PT&T vs.

NLRC 272 SCRA 596 FACTS: PT&T (Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Company) initially hired Grace de Guzman specifically as Supernumerary Project Worker, for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. She was again invited for employment as replacement of Erlina F. Dizon who went on leave on 2 periods, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991 and July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991. On September 2, 1991, de Guzman was again asked to join PT&T as a probationary employee where probationary period will cover 150 days. She indicated in the portion of the job application form under civil status that she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier. When petitioner learned later about the marriage, its branch supervisor, Delia M. Oficial, sent de Guzman a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. Included in the memorandum, was a reminder about the companys policy of not accepting married women for employment. She was dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992. Labor Arbiter handed down decision on November 23, 1993 declaring that petitioner illegally dismissed De Guzman, who had already gained the status of a regular employee. Furthermore, it was apparent that she had been discriminated on account of her having contracted marriage in violation of company policies. ISSUE: Whether the alleged concealment of civil status can be grounds to terminate the services of an employee. HELD: Article 136 of the Labor Code, one of the protective laws for women, explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of marriage of a female employee. It is recognized that company is free to regulate manpower and employment from hiring to firing, according to their discretion and best business judgment, except in those cases of unlawful discrimination or those provided by law. PT&Ts policy of not accepting or disqualifying from work any woman worker who contracts marriage is afoul of the right against discrimination provided to all women workers by our labor laws and by our Constitution. The record discloses clearly that de Guzmans ties with PT&T were dissolved principally because of the companys policy that married women are not qualified for employment in the company, and not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty. The government abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature adopted by PT&T. As stated in the labor code: ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of marriage. The policy of PT&T is in derogation of the provisions stated in Art.136 of the Labor Code on the right of a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment and it likewise is contrary to good morals and public policy, depriving a woman of her freedom to choose her status, a privilege that is inherent in an individual as an intangible and inalienable right. The kind of policy followed by PT&T strikes at the very essence, ideals and purpose of marriage as an inviolable social institution and ultimately, family as the foundation of

the nation. Such policy must be prohibited in all its indirect, disguised or dissembled forms as discriminatory conduct derogatory of the laws of the land not only for order but also imperatively required.

Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals [GR 107383, 20 February 1996] Facts: Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. On 26 March 1982, Zulueta entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and Martins secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which Zulueta had filed against her husband. Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X. After trial, the trial court rendered judgment for Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of Martins Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorneys fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable apply even to the spouse of the aggrieved party. Held: The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

Star Paper Corporation vs. Simbol | Puno G.R. No. 164774, April 12, 2006|487 SCRA 228FACTS S t a r P a p e r C o r p o r a t i o n i s a c o r p o r a t i o n engaged in trading principally of paperproducts. Ronaldo Simbol, Wilfreda Comia and LornaEstrella were all regular employees of thecompany. Simbol met Alma Dayrit, also an employee of the company, whom he married on June27, 1998. Prior to their marriage, Ongsitco,the Manager of the Personnel andAdministration Department, advised thecouple that should they get married, oneof them should resign because of acompany policy promulgated in 1995 . Simbol then resigned before they gotmarried. A similar occurrence happened toC o m i a a n d s h e a l s o r e s i g n e d b e f o r e h e r marriage to Howard Comia sometime2000. E s t r e l l a m e t L u i s i t o Z u n i g a , a l s o a c o - worker, a married man, and got herp r e g n a n t . T h e c o m p a n y a l l e g e d l y c o u l d have terminated her services due toimmorality but she opted to resignsometime 1999. The three respondents,Simbol, Comia, and Estrella, on separatei n s t a n c e s s i g n e d a R e l e a s e a n d Confirmation agreement. Simbol and Comia allege that they did notresign voluntarily and that they were onlycompelled to resign because of an illegalcompany policy. Estrella alleges that she had a relationshipwith Zuniga who misrepresented himself amarried but separated man. After she gotpregnant, she found out that he was notseparated. She severed her relationshipwith him to avoid dismissal due tocompany policy. Sometime November1999, she got into an accident whichnecessitated her to recuperate for 21days. When she returned to workD e c e m b e r 1 9 9 9 , s h e w a s d e n i e d e n t r y into the office. She was directed to ; New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has [a]relative, up to [the] 3rd degree of relationship, already employed by thecompany.2. In case of two of our employees (both singles [ sic], one male and another female) developed a friendly relationship during the course of their employment and then decided to get married, one of them should resign topreserve the policy stated above.proceed to the personnel office where shew a s h a n d e d a m e m o w h i c h s t a t e d t h a t she was being dismissed for immoral conduct. S h e r e f u s e d t o s i g n t h e m e m o b e c a u s e she was on leave for 21 days and wasntgiven chance to explain. When she finallysubmitted her explanation, she wasnonetheless dismissed by the company.D u e t o h e r u r g e n t n e e d f o r m o n e y , s h e submitted a letter of resignation inexchange for her 13thmonth pay.

The respondents filed a complaint forunfair labor practices, constructivedismissal, separation pay and attorneysfees. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaintf o r l a c k o f m e r i t , T h e N L R C a f f i r m e d t h e decision, The CA reversed the NLRCfinding the dismissal illegal and orderingthe reinstatement of the respondents withbackwages.ISSUE :W/N THE RESPONDENTS WERE ILLEGALLY DISMISSED for purposes of class discussion, the only issuet h a t w i l l b e t a c k l e d w i l l b e : W/N ESTRELLAVOLUNTARILY RESIGNED AND WAS NOTILLEGALLY DISMISSED HOLDING & RATIOESTRELLAS DISMISSAL IS DECLARED ILLEGAL. The contention of petitioners that Estrellawas pressured to resign because she goti m p r e g n a t e d b y a m a r r i e d m a n a n d s h e c o u l d n o t s t a n d b e i n g l o o k e d u p o n o r talked about as immoral is incredulous. If she really wanted to avoid embarrassmentand humiliation, she would not have goneb a c k t o w o r k a t a l l . N o r w o u l d s h e h a v e filed a suit for illegal dismissal andpleaded for reinstatement. We have heldthat in voluntary resignation, theemployee is compelled by personalreason(s) to dissociate himself fromemployment. It is done with the intentionof relinquishing an office, accompanied bythe act of abandonment. Thus, it isillogical for Estrella to resign and then filea complaint for illegal dismissal. Given thelack of sufficient evidence on the part of petitioners that the resignation wasvoluntary, Estrellas dismissal is declaredillegal.N o t e : t h e i s s u e o f s i m b o l a n d c o m i a d i s c u s s e s employer policies, theories of employmentdiscrimination and occupational qualification which might be beyond our coverage in class butplease read the original just in case. Thanks!

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio vs Republic of the Philippines GR No. 174689. October 22, 2007 Fact of the Case: On November 22, 2003, Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name from Rommel Jacinto to Melly and sex of birth from male to female in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered in favor of petitioner as it would be more in consonance with the principle of justice and equity. That grating the petitioner would bring much awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her fianc and the realization of their dreams. ON August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines, thru the office of the Solicitor General, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. Issue: Whether or not a person born male would be entitled to change of gender on the civil registrar and afterwards be legally capacitated to entered into marriage with another man. Held: No. Sex reassignment is not a ground for change of gender. There is no law present that allows such in our country. Neither may entries in the birth certificate as to first name or sex be changed on the ground of equity. The remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts. As to contracting marriage,

our law allows only male and female with the main reason of procreation. Sex reassignment scientifically has not yet made one completely into female, with the complete function for reproduction.

Republic vs. Cagandahan GR. No. 166676, September 12, 2008 FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth. During her childhood years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on diagnosed that her ovarian structures had minimized. She likewise has no breast nor menstruation. Subsequently, she was diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where those afflicted possess secondary male characteristics because of too much secretion of male hormones, androgen. According to her, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. She filed a petition at RTC Laguna for Correction of Entries in her Birth Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed to male and her first name be changed to Jeff. ISSUE: WON correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted. HELD: The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. SC is of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. As in this case, respondent, thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones, there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being a male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. GR No. 166676, September 12, 2008) This could be the first case that was decided under Philippine jurisprudence with such unique facts. The author first heard it in the news and decided to make a digested case of the same.

However, the Philippine Supreme Court has no complete record of the case yet online. Despite that the author made use of available online facts provided by the Supreme Court and made it possible to come up with the case digest below. FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that "Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female." The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar. RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. It held that, in deciding the case, the Supreme Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The Supreme Court made use of the availale evidence presented in court including the fact that private respondent thinks of himself as a male and as to the statement made by the doctor that Cagandahan's body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen), which is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. The Supreme Court further held that they give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. That is, the Supreme Court respects the respondents congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. The Court added that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons and the consequences that will follow.

Balogbog vs ca G.R. No. 83598, March 7, 1997

Presumption of marriage Although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place.

FACTS: This is an action for partition brought by Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog against Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog. Ramonito and Generoso claimed that they were the legitimate children of Catalina and Gavino, the elder brother of Leoncia and Gaudioso. Gavino died in 1935, predeceasing their parents, the grandparents of Ramonito and Generoso. Ramonito and Generoso presented witnesses: one, the mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934, another, who was a family friend, and Catalina herself. For its part, defendants denied knowing Ramonito and Generoso and claimed that Gavino died single and without issue. As proof of this, they presented certificates showing that there was no record in the Register of both the marriage between Gavino and Catalina and the birth of Ramonito. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of Ramonito and Generoso. CA affirmed, holding that private respondents failed to overcome the legal presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are in fact married, that a child is presumed to be legitimate, and that things happen according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.

Hence this petition. ISSUE:

Whether or not the presumption of marriage applies Whether or not Ramonito and Generoso were legitimate children of Gavino

HELD: The SC found no reversible error committed by the CA. Petitioner contends that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should be proven in accordance of Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 (only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry) since the marriage was celebrated when such law was in effect. But the SC noted that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 1889 of Spain did not take effect, having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the extension of that code to this country. Consequently, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in the lower court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights, and the rules on evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are legally married. This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary. Evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other evidence may be presented to prove marriage. Rationale for the presumption The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the preservation of the family and the sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional concern. Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee: The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.

Legitimacy of Children

The SC held that the fact that there was no record of birth in the Civil Registry does not mean that Ramonito and Generoso were not legitimate children. Their legitimacy was proved by testimony of witnesses, including Catalina, the mother herself. Moreover, there was submitted an official transcript of an investigation before the Police Investigation Committee of Balamban, Cebu, wherein Gaudioso himself admitted that Ramonito is his nephew.

The Court held this admission of relationship as admissible against Gaudioso as a reliable declaration against interest.

Decision affirmed.

CASE DIGEST ON MARTINEZ VS. TAN

Martinez v. Tan [12 P 731] -- F: Pltff. Rosalia Martinez commenced this action for the cancellation of the cert. of marriage and for damages. Pltff. claimed that what took place before the justice of the peace did not constitute a legal marriage under Gen. Orders No. 68, Sec. 6, "No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife." CFI found for def. HELD: The parties addressed a signed petition to the justice of the peace stating that they had agreed to marry, and asking the justice of the peace to marry them. Before the justice of the peace, they stated under oath that they ratified the contents of their petition and insisted on what they asked for. This statement was signed by them, in the presence of witnesses that they

produced. A certificate was then made out by the justice of the peace, signed by him and the witnesses, stating the parties had been married by him. Both the parties knew the contents of the document w/c they signed. Under the circumstances, what took place before the justice of the peace amounted to a marriage.

WASSMER VS VELEZ G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964

FACTS: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set Sept. 4, 1954 as the big day. On Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left a note for his brideto-be saying that he wants to postpone the marriage as his mother opposes it and that he is leaving. But the next day, Sept. 3, he sent her a telegram and told her that nothing has changed, that he is returning and he apologizes. Thereafter, Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again. Wassmer sued him for damages. Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. ISSUE: Is the case at bar a mere breach of promise to marry?

RULING: Surely, this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Art. 21 of the NCC which provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." DECISION: Affirmed. @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ Facts: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer are to be wed. 2 days prior the ceremony, Francisco left, leaving a telegram he will come back but never did. Beatriz filed for damages, and judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay actual, moral and exemplary damages. Defendant now asserts that the judgment against him is contrary to law, given that there is no provision in the Civil Code authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry. Issue: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is actionable. Held: No it is not, but this case is not a mere breach of promise to marry. He must be held answerable for the damages in accordance with Art. 21. The SC maintained that though breach of promise to marry is not actionable, the defendants act is still punishable under Article 21 of the Civil Code which states that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. In this case, plaintiff already arranged everything for the wedding, like the wedding gowns, invitations, matrimonial bed, etc. The SC held that this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry A wedding has been formally set and all the preparations have been made, only for the groom to walk out 2 days before. This is contrary to good customs, since defendant acted in a reckless and oppressive manner. Facts: Franciso Velez and Beatriz Wassmer decided to get married on September 4, 1954. Two days before the wedding, Francisco left a note for his bride-to-be:Will have to postpone wedding-My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today. The next day, he sent her the ff. telegram: NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE PAKING. Velez filed for damages, and judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay actual, moral and exemplary damages. Defendant now asserts that his failure to marry plaintiff was due to fortuitous event and circumstances beyond his control and the judgment against him is contrary to law, given that there is no provision in the Civil Code authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry. Issue: WON breach of promise to marry is actionable. Held: No it is not, but this case is not a mere breach of promise to marry. He must be held answerable for the damages in accordance with Art. 21. The SC maintained that though breach of promise to marry is not actionable, but the defendants act is still punishable under Article 21 of the Civil Code which states that any person who

willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. In this case, plaintiff already arranged everything for the wedding, like the wedding gowns, invitations, matrimonial bed, etc. The SC held that this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry - A wedding has been formally set and all the preparations have been made, only for the groom to walk out 2 days before. This is contrary to good customs, since defendant acted in a reckless and oppressive manner.

ARTICLE 4, FAMILY CODE

COSCA VS. PALYPAYON JR. ,237 SCRA 249 FACTS: Complainants (Juvy Cosca et al.,) are employees of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon Jr., is the Presiding Judge of the same Court while Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is the Clerk of Court. An administrative complaint was field with the Office of the Court Administrator charging respondents , among others, illegal solemnization of marriage. Complainants alleged that respondent Judge solemnized 6 marriages even without the requisite

marriage license. As a consequence, their marriage contracts did not reflect any marriage license number. The respondent Judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar. ISSUE: Whether or not the action of respondent Judge proper. HELD: [i]The Family Code pertinently proves that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that , while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly , criminally and administratively liable. * The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriage, and what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsible. The Revised Penal Code provides that priests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law. This is of course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.

Navarro vs Domagtoy Presumptive death - family code Navarro is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. He has submitted evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law. First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar

Tagadan and Arlyn Borga, despite the knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife. Domagtoy claimed that he merely relied on an affidavit acknowledged before him attesting that Tagadans wife has been absent for seven years. The said affidavit was alleged to have been sworn to before another judge. Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Domagtoy counters that he solemnized the marriage outside of his jurisdiction upon the request of the parties. ISSUE: Whether or not Domagtoy acted without jurisdiction. HELD: Domagtoys defense is not tenable and he did display gross ignorance of the law. Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wifes presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ihis former wife. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of Domagtoy to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. On the second issue, the request to hold the wedding outside Domagtoys jurisdiction was only done by one party, the bride NOT by both parties. More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the authority of the solemnizing officer. Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction. Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.

ARTICLE 3,4,7 & 8, FC NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY,259 SCRA 129 FACTS: Rodolfo Navarro, Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, filed an administrative complaint against respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy, Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge.

One of the two acts complained of was the fact that respondent Judge performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside his court's jurisdiction. The judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. MonicaBurgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the Municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area. Respondent judge points out to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having solemnized the marriage. ISSUE: Is a marriage solemnized outside of a court's jurisdiction valid? HELD: Article 8 of the Family Code provides that, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chamber or courtroom only in the following instances: 1) at the point of death, 2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or 3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing officer. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer". Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage. A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriage, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in wedding only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the Municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law. RESPONDENT JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY SUSPENDED FOR SIX (6) MONTHS WITH STERN WARNING AGAINST REPETITION OF SIMILAR ACTS. N.B. In this case the marriage is considered VALID, in another case it was held to be VOID.

Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee CASE DIGEST: GR. No. 18081 March 3, 1922 Mora Adong, petitioner and appellant vs. Cheong Seng Gee, opponent and appellant Agpalos Statutory Construction quoted this case to wit: The policy of the law, once ascertained should be given effect by the judiciary. One way of accomplishing this mandate is to give a statute of doubtful meaning, a construction that will promote public policy. FACTS: Cheong Boo, a native of China died in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands on August 5, 1919 and left property worth nearly P100,000 which is now being claimed by two parties - (1) Cheong Seng Gee who alleged that he was a legitimate child by marriag contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Bit in China in 1985, and (2) Mora Adong who alleged that she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands and had two daughters with the deceased namely Payang and Rosalia. The conflicting claims to Cheong Boos estate were ventilated in the lower court that ruled that Cheong Seng Gee failed to sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage through a mere letter testifying that Cheong Boo and Tan Bit married each other but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in the estate as a natural child. With reference to the allegations of Mora Adong and her daughters, the trial court reached the conclusion that the marriage between Adong and Cheong Boo had been adequately proved but that under the laws of the Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful marriage and thus the daughter Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The lower court believes that Mohammedan marriages are not valid under the Philippine Islands laws this as an Imam as a solemnizing officer and under Quaranic laws. ISSUES: Whether or not the Chinese marriage between Cheong Boo and Tan Dit is valid Whether or not the Mohammedan marriage between Cheong Boo and Mora Adong is valid RULING: The Supreme Court found the (1) Chinese marriage not proved and Chinaman Cheong Seng Gee has only the rights of a natural child while (2) it found the Mohammedan marriage to be proved and to be valid, thus giving to the widow Mora Adong and the legitimate children Payang and Rosalia the rights accruing to them under the law. HELD: (FOR STATCON) The Supreme Court held that marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract but it is a new relation, an instruction in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. The presumption as to marriage is that every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency of the law. As to retroactive force, marriage laws is in the nature of a curative provision intended to safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages. Public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriages and should retard acts intended to invalidate marriages. This as for public policy, the courts can properly incline the scales of their decision in favor of that solution which will most effectively promote the public policy. That is the true construction which will best carry legislative intention into effect. (FOR PERSONS) Sec. IV of the Marriage law provides that all marriages contracted outside the islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted, are valid in these islands. To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first necessary to prove before the courts ofthe Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. A Philippine marriage followed by 23 years of uninterrupted marital life, should not be impugned and discredited, after the death of the husband through an alleged prior Chinese marriage, save upon proof so clear, strong and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of such impediment. A marriage alleged to have been contracted in China and proven mainly by a so-called matrimonial letter held not to be valid in the Philippines.