ECHEGARAY v.

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE FACTS: The DOJ, through the Department of Justice, filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration on the January 4, 1999 issuance of the Supreme Court of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray. The DOJ, represented by the Solicitor General, argued that the Court no longer has the authority to grant the TRO because: 1. That the Court lost its jurisdiction the moment it rendered its judgment that is already final and executory; 2. That it is encroaching on the powers specifically vested by the Supreme Court to the executive department in granting the TRO; 3. That the purpose sought to be achieved by the TRO is nil due to certain supervening events that transpired. ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered. RULING: No, the Court was within its authority when it granted the TRO despite the final and executory judgment having been rendered already. 1. The Court did not lose its jurisdiction when it granted the TRO. In its decision, it categorically answered the contention of the plaintiff in such that it is not changing its judgment. The Court is merely suspending its execution temporarily. It was emphasized tht the Court, in rendering the judgment lost its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same, but it retained its power to execute and enforce it. It was further stated that the power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction. The 1987 Constitution, according to the Court, strengthened and broadened the power of the Court in matters like these. It gave the

Court the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, i.e. the right to life. On a final note regarding the first contention of the respondent, the DOJ acknowledged this Courts jurisdiction when it filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Compel the trial judge to disclose the Warrant of Execution containing the date of Echegarays execution to the public. The jurisdiction of the Court, it emphasizes, does not depend on the convenience of the litigants. 2. The respondents contention that the issuance of the TRO encroaches on the power of the executive is also rejected. Section 19 Article VII of the Constitution cannot be interpreted as denying the powers of the Court to Control the enforcement of their decision after their finality. It is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve, although it has he same effect. It must be noted that the powers of the Executive, the Legislative, and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict does not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life. 3. The Court made it a point to clarify the rationale behind the issuance of the TRO. The Court had to decide on the petitioners Very Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a TRO with a mere (5) hours prior to the execution of Echegaray. They had been placed in a very difficult position because it was such a short period to ascertain the validity and substance of the allegation contained in the Very Urgent Motion. They also had no way of checking and verifying with Congress because it was in recess at that time. The Court took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily restraining the execution of the petitioner because of fear that any error of the Court in not stopping the execution will preclude any further relief for all rights stop at the graveyard. At the end of the day, the TRO had achieved its purpose. It crystallized the issue on whether the Congeress is disposed to review capital punishment or not. Supervening events like the (1) pronouncement of then President Estrada that it will veto any law repealing death penalty; (2) the resolkution of the Congressmen that they are against the repeal of the law; and (3) that current actions undertaken by Senators Roco and Pimentel are futile.