INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M. LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B.

AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES, res pondents . Facts: At bar is a special civil action forcer tior ar i and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the Marines ) to join the Philippine National Police (the PNP ) in visibility patrols around the metropolis. In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies,kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression.The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (the AFP ), the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and implement the said order.In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 (the LOI ) which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task ForceTu lu n g an, would be conducted. Task ForceTu lun g an was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila. Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, Dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief. In the Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective Crime prevention program including increased police patrols. The President further stated that to heighten police visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anticrime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved.

The selected areas of deployment under the LOI are: Monumento Circle, North Edsa (SM City), Araneta Shopping Center, Greenhills, SM Megamall, Makati Commercial Center, LRT/MRT Stations and the NAIA and Domestic Airport. On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the IBP ) filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that: I THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE MARINES IN METRO MANILA IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IN THAT:A) NO EMERGENCY SITUATION OBTAINS IN METRO MANILA AS WOULD JUSTIFY, EVEN ONLY REMOTELY, THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOLDIERS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK; HENCE, SAID DEPLOYMENT IS IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 3 OF THE CONSTITUTION; B) SAID DEPLOYMENT CONSTITUTES AN INSIDIOUS INCURSION BY THE MILITARY IN A CIVILIAN FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT (LAW ENFORCEMENT) IN DEROGATION OF ARTICLE XVI, SECTION 5 (4), OF THE CONSTITUTION; C) SAID DEPLOYMENT CREATES A DANGEROUS TENDENCY TO RELY ON THE MILITARY TO PERFORM THE CIVILIAN FUNCTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT. II IN MILITARIZING LAW ENFORCEMENT IN METRO MANILA, THE ADMINISTRATION IS UNWITTINGLY MAKING THE MILITARY MORE POWERFUL THAN WHAT IT SHOULD REALLY BE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution, the IBP questions the validity of the deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement. Issue: WON the Integrated Bar of the Philippines has legal standing to petition for the annulment of the LOI and to assail the constitutionality of the declaration of deployment of the Philippine Marines Ruling: NO Rationale: In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution.Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case.This is too general an interest which is shared

by other groups and the whole ci tizenry .Based on the standards, the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case.Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve the administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines.It should also be noted that the interest of the National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. To be sure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the National President to file the petition, has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act.Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols.Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have been violated by the deployment of the Marines.What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed militarization of law enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more harm than good in the long run.Not only is the presumed injury not personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing.Since petitioner has not successfully established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines.This Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the future.The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy. (Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.Moreover,

because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away.It will stare us in the face again.It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.)

De Castro vs. Judicial and Bar Council GR No. 191002, March 17, 2010 Facts: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Even before the event actually happens, it is giving rise to many legal dilemmas. This dilemma is rooted in consideration of Section 15, Art VII of the Constitution prohibiting the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential election and up to the end of his term, except when temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety. However, Section 4 (1), Art VIII of the Constitution also provides that any vacancy in the Supreme Court shall be filled within 90 days from occurrence. The question leads to who should appoint the next Chief Justice and may the JBC resume the process of screening candidates should the incumbent president not prohibited to do so. May a mandamus lie to compel the submission of JBCs nominees to the president? This issue at hand truly is impressed with transcendental importance to the Nation. A lot of petitions were received by the court from a mandamus to prohibitions. We limit our discussion with GR 191002 for brevity. Issues: Whether or not the case at bar is an actual controversy. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to file said petition. Ratio Decidendi: The court held the case being premature because the Judicial and Bar Council has until May 17, 2010 at the least within which to submit the list of nominees to the President to fill the vacancy created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno. The petitioner here

asserts his right as citizen filing the petition on behalf of the public who are directly affected by the issue of the appointment. The question raised before the court is in fact of transcendental importance. The court dispels all doubt to remove any obstacle or obstruction to the resolution of the essential issue squarely presented. Standing is a peculiar concept to constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not brought by parties who have been personally injured by the operation of law or any other government act but by concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest. The court dismissed the petitions for certiorari and mandamus in GR 191002 and GR 191149 and the petition for mandamus in GR no. 191057 for being premature; dismissal of the petitions for prohibition in GR 191032 and GR 191342 for lack of merit; and grants the in AM No. 10-2-5-SC and accordingly directs the JBC to: resume proceedings for the nomination of candidates, prepare short list of nominees for the said position, submit to the incumbent President the short list of nominees, and to continue proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill other vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in accordance with this decision.

of such service shall not be passed on to the end-consumer. As to the no pass-on provision for sale of petroleum products, petitioners argue that the fact that the presence of such a no pass-on provision in the House version and the absence thereof in the Senate Bill means there is no conflict because a House provision cannot be in conflict with something that does not exist. Escudero, et. al., also contend that Republic Act No. 9337 grossly violates the constitutional imperative on exclusive origination of revenue bills under Section 24 of Article VI of the Constitution when the Senate introduced amendments not connected with VAT. Petitioners Escudero, et al., also reiterate that R.A. No. 9337 s stand- by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power. They submit that the recommendatory power given to the Secretary of Finance in regard to the occurrence of either of two events using the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a benchmark necessarily and inherently required extended analysis and evaluation, as well as policy making. Petitioners also reiterate their argument that the input tax is a property or a property right. Petitioners also contend that even if the right to credit the input VAT is merely a statutory privilege, it has already evolved into a vested right that the State cannot remove. Issue: Whether or not the R.A. No. 9337 or the Vat Reform Act is constitutional? Held: The Court is not persuaded. Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution provides that All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

Abakada Guro vs Ermita Abakada Guro v. Ermita G.R. No. 168056, July 5, 2005 J. Puno En Banc Facts: Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, ABAKADA Guro party List Officer and et al., insist that the bicameral conference committee should not even have acted on the no pass-on provisions since there is no disagreement between House Bill Nos. 3705 and 3555 on the one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950 on the other, with regard to the no pass-on provision for the sale of service for power generation because both the Senate and the House were in agreement that the VAT burden for the sale

The Court reiterates that in making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present. In the same breath, the Court reiterates its finding that it is not a property or a property right, and a VAT-registered person s entitlement to the creditable input tax is a mere statutory privilege. As the Court stated in its Decision, the right to credit the input tax is a mere creation of law. More importantly, the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9337 already involve legislative policy and wisdom. So long as there is a public end for which R.A. No. 9337 was passed, the means through which such end shall be accomplished is for the legislature to choose so long as it is within constitutional bounds. The Motions for Reconsideration are hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court is LIFTED.

unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force and effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not. The publication means complete publication, and that publication must be made in the official gazette. In a comment required by the solicitor general, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and therefore be dismissed. And on the clause unless otherwise provided in Article 2 of the new civil code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative, that the publication when necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette. Issues: (1) Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette. (2) Whether or not publication in the official gazette must be in full. Held: (1) The court held that all statute including those of local application shall be published as condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. (2) The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws.

Tanada vs. Tuvera 146 s 446 Facts: Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The court ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette all BAYAN vs. Zamora G.R. No. 138570 October 10, 2000 FACTS : On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a military bases agreement which formalized, among others, the use of installations in the Philippine territory by the US military personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security relationship, the Philippines and the US entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels and aircraft.

In 1991, with the expiration of RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the periodic military exercises between the two countries were held in abeyance. However, the defence and security relationship continued pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty. On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed, among other things, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). Negotiations by both panels on VFA led to a consolitdated draft text and a series of conferences. Eventually, President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA. On October 5, 1998 President Joseph E. Estrada ratified the VFA thru respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting thru Executive Secretary Zamora officially transmitted to the Senate, the Instrument of Ratification, letter of the President and the VFA for approval. It was approved by the Senate by a 2/3 vote of its members. On June 1, 1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an exchange of notes between Secretary Siazon and US Ambassador Hubbard. The VFA provides for the mechanism for regulating the circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense personnel may be present in the Philippines. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition, assailing the constitutionality of the VFA and imputing grave abuse of discretion to respondents in ratifying the agreement. ISSUE : Whether or not the VFA is unconstitutional. RULING : Petition is dismissed. The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on treaties or international agreements. Sec. 21 Art. VII, which respondent invokes, reads: No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the Members of the Senate. Sec. 25 Art. XVIII provides : After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the RP and the US concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in and when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of votes cast by

the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the Senateby the other contracting state . The first cited provision applies to any form of treaties and international agreements in general with a wide variety of subject matter. All treaties and international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of subject matter, coverage or particular designation requires the concurrence of the Senate to be valid and effective. In contrast, the second cited provision applies to treaties which involve presence of foreign military bases, troops and facilities in the Philippines. Both constitutional provisions share some common ground. The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Sec. 21 Art. VII, and that Senate extended its concurrence under the same provision is immaterial. Undoubtedly, Sec. 25 Art. XVIII which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases and troops should apply in the instant case. Hence, for VFA to be constitutional it must sufficiently meet the following requisites : a) it must be under a treaty b) the treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate, and when so required by Congress, ratified by a majority of votes cast by the people in a national referendum c) recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State There is no dispute in the presence of the first two requisites. The third requisite implies that the other contracting party accepts or acknowledges the agreement as a treaty. Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the US treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. They are equally binding obligations upon nations. Therefore, there is indeed marked compliance with the mandate of the constitution. The court also finds that there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the executive department as to their power to ratify the VFA.

Francisco Vs. House Of Representatives [415 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 160261; 10 Nov 2003] Facts: Impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy poised in front of the Court was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing of a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law. Issue: Whether or Not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution and whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis. Held: In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy spawns that this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the Constitution. In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people. At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.

When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid, but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. In fine, when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest. In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest common to all members of the public. At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained. This Court opts to grant standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds. As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a legislator. Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office. The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary

to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does. To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says "The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding." Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period. The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government. No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any legal system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does

not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life. Thus, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994

Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds. One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate s power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose

amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.

The petitioners seek the declaration of nullity of paragraph 1 of the special provisions of RA 870 (GAA2000) directing that the appropriation for the CAR shall be spent to wind up its activities and pay theseparation and retirement benefits of all the affected members and employees. Issue: 1. Whether the assailed special provisions in RA 8760 is a rider and as such is unconstitutional. 2. Whether the Philippine Government, through Congress, can unilaterally amend/repeal EO 220. 3. Whether the Republic should be ordered to honor its commitments as spelled out in EO.220 Ruling:In relation to article VI section 25(2) and section 26 the court said that xxx an appropriations bill covers abroader range of subject matter and therefore includes more details compared to an ordinary bill. Thetitle of an appropriations bill cannot be any broader as it is since it is not feasible to come out with a titlethat embraces all the details included in an appropriations bill xxx. The assailed paragraph 1 of theRA8760 does not constitute a rider; it follows the standard that a provision in an appropriations bill mustrelate specifically to some particular appropriations.On the other hand, the contention that Congress cannot amend or repeal E.O 220 is rejected, there is nosuch thing as an irrepealable law. And nothing could prevent the Congress from amending or repealingthe E.O. 220 because it is no different from any other law.The last issue, the court ruled that, the concept of separations of powers presupposes mutual respect.Therefore, the implementation of E.O. 220 is an executive prerogative while the sourcing of funds iswithin the powers of the legislature. In the absence of any grave abuse of discretion, the court cannotcorrect the acts of either the Executive or the Legislative in respect to policies concerning CAR

Atitiw V. Zamora G.R. No. 143374En Banc, J. Tinga Facts: The ratification of the 1987 Constitution ordains the creation of autonomous regions in MuslimMindanao and in the Cordilleras mandating the Congress to enact organic acts pursuant to section 18 of article X of the Constitution. Thus, by virtue of the residual powers of President Cory Aquino shepromulgated E.O 220 creating CAR. Then the congress enacted R.A 6766, an act providing for organicact for the cordillera autonomous region, a plebiscite was cast but was not approve by the people. Thecourt declared that E.O 220 to be still in force and effect until properly repealed or amended. Later onFebruary 15, 2000, President Estrada signed the General Appropriations Act of 2000 (GAA 2000) whichincludes the assailed special provisions, then issued an E.O 270 to extend the implementation of thewinding up of operations of the CAR and extended it by virtue of E.O 328.

LAMBINO vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25, 2006 (CARPIO, J.) Requirements for Initiative Petition Constitutional Amendment vs. Constitutional Revision Tests to determine whether amendment or revision FACTS: The Lambino Group commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution and then filed a petition with COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for ratification under Sec. 5(b) and (c) and Sec. 7 of RA 6735. The proposed changes under the petition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. COMELEC did not give it due course for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant to Santiago v. Comelec ruling. ISSUES: Whether or not the proposed changes constitute an amendment or revision Whether or not the initiative petition is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement on direct proposal by the people RULING: Initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art. XVII on direct proposal by people Sec. 2, Art. XVII...is the governing provision that allows a people s initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. While this provision does not expressly state that the petition must set forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that: (a) the framers intended to adopt relevant American jurisprudence on people s initiative; and (b) in particular, the people must first see the full text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a petition containing such full text. The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This means two essential elements must be present.

2 elements of initiative 1.First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. 2.Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent by signing such complete proposal in a petition. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must stated the fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that everyone of the several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full textof the proposed amendments before not after signing. Moreover, an initiative signer must be informed at the time of signing of the nature andeffect of that which is proposed and failure to do so is deceptive and misleading whichrenders the initiative void. In the case of the Lambino Group s petition, there s not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of the proposedchanges in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral- Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. This omission is fatal. An initiative that gathers signatures from the people without first showing to the people the full text of the proposed amendments is most likely a deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on the people. That s why the Constitutionrequires that an initiative must be directly proposed by the people x x x in a petition - meaning that the people must sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue as amending the nation s fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposed amendments cannot be hidden from the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and unelected individuals. The initiative violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution disallowing revision through Initiatives Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all its Members. The

second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third mode is through a people s initiative. Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second modes, applies to any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution. In contrast, Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies only to amendments to this Constitution. This distinction was intentional as shown by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. A people sinitiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution. Does the Lambino Group s initiative constitute a revision of the Constitution? Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President and the abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a mere amendment.

Amendment vs. Revision Courts have long recognized the distinction between an amendment and a revision of a constitution. Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended. Where the proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution without affecting any other section or article, the change may generally be considered an amendment and not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18 years to 15 years is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipino ownership of mass media companies from 100% to 60% is an amendment and not a revision. Also, a change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for election to the Presidency is an amendment and not a revision.

The changes in these examples do not entail any modification of sections or articles of theConstitution other than the specific provision being amended. These changes do not alsoaffect the structure of government or the system of checks-and-balances among or withinthe three branches. However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision. A change in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not an amendment. For example, the substitution of the word republican with monarchic or theocratic in Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire structure of government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have to be examined case-bycase, depending on how it affects other provisions, as well as how it affects the structure ofgovernment, the carefully crafted system of checksand-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of the existing Constitution. Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or several provisions of a constitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several provisions, but also the altered principles with those that remain unaltered. Thus, constitutions normally authorize deliberative bodies like constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions to undertake revisions. On the other hand, constitutions allow people s initiatives, which do not have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendments and not revisions. Tests to determine whether amendment or revision In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test: the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the substantial entirety of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions. The court examines only the number of provisions affected and does not consider the degree of the change. The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision. Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry.

Thus, a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan includes change in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches. A change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and balances. Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group s initiative is a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group s proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature. A change in the structure of government is a revision A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present Bicameral- Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the structure of government. The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and- balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution. The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between amendment and revision is only one of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when a deliberative body drafts and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive changes are called revisions because members of the deliberative body work full-time on the changes. The same substantive changes, when proposed through an initiative, are called amendments because the changes are made by ordinary people who do not make an occupation, profession, or vocation out of such endeavor. The SC, however, ruled that the express intent of the framers and the plain language of the Constitution contradict the Lambino Group s theory. Where the intent of the framers and the language of the Constitution are

clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from such categorical intent and language.