refurbishment but prior to the recertification test.
Recertification Test (After Partial Disassembly) PRD Packaging
(a) Pre-test leakage (b) Operational verification of auxiliary (manual) actuating devices (c) Set pressure actuation (d) Post-test leakage (a) Seat leakage (a) PRD preparation for shipment (b) Final inspection & radiation survey (c) Placement in shipping container
6.3.2 On-Site Bench Testing

On-site bench testing is normally accomplished by setting the valve on a test stand that contains a limited volume accumulator. It is very important that the test stand be designed for the type of test that is to be performed. For non-compressible fluid valves, where the lift of the valve may be directly proportional to the inlet pressure, the design of the test stand is strictly a measure of pump capacity. For compressible fluids, such as air, gas, or steam, energy is stored in the compression of the fluid which is released when the valve lifts (pops). This release of energy is what causes the popping action in compressible service PRVs. The volume of the accumulator and the size and length of the piping leading to the test stand are extremely important. The testing must ensure that the captured measurements are the mechanical characteristics of the valve and not characteristics of the test stand. Very little published guidance exists as to the sizing of accumulator volumes necessary for testing PRVs. However, Appendix C of the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel and Pressure Inspectors publication, NB-65, provides curves for sizing accumulators with the size of the accumulators based on performing an operational test. The curves are greatly oversized for limited lift set pressure testing.
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Recent research indicates that the size of the accumulator may affect the set pressure of a safety valve. For example, testing a valve using a DOT bottle, a pressure regulator and a 3/4-inch line connected to a test flange may not yield the same set pressure as a test stand containing a 30 gallon accumulator. Factors that can cause these variations are: 1) tester inexperience; 2) valve seat condition; 3) fluid; and 4) valve set pressure. Consequently, changing the test stand equipment between testing periods may affect the repeatability of previous tests. The required accumulator size is directly related to the maximum relieving capacity of the valve, i.e. the orifice size of the valve nozzle. The capacity of PRVs is determined by: The bore diameter of the nozzle (or seat bushing) The set pressure of the valve The rated lift of the valve The overall valve design Whether the valve lift is restricted during test Bore diameter of the nozzles have been standardized by assigning alpha characters to the different sizes, ranging from a D orifice (0.110-inch2) to a BB2 orifice (185-inch2). Obviously, the capacity required for blowdown testing of an F orifice valve is substantially less than that of an R orifice valve. To compensate for this volume, some manufacturers recommend the position of the ring(s) be changed for bench testing. For more information about bench testing, see Appendix E. 6.3.3 Auxiliary Lift Devices (ALDs) ALDs operate by measuring the amount of force required in addition to the force provided by the system fluid pressure to cause the valve to lift. The force measurement is converted to a pressure per unit area and is summed with the existing system pressure at the valve inlet to calculate the simulated set pressure of the valve. In order to measure the set pressure of a valve, the ALD must be able to capture the point at which the valve attains lift. With compressible fluid service valves, the lift of the valve makes the set pressure determination relatively easy. However, with liquid service valves, the point of lift is not so easily detected. Since the lift of liquid service PRVs may be proportional to the applied force, it is difficult to pin-point the moment where lift has occurred. For this reason, the ASME Code discourages or forbids the use of ALD on liquid service valves. ALDs must be calibrated in order to ensure accuracy. ALDs use a variety of measuring instruments ranging from analog gages and force transducers to acoustic frequency transducers and linear variable differential transducers or transformers. Some of the newer systems include strip chart recorders and computer controlled data acquisition systems to capture and document the results. It is important that certifications for the different calibrated instruments be obtained prior to any testing. There should also be a means of verifying the calibration of the equipment before and after the testing. Most verifications use the shunt calibration method where a known resistance is placed across the bridge of the transducer and a known voltage signal is applied. The resulting
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signal returned from the transducer must read between certain prescribed limits if the transducer is in calibration. Systems employing analog gages should be checked with a dead weight tester or other calibration verifying device. Testing with an ALD is discussed in Section 6.4.1 and in Appendix D.
6.3.4 Developing a Repeatable Test

Control of the testing process (in situ, bench, or with an ALD) is essential if repeatable test results are to be obtained. The five areas listed below must be carefully evaluated and controlled so that errors are not introduced between tests: Environmental conditions Test equipment Test procedures Valve history Valve condition When testing a PRV, it is important that the measurements obtained from testing are an accurate indicator of the valve performance (free from errors induced during the testing process). Knowing the capabilities of the test equipment and the personnel performing the test is essential. Accumulator size, the proper test media, gage ranges etc. must be properly selected for the type of test that is to be performed. Also the required experience level of personnel performing each task is essential to perform an accurate test. 6.3.4.1 Environmental Conditions One of the most overlooked areas in safety valve testing programs is the effect of environmental conditions on the testing process. Things that must be considered when developing a test program are: The temperature of the test fluid The temperature and media of the plant system The ambient temperature of the valves environment while installed in the plant Testing methodology Deviations between the inservice plant systems fluid temperatures and test fluid temperatures can cause the as-measured tested set pressure to differ from its inservice set pressure. BOP valves that are removed from a system and installed on a test stand are usually tested with air, gas, or water at room temperature (the exceptions to this are large steam valves, such as MSR steam safety valves, which are normally sent to an offsite testing facility for steam testing). Fluid temperatures in plant systems are normally much higher than the temperature of the test fluids. The conduction of heat from the system fluid through the valve can cause changes in the rigidity of the valves spring by reducing the modulus of elasticity of the spring metal. The effect may be a lowering of the set pressure. Manufacturers have recognized this fact and have published tables of
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correction factors that should be used when setting safety relief and relief valves where temperature differences exist. The correction factor is added to the stamped setpoint of the valve in order to calculate a temperature-weighted set pressure. Generally, temperature correction factors are not employed on safety relief and relief valves (which are permitted by Code to have a broader set pressure tolerance) unless the system fluid temperature exceeds 149F. However, always check the valve manufacturers technical manual or with the manufacturer for a determination of whether a temperature correction factor is necessary. Further, most manufacturers will, on ASME Section VIII Code Stamped (UV) valves, attach or mark on the nameplate a cold differential test pressure (CDTP) (see glossary for definitions). Section 6.5 describes the methods used to test for ambient inservice valve temperature. It is also important that a valve be tested with the same fluid it is exposed to inservice. Testing a steam service valve with air without using a correlation factor will lead to discrepancies in set pressures. ASME Section VIII, Division 1, Paragraph UG-136 defines production testing requirements for a manufacturer. When testing valves on steam, it is also important that the valve be allowed to come to thermal stability before testing between each lift. After each lift, a suitable amount of wait time should be allowed before another test is performed so that the valve can return to thermal stability. The standard wait-time between tests is five minutes, but more time may be needed. Attaching surface mounted temperature sensors on the body can assist in this determination by measuring the valves temperature (see Section 6.5). Temperature gradients across a valve can cause uneven thermal growth of the valve body, internals, and spring as well as thermal distortion of the seating surfaces. The thermal growth of parts caused by the fluid and ambient temperature can cause fluctuations in the spring force, thus causing the set pressure to change. Distortion of the seating surfaces can cause seat leakage and instability of the pressure boundary between the disk and nozzle seating surfaces. It is important to recognize that insulation can also cause differences in the actual set pressure. Valve manufacturers recommend that PRVs may or may not be insulated. This recommendation can change based on fluid, service and valve location. However, many utilities commonly insulate PRVs for personnel safety reasons. The purpose of insulation is to reduce heat transfer, i.e., to prevent personnel from being burned. Reducing valve heat transfer will increase the temperatures experienced by the valve. Whenever possible, the same type of insulation should be used for off-site testing. Recent testing experience of PSVs at an off-site steam test facility without the normally installed insulation caused a set pressure difference of minus 5% from the actual set pressure of the valve under installed conditions. This premature lifting was resolved by sending the insulation with the valve to the test facility and installing it on the valve throughout the testing process. 6.3.4.2 Test Equipment All test equipment and instrumentation used in the performance of valve testing should be calibrated in accordance with utility quality assurance (QA) policies. This includes
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both on-site and off-site testing. Standards used for performing all calibrations should be traceable to the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Test equipment may be calibrated on a periodic basis with the calibration interval displayed on a decal or on a pre and post test basis. Calibration frequencies should be based on the utility QA requirements. In addition to individual component calibration, an end-to-end system calibration should be performed as necessary. Recommended maximum allowable tolerances on test measurements are: Temperature Heise gage Deadweight tester or digigage Pressure transducer 6.3.4.3 Test Procedures Procedural control is one of the keys to ensuring repeatable tests. The testing process should be documented step by step to ensure that the test practices are consistent between testing periods. When testing a PRV on a test stand, the following minimum information should be included : Personnel safety and ALARA concerns Instruction for proper installation of the valve to the test stand Visual inspection criteria Pre-set pressure tightness criteria Maximum test pressure Temperature correction factors and alternative fluid correlation factors, if applicable Setpoint acceptance range Acceptable pressure gage range and accuracy criteria for desired pressure measurement Instructions for controlling the test bench when performing tests Set pressure adjustment instruction Blowdown and control ring adjustment criteria, if applicable Post test seat tightness criteria Bellows integrity testing criteria Imposed back pressure +/- 4F +/- 0.1% full scale +/- 0.03% +/- 1.0 psig
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The criteria listed above are for PRVs in general. There will be information specific to the individual type of valve to be tested, such as pilot or solenoid operated relief valves, that should be included in the test procedure. It is important that a consistent ramp rate be obtained. The ramp rate is the rate at which the test pressure/force is applied to the valve in order to cause the valve to lift. Testing a PRV using a high ramp rate could cause the valve to lift at a perceived lower pressure due to pressure ramp rate. Care should be taken to include a procedural statement concerning the speed of the pressure ramp rate. When testing compressible fluid service valves, the test pressure should be raised to approximately 90% of the setpoint and then increased 2 psig/sec until the set pressure is achieved. Rarely are there means to determine and moderate the actual ramp rate so precisely. Normally, statements such as, Raise the system pressure to 90% of setpoint. Increase test pressure slowly until set pressure is reached, will suffice. 6.3.4.4 Valve History Test records allow the formulation of valve histories on individual valves, valve styles, valve groups, and valves in particular plant systems that can be used for trending. With the advent of computers and database programs, it is now very easy to run queries on certain valves, valve types, manufacturers, and systems of valves to determine adverse trends and recurring problems. It is also useful for determining valves that were tested with individual test instruments so that the effect of an out-of-tolerance can be evaluated. Test records in addition to the valves name plate data and serial should include the following: The type and number of valves to be examined for each operating time period Procedures used in valve repair, testing and maintenance Results of examination Repairs and corrective action Modifications per the manufacturer Valve test schedules Results of tests Nameplate data should also be included in the test report. The serial number on the nameplate of the valve can be used to obtain original test data and design/purchase specifications from the manufacturer. Records should be kept for the time period expressed in the utilitys Technical Specifications or for a minimum of four test cycles. 6.3.4.5 Testing Practices Differences between test methods can also cause variances in the measured set pressure. Recent comparison studies between ALD and bench testing have been performed at an off-site testing facility. The results of the study have shown that a small difference may
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exist between the set pressure value determined by each method. This difference can normally be attributed to the following factor: An ALD set pressure measurement is derived from determining the additional force required above the test pressure to cause the valve to lift. This value is determined based on a derived seat area, while bench testing yields a direct pressure measurement. Utilities that use an ALD for set pressure verification often remove valves that give inconsistent results and send them to off-site testing facilities for repair and final set pressure testing. While it appears that the difference is small enough not to create a test failure, the difference between the test methods does exist. For utilities that perform ALD testing as a means to verify the as found set pressure, it is advisable to reset these valves using the same ALD so that the same test method is used to determine the as-found testing during the next testing period. As stated previously, in any test program it is important that the same procedures be followed. 6.3.4.6 Fluid Temperature Compensation If the temperature of the plant system fluid differs from the temperature of the test fluid, a temperature correction factor may be needed. Generally, temperature correction factors for safety relief and relief valves are not recommended by valve manufacturers if the plant system fluid exceeds 149F since these types of valves, by the ASME Codes, have a broader set pressure tolerance than safety valves. The manufacturers technical manual should always be consulted when determining temperature correction factors. Many manufacturers stamp the valves nameplate with cold differential setpoint. The cold differential set pressure is the desired setting of the valve compensated for the temperature differences between the system and the test fluid. 6.3.4.7 Compensation for Superimposed Backpressure Conventional Valve: If an unbalanced, conventional PRV discharges to a system or vessel where outlet of the valve is exposed to a constant backpressure, then the set pressure must compensate for the back pressure. Balanced Valve: If the valve contains a balancing mechanism, such as a balancing bellows, back pressure compensation is not necessary. The set pressure of an unbalanced valve under constant back pressure is calculated by the following method: Set pressure = Stamped setpoint - Backpressure Note that this value is combined with the temperature correction to establish the total CDTP. As with any type of set pressure setting, the plant conditions under which the valve is installed must be considered.
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6.3.4.8 Determining Setpoint for Liquid Service Valves Determining setpoint may be different for each valve manufacturer. Contact the manufacturer or use the National Board Red Book to determine the correct method to be used. The method used can make a difference in determining what the actual setpoint is. When testing liquid service valves, the definition of the point at which set pressure occurs must be clear. Set pressure can be defined as the first drop of water, the first continuous flow, a specified number of drops, or when the valve disc separates from the nozzle seat. If a data acquisition system is used to record the test of liquid relief valve and a linear variable differential transformer is used to determine the moment where spindle travel first occurs, only in the later definition can this equipment be an aid and only on a full flow system. 6.4
In Situ Testing
In situ testing is the most accurate method to evaluate the set pressure of an installed PRV. If proper test procedures are employed, testing PRVs in place is called in situ system pressure testing. In this method the system pressure is increased until the PRV opens (i.e. self actuates). The system pressure is then decreased until the valve reseats. If the valve set pressure is not within the pressure tolerance (such as 3%) the valves set pressure is adjusted and the test repeated until the set pressure is within the prescribed tolerance. Should actual set pressures vary above and below the allowed tolerance value during testing, the root cause should be determined and corrective action taken. This set pressure testing technique is the most accurate because all of the system factors of pressure, temperature, fluid characteristics, valve installation and environmental conditions are actual service conditions.
6.4.1 ALDs
In service applications where the PRVs are welded to the system and there is no reasonable way to raise the system pressure to the set pressure of the valves, the only means to verify the set pressure is the use of an ALD. In other applications where raising the system pressure to self-actuate the PRVs would adversely affect other components installed in the system, the use of an ALD is also required. Properly used ALDs can accurately determine the set pressure of PRVs in situ under appropriate test conditions that follow proven test procedures. Pressure setpoint tests have been conducted using the ALD and then pressure popping the valve to determine the actual set pressure. The tests have typically shown that the pressure set by the ALD will normally fall within a band of 1% of the actual set pressure. However, there has been a number of valve testing failures caused by the improper use of ALDs. See Appendix D for more information about ALDs.
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The concept behind ALDs is simple. The device applies an auxiliary lifting force in conjunction with the system pressure in order to cause a PRV to lift. ALDs are recognized by the major regulatory codes with the exception of the limit for use on liquids, such as: Section VII of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors Publication NB-65 Appendix I of the ASME OM Code ASME/ANSI Publication PTC-25.3 Note: ASME PTC-25.3 has been revised as ASME PTC-25 in 1994. There are generally three guidelines shared by all of the codes: ALDs are an acceptable means for setpoint verification ALDs should only be used on systems containing compressible fluids Blowdown cannot be measured using an ALD 6.4.1.1 ALD Design The design of an ALD normally consists of three basic components: Power source Mechanical frame Setpoint indicator The power sources that drive ALDs are diverse. They range from a hydraulic oil handpump supplying hydraulic cylinders to sophisticated pneumatic or electric driven hydraulic pumps with microprocessor flow valves to regulate the ramp rate of the auxiliary force provided by hydraulic cylinders. The load-bearing structure of the ALD is the mechanical frame. It provides the connection to the valve spindle (where the auxiliary spindle lifting load is applied) and mounts the system securely to the valve yoke or bonnet. Load bearing structures are designed to provide the high lifting forces necessary to test large valves or valves with high nameplate set pressures. The setpoint indicator is the most critical part of an ALD. The setpoint indicator can range from something as simple as a mechanical bourdon tube type gage to a digital microcomputer-based data acquisition system that simultaneously records the applied auxiliary load, valve spindle travel, system pressure, acoustic monitoring of the valve, and various outputs from the thermocouple. Microcomputer-based systems generally have video screens that simultaneously display the sensors outputs in near-real time (digital or graphical form - signal versus time). Usually, this information is stored for playback, hard copy dump, or downloaded to a personal computer through a disc or a communications port for further analysis. Some units also have the capability to expand areas of the graphs produced to allow further analysis.
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6.4.1.2 Setpoint Determination The differences between the individual ALD systems are generally found in the methods used to capture the point in time where the valve opening occurs and the conversion of the data acquired into an actual set pressure. There are basically two different schools of thought. The first school of thought derives the setpoint based on empirical curves. This is done by developing a fitted curve for each orifice of a particular type or series of valves. This method is based on the simple equation: Setpoint System Pressure P = = = System pressure + P The pressure of the fluid in contact with the wetted disc area The additional pressure beyond the system pressure necessary to cause the valve to lift
For a given auxiliary lifting force, a corresponding pressure differential is determined so that the calculated setpoint is in agreement with the bench tested setpoint. A curve is then developed from which all pressure differentials can be interpolated for a given amount of auxiliary force (see Figure 6-1).
LIFTING FORCE
DP
Figure 6-1 Force vs. DP Curve for an ALD The second school of thought determines the setpoint by calculating the seat area. This is done by assuming the boundary of the wetted area of the disc is at some point between the ID and OD of the nozzle or disc seating surfaces. The wetted surface area should not be assumed but should be experimentally determined. Once the assumption of the boundary location is made, the wetted surface area is simply calculated as the area of the circle. In this case,
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Lifting force Wetted surface area
6.4.1.3 ALD Testing Considerations As with any type of testing, skilled personnel are the key to performing an accurate test. While there are no special requirements in the Code specifically written for ALD test personnel, it is important that such personnel have demonstrated a proficiency in the use of the test equipment and this type of testing. The advantage in using equipment where the data is computer acquired (such as the Crosby SPVD) is that the test operator has no effect on the test or the observed or recorded results. If contractors are used, the training requirements should be reviewed to determine the competency of the operators. If calculations are required, they should be verified by the test supervisor. It is also recommended that the utility provide supervision during the testing procedure. Before testing begins, the user should obtain the calibration certificates of all test instruments used to perform the test or have all instruments calibrated prior to the test. All equipment should be calibrated to standards traceable to the National Bureau of Standards. Contractors should also have a QA program that requires them to notify the user about instruments that were found to be out-of-tolerance at the end of the calibration cycle. Whenever possible, the calibration of the contractors equipment should be checked before and after the testing. The equipment should meet or exceed the accuracy and uncertainty requirements (if applicable) as discussed in Section 6.3.4.2 of this manual. ALDs can not determine the operational readiness and/or operational characteristics of a PRV. Therefore, valve rated lift, blowdown or freedom from cycling/chattering cannot be demonstrated using an ALD. Depending on the valve design and service conditions, the system pressure should not be too close to the valve set pressure when using an ALD. High performance valves may experience cycling under these conditions. This caution is also valid for full lift of the valve using the ALD at system pressures above the valve reseat pressure. System pressure less then 90% of set pressure is recommended, but the PRV manufacturer should be consulted if doubt exists. Unless specificality stated by the ALD manufacturer, the use of an ALD at system pressures below 20% of set pressure should be avoided because set pressure accuracy is not reliable. ALDs cannot determine a valves set pressure within acceptable set pressure tolerance limits at zero system pressure.
CAUTION: Attempting to lift the valve using an ALD at zero system pressure may over stress and/or damage the valve stem.
ALDs also do not recognize the differences in actual set pressure resulting from different system fluids. In order to determine the sensitivity of an ALD to various system
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fluids, the utility or manufacturer should have conducted set pressure verification tests on air, steam systems. The set pressure (i.e., spring force) of the test valves should not be altered from one test medium to the other. Once this data has been collected the valve should be set pressure tested to verify valve actuation using only system pressure and fluid. This type of testing, depending on the system fluid, has demonstrated that the set pressure determined by the ALD can vary as much as five percent from the set pressure determined by pressure actuation. The reason for the variance is that the calculated set pressure using an ALD is based on a constant seat area for a given valve design/orifice. The calculated set pressure will be the same irrespective of fluid tested. Thus, a correction factor for each fluid determined by actual testing must be used to determine the correct set pressure. 6.5 Testing for Ambient Temperature Conditions
The purpose of testing for PRD ambient temperature operating environment conditions is to establish the inservice thermal profile of the valve. Failure histories and testing have shown that the thermal profile of a PRD must be maintained during testing both in situ and when bench tested. This data is extremely critical for valves that are required to open within a tight tolerance band. This requires that the valve when tested have stable temperatures at critical locations that are the same as when the valve is installed and at normal operating temperature and pressure. The temperature of the PRD, especially the valve bonnet, is important to a valves set pressure.
6.5.1 Thermal Profile Mapping

The thermal profile of any inplant installation of PRDs can depend on the number of valves, relative positions and different local thermal conditions. If the valves above the inlet flange and tail piping are not lagged infrared thermography (IR) can be used to establish the specific surface temperature profile for each valve. However, if the valve and tail piping are lagged, two surface mounted thermocouples per location should be mounted on the valve inlet flange, the discharge flange, and the lower and upper spring bonnet as shown in Figure 6-2. The thermal profile should be established when the plant has stabilized at normal operating temperature and pressure and the valves temperature readings have stabilized. Each valve location may require a different approach and waiting period to establish the thermal profile. Normal full power thermal conditions are required, but full power operation may not be required to obtain the full power thermal environment. Each plant valve location should be surveyed to determine the required test conditions. 6.5.1.1 Infrared Thermography (IR) IR is based on measuring the radiant thermal energy (heat) emitted from a target surface. This emitted heat is normally distributed over the surface and can be converted to a surface temperature map or thermogram. For a detailed discussion of IR, see the NMAC IR Guide (NP-6973 R2). The benefit of using IR to establish a safety valves temperature profile is that all of the safety valves exposed surface in the sensors field of
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view (see Figure 6-3) is measured at the same instant in time. Thus, a direct relationship between the lower and upper valve surfaces can be established using the same instrument. No temperature sensing or recording equipment need be installed. Also, the reading can be taken at a distance from the valve that in some installations may be the most desirable from a radiation or heat stress consideration.
Cap, Screwed Thermocouples
Compression Screw Bonnet Spring Stem
Guide Bellows Body Disc Holder Disc Guide Pin Nozzle
Thermocouples
Figure 6-2 Typical Thermocouple Placement
6-16
TARGET
MEDIUM
INSTRUMENT
SENSOR
RADIANT ENERGY
PROCESSOR AND DISPLAY
THE TOTAL MEASUREMENT CONDITION
MEASUREMENT CATEGORIES The target surface The transmitting medium The measuring instrument
Figure 6-3 IR Thermography
6.5.2 Temperature Profile

Each valve may have a different temperature profile so that just taking an area temperature will not provide the thermal information necessary for valve testing. An example of this condition is shown in Table 6-2 which is the actual temperature profile of two pressurizer valves. Note that the A and B valves temperatures differ. The reason is that the flange on which the A valve is installed has a shorter nozzle and so is closer to the pressurizer. The critical temperature appears to be the A-valve upper spring bonnet. Subsequently, valve A was also reported to be the valve that always appeared to leak. This leakage may have been attributed to a decrease or loss in set pressure when installed due to temperature effects. Table 6-2 Thermal Profile for a Pressurizer Valve (F)
Inlet Flange A Valve B Valve 500501 454-486 Discharge Flange 260277 258-265 Tail Piece Lower Spring Bonnet 347-377 321-327 Upper Spring Bonnet 230-258 207-210
238 238
6.6
Pilot-Operated Relief Valves
A PRV that is pilot-operated and has a field test device can be tested in situ by testing the pilot set pressure while the valve remains in service. To test the pilot valve set pressure, an external pressure source is connected to a closed manual field test connection (valve) and the pressure is raised above system pressure as
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shown in Figure 6-4. The field test valve is then opened to admit the external pressure to the pilot. Being higher than the system pressure, the test pressure causes a check valve (normally open) to close preventing test fluid from flowing back through the system pressure sense line into the protected system.
Interconnecting Line Test Gauge Vent Valve Chamber A Shut Off Valve Field Test Connection Pilot
External Pressure Source
Guide
Disc
Figure 6-4 Schematic for Test Pilot Operated Relief Valves In Situ The external test pressure to the pilot may then be increased until the pilot opens. When the pilot opens, a portion of the pressure above the main valve disc will be vented (chamber A). Set pressure testing using the field test connection may or may not cause the main valve to open depending upon system pressure and/or testing technique. For safety reasons, it should be assumed that the main valve will open. After the set pressure has been verified and the pilot adjusted as necessary, the field test valve may be closed and the external pressure source vented and disconnected. Set pressure verification testing can validate the operational readiness of the pilot operated PRV if the main valve is cycled. However, valve blowdown cannot be determined. 6.7 Setpoint Drift
The term setpoint drift as used for PRDs refers to the change in as-found setpoint from the as-left setpoint. If a deviation is noted in the first test, but subsequent valve testing, without adjusting the valves setpoint, coincides with the as-left setpoint valve drift has not actually occurred but a setpoint variance on the first pop of the valve has. This type of PRD performance is not a new phenomenon, but has been a well recognized occurrence that the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors has observed for many years. The actual setpoint of the PRD can best be determined from a series of at least three and up to four lifts, if the first lift is not consistent with the other valve tests. The average of the acceptable three consecutive lifts should be used as the as-found or as
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left setpoint. Only after the valves setpoint has been determined using this method should any valve setpoint adjustments be made. However, if the average setpoint has drifted and a reason can not be determined from external inspection of the valve, consideration should be given to inspect the valves internals for wear or damage.
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7
HANDLING AND SHIPPING OF SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVES
This section discusses a number of maintenance-related topics relevant to the handling of PRDs such as safety valves, relief valves, and safety relief valves. PRD handling, if done improperly, may affect some manufacturers setpoints or seat tightness. Therefore, it is important to develop precise procedures for removing, cleaning, handling, shipping, and reinstalling PRDs. Documentation of PRD testing and maintenance results are also critical elements in a PRD maintenance program. 7.1 Handling of Safety and Relief Valves
PRVs depending upon their size, set pressure, and manufacturers design, could be damaged if not handled and packaged properly for shipment. The small pilot and pilotoperated valves and small and large safety, safety relief, and relief valves with low-set pressure are especially vulnerable. Prior to removing a valve from the system, a number of criteria should be satisfied: All the requirements for the valves removal from the system should be satisfied including the identification of the relevant procedures, removal paths, and the acquisition of the certified slings and hoisting devices. The removal path should be identified and cleared of all interferences. Seismic supports should be tagged and removed, as required. If the valves are to be transported off-site, transport containers, for either radioactive or nonradioactive service, and metal protective covers should be acquired and prepared prior to the removal of the PRDs. Refer to DOT 49 CFR PART 107 for design requirements for radioactive shipping containers. Remove and properly store the valve insulation material. Properly tag electrical leads before they are removed from the valve, as applicable. Appropriate radiation work permit should be in effect. Remove instrumentation such as the linear variable differential transducer (LVDT), position indicators, accelerometers and thermocouples, as applicable. All lines should be drained to prevent spillage. QA/QC witness points should be identified as required.
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Perform necessary pre-removal inspections, i.e., valve nameplate data such as serial number verification, scaffolding, cleanliness, rigging, etc. Finally, follow the instructions of the PRV manufacturer for removal.
7.1.1 Typical Rigging and Handling Instructions: Target Rock Safety and Relief Valves (Including Valve Auxiliary Equipment Removal)
The following general rigging and handling instructions are provided as a guide to preclude damage to PRD components and prevent injuries to maintenance personnel. Cautions should be observed in the transport of the PRD and subassemblies in order to protect the exposed flanges and bores of the safety and relief valves.
CAUTION: Remove and place the solenoid assembly of a pilot-operated relief valve in a protective container prior to handling ANY of the PRD valve subassemblies.
CAUTION: Ensure that the technical manual used is the latest revision and a controlled copy.
NOTE: Prior to removing the PRDs from the header, identify the piping and PRD valve interface points with scribe marks for orientation upon reinstallation.
NOTE: Foreign material control and tool control requirements should be in effect.
The PRD assembly should be rigged and handled as shown in Figure 7-1. When removing the assembly from the PRD, the pilot stage assembly should be rigged and handled as shown in Figure 7-2 or 7-3. The base assembly should be removed from the main stage assembly in a horizontal direction when the PRD is on the steam header as shown in Figure 7-4, or in a vertical direction when the PRD is in a work area as shown in Figure 7-5. The PRD main stage assembly should be rigged and handled as shown in Figure 7-6.
7-2
1 Ton Lift Capacity
CAUTION: Remove Solenoid Assembly Prior to Handling Valve Assembly
Flange Face Protective Covers
Lifting Eyes 1/2 - 13,2 Places Note: Lift Eyes Not Supplied
Figure 7-1 Target Rock (Typical), Valve Assembly Hoisting (Valve on Header or Work Area)
7-3
EPRI Licensed Material Nuclear Maintenance Applications Center Lift Vertically Until Pilot Assembly Is Clear of Base and Studs
200 Lb. Lift Capacity
Air Operator Assembly
CAUTION Remove Solenoid Assembly Prior to Handling Pilot Assembly and/or Valve Assembly
Pilot Assembly
Studs
Studs Base
Note: Install Protective Cover on Flange Face When Placing Valve on Work Area Floor
Assembly on Header or at Work Area
Figure 7-2 Target Rock (Typical), Pilot Assembly Hoisting (Valve on Header or Work Area)
7-4
Support Lift CAUTION Move along Center Line until Main Spring Force is Eliminated, Approx. 150 Lbs Spring Force, Cap All Open Ports and Flange Faces
Strap
Drawbars (2) 1-1/8 Dia. X18"Lg
Discharge
Steam Line Standpipe Horizontal (Valve on Line)
Lift Vertically Until Clear of Main Spring
Vertical (Valve in Work Area)
CAUTION Cap All Open Ports and Flange Faces
Figure 7-3 Target Rock (Typical), Pilot Valve Hoisting
7-5
1/4 Ton Lift Capacity CAUTION: Remove Solenoid Assembly Prior to Handling Valve base Assembly
Lifting Eyes 1/2 13,3 Places NOTE: Lift Eyes Not Supplied
Withdraw Along Axial Centerline until Clear of Spring and Studs
1 in. Dia. x 12 in. Long Drawbar, qty. 2
Figure 7-4 Target Rock (Typical), Base Assembly Hoisting (Valve on Header)
7-6
Lift Vertically until Clear of Spring and Studs
1 Ton Lift Capacity
Lifting Eyes, 1/2-13, 3 Places NOTE: Lift Eyes Not Supplied
Spring
Studs
CAUTION: Remove Solenoid Assembly Prior to Handling Base Assembly and/or Valve Assembly Flange Face Protective Covers
Figure 7-5 Target Rock (Typical), Base Assembly Hoisting (Work Area)
7-7

Lifting Eye Bolt/Nut 1-8 x 4" Long NOTE: Eye Bolt/Nut Not Supplied 1/2 Ton Lift Capacity
Figure 7-6 Target Rock (Typical), Main Valve Hoisting (Work Area)
7.1.2 Typical Rigging and Handling Instructions: Consolidated, Crosby, and Dresser Safety and Relief Valves
The following general rigging and handling instructions are provided as a guide to preclude damage to safety and relief valve components and prevent injuries to maintenance personnel. Some PRD designs have eyebolts, eyebolt adapters, or lifting bracket eyes on the PRD to assist in handling. In other designs, the manufacturers may suggest locations for slings to be used. Still others leave this activity to the owner to use good judgement.
7-8
Whatever the case, caution should be observed in the transport of the PRD and subassemblies to preclude damage and to protect the exposed flanges and flange faces and bores.
NOTE: The valve should never be lifted and/or carried with the lifting lever (do not remove the valve cap and lever, if applicable). On safety, safety relief, and relief valves, secure the lifting lever to the valve bonnet to prevent movement during handling and shipment (see Figure 7-7).
NOTE: Fully assembled PRDs may weigh in excess of 1500 pounds. Be sure you know the weight of the valve prior to lifting so it can be rigged properly.
CAUTION: Use extreme caution when rigging the PRDs off of the mating flanges to ensure that damage is not caused to the mating valve flanges and flange faces.
7.1.2.1 PRD Rigging without Eyebolts or Lifting Brackets The assembled safety and relief valve must be maintained in a vertical, upright position at all times. Care should be taken to prevent damage to exposed studs and mating surfaces when the valve or valve body is handled or stored. In addition, stud protectors should be used in addition to flange protectors when handling PRDs. Use nylon slings or other special lifting devices to move the PRD and subassemblies. Assure that the slings are free from the spindle, compression screw, spring, top spring washer and bottom spring washer, as applicable, for all lifting operations.
NOTE: Use a spreader bar to prevent the slings from creeping toward the PRD spindle.
The PRDs should be removed from the header by wrapping a sling around the discharge neck, then around the upper yoke structure in such a manner as to ensure the valve is in the vertical position during the lift, i.e., not lifted in the horizontal position (see Figure 7-7). Never lift the PRD with the lifting lever. Never hook to the PRD spring when lifting or transporting. When horizontal movement is required, use the inlet or outlet flanges as the lifting points and exercise extreme care so as not to distort the nozzles. Exercise care when hoisting the PRD away from the inlet flange to prevent foreign material from entering into the header or impacting the PRD flange/gasket mating surfaces.
7-9
Release Nut Cap Top Lever Compression Screw Nut Top Spring Washer Drop Lever Spring Spindle Yoke ("Rig Here") Compression Retaining Ring
SECURE LIFTING LEVER TO BONNET OR YOKE WITH TAPE OR WIRE Disc Guide Disc Adjusting Ring Adjusting Ring Pin Drain Seat Bushing
Base
Discharge Neck ("Rig Here")
Figure 7-7 Typical Safety and Relief Valve Lifting Locations 7.1.2.2 PRD Rigging with Eyebolts or Lifting Bracket Eyes The assembled safety and relief valve should be maintained in a vertical, upright position at all times. Care should be taken to prevent damage to exposed studs and mating surfaces when the valve or valve body is handled or stored. Stud protectors should be used in addition to flange protectors when handling PRDs. The PRD should be hoisted only by the eyebolts or lifting brackets using suitable cleats. The eyebolts or lifting bracket eyes are located to provide balanced hoisting of the complete PRD assembly (Figures 7-8 through 7-10). In no case should the PRD be hoisted by any member of the auxiliary valve lifting gear linkage. Exercise care when hoisting the PRD away from the inlet flange to prevent foreign material from entering into the header or impacting the PRD flange/gasket mating surfaces.
7-10
Figure 7-8 Typical Consolidated Electromatic Valve with Lifting Eyebolt
7-11
Hoisting Bracket Hoisting Bracket
Section A-A
Figure 7-9 Typical Crosby 6R10 Safety Valve with Hoisting Bracket
7-12
2-Ton Minimum Hoist
Cables or Slings 1" Clearance Lever Lifting Bracket 5/8 Anchor Shackle
Bonnet
Figure 7-10 Crosby Hoisting Arrangement for Crosby 6R10 HB-BP Safety Valve
7.1.3 PRD Cleanliness Control Instructions (at Workstation or Maintenance Shop)

The establishment of a clean work area is essential to the production of a leak-free PRD seat. The clean work area whether in a hot shop or open maintenance area, must be free of grease, water, solvents, and surface dirt during refurbishment activities. Care must be exercised during the repair of safety and relief valves to assure that the minute particles of stellite are controlled and prevented from entering the reactor coolant system. This is very important to prevent activation during operation and thereby becoming a significant radiological hazard. When applicable, all radiation protection requirements should be observed to prevent area contamination. If isopropyl alcohol is used as a cleaning agent, exercise caution to prevent the work area from becoming airborne contaminated due to alcohol evaporation. 7.1.3.1 Generic External Cleaning Instructions Prior to Packing and Moving Valve from System Location Clean all external flange faces with an approved solvent, then rinse with demineralized water. Wipe dry with lint and chloride-free cloth or lint-free tissue paper. Maintain an ANSI-N45.2.2 Level B cleanliness for all internal parts and cover valve flange faces with a protective cover. Treat all debris as potentially contaminated refuse.
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7.1.4 PRD Storage The following are suggested short- and long-term storage requirements for complete PRD assemblies.
CAUTION: Inside storage in a dry, unheated warehouse environment is required for PRDs and ancillary equipment. Equipment should be stored off the floor on skids, pallets, or racks.
7.1.4.1 PRD Short-Term Storage (Less Than 12 Months) Cover the PRD with an approved poly or plastic material. DO NOT SEAL. Leave the bottom open to avoid condensate entrapment. Place the PRD in an approved container for storage. ( Refer to DOT 49 CFR PART 107 for the detail requirements for storage and shipping containers.) PROPERLY packaged PRDs may be stored inside a warehouse without inspection of its contents for a period of 12 months. 7.1.4.2 PRD Long-Term Storage (Greater Than 12 Months) Annual inspection is recommended for long-term storage periods in excess of 24 months. PRDs scheduled for inspection should be uncrated to an extent that permits visual inspection of external surfaces. Care should be exercised in uncrating so the containers can be used again. Check for corrosion, contamination or other damage. If there is no visible corrosion or damage, repack the PRD as previously discussed. If any corrosion or contamination is noticed, clean the PRD as prescribed in Section 7.1.3.1, dry the PRD and repackage for long-term storage. Assure that the causes for the corrosion or contamination are corrected prior to returning the PRD to storage. Extended storage, 6 years or longer, requires detailed inspection of the PRD assembly and may require PRD disassembly, inspection, reassembly and retest. 7.2 PRD Shipping to an Off-Site Vendor for Inspection and Testing
A PRD consists of precision machined and fitted parts. Rough handling can sufficiently damage or misalign the valve internals causing undesirable seat leakage or erratic operation. PRDs should be shipped with a protective covering over the inlet and the outlet. This covering is to prevent the entry of foreign material in the PRD. If the coverings are removed for inspection, they should be reinstalled as soon as possible. The protective covers should be left on the PRD until the PRD is ready for installation into the system. Valves should be crated or bolted to a skid with the inlet flange down on the bottom and the spindle vertical and above the inlet flange. To prevent potential misalignment and damage to internals, never lay a safety or relief valve on its side. Safety or relief valves should never to subjected to sharp impact. When hoisting the PRD into position for installation, care should be exercised to prevent bumping steel structures or other
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objects. When preparing the movement of a PRD into position, proper site rigging techniques should be used to prevent PRD or other equipment damage.
7.2.1 PRD Preparation for Shipment

After the PRD has been removed from the system, cleaned, and the necessary protective covers placed on the valve, the valve can be prepared for shipment. The same care used in handling the valve when it was removed from the system should be followed in placing the valve in a shipping container and in its transportation. Most manufacturers technical manuals specify recommended methods and equipment to be used for transporting their valves. Figures 7-11 and 7-12 (utility design) and Figure 7-13 (Crosby design) provide examples of typical PRD transport or storage containers. In general, the following steps should be included in the owners shipping procedure and invoked upon the receiver of the equipment.
NOTE: The safety and relief valve should be shipped to the test facility in a shipping container on a dedicated transport.
1. Perform a final radiation survey on the PRD. 2. Package the PRD for shipment according to a written packaging procedure. 3. Place the PRD in the shipping container: (a) Verify the identity of the component prior to placement in the container. (b) Handle the PRD and/or subassemblies in accordance with the guideline requirements identified in the hoisting and rigging Section 7.1.1/Section 7.1.2 and any additional specific requirements recommended by the manufacturer. (c) Secure the PRD and subassemblies in the shipping container as identified by the shipping procedure for the specific PRD. Some PRDs may have to be secured at the top to prevent lateral movement and/or damage to hardware attached to the valve. (d) Collect the radiation protection and shipping documents and attach or enclose as required by the respective procedures. (e) Load the PRD shipping container on the transport and secure. (f) Identify the equipment in the container on the external surface by tagging or other means.
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Bolted on Hinges
Cover Aluminum/16"
Gasket
Quick Release Pin
Cord
Aluminum Door
Figure 7-11 Typical Utility Design PRD Transport/Storage Container
7-16
Mount hinges from top here
36" 36" 31"
2 1/2"
60"
Figure 7-12 Typical Utility Design PRD Transport/Storage Container
7-17

Nail superstructure to skid. Nail spacing approximately 2-1/2". After nailing superstructure to skid, band around girth with heavy duty, nailless, steel strapping in two (2) places.
DO L NO FR IFT T TO OM P
48"
UP
78"
UP
FOR K THIS FROM END
N TIO CAU
TER CEN OFFLOAD
NOTES
1. Construction of superstructure consists of nominal, 1x4's and 1/2 thk. CDX Plywood. 2. Line all interior surfaces with PPP-B-1055, Cl. L-2B Asphaltic Kraft. All joints to be glued and nailed. 3. Block and brace as required to immobilize valve while superstructure is being fabricated
Stencil Other End: "Do Not Lift This End. OffCenter Load" 3"
36-1/8"
VALVE REMOVED FOR CLARITY
Figure 7-13 Typical Crosby PRD Packing Crate Construction for Crosby Pressurizer and MSSVs
7.2.2 PRD Valve Receipt (Typical)

This section addresses typical vendor requirements for safety and relief valve receipt, inspection and handling activities at the test facility. 7.2.2.1 PRD Removal from the Shipping Container 1. Verify external markings on container to shipping documents. 2. Unpack the PRD assembly and separately packaged air operator per utility and manufacturer uncrating instructions, as applicable. The PRD and subassemblies should still be secured to the container. 3. Verify the PRD name plate data against the shipping documents prior to removing the PRD from the transport.
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4. Lift the PRD from container per the requirements identified in the hoisting and rigging Section 7.1.1/Section 7.1.2 or as directed in the uncrating instructions after the initial radiation survey has been completed and as directed by the radiation protection technician. 7.2.2.2 PRD Receipt Inspection An initial external visual inspection of the PRD should be conducted to determine the as-found condition of the valve. The following points should be addressed: Verify that no transport damage to the PRD has occurred. Ensure that the PRD has been shipped properly and in the vertical position. Ensure that the lockwired seals for applicable locations are still intact. Verify that all hardware has been received with the PRD. Check the condition of the cotter pins. Check the condition of the PRD inlet and outlet flanges. The PRDs nameplate and serial number. Verify the packing list for individual items such as subassemblies. Report any unacceptable conditions to the responsible party. 7.2.2.3 PRD Storage If the PRD is not to be tested for a prolonged period, the PRD and its components should be stored in a controlled storage area. See Section 7.1.4 for applicable storage requirements.
7.2.3 PRD Packaging and Return Shipment Preparation

This section addresses typical vendor requirements for return shipment of the PRD to the utility. 7.2.3.1 PRD Preparation for Return Shipment 1. Verify nameplate information on the valve to confirm it is the component to be shipped. 2. Perform a final PRD radiation surveys as required. 3. Package the PRD for return shipment to the owner according to the test facilitys packaging requirements that have been approved by the owner or as directed by the test facilitys radiation protection technician. 7.2.3.2 PRD Placement in Shipping Container 1. Verify nameplate information on the valve to confirm it is the component to be shipped.
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2. Handle the PRD and subassemblies according to the requirements identified in the hoisting and rigging Section 7.1.1/ Section 7.1.2 or as specified in the owners procedure. 3. Secure the PRD and subassemblies in the PRD shipping container as identified by the shipping procedure for the PRD. 4. Collect all the PRD testing and shipping documents and attach or enclose as required by the respective procedures. 5. Seal the container and identify the contents on the external side of the container. 6. Load the PRD shipping container on the transport and secure.
7.2.4 PRD Documentation and Procedures

The safety and relief valve vendor manual provides the necessary instructions for the installation and maintenance of the safety and relief valves. The manual will typically contain the following information: Design features Theory of operation Storage and handling precautions Terminology Principles of operation Specific corrective maintenance techniques and specialty Field settings or adjustments Disassembly, assembly, and repair guidance Troubleshooting recommendations Replacement spare parts Vendor manuals are typically specific to a PRD model and/or serial number sequence. These requirements are significant for safety related components and of importance for non-safety related PRDs. Good vendor documentation provides a record of exactly what was supplied and received. Information that is fundamental to each PRD installation is the inlet and outlet flange bolting and gasket configurations. This documentation should include the use of checklists and procedures that identify to utility personnel critical components to ensure adequate quality control can be maintained. It also provides the first step in the history from when the PRD arrives on site and is inspected. Vendor manuals must be controlled and updated regularly to assure the requisite service bulletin, etc., are incorporated. Utility Purchase Order and/or Procedures The utility procurement and inventory departments are responsible for ordering and storing safety and relief valves including spare parts. The initial basis for purchase order
7-20
begins with the original component design specification. This design specification provides the necessary information to purchase replacement PRD and spare parts while maintaining design configuration control. The procurement department should have internal procedures that identify a programmatic method to be used when purchasing replacement components, service, and spare parts. ASME Section III class components may require an addition level of documentation to support QA requirements (Section 7.2.5). Vendor Procedures Utility maintenance procedures are developed and maintained through vendor-supplied procedures and vendor manual updates/bulletins. In most cases, the vendor procedures cannot be used directly by the utility. This requires that the vendor manual and procedures be reviewed and evaluated to develop specific utility procedures. The utility-generated procedures should then be reviewed by the vendor for completeness and accuracy. This should be accomplished initially and after performing component improvements or changing test methods. Operating Experience Industry and internal operating experience is gathered by each utility and forwarded to the maintenance and technical support ISI department personnel responsible for safety and relief valves. This information should be evaluated to determine if there exists similar operational likeness to the utilitys specific PRD types. If there is a common relationship, then the responsible department should take action to determine the safety significance and identification of necessary corrective actions. Utility maintenance and/or program support departments monitor safety-related safety and relief valve performance on selected non-safety PRD. The extent that non-safetyrelated PRD are monitored is unique to each utility. There is little cost benefit information that suggests that the non-safety-related PRDs should be monitored. This may change in the future when the USNRC Maintenance Rule goes into effect in 1996. Then each utility may develop a monitoring program to trend the performance of these PRDs. If the utility develops this program early there will be a savings in the number of nonsafety-related PRD failures and the combined implementation of the USNRC Maintenance Rule.
7.2.5 PRD QA Requirements

General Discussion Based on the regulatory, Code, and insurance requirements, the maintenance of pressurizer and MSSVs must be governed by a QA program consistent with the requirements of Appendix B of 10CFR50, ANSI N45.2, ANSI/ASME NQA-1 or Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. Specific quality assurance interfaces with maintenance include hold points or witness points for critical refurbishment steps such as ring settings, setpoint tests, and NDE examination. The utilitys QA program should ensure that these particular hold points are incorporated into the PRD maintenance procedures.
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The utilitys QA program should also ensure that both maintenance personnel and QC inspectors are properly trained in PRV maintenance and inspection. Adequate training programs should include written instruction and hands-on training. Vendor Reports Vendor documentation and procedures provide a record of exactly what was supplied and received. This documentation should include checklists and utility receipt inspection procedures to enable personnel adequate QC for incoming materials. It also provides the first step in the history of the part from when it arrives on site and is inspected. Vendor records should include the following: Vendors QA inspection record with actual critical dimension verifications and signoffs PRD assembly drawings identifying purchase order number, part name(s) and number(s), serial number(s), Code references, overall dimensions and tolerances, handling requirements, and shelf life Certificate of Compliance to the purchase order requirements Certified material test reports including a report of mechanical properties and chemical analysis as required by the specific ASME Code to which the valve is manufactured. Bill of materials listing the part(s) supplied and material designation, special processes including statement of heat treatment and weld processes, required examinations and any special notes and requirements Record of all dispositioned non-conformance identified during manufacturing or inspection with the owners approval Vendor manual, vendor manual revisions, or supplements applicable to the part(s) NDE reports including visual, liquid penetrant, ultrasonic, and radiographic as applicable Certificate holders data report for nuclear components, parts and appurtenances, when the original order was for an NV stamped PRV. Utility Reports The utility-generated documentation provides the PRVs history trail from transferred, pre-service inspected and tested, installed, reworked, reinstalled and removed from the system. Safety-related PRVs should be tracked by a maintenance technical support group responsible for the PRD testing and off-site vendor test report review and evaluation. Recordkeeping Detailed records of safety and relief valve design, operation, and maintenance are essential for a successful PRD maintenance program. The records should be maintained by the appropriate system engineer, maintenance engineer, or ISI engineer.
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It is desirable to have the records in a centralized location that allows ready access by maintenance, technical support, and engineering personnel. A file for each PRD is recommended to provide a collection point for maintenance records, failure root cause evaluations, vendor contact information, and relevant industry reports and notifications. These records ultimately become a PRD equipment history record invaluable to performing root cause failure analysis. System Files As detailed recordkeeping is an essential part of the PRD maintenance program, system files are the individual files for each component. The purpose of a detailed record is to develop a specific equipment history. This information is useful to the maintenance supervisor or technical support engineer. If PRD performance degrades, the information collected in these files can be helpful in determining PM schedules and also provide a basis for PRD refurbishment.
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8
MAINTENANCE AND PERFORMANCE TRENDING
8.1 Predictive Maintenance and Inspection
Predictive Maintenance programs for PRVs are different than programs for active components such as pumps. PRVs are passive by design and only activate under abnormal system operating conditions. Passive components such as PRVs, therefore, require condition-directed tasks normally found by active monitoring, testing, or inspections. Several methods can be used to predict the condition of PRVs. The condition-directed methods listed in the following subsections when effectively used can determine the operational status of safety valves. If the predictive techniques identify a PRV operating improperly, the corrective maintenance guidance provided by the PRV manufacturer along with the special maintenance considerations described in Section 8.3 through 8.11 of this guide can be used to repair the valve.
8.1.1
Parts Control
Throughout the PRV disassembly, extreme care should be exercised to ensure that all component parts remain with their specific valve. Under no circumstances should component parts be exchanged from one valve to another. Table 8-1 lists the basic principles of parts control. The variables that influence parts control are: Valve Size: Size will dictate the type of control that can be used on specific valves. Smaller valves and their disassembled components may be contained in their entirety in suitable tote pans (plastic preferred) or similar containers. The pan(s) can then be temporarily tagged with the valve ID number or another appropriate method of identification. As the PRV increases in size it will be necessary to adjust the method by which control is accomplished. Smaller parts may still be placed in tote pans, but larger parts will have to be tagged and kept with the tote pans on a pallet or similar container and in one area (e.g., tote pans with smaller parts placed on a pallet or receptacle holding the larger parts (body/bonnet, etc.). Lead Time for Replacement Parts: Sometimes during valve repair, replacement parts are not readily available. In this case, the valve should be held in a satisfactory holding area until parts can be procured. The holding area and its proximity to the work area should be determined by the anticipated lead time for replacement part(s). In the event lead time for repair parts is long, it is recommended that the specific disassembled valve be placed in a temporary controlled storage area. This will help eliminate the possibility of confusion, parts loss, or inadvertent switching of parts from taking place. Consideration should also be given to possibly performing a loose assembly of the valve with appropriate tagging to identify its status in the repair cycle. This type of loose assembly will
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assure that the valve internals do not get misplaced. It may also be appropriate to maintain an inventory of parts to be used in the repair, based on the valve manufacturers recommendation or valve repair history. Shop Versus In-Line Repair: Shop repair is usually structured into a set pattern. This structured approach allows for more control of parts due to the surrounding environment. In-line repair requires a great deal more flexibility due to its nature and techniques that must be used to accomplish the repair process. System for Valve Repair: One valve is repaired at a time. This type of repair will reduce the need for skidding or handling of valve parts unless temporary storage is required. In the event that more than one valve is repaired at a time, parts control becomes essential. The system for parts control that is implemented should be specifically defined. Table 8 -1 Basic Principles of Parts Control
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Note A: Identification of the specific valve Segregation of parts Verification of parts serialization to utility records (see Note A) Containment of the disassembled valve Mobility of contained parts (if necessary) Damage prevention of internal components (e.g. protecting valve seats) Controlled parts for ASME Section III Class 1, 2 or 3 Pressure Relief Valves are serialized and recorded on the ASME NV-1 form.
8.1.2
Visual Inspection
A visual examination of the internal pieces of a PRV can be conducted to determine the condition of a part, a component, or a valves seat or disc surface condition. The examination should include looking for conditions such as wear, corrosion, erosion, cracks, or physical damage on the surfaces of the part or component. The use of an illuminated magnifying glass, inspection mirror, metallurgical examination, and boroscope may be appropriate. The visual guidelines given in this section may seem obvious and not important, but many valve failures can be avoided by properly conducted visual examinations. The visual examination can also be used to locate evidence of leakage from pressure retaining components or abnormal leakage from other components. In addition, the visual examination can be conducted to determine the general mechanical and struc8-2
tural conditions of components and their supports, such as the presence of loose parts, internal and external debris, abnormal corrosion products, wear, erosion, corrosion, and the loss of integrity at bolted or welded connections. Clean surface conditions are necessary for valid interpretations of erosion, cracks, and other defects. A clean surface is defined as one which is free of loose foreign material such as rust, scale, welding flux or spatter, excessive grease or oil, dirt, loose and flaking paint, etc. Cleaning may be performed with the use of a stainless steel wire brush, demineralized water, isopropyl alcohol, or an approved solvent with clean rags. Only stainless steel brushes, not previously used on other materials, should be used on stainless steel. Evaluation Criteria for Pressure-Retaining Bolting and Flange Surfaces The following conditions or indications are normally considered unacceptable: Cracks. Galling, stripping, or cross threading, unless isolated to an unused portion of the item. Corrosion, arc strikes, or mechanical damage that reduces the cross-sectional area by 5% on studs or bolts that are normally under tension when installed. Corrosion, arc strikes, or mechanical damage of all surfaces. This is considered to be detrimental to the function of the component in which the bolting or weld is installed. Threads that are not engaged for the full length of the thread in the nut. Bolts and studs should extend completely through nuts. If this cannot be accomplished, the stud or bolt should be replaced. Evaluation Criteria for Safety Valve Internal Pressure Boundary Surfaces The following conditions or indications may be unacceptable and require an engineering evaluation to determine acceptability: Cracks, other than light superficial surface crazing which occurs in the thin hard surface skin of castings Erosion, corrosion, and wear that infringes on the minimum wall thickness or is considered to be detrimental to the components function Loose parts Foreign material Structural distortion or displacement of parts to the extent that component function may be impaired Bent or degraded parts Any abnormal wear or surface conditions should be documented with photographs whenever possible
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8.1.3
Acoustic Monitoring
Acoustic monitoring is typically used to detect leakage from safety valves where the discharge is common to other safety valves or PRVs in a non-accessible space during plant operation. Monitoring equipment can be portable or locally installed at each valve or along piping runs to provide remote indication to monitor safety valve leakage. Permanently installed equipment can be used to determine when and which safety valve has lifted during a plant transient or test. Acoustic systems have been used to monitor leakage past pilot valve seats at some BWR plants. PWR plants have used acoustic monitoring on PRVs where valve stem movement cannot be observed. Acoustic monitoring equipment has also been used to measure sound disturbances in the discharge pipe. The selection of equipment to use is application dependent. Personnel who specialize in acoustical engineering should be used to develop the monitoring techniques and type of equipment to use. Acoustic systems used for PRV leak detection consist of sensors, signal processors, and display units. The typical device uses either accelerometers or sensors to convert acoustic energy in the 10 kHz to 100 kHz range into an electrical signal. These signals can then be displayed on oscilloscopes, spectrum analyzers, RMS voltmeters, and X-Y plotters. Some systems use a computer for analysis by first storing the information and then downloading to the computer. There are two main methods of comparison that can be used for detecting a leaking PRV: Baseline Comparison: In this method, a baseline reading of the PRV is established when it is certain the PRV is not leaking and is in normal operating condition. Then a reading is taken periodically at the same plant conditions and compared to the baseline readings. Comparison: In this method, the PRVs acoustic data is compared with the baseline of a similar PRV. The PRV used for comparison should be similar in construction, design, and application. The best selection is an identical PRV in the same type of service with the same acoustical background levels.
8.1.4
Temperature Monitoring
Temperature monitoring equipment that can be used for PRV condition monitoring includes permanently installed resistance temperature detectors (RTDs) or portable pyrometers. In addition, these devices can be used during PRV testing to determine the condition of a PRV both before and after scheduled maintenance. Section 6.5 of the guide provides information on obtaining temperature profiles and how they can be used for valve testing. Safety valve leakage that has been attributed to the PRV temperature profile used during testing was covered in Section 6. As discussed, a temperature profile needs to be developed for each individual PRV. A manufacturers test procedure that includes temperature values is adequate for initial testing, but a plant-specific temperature
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profile is needed to ensure that correct PRV setpoints are maintained. It has been noted during the testing of safety valves that as a valves bonnet temperature increases, the valves actual set pressure decreases and leakage may occur. The opposite is also true in that as the valves temperature decreases, the setpoint increases. This change in set pressure will not be identified during testing at a laboratory if the same incorrect temperature profile used to originally set the valve is used to retest the valve. Several factors can contribute to changes in a valves temperature profile: Valve inlet piping length can directly affect valve temperature. The length of the cooler pipe separating a PRV from its pressure source is critical to the temperatures the valve sees during operation. Valve insulation can effect valve performance. Insulation used during testing must be the same as installed in the plant. Air flow around the valve during plant operation can effect a valves temperature. Operations personnel should understand that during plant operation any changes in ventilation in the area of the safety valves can effect their setpoints. Also, maintenance personnel should understand that any forced ventilation used for personnel access can effect the valves setpoint. This type of maintenance induced failure is not detected until an overpressure event has occurred and may not even be identified as the failure cause when an event has occurred. Quench tank temperature can effect valve temperature. If a valves quench tank temperature is at or near the saturation temperature then this could effectively maintain an elevated temperature in the safety valve. The above factors are the reason why safety valve thermal profiles are important. They are also plant specific and should be used in testing. This includes set pressure testing with steam and leakage testing with nitrogen. In order to accurately set the valves and to ensure the tightest valves during power operations, the valves should be set with the temperature of the critical areas maintained to the specific thermal profile. IR uses specialized photographic equipment to measure and record absolute and relative temperatures of surfaces. See Section 6.0 and NMAC Document #NP-6973R2 for detailed information about the use of thermography. IR surveys (infrared inspections), should be used to trend and analyze the performance of PRVs. Baseline surveys should be scheduled every five years and prior to scheduled valve testing if used to determine the PRV thermal profile. This permits proper testing to identify required maintenance prior to unexpected failures. If insulation is not present, surveys can be used to determine the PRV thermal profile as described in Section 6 or can be used to detect PRV leakage. Color thermography equipment will give the best results for leakage testing. Before and after IR surveys should be used as a method for determining the adequacy or effectiveness of seat leakage corrective actions.
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Temperature profiles should be correlated with the acoustic baseline discussed in Section 8.1.3. By trending these condition-directed tasks, PRV leakage can effectively be detected and repaired. 8.2 Trending Safety and Relief Valve Performance and Maintenance History
The trending of safety and relief valve performance and maintenance histories is a key element in solving and preventing safety valve problems. It will also assist in the maintenance and repair work that may be required for any particular valve, predict spare parts requirements and finally may assist in the identification of the root cause of a problem valve. An aggressive trending program as outlined below provides a complete, accurate and easily accessible record of valve performance. With this type of record, any anomaly in the valves performance is easily identified and can be corrected.
8.2.1
Safety and Safety Relief Valve Performance and Maintenance Trending
PRV performance trending should be performed under each of the following conditions: Normal operating conditions Transient conditions Overpressure conditions Test conditions It is under these conditions that the safety and relief valves must be relied upon to perform one of their design functions. All safety and relief valves should be included in the maintenance, testing and trending programs because these valves perform an important personnel safety function. This is typically not the case. In most nuclear plants, inspection and maintenance activities are usually focused on valves that are installed in systems that perform an important nuclear safety function. If a neglected safety or relief valve is required to relieve in response to an overpressure event and fails, the possibility for a pipe rupture exists. This may result in many consequences including personnel injury. Performance trending of safety and relief valves is most effective when the trended data is maintained in an organized log or filing system. This record should contain the same type of data in the same format for each valve that is being trended to facilitate review and evaluation. The person responsible for initiating the trending log must first determine what data will be trended, how frequently the data is obtained, the data format, and the method for evaluating the data. In addition, the final presentation of the results must be considered when designing the trend log. The data to be trended for inservice valves should include: Seat leakage Body-to-bonnet leakage
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Premature lift Failure to lift Service time before the valve failure Thermal profile data Acoustic monitoring data The data to be trended for valves in test should include: Seat leakage Out of tolerance lift Premature lift Failure to lift Ring settings (if applicable) Developing and trending the thermal profile of a safety valve establishes the stable temperatures at specific locations on the valve when installed in the system and the system is at normal operating temperature and pressure. This thermal profile effects the set pressure of the safety valve which, in turn, affects the seat tightness of the valve. Maintenance usually occurs on safety and relief valves as a result of an inservice failure, test failure, or a problem identified during inspection. The maintenance practices recommended in this section include comprehensive maintenance and inspection activities the results of which are recorded on maintenance data sheets. Typical data that should be trended related to the maintenance of safety and relief valves include: Wear characteristics Degraded or deficient material conditions Incorrect as-found data Foreign material or corrosion This data is recorded in the trend log each time a work order is written for any safety or relief valve in the trending program. In addition, a schedule should be developed that inspects and tests safety and relief valves on a predetermined frequency. The frequency for inspection and testing of safety and relief valves should be commensurate with the function of the application. The ASME Code defines the test frequency for valves that are included in the inservice test (IST) program and NUREG-1482. These are valves identified in the plants final safety analysis report as having a safety function that prevents or mitigates the consequences of an accident. Typically, these valves are tested on a staggered frequency such that each valve is tested at least every five years. For valves that are not in the IST program, the inspection and test frequency should be determined based on several factors including valve performance history, safety func8-7
tion, and consequence of failure. The frequency can be established based on these criteria and adjusted as a performance record is established. Valves with good performance can be inspected and tested on a reduced frequency and the bad performers can be scheduled for inspection and test on a more frequent basis with an eye toward identifying causes and plans for corrective actions. The trending log should record the data and any relevant information, such as valve tag ID, work order number, and the date. Each sheet can include maintenance, inspection, or test results performed per a work order. The key performance and maintenance data should be extracted from the data sheets and included on the log to permit effective trending, and the complete data sheets from the work package should be attached to the log to complete the reference. The individual trend log sheets do not provide additional data that is very useful. However, when the sheets are compiled over a long period of time, the performance and maintenance histories become evident. This trended data should be used to adjust the maintenance and test schedules to effectively apply resources to the bad actors.
8.2.2
NPRDS Trending and Failure Codes
The NPRDS (Nuclear Plant Reliability Data System) is a computer database maintained by the INPO (Institute of Nuclear Power Operations) for use by the nuclear industry. The purpose of the database is to enhance the operations of nuclear plants by analysis of component performance history. The database contains records of selected components for each nuclear plant in the United States. These records contain specific information about each component of interest indicating the manufacturer, component characteristics, and the record of reported failures. The NPRDS database is a useful tool to supplement the trending efforts described above. Periodic evaluations of safety and relief valve failure data as compared to industry failure data can be performed and corrective actions taken if adverse trends are identified. Searches of industry data for reliability, failures, and the effect on plant operation can also be performed. For the NPRDS database to be a useful tool to utilities and the industry, the reporting of failures must be standardized so that meaningful comparisons of data can be made. INPO has provided a standardized categorization and classification system for the reporting of failures. Briefly, it consists of four basic categories to which all failure causes are attributed. The categories are mechanical, electrical/electronic, adjustment related, and human. Cause codes are identified for each type of failure cause. For example, setpoint drift, material defect, incorrect procedure, etc. Some cause codes may appear in more than one category. It is recommended that utilities formalize the categorization of failures consistent with the INPO NPRDS program, report all component failures, and perform plant and industry trending as an enhancement to the maintenance program.
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8.2.3
Trending and Analysis of Adverse Conditions
The analysis of the trended data should be comprehensive enough to detect subtle and not so subtle trends. To accomplish this, the trending should not only occur for a particular valve in a particular system, but should also occur for the same valve type in different systems and different valve types in the same system. Adverse trends such as the following should be identified: Repetitive failures or degradation of the same PRV or similar types of PRVs Recurring failures or degradation in certain systems Recurring failures or degradation in PRVs located in certain application (e.g., pump discharge) This type of trending can lead to solutions of problems related to a particular PRV type or a particular system. For example, if a particular PRV type has a high failure rate that is consistent for different systems, it may indicate a problem with the design of the PRV. If a particular PRV or many different types of PRVs experience a high failure rate in the same system, this might indicate a chemistry problem or a problem in the way the system is designed or operated. If trending indicates poor safety valve performance, abnormal degradation or impending valve failure, then immediate corrective action should be taken, as appropriate, and the safety valve program should be revised to address the root cause of concern. When applicable, design reviews should be performed to determine the adequacy of valves for specific applications and design changes initiated as necessary. Technical specification changes should also be considered when a valve is failing its setpoint acceptance criteria on a regular basis, but the criteria is overly restrictive for the application. Many times, a setpoint acceptance criteria of 1% is specified when the actual system requirements would warrant a larger tolerance range. There are not many safety valves that consistently produce at a setpoint within 1% of the nameplate setpoint over a period of time. The trending program should not be established for the sole purpose of trending. It should be used to provide good data that may be used in future valve maintenance work. Further, this data should be used in a thorough analysis process to obtain the root cause of a problem and correct it. 8.3 Preventive Maintenance (PM) and Inspection
Planned maintenance is the cost-effective application of a preplanned, organized set of integrated maintenance activities that will significantly contribute to inherently reliable PRV operations. Each maintenance action should be preplanned to ensure that the designed safety and reliability levels of the PRV are maintained. The PM action should identify and restore degraded conditions as they occur and obtain the necessary information for taking corrective action on valves where the desired reliability is not achieved. This type of PRV maintenance program encompasses the total maintenance
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triad consisting of preventive, predictive, and corrective actions. The first two (preventive and predictive) are supportive in that they prevent aging effects from leading to the loss of important valve functions through the timely identification of degrading conditions. They are more condition-directed than time-directed and can be integrated into a true planned maintenance program. Corrective maintenance activities should be used as a feedback to the planned program to enhance actions that prevent future failures. This section describes the typical actions necessary to inspect and correct PRV failure causes as described in Section 5. However, because many of the PRV failure causes are not PRV specific, separate sections for each PRV manufacturer type is not presented. This section only provides an overview of the critical areas of preventive and corrective maintenance of a PRV . The maintenance and inspection of PRVs has in the past not been accomplished by the owner or a repair organization. Scheduled planned maintenance can prevent most of the aging failures as discussed in Section 5. This section of the guide is not meant to replace the specific PRV manufacturers maintenance manual but to highlight some specific maintenance actions that can be used to reduce many of the failure causes listed in Table 5.1.
8.3.1
8.3.1.1
Valve External
Identification
The first inspection step of any PRV maintenance action is the positive identification from its nameplate of the valve that is to be repaired. Identification should include the following: Valve ID number Serial number Verification of manufacturer Verification of valve size and type Verification of valve set pressure Verification of valve ASME Code Stamp (UV, NV) and Class (1, 2 or 3 for ASME NV stamped valves only) Verification of valve location ID (if applicable) All of the above information should agree with the valves documentation. In the case of an ASME Section III valve, the documentation should include an NV-1 form, a serialization record of the valve. The stamped set pressure should correspond with the manufacturers tag and also be consistent with the plant maintenance information provided for the specific valve. There should be an appropriate tag affixed to the valve near the original manufacturers tag if any changes were made to the valve since it was originally manufactured, such as new valve set pressure, capacity, and blowdown. The original manufacturers tag should have information crossed out, but still be legible. In
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the case of valves where the lift set pressure is also stamped on the discharge flange, the set pressure should be deleted with the old lift set pressure still legible, in the same manner as the tag above. Verification of the lift set pressure is essential in the event that the manufacturers tag has been altered or lost and there is no appropriate reset information affixed to the valve (set pressure is crossed out or illegible). In the event the lift set pressure cannot be positively identified, there are several methods that may be used to obtain the PRV lift setpoint: From the PRV maintenance history (old test report or stored valve maintenance data) Verification through the valve manufacturer in conjunction with a traceable valve serial number From the top of the valve discharge flange (some manufacturers die stamp set pressure, valve type, and valve serial number on the discharge flange) 8.3.1.2 External Visual Inspection
Before the disassembly, several preliminary actions can be performed to help in the maintenance process. The first preliminary action is visual inspection that can identify several specific PRV problems. Points of inspection should include the following: Seals/Previous Repair Information: Inspection of valve safety seals (usually lead) should be performed to ensure the valve has not been tampered with (e.g., lift setpoint and ring pins) since its last repair or as-left condition. Any discrepancies such as broken or missing seals should be duly noted along with any previous repair information (affixed metal tag). Repair information may include the following: date of last repair, lift set pressure, repair organization, mechanic identification, VR stamping, and/or valve capacity. Gasket Sealing Surfaces: In closed bonnet designs, sealing surfaces should be examined for signs of leakage (e.g., corrosion, erosion, or removal of paint in affected area). Gasket surfaces should include body/bonnet, cap, gag plug, and ring pins. Also included in sealing surfaces are the nozzle/body seal if a full nozzle valve design is used. Lever Assembly Function (if present): Lever assemblies are of two basic designs, open or packed, as shown in Figure 8-1. Open lever design will need only to exhibit the ability of the lever to engage the lift nut. This will require freedom of lever movement and clearance between the lift nut and lever. Some valves use a lift washer and lock nut design. This configuration requires lever clearance (the distance between the lift lever at rest and the lift washer). With the lock nut configuration present there is a chance for the lock nut to become disengaged allowing the lift washer to work its way down the stem and jam on the lift lever. This can cause the valve to leak or to be in a permanent partially open position. The packed lever should also engage the lift washer. Due to design configuration, the lift washer and lock nut (if present) cannot be inspected visually for clearance, but can be checked by lifting the lever to at least a 45 angle. A packed lever may also be found in a frozen position (no movement possible). This is usually an indication that contamination (e.g., steam, water, etc.) is present in the cap area creating corrosion in the lifting gear assembly.
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Packed Cap O-Ring Drive Pin Cam Shaft Bushing Lever Lock nut ReleaseNut
Packed Lever
Open Lever Cap Lock Nut Release Nut Lever Pin Lifting Lever Cap Screw Stem
Open Lever
Figure 8-1 Lever Assembly Design Inlet and Outlet Flange Faces: The inlet and outlet flange faces (or valve nozzle flange face) should be inspected for damage and the condition noted. If the valve body is a studded construction, the studs and nuts should be inspected for damage. For welded inlet and outlet valves, the condition of the weld end should also be noted. Discharge (if accessible): Visual inspection of the internal components through the valve outlet may reveal signs of prior valve leakage. Indicators of leakage can mean severe corrosion or erosion of the valve seat and require part replacement. Test Results: PRV test results can provide valuable information that may be usd to analyze adverse valve condition. Table 8-2 lists information that should be used to determine PRV maintenance action.
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Table 8-2 Test Results Useful for Determining PRV Maintenance

1. 2. 3. As-found lift setpoint of the valve (high, low, or OK) External valve leakage present Severe seat leakage present; e.g., seat leakage is so severe that a valve lift setpoint cannot be established (leaked too bad to pop) Failure to open at +10% of valve stamped lift set pressure (no manual lift lever assist) Failure to open at +10% of valve stamped lift set pressure (with manual lift lever assist) Lift lever assembly frozen Erratic lift set pressure results Leaking bellows
4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
8.3.2
8.3.2.1
Valve Internals
Disassembly Methods
With the external visual inspection of the valve complete, documentation on the valve reviewed and verified, and the as-received tests for set pressure, etc., completed, the next step is to disassemble the valve and perform an internal visual inspection. The steps of this process are: 1. Have available the necessary documents on the valve. 2. Have available the manufacturers instruction manual or plant documentation on the specific valve. 3. Review to confirm that all necessary standard and special tooling is available. 4. Serialization record and verification. As stated in Paragraph 8.3.1, valves that have been manufactured to ASME Section III will have all pressure retaining parts serialized. During disassembly and assembly processes, verification of the serial numbers should be performed. If parts are changed, a record of the new serial number should be made in the records by the utility or repair agency. With the above reviews complete and equipment available, the disassembly process can begin.
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Most manufacturers instruction manuals recommend two types of disassembly procedures: Disassembly retaining the spring compression (termed jack and lap) Complete disassembly without retaining spring compression The jack and lap procedure is generally used on spring-loaded PRVs that are 2-1/2- to 8inch inlet sizes with high set pressure spring loads (pressurizer safety valves, MSSVs for PWR and BWR plants). The procedure is used when the valve repair activities are anticipated to be minimal such as seat lapping only. Complete disassembly is used on all sizes of PRVs. Generally, all valves 2-1/2 inch and smaller are completely disassembled. Valves of larger sizes may be jacked and lapped. Valve manufacturers provide specific information on when either method of disassembly should be used and will rent or sell equipment that will assist the technician who is performing the disassembly.
CAUTION: Personnel are cautioned that both procedures (jack and lap and/or complete disassembly) must be performed to the manufacturers recommendations, or damage to the valve pieces can result.
In Section 8.6, each type of disassembly operation is described and illustrated. 8.3.2.2 Securing the PRV for Maintenance
The first step that should be performed before repair of any PRV is the securing of the PRV in a fixed upright position. The important point here is to prevent damage to the PRV during maintenance. The valve size and configuration will dictate the method that can be employed. Several methods that may be used are: A vise mounted on a bench or the floor Bolting or clamping to a secure test flange (stand) Positioning the discharge flange in a V channel angle iron setup Any other variation or adaptation of the above that will secure the valve in a fixed upright position
NOTE: Care must be taken not to damage valve inlet flange sealing surfaces when securing the valve for maintenance.
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8.3.2.3
Match Marking
Before disassembly, the PRV should be match marked to ensure that the body and bonnet are reassembled exactly in the position they were prior to disassembly. This is a one-time procedure. Place the match mark on the center back portion of the valve when possible. In the case of multiple existing match marks, the following should be used to reestablish alignment. First, remove all previous markings from the bonnet and body using a surface grinder or similar tool. Prior alignment can be obtained from an identical type of valve that is present in the repair shop, plant, or storage. If this approach is not possible, it may be necessary to contact the valve manufacturer for specific valve alignment. Crosby and Consolidated valves have the bonnet vent holes to the front (above the outlet flange) and Farris valves have vent hole to the back. This vent location will assist the positioning of closed bonnet valves. Upon reestablishing alignment, one set of permanent match marks should be made on the flanges as shown in Figure 8-2. Low stress die stamping a valve accomplishes match marking and permanently identifies the specific valve. Match marking is not required for valves where components are threaded and reassembly requires a locking technique.
MSSV 23 MSSV 23
Match Marks
Figure 8-2 Match Marks

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8.3.2.4
Cap and Lever Assemblies
Removal of a lever assembly, packed lever, or plain cap is a fairly straightforward procedure. During such a removal process, visual inspection should be made to confirm that assembly was correct. 8.3.2.5 Confirmation of Ring Settings
If the valve is of a design that has adjustable rings (nozzle ring and guide or adjusting ring), the as-found locations of these rings should be verified at this point in the disassembly process. It is important that the method used to confirm ring setting is in accordance with the valve manufacturers procedures. A single valve manufacturer may use different procedures depending upon the valve style and/or type, and each manufacturer has a method that is not common to any other valve manufacturer.
NOTE: Review ring settings for valves in Sections 8.7 through 8-11.
The as-found settings of these rings should be compared to the as-left settings based on the specific valve records. If they are not identical, an investigation as to the cause for the difference should be made and corrective action immediately taken. 8.3.2.6 Compression Screw/Adjusting Bolt
If the valve is completely disassembled, match marking and measuring the position of the top of the adjusting bolt to the bonnet provides an approximate location to reposition the bolt to achieve the same compression when the valve is reassembled. Larger (high pressure) compression screws normally have a hex head construction to facilitate removal. Some smaller compression screws have two milled flats. All compression screws are of right-hand thread design (clockwise to install or increase pressure and counter clockwise to remove or decrease pressure). Compression screw design varies with the valve design. High-pressure valves (such as Consolidated types 2700, 31700, 3700 and Crosby types HA and HC) will typically have thrust bearings incorporated in their design as shown in Figure 8-3. Thrust bearings allow for the compression screw to transmit the power load of the spring to the disc assembly without the occurrence of severe galling between the compression screw bearing point and the upper spring washer bearing point. Valves without thrust bearings have the compression screw bearing point directly engaging the upper spring washer. If the valve is completely disassembled, the threads on both the compression screw and the bonnet/yoke should be thoroughly cleaned and inspected as described next. Inspect the Compression Screw. This should include all bearing surfaces (especially if no thrust bearing is used in the design) for galling, out of round or any surface damage that may adversely affect freedom of movement. Inspection of the compression screw
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threads is very important when there is any difficulty in removal (e.g., frozen in place and takes excess force to remove usually resulting in thread damage). Damage to one or two threads with moderate tearing can be remedied. The end result must be freedom of movement, the ability to screw the compression screw into the bonnet/yoke with no binding (without lubricant). If this cannot be accomplished, then further inspection of the threads is required, and the valve manufacturer should be contacted to confirm the thread size and recommended repairs.
Compression Screw Yoke
Thrust Bearing Cage Lubricate Bearing
Compression Screw Adaptor Aligning Washer
Lubricate Spring Washer Thrust Bearing
Figure 8-3 Typical Thrust Bearing Design 8.3.2.7 Studs and Nuts
Removal of body/bonnet nuts is a straightforward process that may be accomplished in the easiest manner available. During reassembly the tightening of the body nuts should be done with a torque wrench if recommended values are available.
CAUTION: The spring must be free of tension when removing the bonnet nuts. Serious personal injury or damaged parts may result if the spring remains under tension when the bonnet is removed.
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Inspection of the studs and nuts should include the following: Look for thread damage on either the nut or the stud. The stud/nut should have freedom of movement (the ability of the nut to be moved up or down the stud by hand). Some thread damage can be corrected through thread chasing or taps, but must be addressed (corrected or replaced) or damage will increase during reassembly (nut may seize causing breakage or severe irreparable damage). Look for erosion of exposed studs between bonnet and body (if present by valve design). If erosion is present, stud(s) replacement is recommended. 8.3.2.8 Bonnet/Yoke Removal and Inspection
Removal of a closed bonnet should be accomplished by lifting it in a straight vertical plane. It is very important to keep the bonnet in a straight vertical plane so as not to momentarily bind/catch the spindle/spring assembly. If binding is experienced, there is a chance of seat damage by some of the components above slipping out of the bonnet and falling into the valve. Size and weight will dictate whether the bonnet can be removed manually or require mechanical assistance. If a mechanical assisted lift of the bonnet is necessary, the bonnet may have threaded holes provided (by design) to allow eye bolts or similar lift assist devices to be installed. Designing a permanent lifting device is recommended. In the case of a larger closed bonnet, it is helpful to limit the number of times the bonnet has to be handled (lifted). Closed bonnets may have recessed or raised body gasket surfaces. Recessed gasket surfaces can be laid on a flat surface since there is little or no chance of physical damage. When placing a raised gasket surface bonnet in a resting position, it should be placed on a surface that will not damage the sealing surface (e.g., wood, cardboard, etc.). Removal of an open bonnet or yoke design usually requires less effort due to the fact that it is physically less demanding to sling for mechanical lifting. Some designs require the spring assembly to be lifted at the same time the open bonnet is being lifted over the spindle. Care must be taken to keep the bonnet in a perfectly vertical position so as not to allow the spindle (stem) to bind/catch the bonnet or the spring washer ID. If this occurs, the stem along with the disc assembly could possibly fall back into the valve and cause unnecessary seat damage. Visual inspection should include all gasket surfaces and threads for the adjusting bolt. For closed bonnet designs, the area and threads of studs and nuts that affix the cap to the bonnet should also be inspected. 8.3.2.9 Spring Assembly (Spring and Washer) Removal and Inspection
Removal of the spring assembly from a valve is accomplished by vertically raising it from the spindle. Size will dictate the method of removal; smaller spring assemblies may be manually removed as a unit. Larger assemblies may have to be removed by separate components parts (e.g., top spring washer, then spring, and last the bottom spring washer). In the case of larger spring assemblies where mechanical lift is
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necessary, care must be exercised to not inadvertently lift the spindle/disc assembly. If this occurs, there is a possibility of the spindle/disc assembly dropping back into the valve causing unnecessary seat damage. See Table 8-3 for inspection points.
CAUTION: Each spring washer (top and bottom) in most manufactures valves is custom fitted to the spring. During disassembly, identify to which spring end the washer is fitted. This will assist and assure correct placement of the spring during reassembly.
Table 8-3 Spring Assembly Inspection

1. Look for the presence of uneven coil spacing (collapsed). This condition may cause repeated lift setpoint drift (low) or failure to obtain desired lift setpoint. 2. Look for coil erosion or metal decay. Severity in conjunction with past valve performance (lift setpoint drift high or low) will determine if replacement is required. Measure the spring standing free height and compare it with design length. Look for cracked or broken spring. Look for the presence of lateral bending (spring is not perpendicular to top or bottom machined flats).
3. 4. 5.
The spring washers are important in that they transmit the power of the spring to the disc assembly. When spring replacement is necessary it is imperative that the new spring has been properly fit with a new set of washers by the manufacturer. Another critical area of the spring washer is its bearing point surface: the lower spring washer bearing point contacts the spindle bearing point while the upper spring washer bearing point contacts the compression screw bearing point (unless thrust bearing design is present). Inspection of spring washers should primarily focus on the bearing points and the surface the spring rests on. Bearing points should be free of galling and show a uniform concentric surface that has been in contact with the mating part. The surface on which the spring rests should be flat and free of erosion or any physical damage. Some pitting and corrosion is acceptable in noncritical areas of the spring washers. Thrust bearings are incorporated in some upper spring washer designs (see Figure 8-3). They should have freedom of movement or the ability to be restored to this condition. In the event the bearings are frozen and freedom of motion cannot be obtained by cleaning and lubrication, the thrust bearings should be replaced.
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8.3.2.10 Nozzle Ring/Lower Ring Removal of the nozzle ring should be accomplished in conjunction with obtaining a nozzle ring location measurement (in cases where the specific valve manufacturer uses this method or manufacturer ring setting or past maintenance history is not provided for assembly purposes). The nozzle ring can be removed after taking the nozzle ring lock pin from the valve body. The nozzle ring is removed by turning in a counter-clockwise motion until the threads disengage. It is imperative that the nozzle ring be held firmly while removing it from the valve body. Failure to do so may result in the nozzle ring being dropped causing severe damage of the nozzle seat, and require machining. If a nozzle ring is found in a frozen state, the ring must be freed prior to valve repair. After removal, the nozzle ring should be cleaned (especially threads) so that a proper inspection can be made. The nozzle ring should be examined for the following types of damage: Missing Teeth/Notches: This condition can adversely effect proper setting of nozzle ring if missing notches are located at the lock-in position (e.g., -3 notches). Replacement will depend on the ability to properly set (lock in) the nozzle ring to its appropriate measurement. Steam Cuts: This condition requires replacement due to the impact on the huddling chamber and valve performance (blowdown/simmering). Out-of-Round: If the nozzle ring cannot move freely up and down the nozzle because of out-of-roundness, replacement is recommended. Thread Damage: If the nozzle ring cannot move freely up and down the nozzle because of thread damage, replacement is recommended. 8.3.2.11 Disc or Disc Assembly Removal and Inspection The typical disc assembly, shown in Figure 8-4, is commonly removed from a valve in conjunction with the spindle (stem) as a unit. Care must be exercised during removal not to damage the disc or nozzle seat. When removing the disc assembly, note the degree of restriction that is present (e.g., the disc assembly should be free from any restriction that limits smooth/clean removal from the valve guiding system). Degree of restriction may vary as described in Table 8-4 and have a number of causes and effects on the PRV. Design characteristics will dictate the disc assembly removal process. There are a variety of basic designs used for disc retention. Some are: Threaded (Consolidated design shown in Figure 8-4 disc and spindle) Cotter pin (Crosby HS, HC and JO) for disc insert (see Figure 8-17) Retainer clip (Consolidated 1900 Series, Crosby HS, HC and JO) for spindle or disc insert (see Figure 8-5) A review of each specific manufacturers instruction manual will provide instructions for the removal procedure.
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Disc Holder
Disc Collar
Cotter Pin
Rock Gap
Disc
Figure 8-4 Typical Disc Assembly Table 8-4 Disc Removal Restrictions, Causes, and Effects
Degree of Restriction Slight initial dysfunction (sticking) that requires no external force in removal Possible Causes 1. Minor corrosion bonding 2. Minor corrosion of the guide and disc holder surfaces 3. Presence of binding between the guide and disc holder surfaces (e.g., minor galling isolated to one side of guide/disc holder 1. Moderate corrosion bonding 2. Substantial corrosion buildup between the disc holder and guide 3. Presence of moderate binding between the disc holder and guide as evidenced by isolated galling 4. Existence of moderate seat leakage 1. Severe corrosion bonding 2. Severe corrosion/bonding of the guide and disc holder 3. Severe binding between the disc holder and guide that results in galling that may ultimately lock up the above parts 4. Severe seat leakage Effects on Performance 1. Set point drift high 2. Erratic test results
Moderate dysfunction that requires external force in removal (e.g., mechanical lift, press, or external force [brass hammer])
1. Failure to lift 2. Set point drift (high) 3. Failure to properly reseat 4. Erratic test results
Severe dysfunction (frozen) that requires mechanical force to remove
1. Failure to lift 2. Failure to reseat which may occur in conjunction with partial lift
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Guide
Disc Holder Retainer Ring Disc
Nozzle
Figure 8-5 Typical Retainer Ring for Disc Insert If, in the cotter pin retention design, the pin is distorted or broken, replacement is necessary. With replacement it is important that the new pins material be of equal grade as the old (e.g., never replace a stainless steel pin with carbon steel). It is also important that the pin be of proper length so as not to contact the guiding surface. After disassembly, the parts (disc, disc holder, retainer mechanism) should be cleaned so a proper inspection can be made. Cleaning may be accomplished in stages during disassembly or in entirety after the valve is completely disassembled. The disc holder is a critical component in the internal structure of a PRV and should be inspected accordingly. It works in conjunction with the valve guiding system and its failure to meet acceptable criteria will result in valve failures. Table 8-5 lists major failures that may result due to component conditions.
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Table 8-5 Disc Holder Failure Causes and Effect on PRV Performance
Inspection Point Condition Possible Result
Guiding surface Guiding surface Top Bleed holes (if applicable) Threads Bearing points
Pitting Galling Steam cuts Plugged Damage (torn or stripped) Galling or pitting
Corrosion buildup which may result in set point drift (high), seat leakage, or failure to lift Failure to lift due to lockup of disc holder in guide Adversely affect huddling chamber/valve performance characteristics (e.g., blowdownsimmer) Adversely affect blowdown characteristics of valve Will not allow proper engagement of disc/disc holder bearing points which could result in seat leakage Seat leakage due to improper engagement of bearing points
Corrective action should be implemented for some of the conditions listed above (e.g., bearing points, threads, bleed holes) to make them acceptable. In the case of the disc holder guiding surface, only minor cleanup is allowed (e.g., use of crocus paper or similar while turning in a lathe). Use of coarse paper for cleanup is not recommended due to the possibility of reducing the diameter of the disc holder, causing a looser fit (clearance) of the disc holder to the guide. In the case of steam cuts, there is no corrective action that may be taken. Replacement of the disc holder is recommended if there is damage in either of the above areas. Bearing points of the disc/disc holder should be inspected for damage or wear. Transmission of the spring force occurs through the bearing points. Therefore, it is critical that they be free of damage. Look for galling, erosion, pitting, and any metal distortion in the bearing contact areas and mushrooming or peening of the bearing point. Machining and Lapping: Discs are evaluated for repairs in the following manner. The severity of damage combined with allowable disc tolerance determines whether machining can be performed before lapping. Most manufacturers have machining tolerances and minimum tolerances. It is important to understand the difference between the two concepts. Machining tolerance is a measurement that the manufacturer requires the component part (disc) to have after it has been machined. Minimum tolerances are dimensions for the component part (disc) that must not be exceeded per manufacturer specifications to be a useable piece that can be installed in a valve. In most valves, disc inserts cannot be machined and only the seat should be lapped. Tolerances are established by manufacturers for each specific valve to ensure optimum performance. Exceeding tolerances may result in unsatisfactory valve performance (e.g., failure to meet blowdown requirements, presence of simmer, or chattering). Before
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machining and lapping, it is important that machining tolerances for the specific disc be known so that proper machining can take place. Figure 8-6 shows a typical Crosby disc insert (without a flexi-disc seat) and identifies some of the critical dimensions of the part. Beyond this, there are other geometrical shapes that are also critical and controlled in manufacturing. Thermal or flexi-discs require lapping only (if damage permits) for refurbishment. There will typically be an outside relief minimum tolerance that will determine the ability of the disc to be reused. If the outside relief is below the minimum allowable tolerance, the disc should be discarded and replaced. In all cases, the owner should follow the manufacturers instructions for part reuse and refurbishment.
D-Min
D-Original
Seating Surface B Dia. A Dia.
Figure 8-6 Typical Disc Tolerances 8.3.2.12 Nozzle Design Types Removal and Inspection Nozzle designs vary from one manufacturer to the next. Basic designs of nozzles are as follows: Full, threaded and removable Semi, threaded and removable Semi, welded in valve body Semi, pressed and removable Prior to reviewing nozzle designs, it is important to note that the nozzle seat in conjunction with the disc seat form the primary pressure containment boundary in a PRV.
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Proper repair of a damaged seat is the first step toward ensuring that a PRV will perform to an acceptable standard. Nozzle seats have critical dimensions as do the disc seats. The nozzle tolerances are established by the manufacturer to ensure optimum valve performance. This is the allowance between machining tolerance and minimum tolerance as explained in the disc section. The nozzle seat should be inspected after appropriate cleaning. Measurements of the nozzle seat should be taken and recorded. Lapping should be done if it can be accomplished within the minimum tolerance constraints. If tolerances cannot be held, then machining of the nozzle is recommended. When tolerances are not met or exceeded, valve performance will suffer. Improper evaluation and repair of a nozzle seat may result in failure and/or adverse performance of the valve. Figure 8-7 shows typical critical dimensions of a valve nozzle, and Table 86 identifies effects on valve performance. B A
Relief Step
Nozzle
Figure 8-7 Typical Critical Dimension for Nozzle Seat
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Table 8-6 Typical Improper Nozzle Tolerance Effects on Valve Performance and Tightness
1. Blowdown: failure to meet required blowdown for set pressure of the PRV. This may cause the blowdown to violate the operating pressure boundary creating reseat failure. Simmer: premature release of media prior to lift. May develop into permanent leakage. Chatter: serious condition where rapid opening and closing of a valve occurs. Can result in a number of adverse conditions: leakage, setpoint drift low, damage to internal component parts, or reseat failure. Tightness: valve seat leakage.
2. 3.
4.
Full Nozzle: A full nozzle can be removed from the valve with a special tool available from the manufacturer. It can also be removed from the valve body as shown in Figure 8-8. Its design makes it part of the inlet connection of the valve and is threaded into the valve body at the inlet from the outside. Factors determining whether the nozzle is to be removed from the body depend on the specific valve and plant procedures (see Table 8-7). Table 8-7 Full Nozzle Removal Criteria
Factors for Removal 1. 2. 3. 4. Ease of machining Ease of lapping Ability to properly measure seat dimensions (tolerances) Presence of constant backpressure in the system that would require a positive seal between the nozzle and body Failure to do so increases the difficulty if nozzle needs to be removed next for repair Appropriate cleaning may be accomplished Damage beyond repair and replacement is required Factors to Leave in Place 1. Size which may make it impractical 2. Lack of proper tooling 3. Time constraint 4. In-line repair 5. Lap only 6. Non-availability of spare parts
5. 6. 7.
The full-nozzle design requires additional points of inspection (beyond seat inspection): the inlet and the nozzle body threads (when nozzle is removed). The inlet can be repaired using standard flange refurbishment. The nozzle body threads, in conjunction with the body threads, allow the nozzle to be returned to a locking position in the valve body. Thread damage should be corrected to allow reinstallation and lockup of the nozzle in the valve body.
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Semi Nozzle (Threaded/Removable): This nozzle is designed to be internally threaded into the valve from the top of the body and locked on a sealing surface or shoulder. Leakage can occur through the threads and/or sealing surface. Any evidence of leakage or the actual testing of the nozzle (bushing) may be used for evaluation. Cost factors (replacement value) should dictate if leakage will be corrected. Leakage can be corrected in the following manner: Removal of the nozzle bushing with proper tooling Proper cleaning of nozzle and body threads Application of thread sealant Reinstallation of nozzle bushing and curing of sealant, if required If there is damage present in the body threads or on the sealing shoulder (erosion/ steam cuts caused by severe leakage), replacement of the valve is recommended. Semi Nozzle (Welded): The semi-nozzle design has a bushing that is internally inserted into the valve body and welded in place by the manufacturer. It may become necessary to replace the nozzle bushing due to severe seat damage. Replacement of a welded nozzle bushing should only be performed by the valve manufacturer. Semi Nozzle (Pressed): There are two versions of this type of construction: 1) an internally pressed (permanent) nozzle in the valve body in conjunction with a body seal, and 2) a free-standing nozzle that rests in an internal recess of the valve body. Typically, this type of valve has a back seat (O-ring or similar soft seal) to isolate inlet pressure. Any soft seal of this nature should be replaced during each repair.
8'-10' Long Rod or Heavy Pipe Base Nozzle Protect Nozzle Seat
3 Jaw Chuck Chuck Stand
CAUTION: The Nozzle OD and Flange Face Must Be Protected to Preclude Damage to These Surfaces.
Figure 8-8 Full-Nozzle Removal
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8.3.2.13 Stem/Spindle Inspection The stem/spindle transmits the power of the spring to the disc assembly. Transmission of this power must occur in a uniform manner that allows even distribution of the spring force to the valve seats. Failure of uniform distribution to occur may result in adverse valve performance (e.g., leakage/internal binding of component parts). A common cause for bending of the spindle is overgagging of the valve. However, thermal expansion of the spindle while gagged can also cause bending. Inspection should involve checking the stem/spindle for total indicated runout (TIR). This is accomplished in the following manner. The spindle is placed in a vertical position with the ball end in a fixed pocket and the top end in a fixed V block as shown in Figure 8-9. A dial indicator is then positioned to contact the spring bearing point surface C. The stem is then rotated and a reading taken from the dial indicator. The amount of allowable TIR will vary according to valve size, type, and manufacturers allowance (typically <0.007"). If the runout is beyond allowable limits, the stem will need to be straightened. Straightening of the stem can be accomplished by either of the following: V blocks in conjunction with a padded press Between centers in a lathe using a rubber mallet Generally, the standard stem/spindle construction consists of two bearing points: spring washer contact surface and disc/disc holder pocket contact surface. There can, however, be additional critical areas depending upon the valve design, so manufacturers standards should always be followed. The bearing points are critical to the transmission process (spring force to seats) and should not be overlooked. Bearing point conditions that must be addressed are galling, erosion, uneven wear, and bearing band-width. Some spindle designs also incorporate a lift stop (such as Consolidated 31700, 3700, and 2700). The lift stop is set by the manufacturer and controls the measured lift a valve may attain. If the lift stop is removed, it is imperative that it be properly set upon reinstallation. Improper setting may result in the failure of a valve to attain full lift and its rated capacity. The lift stop can be set by adjustment (up or down) on the threaded portion of the spindle provided for it. The spindle along with the disc assembly are lowered into the valve and the cover plate affixed. A measurement is then taken from a fixed point (usually the top of the compression screw to the top of the spindle) and recorded. The spindle is then manually lifted until the lift stop engages the cover plate (spring assembly is absent during the procedure). A second measurement is taken at the fixed point and recorded. The difference between the two measurements is the lift of the valve. The lift stop is adjusted accordingly to meet lift requirements (including any allowances for thermal expansion per the manufactures specifications) and pinned. Other parts that may be attached to a valve spindle as part of the valve internals are a piston (backup to a bellows), a disc collar (see Figure 8-4) used to retain the disc holder, spindle and insert as an assembly, and an overlap collar used in the Consolidated (Dresser) backpressure closing design, to mention a few. The owner, with the help of the valve manufacturer and the instruction manual, must address the type of inspections required for each design and incorporate them into the maintenance procedure.
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SECTION XX C
45
Figure 8-9 Stem Inspection
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8.3.2.14 Guide Inspection A guide or guiding system is incorporated in all PRVs as part of their basic design. Guiding systems can be classified as either top-guided or bottom-guided, spindle-guided, or disc/disc-holder-guided. Top-guided has the guiding system incorporated above the nozzle seat. Bottom-guided has the guiding system below the nozzle seat. The guide is defined as the mechanism used to concentrically locate the disc/disc holder so as to create positive seating interface between the disc and nozzle seat. Bottom guides have their guiding system built into the nozzle bore (nozzle bore and guide are one and the same). A typical disc holder/top guided system is shown in Figure 8-10. This system incorporates a component part that is independent from the valve body. The guide rests in a recess provided for it in the valve body, or it rests on top of the body and aligns itself with the body bore. It is imperative that the guide rest properly in its designed seating surface provided by the manufacturer.
Adjusting Bolt Adjusting Bolt Lock Nut
Cap Cap Gasket Spring Washer Bonnet Spring Spring Washer
Gaskets Spindle Spindle Lock Clip Guide Ring Set Screw Gaskets Nozzle Ring Set Screw Set Screw Pin Set Screw Rod
Body Guide Guide Ring Disc With Bushing Nozzle Ring
Nozzle
Figure 8-10 Typical Disc/Top Guided System The guiding surface of the guide is designed so that it runs at a 90 angle to the valve seats. Any damage (e.g., raised surface caused by dropping or improper disassembly) that would prohibit the guide from seating properly on the provided surface will result in seat leakage. The guiding surface must be inspected for damage and/or wear. Adverse conditions that may be found in the guiding system are described in Table 8-8. A typical spindle guided system is shown in Figure 8-11. In this guiding design, the spindle is guided by a guide that is located in the valve body. The spindle also guides the disc holder to assure proper disc seat to nozzle seat alignment and contact.
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Any of the conditions shown in Table 8-8 will usually warrant replacement of the guide. Adverse conditions will usually coincide with conditions found on the disc holder and/ or spindle. Table 8-8 Guiding System Troubleshooting Guide
Condition Out-of-round Possible Causes Vibration in the system that may cause wear of the guide 1. Valve chatter 2. Guide out of tolerance 3. Dirt in guiding surfaces 1. Aging 2. Seat leakage Effects on Valve Performance 1. Leakage 2. Valve may hangup after opening (low reseat pressure) 3. Erratic test results 1. Set point drift (usually high) due to binding of guiding surface 2. Leakage 3. Failure to reseat at correct pressure 1. Binding in the guiding surface that may result in set point drift (high) 2. If caused by seat leakage, may become worse and result in part failure Poor valve performance, blowdown requirements, or improper lift
Galling
Corrosion
Steam cuts
Seat leakage
Guides with guide rings incorporated into their design should be inspected for the following: Freedom of assembly and disassembly. Should be able to be adjustable freely on the guide threads. Free of steam cuts. If there is a guide ring stop pin present in the valve body, it is important that the guide ring be adjusted so that it does not contact the stop. If the guide assembly is placed in the valve and the guide ring is contacting the stop (ring is down too far), valve leakage will occur.
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Screwed Cap
Compression Screw Bonnet Spring Stem Vent Opening
Guide Bellows Body Disc Holder Disc Guide Pin Nozzle
Figure 8-11 Typical Spindle-Guided Bellows Valve and Bellows Testing 8.3.2.15 Bellows Inspection Inspect the bonnet cavity/spring assembly and the bellows internally for any signs of leakage (e.g., corrosion or any contaminant that would indicate such). Pressurize the valve body with air through the outlet to a pressure value recommended by the valve manufacturer, as shown in Figure 8-11. In the bonnet vent, place a leak detecting solution or a plug with a tube and the tube outlet submerged in water. If leakage is present in the bellows, bubbles will occur in the water.
CAUTION: When this test is performed, all bonnet leak paths should be sealed.
If the bellows leaks, it should be replaced. If the gasket leaks, it should be replaced. If disassembly is required, the PRVs technical manual should be carefully followed. If there are any questions about the removal process, a resolution with the manufacturer should be obtained prior to the maintenance being performed. The bellows is a very delicate component and must be handled accordingly. Special tooling is usually required and may be obtained through the valve manufacturer.
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8.4
Generic Corrective Maintenance
8.4.1
8.4.1.1
Lapping
Lapping Valve Seating Surfaces
This section describes the general methods used for renewing the disc and nozzle seat. The objective of this section is to provide a basic overview of valve seat lapping that can result in a reliable, leak-tight valve. In the repair of PRVs, there is one maintenance activity that is common to all valves: lapping of the seats. The pre- and post-cleaning and lapping operation in all cases is the same except for the compounds, vehicles, and lapping blocks used to obtain the desired surface finish and optical flatness (for flat-seated valves). Therefore, prior to performing the lapping operation, the following should be reviewed and confirmed: Review the manufacturers procedures. Confirm lapping blocks/tools are optically flat and in a ready-to-use condition. Determine (based on manufacturers recommendations) the type of compounds (grit size) and vehicle to be used (e.g., compound diamond or aluminum oxide, grit size from 100 to 1000). Confirm that seats to be lapped conform to and have adequate material to conform to manufacturers dimensions after lapping. Determine if the seat can be refurbished by lapping or remachining. If not, replacement is required. 8.4.1.2 CleaningPrior to Lapping
General cleaning of the nozzle bore, threads, and disc should be completed prior to seat renewal (lapping). If possible, the nozzle should be removed from the valve body so it can be systematically cleaned in its entirety (i.e., bore, inlet, nozzle ring threads, and base threads). Nozzle removal will also produce a better environment for lapping, taking seat measurements, and performing inspections. Cleanliness in the nozzle bore, inlet (gasket surface), and the disc seating area is imperative for quality safety valve repair. Lack of cleanliness in these areas can result in contamination of the lapping compound, causing unsatisfactory results (i.e., poor seat surface finish followed by failure of seat tightness specifications). The purpose of cleaning is to remove all physical contamination. Physical contamination is the presence of any dislodged material that results in failure of the seating surface. An area normally requiring cleaning is the outside relief (step) of the nozzle because there is a tendency for corrosion particles to bond to the relief step (Figure 8-12).
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Relief Step
Nozzle
Figure 8-12 Nozzle Relief Step 8.4.1.3 Precautionary Measures Prior to Seat Refinishing
Seat refinishing is the last step performed on the disc and nozzle prior to reassembly. Precautionary measures that should be taken are: Check spindle threads in conjunction with disc insert threads (if applicable). There is a tendency for the lead threads to present some difficulty in starting. If this is the case, clean up the thread or threads causing the problem. The disc should also spin onto the spindle freely with minimal effort on the contact surface and be free of any galling. Check cotter pin holes and their alignment with disc insert and disc holder (if applicable). Corrosion can build up in these areas causing the cotter pins to bind when they are being inserted. Make sure that these holes are free and clear of any corrosion or foreign matter. Make sure that the nozzle ring can move freely on the nozzle. The ring should be checked without any form of lubricant on it. Corrective action may include: chasing threads (manually and lathe threading), wire brushing and/or cleaning, use of coarse grade compound, correcting out of round ring, or replacement of the nozzle ring.
Make sure that there is no binding of the disc in the disc holder and that the disc is free to rock. Binding occurs due to corrosion build up or damage in the guiding areas on either the disc or disc holder. Binding should be corrected by using a fine file or abrasive paper on the area of concern. Take any measurements that are required pertaining to the as-left condition of the disc and nozzle (see Figures 8-6 and 8-7). The radial dimensions do not require reverification because the lapping cannot change the dimensions of the seating area (i.e., ID and OD of the disc and nozzle). At this stage of the repair process, these dimensions have already been determined.
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8.4.1.4
Inspection for Seat Condition
Inspection of the seating area is conducted to determine at what level the lapping process should be started. Listed below are common seating area conditions along with suggested repair actions to return the valve to an operating condition. Minor visible imperfections are described as having no apparent physical damage to the seating area. When the seating area contains only minor imperfections, seat renewal can be accomplished by using lapping compound only. Minor seat damages consist of small cuts, scratches and pitting that do not run all the way across the seating surface. Seat repair will require minimal effort to restore the seating area to an acceptable level. Usually a coarse lapping compound or medium grit abrasive paper (320 grit) can remove damage at this level. When visual inspection indicates the damage has been removed, the seat can then be lapped to the desired finish. Sometimes it may appear the damage of the seating area was removed only to find out, during the use of the compound, that some damage still exists. In this case, return to the first step in the procedure and repeat the process until the desired results are obtained. Major seat damages include pronounced cuts, scratches, scoring, and pitting that run all the way across the seating area. Damage removal at this level will require significantly more effort than minor damage, and seating area relief tolerances may also compound the repair process. When dimensions are not available, the valve manufacturer should be contacted. Damage of this nature can be removed by using abrasive paper (120, 150, 180 grit size) or by machining. Inspection of the damaged areas should be performed periodically during the lapping process to determine when the physical damage has been totally removed. After removal of the damage to the seat, relief measurements and any other critical measurement required by the manufacturer (e.g., nozzle overall height) should be taken to ensure that minimum tolerances have not been exceeded. The nozzle seat height dimensions are critical because, if too much material is removed from this interface, the critical dimensions controlling valve performance can be affected (see Table 8-6). Critical dimensions on the disc (see Figure 8-6) can also affect its fit in the disc holder and the valves performance. When the safety valve is reassembled with an excessive amount of material removed from the disc/seat interface, the spring is extended to make up the axial dimension of the removed material. This extended spring results in a lower lift setpoint. For certain valve types, manufacturers will recommend a jack and lap procedure without retesting the valve. Therefore, the allowable amount of material that may be removed from the disc/ seat interface without affecting the lift setpoint should be obtained from the manufacturer. This dimension should be tracked to ensure that cumulative lapping operations do not adversely affect the lift setpoint of the valve. At this point (if relief step tolerances are acceptable, see Figure 8-7) a medium-grade compound can be used. A coarse-grade compound may also be acceptable as a starting point. In either case, the final objective is to graduate to a polishing-grade compound to obtain a quality finish on the seating surfaces. As in the previous
8-35
sections, it may be necessary to repeat some or all the steps in the procedure to obtain satisfactory results. Wire drawings describe serious damage of the seating area. Wire-drawn areas of the seating surfaces are created by the continuous leakage of the fluid medium across an isolated cross section of the seating surface. Due to damage severity, either machining or seat replacement will be necessary. Stress cracks are cracks in the seating area that usually radiate from the ID out and run perpendicular to the circular configuration of the seat. Initial inspection does not always reveal the presence of stress cracks, and damage can be difficult to repair. Cracks tend to be more easily observed during the final stages of the lapping process (the use of fine or polishing grades of compound). Stress cracks will have varying degrees of severity and thus require varying degrees of effort to remove. They should be evaluated by some type of NDE examination method. Complete removal of damage of this nature is imperative due to the tendency of the cracks to fissure and open when heated with pressure applied. Removal of the damaged areas can be performed using the same techniques used in 8.4.1.3 and 8.4.1.4 above. If the cracks persist, it may become necessary to machine the damaged seating area or even replace the damaged seat to correct the problem. 8.4.1.5 Lapping Operation
A conservative approach is recommended for the lapping process. The most conservative option is to use a lapping compound (polishing grade/high grade number). The most liberal option is the use of abrasive paper (low grade number). It is easier to go back in the progression and use coarser compounds than it is to start with a coarse compound that removes excessive metal. There are no stringent rules that govern the process of lapping with compound. There are, however, principles and concepts that affect the final outcome. Lapping requires a combination of skill, patience, diligence, practice, and touch. Other factors involved are choosing: The proper size and type of lapping tool The proper grit size (fine, medium or coarse) (see Table 8-9) Proper hardness or type of abrasive (aluminum oxide or diamond) Lapping time Pressure applied to the part being lapped
CAUTION: For a flat seat safety valve, never lap the disc seat against the nozzle seat.
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Table 8-9 Lapping Compounds

Abrasive Grit Size Average Micron Size 31 22 16 9 Description Manufacturer Trade Name or Equivalent U.S. Products Number 2F Crystolon U.S. Products Number 3F Crystolon U.S. Products Number A-600 Crystolon U.S. Products Number 38-900-A
Silicon carbide Silicon carbide Silicon carbide Hard alumina or Aluminum oxide
320 400 600 900
Medium coarse Medium Fine Polish
Information on diamond lapping compounds should be obtained from the valve manufacturer for diamond compound type, and when and where the compounds should be used.
When lapping, it is important to use the lapping (block) tool recommended by the manufacturer, which will cover the seating area at all times during the procedure but does not excessively overhang the seating area. This is important in smaller sized orifices. The use of a lap that is too large creates a tendency to rock the lap while performing the procedure. This will create unsatisfactory results such as the following: Unacceptable Seat Finish: fine scratches on the polished seating surfaces. A Seat That Is Not Flat: high or low areas in the seating surfaces. This is representative of a seating surface that has areas that are highly polished, accompanied by areas that have a dull lustre. Loss of the Perpendicular Relationship: between the seats and the valve spindle and disc.
The most common type of surface finish measurement for seat flatness is the use of optical flats with a monochromatic light. This method represents the most accurate method of checking surface flatness. Optical flats use light bands to measure surface flatness with one band equal to 11.6 millionths of an inch. Interpretations of light band readings are based upon a point of contact on circular pieces. Because this type of measurement is difficult to perform in the field with portable equipment, the degree of flatness is obtained by a transfer process. That is, verification of the optical flatness of the lapping block prior to use causes the valve seat to be suitably flat to achieve valve tightness. Obviously, to assure that this transfer process is correct, the following guidelines should be used: Use a different lapping block for different grade compounds. Clean the surface being lapped and the lapping block frequently during the process to remove contaminated compounds. Use a newly reconditioned lapping block for the final lapping operation. Recondition the lapping block frequently (see note).*
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NOTE: Lapping blocks (ring) can be reconditioned on a lapping machine or on a reconditioning lapping plate as shown in Figure 8-13. The reconditioning plate is made of a special grade of annealed cast iron (as are the lapping blocks). It is machined and lapped flat on one side and has small squares. It is on this side that the lapping block is reconditioned using the appropriate compound and moving the lap as shown in Figure 8-13.
Lapping Plate
Lap Ring BLOCK
Figure 8-13 Reconditioning Block An important requirement for the lapping process is the perpendicular relationship of the valve guiding system, the disc, and the nozzle seat. All valves are designed with a guiding system, an internal component whose function is to direct the disc/disc holder to its designation, the nozzle seat. The guide normally runs in a vertical plane through the valve, while the seats (disc and nozzle) run in a horizontal plane through the valve. The nozzle seat is permanently fixed in the horizontal plane. The disc is movable but should also remain in a horizontal plane. The interface of these two horizontal planes (disc seat and nozzle seat) create the pressure containment seal in a valve. The degree of tightness of this seal is influenced by the vertical plane of the valve guiding system. When this relationship is violated, the seating area is adversely affected and may result in seat leakage. Failure occurs when either the disc or nozzle seat (or both) is no longer at a 90 intercept of the guide plane. This may occur if the valve seats have been improperly lapped or machined. Even if the valve seats are flat and have an acceptable finish, valve seat tightness failure may result if they are no longer at a 90 angle to the guiding system. Geometric relationships for the disc and the nozzle as well as the nozzle to body should be obtained from the valve manufacturer if extensive lapping or machining of the nozzle seat is performed.
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CAUTION: The seating area should be covered with the lap at all times. Failure to do so may result in the loss of the perpendicular relationship between the seat and the valve guiding system.
Lapping time is dependent on the following factors: Grit size, coarse compound (320 or less) will remove more material in a shorter time and will take longer to break down than fine (600 to 900) The amount of seat damage that has to be removed Pressure that is used during the lapping process For the majority of lapping, the only pressure necessary will be the weight of the lap along with the natural force of the arm and hand performing the lapping procedure. Slight pressure may be applied during the use of coarse and medium compounds that are used to remove damaged seating areas. Care must be used if pressure is being applied so as to not loose the perpendicular relationship of the guide with the disc and nozzle seat. Whenever a finish is being created on a seating surface, normal pressure is all that will be necessary. If the proper lap and compound is used in conjunction with the above principles and concepts, a quality end product will result. 8.4.1.6 Compound Lapping Process
The process of lapping with compound varies according to the type of compound being used and the desired surface finish. There are several techniques that can be used in the lapping process. Fasten the disc in a fixed position (i.e., a vise with brass jaws or similar protection) and lap the disc with the lap in the mechanics hand. Use a fixed lap with the disc in the mechanics hand. The disc-in-hand approach allows the use of the correct size lap or a lapping plate. Employ the use of a mechanical lapping machine (Lapmaster or equivalent), if available. All the above will produce acceptable results. The nozzle will limit the type of technique that can be used due to its size, weight, configuration, and accessibility. The preferred technique is a correctly sized lap in the mechanics hand. When the disc or nozzle are manually lapped, hand motion (technique) should remain relatively stable for each compound. This motion will consist of a back and forth oscillating motion with as little lateral movement as possible. Lateral movement may cause undue scratching of the surface being lapped. This is especially true in the latter stages of the lapping process (fine and polish grades of compound). Check the lapping block frequently on a good reconditioning plate to be sure that it is perfectly flat.
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If the valve seat is to be microfinished as the final lapping operation using a diamond compound, use new, clean laps and only the compound and vehicle recommended by the manufacturer. 8.4.1.7 Lapping Angle Seats
Lapping an angle seat requires different techniques and tools than that of a flat seat. The angle of the seating surface must be determined (e.g., 3, 5, 10, 15 or 45) prior to lapping. This may be accomplished in two ways. The first and recommended way is to use vendor engineering information. If vendor information is not readily available, the angles must be measured manually. A common application of angle seats has a 15 seat opposing a flat seat. In most cases, the seats are independently lapped, with the flat seat being done using normal lapping techniques. The angle on the mating seating surface must have a flat lapped onto it to a predetermined width. The angle seat should be lapped first, then the flat should be lapped to control the seat width. Width of the seat must be carefully controlled. The use of a medium grade lapping compound will establish a desired width. After the seat width has been attained, the seat is then polished. The width of the seat will slightly decrease during polishing. Lapping of this variety of angle seats does not require special laps. The standard flat, cast iron lap will produce a satisfactory seating surface in any of the above angle configurations. Some valve applications use angle seating with a 45 angle on the disc and a 45 angle on the nozzle. This type of seating arrangement requires a different lapping technique. A lap with an identical 45 angle is used on the nozzle seat. The lap will have either a top or bottom guiding system. Valve design will dictate which type of guiding system the lap will employ. Cleaning up the nozzle seat can be accomplished with the use of abrasive paper affixed to the 45 angle of the lap. The objective here is to prepare the nozzle seat for the use of lapping compound. There are three options that can be used to prepare the disc seat. The first option for minor cleanup of the disc seat is accomplished by placing the disc in a lathe and cleaning the seat with crocus paper. The second option is machining the disc, and the third, replacing the disc insert. When the disc and nozzle have been properly prepared, the seats are then lapped together. This is one of the few instances where it is necessary to grind (using lapping compound) the disc and nozzle seat together. This type of lapping is accomplished with the use of a medium grade compound. Compound is applied to the disc seating surface and the disc and nozzle are ground together in conjunction with the guiding system of the valve. In the case of a bottom-guided (bore) valve, lapping may be accomplished by physically turning the disc in the nozzle bore. DO NOT TURN THE DISC IN ONE CONTINUOUS CIRCULAR MOTION. Divide one revolution into segments with four being the starting point. The number of segments may increase with an increase in valve size.
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Upon completing one revolution, the disc will be lifted from the nozzle seat (approximately 1/4-inch) and rotated 90. Repeat this process several times. The mechanic should be able to feel the lapping process taking place and the breaking down of the compound. Conversely, if the disc is galling or dragging (an indication the lapping process is incomplete) the mechanic should be able to feel the irregularities. The ideal sensation will be that of a smooth uniform grinding action. Lapping in this manner avoids the possibility of the disc riding high to one side or galling of the seating area. After repeating the above process, inspect the seating area. Inspection is performed after cleaning the seating area with an approved cleaning solution. The final objective is a solid uniform seat on both the disc and nozzle. Lapping seats together in this fashion can only be done for a short period of time. Prolonged lapping will eventually lead to wearing a groove into the seat. If lapping of the seats does not provide the desired results in this time frame, there is usually a problem that must be corrected. The following are some of the common problems found in this type of seating arrangement: A uniform seat is one that has dark graying intermingled with spots of light graying or no graying at all. This indicates the seats are concentrically true, but the seating surface finish is not adequate (low spots). Lapping with abrasive paper again or remachining will correct this problem. A seat that has dark graying all the way around it but is not uniform. The seat will be wide on one side while directly opposite it will be narrow. This usually indicates an alignment problem that could be created in several ways. The vast majority of the time it is caused by improper machining (total indicated runout was exceeded causing misalignment in conjunction with the guide). A second possibility, especially in top guided valves, is the misalignment of the guide in conjunction with the nozzle. Graying of the seating area only at the top or bottom usually indicates that a metal burr is present and the seat is not making full contact with the mating seat. Removal of the burr can normally be accomplished with a fine file or similar device. Once the final seat finish has been obtained, the seating area should be cleaned of any excess compound with an approved cleaner. 8.4.1.8 Final Inspection of Lapped Seating Surfaces
A final inspection of the lapped seating surfaces is performed to determine if the lapped surface is flat and has an acceptable surface finish. Either of the following approaches can be taken to determine if the seats are flat. Visual Inspection The first method is visual inspection. Adequate lighting is essential for this type of inspection. There are two criteria that the seat inspection must pass. The first criteria is the absence of any physical damage in the seating area. If the seat passes the first criteria it is then inspected for any signs indicating unacceptable finish or flatness. This part of the inspection process requires the rotation of the seat (if practical) so that the light
8-41
can reflect off the surface at different angles. Rotating the seat in this manner reduces the chance of missing an imperfection. Specific imperfections that must be corrected are: Areas that are highly polished intermixed with areas with a dull lustre Fine scratches created during the lapping process (especially if they are grouped together) A seat is not lapped completely to the outside or inside edge yielding a uniform ring along the edge of the seat A solid ring (dull lustre) running in the middle of or across the seat width Optical Flat Inspection with an optical flat and monochromatic light is the second method. However, as was discussed in Section 8.4.1.5, this method is difficult to use and may not be applicable in many cases. 8.5 PRV Control Rings and Their Settings
Section 4 reviewed PRV design and theory. It also discussed the reason for, the importance of, and the effect of control rings on valve performance. With this background, it is easy to understand the importance of the positioning (setting) of these rings after the maintenance activity is complete and the valve is reassembled. First, a review of some basics in ring settings: Each manufacturer has a unique method of setting rings. Do not attempt to use one manufacturers method of setting rings on another manufacturers design. Ring setting for each manufactured valve has been established by: a) a factory test on that specific valve, or b) based on the manufacturers test data for that particular valve style. This is based on ASME Code and/or valve design or valve specification at time of valve purchase. Ring settings effect valve performance (i.e., opening characteristics and closing or blowdown) and should not be changed unless the valve is retested or by specific instructions from the valve manufacturer. If a set pressure change is made on a valve, consult the valve manufacturer for the effect of that change on the ring setting (i.e., valve may have to be operationally retested). The ring pins (or set screws) that are installed threaded into the valve body and engaged in a notch or groove in the control ring are fit for each valve. Do not interchange them with ring pins from other valves. In summary, it is important that during the maintenance activity: 1) the location of the control ring(s) are confirmed at the time of valve disassembly, and 2) the setting of the control rings during or after (depending on manufacturers design) valve assembly should be done strictly in accordance with the manufacturers instruction manual.
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Subsections 8.6 through 8.11 review the disassembly and assembly of three different types of PRVs: pressurizer, main steam, and auxiliary-relief application. It is important to note how each design has a different method of setting the guide ring. 8.6 Disassembling and Assembling Typical PRVs
To this point in Section 8, a broad overview of the maintenance activities on PRVs has been provided. However, there has not been a review of any disassembly or assembly methods. To provide a better understanding of these operations and to illustrate the importance of using the manufacturers instruction manual, three different valve designs of a single manufacturer (Crosby) have been selected to demonstrate how similar this operation is in some areas, but dissimilar in others (e.g., valve ring settings). The operation will be performed using two methods of disassembly: 1) retaining the spring compression (sometimes called jack and lap), and 2) without retaining the spring compression (or total disassembly) on a pressurizer, a MSSV, and an auxiliary valve.
8.6.1
Disassembling and Assembling Pressurizer Safety Valve
The first valve used to perform a disassembly and assembly operation is a Crosby pressurizer safety valve. The valve size is a 6-inch inlet, M orifice with a 6-inch outlet (Crosby Style HB-86-BP). The valve set pressure is approximately 2500 psig, its height approximately 48 inches, and its total weight 1100 lbs. A valve outline drawing with piece names and numbers is shown in Figure 8-14.
8-43
8-44
Part Name
31 42 43 32 44 21 17 16 16 22 23

A
26 27 28 23 24 36 25
39B 39A
Piece No. 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35
?
30 37 29 20 19 48 49 14
14B
28
18 20 40 41 15 47 49 8 12 35 13
14A
38 39 33 34 11
36 37 38 38A 39 39A 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49
Piece No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 14A 14B 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

6 5 10 9 35 4 1 2 7 3
Body Nozzle Nozzle Ring Nozzle Ring Set Screw Disc Holder Disc Bushing Disc Ring Bellows Disc Insert Disc Insert Pin Eductor Adjusting Ring Adjusting Ring Set Screw Spindle Assembly Spindle Point Spindle Rod Bonnet Adapter Spindle Nut Spindle Nut Cotter Bonnet Spring Spring Washer Cap Dog Dog Shaft Dog Shaft Bearing Dog Shaft "O" Ring Dog Lever Nut
Part Name Dog Lever Lockwasher Lever Adjusting Bolt Adjusting Bolt Nut Cap Plug Cap Plug Gasket Bonnet Adapter Gasket Eductor Gasket Nozzle Ring and Adjusting Ring Set Screw Gasket Dog Shaft Bearing Gasket Cap Gasket Bonnet Stud Cap Stud Bonnet Stud Nut Cap Stud Nut Piston Piston Lockclip Gag Screw Cap Top Cap Top Gasket Canopy Ring Gasket (Special) Nameplate and Identification Plate Caution Plate Drive Screws
STYLE HB-BP (WITH PISTON)
Figure 8-14 Crosby Pressurizer Safety Valve
8.6.2
General Information
When possible, remove the valve from the system before dismantling. In any case, there should be no system pressure when a valve is either dismantled in place or removed for shop repair. Several flat metal gaskets are employed for sealing joints. Care must be exercised when dismantling not to damage or lose these gaskets as they can be reused. Gasket locations can be determined by referring to Figure 8-14. Nozzle and guide ring set screws are custom fitted to each valve and are not interchangeable. Spring washers are fitted to each end of the spring. The spring and its washers are to be kept intact as a unit. Certain pieces, as covered in the ASME Section III NV-1 form, are serialized. In disassembly and assembly, confirm and reinstall only pieces that match the documentation. 8.7 Pressurizer Valve Disassembly
The proper procedure for dismantling a safety valve is described below (see Figure 8-14 and 8-15).
8.7.1
Remove the Cap
Remove the lifting lever (28), the cap top (43), and the spindle nut cotter (17). Next, unscrew spindle nut (16) from the spindle and remove cap nuts (39A) and cap (21).
8.7.2
Record Ring Settings
Remove the adjusting and nozzle ring set screws (4 and 13). Check the setting of the nozzle ring (3) by turning it to the right while counting the number of notches turned until it makes contact with the disc ring (7). Record the number of notches. Check the setting of the adjusting ring (12) by turning it to the right while counting the number of notches turned until it makes contact with the disc ring (7). Record the number of notches.
8.7.3
Disassembly Retaining Spring Compression
If the valve is to be reconditioned without retesting, the original set pressure can be retained by use of a jacking device shown in Figure 8-15. Tabulation of Crosby piece numbers for the hydraulic jacking device are shown in Figure 8-15(b). Install bonnet spacer (5) on the bonnet. Position jacking device assembly by lifting the assembly over the spindle (14) and lowering it down onto the bonnet spacer (5).
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CAUTION: The piston (2) should be seated within housing (1) before continuing. This position is reached when the first notch on the piston (2) is level with or below the top of the housing (1) as indicated in Figure 8-15(a).
Lubricate the spindle threads with Never-Seez, Molykote-G, or an equivalent. Thread the spindle adapter (6) onto the spindle until the spindle adapter comes into contact with the jacking device assembly. Next, attach the hand-operated hydraulic pump (7) and hose (8). To raise the valve spindle, pressure is applied to the jacking device assembly with the hand operating hydraulic pump. This actuates the piston (2) which raises the lower spring washer compressing the spring.
CAUTION: This device has a limited piston stroke that should not be exceeded. The second notch on the piston (2) will be above the top of the housing (1) and hydraulic fluid will flow from the bleed hole located in the housing. If hydraulic fluid is flowing from the bleed hole, but piston stroke has not been exceeded, the O-rings (3 and 3A) and the back-up rings (4 and 4A) should be inspected for wear or damage and replaced, if necessary. Removal of the jacking device for repair may be accomplished by the releasing procedure, the reverse of the procedure used above for its installation.
After the valve has been jacked approximately 1/8-inch (3mm) and the spring load has been taken up by means of the jacking device, remove the adjusting ring set screw (13), nozzle ring set screw (4), loosen and remove bonnet stud nuts (39), and then lift the complete bonnet (18) assembly from the valve body (1). The valve may now be further disassembled for maintenance as follows.
CAUTION: In removing the disc holder and bellows assembly from the spindle, care should be exercised not to damage the bellows. The spindle should also be protected against any damage (bending) while handling.
Remove the adjusting ring (12) from the eductor (11). Remove the disc insert pin (10), disc insert (9), and disc ring (7). Slide the eductor (11) over the disc holder (5). The disc holder (5) and bellows assembly (8) may now be unscrewed from the spindle (14), and the bonnet adapter (15) can be lifted over the spindle (14).
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1 8
HOUSING 7
PISTON
* 3
14 6 2 PISTON STROKE INDICATOR
"O" RING
Hydraulic Jacking Device Installed Here
3A
"O" RING
* 4
BACK-UP RING
4A
BACK-UP RING
Bonnet
5 BLEED HOLE 3 4
BONNET SPACER
3A 4A
SPINDLE ADAPTER
HYDRAULIC PUMP
* 8
1/4" HOSE
Body
14
VALVE SPINDLE
20
BONNET
26 ADJUSTING BOLT
1/4 18-NPT 1 26 27 5 20
27 ADJUSTED BOLT NUT
Set Screws and Nozzle Ring Removed and Attached to Bonnet
*RECOMMENDED SPARE PART HYDRAULIC JACKING DEVICE
(A)
(B)
Figure 8-15 Hydraulic Jacking Device and Jacked Valve
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8.7.4
Disassembly without Retaining Spring Compression
If it is desired to completely disassemble the valve and not retain the spring compression, the following procedure should be used. 1. Measure the length of the spindle (14) above the adjusting bolt (29), and record the dimension so the same distance can be reestablished when reassembling the valve. 2. Release the spring tension by loosening the adjusting bolt locknut (30) and then the adjusting bolt (29).
WARNING: Never loosen bonnet nuts before releasing spring tension with the adjusting bolt.
3. Loosen the bonnet nuts (39) holding the bonnet (18) to the body (1) of the valve. Lift the bonnet (18) up to clear the spindle (14) and spring (19). Remove the spring (19) and washers (20). 4. The spindle (14), bellows (8) and disc holder assembly, and eductor (11) should be lifted out of the valve as a complete unit. Place this assembly on a clean, soft material to insure no damage occurs to the disc insert (9) seating surface. 5. Remove the spindle (14) from the disc holder assembly and the adjusting ring (12) from the eductor (11). Next, remove the disc insert pin (10).
CAUTION: The disc insert pin (10) is flared at one end and should be removed by driving a drift pin into the hole from the non-flared end while resting the opposite end on a soft wooden block to insure that no damage occurs to the disc ring.
6. After the removal of the disc insert pin (10), the disc insert (9) can be removed from the disc holder (5), and the disc ring (7) can be unscrewed from the disc holder (5). The disc holder and bellows assembly can now be removed from the eductor (11). 7. Remove the nozzle ring (3) from the nozzle (2). 8. When the valve is completely disassembled, examine all parts for signs of wear, damage or corrosion to determine whether any replacement parts are required. Particular care should be taken to examine for wear or scoring the inside of the eductor (11), the outside of the disc holder (5), the inside of the bonnet adapter (15), and the piston (40).
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8.8
Pressurizer Valve Assembly
8.8.1
General
Prior to any assembly operation, the valve seats should be relapped and other parts reconditioned, cleaned, lubricated, and then assembled. This would be accomplished as follows: 1. Lap valve seats per instructions. 2. Parts should be thoroughly cleaned. A fine emery cloth or crocus cloth may be used to polish guiding and bearing surfaces and surfaces in intimate rubbing contact. Care must be used to ensure that the critical dimensions are not affected. 3. Examine all gasket sealing surfaces and gaskets. If they are damaged, the surfaces should be polished and the gaskets replaced. 4. Finally, clean parts with acetone or any other acceptable cleaner prior to assembly. The following areas should be lubricated before and during assembly with a suitable sealant or lubricant as indicated against each item: All gaskets and gasket surfaces - sealant Nozzle-to-body threads - lubricant Adjusting bolt threads - lubricant Spindle point threads - lubricant Spring-washer bevels - lubricant Cap top threads - lubricant Cap plug threads - lubricant Set screw threads - lubricant Dog shaft bearing threads at ID - lubricant All studs and nuts - Never-Seez or equivalent Eductor and guide ring threads - lubricant Disc ring and disc holder threads - lubricant Nozzle ring to nozzle threads - lubricant Piston OD and bonnet adapter ID - powdered graphite or Neolube
8.8.2
Assembly of Valve with Spring Compression Retained
The bonnet and jacking device assembly with spring, spring washers, and spindle should be placed on a work bench with the spindle horizontal. Place the gasket on the bonnet adapter (15) and place the adapter over the spindle.
8-49
Place the bellows assembly (5, 6, and 8) onto the spindle (14) and turn it on the spindle until it drops off the spindle thread and spins freely.
NOTE: If a new bellows is installed, the bellows flange surfaces should be lapped with medium compound against the bonnet adapter and eductor surfaces until a satin dull finish is obtained on the bellows flange across the sealing face. This operation is performed to preclude the possibility of leakage across the gasket surface.
The eductor (11) should be installed over the bellows assembly (5, 6, and 8). Assemble the disc ring (7) with lubricated threads onto the disc holder (5). The through holes in the disc ring (7) and disc holder (5) must be in alignment. Assemble the disc insert (9) using the disc insert pin (10) (Note: see caution in section on disassembly). If a new pin is installed, one end should be flared prior to assembly. The adjusting ring (12) can then be screwed onto the eductor (11). Install the nozzle ring (3) on the nozzle (2) locating it approximately 1/32-inch above the seat level of the nozzle.
CAUTION: Perform a final inspection and clean the nozzle and disc insert seating surface.
The entire jacked assembly, complete with eductor, bellows, disc insert and all the other parts described above, may now be lowered carefully into the valve body and the bonnet studs (39) tightened as follows. 1. Valve studs and nuts should be cleaned and visually inspected to ensure freedom from any objectionable foreign matter, rust, burrs, or physical damage. 2. With the bonnet in place, lubricate the bonnet stud threads, the nut threads and nut face with Never-Seez compound. 3. Install nuts on the studs finger-tight. 4. Tighten the nuts in the sequence shown in Figure 8-21 to approximately one-half the required torque value. Repeat the same sequence of tightening to .75 times the required torque value. Then perform the final tightening operation starting with the number 1 nut and tighten each nut in order in a clockwise or counter-clockwise direction to the final required torque value. 5. When tightening is complete, wipe off excess lubricant. 6. Lower the nozzle ring (3) by turning it to the left (clockwise when facing the set screw hole) until it is in the lowest free position, and then lower the adjusting ring until the lower edge is below the level of the nozzle seat.
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7. The jacking device may now be removed by reversing the instructions described in the section on disassembly retaining spring compression. 8. Adjust the nozzle ring (3) by turning it to the right until it makes contact with the disc ring (7). Then turn the nozzle ring to the left the same number of notches recorded prior to disassembly. Adjust the adjusting ring (12) (that should also be reset to its original location recorded prior to disassembly) by turning it to the right until contact is made with the disc ring. Then turn to the left and count the notches until the same number of recorded notches is reached. 9. Replace the adjusting ring, nozzle ring set screws (4 and 13), and gasket (35), being sure the point engages the notch. 10. The cap (21), spindle nut (16), and lifting gear assembly are assembled by reversing the procedure used in the disassembly operation. Make sure the lifting gear dog (22) has the curved side up so the curve will contact the spindle nut (16) when the lever is lifted. The spindle nut should be adjusted, and the lever (28) put on so the dog (22) is not bearing on the spindle nut (16) until the lever is lifted to about the position shown in Figure 8-14. Replace the spindle nut cotter pin (17).
8.8.3
Assembling a Pressurizer PRV
Place the bellows assembly (8) on a clean flat surface with the disc holder (5) up. If a new bellows is installed, perform the same procedure on bellows as described if the valve was disassembled retaining spring compression. 1. Place the eductor (11) over the bellows assembly (8). 2. Assemble the disc ring (7) with the threads lubricated on the disc holder (5). The through holes in the disc holder (5) and the disc ring (7) must be in alignment. Assemble the disc insert (9) using the disc insert pin (10). Note: See caution in section on valve disassembly. If a new pin is installed, one end should be flared prior to assembly. 3. The adjusting ring (12) may then be screwed onto the eductor (11). 4. The assembly may now be turned over so the disc insert is down and the flange on the bellows assembly is up.
CAUTION: When placing this unit on a bench, make certain that the disc insert seat is protected from damage.
5. Place the bonnet adapter (15) on top of the bellows flange. 6. Lubricate and assemble the spindle (14) into the disc holder (5) until the threads drop into the undercut in the disc holder and the spindle rotates freely.
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7. Install the nozzle ring (3) on the nozzle (2) locating it approximately 1/32 inch above the seating surface of the nozzle (2). Final inspect and clean the nozzle and disc insert seating surface. 8. Lift the bellows, eductor, adjusting ring and bonnet adapter assembly straight up with the spindle (14) and lower it straight down into the body (1) until the disc ring (7) rests on the nozzle ring (3). 9. Install the lower spring washer (20), the spring (19), and the upper spring washer (20). 10. Install the bonnet (18) and assemble and tighten the nut (30) as described in the section on assembly with spring compression retained. 11. Lower the nozzle ring (3) by turning to the left (clockwise when facing set screw hole) until it is in the lowest free position, then lower the adjusting ring (12) until the lower edge is below the level of the nozzle seat.
NOTE: If difficulty is encountered in lowering the nozzle ring, lift up on the spindle (14) while lowering the nozzle ring.
12. Replace the adjusting bolt (29) turning it down until the length of the spindle (14) above the adjusting bolt (29) measurement is the same as before disassembly. Tighten the adjusting bolt nut (30) to lock the adjusting bolt (29).
NOTE: At this point, the valve can be bench tested if desired in accordance with the utility test procedure.
13. Adjust the nozzle and adjusting ring by following the procedure as described in assembly of the valve with spring compression retained. 14. Replace the cap (21), spindle nut (16), and lifting gear, etc., by following the procedure described in the paragraph on assembly with spring compression retained. 8.9 Disassembly and Assembly of MSSVs
The second valve used to perform a disassembly and assembly operation is a typical Crosby MSSV. The valve size is a 6-inch inlet, R orifice, 10-inch outlet Crosby Style HA-75-FN (full nozzle) with a set pressure of approximately 1200 psig. The valve is approximately 64 inches high with an approximate weight of 1550 lbs. The outline drawing of the valve and piece name and numbers are shown in Figure 8-16.
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Piece No.
Part Name
1" Approx.
1 2 3 4 5A 5B 6 7 8A 8B 10 11 12A 12B 12C 12D 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38
Body Nozzle Nozzle Ring Nozzle Set Screw Disc Holder Disc Bushing Disc Insert Disc Insert Pin Guide Guide Bearing Guide Ring Guide Ring Set Screw Spindle Point Spindle Rod Spindle Rod Pin Spindle Ball Spring Spring Washer (bottom) Spring Washer (top) Bearing Pin Bearing Bearing Adapter Adjusting Bolt Nut Bonnet Bonnet Stud Bonnet Stud Nut Cap Cap Set Screw Lever Lever Pin Lever Pin Cotter Fork Lever Fork Lever Pin Fork Lever Pin Cotter Spindle Nut Spindle Nut Cotter Adjusting Bolt Seal & Wire Data Plate Nameplate Identification Plate Drive Screw
C.G. Valve Only 14" Approx.
OUTLET
31 32 23 33 29 27 15 25 Lever Can Be Rotated 180 from Position Shown 24" MAX 34 28 29 30 19 24 18 17 16 13 12B 20
+1/4 -1/8 9 1/4 1/64
54" Approx. Height From outlet
19" MAX
14 21 22 49 38 37 36 35 8A 50 11 34
OUTLET 4
1/16
OUTLET 12C 12A 5B 5A 12D 10 7

See Note 4 5 5/8 Approx. 10" 300# ANSI STD. R.F. 16 Holes 1"-8 UNC-3B Equally Spaced on a 15-1/4 DIA B.C. And Straddling CL's 1-1/8 Min. Thd. Depth
8B
3 6 2 1 42
1/6 Approx. 1/8 6" DIA 1/64 8 1/2 DIA
12 3/4 1/8 DIA 10" DIA Concentric Separations
1/32
1/64 1/4
9 3/4
+1/4 -1/8
1" MAX
Concentric Separations
34" MIN Working Space
INLET
5 1/8 MIN
6" 1500# ANSI STD. RF. 12 Studs 1 3/8-8 UN-2A Equally Spaced on a 12-1/2 DIA E.C. And Straddling CL's
Figure 8-16 Typical Crosby MSSV
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8.9.1
General Information
When possible, remove the valve from the system before dismantling. In any case, there should be no system pressure when a valve is either dismantled in place or removed for shop repair.
8.9.2
MSSV Disassembly
The safety valve may be disassembled in two ways, either retaining spring compression (and, thereby, retaining the original set pressure) or not retaining spring compression. For either method, disassembly proceeds as described below. 8.9.2.1 Remove the Lifting Gear
To remove the cap (23), remove the forked lever pin (29) and forked lever (28) and the lever pin (26) and lever (25). Loosen the cap screws (24) and remove the cap. Remove the spindle nut cotter (32) and unthread the spindle nut (31). 8.9.2.2 Record Ring Settings
Remove the guide ring set screw (11) and nozzle ring set screw (4). Check the setting of the nozzle ring (3) by turning it to the right (counter clockwise) while counting the number of notches turned until it makes contact with the disc holder as shown in Figure 8-17. Record the number of notches. This location is given as a minus (-) notches from this contact position. The guide ring (10) should be turned to the right (counter clockwise) or left (clockwise) whichever is necessary to return it to its level position. The guide ring is in level position when the bottom face of the guide ring is level with the bottom face of the disc holder (5). This can be determined visually or with a metal rod as illustrated in Figure 8-17. The guide ring position is recorded as minus (-) (down) or plus (+) (up) notches from this level position.
NOTE: Confirm that as-found ring settings are identical to those stamped on the bonnet (see Figure 8-18a) and in plant documentation records.
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EPRI Licensed Material Safety and Relief Valve Testing and Maintenance Guide Disc Holder
Disc
N Notches down from touching Where, N = Factory setting stamped on the Bonnet Nozzle Ring Setting
Nozzle Ring
Cotter Pin Guide Ring
+ -
Level Position*
Disc Holder Steel Rod To Check Guide Ring Position
Guide Ring Level with Disc Holder

*Factory setting of Guide Ring Position (+ or -) Notches from Level stamped on Bonnet.
Figure 8-17 Illustrations of Nozzle Ring Setting and Guide Ring Level
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INSTALL HYDRAULIC JACKING DEVICE HERE NOZZLE RING AND ADJUSTING RING SETTINGS STAMPED HERE
1 2
HOUSING PISTON "O" RING "O" RING BACK-UP RING BACK-UP RING BONNET SPACER SPINDLE ADAPTER HYDRAULIC PUMP 1/4" HOSE BLEED HOLE
7 8
* 3 *
3A
14 6 2
3A 4A
* 4
THREE STEEL BLOCKS
4A
PISTON STROKE INDICATOR
5 6 7
3 4 1/4 18-NPT 1 26 27 5 20
* 8
14 VALVE SPINDLE VALVE BODY 20 BONNET 26 ADJUSTING BOLT 27 ADJUSTED BOLT NUT
*RECOMMENDED SPARE PART HYDRAULIC JACKING DEVICE
(a)
(b)
Figure 8-18 Illustration of MSSV (Jacked) and Location of Ring Setting Marking 8.9.2.3 Disassembling Retaining Spring Compression Using a Hydraulic Jacking Device
If the valve is to be reconditioned without retesting, the original set pressure can be retained by use of a hydraulic jacking device as shown in Figure 8-18. After removing the lifting gear and recording of the ring settings per Figure 8-16, disassembly retaining the spring compression is performed as follows: 1. Measure from the bottom face of the bottom spring washer to the bonnet flange top face and record the dimension. Cut three pieces of bar stock, minimum 50mm in diameter (approximately 2 inches) 3mm (1/8-inch) longer than the recorded dimension. These spacer blocks will be placed between the bottom spring washer and the bonnet flange after the spring has been compressed. 2. Position the jacking device assembly (see Figure 8-18b) by lifting it over the spindle (14) (Piece 12 on Figure 8-16) and lowering down onto bonnet (20).
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CAUTION: The piston (2) should be seated within the housing (1) before continuing. This seated position is reached when the first notch on the piston (2) is level with or below the top of the housing (1) as indicated in Figure 8-18b.
3. Lubricate the spindle threads with Never-Seez or an equivalent. Thread the spindle adapter (6) until it comes into contact with the jacking device assembly, and attach the hand-operated hydraulic pump (7) and hose (8). 4. To raise the valve spindle, apply pressure to the jacking device assembly with the hand-operated hydraulic pump. This activates the piston (2) which raises the lower spring washer that compresses the spring.
CAUTION: This device has a limited piston stroke that should not be exceeded. If the piston stroke is exceeded, the second notch on the piston (2) will be above the top of the housing (1) and hydraulic fluid will flow from the bleed hole located in the housing. If hydraulic fluid is flowing from the bleed hole but piston stroke has not been exceeded, the O-rings (3 and 3A) and the back-up rings (4 and 4A) should be inspected for wear or damage and replaced if necessary.
5. After the spring load has been taken up and the valve has been jacked approximately 1/8-inch, place three spacer blocks under the lower spring washer. 6. The jacking device can now be removed by releasing pressure in the pump and reversing the above procedure. 7. Referring to Figure 8-16, remove the guide ring set screw (11) and the nozzle ring set screw (4).
CAUTION: Never loosen the bonnet stud nuts before taking up the spring compression load with the spacer blocks.
8. Loosen and remove the bonnet stud nuts (22). There are two ways to remove the pieces from the valve body. They are as follows: Using a suitable lifting device, lift the bonnet and spring assembly vertically to clear the spindle.
CAUTION: The spring washers are fitted to each end of the spring. The spring and washers must be kept intact as a unit.
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The spindle assembly (12), disc holder (5A), guide (8A), guide ring (10), and disc insert (6) can be removed from the valve body as a complete unit by carefully lifting the spindle rod (an eye nut can be attached to the spindle rod end and used in conjunction with a hoist).
CAUTION: Do not permit any rocking motion of the spindle or any other parts while lifting them out of the body. Any rocking motion could damage the valve seats.
Lower the complete assembly onto a clean flat surface. Lift the spindle rod (12B) slightly to engage the disc holder threads and unscrew the spindle (12) from the disc holder (5A). Lift the spindle up and out of the guide assembly. Remove the guide ring (10) from the guide (8A). The disc insert (6) can be removed from the disc holder by removing the disc insert pin (7). Remove the nozzle ring (3) from the nozzle (2). When the valve is completely dismantled, examine all parts for signs of wear, damage, or corrosion to determine if any replacement parts are required. Particular care should be used to examine the inside of the guide, the outside of the disc holder, and the spindle surface that is guided by the guide for wear or scoring. 8.9.2.4 Disassembly (without Retaining Spring Compression)
After the lifting gear is removed and the ring settings are recorded as covered in an earlier paragraph, disassemble the valve without retaining the spring compression as follows: 1. Remove the spindle nut cotter (32), spindle nut (31), and cap (23). Measure the distance between the top of the bonnet and the top of the adjusting bolt and record this measurement. This measurement will be necessary when the valve is reassembled. 2. Release spring tension by loosening the adjusting bolt locknut (19) and then the adjusting bolt (33).
CAUTION: Never loosen the bonnet stud nuts before releasing the spring tension with the adjusting bolt.
3. Remove the guide ring set screw (11) and the nozzle ring set screw (4).
CAUTION: Nozzle and guide ring set screws are custom fitted to each valve and are not to be interchanged.
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4. Lift the bonnet and spring up to clear the spindle using caution to prevent the spring from falling out of the bonnet. Remove the spring and washers from the bonnet. Remove the adjusting bolt (33) and the adjusting bolt nut (19) from the bonnet and thoroughly clean the threads.
CAUTION: The spring washers are fitted to each end of the spring. The spring and washers must be kept intact as a unit.
Disassembly from this point proceeds as in the paragraphs covered in Section 8.9.2.3, Disassembly Retaining Spring Compression Using Hydraulic Jacking Device. 8.10 MSSV Assembly
8.10.1
General
Prior to any assembly operation, the valve seats should be relapped and other parts reconditioned, cleaned, lubricated, and then assembled. This is accomplished as follows: 1. Lap the valve seat per instructions. 2. Clean all parts thoroughly. A fine emery cloth or crocus cloth may be used to polish guiding and bearing surfaces and surfaces in intimate rubbing contact. Care must be taken to ensure that the critical dimensions are not affected. 3. Check all bearing surfaces before assembly to ensure that they are free of nicks or gouges on the surface. 4. Finally, clean parts with acetone or any other acceptable cleaner prior to assembly. The following areas should be lubricated before and/or during assembly with suitable lubricant. Nozzle-to-body threads Adjusting bolt and bonnet threads Spindle point threads Spindle ball Spindle rod threads Spring washer bevels Set screw threads All studs and nuts
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8.10.2
Assembly of Valve (Spring Compression Not Retained)
Refer to Figure 8-16. 1. Install the disc insert (6) into the disc holder (5). Install the disc insert pin (7) and bend the pin ends making certain that the pin cannot move in a manner that will allow either end to extend beyond the OD of the disc holder.
CAUTION: Care should be used in the assembly operation to insure against damage of the disc insert seat.
2. Screw the guide ring (10) onto the guide (8). Install the disc holder (5) in the guide. Lubricate the spindle point (12A) threads and spindle ball (12D). Insert the spindle point through the guide bearing and into the disc holder. Screw the spindle clockwise until it drops off the bottom thread of the disc holder, and the spindle ball is in contact with the disc bushing (5B). The spindle should spin freely. 3. Screw the nozzle ring (3) onto the nozzle (2). Leave the nozzle ring to 3mm (approximately 1/8 inch) above the nozzle seat. 4. Lift the assembly of spindle (12), disc holder (50), guide (8A), guide ring (10) and disc insert (6) into position over the valve body (1). Carefully lower the assembly into the body until the guide flange is seated flat on the top of the body and the face of the disc holder contacts the nozzle ring (3). Rotate the spindle to be sure the spindle ball (12D) is in contact with the disc bushing (5B). 5. Install the bearing (17) and bearing adapter (18) on the top spring washer (15). Lubricate the bearing adapter bevel and the bottom spring washer (14) bevel. Place the bottom spring washer in position in the bonnet. Position the spring (13) on the bottom spring washer, and place the top washer assembly on the spring. Strap the spring assembly to the bonnet to hold it in place. 6. Lubricate the adjusting bolt (33) threads. Screw the adjusting bolt locknut (19) onto the adjusting bolt all the way to the end of the adjusting bolt thread. Lubricate the bonnet (20) threads. Screw the adjusting bolt into the bonnet. Leave a 6 to 13mm (1/ 4- to 1/2-inch) gap between the bearing adapter and the adjusting bolt. 7. Lift the assembly of bonnet (20), spring (13) and spring washers (14 and 15) over the spindle (11). Carefully lower the assembly, guiding the spindle through the spring washers and adjusting the bolt (33). Position the bonnet over the body-to-bonnet studs (21). Lower the bonnet onto the guide (8A) taking care not to damage the stud threads. Screw the adjusting bolt upwards during this process, if necessary, to maintain a minimum 3mm (1/8-inch) gap between the adjusting bolt and the bearing adapter (18). Make sure the bonnet is fully seated on the guide. 8. Install the bonnet nuts (22) on the bonnet studs (21) and uniformly tighten in accordance with the recommended bolting procedure and torque values.
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CAUTION: After the bonnet nuts have been tightened, lift up the spindle as before (approximately 1 inch). Place a screwdriver in the nozzle ring set screw (4) hole and turn the nozzle ring to the left (clockwise) until the top edge of the nozzle ring is below the nozzle seating surface. Lower the spindle assembly slowly until it bottoms out. The nozzle and disc insert seating surfaces are now in intimate contact. Be sure the spindle ball is in contact with the disc bushing and not caught on the disc holder thread. This is done by rotating the spindle assembly clockwise.
9. Before tightening the adjusting bolt, rotate the spindle to be sure that it is free to move with the spring. This is done to ensure that there is no binding within the valve that could cause faulty operation. It also ensures that the spindle is not caught on the disc holder threads but is seated on the disc holder bushing. 10. Tighten the adjusting bolt until the distance between the top of the adjusting bolt and the top of the bonnet is the same as that recorded at the time of disassembly. Unless considerable lapping or machining has been done, the set pressure should be almost the same as before reconditioning. 11. Having recorded the ring positions at disassembly, follow the procedure for locating rings, discussed in Section 8.9.2.2 and shown in Figures 8-17 and 8-18, to return the rings to the recorded location. Lock the set screws in place making sure that the set screws are engaged in a notch and that the rings are free (have slight side to side movement). 12. Replace the lever and lever pin. Install the forked lever and spindle nut leaving approximately 1.5mm (approximately 1/16-inch) clearance between the spindle nut and forked lever. Make sure the clearance is adequate and that the spindle nut cotter pin is installed properly. Replace the cap top. 13. Protect the valve inlet and outlet and place in an area ready for the next operation.
8.10.3 Assembly of Valve (Spring Compression Retained) 1. Install the nozzle ring (93) onto the nozzle (2), leaving the nozzle ring about 1.5 to 3mm (1/16 to 1/8 inch) above the nozzle seating surface.
2. Install the bonnet assembly (including internal parts) into body bowl. 3. Install the bonnet stud nuts (22) on the bonnet studs (21) and uniformly tighten in accordance with the proper bolting procedure. Remove the spacer blocks from under the lower spring washer transferring the spring load to the valve seat. This is accomplished by repeating the procedure to remove the spacer blocks and then removing the jacking device in the assembly procedure.
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CAUTION: After the bonnet nuts have been tightened, lift up the spindle as before (approximately 1 inch). Place a screwdriver in the nozzle ring set screw (4) hole and turn the nozzle ring to the left (clockwise) until the top edge of the nozzle ring is below the nozzle seating surface. Lower the spindle assembly slowly until it bottoms out. The nozzle and disc insert seating surface are now in intimate contact. Be sure the spindle ball is in contact with the disc bushing and not caught on the disc holder thread. This is done by rotating the spindle assembly clockwise.
4. Having recorded the ring positions at disassembly, follow the procedure for locating rings discussed in Section 8.9.2.2 and shown in Figure 8-17 to return the rings to the recorded location. Lock the set screws in place making sure that the set screws are engaged in a notch and that the rings are free (have slight side-to-side movement). 5. Reinstall the cap, lever, and forked lever assembly. Install the spindle nut leaving approximately 1.5mm (1/16 inch) clearance between the spindle nut and forked lever. 8.11 Auxiliary PRVs
As discussed in Section 4, there are a variety of PRV manufacturers, valve sizes, and valve types used on auxiliary systems. This section reviews the disassembly and assembly of only one valve to illustrate that the maintenance of this valve is similar to the previous valves discussed, but also dissimilar, requiring that the person performing this activity follows the manufacturers instructions. Valves on auxiliary systems are usually flanged and easy to remove from the system for maintenance and testing. In this section, disassembly and assembly of a Crosby 3/4-inch inlet, D orifice, 1-inch outlet Style JB-TD valve used on gas service is discussed. The valve has a set pressure of approximately 70 psig and is approximate 16.25 inches high with a weight of 32 lbs. The outline drawing of the valve and its piece names and numbers are shown in Figure 8-19.
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38 39 31 30 34 29 35 32 33 28 16 15 17 16 18 19 5D 13 5A 5B 7 40 4 23 3 1 2 52 27 36 37 14A 20 21 41 40
Piece No.
Part Name
1 2 3 4 5A 5B 5D 6 7 8 13 14A 14B 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 23 24 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 49 50 51 52
Body Nozzle Nozzle Ring Set Screw Bellows Disc Holder Bellows Adapter Plug Disc Insert Disc Insert & Ring Pin Disc Ring Guide Spindle Spindle Ball Spring Spring Washer Bonnet Bonnet Stud Bonnet Stud Nut Adjusting Bolt Adjusting Bolt Nut Set Screw Gasket Bellows Adapter Gasket Guide Gasket Cap Cap Gasket Dog Cam Dog Cam Bearing Dog Cam Bearing Gasket O-Ring Lever Lever Pin Lever Spacer Spindle Nut Spindle Nut Cotter Cap Plug Cap Plug Gasket Seal & Wire Seal Clip Test Rod Nameplate Identification Plate Drive Screw Inlet Stud
Figure 8-19 Crosby Style JB-TD PRV
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8.11.1
General Information
When possible, remove the valve from the system before dismantling. In any case, there should be no system pressure when a valve is either disassembled in place or removed for shop repairs. Several flat metal gaskets are employed for sealing joints. Care must be exercised during disassembly not to damage or lose these gaskets as they can be reused. Gasket locations can be determined by referring to the assembly drawing. Spring washers are custom fitted to each end of the spring. The spring and its washers should be kept intact as a unit.
CAUTION: To ensure proper valve operation, care must be taken to accurately measure and record the adjusting ring settings (nozzle ring, guide ring, or guide and ring).
8.11.2 Disassembling Auxiliary PRVs 1. The first operation in the disassembly procedure is to determine the position of the nozzle ring. The level position of the nozzle ring (3) is when the ring is in contact with the disc ring (8). Therefore, its operating position always has a negative value because its movement is away from the disc ring.
2. Determine the position of the nozzle ring (3) by removing the set screw (4). Use a screwdriver or similar tool to engage the notches on the nozzle ring through the set screw hole. While counting the notches, move the nozzle ring counter clockwise as viewed from the top of the valve until the ring stops moving. Record the number of notches moved and locate the nozzle ring in the same position when reassembling the valve. 3. Remove the cap (27) and the lifting gear assembly by first unscrewing the dog cam bearing (30) while holding the lever (33). Unscrew the cap (27). 4. Before removing the spindle nut (36), take a measurement from the bottom face of the nut to the top face of the bonnet (17). Record this measurement and use it when reassembling the valve to obtain the same location of the spindle nut (see Figure 820a). 5. Before loosening the adjusting bolt nut (21), take a measurement from the top face of the nut to the top face of the adjusting bolt (20). Record this measurement and use it when reassembling the valve to obtain the approximate set pressure (see Figure 8-20b).
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Spindle Nut
Record Measurement
Adjusting Bolt
Record Measurement
Figure 8-20 Measurement for Spindle Nut and Adjusting Bolt
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CAUTION: Release the spring load by loosening the adjusting bolt nut (21) and then the adjusting bolt (20) by turning them counter clockwise before loosening the bonnet stud nuts.
6. Remove the bonnet stud nuts (19) holding the bonnet (17) to the body (1). Lift the bonnet up to clear the spindle (14) and spring (15). Be sure that the bellows adapter flange (5D) is not stuck in the bonnet. 7. Remove the spring (15) with its spring washers (16) from the spindle (14) and keep them as a unit. 8. Lift as a unit the spindle (14), bellows assembly (5), disc insert (6), disc insert and ring pin (7), and disc ring (8) out of the guide (13). 9. The spindle (14) can be separated from the assembly by screwing it out of the disc holder (5B) using a slight upward force to engage the disc holder threads. 10. The disc holder (5B), disc insert (6), and disc ring (8) are held together by means of the disc insert and ring pin (7). To remove the disc insert for lapping or replacement, it is necessary to drive the pin out to separate the pieces. 11. Visually inspect the seating surface of the disc for scratches, nicks, or indentations caused by foreign matter in the service fluid. The seating surface should be lapped in accordance with the procedures described in Section 8.4.1. 12. Remove the guide (13) from the body (1). 13. Remove the nozzle ring (3) by screwing it off the nozzle (2). 14. Unless the seat on the nozzle (2) is severely damaged, it will not be necessary to remove the nozzle from the body (1). If repair is necessary, the nozzle seat can usually be lapped in place. To recondition the seat, it may be easier to remove the nozzle 15. Visually inspect the seating surface of the nozzle for scratches, nicks, or indentations caused for foreign matter in the service fluid. The seating surface should have a mirror finish. If the nozzle seat requires machining or lapping, it will be necessary to remove the nozzle from the body (1) by unscrewing it. Remove the inlet studs (52) before unscrewing the nozzle. The seating surface should be lapped in accordance with the procedures described in Section 8.4.1. 16. If it is necessary to replace the O-ring in the cap and lever assembly, remove the lever pin (34) and back out the dog cam bearing (30).
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8.11.3
General
Assembling Auxiliary PRVs
Prior to any assembly operation, the valve seats should be relapped and other parts reconditioned, cleaned, lubricated, and then assembled. This is accomplished as follows: 1. Thoroughly clean all parts by an approved cleaning method. A fine emery cloth or crocus cloth may be used to clean guiding surfaces and surfaces in intimate rubbing contact. Care must be exercised to insure that the dimensions of these surfaces are not affected. 2. Examine all gasket sealing surfaces as well as the gaskets themselves. If necessary, polish sealing surfaces and replace defective gaskets. 3. The disc and nozzle seating surfaces should be examined for nicks or marks that could effect valve seating. If these surfaces are not flat and free from defects, the surfaces should be lapped in accordance with the manufacturers recommended procedures. 4. The following areas should be lubricated prior to assembly: 1) on the bonnet and cap stud and nut threads as well as the washer face of the nuts, use Never-Seez (pure nickel special number 165) nuclear grade or equivalent; on all locations, excluding those specified in the assembly procedure, use Dow Corning 41 or equivalent.
8.11.4
Assembly
The assembly drawing for the particular valve being assembled should be on hand. Assembly is essentially the reverse of disassembly, but certain steps and precautions must be observed.
CAUTION: To ensure proper valve operation, care must be taken to accurately set the adjusting rings (nozzle ring) to the measurement recorded during disassembly. If the correct setting of the adjusting rings is questionable for any reason, the valve document package should be consulted. If the document package is not available or further difficulty is encountered, contact the manufacturer.
1. If the nozzle was removed for lapping, lubricate the nozzle threads and the nozzle backface. Screw the nozzle into the body and tighten by hand until the nozzle backface is firmly seated. Lubricate and install the inlet studs (52). 2. Screw the nozzle ring (3) onto the nozzle (2) until the seating plane of the nozzle extends above the guide diameter of the nozzle ring. 3. Place the disc insert (6) in the disc holder (5B) and install the disc insert pin (7). Place the disc ring on the disc holder (5B).
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4. Lubricate both sides of the guide gasket (26) and place on the body (1). Lower the guide (13) into the body (1). 5. Lubricate both sides of the bellows adaptor gasket (24) and place on the top of the guide (13). Lower the bellows and disc holder assembly into the body taking care to align the disc ring (8) into the nozzle ring (3). 6. Lubricate the spindle ball and install the spindle (14) into the back end of the disc holder (5B). 7. Lubricate the spring washer beveled bearing surfaces and install the spring (15) and spring washer (16) on the spindle. 8. Lower the bonnet (17) into place using care to prevent any damage to the seats or spindle. The bonnet must be located and seated on the bellows adaptor flange (5D) and must be evenly tightened down as follows: 9. With the bonnet in place, lubricate the stud threads, nut threads, and nut washer faces with an approved thread lubricant. 10. Install the nuts on the studs finger-tight. 11. Tighten the nuts in the sequence shown in Figure 8-21 below to approximately onehalf the minimum torque value shown on the data sheet drawing. Repeat the same sequence of tightening to 0.75 times the minimum required torque value. Then, starting with the number 1 nut, tighten each nut in order in a clockwise or counter clockwise direction to a value no greater than the maximum torque value shown on the data sheet drawing.
1 6 4 3 4 2 2 5 1 3
Figure 8-21 Typical Bonnet Assembly Torque Sequence 12. Lubricate the adjusting bolt (20) threads and radius that contact the upper spring washer bearing surface. Lubricate the adjusting bolt nut (21) threads and bearing surfaces and screw the two parts together. Install both parts in the bonnet (17). Tighten the adjusting bolt to its approximate original position. 13. Adjust the nozzle ring to its original position. 14. Lubricate the set screw gasket (23) and install the set screw (4) and gasket (23). Care must be taken to engage one of the slots in the nozzle ring. The set screw must engage but not bear on the nozzle ring.
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15. Screw the spindle nut (36) onto the spindle (14) to its approximate original position. Install the spindle nut cotter pin (37) and bend the tabs. 16. Lubricate both sides of the cap gasket (28) and place on the bonnet. 17. Lubricate the threads on the cap and screw the cap (27) onto the bonnet (17). 18. Lubricate both sides of the cap plug gasket (39) and install the cap plug gasket and cap plug (38). 19. Install the O-ring (32) in the dog cam (29). Slide the dog cam bearing (30) over the Oring followed by the lever pin spacer (38). Slide the lever (33) over the dog cam (29) and pin the assembly. Lubricate the dog cam bearing gasket (31) and slip the dog cam (29) into the cap (27). Put the lever in the exact vertical position and tighten the dog cam bearing. 20. The spindle nut (36) may need to be adjusted at this point. The dog cam (29) must not bear on the spindle nut when the lever is in the vertical position but the valves must open when the lever is rotated upward. The valve is now ready for test. Partial disassembly may be necessary during the test sequence to allow for adjustments.
8.11.5
Troubleshooting
Tables 8-10a and 8-10b show typical problems and corrective actions for auxiliary relief valves: Table 8-10a Operational Problems for Auxiliary Relief Valves
Problem Set pressure too high or too low Set pressure verification Valve will not close Overpressure too high, reseat pressure too low Possible Cause Set pressure not correctly set Loose adjusting bolt nut Dog/spindle nut interference Ring(s) not properly adjusted Corrective Action Reset valve Reset valve and tighten adjusting bolt locknut Adjust spindle nut Reset ring(s) to as-shipped position
8-69
Table 8-10b Seat Leak Problems for Auxiliary Relief Valves

Problem Excessive leakage Possible Cause Dog/spindle nut interference Foreign matter between seats Corrective Action Adjust spindle nut Operate valve with lifting lever at a pressure no less than 75% of valve set pressure Relap seats or replace pieces Repair or replace pieces (nozzle and/or disc) Disassemble, then properly reassemble Replace gasket Retorque bonnet stud nuts
Damaged seats Seats not properly lapped Bonnet not positioned correctly on guide or body Body-to-bonnet leakage Damaged gasket Unequal torquing of bonnet stud nuts
8.12
Summary
In this maintenance section of the guide, a broad overview of the maintenance activities of PRVs is provided. Hopefully, the guide has provided enough information for the reader to understand the importance of a maintenance program and the critical part it plays to assure satisfactory performance of PRVs. It can only reiterate how important it is to use the valve manufacturer as the primary source for information and for personnel to apply and use the information correctly.
8-70
9
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL QUALIFICATIONS
9.1 Codes and Standards for Training The codes are not specific as to all the elements necessary for an adequate personnel training and qualification program for safety valve testing and maintenance personnel. The individual facility is allowed to develop and implement their own training program. Subsequent sections will outline the basic elements of an adequate training and qualification program. The addition and addenda of ASME Section XI applicable to the plants inservice testing program plan ultimately determines whether OM-1-Appendix I, OM-1-Part-13 or ASMEPTC 25.3 (1988) are used as the basis for the pressure valve relief testing and training requirements. Later editions (1989) of the Code refer the user to OM-1-ISTC and OM-1 Appendix I to prescribe testing frequencies and requirements. For earlier editions of the Code, both Section XI and PTC-25.3 must be used. Utility personnel should also refer to their technical specification requirements to determine any additional considerations above and beyond code requirements. Additionally, when using Appendix I, personnel should recognize the limitations described in the document and consider other tests or procedures to verify the operability of PRDs. Appendix I is not intended to demonstrate conformance with design requirements or verify all aspects of pressure relief operation. OM-1-Part-13 also provides recommendations for testing of PORVs that are not required for system overpressure protection and not tested according to OM-1-Appendix I. Note: ASME PTC-25.3 has been revised as ASME PTC-25 in 1994.
9.1.1 PTC-25.3 Training and Qualification Requirements PTC-25.3 (1988) in the Code introduction states that it covers the methods and procedures to determine relieving capacity and other operating characteristics required for certification. It does not identify specific training requirements for personnel conducting maintenance or testing on safety or relief valves. However, stringent responsibilities and accountabilities are identified for the testing supervisor certification and can be used as a guide for maintenance personnel. For example, the person supervising the testing is solely responsible for all aspects of the testing process and should be present at all times during the test.
PTC-25.3 does require that the person supervising the test must have the following education and experience: A formal education in thermodynamics and fluid mechanics At least 2 years practical experience in fluid flow measurement
9-1
Experience in test supervision In addition, the supervisor should have sufficient training to ensure that: All who are involved in taking readings, making pressure and temperature adjustments, or any other function that affects test accuracy are fully informed as to the correct method of performing such tests The written test procedures are followed All instruments used in the test are properly calibrated Sign and date the test results, thereby verifying to the best of the testers knowledge that the tests are accurate and were conducted in accordance with written test procedures
9.1.2 OM-1 Training and Qualification Requirements The valve owner is responsible for the qualifications of personnel who perform testing and maintenance when conducting activities within the scope of ASME Section XI, OM-1, Appendix I. Testing and maintenance shall be performed in accordance with the owners QA program. This appendix also describes inspections and examination methods that may require other qualifications and certifications to satisfy the owners QA program.
Additionally, the test supervisor shall have adequate training to ensure that: Personnel involved in recording data, making adjustments, or performing any function that affects the accuracy of the test results are informed of the correct methods of performing such functions Instrument calibrations are current Written procedures used to conduct testing are complied with Test results are signed and dated to certify that the tests are accurate and were performed in accordance with the written test procedure 9.2 The NBBI The National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors (NBBI), located in Columbus, OH, is a non-profit organization comprised of the Chief Inspectors of the jurisdictions throughout the U.S. and Canada. Its primary objective is to promote boiler and pressure vessel safety through the administration and enforcement of a uniform set of laws, rules, and regulations covering all aspects of boiler and pressure vessel design, installation, operation, and maintenance. To that end, the Executive Committee of the NBBI authorized the development of rules and procedures for the repair and testing of PRDs installed on ASME Code boilers or pressure vessels. The first set of PRD rules and procedures was issued on January 26, 1977, and has evolved into the current revision of NB-65, NBBI PRV Repair Symbol, Administrative Rules and Procedures. NB-65 applies to the repair of NBBI capacity certified ASME Code Section I (V stamped), Section IV (HV marked), and Section VIII (UV stamped) PRVs.
9-2
The rules and procedures of NB-65 may be used as a guide and/or extended to apply to the repair of ASME Code Section III, Class 1, 2, or 3 PRDs that have been capacity certified by the National Board. The NR stamp may also be required when repairing and testing ASME Section III PRDs. A copy of NB-65 can be obtained from the NBBI at 1055 Crupper Avenue, Columbus, OH, 43229-1183, USA.
9.2.1 NB-65 Training and Personnel Qualifications NB-65 provides rules and procedures for the training and qualification of personnel involved in the repair and testing of PRDs. The following key elements are prescribed:
Indoctrination Training Qualification Certification Evaluation Documentation It is the responsibility of the repair organization to ensure that their personnel are knowledgeable and qualified within the scope of repairs to be conducted). The repair organization is responsible for providing a written in-house training program that establishes the training objectives and the method for evaluating training effectiveness. Minimum training objectives shall include: Applicable ASME Code requirements Responsibilities within the organizations QC system Knowledge of the technical aspects and mechanical skills for the applicable position held The repair organization is responsible for establishing the minimum qualifications for the positions within the organization as they directly relate to PRV repair and testing. ANSI-N45.2.6 and USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.58 can provide the basis for an adequate personnel certification program. Documentation of the evaluation and acceptance of each individuals qualification is required. The repair organization shall also annually document and review personnel qualifications to verify proficiency as well as compliance with the certificate holders QC system. The review shall include training records, documented evidence of work performed, and, when necessary, monitoring job performance.
9.2.2 Repair Facility Certification Some state laws require certification of the safety and relief valve repair facilities.
9-3
The jurisdiction in which the facility is located determines the necessity of obtaining and maintaining the VR or NR symbol stamp. Utilities are encouraged to contact their chief boiler and pressure vessel inspector to verify applicable requirements for nuclear facilities. Authorization to use the VR or NR symbol stamp is granted when a Certificate of Authorization is issued by the National Board. The certificate indicates the authorization to repair ASME Section I, III, IV, and/or VIII valves as applicable pursuant to the certificate holders QC system. The certificate holders QC system designates the scope and type of valve repairs, the location where the repairs are to be conducted (shop or both shop and field) and test media. The QC system must specifically address special processes such as machining, welding, post-weld heat treatment, and NDE. Additionally, the types and size of valves, pressure ranges and other limitations, such as engineering capabilities and test facilities, are addressed. The VR symbol stamp may only be applied to valves that are: Stamped with the ASME V, UV, or NV code symbol and have been capacity certified by the National Board Disassembled, inspected, and repaired by the repair certificate holder such that the valves condition and performance are equivalent to the standards for new valves
CAUTION: Utilities located in jurisdictions requiring the use of the VR symbol stamp should note that a PRD meeting all as-found OM-1 Appendix I test requirements may not be acceptable for return to service until the second condition is met.
9.3 Site Training and Personnel Qualifications NB-65 provides an effective training and qualification program that utilities should consider using as a basis for training personnel involved in the repair and testing of PRDs. For utilities in jurisdictions requiring the VR symbol stamp, the training and qualification program is mandatory. Some jurisdictions may allow the use of 10CFR50 Appendix B and its referenced standards because of the generally more restrictive nature of federal regulations enforced by the USNRC. Additionally, some jurisdictions defer regulation of the facility exclusively to the USNRC.
9.3.1 Program Elements Elements of effective site training programs for personnel involved in the repair and testing of PRDs should include consideration of the factors cited in NB-65. Several utilities have attended seminars conducted by the NBBI and various valve manufacturers as part of their training programs. This supplemental training is especially effective for personnel engaged in the repair and engineering aspects of PRDs. The NBBI encourages repair organizations to attend these seminars to supplement in-house training programs.
Program elements should include the following key areas:
9-4
Training of personnel in the applicable ASME Code requirements, responsibilities within the organizations QA program and knowledge of the technical aspects, and mechanical skills required to repair and test PRDs. Documentation of training including the date of training, attendees, instructor(s), training hours, and the topics covered. Qualification and certification of personnel including the objective and subjective attributes used by the utility to qualify and certify personnel to repair and test PRDs. Documentation includes the following: The utility program should provide documented training to craft and engineering personnel performing PRD repair and testing. Training materials should be reviewed annually for adequacy and revised when appropriate. Operating Experience Review Program items should be routed to the training department for inclusion in training material when appropriate. Craft and technician qualifications should be maintained and reviewed to ensure that only trained individuals are performing PRD repair and testing. Although craft qualifications are required to be reviewed prior to a work task assignment, it is suggested that the craft and technician qualifications be reviewed at least 12 weeks prior to any safety and relief valve testing. This allows time for training departments to conduct any relevant additional training. A list of qualified technical, maintenance, or engineering management personnel should be maintained and periodically reviewed to ensure that only trained individuals supervise setpoint testing, review and approve test procedures or disposition the results of tests. A successful site training program for maintenance personnel, engineering, and other personnel should ensure that: Craft and engineering personnel who perform safety valve maintenance and testing receive training commensurate with their duties. Existing valve training classes are reviewed for adequacy in dealing with safety valve issues and revised as appropriate. Craft qualification for safety valve related tasks are reviewed to ensure that only craftsmen trained for the tasks are used. Test procedures should list engineering or other personnel who are qualified to supervise setpoint testing and sign-off test acceptance. Utilities should also consider training requirements for stores and QA personnel in their programs. Shipping and handling practices, proper storage of PRDs, and receipt inspection procedures and methods can directly impact a PRD testing program.
9.3.2 Training Aids Facilities to support safety and relief valve testing and maintenance training are key considerations in obtaining safe, efficient, and high-quality testing and maintenance
9-5
training. Considerations for these facilities and training aid equipment should include the following: Training class size (4 to 6 personnel) Type of training (for example, lecture or hands-on) Use of mockups Environmental controls Services (for example, electricity, air, water, gas, etc.) Training equipment Training mockups can also be used for test procedure validation and ALARA concerns when preparing for critical work on valves.
9.3.3 On-the-Job Training (OJT) This aspect of an individuals training is normally done in the plant as part of day-today work activities. OJT provides hands-on experience that cannot be gained from a textbook or training class. It is essential that skills embodied in experienced craftsmen be passed along to lesser skilled craft personnel. A formal OJT training program assures that skills-of-the-craft are not lost. Accordingly, maintenance department supervisors and selected qualified and experienced craftsmen are directly involved in OJT.
OJT should be conducted in accordance with formally defined training programs that specifically identify items the trainee must accomplish. Knowledge requirements for each item as well as what the trainee must do (perform, simulate, observe, or discuss) should be defined. OJT should be conducted by personnel who have successfully qualified as OJT trainers. Personnel with maintenance experience in the training department, as well as personnel in the maintenance department itself, may be used as OJT trainers. These trainers should have good verbal communication skills, technical knowledge, and the ability to effectively provide trainees with hands-on experience. It is incumbent that the OJT trainer promptly update the craft personnels training records to assure that the OJT training is documented so that the craft can be assigned work tasks without lost time searching for qualification records. When trainees perform maintenance on equipment, a qualified OJT instructor should observe the work so that the trainee properly accomplishes the activity and understands how to avoid errors that could affect personnel safety or adversely impact the plant. The cognizant manager should establish a policy that allows trainees to independently perform maintenance only on station equipment for which they are qualified. This policy should specify how supervisors are to ensure a trainee has completed needed training requirements before the craftsman is assigned a task to independently perform on that equipment.
9-6
Prior to a craftsman being allowed to perform independently, he/she must be certified as qualified. This certification requires that the following be addressed: Verify that all designed training is complete. Conduct or evaluate the results of a final written, oral, or practical demonstration examination and evaluate the recommendations of the individual supervisor. Resolve all discrepancies concerning the craftsmans qualifications. Provide formal qualification approval and documentation. In conjunction with the Site Training Department requirements, the qualified OJT trainer maintains an up-to-date record of each craftsmans OJT training experiences and provides OJT records to the Site Training Department. Without these training records, the craftsman will not be allowed to independently perform required facility maintenance.
9-7
10
INDUSTRY DATA AND CONTACTS
The main purpose of this section is to provide a reference for engineers and maintenance supervisors to use as a source book for specific contacts and data applicable to safety and relief valves used in nuclear power plants. The information contained in this section is for reference only and in no way constitutes an endorsement of their services by EPRI or NMAC. There may also be other manufacturers/suppliers not listed here. Maintenance and utility personnel requiring specific testing and valve information should obtain that information by contacting the test facility or valve manufacturer. This section also provides a listing of contacts for valve testing facilities, valve manufacturers, and ALD manufacturers. In addition, applicable data and applications for unique safety relief valve types are identified. Utilities that have testing facilities can provide valuable data and information and should be contacted. The testing facilities identified offer a wide variety of testing options, steam and fluid conditions to satisfy code testing requirements. 10.1 Safety and Relief Valve Testing Facilities
Testing is a requisite to confirm the reliability of primary safety and secondary system safety, safety relief, and relief valves.
10-1
Table 10-1 below identifies domestic testing facilities that have a broad range of testing capabilities from full-flow testing to limited volume. It is recommended that the specific facility be contacted for their total test capability. Table 10-1 Safety and Relief Valve Testing Facilities
Wyle Laboratories 1841 Hillside Avenue Norco, CA 91760 (909) 737-0871 Duke Power Company Marshall Steam Station Terrell, NC (704) 875-4866 National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors National Board Testing Laboratory 7437 Pingue Drive Worthington, OH 43085 (614) 888-8320 Wyle Laboratories P. O. Box 077777 7800 Highway 20 W Huntsville, AL (205) 837-4411 Crosby Valve and Gage Company 43 Kendrick Street Wrentham, MA 02093 (508) 384-312
10.2
Safety and Relief Valve Manufacturers
Table 10-2 identifies valve manufacturers who are currently supplying and servicing safety and relief valves in the United States. Valves from other manufacturers may be found in some nuclear power plants in the US. However, these companies are either no longer providing services, have contracted with other manufacturers to provide service for them, or their product has been acquired by one of the manufacturers listed in Table 10-2.
10-2
Table 10-2 Safety and Relief Valve Manufacturers

Control Components Inc. 22591 Avendia Empres Rancho Santa Maria, CA (714) 858-1877 Crosby Valve and Gage Company 43 Kendrick Street Wrentham, MA 02093 (508) 384-3121 (Also manufacture and support Garrett PORV) Fisher Controls Company 205 South Center Street Marshalltown, IA 50158 (515) 754-3011 Target Rock Corp. 1966 E. Broadhollow Road E. Farminghdale, NY (516) 293-3800 Dikkers (out of business) Contact: GE Nuclear Energy 175 Curtner Avenue Mail Code 753 San Jose, CA 95125 (408)-925-1000 (Contact GE site representative, if available) Copes-Vulcan P. O. Box 577 Lake City, PA 16432 (814) 774-1500 Dresser Industrial Valve Operation P. O. Box 1430 Highway 71 North Alexandria, LA 71309-1430 (318) 640-2250
Masoneilan 85 Bodwell Street Avon, MA 02322 (508) 586-4600 Anderson Greenwood P. O. Box 944 Stafford, TX 77497 (713) 274-4400
10-3
10.3
ALD Manufacturers
The use of ALDs is becoming an important maintenance tool in the ISI programs of many facilities. This versatile testing tool allows for testing in non-hostile environments, does not affect subsequent valve performance, minimizes testing expenses and manpower requirements, and fully complies with the accuracy requirements of the ASME OM-1 Code. Table 10-3 is a listing of ALD suppliers. Table 10-3 ALD Suppliers
ALD System (or Trade Name) Trevitest Supplier Furmanite Incorporated 2645 International Parkway Virginia Beach, VA 23452 (804) 427-1991 Dresser Industrial Valve P. O. Box 1530 Highway 71 North Alexandria, LA 71309-1430 (318) 640-6046 Crosby Valve & Gage Co. 43 Kendrick Street Wrentham, MA 02093 (508) 384-3121 A.V.K. Industries 8640 Phillips Highway Jacksonville, FL 32256 (904) 733-9887
Electronic Valve Testor (E.V.T.)
Set Pressure Verification Device (S.P.V.D.) Air Set Pressure Device (ASPD) Hydraulic Set Pressure Device (HSPD) Ultrastar
10-4
10.4 Safety and Relief Valve Types, Applications, and Distribution The tables that follow are designed to provide information on safety and relief valve installations at various domestic and international nuclear power plants. They provide an overview of a products installed base for a particular manufacturer. Table 10-4 Pressurizer Safety Valves and Distribution in PWR Plants
Size* Valve Manufacturer Crosby Valve & Gage Co. Model HB-BP-86 3 3 4 6 4 6 4 6 6 2.5 2.5 3 3 6 6 Inlet Orifice K K2 K2 K2 M1 M1 M M N K No.3 No.4 No.5 N 3.513 in2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 6 6 6 6 8 6 Outlet No. of Plants 3 2 6 2 3 6 1 38 6 1 11 3 5 17 1
Dresser Industries
31709KA 31739A 31749A 31759A 31709NA 69C
Target Rock Corp.
*Inlet and outlet sizes are nominal pipe sizes in inches.
10-5
Table 10-5 Power-Operated Relief Valve Distribution in PWR Plants

Valve Manufacturer Control Components Copes-Vulcan Model Drag Valve Globe D-100-160 with 17-4PH cage and plug Globe D-100-160 with 316 w/Stellite plug and 17-4PH cage Globe D-100-160 with 316 w/Stellite plug and Haynes #25 cage Crosby Valve & Gage Co. HPV-SN Size* 3-in NPS 2-in NPS No. of Plants 4 13
3-in NPS
23
3-in NPS
1-3/8-in bore 1-1/2-in bore 1-3/32-in bore 1-5/32-in bore 1-5/16-in bore 1-3/8-in bore 3-in NPS 3-in inlet 8-in outlet 3-in inlet 6-in outlet 2-in NPS 2-in NPS 2-1/2-in inlet 4-in outlet
2 1 6 3 11 1 3 1
Dresser Industries
31533VX-30
31533VX Fisher Controls Co. Garrett Pneumatic Systems Division (Product line acquired by Crosby Valve & Gage Company) SS-103-SS-95 Angle Straight-through
** 9 1 2
Masoneilan MUESCO Controls, Inc. Target Rock Corp.
20,000 series 70-18-9-DRTX 80X-006
*NPS is the valve's nominal pipe size. **Data not available.
10-6
Table 10-6 Crosby MSSV and PSV Installations at Domestic and International Utilities
Utility Station Style/ Model # HB-BP-86 HB-BP-86 HB-BP-86 Size Reactor MFG (note 4) W CE W Type Reactor and Rating 829 MW BWR 858 MW PWR 900 MW each PWR 665 MW 1120 MW 1120 MW BWR 1078 MW each PWR 1040 MW each PWR 582 MW PWR 265 MW Loop
Alabama Power Co. Entergy Operations Inc. Carolina Power & Light
Joseph M. Farley Units 1 & 2 Arkansas Nuclear Unit 2 Shearon Harris Units 1 & 2 Robinson Unit 2
6M16 6M6 6M6
PSV PSV MSSV PSV MSSV PSV MSSV PSV PSV MSSV
HB-BP-86 HB-BP-86 HB-BP-86 HB-BP
4K26 6M6 6M6 6R10
W W W GE
Commonwealth Edison
Braidwood Units 1 & 2 Byron Units 1 & 2 LaSalle Units 1 & 2 Zion Units 1 & 2
HA-65
6R10
MSSV
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Consolidated Edison
Haddam Neck Unit 1 Indian Point Unit 1 (Retired from Service in 1980) Indian Point Unit 2
HB-BP-86 HA-65
3K6 6R10
PSV MSSV PSV MSSV
--
--
BW
HB-BP-86
4M6
W GE
PWR 873 MW BWR 63 MW PWR 740 MW PWR 50 MW PWR 860 MW PWR 833 MW each
PSV MSSV MSSV MSSV PSV MSSV MSSV
Consumers Power
Big Rock Point Unit 1 Palisades Unit 1 HA-65 HB-BP-86 HA-65 6R10 6M6 6R10
CE W BW
Duke Power Co.
McGuire Units 1 & 2 Oconee Units 1 & 2
Duquesne Light Co.
Beaver Valley Units 2
HB-BP-86 HA-65
6M16 6R10
PSV MSSV
10-7
Table 10-6 Crosby MSSV and PSV Installations at Domestic and International Utilities (cont.)
Utility Station Style/ Model # -Size Reactor MFG (note 4) W Type Reactor and Rating 60 MW (pre-code) PWR 839 MW each 666 MW Loop
Shippingport (to be decommissioned in 1984) Florida Power & Light Co. St. Lucie Units 1 & 2 Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 Georgia Power Co. Gulf States Utilities Co. Houston Lighting & Power Co. and Others Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. Wolf Creek Operating Co-op Entergy Operations Inc. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. Northeast Utilities Northern States Power Co. Omaha Public Power District Pacific Gas & Electric Co. Power Authority of the State of New York Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. Vogtle Units 1 & 2 River Bend Units 1 & 2 South Texas Project Units 1 & 2 Donald C. Cook Units 1 & 2
--
PSV
HB-BP-86
3K6
CE
MSSV
HB-BP-86 HB-BP-86 HA-65 HB-BP
4K26 6M6 6R10 6M6
W W GE
PSV PSV MSSV
BWR 940 MW each 1250 MW
MSSV
HB-BP-86
6N8
PSV
1054 MW and 1094 MW PWR 1150 MW PWR 1104 MW PWR 825 MW 1150 MW 520 MW 478 MW 1084 MW and 1106 MW PWR 965 MW BWR 1050 MW each
PSV
Wolf Creek Unit 1 Waterford Unit 3 Maine Yankee Unit 1 Millstone Unit 3 Prairie Island Units 1 & 2 Fort Calhoun Unit 1 Diablo Canyon Units 1 & 2 Indian Point Unit 3 Susquehanna Units 1 & 2
HB-BP-86 HA-65-FN
6M6 8T 10 X 10
W CE
PSV MSSV MSSV
HA-65 HB-BP-86 HB-BP-86 HB-BP-86 HB-BP-86 6M6 6M16 3K6 6M6
CE W W CE W
MSSV PSV PSV PSV PSV
HB-BP-86 HA-65
6M6 6R10
PSV MSSV
HB-BP-65
6R10
GE
MSSV
10-8
Utility Station Style/ Model # HB-BP-86 HA-65 Size Reactor MFG (note 4) W Type Reactor and Rating PWR 1090 MW and 1115 MW PWR 1150 MW each PWR 490 MW 900 MW PWR 1100 ME each 436 MW Loop
Public Service Electric & Gas Co.
Salem Units 1 & 2
6M6 6R10
PSV MSSV
New Hampshire Yankee Rochester Gas & Electric Co. South Carolina Electric Co. Southern California Edison Co. Southern California Edison Co. and San Diego Gas & Electric Co. Tennessee Valley Authority
Seabrook Units 1 & 2 (note 1) Ginna Unit 1 Virgil C. Summer Unit 1 San Onofre units 2 & 3 San Onofre Unit 1
HB-BP-86 HA-65 HB-BP-86 HC-65 HB-BP-86 HA-65
6M6 6R10 4K26 6R10 6M6 6R10
PSV MSSV PSV MSSV PSV MSSV
W W CE
HB-BP-86
3K26
PSV
Sequoyah Units 1 & 2 Watts Bar Units 1 & 2
HB-BP-86 HA-65 HB-BP-86 HA-65 HB-BP-86
6M6 6R10 6M6 6R10 4M16
PWR 1148 ME each 1177 MW PWR 1150 MW each 906 MW PWR 1150MW PWR 865 MW and 890 MW 775 MW PWR 497 MW each 535 MW
PSV MSSV PSV MSSV PSV MSSV PSV PSV MSSV MSSV
W W
Texas Utilities Generating Co. Toledo Edison Co. Union Electric Co. Virginia Electric & Power Co.
Comanche Peak Units 1 & 2 Davis Besse Unit 1 Callaway Unit 1 North Anna Units 1 & 2
HB-BP-86 HB-BP-86 HB-86-BP
4M16 6M6 6M6
BW W W
Surry Units 1 & 2 Wisconsin Electric Power Co. Wisconsin Public Service Corp. Point Beach Units 1 & 2 Kewaunee Unit 1
HB-BP-86 HB-BP-86
6K26 4K26
W W
PSV PSV MSSV PSV
HB-BP-86
6M16
10-9
Utility Station Style/ Model # N.A. Size Reactor MFG (note 4) A (Belgium /West) F A F A W AECL Type Reactor and Rating 390 MW PWR 900 MW PWR 1000 MW 900 MW 1000 MW PWR 626 MW PHWR 516 MW each 890 MW Loop
ELECTRABEL Belgium ELECTRABEL Belgium
Doel Units 1 & 2 Doel Unit 3 Doel Unit 4
N.A.
PSV
N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
PSV MSSV PSV MSSV PSV PSV PSV MSSV MSSV
ELECTRABEL Belgium
Tihange Unit 1 Tihange Unit 2
Furnas Centrais Electriacs SA, Brazil Ontario Hydro Canada Electricite de France (EdF)
Angora Uinit 1 Pickering Units 5,6,7 & 8 Fessenheim Units 1 & 2
N.A.
N.A.
F/C-L
PSV
(Valves supplied by Crosby Licensee in France) Tricastin Units 1, 2, 3, &4 N.A. N.A. F/C-L 920 MW PSV
(Valves supplied by Crosby Licensee in France) Nuclear Power Corp. (India) Kansai Electric Power Co. - Japan Tarapur Units 1 & 2 (note 2) Mihama Unit 1 OHI Units 1 & 2 Takahama Unit 1 Korea Electric Power Corp. Korea KO-RI Unit 1 KO-RI Unit 2 Comision Federal de Electricidad (CFE) - Mexico Laguna Verde Units 1 & 2 N.A. N.A. GE BWR 200 MW each 320 MW 1120 MW 780 MW 564 MW PWR 605 MW BWR 654 ME each MSSV
W W W W W GE
PSV PSV PSV PSV MSSV PSV MSSV MSSV
10-10
Utility Station Style/ Model # N.A. N.A. Size Reactor MFG (note 4) W W Type Reactor and Rating PWR 620 MW PWR 930 MW each 153 MW (pre-code) Loop
National Power Corp. Phillipines Central Nuclear de Almaraz, S.A. Spain Union Electrica SA and Fuerzas Electricas del Noroeste, SA Spain Iberdrola, S.A. Spain Central Nuclear de Valdecaballeros Spain Central Nuclear Vandellos II - Spain Vattenfall AB Sweden
PNPP Unit 1 Almaraz Units 1 & 2 Jose Cabrera Unit 1
N.A. N.A.
PSV MSSV PSV MSSV
N.A.
N.A.
PSV
Cofrentes Unit 1 Valdecaballeros Units 1 & 2
N.A. N.A.
N.A. N.A.
GE GE
PWR 930 MW BWR 975 MW each PWR 982 MW #2: 800 MW #3&4: 900 MW 350 MW BWR 604 MW each BWR 951 MW each PWR 907 MW each 615 MW
MSSV MSSV
Vandellas II (note 3) Ringhals Units 2, 3 & 4
N.A. N.A.
N.A. N.A.
W W
PSV MSSV PSV
Nordostshweizenisc he Kraftwerke AG (NOK) - Switzerland Taiwan Power Co. Taiwan
Beznau Units 1 & 2 Chinshan Units 1 & 2 Kuosheng Units 1 & 2 Maanshan Units 1 & 2
N.A.
N.A.
PSV
N.A.
N.A.
GE
MSSV
N.A.
N.A.
GE
MSSV
N.A.
N.A.
MSSV
Nuklearna Elektrarna Krsko (Slovenia)
Krsko Unit 1
N.A.
N.A.
PSV
10-11
Notes:
1. Manufacturer of Unit 2 valves is on hold pending decision by utility to build this unit. 2. Main steam valves manufactured by Crosby USA/Nuovo Pigone, Italy. 3. Main steam valves manufactured by the Crosby affiliate, Walthon Weir Pacific S.A. - Spain 4. Reactor manufacturers shown in Table 10-6 are: CECombustion Engineering GEGeneral Electric B&WBabcock and Wilcox ACAllis Chalmers C-LCreusot-Loire AECLAtomic Energy of Canada NIRANucleare Italiana Peacttori Avanzati FFramaceco AAcecowen N.A.Information Not Available
Table 10-7 Nuclear Power Plants with Dresser Pressurizer Safety Valves
Utility Arizona Public Service Co. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. Unit Palo Verde 1, 2, & 3 Calvert Cliffs 1 & 2 31709 NA 31739A (Cast, Body, Forged Bonnet) 31739A (Forged Body, Forged Bonnet) 31809 NA 31709 A 31739 A (Forged Body, Forged Bonnet) 31739 A (Forged Body, Forged Bonnet) 31709 NA 31759 A (Forged Body, Forged Bonnet) 31709 NA 31709 NA 31759 A (Cast Body, Forged Bonnet) 31709 NA Model #
Louisiana Power & Light Co. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Metropolitan Edison Co. Northeast Utilities Portland General Electric Co. Sacramento Municipal Utility District Southern California Edison Co. Tennessee Valley Authority Virginia Electric & Power Co. Washington Public Power Supply System
Waterford 3 Maine Yankee TMI 1 & 2 Millstone 2 Pebble Springs 1 & 2 Rancho-Seco 1 (Shut Down) San Onofre 2 & 3 Bellefonte 1 & 2 North Anna 1 & 2 WPPSS 1 & 4
10-12
Table 10-8 Nuclear Power Plants Using Target Rock Safety Valves
Site General Electric P. O. # General Electric MPL #
A.
Model 67F (BWR Application) Valve Serial Numbers 1 through 129 205AE940, 205AE940, 205AE940 205AE940 205AE940 205AE940 205AE940 205AE940 205AE940 205AE940 205AE940 205AE940, 205AB841 205AE940, 205AE940 205AB841 205AB841 AB841 AB841 203-3 2-71 203-3 2-71 2-71 2-71 2-71 2-71 2-71 2-71 2-71 B21F013 B21F013 B21F013 2-71 203-5 203-5
Millstone Monticello Pilgrim 1 Vermont Yankee Peachbottom 2 Peachbottom 3 Browns Ferry 1 Browns Ferry 2 Browns Ferry 3 Fitzpatrick Cooper E. I. Hatch 1 Brunswick 1 Brunswick 2 Fukushima 2 Dresden 3 Quad Cities 1 B.
AB841 AB841
Valve Serial Numbers 130 and up 205AF791 205AF791 205AF791 205AF791 205AF791 205AF791 205AF791 205AF791 205AF791 205AF791 205AF791 205AF791 205AF791 205AF791 203-3 203-3 2-71 2-71 2-71 B21F013 203-5, -7 203-5, -7 114 2-71 203-5, -8 2-71 203-7 203-7
Millstone 1 Pilgrim 1 Peachbottom 2 and 3 Browns Ferry 1 Fitzpatrick Brunswick 1 Dresden 2 and 3 Quad Cities 1 and 2 Nine Mile Point 1 Monticello Fukushima 1 Fukushima 2 Tsuruga Nuclenor C.
Model 7567F (BWR Application) 205AD140 205AD141 205AD141 205AJ600 205AB843 205AB845 205AJ600 205AJ600 205AJ600 205AJ600 205AJ600 B21F013 B21F013 2-71 " " D21F013 203-3 2-71 2-71 B21F013
Fermi 2 Hope Creek 1 and 2 Cooper " " Shoreham Pilgrim 1 Peachbottom 2 and 3 Fitzpatrick Brunswick 1 and 2
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APPENDIX A SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVE MAINTENANCE GUIDELINE REFERENCES
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Documents
Information Notices
79-18 80-40 82-41 83-22 83-26 83-39 83-82 84-33 86-05 86-12 86-56 86-92 87-46 87-48 88-30 88-68 89-32 89-90 89-90 89-90 90-06 90-11 91-74 Proper Installation of Target Rock Safety Relief Valves Excessive Nitrogen Supply Pressure Actuates Safety Relief Valve Failure of Safety Relief Valves to Open at a BWR BWR Relief Valve Failures Failure of Safety Relief Valve Failure of Safety Relief Valves to Open Failure of Safety/Relief Valves to Open at BWR Main Steam Safety Valve Failures Caused by Failed Cotter Pins Main Steam Safety Valve Test Failures and Ring Setting Adjustments Target Rock Two-Stage PRD Set Point Drift Reliability of Main Steam Safety Valves Set Point Drift Pressurizer Safety Valve Reliability Undetected Loss of Reactor Coolant Information Concerning the Use of Anaerobic Adhesives/Sealants Target Rock Two-Stage PRD Set Point Drift Update Set Point Testing of Pressurizer Safety Valves with Filled Loop Seals Using Hydraulic Assist Devices Surveillance Testing of Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection Systems Pressurizer Safety Valve Lift Set Point Shift Pressurizer Safety Valve Lift Set Point Shift; Supplement 1 Pressurizer Safety Valve Lift Set Point Shift; Supplement 2 Power Operated Relief Valve Reliability and Additional Low-Temperature Overpressure Protection for Light Water Reactors Maintenance Deficiency Associated with Solenoid Operated Valves Changes in Pressurizer Safety Valve Set Points Before Installation
A-1
92-61 92-64 92-60 93-02
Loss of High Head Safety Injection Nozzle Ring Settings on Low Pressure Water Relief Valves Valve Stem Failure Caused by Embrittlement Malfunction of a Pressurizer Code Safety Valve
Generic Letters
81-36 Revised Schedule for Completion of TMI Action Plan Item II.D.I Relief and Safety Valves in PWRs Bulletins and Reports 74-04 Malfunction of Target Rock Safety Relief Valves 74-14 BWR Relief Valve Discharge to Suppression Pool 80-25 Operating Problems with Target Rock Relief Valves at BWRs AEOD/S92-02 -Special Study- Safety and Safety/Relief Valve Reliability NUREG-1482, Guidelines for In Service Testing in Nuclear Power Plants Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Documents
Significant Operating Experience Report (SOER)

SOER 81-6 SOER 81-8 SOER 82-9 Dresser Safety Valve Blowdown Setting Spurious Actuation of Safety/Relief Valve Ring Settings for Dresser Safety Valves
SOER 82-81 Brazed Spring Guides in Dresser Relief Valves SOER 83-83 Stress Corrosion Cracking for Pilot Line for Pressurizer Safety Valve SOER 84-84 Loss of Reactor Coolant Due to Stuck Open Relief Valve and Blocked Valve
Significant Experience Report (SER)

SER 08-80 SER 29-80 SER 52-80 SER 10-81 SER 15-81 SER 98-81 SER 98-81 Main Steam Safety Valve Failed to Reseat Valve Disc Guide Cracking Main Steam Safeties Main Steam Safety and Reliefs Target Rock Failure to Open of Steam Generator Relief Valve BWR Electromagnetic Relief Valve Failure Two-Stage Target Rock Safety Relief Valves Two-Stage Target Rock Safety Relief Valves Set Point Drift; Supplement 1
A-2
SER 98-81 SER 08-82 SER 10-82 SER 50-82 SER 21-84 SER 58-84 SER 59-84 SER 14-86 SER 15-86 SER 25-86 SER 26-86 SER 26-88 SER 5-90 SER 20-91 SER 20-92 SER 3-92 SER 18-92
Two-Stage Target Rock Safety Relief Valves; Supplement 3 Inadvertent Main Steam Insolation Valve Closure Steam Generator Tube Rupture with Primary Relief Valve Stuck Open Failure of Safety Valves to Lift at Set Pressures During Transient Failure of Target Rock Power Operated Relief Valves to Open During Testing Failure of Main Steam Safety Valve to Reclose Out-of-Specification Lift Pressures on Main Steam Safety Valves Reactor Coolant System Depressurization Inoperability of Trains of the Standby Liquid Control System at BWRs Due to Incorrect Relief Valve Set Points Failure of Main Steam Relief Valves to Actuate Set Point Drift of Target Rock Two-Stage Safety Relief Valves Failure of Safety Valves in Condensate and Feedwater Systems to Open Due to Bonding of Valve Disc and Seat Premature Lifting and Excessive Blowdown of Residual Heat Removal Relief Valves Safety Injection System Degraded Due to Damaged Relief Valves in Alternate Minimum Flow Lines Multiple Safety System Malfunctions During Safety Valve Testing Loss of Component Cooling Water Inventory Due to Improper Relief Valve Setting Loss of Reactor Coolant Due to Malfunction of Pressurizer Safety Valve During Load Rejection
Codes and Standards
American Society of Mechanical Engineers

ASME/ANSI PTC 25.3-1988 ASME OM-1990 Code, Appendix I ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Sections I, II, III, IV, VIII, and XI, including Appendices 1994 Issue and Addenda issued February 1995
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Vendor Technical Manuals Dresser Industries\ConsolidatedI&M Electromatic RV Type-1533VX Target Rock I&M SR-Model 7567F &M SR-Model 67F Crosby Valve and Gage Company I&M SR-HB-65-BP Bulletin No.100 IOM Instruction No. I-1137 IOM Instruction No. I-1139 IOM Instruction No. I-1105-2 Furmanite-Trevitest Apparatus-Operations Manual Anderson, Greenwood and Company Bulletin No. 02-400-90 Bulletin No. Catalog 3-1900-89 Wyle Laboratories Test Procedure No.-1018 Test Procedure No.-1016 Test Procedure No.-1009 Test Procedure No.-1059 EPRI Reports EPRI NP-2292 EPRI NP-4306-SR EPRI NP-2628 EPRI NP-2352 EPRI NP-2296 EPRI NP-2318 PWR Safety and Relief Valve Test ProgramValve Selection/ Justification Report Safety and Relief Valves in Light Water Reactors EPRI PWR Safety and Relief Valve Test ProgramSafety and Relief Valve Test Report Valve Inlet Fluid Conditions for Pressurizer Safety and Relief Valves for Babcock and Wilcox 177-FA and 205-FA Plants Valve Inlet Fluid Conditions for Pressurizer Safety and Relief Valves for Westinghouse-Designed Plants Valve Inlet Fluid Conditions for Pressurizer Safety and Relief Valves in Combustion Engineering-Designed Plants Set Point Testing of Safety Valves Using Alternative Test Methods EPRI Project 1811-1
EPRI NP-4235
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Miscellaneous Publications Dunns Valve Testers Inc. Brochure Lewis, R.E., P.E. Safety Valve Set Point Shift due to Temperature. December 8, 1992 Wade, Jack. Thermal Profiles and Thermal Effects on Valve Operations. ENTERGY Operations. Zahorsky, J.R. Degradation of Pressure Relief Valve Performance Caused By Inlet Valve PipingConfiguration. Shideler, Howard. Pressure Relief Valve Basics. Valve Magazine ,Winter 1993. Thibault, David G. and Zahorsky, John R. .In-Service Set Pressure Testing of Safety Valves. Crosby Valve and Gage Company ASME Code Safety Valve Rules-A Review and Discussion. Presented at the Seventh International Conference of Pressure Vessel Technology [conference paper]. J. S. Hsieh, D.A. Van Dyne, G. G. Morell, J. R. Zahorsky. Effects of Pressure Relief Valve Characteristics on System Operation and Water Hammer Loads. Presented at the ASME Annual Meeting, Winter 1987.
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APPENDIX B SELECTION, SIZING, AND INSTALLATION OF PRVS
1.0
Introduction
In selection and sizing of a relief valve it is necessary to determine all potential sources of overpressure and then calculate the fluid removal rate under emergency conditions to maintain the pressure within allowable limits. The ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&VP) Code provides rules for the design, manufacture, capacity certification, selection, and application of pressure devices used to protect fired and unfired pressure vessels. However, providing adequate overpressure protection is not always clearcut, and the Code rules may differ depending on the type of vessel to be protected. This requires a good working knowledge of the 11 book sections of the ASME B&PV Code, of which 5 sections specifically deal with the requirements for overpressure protection. This discussion will only address Section IIINuclear Power Plant Components and Section VIIIUnfired Pressure Vessels. 2.0 Overpressure Protection
The principle design basis for pressure vessels is the safe containment of design pressure. Protection against overpressure is a very important aspect of pressure vessel design. Proper selection, use, location, and maintenance of relief devices are also essential to protect personnel and equipment as well as to comply with codes and laws. To provide the protection required, the designer must first determine the consequences that could arise in the system from the application of conditions of pressure and coincident temperature that would cause either the design pressure or service limits (specified in the design specification) to be exceeded and the capacity developed as a result of this event. The system designer must then provide a sufficient number of relief devices to furnish a capacity that would mitigate the overpressure condition. The Code is often specific as to the capacity required, but sometimes this capacity is not readily apparent; in such cases, the Code places the responsibility for its determination on the designer. 2.1 Determining Required Relieving Capacity
The design of the proper relieving device must take into consideration all of the following upset conditions for the individual equipment if such an upset can occur: 1) blocked discharge; 2) fire exposure; 3) tube ruptures; 4) control valve failure; 5) thermal expansion; and 6) utility or auxiliary service failure. Each upset condition must be carefully evaluated to determine the worst case condition that will dictate the relieving capacity.
B-1
The first step in selecting PRDs for a vessel or system is to determine the required relieving capacity. This requires that all sources of fluid flow and energy into the system be considered and evaluated. Sources of energy might be heat, fire, chemical reaction, etc. Sources of fluid flow could include pumps, compressors, stuck open reducing valves, malfunctioning control valves or inadvertent valve operation, failure of an internal heat exchanger tube, or a combination of these types of events. All of these events must be taken into account to determine the worst case overpressure condition. ASME B&VP Code Section III Nuclear Plant Components, Article N(X)7000 provides a comprehensive set of rules for overpressure protection of nuclear plant components. The rules require an analysis of all conditions that could cause overpressure and an analysis of pressure transient conditions. The relieving capacity of a safety and relief valve is determined from this analysis. For each plant or installation, this analysis is captured in a document known as the overpressure protection report. This report will also cover the selection of PRDs, their redundancy and independence under failure conditions. 2.2 System Allowable Valve for Overpressure (Certified Relieving)
PRDs require an increase in pressure above the set pressure to reach a full open position. The ASME Code provides overpressure values at which PRDs are capacity certified and credited. The Code provides its own rules as to how much the pressure is allowed to increase above the MAWP or design pressure for the particular vessel or system during an overpressure event. Section III limits the overpressure to 10% or 3 psi, whichever is greater, above design pressure for most systems of any component within the systems pressure retaining boundary. Section VIII limits on overpressure depend on the type of installation. Section VIII mandates that pressure not be allowed to rise more than 10% or 3 psi, whichever is greater, above MAWP. When multiple devices are used, or additional devices are provided to protect against exposure to fire, overpressures of 16% or 21% respectively, are allowed. 2.3 Determining Set Pressure
After the relieving capacity and allowable overpressure have been established, the next step is to determine the set pressure of the safety and relief valve. The rule for setting safety and relief valves is that at least one device be set to open at or below the design pressure of the system or vessel being protected. When more than one safety and relief valve is used, the additional safety and relief valves may be set at slightly higher pressures. This allowable increase in set pressure over MAWP varies throughout the Code depending on the application and the circumstances as shown in Table B-1. In all cases, the valves must open fully and relieve their (credited) rated capacity at a pressure equal to, or below the system allowable overpressure. Section III requires at least one PRD to be set at or below the design pressure. Additional devices may be set at slightly higher pressures, so long as the maximum overpressure does not exceed 10% of the design pressure when all relief devices are discharging.
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Section VIII requires one safety and relief valve be set at or below MAWP. If additional safety and relief valves are used, they may be set up to 5% above MAWP. The section further allows a supplemental valve added to a vessel to protect against hazard due to fire to be set up to 10% above MAWP. 2.4 Set Pressure Tolerances
Each section of the Code provides set pressure tolerances for a myriad of applications. These are also summarized in Table B-1. Note that the set pressure tolerances shown in the table for ASME Section III Code stamped valves shall apply unless a greater tolerance is established in the overpressure protection report and in the valve design specification.
B-3
Table B-1 PRD Operating Requirements ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Summary
Application Allowable Vessel Overpressure (Above MAWP or Vessel Design Pressure) 10 % Above the design pressure of any component within the pressure retaining boundary of the protected system (NB-7311b) (NC-7311b) (ND-7311b) Specified Pressure Settings Set Pressure Tolerance with Respect to Set Pressure Required Blowdown
Section III NB NC ND NE
One valve at design pressure Additional valves may be set higher provided limits on overpressure are maintained (NB-7410) (NC-7410) (ND-7410)
Safety Valves 2 psi for pressures up to and including 70 psi 3% for pressures above 70 psi up to and including 300 psi 10 psi for pressures above 300 psi up to and including 1000 psi 1% for pressures above 1000 psi (NB-7512.2) (NC-7512.2) (ND-7512.2) (Note 3)
Safety Valves 95% of set pressure (maximum), or as specified in design specification (NB-7512.3) As specified in design specification (NC-7512.3) (ND-7512.3) (NE-7512.2)
Overpressure may not exceed the service or test limits specified in the design specification (NE-7110a)
Valves must be set to operate within overpressure limits (NE-7410)
Safety Relief and Relief Valves 2% psi for pressures up to and including 70 psi (NB-7513.1a) (NC-7513.1a) (ND-7513.1a) (NE-7512.1a) 3% for pressures over 70 psi (NB-7513.1a) (NC-7513.1a) (ND-7513.1a) (NE-7512.1a) (Note 3)
Safety Relief and Relief Valves As specified in design specification (NB-7513.2) (NC-7513.2) (ND-7513.2) (NE-7512.2)
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Table B-1 (cont.) PRD Operating Requirements ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Summary
Application Allowable Vessel Overpressure (Above MAWP or Vessel Design Pressure) Specified Pressure Settings Set Pressure Tolerance with Respect to Set Pressure Required Blowdown
Section III (continued)
Pilot Operated Pressure Relief Valve Same as safety valve above (NB-7525 b) Same as safety relief valve above (NC-7523.3) (ND-7523.3) (Note 3) Power Operated 1% of set pressure (NB-7532 b1) (NC-7533 b1) Same as safety valve above (ND-7533 b1) Rupture Disc 2% of burst pressure for pressures up to 40 psi (NB-7611) (NC-7612) (ND-7612) 5% of burst pressure for pressures above 40 psi (NC-7612) (ND-7612)
Pilot Operated Pressure Relief Valve Same as safety valve (NB-7524) (ND-7525.2) (ND-7524.2)
Power Operated Same as safety valve (NB-7532 b2) (NC-7533 b2) (ND-7533 b2)
B-5
Table B-1 (cont.) PRD Operating Requirements ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code Summary
Application Allowable Vessel Overpressure (Above MAWP or Vessel Design Pressure) Specified Pressure Settings Set Pressure Tolerance with Respect to Set Pressure Required Blowdown
Section VIII All vessels unless an exception specified
10% or 3 psi whichever is greater (UG-125c)
MAWP of vessel (UG-134a)
2 psi up to and including 70 psi
None specified
Exceptions When multiple devices are used
16% or 4 psi whichever is greater (UG-125 c1)
One valve MAWP additional valves up to 105% of MAWP (UG-134a)
3% over 70 psi (UG-134 d1)
Note: Pressure relief valves for compressible fluids having an adjustable blowdown construction must be adjusted prior to initial capacity certification testing so that blowdown does not exceed 5% of set pressure or 3 psi, whichever is greater (UG-131 c3a). This is a manufacturers certification test requirement only.
Supplemental device to protect against hazard due to fire
21% (UG-125 c2)
Up to 110% MAWP (UG-134b)
Notes: 1. 2. 3. NB, NE, etc. refers to articles of the Article numbers of the ASME B&VP Codes. The numbers in parentheses reference ASME B&VP Code paragraphs. Set pressure tolerances may be higher if specified in ASME Section III valve design specification (see Section 2.4 - Set Pressure Tolerances in this appendix).
B-6
2.5
Determining Blowdown
A PRV will generally not reseat until the inlet pressure is reduced to below the set pressure. The difference between actual opening pressure and reseating pressure is called blowdown. Section III allows 5-7% blowdown for safety valves unless a different value is allowed and specified in the valve design specification. For other types of valves, blowdown is specified in the design specification. Section VIII has no blowdown requirements for valves as they are shipped from the manufacturer. 3.0 Selecting PRVs
When the required relieving capacity has been established and the allowable set pressure and overpressure determined, the pressure relieving devices can then be selected. The choice of device is limited to those permitted by the particular book section covering the service in question. The PRD most widely accepted by the various book sections of the Code is the springloaded PRV. One particular type of spring-loaded valve is the balanced valve, sometimes called a balanced bellows valve. In this type of valve, a bellows having an effective area equivalent to the valve seat area is attached to the disc to prevent backpressure in the valves discharge system from acting on the disc. Valves designed under Article NB-7511 of ASME Code Section III include a redundant piston in addition to the balanced bellows. Traditionally, spring-loaded valves for boiler or steam application have been called safety valves, spring-loaded valves for liquid application have been called relief valves, and multipurpose spring-loaded valves that might be used for steam, other compressible fluids, or liquid, have been called safety relief valves. None of these terms fully describes the design or function of a PRV, and in many cases utility personnel tend to use the terms interchangeably. The more generic term, as defined by the ASME Code, is PRV. A spring-loaded PRV is permitted by all sections of the Code as an overpressure protection device. Operational and construction requirements, however, vary among the book sections. The popularity of this design is due to the reliability of having few moving parts, the repeatability of an opening point controlled by a spring, and the ability of the valve to close when an overpressure condition is reduced to a safety level. However, systems with unusual piping configurations, a desire to operate at pressures close to valve set pressure, requirements for on-site testing, and a need for improved seat tightness have lead to the development of other types of equipment to be added to the spring-loaded valve. A variation on the spring-loaded valve is the anti-simmering device valve allowed in Section III service only. This valve employs an auxiliary actuator to hold the disc closed under normal operating conditions, using an external source of power such as compressed air. The external loading is limited so that if the device fails, the valve will still
B-7
open (despite the external load) and pass its rated flow within the specified overpressure. When the valve is called upon to open, the assisting load is automatically removed and the valve opens. When a safe pressure is restored, the auxiliary actuator assists in closing the valve. Due to the auxiliary load, seat tightness is enhanced up to the opening pressure of the valve. Although the ASME Code permits this anti-simmer device, it is not generally used for a broad array of reasons (mainly equipment qualification-see glossary for definition). A second type of auxiliary device used on spring-loaded and pilot valves is the auxiliary actuating device that assists the valve to open and then allows the valve to reseat normally. When the valve is called upon to open, the assist device is actuated, opening the PRV by mechanical means. When a safe pressure is restored, the assist device is deactuated and the valve closes normally. If the assist device should fail to operate, there is no interference with the normal operation of the valve. (This device is typically used on BWR main steam safety valves.) The second type of PRV is the pilot-operated PRV. This is a valve in which the major relieving device or main valve is combined with and controlled by a self-actuated auxiliary PRV or pilot. The main valve consists of a nozzle and a disc similar to the springloaded valve except that the disc is held in place by system pressure. When system pressure rises above the set pressure of the valve, the pilot senses that pressure and vents the pressure above the disc allowing the main valve to open. Pilot-operated PRVs have the advantage that their operation is less influenced by fluid conditions at the valve inlet; they generally can be tested in situ, and a high seating load is maintained up to the opening point of the valve. The valve has more operating parts, however, and because of typically small passages in the pilot, the cleanliness of the fluids on which this type of valve operates could become a concern. Pilot-operated PRVs are permitted by Sections III and VIII. A third type of PRV is the power-actuated PRV. These valves depend upon an external energy source provided by electrical, pneumatic or hydraulic systems and generally operate in response to signals from pressure or temperature-sensing devices. This type of PRV offers the benefits of a wide variety of control systems but has the disadvantage of relying on an external source of power that may fail under emergency conditions. Power-actuated relieving valves are often furnished on drum type boilers as a convenience to the operators, even though for that type of boiler Section I permits no credit for their relieving capacity. Power-actuated PRVs are permitted by Section I and III, provided they are used in addition to self-actuated PRVs in Section I service and provided that redundant controls and energy sources are included for Section III service.
B-8
4.0
Installation
The installation of PRVs is critical to their performance. It is important that they are installed to ASME Code requirements and each Code, ASME Section III and Section VIII provides specific functional and mechanical requirements to assure proper overpressure protection. Some of this data is covered in the following Code sections/articles: ASME Section III Article NB7000 Article NC7000 Article ND7000 Article NE7000 Appendix O ASME Section VIII Paragraph UG-125 through and including UG-136 Appendix O ASME/ANSI B31.1 Non-Mandatory Appendix II An additional document that provides recommendations is the American Petroleum Institutes document API-RP-520, Recommended Practice for the Design and Installation of Pressure Relieving Systems in Refineries. 5.0 Sizing Relief Devices
After the required relief capacity of a relief valve has been determined, in addition to other critical parameters, the minimum required orifice area must be calculated. This calculation must be done in accordance with the applicable Code to which the particular system is being designed and, for nuclear applications, specific subsection must be used. Example: If a safety valve for the pressurizer of a PWR nuclear plant is desired, this system, an ASME Class 1, is designed to the requirements of Subsection NB. The spring-loaded safety valve must meet the requirements of Article NB-7000 and also the requirement for a Class 1 safety valve. Safety valves that have been capacity certified to these requirements is published in the NBBI publication, PRD Certifications. This publication identifies valve manufacturers, valve types and styles, ASME Code section and class of certification, inlet sizes, pressure limit, and the certified nozzle flow area, and the certified coefficient of discharge. With this information and the ASME formula in the Article NB-7000, the valves capacity can be determined.
B-9
It is important to note that when sizing and selecting PRVs the following must be adhered to: Use only ASME formula for the fluid being used. Use only ASME certified area (bore diameter). Use ASME certified coefficient of discharge. Use overpressure for which a valve was certified (do not use a 3% overpressure for a manufacturers valve type that was certified at 10%). If capacity is prorated, only use ASME formula. For more information, ASME Section III, Appendix 18, Article 1000 and ASME Section VIII, Appendix 11, Division 1 provide guidelines on valve capacity calculations and conversions and should be used for capacity calculations. Furthermore, for ASME Section VIII, valve manufacturers offer a variety of catalogs, technical documents, and valve sizing programs that can be used on a personal computer to select valves for your service conditions. It is strongly recommend that, when in doubt and/or when questions arise on valve selection, sizing, and/or capacity certification, the valve supplier or the NBBI be contacted.
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APPENDIX C ASME CODE TESTING REQUIREMENTS
1.0
Code Requirements
The requirements for nuclear safety and relief valve performance are listed in the ASME B&VP Code Section III Article NB-7000 for Class 1 valves, NC-7000 for Class II, and ND-7000 for Class III valves. Requirements are set forth for valve set pressures, blowdown, and overpressure capacity. The data summarized below is based on the 1994 ASME Code Winter Addenda issued February 1995. The reader is cautioned that there have been changes to the ASME Code in testing requirements. It is important that the Code and Addenda to which the valve was manufactured (shown on the valve nameplate and Code data report) be used for performance requirements. Safety valve set pressure tolerances per ASME Section III, Article NB-7000 are summarized in Table C-1. Table C-1 Class I - Safety Valve Performance Tolerances
Set Pressure (Note 1) Manufacturers Tolerance Set Pressure Blowdown Max. (Note 1) Overpressure for Rated Capacity 0 - 70 psi 2 psi 71 - 300 psi 3% 301 - 1000 psi 10 psi Over 1000 psi 1%
95% Rated Capacity (Nameplate) is at 3% or 2 psi above set pressure whichever is greater
Note 1:
A greater set pressure tolerance and blowdown is permitted but must be specified in the valve design specification.
C-1
1.1
Test Frequencies
The requirements for testing frequencies and types are set forth in the ASME B&VP Codes Section XI Sub-Section IWV-3510, ASME/ANSI Operation and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants Part 1 (OM-1) and the ANSI/ASME Performance Test Codes (PTC) 25.3. Prior to the winter 1985 Addenda of Section XI IWV-3510, Section XI required that all safety and relief valves be tested according to the Performance Test Code 25.3 (PTC-25.3). Although PTC-25.3 (1988) is a Code for certification of PRVs, it does provide some guidelines, definitions, and requirements for calibration of instruments, training of test personnel, etc., PTC-25.3 also has procedures for carrying out several types of tests on different process fluids, and there are sections devoted to capacity calculations for various test fluids. The winter 1985 Addenda of Section XI of the ASME Code requires that safety and relief valves be tested to ANSI/ASME OM-1. In the 1994 edition of ASME OM-1 Code, Appendix I, a mandatory appendix, is the culmination of Code work for inservice testing of pressure relief devices in light water reactor power plants. The general requirements sections of OM-1 Appendix 1 defines the scope, terminology, and the responsibilities of plant personnel. Also included are the requirements for testing frequency which requires all Class 1 valves of each type and manufacturer to be tested at least once every five years. All Class 2 valves are to be tested once every ten years. Table C-5 provides a general comparison of PTC-25.3 and Appendix 1 of the OM-1 Code (1994). Note: ASME PTC-25.3 has been revised as ASME PTC-25 in 1994. 1.2 Test Methods
The testing methods for determining the set pressure of PRVs regardless of fluid service should incorporate the following as a minimum: The test media 1) for steam valves shall be saturated steam or some other compressible fluid for which correlating data has been developed; 2) for valves on a compressible fluid other than steam shall be air or nitrogen; and 3) for liquid services are liquids. The accumulator employed shall have a volume and pressure source sufficient to determine valve set pressure (valve lift may be restricted). Assist devices may be used for set pressure testing (not allowed for liquids). The temperature of the valve body must be stabilized and known prior to testing. The ambient temperature of the operating environment shall be simulated during testing or a correlation factor used.
C-2
Control rings may be adjusted to ensure valve action. When testing for set pressure, the valve control rings cannot be altered between openings. Consideration for superimposed backpressure must be known and compensated for in valve set pressure (if required). Elapsed time between openings must be defined. (Note: At present, a 10-minute wait between openings is recommended. ASME OM-1 Code Committee is looking into reducing this time interval to 5 minutes. Code Case expected to be published in ASME OMB Code 1997.) As-found opening set pressure shall be within owners acceptance criteria. A minimum of two consecutive openings within owner-specified tolerance is required to demonstrate valve compliance with the as-left set point of the Code. Blowdown testing is not required. 1.3 Test Types
There are four basic parameters associated with safety valve operation that must be tested. These are set pressure, blowdown, capacity, and seat tightness or leakage. This section defines what is meant by each of these terms and certain methods of testing for these variables as stated in the test method above. Inservice testing of valves, according to OM-1 Appendix 1, does not require blowdown or capacity testing.
1.3.1
Set Pressure
The set pressure of a PRV on steam or a compressible fluid is the pressure at which the valve will pop. This parameter is directly affected by the amount of compressive force exerted on the valve seat by the valve spring. The control for how much force the spring exerts is accomplished by raising or lowering the adjusting bolt (Crosby) or compression screw (Dresser). One obvious way to test for set pressure is to raise the pressure of the system at the valve inlet until the valve pops. When testing for set pressure, the pressure of the system as anticipated set pressure is approached, should not be raised more than 2 psig per second. This will ensure a proper reading of the opening pressure value when the valve pops. Normally, for gas relief valves, there is a defined pop sound. For liquid reliefs, the set pressure can be a pencil stream, excessive flow, or even a two-step flow change. If raising the system pressure to the valves set pressure is impractical, a lift assist device (see Appendix D of this guide) may be used to apply the required extra force to achieve a valve opening.
C-3
1.3.2
Blowdown
The blowdown of a valve is described as the difference between the valves actual popping pressure and actual reseating pressure. The reseating pressure will be lower than the popping pressure. The ASME Codes place requirements on the amount of blowdown (i.e., at what value below the popping pressure the reseating pressure can be) that a newly manufactured valve must have. For Section III Class 1 (nuclear power plants), it is generally required that the blowdown be specified in the valve design specification and the basis for it be covered in the overpressure protection report. In order to properly test for blowdown, the test facility must have adequate fluid flow to cause the valve to achieve a substantial lift and then to close. As will be explained in the next section on capacity testing, achieving full lift on large valves like pressurizer or MSSVs can be difficult. Lift assist devices cannot be used when testing for blowdown because valve full lift is not achieved when lift assist devices are employed. From the two values (popping and reseating pressure) the blowdown can be determined as follows:
Percent Blowdown = Popping Pressure Reseating Pressure Popping Pressure x 100
1.3.3
Capacity
Capacity refers to the amount of fluid a valve can pass at a given overpressure in a given time. Capacity is usually measured in gallons per minute (gpm) for water valves, pounds of steam per hour (lb/hr) for steam service, and standard cubic feet/minute (SCFM) for air. Establishing a relieving capacity for a valve design is a complicated process, usually undertaken by the valve manufacturers to obtain the ASME Code symbol stamp for the particular valve design. In order to determine the valve design capacity, the manufacturer provides information on the valves to the NBBI. The manufacturer then, at the NBBI or any other ASME approved flow laboratory, performs certification testing. These valves undergo a vigorous testing program defined by the ASME Code to which the certification tests will be performed. The successful results of this testing establishes coefficient of discharge and/or other flow capacity formula constants that are used for the valve design. This certified capacity is then stamped on the valves nameplate. In addition to the capacity test, the manufacturer must also have in place an ASME approved QC program. After meeting all the Code requirements and processing the necessary documentation, the manufacturer receives a Certificate of Authorization from the ASME that allows him to affix the ASME Code Symbol to the valve nameplate. If changes are made to the valve design, another certification test must be performed. There is no requirement for a user to conduct a capacity test for valves that have an ASME Code symbol stamp.
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1.3.4
Seat Tightness Testing
The ASME Codes, with the advent of ANSI/ASME OM-1, Mandatory Appendix I, have established leakage limits for safety valves and require utilities to test PRVs for seat tightness. Seat tightness requirements for newly manufactured PRVs are usually specified on the valve design specification. Typically, API Standard 527, Seat Tightness PRVs, may be referenced. There are several methods mentioned in ASME OM-1 Appendix I that may be employed to establish whether or not a valve is leaking. For the sake of this document, only those methods that may be used on steam service valves will be noted. The OM-1 Code requires leak tests to be performed on the valves at either maximum system operating pressure or as specified by the owner. This information can be obtained from the valve design specification. There are several methods that may be used to test for valve leakage on steam. When in service tests are performed, these methods are either qualitative or quantitative. Audible/Visible Test Downstream Temperature Measurement Test Weighed Condensate Test Cold Bar Test Acoustic Emission Test Audible/Visible Testing When a safety valve has a major leak, the audio level of steam may be loud enough to be heard. When steam valves are vented to the atmosphere, a visual observation can be made against a dark background. Downstream Temperature Measurement Testing Steam escaping into the exhaust piping from a safety valve will raise the temperature of that piping. Therefore, if the temperature of the downstream piping is higher than the ambient temperature, it may be concluded that the valve is leaking. Weighed Condensate Testing If it is possible to divert the exhaust steam flow of a valve into a container and be condensed, then the leakage rate of a valve can be determined by weighing the amount of condensate in the container and dividing that by the number of hours it took to accumulate that condensate.
Leakage =
Weight of Condensate in Pounds (lbs) lbs / hr Test Time in Hours ( hrs)
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Cold Bar Testing (Mirror) Cold bar leakage testing is accomplished by passing a cold bar past the face of the valve outlet. If the valve is leaking, steam will condense on the bar. Acoustic Emission Testing Acoustic emission testing is similar to audible testing except that sensitive acoustic monitors are used to pick up the acoustic (sound) emissions of the valve. By measuring how loud the noises emanating from the valve are, the tester can determine the magnitude of valve leakage. If in testing an alternate compressible fluid is used for set pressure testing (such as air or nitrogen), the owner may elect to use the same fluid to perform the seat leak test. In this case, the air/gas under water test may be used. Air/Gas Under Water This leakage test method allows the tester to quantify the amount of leakage instead of just verifying whether or not the valve is leaking. This test method is generally used on enclosed spring valve designs and is covered in API Standard 527. It is performed as follows: All openings that connect to the PRV outlet and body bowl are sealed. A blind flange or other sealing device is placed on the valve outlet, and a specific size tube is placed through the outlet flange to connect to the body bowl. If the valve seat is leaking, air will escape through the ID of this tube which is submerged in water at exactly 1/2 inch. The leakage will escape through this tube into the water as bubbles that can be counted to give a quantitative leakage rate. The utility must set an acceptance criteria that defines how many bubbles are acceptable over a specific period of time. This method, although not recommended for steam service valves, may be used on pressurizer safety valves in addition to the steam test due to service conditions. The acceptance criteria is not required but should be considered. 2.0 ASME OM Code Mandatory Appendix I
Appendix I of the OM Code was written strictly to provide general requirements for periodic performance testing of PRVs used in nuclear power plants. It is not intended to demonstrate conformance to design specifications nor to verify all aspects of PRD operation. It does establish test intervals, test methods and test data requirements as well as criteria for evaluation. Thus, Appendix I should be thought of and used as a failure finding PM action. Like some other PM failure finding tasks, valve testing can cause aging to the valve. Testing is not a substitute for periodic valve refurbishment as described in Section 8 of this guide. The following sub-sections describe the main points of OM-1 Appendix I and can be used as a guide for developing a valve testing program. However, the Code to which the plant has committed for the InService Testing Program should be referred to for details.
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2.1
Seat Leakage
The first requirement for any valve test is seat tightness determinations. Seat tightness testing must be performed prior to as-found testing and after the final as-left set pressure test. However, the type of seat tightness test performed is left to the utility to decide depending upon the valve type and service conditions. Various types of seat leakage tests, their applicability and effectiveness is shown in Table C-2. The type of test performed should be based on the importance of the individual valve to the system and the type of fluid medium such as steam, air or nitrogen that it services. As an example, pressurizer safety valves typically experience system operating pressures of approximately 2300 psig with a fluid medium of steam and non-condensable gases at saturation temperature. Seat leakage in a pressurizer safety valve can result in seat damage. Therefore, very stringent seat tightness criteria is generally applied to these valves. However, a typical Class III valve that usually experiences much lower pressures and temperatures might only require an audible/visible seat leakage test. Since Appendix I allows the utility to define its own seat tightness criteria, the acceptance criteria should be based on each valves service environment and the consequences of valve seat leakage. The following factors in order of importance should be considered when selecting valve seat leakage testing criteria: 1. The fluid medium (steam-tested with steam) 2. The effect leakage may have on the valves lift set point 3. Consequences of leakage on personnel safety and/or equipment damage 4. The effect on system and plant performance
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Table C-2 Seat Tightness Testing Methods for Pressure Relief Devices
TEST METHOD Audible Visual ANSI 147.1 (API RP-527) Air/gas under water Downstream temperature measurement Weighed condensate Volumetric or Weight measurement Cold bar Acoustic emission Notes: 1. 2. 3. Prevent leakage past the valve stem and adjacent valve pieces for open spring valves Requires a 1-in.-diameter polished stainless steel bar less then 100F be passed across the outlet flange face. On exposed spring valves, care must be exercised due to leakage past stem. STEAM X X X X X X X X AIR/GAS X X X X X X LIQUID X X X X X REMARKS Good for large leaks or high differential pressures Requires open discharge pipe See note (1) Requires special test setup Installed valves only See note (1) and (3) requires a 10 min. test Requires a 10 min. test See note (2) Requires special equipment
2.2
Setpoint Tolerance
The set point tolerance is a requirement that specifies the pressure range the valve should provide over and under pressure protection. Each plants specific as-found requirements may be different than what is required by the Code due to design conditions, but should always meet the Code requirements for the as-left condition. The tolerances used in the set pressure testing of PRVs in accordance with the OM Code Appendix I are determined from the individual plants technical specifications and the valves design specification that may require compliance with Section III of the ASME Code or some other greater value. If Section III is the governing Code, it defines the setpoint tolerances as shown in Tables C-3 and C-4.
C-8
Table C-3 Manufacturers Setpoint TolerancesSafety Valves

SETPOINT 0 - 70 PSIG 71 - 300 PSIG 301 - 1000 PSIG 1001 PSIG AND ABOVE TOLERANCE 2 PSIG 3% OF SETPOINT 10 PSIG 1%
Table C-4 Manufacturers Setpoint TolerancesSafety Relief Valves and Relief Valves
SETPOINT 0 - 70 PSIG 71 PSIG AND ABOVE TOLERANCE 2 PSIG 3% PSIG
Again, it should be noted that even though Section III lists tolerances per the design of the PRV, they are the tolerances that the valve was designed to maintain. The valve design specification and the technical specifications of an individual plant may supersede the Code specified design tolerances. OM-1 Appendix I allows the utility to make simple set pressure adjustments if a valve fails the set pressure acceptance criteria by less than +3% of its stamped setpoint. For any valve that exceeds its stamped setpoint by more than +3%, a root cause determination must be made and the valve must be repaired or replaced. 2.3 Bellows Testing
Appendix I requires that the integrity of a bellows in a balanced valve be tested, but it does not specifically outline how this test should be performed. Normally, bellows testing is carried out in the following manner: A blank flange or pipe cap is installed on the outlet of the valve Gas pressure is then applied to the outlet of the valve through a pressure connection welded to the blank flange or pipe cap The bonnet vent should be used to sense bellows leakage with soap bubble or bubble counter.
CAUTION: Any other leak path should be sealed prior to using the bonnet vent for sensing leakage.
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CAUTION: Pressure to be used during the bellows test should be obtained from the valve manufacturer.
2.4
Testing Sequence
When conducting a setpoint verification test, a step-by-step procedure should be developed to ensure that the test is conducted the same way each time. The procedure should ensure that the valves temperature profile is the same or nearly the same as the valve will experience in service. This is just as important when conducting in situ testing as it is for testing at a test facility. See Section 6.5 for more information about maintaining a proper valve temperature profile. OM, Appendix I gives explicit instructions as to the types of testing required for before and after maintenance and the sequence in which the testing shall be accomplished. The test scope for an individual valve depends on its ASME component class, its function in the plant and the design of the valve (Table C-4 highlights some of these requirements and their sequence for valves in a Nuclear Plant).
NOTE: An OM-1 change in test sequence is expected to be approved in 1996. When revised, the only required sequence of tests will be, visual inspection, as-found seat tightness, and as-found set pressure determination.
C-10
Table C-5 Test Requirements and Sequence

Tests Performed Test Sequence for Class I Main Steam Valves with Auxiliary Actuating Devices 1 2 3 4 Test Sequence for Class 1 Main Steam Valves without Auxiliary Actuating Devices 1 2 3 4 Test Sequence for Other Class 1 Pressure Relief Valves 1 2 3 4 Test Sequence for Class 2 and 3 Pressure Relief Valves 1 2 3 4
Visual examination Seat tightness determination Set pressure determination Determination of compliance with owners seat tightness criteria Determination of electrical characteristics and pressure integrity of solenoid Determination of pressure integrity and stroke capability of air actuator Verification of the integrity of the balancing device on balanced valves Determination of operation and electrical characteristics of position indicator Determination of operation and electrical characteristics of bellows alarm switch Determination of actuating pressure of auxiliary actuating device sensing element, where applicable, and electrical continuity
Note: The numbers in the table show the sequence in which the tests are to be performed.
2.5
Testing Frequencies
The frequency and scope of required testing should be based on the history of past valve testing results but within the requirements of the governing Code. Appendix I requires that the frequency and scope are determined by the ASME Section III Code classification of the valves.
C-11
For Class 1 PRVs during the first five year period: There is no maximum limit specified for the number of valves to be tested with each interval. A minimum number of 20% of each valve group rounded to the nearest whole number should be tested within any 24-month period. This 20% shall consist of valves that have not been tested from the current 5-year cycle, if they exist. (Note: Valve Group consists of valves of the same manufacturer, type, system application, and service media.) The test interval for any valve will not exceed 5 years For Class 2 and 3 relief valves during the first 10-year period: There is no maximum limit for the number of valves tested during any time period. During a single plant operating cycle, a minimum of 20% of each valve group shall be tested within a 48-month interval. This 20% should consist of valves that have not been tested from the current 10-year test interval, if they exist. The test interval for any valve shall not exceed 10 years The only exceptions to this rule are PWR MSSVs. They must be tested under the requirements for Class I PRVs. Replacement with Pretested Valves OM-1 Appendix I also makes provisions for utilities that wish to change out installed valves with pretested valves or a partial compliment of the test group. For Class 1 Valves: If the entire scope of valves is swapped out with pretested valves, then the removed valves must be tested within 12 months of removal. If a partial compliment is used to replace the valves removed from service, they should be tested prior to resumption of electric power generation. For Class 2 and 3 Valves: If the entire scope of valves is swapped out with pretested valves, then the removed valves must be tested within 12 months of removal. If a partial compliment issued to replace some of the valves, then the removed valves must be tested within 3 months of removal. For Class 2 and 3 Primary Containment Vacuum Relief Valves: These valves shall be leak tested every two years, unless historical data indicates a need for more frequent testing. An operability test shall be performed every 6 months, unless historical data indicates a need for more frequent testing.
C-12
2.6
Requirements for Testing Additional Valves
OM Appendix I allows the utility to evaluate the need for additional tests if the valve does not meet certain test criteria: For each valve tested for which the as-found set pressure (first actuation) exceeds the greater of either the tolerance limit of the owners established set pressure acceptance criteria or 3% of the valve nameplate set pressure (not necessarily the conservative value): Two additional valves shall be tested of the same valve group If the as-found set pressure of any of the additional valves tested in accordance with paragraph 1 above exceeds the criteria noted therein, then all of the remaining valves in the same valve group shall be tested. 2.7 Test Media
OM Appendix I, just as the ASME Codes to which the valves were manufactured, is very specific about the fluid media to be used for setpoint testing. Valves designed to operate on steam must be tested with saturated steam. Valves designed to operate on liquid and compressible fluids other than steam must be tested with their normal service fluid. OM Appendix I also requires normal service temperature and/or a correction factor. Alternative fluids may be used if the correlation data between the alternative fluid and the actual system fluid has been established. No major manufacturer contacted would supply compensation charts for testing primary system safety related valves with alternative fluids, such as testing steam valves on air or nitrogen. Since correction factors for the use of an alternative fluid is not available, a utility desiring to use alternative fluids must perform tests and document the correlation. These tests should be conducted at an approved test facility that can fully document the testing. Additional testing and correlation may be necessary after a rebuild or replacement of parts. Testing of this nature is beyond the scope of this guide. The valve users should be cautioned that if these types of correction factors are to be determined, a detailed review of the expected in service PRV set pressure tolerance should be done. The tighter the tolerance, the more difficult it is to achieve a usable correction factor. 2.8 Testing at Inservice Ambient Temperature
During the performance of a bench or in situ test, OM Appendix I requires that the ambient in-service temperature of a valve, while installed in its operating environment, must be simulated or maintained during setpoint testing. OM Appendix I also requires that a valve be thermally stable prior to testing with no more than a 10F fluctuation in 30 minutes.
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2.9
ALDs
Section 4.1.2.3 of OM-1, 1981, allows the use of calibrated ALDs for set pressure determination. The set pressure measurement derived from the device must meet the same accuracy as discussed in Section 2.11 below. However, Appendix I strictly prohibits the use of auxiliary lift devices on liquid service valves. See Appendix D of this guide for a detailed discussion of auxiliary lift devices. 2.10 Personnel Requirements
OM Appendix I states that it is the responsibility of each individual and organization performing work covered by OM Appendix I to meet the requirements defined therein (See Section 9 of this guide for a detailed discussion of personnel training requirements.) 2.11 Test Instrument Requirements
OM Appendix I states that each instrument shall be of sufficient accuracy to perform the measurement task. Measuring equipment used during testing must be calibrated and traceable to National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). The combined overall accuracy of equipment used to determine the set pressure of a valve must have a combined accuracy not to exceed 1% of the indicated (measured) set pressure. 3.0 Documentation, Records and Record Keeping
OM Appendix I gives specific requirements for records and record keeping. Detailed maintenance records are a valuable source of information for troubleshooting valve problems. The disassembly, inspection, and refurbishment process should be documented for future reference. 3.1 Records and Record Keeping
When repair of the PRV is performed to a NR/VR program, documentation of the repair of NV stamped pressure relief devices must be recorded on the National Board form NVR-1, Report of Repair, Modification or Replacement of Nuclear Pressure Relief Devices. The repair organization shall file the original form with the National Board and provide a signed copy to the owner, the jurisdiction and the authorized inspection agency. For repairs not performed under an NBBI NR/R program, the utility will get reports per their specification and purchase order requirements.
C-14
When repairs are performed to OM Appendix I, the following minimum requirements are defined: The owner shall maintain a record that includes the following for each valve covered by this appendix: The manufacturer and manufacturers model and serial number, or other identifiers Copy or summary of the manufacturers acceptance test report, if available The owner shall also maintain records that include the following information: Valves to be examined during each operation time period Procedures used in valve repair, testing, and maintenance Results of valve examinations Descriptions of repairs and modifications or corrective actions Valve test schedules Types and results of tests Analysis of tests which do not satisfy acceptance criteria, or evaluation of test anomalies
C-15
Table C-6 SECTION XI / PTC 25.3 AND OM CODEGeneral Comparison Chart

Section XI/ ASME ANSI-PTC 25.3 Requirements 1. Prior to winter, 1985. Section XI required valve testing in accordance with PTC 25.3. 1976 Edition. ASME OM Code Requirements ASME Code Section XI, 1985 winter addenda requires all testing in accordance with the requirements of ASME OM Standard Part 10. Now referred to as ASME OM Code Appendix I. Tolerances used for setpoint testing are defined in the individual plants' technical specifications or the ASME Code as invoked by the owner. If a PRV fails to meet the set pressure criteria: a) Simple set pressure adjustments may be made if the valve fails the set pressure criteria based on before maintenance test requirements. b) If the valve exceeds its stamped setpoint, a root cause determination must be made and the valve must be repaired or replaced. a) Valves designed to operate on steam must be tested with saturated steam b) Valves designed to operate on liquid and compressible fluids other than steam must be tested with their normal service fluid at its normal service temperature. a) Ambient temperature of a valve, while installed in its operation environment, must be simulated during setpoint testing. b) The valve to be tested must be thermally stable prior to testing, with no more than a 10F fluctuation in thirty minutes. Safety and relief valve setpoints shall be verified in accordance with the technical specifications and the current in-service inspection programs and at a frequency specified in OM-1. See Item #6 above.
2.
Tolerances used for setpoint testing are determined from: a) Technical specifications b) Section III of the ASME Code. A valve failing to function properly during test shall be repaired or replaced.
3.
4.
Liquid service valves shall be tested with a liquid and compressible fluid valves shall be tested with a compressible fluid.
5.
Compensation for differences in test media temperature and operating media temperature is required.
6.
Safety and relief valve setpoints shall be verified in accordance with the technical specifications and the current in-service inspection programs. After the initial test schedule has been completed, all PRVs that have not been tested during the previous five years must be tested during the next refueling outage.
7.
C-16
Table C-6 SECTION XI / PTC 25.3 AND OM CODEGeneral Comparison Chart (cont.)
Section XI/ ASME ANSI-PTC 25.3 Requirements 8. If any valve in a system fails to meet acceptance criteria, additional valves shall be tested as determined by: N+12 X T, 60 Where, N=No. of months since previous test cycle. T=Total number of valves in test program. This requirement is based on similar valves in a system (i.e., may not be same type or manufacture). 9. If any valve within the expanded scope fails to meet the acceptance criteria, the all of the PRV within that system must be tested. A test supervisor shall be responsible for carrying out all tests. The test supervisor must meet the following qualifications: 1. A formal education in thermodynamics and fluid mechanics. 2. Two years experience in fluid flow mechanics. 3. Prior experience in test supervision. For final results, other than flow measurements, the measurement uncertainty is not expected to exceed 0.5%. The use of commercial metal-encased thermometers is prohibited. The code allows: 1. Testing in situ by manipulating the system pressure. 2. Testing in situ by an auxiliary lift device. 3. Removing the valve from the system and testing its performance on a test stand. Auxiliary lift devises must be calibrated with the final measurement uncertainty of the lift device 2%. Test stands with "limited" accumulator volumes may only be used to test for set pressure and seat leakage. See Section 2.5, Appendix C of this guide. ASME OM Code Requirements The utility may evaluate the need for additional testing if the valve does not exceed as found set point (see Section 2.5). This requirement is based on similar group of valves.
10. 11.
Owner establishes his program and qualifications. See Item #10 above.
12.
Combined instrument accuracy not to exceed 1%. (See Section 2.11, Appendix C of this guide.) Not Addressed. OM Appendix I allows: 1. Bench testing. 2. In situ testing with an auxiliary lift device.
13. 14.
15.
See Section 2.9, Appendix C of this guide.
16.
No specific size required.
C-17
Table C-6 SECTION XI / PTC 25.3 AND OM CODEGeneral Comparison Chart (cont.)
Section XI/ ASME ANSI-PTC 25.3 Requirements 17. When testing compressible fluid service valves, the test pressure should be raised to 90% of the setpoint and then increased 2 psi/sec until the set pressure is achieved. After a PRV has been repaired, a set pressure test is required. Test accumulator diameter should be ten times the valve nominal inlet size when testing compressible fluid valves and four times the valve nominal inlet size when testing liquid service valves. Seat tightness may be determined by seeing, hearing, or feeling. The duration of the setpoint test shall be that required to obtain the necessary performance and capacity data under stable conditions. ASME OM Code Requirements Not Addressed.
18.
After a PRV has been repaired, a set pressure test and seat tightness test is required. No specific size requirement.
19.
20.
Seat tightness determinations must be performed prior to "as found" testing and after the final "as left" set pressure test. Once the first test (as found) is completed, a waiting time of 10 minutes must elapse between successive lifts.
21.
C-18
APPENDIX D AUXILIARY LIFT DEVICES
1.0
Auxiliary Lift Devices
There are service applications where PRVs are welded to the system piping and there is no reasonable means to raise the system pressure to the set pressure of the valves. In these installations, the only means for verifying the set pressure is the use of an auxiliary lift device (ALD). There are also applications where the cost of removing the valve from the system is excessive and/or where raising the system pressure to self-actuate the PRVs would adversely affect it or other components installed in the system. In these applications, the use of an ALD is desirable. The concept behind ALDs is simple as shown in Figure D-1. The device applies an auxiliary lifting force in conjunction with the system pressure in order to cause a PRV to lift. Assist devices for the in situ determination of set pressure of PRVs generally consist of a means to apply an additional lifting load to the valve stem (spindle) with the PRV installed on the system and the system at a pressure below the valve set pressure (generally below the valves normal reseat (blowdown) pressure and in the range of 80% of the valves set pressure). The assist device applies an increasing lifting load to the valve stem (counteracting the spring load) until the spring load on the valve seat is in equilibrium with the pressure load (system pressure times effective seat area) as shown in Figure D-1. At this point, the valve opens. The valve opening may be characterized by a) an audible sound, b) a momentary drop in assist load, c) stem lift, and/or d) system fluid release. At the instant of valve opening, the assist load and the system pressure are noted and from these two values the perceived set pressure is determined. Assist devices may be operated manually, semi-automatically and/or fully automated to the extent that the perceived set pressure is calculated and all of the test variables, valve test set pressure, and valve data are recorded and printed so that a permanent record of the valve test may be maintained.
D-1
Calibrated Assist Device Spindle Assist Load
Spring
Spring Load
Disc
Pressure Load Seat Area Nozzle
F =
Spring Load
Pressure + Assist Load Load
where, F= Force at set pressure
Figure D-1 ALD Principle of Operation ALDs are recognized by the major regulatory codes: Section VII of the ASME B&PV Code NBBI publication NB-65. Appendix I of the ASME OM Code ASME/ANSI publication PTC-25.3 Note: ASME PTC-25.3 has been revised as ASME PTC-25 in 1994. There are generally three guidelines shared by all of the codes: ALDs are an acceptable means for setpoint verification. ALDs should be used only on systems containing compressible fluids. Blowdown cannot be measured using an ALD. 1.1 ALDs Used in the Industry
There are different types of ALDs currently used in the industry. The following subsections give a brief description of typical devices available and points out the more important factors that should be considered when using the ALD for PRV testing. Table D-1 is a general comparison of selected manufacturers of ALDs.
D-2
NOTE: Information on specific ALD equipment has been obtained from the vendor or supplier of such equipment. NMAC neither endorses or recommends any specific equipment. All information in this section is provided for reference only.
Table D-1 ALDs Used by the Industry

Requirement ASPD Assist Device Fluid Air Yes Crosby SPVD Yes HSPD No Dresser Hydroset No AVK Industries Ultrastar No Furmanite Trevitest Yes to Charge Yes Yes No No Yes
Liquid Mean Seat Area Orifice Size Uses Valve Stem Position Must know System Pressure
No No Yes No Yes
No No No* Yes Yes
Yes No Yes No Yes
Yes No Yes No Yes
-Yes No No ** Yes
* Must use manufacturers style and assembly number of the valve ** Uses acoustic sensor to determine valve open point ASPD = Air Set Pressure Device SPVD = Set Pressure Verification Device HSPD = Hydraulic Set Pressure Device
1.2
Crosby ALD Devices
Crosby has three types of ALDs that are being used in the industry. These devices are the older air set pressure device (ASPD), the new set pressure verification device (SPVD), and a more recently developed hydraulic set pressure device (HSPD). Two devices, the ASPD and SPVD, use air for the assist force but are very different in their method of determining the lift set pressure of the PRD as discussed later. The SPVD is more of a system then just a mounted testing device. The newer HSPD at present is used primarily for fossil boiler safety valve applications and will not be discussed in detail in this section. The HSPD concept is the same as the ASPD but uses a hydraulic fluid instead of air.
D-3
1.2.1
Crosby ASPD
Crosbys older ASPD (see Figure D-2) consists of a safety valve lifting device mounted on the bonnet of the safety valve (hand lifting gear assembly removed), an air operated lifting motor (diaphragm sealed air cylinder having a known effective area), and a pressure gage. The ALD applies and measures the differential force required to lift the safety valve with the actual system pressure force acting on the area of the valve seat below the spring setting of the valve. This force is evaluated in terms of valve spring force to determine the valves set pressure.
Manifold Assembly Pressure Gage Pressure Regulator
Air Motor
Upper Plate Studs Spindle Adapter Lower Plate Valve Spindle Valve Adj. Bolt
Base Plate Valve Bonnet
Air Set Pressure Device for Determining Valve Set Pressure with Type D or E Handlifting Lever Assembly Removed
Figure D-2 Crosby Air Set Pressure Device

D-4
1.2.1.1
Crosby ASPD Operation
Air pressure is applied by means of the air pressure regulator or manual control valve to the air inlet of the air motor. The resultant force is transmitted by the lower plate, through the spindle adapter, to the spindle of the valve, imposing a lifting force on the spindle and adding a lifting force in addition to the force from the pressure acting below the valves seat. When the total lifting force is equal to the spring load holding the valve closed, the valve will partially open, simmer, or audibly leak. The air pressure to the air motor at that point can be converted into valve differential set pressure from a chart of air motor pressure versus differential set pressure based on data that has been plotted from factory tests for a specific valve type, air motor size, and orifice size (see Figure D-3).
Figure D-3 Generic Crosby Graph for Air Set Pressure Device 1.2.1.2 Crosby ASPD Test Procedure Considerations
When preparing an in-plant test procedure for use of the Crosby ASPD, the following considerations, covered in the Crosby technical instruction on the device, should be considered: The system pressure for set pressure testing should be in the range of 15-25% below the set pressure of the valve. System pressure in the blowdown range of the valve ~4-10%, and system pressures below 25% of set pressure should be avoided. Air pressure to the air motor should be increased slowly by operating the pressure regulator. To determine when the valve starts to open requires the testing personnel to hear an audible leaking noise or see a vapor emitted. Both the reading of the air pressure gage, the manifold assembly, and the system (steam) pressure must be recorded at the same time. Determine the differential pressure using specified Crosby graphs.
D-5
Air Pressure
P P is the differential set pressure
This value of differential pressure when added to the system pressure is the safety valve set pressure. Normally, testing is repeated at least three times to average out data readings and more accurately establish the opening pressure of the valve. 1.2.1.3 Crosby ASPD Application
The following are application requirements that must be met to use the Crosby ASPD: The Crosby ASPD requires a source of air pressure for actuation of the air motor and sufficient head room and space for mounting the device on top of the valve. With air pressure of 100 psig available, the ASPD can be used for determining the set pressure of valves with a maximum recommended pressure differential beneath the valve as indicated below. Air Motor Size and Part No. 12 Sq. In. (SA-50601) Orifice F G H J K K K2 M, M1, M2 P Q R T Differential Pressure (PSIG) 2500 2500 1500 875 650 2200 1800 1350 825 475 325 200
50 Sq. In. (SA-50529)
1.2.2
Crosby SPVD Model
Crosbys latest style ALD, the SPVD, consists of two different types of head assemblies as shown in Figure D-4. A microprocessor, a signal conditioner, an integral printer, a CRT for review of test data, and a keyboard to provide operator interface are included in a portable module. The ALD applies a force by air pressure and measures the valve stem position. Valve stem movement determines when the safety valve starts to lift. The force applied by the air pressure acts along with the actual system pressure under of the valve seat. This force is evaluated in terms of valve spring force to determine the valves set pressure by the microprocessor. Special features of this model are: Valve stem position measured by a linear variable differential transformer. Uses a load cell to measure applied force. Can be supplied with either a bellows head or diaphragm head. Can be permanently mounted.
D-6
Human elements, such as visual reading, manual data recording, and calculating test results are avoided. Testing can be done from remote location; the test device operator does not need to be near the valve.
LVDT: Linear Variable Differential Transformer supplies rapid and accurate valve stem position to the microcontroller.
Load Cell: High resolution load cell provides continuous force data to the microcontroller to determine valve set pressure. Overtravel stop prevents SPVD from achieving full lift.
BELLOWS HEAD ASSEMBLY*
Bellows provide auxiliary lift upon pressurization.
Vent hole precludes possible condensation buildup and provides additional venting. SPVD may be adapted to any manufacturer's spring operated valves.
*Accommodates fixed installation on PWR pressurizer valves and BWR dual function valves as well as portable installation on PWR main steam safety relief valves.
Solenoid Valve: Fail safe solenoid valve controls bellows pressurization and is sequenced by the microcontroller to exhaust bellows chamber at end of the test.
LVDT Tension Stud Load Cell Flexible Diaphragm Load Plate (Movable)
DIAPHRAGM HEAD ASSEMBLY

In stainless steel, it is suitable for fixed installation on pressurizer valves and BWR dual function valves. In aluminum, its low weight and easy assembly facilitate portability for temporary installation on PWR steam relief valves. For system interface connections of the Diaphragm Head Assembly contact the factory. SPVD may be adapted to any manufacturer's spring operated valves.
Solenoid Valve
Pressure Relief Valve Set Pressure Adjustment
Figure D-4 Crosby Set Pressure Verification Device (SPVD)
D-7
1.2.3
Dresser Hydroset ALD
The Dresser Companys Hydroset ALD (see Figure D-5) consists of a safety valve lifting device mounted on the bonnet of the safety valve (hand lifting gear assembly removed), a hydraulic operated lift assist unit, a hydraulic pump, and a pressure gage. The Hydroset applies and measures the hydraulic pressure to lift the safety valve with the actual system pressure acting under of the valve seat. This hydraulic pressure is evaluated by the operator to determine the set pressure of the valve.
List assist unit
6 in. min.
Turnbuckle 13-1/2 in. Yoke
Gage
Pump
Figure D-5 Dresser Hydroset 1.2.3.1 Dresser Hydroset Operation
Hydraulic pressure is applied by means of a hand pump to the Hydroset unit. The resulting force is transmitted through the turnbuckle to the spindle of the valve, imposing a lifting force on the spindle along with the force of the pressure acting below the valve. When the total lifting force is equal to the spring load holding the valve closed, the valve will partially open, simmer, or audibly leak. The hydraulic pressure indicated by the pressure gage is recorded by the test personnel at the lift point. The Hydroset pressure and system pressure are used to determine the valves set pressure.
D-8
1.2.3.2
Dresser Test Procedure Considerations
When preparing an in-plant test procedure for the use of the Dresser device, the following considerations, covered in the Dresser technical instructions on the device, should be taken into account: The system pressure for set pressure testing should be in the range of 15-25% below the set pressure of the valve. Hydraulic pressure to the Hydroset should be increased slowly by operating the hand pump. To determine when the valve starts to open requires the testing personnel to hear an audible leaking noise or see a vapor emitted. Both the reading of the hydraulic pressure gage and the system (steam) pressure must be recorded at the same time. The Hydroset pressure as measured by the test gage must be adjusted by using the correction chart and for the test gage head if required. The corrected value of Hydroset pressure when added to the system pressure is the safety valve set pressure. The Hydroset unit must be vented and purged before using; any time the systems connections have been opened, and once per hour during use. Normally, the testing is repeated at least three times to average data readings and to more accurately establish the opening pressure of the valve. 1.2.3.3 Dresser Hydroset Application
The following are application requirements that must be met to use the Dresser Hydroset: The Hydroset device requires a hand pump for pressure actuation of the unit and sufficient head room and space for mounting the device on top of the valve. The corrected Hydroset test gage pressure must be corrected by the valve constant as determined by the valves orifice size.
1.2.4
Trevitest Furmanite ALD
The Trevitest ALD is designed to measure the set pressure of PSVs and to indicate the reseating pressure. The mounting device has a frame, hydraulic rams, and a load cell. A totally enclosed power pack provides the fluid used by the rams. The electronics consists of a proprietary two-channel analog recorder attached to the load cell with appropriate connections and leads. Figure D-6 shows the basic head assembly the device uses.
D-9
1.2.4.1 Trevitest ALD Operation

The Trevitest uses a hydraulic force to overcome the closing force of the valve spring. The applied force is measured by the load cell. A controlled release of the applied hydraulic force enables the reseating point to be established. The force required to lift the valve is provided by the hydraulic unit. The force measured by the load cell is displayed on the recorder chart. The chart graph reads in percent of the load cell used. For example, 50% of a 5000 lb cell would be 2500 lbs. The 2500 lb force is reduced by the weight of the active part of the device, which is 3 lbs without the reclosing ram. This number, 2497 lbs is divided by the mean seat area. The set pressure is determined by adding the system pressure to pressure defined by the load force divided by the mean seat area. The equation is as follows:
Ps = FLC W + PL MSA
where,
Ps PLC W = set pressure = force from load cell
= weight differential of reclosing ram MSA = mean seat area PL = system pressure
To determine the Mean Seat Diameter (MSD) (refer to Figure D-7),
MSD =
where,
ID + OD 2
ID = the inside seat diameter OD = the outside diameter
To determine the Mean Seat Area (MSA),
( MSD) MSA = 4
D-10
PUSH ROD NUT
CROSSHEAD BRIDGE
PUSH ROD NUT LOCATION PIN
SUPPORT PILLAR
LOCATION PIN
CROSSHEAD BRIDGE
HYDRAULIC RAMS
BAHCO COUPLER
HYDRAULIC RAM-LOWER
SUPPORT PILLAR
HYDRAULIC RAM-LOWER
BAHCO COUPLER SPINDLE
BAHCO COUPLER ADAPTOR PLATE
LOAD CELL
LOAD CELL ADAPTER PLATE FIXING SCREWS FOR LOAD CELL SPINDLE ADAPTING COLLAR
SHEAR PIN
GEAR BOX & COVER DRIVE HANDLE BASE PLATE
SUPPORT PILLAR
PILLAR LOCK SCREW
PILLAR BASE BASE SPINDLE
PILLAR BASE DRIVE HANDLE
FURMANITE TREVITEST
GEAR BOX
Figure D-6 Furmanite Trevitest Apparatus
D-11
Mean Seat Diameter (Required for Trevitest) ORIFICE
Figure D-7 Mean Seat Diameter 1.2.4.2 Trevitest Test Procedure Considerations
The following considerations should be taken into account when drafting a test procedure using the Trevitest: Only Trevitest personnel operate this equipment (this device is not sold for utility personnel use). Accurate set pressure results can only be obtained if the valves MSA is precisely known and verification has been performed. The system pressure acting on the seat at the time of testing must also be known. If lagging or removing insulation from the valve is required, a temperature correction is also required. 1.2.4.3 Trevitest Application
The following are application requirements that must be met to use the Trevitest: The Trevitest set pressure device requires a source of air (50 to 125 psi) pressure for charging the hydraulic power pack, and sufficient head room and space for mounting the device on top of the valve. With the power pack charged and a method to measure the system pressure established, the Trevitest can be used to determine the set pressure of a valve. The correct mean seat diameter must be known for calculating the MSA.
D-12
1.2.5
AVK Industries
AVK Industries of Jacksonville, FL, manufactures the Ultrastar ALD. The Ultrastars primary function is to verify the set pressure of safety and safety relief valves without having to remove the valve and shut down a system or unit. External force applied to the valve spindle coupled with system pressure and a true effective area are acquired and processed in real time. The end result is the valve set point. This is derived from the following equation:
Ps = F / A + Pt
where,
Ps F Pt = nameplate set pressure = force required to overcome seating force
A = effective area = inlet pressure at time of test
The Ultrastar claims to have in its database effective areas for most PRV types and configurations. As an engineering tool, the system can calculate custom seat areas provided the inlet (Pt) can be varied five times whereby the valve is popped twice at each interval. Force and inlet pressure are measured and brought into the microprocessor using high resolution data acquisition and precision transducers calibrated to +/- 0.1%. An electro-hydraulic control system fully automates the testing procedure and provides for constant ramp speed. The system software controls the feedback loop that continuously monitors actuator position. Once the proper valve data is entered into the valve database and the user performs the necessary automatic calibration, the test screen then instructs the user to begin the test. This is done by simply touching two function keys the close gripper and the start test. The user may also click on the buttons with a mouse. The custom robotic gripper arm then closes on the threaded spindle adaptor and begins applying force to the valve spindle (the operation of the PRV is never hampered during the entire test procedure). Should the valve hang up or leak after test, the user can instruct the system to perform a reclose operation whereby the closed gripper fingers apply force to the top of the spindle adapter. This takes place while the system continuously monitors safe force levels to prevent damage to valve spindle or disc. The system hardware is universal and can be mounted to most exposed spindle, spring-loaded PRVs. At the moment of valve opening, an acoustic sensor mounted on the valve body triggers the system software to trap and process the inlet and load data. It then instantly displays the test results in graphic and digital format. The results can then be stored, printed or exported.
D-13
APPENDIX E TEST BENCHES AND TEST SYSTEMS
1.0
Introduction
The design and size of each utilitys test facility is determined by the scope of repair and testing to be conducted. Considerations include pressure, temperature and service media of the PRV to be tested; accuracy of test results, the test methods and, the type and Code class of the device. The NBBIs VR symbol stamp Administrative Rules and Procedure NB-65 includes excellent guidance for the design of test facilities using compressible fluids. The jurisdiction in which a facility is located determines the necessity of obtaining and maintaining the VR symbol stamp. Some jurisdictions exclusively defer regulation of the facility to the NRC or do not have a specific requirement. However, the use of NB-65 guidelines in setting up a test bench facility is recommended. NB-65 applies to the repair and testing of ASME Code Section I PRVs and can be extended to apply to ASME Code Section III, Class 1, 2, or 3 PRVs. NB-65 provides guidance for sizing test accumulators in cubic feet versus the valve orifice area for saturated steam and air. The size of the test vessel depends on the size and the setpoint of the valve and whether blowdown is to be demonstrated. This appendix provides a simple overview of testing facilities and types of test arrangements. As always, valve manufacturers should be contacted for specific test instructions. The equipment required to test assemblies attached to valves such as actuators, solenoids, solenoid valves, etc. are not covered since this type of test equipment is valve-manufacturer specific. 2.0 Testing Techniques
Bench testing will typically use a combination of techniques for the performance of periodic testing. The test bench facility should, as a minimum, be able to perform the following types of tests: Seat tightness Set pressure Solenoid valve Actuator tests Figure E-1 through Figure E-4 show typical test bench setups used to perform the above tests on a Target Rock pilot operated PRV.
E-1
Gag Valve Assembly
Bonnet
Inlet Blank Flange
1/2 Inch Pressure Line
N2 Supply 1500 PSIG
Main Stage Seat
Figure E-1 Seat Tightness Test Setup
E-2
Pilot Stage Inlet
Second Stage Inlet
N2 Supply 1500 PSIG
Figure E-2 Set Pressure Test Setup
E-3
Air Operator Assembly
Solenoid Valve Electrical Junction Box
Inlet
Test Fixture 1/2 SAE Split Flange With 37 JIC Adapter Dual Solenoid Configuration Show, Setup Is Similar For Single Solenoid Configuration
Figure E-3 Solenoid Valve Test Setup
E-4
In Line Rotameter (Use Only When Performing Leak Test)
Dry Filtered Air Supply 70/110 PSIG
Independent Elec Conn
Figure E-4 Actuator Test Setup 3.0 Test Benches
The test bench or fixture used for this process can be as simple as a standpipe with a flange mounted at one end with a pressure source, a pressure regulating device, and a pressure gauge. Other test fixtures can be quite sophisticated with multiple flange mounting options, automatic performance of the test, and chart recorders to document the setpoint data. The bench type needed depends on the number and types of PRVs that will be tested, Code requirements, and available space.
NOTE: When performing tests on a test bench, valve blowdown cannot be determined.
4.0
Test Bench Arrangement
The following are some general requirements for test benches. A typical test bench is shown in Figure E-5: The test bench feed valve should be of sufficient size to permit accurate controlled flow to the PRD being tested.
E-5
The piping connecting the test vessel to the PRV should be short and sized to assure that correct inlet pressure at the valve inlet is recorded. The pressure sensing lines should be connected to the test vessel away from inlet and outlet openings to avoid transient flow velocity during tests that cause erroneous inlet pressure readings. The test vessel should have a length-to-diameter ratio as low as practical with a pressure relief valve installed to provide overpressure protection for the vessel. The PRD discharge (to a safe place) during testing should be considered when designing the testing system. The air (or N2) used as test fluid supply should be clean, dry, and filtered.
E-6
Flowmeter Isolated VDC Power Supply (125 VDC) Test Gauge (0-200 PSI) Test Gauge N2 Regulator
Connect to Plant Air Or N2 Supply (120 PSI)
N2 Supply (Shown for Reference)
Test Fixture Test Fixture
Service Cabinet
Figure E-5 Typical Air/N2 Test Bench Arrangement
E-7
If the test bench is to be designed for testing with steam (not shown): Pressure supply should be capable of supplying pressure and steam at 98% quality. Fluid discharge from the valve should be contained, if radioactive. Pressure gauges should be installed to assure they are not effected by the system. Safety valves being tested are to be insulated to the extent required during plant operation. The test bench must be designed with sufficient room to accommodate installation of insulation on the safety valve being tested. Test bench instrumentation should be of sufficient accuracy to perform the measurement task. Critical measurements should be displayed on an ordinate chart or digital display. All instruments shall be calibrated to standards and traceable to the NIST. Test instrumentation must be capable of determining valve set pressure within the limits required by the Code to which it is being tested. The following are general recommendations for test bench instrumentation: A recording instrument: oscillograph recorder, visual recorder or brush type recorder with minimum chart speed of 8-inches/second to record the test events. A pressure transducer to monitor inlet pressure. Various pressure gauges that meet accuracy and range requirements to monitor test pressure for ready reference during performance of the test. This allows pressure transducer output to be correlated with gauge pressure to permit compensation of transducer drift. An LVDT or accelerometer to measure disc motion. A signal marker to indicate energized and deenergized solenoid assemblies. 5.0 Test System Design
This section provides general recommendations for the design of a test system using compressible fluids (i.e., steam or air/gas) and permits the determination of PRV set pressure and valve opening characteristics. The physical size of the required test vessel depends on the size of the valve, its set pressure, the design of the test system, and whether blowdown is to be demonstrated. It is beyond the scope of this section to specify test equipment or facilities to fully evaluate the performance of some PRV designs that require testing at maximum allowable overpressure. For steam testing, a test line from a boiler or other source to the test system should connect to the test vessel and not directly to the safety relief valve. This will limit the amount of energy that can be released if a valve failure occurs. This also allows the testing of PRVs at any pressure up to the boilers supply pressure. Testing facilities should have the ability to thermally stabilize safety valves prior to testing. Thermal stabilization can be achieved by enclosing the bonnet/solenoid/air operator portion of the assembly in a temperature controlled test chamber. The use of
E-8
bonnet heaters installed on the exterior surface of the bonnet to accelerate safety valve heat-up is not recommended as they can cause local hot spots and not simulate the installed condition of the valve. The bonnet heaters must be off during the course of testing. Temperature sensors can be installed at specific locations on the valves being tested. Typical safety valve thermocouple locations are shown on Figures E-6 and E-7. If the test system medium source is of small capacity, a system configuration as shown in Figure E-8 could be used. The test medium from the pressure source, usually a compressor or a boiler, is supplied to a test accumulator if full flow testing is to be done. It then flows through a pressure controlling valve into the test vessel. The pressure controlling valve is usually a globe valve, although any throttling valve is acceptable. If the pressure controlling valve is of adequate size and can quickly open, large flows can be generated increasing the pressure above the PRV set pressure. This causes the valve to lift and be sustained in its lifted condition. Figure E-9 is a simpler test system in which the test vessel is pressurized directly from the pressure source without the use of an accumulator. Flow rates through the PRV and any consequent overpressure are dependent on the flow generating capacity of the pressure source. However, as stated above for steam testing, source isolation is recommended due to the energy release if valve failure occurs. If an isolation valve is installed between the PRV and the test medium it should be of sufficient size as to not restrict the test medium source flow to the PRV. Piping between the two valves should not contribute to any unnecessary pressure drops between the test vessel and the PRV. If the facility is designed to perform full flow testing, all valves and adapter flanges or test nozzles must be of a design to sustain PRV discharge forces and secured to prevent transmitting the forces to the test vessel. If limited (bench type) testing is being performed and valve lift is to be limited during test, design the facility to sustain these forces only. All pressure sensing lines should be connected to the test vessel away from inlet and outlet nozzles where transient flow velocity during testing could cause erroneous pressure readings. When testing with steam, any water head that develops in the gauge line must be taken into consideration. In the case of steam, the equipment should be insulated and steam traps or drains should be installed to assure a saturated steam quality of at least 98%.
E-9
Cap, Screwed Thermocouples Compression Screw
Bonnet Spring Stem Guide
Bellows Body Disc Holder Disc Guide Pin
Nozzle
Thermocouples
Figure E-6 Typical PRD Thermocouple Locations
E-10
T/C 2 Upper Bonnet
T/C 1 (Ambient)
4 to 6"
18" to 20"
T/C 3 Lower Bonnet 4 to 6"
6 to 8"
T/C 4 Body
Test Drum
Figure E-7 Typical PRD Thermocouple Arrangement
E-11
Accumulator
Test Medium Source
Drain Test Valve Block Valve and Bypass
Trap
Gauges
Test Vessel Control Valve and Bypass
Drain
Trap
Figure E-8 Small Test Source
Test Medium Source
Test Valve
Block Valve and Bypass
Gauges
Test Vessel Control Valve and Bypass
Drain
Trap
Figure E-9 Large Capacity Test Source
E-12
6.0
Test Vessel Sizing
It is recognized that there are practical limits to the size and maximum pressure of a test vessel used to demonstrate PRV operational characteristics. In such cases, set pressure remains the only viable test option. The recommended minimum size test vessel (15 cubic feet) should be adequate for setpoint testing purposes. Appendix C to NB-65 is a good source to determine the size of the test vessel when a full flow blowdown test is to be performed. 7.0 Typical Test Procedure
The following is a typical test procedure for verifying set pressure in a spring operated safety relief valve used in steam service: Action Steps: 1. Perform a visual inspection of valve inlet and outlet flanges for any condition that would affect the proper mating at these areas. 2. The valve will be installed on the test bench in its normal operating position with its normal insulating material installed. The cap assembly will be removed and a gag installed to restrict the lift of the valve. 3. If the valve is large enough, a LVDT can be installed on the valve to measure the lift of the disc. 4. If size permits, thermocouples and a pressure transducer can be mounted on the valve, and a recording instrument can be connected to all instruments to record test events. 5. The valve should be thermally stabilized by installing a temperature chamber around the valve and heated until thermal equilibrium is achieved. This can be done at the test facility to achieve ambient conditions followed by additional heatup over on the test stand for inlet fluid conditions. A typical thermal equilibrium is defined in OM-1 Appendix I as when the valve body temperature does not change more than 10F in 30 minutes as measured directly. Upon achieving thermal equilibrium as defined above, hold the system at steadystate conditions for a 30 minute period. If at any time thermal equilibrium is disturbed, it must be reestablished and the 30 minute holding period repeated. 6. At this point, the set pressure test is ready to be performed. Raise steam pressure until the valve disc lifts off its seat. A total of three consecutive set pressure tests shall be performed. The safety valve set pressure must be within the prescribed set pressure and tolerance limits. If the valve requires adjustment during the tests, all initial conditions must be reestablished and three consecutive tests performed until a satisfactory set pressure is obtained. 7. At the completion of the set pressure test, a leak check will be performed by passing the test defined by the owner.
E-13
8. Test results can now be reviewed for accuracy and quality. The certification test report shall include a brief summary of test events, test data, and a record of instrumentation used with their calibration information.
E-14
APPENDIX F GLOSSARY
3.0 Terms, Abbreviations, and Symbols Technical terms related to safety and relief devices as used in this guide are consistent with those in Appendix I of PTC-25.3 (1988). (Note: ASME PTC-25.3 has been revised as ASME PTC-25 in 1994.) Other terms specific to this document are noted with an asterisk (*). Abbreviations and symbols are defined in the beginning of this guide. Terms, abbreviations and symbols that are commonly and unambiguously used in the industry are not included. 3.1 Glossary of Terms
*accumulation. Pressure increase over the set pressure of a PRV usually expressed in percentage of set pressure. actual discharge area. Measured minimum net area that determines the flow through a valve. aging. The deterioration of a valve caused by extended service with no preventive maintenance. approach channel. The passage through which the fluid must pass to reach the operating parts of a PRD. auxiliary lift device (ALD). A pneumatic, hydraulic, or mechanical device used on PRVs that applies the differential force required to lift the valve disc at a system pressure below the set pressure. It is used to determine the valve set pressure. backpressure. The static pressure that exists at the outlet of a PRD due to pressure in the discharge system. balanced safety valve. A PRV that incorporates means to minimize the effect of backpressure on the operational characteristics (opening pressure, closing pressure, and relieving capacity). bellows. A flexible shield designed with an effective pressure area equal to the seat area of the disc to seal it from the effects of pressure in the valve body. blowdown. The difference between the actual popping pressure of a PRV and an actual reseating pressure expressed as a percentage of set pressure or in pressure units.
F-1
bore area. The minimum cross-sectional flow area of the nozzle. bore diameter. The minimum diameter of the nozzle. built-up backpressure. Pressure existing at the outlet of a PRD occasioned by the flow through that particular device into a discharge system. capacity (measured relieving). The relieving capacity of a PRD measured at the flowrating pressure, expressed in gravimetric or volumetric units. capacity (marked or rated relieving). The portion of the measured relieving capacity permitted by the applicable code or regulation to be used as a basis for the application of a PRD. chatter. Abnormal rapid reciprocating motion of the moveable parts of a PRV in which the disc contacts the seat. closing pressure. The value of decreasing inlet static pressure at which the valve disc reestablishes contact with the seat or at which lift becomes zero. cold differential set pressure or cold differential test pressure (CDTP). The inlet static pressure at which a PRV is adjusted to open on the test stand. This test includes corrections for service conditions of backpressure and/or temperature. compressible fluid. System or test fluid which experiences a significant change in volume with a change in pressure (e.g., steam, air, nitrogen). conventional safety relief valve. A PRV that has its spring housing vented to the discharge side of the valve. The operational characteristics (opening pressure, closing pressure, and relieving capacity) are directly affected by changes of the backpressure on the valve. curtain area. The area of the cylindrical or conical discharge opening between the seating surfaces created by the lift of the disc above the seat. *delay time (pilot-operated PRDs). The time between the opening of the pressure sensing pilot and the initial movement of the main valve disc which causes the relieving of primary pressure. developed lift. The actual travel of the disc from a closed position to the position reached when the valve is at flow-rating pressure. disc. The pressure containing the moveable element of a PRV that effects closure. *discharge channel. The passage through which the fluid must pass beyond the operating parts of a PRD. *environmental qualification (EQ). A term generally used to refer to qualification data that demonstrates that a device will operate as required under nuclear accident conditions associated with loss-of-coolant accidents and other types of pipe breaks. These hypothesized accidents cause pressurized steam, water/chemical spray, and radiation conditions within certain plant areas. The most severe environmental conditions generally occur inside primary containment structures.
F-2
*equipment qualification. A term referring to the accumulated testing experience and analysis data, including environmental and seismic qualification data, that demonstrates that a device will operate as required under normal, abnormal, and nuclear accident conditions. (Often confused with the term environmental qualification of EQ.) flutter. Abnormal, rapid reciprocating motion of the moveable parts of a PRV in which the disc does not contact the seat. *gag. A mechanical device installed on a safety valve to restrict or prevent valve lift or otherwise limit or prevent flow through the valve. huddling chamber. The annular chamber pressure located beyond the valve seat for the purpose of generating a popping characteristic. *incompressible fluid. System or test fluid which does not experience a significant change in volume with increasing pressure (e.g., water). inlet size. The nominal pipe size of the inlet of a PRV unless otherwise designated.
*in situ. Safety valve testing performed with the valve installed on the system it is protecting.
leak test pressure. The specified inlet static pressure at which a quantitative or seat leakage test is performed in accordance with a standard procedure. lift. The actual travel of the disc away from closed position when a valve is relieving. nozzle. A pressure containing element which constitutes the inlet flow passage and includes the fixed portion of the seat closure. opening pressure. The value of increasing inlet static pressure of a PRV at which there is a measurable lift or when discharge becomes continuous as determined by seeing, feeling or hearing. outlet size. The nominal pipe size of the outlet of a PRV unless otherwise designed. overpressure. A pressure increase over the set pressure of a safety valve, usually expressed as percentage of set pressure. pilot valve. An auxiliary valve that actuates a major relieving device. pilot-operated pressure relief valve. A PRV in which the major relieving device is combined with and is controlled by a self-actuated auxiliary pressure valve. popping pressure. The value of increasing inlet static pressure at which the disc moves in the opening direction at a faster rate as compared with corresponding movement at higher or lower pressures. It applies only to safety or safety relief valves on compressible fluid service. power-actuated pressure relief valve/power-operated relief valve (PORV). A pressure valve in which the major relieving device is combined with and is controlled by another device requiring an external source of energy.
F-3
pressure containing member (of a PRD). A part which is in actual contact with the pressure media in the protected vessel. pressure relief device (PRD). A device designed to prevent internal fluid pressure from rising above a predetermined maximum pressure in a pressure vessel exposed to emergency or abnormal conditions. pressure relief valve (PRV). A PRV is a spring-loaded PRD designed to open to relieve excess pressure and to reclose and prevent the further flow of fluid after normal conditions have been restored. It is characterized by a rapid opening pop action or by gradually opening proportional to the increase in pressure over the opening pressure. Depending on design, adjustment, or application, it may be used for either compressible or incompressible fluids. pressure retaining member (of a PRD). A part that is stressed due to its function in holding one or more pressure containing members in position (also see ASME Section III Paragraph NX-3591). rated relieving capacity. That portion of the measured relieving capacity permitted by the applicable code or regulation to be used as a basis for the application of a PRD. rated lift. The design lift at which a valve attains its rated capacity. relief valve. A PRV actuated by inlet static pressure having a gradual lift generally proportional to the increase in pressure over the opening pressure. It may be provided with an enclosed spring housing suitable for closed discharge system application and is primarily used for liquid service. resealing pressure. The value of decreasing inlet static pressure at which no further leakage is detected after closing. The method of detection may be a specified water seal on the outlet or other appropriate means for the application. reseating pressure. See closing pressure. safety-relief valve. A PRV characterized by rapid opening or pop action, or by opening in proportion to the increase in pressure over the opening pressure, depending on application. May be used for liquid or compressible fluids. safety valve. A PRV actuated by static pressure and characterized by rapid opening or pop action. It is normally used for steam and air service. seat. The pressure containing contact between the fixed and moving portions of the pressure containing elements of a valve. seat angle. The angle between the axis of a valve and the seating surface. A flat seated valve has a seat angle of 90. seat area. The area determined by the seat diameter. seat diameter. The smallest diameter of contact between the fixed and moving portions of the pressure containing elements of a valve.
F-4
seat tightness pressure. The specified inlet static pressure at which a quantitative seat leakage test is performed in accordance with a standard procedure. set pressure. The value of increasing inlet static pressure at which a safety valve displays the operational characteristics as defined under opening pressure, popping pressure, or start-to-leak pressure. It is one of the pressure values stamped on the safety valve nameplate. setpoint. The system pressure in pounds per square inch at which the disc begins to lift off the seat. simmer. The audible or visible escape of fluid between the seat and disc at an inlet static pressure below the popping pressure and at no measurable capacity. It applies to safety or safety relief valves on compressible fluid service. stamped set pressure. A value of pressure stamped on a PRD nameplate required by the applicable code or regulation that specifies the set pressure of that device. start-to-discharge pressure. See opening pressure start-to-leak pressure. The value of increasing inlet static pressure at which the first bubble occurs when a PRV is tested by means of air under a specified water seal on the outlet. stem gag. A mechanical device installed on a safety valve stem to restrict or prevent valve lift (see gag). superimposed backpressure. The static pressure existing at the outlet of a PRD at the time the device is required to operate resulting from pressure in the discharge system from other sources. theoretical relieving capacity. The computed capacity expressed in gravimetric or volumetric units of a theoretically perfect nozzle having a minimum cross-sectional area equal to the actual discharge area of a PRV or relief area of a non-reclosing PRD. wire drawing. Erosion of the seat and disc caused by escaping steam. valve group. Valves of the same manufacturer, type system application, and service media.
F-5
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Program: Nuclear Power
TR-105872
1996 Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), Inc. All rights reserved. Electric Power Research Institute and EPRI are registered service marks of the Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. EPRI. ELECTRIFY THE WORLD is a service mark of the Electric Power Research Institute, Inc. Printed on recycled paper in the United States of America
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Safety and Relief Valve Testing and Maintenance Guide

Safety and Relief Valve Testing and Maintenance Guide

Electric Power Research Institute

Safety and Relief Valve Testing and Maintenance Guide

Prepared by QES Inc. One Shell Square New Orleans, LA 70139

DISCLAIMER OF WARRANTIES AND LIMITATION OF LIABILITIES

EPRI Licensed Material Nuclear Maintenance Applications Center

6.6 6.7 7.0

Summary ........................................................................................................................... 8-70

2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3

4-11 4-12 4-13 4-14 4-15 4-16 4-17 4-18

C-1 C-2 C-3 C-4 C-5 C-6 D-1

EPRI Licensed Material Nuclear Maintenance Applications Center

Section 6 Section 7 Section 8

EPRI Licensed Material Nuclear Maintenance Applications Center

Figure 4-1 Typical Safety, Safety Relief, and Relief Valve

Cap Adjusting Screw Bonnet (closed)

OUTLET VALVE SEAT

Primary pressure zone Nozzle

EPRI Licensed Material Nuclear Maintenance Applications Center

PRV Design Theory

EPRI Licensed Material Nuclear Maintenance Applications Center

Valve Seat (Bevel)

Figure 4-3a Simple PRV Disc with Bevel Seat

Enlarged Disc Area

INLET Valve Closed

INLET Valve Opened

EPRI Licensed Material Nuclear Maintenance Applications Center

FLOW VALVE INLET

Flat-Seated Valve Curtain area = surface of cylinder = DL

Bevel-Seated Valve D + DB Curtain area = surface of frustrum of cone = B 2

Bevel-Seated Valve D + DB Curtain area = surface of frustrum of cone = B 2

Bevel-Seated Valve D + DB Curtain area = surface of frustrum of cone = B 2

Radial-Seated Valve D + DB Curtain area = surface of frustrum of cone = B 2

Radial-Seated Valve D + DB Curtain area = surface of frustrum of cone = B 2

Figure 4-5 Typical Curtain Areas of Pressure Relief Valves

EPRI Licensed Material Nuclear Maintenance Applications Center

Full-Lift Safety Valve Designs and Full-Bore Safety Valves

SAFETY VALVE CLOSED Disk

VALVE SEAT (FLAT)

VALVE SEAT (FLAT)

Figure 4-6 (a-b) Pressure Relief Valve Control Rings

EPRI Licensed Material Nuclear Maintenance Applications Center

FULL CAPACITY LIFT

100% CLOSES SECONDARY LIFT 80%

OPENS 60% POP LIFT 40%

4% MAX BLOWDOWN FINAL CLOSING

EPRI Licensed Material Nuclear Maintenance Applications Center

Safety Relief and Relief Valves

Bonnet Spring Bonnet Vent Plugged Body Bonnet Vent Open

Nozzle CONVENTIONAL (a) BALANCED (b)

Disc Holder Disc

Set Screw Nozzle

EPRI Licensed Material Nuclear Maintenance Applications Center

Spring Bonnet Spring FS

Backpressure Increases Set Pressure

Conventional (Non-Bellows) Safety Relief Valves

EPRI Licensed Material Nuclear Maintenance Applications Center

Piston Seal Main Valve Disc (Piston) Seat

Inlet Main Valve

Dome (Process Pressure Valve Closed)

Diaphragm Outlet Seat and Main Valve Disc Main Valve

Inlet Pressure Pickup