Nial vs.

Bayadog
328 SCRA 122
Facts:

Pepito Nial was married to TeodulIa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out oI their marriage
were born herein petitioners. Pepito resulting to her death on April 24, 1985 shot TeodulIa.
One year and 8 months thereaIter or on December 24, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma
Bayadog got married without any marriage license. In lieu thereoI, Pepito and Norma executed
an aIIidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that
they had lived together as husband and wiIe Ior at least 5 years and were thus exempt Irom
securing a marriage license.
AIter Pepito`s death on February 19, 1997, petitioners Iiled a
petition Ior declaration oI nullity oI the marriage oI Pepito and Norma alleging that the said
marriage was void Ior lack oI a marriage license.

Issue:
What nature oI cohabitation is contemplated under Article 76 oI the Civil Code (now Article
34 oI the Family Code) to warrant the counting oI the 5-year period in order to exempt the
Iuture spouses Irom securing a marriage license.

Ruling:
The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back Irom the date oI
celebration oI marriage, should be a period oI legal union had it not been Ior the absence oI the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years immediately beIore the day oI the marriage
and it should be a period oI cohabitation characterized by exclusivity-meaning no third party
was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity is unbroken.
Any marriage subsequently contracted during the liIetime oI the Iirst spouse shall be illegal
and void, subiect only to the exception in cases oI absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. In this case, at the time Pepito and respondent`s marriage, it cannot be
said that they have lived with each other as husband and wiIe Ior at least 5 years prior to their
wedding day. From the time Pepito`s Iirst marriage was dissolved to the time oI his marriage
with respondent, only
about 20 months had elapsed. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started
cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had
already been separated in Iact Irom his lawIul spouse.
The subsistence oI the marriage even where there is was actual
severance oI the Iilial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by
either spouse with any third party as being one as 'husband and wiIe. Having determined that
the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement oI a
marriage license, it is
void ab initio because oI the absence oI such element.

Manzano vs. Sanchez
A.M. No. MT1-00-1329 March 8. 2001
Facts:

Complainant avers that she was the lawIul wiIe oI the late David Manzano, having been
married to him in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City. Four
children were born out oI that marriage. However, her husband contracted another marriage
with one Luzviminda Payao beIore respondent Judge. When respondent Judge solemnized said
marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was
void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were
"separated."
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims that when he
oIIiciated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was
legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wiIe
Ior seven years already without the beneIit oI marriage, as maniIested in their ioint aIIidavit.
According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised
the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then
prayed that the complaint be dismissed Ior lack oI merit and Ior being designed merely to
harass him. AIter an evaluation oI the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator
recommended that respondent Judge be Iound guilty oI
gross ignorance oI the law and be ordered to pay a Iine oI P2,000, with a warning that a
repetition oI the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

Issues:
1) Whether or not convalidation oI the second union oI the
respondent Ialls under the purview oI Article 34 oI the Family Code.
2) Whether or not Respondent Judge is guilty oI gross ignorance oI the law.

Ruling:
For this provision on legal ratiIication oI marital cohabitation to apply, the Iollowing requisites
must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wiIe Ior at least Iive
years beIore the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The Iact oI absence oI legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time oI
marriage;
4. The parties must execute an aIIidavit stating that they have lived together Ior at least Iive
years and are without legal impediment to marry each other; and
5. The solemnizing oIIicer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the
qualiIications oI the parties and that he had Iound no legal impediment to their marriage. Not
all oI these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is signiIicant to note that in their
separate aIIidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to beIore respondent Judge himselI,
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the Iact oI their prior existing
marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were "separated."
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment
impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. Neither can respondent
Judge take reIuge on the Joint AIIidavit oI
David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as husband and
wiIe Ior seven years. Just like separation, Iree and voluntary cohabitation with another person
Ior at least Iive years does not severe the tie oI a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly,
respondent Judge demonstrated
gross ignorance oI the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

Cosca vs. Palaypayon
237 SCRA 249
Facts:

Same. Article 27-34; Emphasis to the marriage oI Abellano and Edralin, Judge Palaypayon
admitted that he solemnized their marriage, but he claims that it was under Article 34 oI the
Family Code, so a marriage license was not required. The contracting parties here executed a
ioint aIIidavit that they have been living together as husband and wiIe Ior almost six (6) years
already.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent iudge solemnization oI such marriage with the exception oI a
marriage license under Article 34 oI the Family Code is valid.

Ruling:
In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was solemnized, it was
stated that Abellano was only 18 years, 2 months and 7 days old. II he and Edralin had been
living together as husband and wiIe Ior almost 6 years already beIore they got married as they
stated in their ioint aIIidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years old when he started
living with Edralin as his wiIe and this is hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon should have been
aware oI this when he solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to ascertain the qualiIication
oI the contracting parties who might have executed a Ialse ioint aIIidavit in order to have an
instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license requirement.
This act oI Judge Palaypayon oI solemnizing the marriage oI
Abellano and Edralin Ior the second time with a marriage license already only gave rise to the
suspicion that the Iirst time he solemnized the marriage it was only made to appear that it was
solemnized under exceptional character as there was not marriage license and Judge
Palaypayon had already signed the marriage certiIicate.

Mariategui vs. CA
G.R. No. L-57062 1anuary 24. 1992
Facts:

Lupo Mariategui contracted three marriages during his liIetime. On his Iirst wiIe, Eusebia
Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he begot Iour children, Baldomera, Maria del
Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. With his second wiIe, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter
named Cresenciana. And his third wiIe, Felipa Velasco, he begot three children, namely
Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. At the time oI Lupo`s death he leIt certain properties with which he
acquired when he was still unmarried. Lupo died without a will. Upon his death, descendants
Irom his Iirst and second marriages executed a deed oI extraiudicial partition on Lot No. 163.
However, the children on Lupo`s
third marriage Iiled with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that they were
deprive on the partition oI Lot No. 163 which were owned by their common Iather. The
petitioners, children on Iirst and second marriage, Iiled a counterclaim to dismiss the said
complaint. Trial court denied the motion to dismiss and also the complaint by the respondents,
children on third marriage. Respondents elevated the case on CA on the ground that the trial
court committed an error Ior not Iinding the third marriage to be lawIully married and also in
holding respondents are not legitimate children oI their said parents. CA rendered a decision
declaring all the children and
descendants oI Lupo, including the respondents, are entitled to equal shares oI estate oI their
Iather. However, petitioners Iiled a motion Ior reconsideration oI said decision.

Issue:
Whether or not respondents were able to prove their succession
rights over the said estate.

Ruling:
With respect to the legal basis oI private respondents' demandIor partition oI the estate oI Lupo
Mariategui, the Court oI Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are legitimate children
oI the deceased. Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawIully
married in or about 1930. This Iact is based on the declaration
communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who testiIied that "when his Iather was still
living, he was able to mention to him that he and his mother were able to get married beIore a
Justice oI the Peace oI Taguig, Rizal." The spouses deported themselves as husband and wiIe,
and were known in the community to be such. Although no marriage certiIicate was
introduced to this eIIect, no evidence was likewise oIIered to controvert these Iacts. Moreover,
the mere Iact that no record oI the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided
all requisites Ior its validity are present. Under these circumstances, a marriage may be
presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a
woman, deporting themselves as husband and wiIe, have entered into a lawIul contract oI
marriage; that a child born in lawIul wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or Irom bed and
board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course oI nature
and the ordinary habits oI liIe.



Republic vs 1ose Dayot
Facts:

Jose was introduced to Felisa in 1986. He later came to live as a boarder in Felisa`s house, the
latter being his landlady. Later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall,
so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother Irom Saudi. At the PSH, upon a pre-
arranged signal Irom Felisa, a man bearing three Iolded pieces oI paper approached them.
They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to
Felisa. He initially reIused to do so. However, Felisa caioled him, and told him that his reIusal
could get both oI them killed by her brother who had learned about their relationship.
Reluctantly, he signed the pieces oI paper, and gave them to the man who immediately leIt. It
was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He
alleged that he saw a piece oI paper lying on top oI the table at the sala oI Felisa`s house.
When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy oI his marriage contract with
Felisa. When he conIronted Felisa, she said she does not know oI such. Felisa denied Jose`s
allegations and deIended the validity oI their marriage. She declared that they had maintained
their relationship as man and wiIe absent the legality oI marriage in the early part oI 1980, but
that she had deIerred contracting marriage with him on account oI their age diIIerence. In her
pre-trial brieI, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter
contracted marriage with a certain RuIina Pascual (RuIina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June
1993, Felisa Iiled an action Ior bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she Iiled an administrative
complaint against Jose with the OIIice oI the Ombudsman, since Jose and RuIina were both
employees oI the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. The Ombudsman Iound Jose
administratively liable Ior disgraceIul and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty
oI suspension Irom service Ior one year without emolument. The RTC ruled against Jose
claiming that his story is impossible and that his action oI Iraud has already prescribed. It cited
Article 87oI the New Civil Code which requires that the action Ior annulment oI marriage must
be commenced by the iniured party within Iour years aIter the discovery oI the Iraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action to Iile an action to nulliIy a marriage due to Iraud is subiect
to prescription.

HELD: The OSG avers that Jose is deemed estopped Irom assailing the legality oI his
marriage Ior lack oI a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together
Irom 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose`s subsequent marriage to RuIina Pascual on 31
August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years beIore he sought the declaration oI nullity;
hence, estoppel had set in.This is erroneous. An action Ior nullity oI marriage is
imprescriptible. Jose and Felisa`s marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other
conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a
void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.

Domingo vs. CA
226 SCRA 572
Facts:

Delia Domingo, private respondent, Iiled a petition beIore RTC oI Pasig Ior the declaration oI
nullity oI marriage and separation oI property against Roberto Domingo, petitioner. She
alleged that they were married at Carmona, Cavite with evidences oI marriage certiIicate and
marriage license, unknown to her, petitioner had a previous marriage with Emerlina dela Paz
which is still valid and existing. She came to know the prior marriage when Emerlina sued
them Ior bigamy. She prays that their marriage be declared null and void and, as a
consequence, to declare that she is the exclusive owner oI all properties she acquired during the
marriage and to recover them Irom him.
Roberto moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the
marriage being void ab initio, the petition oI declaration oI nullity is unnecessary. It added that
private respondent has no property which in his possession.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent may claim Ior the declaration oI nullity oI marriage and separation
oI property against petitioner on the ground oI bigamy.

Ruling:
There is no question that the marriage oI petitioner and private
respondent celebrated while the Iormer's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was
still subsisting is bigamous. As such, it is Irom the beginning. Petitioner himselI does not
dispute the absolute nullity oI their marriage. The Court had ruled that no iudicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity oI a void, bigamous marriage. The Family Code has
clearly provided the eIIects oI the declaration oI nullity oI marriage, one oI which is the
separation oI property according
to the regime oI property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court
beIore whom the issue oI nullity oI a Iirst marriage is brought is likewise clothed with
iurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties.



Nial vs. Bayadog
328 SCRA 122
Facts:
Same. Article 35

Issue:
Whether or not the second marriage oI plaintiIIs' deceased Iather with deIendant is null and
void ab initio.

Ruling:
Any marriage subsequently contracted during the liIetime oI the Iirst spouse shall be illegal
and void, subiect only to the exception in cases oI absence or where the prior marriage was
dissolved or annulled. The subsistence oI the marriage even where there is was actual
severance oI the Iilial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by
either spouse with any third party as being one as 'husband and wiIe. Having determined that
the second marriage involve in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement oI a
marriage license, it is void ab initio because oI the absence oI such element.

Republic vs. CA and Molina
February 13. 1997
Facts:

On April 14, 1985, plaintiII Roridel O. Molina married Reynaldo Molina which union bore a
son. AIter a year oI marriage, Reynaldo showed signs oI "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a
husband and a Iather as he preIerred to spend more time with his peers and Iriends, depended
on his
parents Ior aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wiIe in regard to their Iinances,
resulting in Irequent quarrels between them. The RTC granted Roridel petition Ior declaration
oI nullity oI her marriage which was aIIirmed by the CA.

Issue:
Whether or not irreconcilable diIIerences and conIlicting
personalities constitute psychological incapacity.

Ruling:
The Iollowing guidelines in the interpretation and application oI Art. 36 oI the Family Code are
hereby handed down Ior the guidance oI the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden oI prooI to show the nullity oI the marriage belongs to the plaintiII. Any doubt
should be resolved in Iavor oI the existence and continuation oI the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity.