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is satisfied that a law has become obsolete or it requires to be modified to suit to the changed need of the society, the

Legislature may obliterate the same. This is called Repeal. peal means abolition or revocation of a law. The repeal of a law is exclusive domain ofh Legislature. Parliament may repeal a perpetual statute and bring it to an end. A temporary statute can also be repealed before completion of its life. But as far as expiry of a statute is concerned, it is only temporary statute that expires. The perpetual statute never expires. It lasts forever. There is no fixed life span of a perpetual statute. It is eternal It can only be abolished or cancelled by Parliament by the process of repeal), CKinds of repeal Parliament has power to make law and to repeal any existing lawbe it temporary statute or a perpetual statute. Repeal may be brought by the Legislature in two ways : (a) The Legislature may enact a distinct repealing enactment to declare that an earlier Act has been abolished. It is called Express Repeal. (b) The Legislature may enact an enactment which is so inconsistent with the earlier Act that no harmony between the two is possible or it covers the entire subject matter of the earlier statute. This is called Implied Repeal of the earlier Act. No repeal can be brought unless there is express repeal of an earlier Act by a later Act or two Acts cannot stand together. Express repeal

The dictionary meaning of the word express is clearly and definitely stated. Therefore, when an earlier Act is repealed by later distinct and repealing Act, it is called express repeal. The later- enactment declares m unequivocal terms that an existing law is sought to be repealed with effect from a particular day. Essentials of express repeal The essential ingredients of an express repeal are mentioned below (a) There must be a subsequent repealing Act. (b) Such subsequent Act must seek to repeal an earlier Act. (c) Specific words must be used in the subsequent repealing Act showing clear intendment to effect repeal of an earlier Act. (d) Usually any one of the following forms are employed to intend the express repeal .... is hereby repealed .shall cease to have effect

TEMPORARY AND PERPETUAL STATUTES ThE)R EXPRY AND REPEAL 287 .shall be inoperative ...shall be invalid ....all provisions inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed Implied repeal In this case, the Legislature does not use the words to precisely show its intention to repeal a law. Instead, it enacts a law which is so contradictory to an existing law that both cannot be given effect to. This implies abrogation of the existing law. Thus, implied repeal is the result of inconsistent subsequent legislation. The implied repea1 takes place in two ways (a) When subsequent Act is so inconsistent with earlier Act that only one of the two can remain in force

(b) When a subsequent Act covers whole subject matter of the earlier Act and intended to be a substitute for the earlier Act) In Atal Tea Co. Ltd. v. Regional PF Commr., it was held that a repeal may be express or implied. If provisions of a later enactment are so inconsistent or repugnant with the provisions of an earlier one that the two cannot stand together, the earlier Act can be said to have been repealed by implication. There is no real distinction in essence between a repeal and an amendment. In this case question was relating to Section 14-B of Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. This section was amended in 1988. By way of amendment, power of Commissioner to levy damages was curtailed. Formerly it was up to 100% and now it is as per sliding table under para 32-A of the scheme, Point is whether this curtailment of power is prospective or applied also in connection with defaults prior to amendment for which no action was initiated prior to amendment. It was held that there is no saving clause. There is a presumption against retrospectivity. This rule may be overcome not only by express words in the Act but also by circumstances sufficiently strong to displace it. The amended and unamended Section 14-B are really incompatible and inconsistent with one another so far as rates of levy of damages are concerned. By this amendment, provisions of Section 14-B so far as it conferred the discretionary power to determine the rates at which damages would have to be levied, can be said to have been repealed by implication. The discretionary power to levy damages stands curtailed by virtue of amendment. CDoctrine of implied repeal is based on the presumption that the Legislature knows existing laws and it did not intend to create confusion by enacting and retaining conflicting provisions. Implied repeal may operate on a part of statute or on its entirety. If repugnancy relates to a part of statute, that part of statute will stand repealed only to the extent of repugnancy. Repeal shall not be inferred if two Acts can be read together and some 1. 1998 (79) FLR 372 Cal He.

application may be made of words in earlier Act. Presumption against implied repeal There is a presumption against repeal by implication. Reason is based on the theory that Legislature while enacting a law has complete knowledge of existing laws on the same subject matter and therefore, when it does not provide a repealing provision, it gives out an intention not to repeal existing legislation. Test of implied repeal

Owing to abovementioned presumption against repeal by implication, very cautious approach is required while inferring repeal. In the absence of clear words, repeal should not be readily concluded. The following aspects must be thoroughly considered. (a) Whether the earlier and later laws are in direct conflict with each other. (b) Whether the contradiction is so serious that no reconciliation is possible. (c) Whether subsequent Act is so inconsistent with earlier Act that both the laws cannot harmoniously co-exist and only one of the two can remain in force. (d) Whether two laws occunyJhe same field. In Harish Chandra v. State of M.P., it was held that if two laws operate in the same field without collision, they cannot be said to occupy the same field and there will be no inconsistency and no implied repeal, unless later law intends to be exhaustive Code. (e) Whether Legislature intended to lay down an exhaustive Code in respect of subject matter replacing earlier law Implied repeal could therefore be inferred only when the earlier and later law operate in the same field and occupy the same field but are so inconsistent with each other that both of them cannot co-exist in harmony and only one can survive. Implied repeal may also be concluded when legislative intent is to bring exhaustive Code in respect of subject matter replacing earlier law. In such cases, the earlier law is deemed to have been repealed by implication. In State of M.P v. Kedia Leather and Liquor Ltd. and others,2 it was observed that the doctrine of implied repeal is based on the theory that the Legislature, which is presumed to know the existing law, did not intend to create any confusion by retaining conflicting provisions and therefore, when the court applies the doctrine, it does not more than give effect to the intention of the Legislature by examining the scope and the object of the two enactments and by comparison of their provisions. The matter in each case is one of the construction and comparison of the two statutes. The court 1. MR 1965 Sc 932. 2. 2004 (1) Mh IA sc 306.

leans against implying repeal. Unless two Acts are so plainly repugnant to each other that effect cannot be given to both at the same time, a repeal will not be implied, or that there is necessary inconsistency in the two Acts standing together. To determine whether a later statute repeals by implication an earliei it is necessary to scrutinize the terms and consider the true meaning and effect of earlier Act. Until this is done, it is impossible to ascertain whether any inconsistency exists between two enactments.

General principles of implied repeal Some general principles governing implied repeal are mentioned below: h) Qjji.i or__legislation is repealed by implicationWhere the provisions of subsequent Act directly contradict the provisions of the earlier Act and there is no possibility of reconciliation between them or when the subsequent Act covers whole subject matter of the earlier Act, implied repeal may be inferred. It may be appreciated that in these circumstances, it is the previous law which stands repealed by implication, not the later one. .-5 Implied repeal may not__opte on entire statuteIt is not necessary that the whole statute is impliedly repealed. Implied repeal may affect only a part of the earlier Act. Where certain provisions of later enactment are similar to or are in agreement with the earlier law and both can stand and operate together, there is no implied repeal in respect of such provisions. The question of implied repeal in such cases shall be confined to only those provisions of previous Act which have been contradicted in the later Act. Implied repeal of earlier law can be inferred only when subsequent law occupies the same field, yet contradicts the earlier oneImplied repeal carmot be inferred if the previous law and later law can be read together and both of them can be applied, may be to limited extent, without interference. There could be implied repeal of earlier legislation when the later law operates in the same field and occupies the same field, but cannot co-exist with it due to inco,stency and contradiction. In Zhi Municipality v. Shivshank, it was held that the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and Rules made thereunder relating to vinegar were not impliedly repealed by the subsequent Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Although both contained regulating provisions and laid down standards of quality and composition of vinegar, it cannot be said that the two laws could not stand together. The former does not render compliance with latter impossible, nor compliance of former involves violation of latter. 441 Implied repeal may be concluded when exhaustive Code is intendedWhen legislative intent is to replace earlier law by an exhaustive Code in respect of subject matter, implied repeal of earlier Act may be inferred. In such cases, the earlier law stands repealed by implication. Prioriecii-il law is iiot repealed by later general lawOrdinarily, a prior particular law or special law is not readily inferred to be repealed by a 1. AIR 1971 SC 815.

later general law. The basis of this doctrine is the principle of generalia speciali o der which means that general things do nor rom special things. Therefore, in the absence of clear and unequivocal words, a special law cannot be abrogated by a subsequent general Act. In Municipal Council Palai v. T.J. Joseph, the provisionsof Municipal Act were in question which empowered a Municipal Authority to provide for bus stands. The subsequent Motor Vehicle Act empowered the Government to do the same. It was held that provisions of Municipal Act were not repealed by the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act. Reason for reaching this conclusion was that Municipal Act was special law which applied to Municipal area but Motor Vehicles Act was general Act applying to all areas in general. Both the provisions were enabling ones and there could be no question of conflict till the authority in later Motor Vehicle Act also provided for bus stand in same areas for which bus stands had already been provided under Municipal Act. In Paradip Port Trust, Paradip v. Their Workmen,2 Section 36 (4) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was in question which provides that a party carmot be represented by a legal practitioner before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal except with consent of other parties and with leave of Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is a special law. Subsequently, Advocates Act, 1961 was enacted Section 30 of which provides that every advocate shall be entitled as a right to practise in all courts and before any Tribunal. It was held that the provision under Section 36 (4) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was not affected by Section 30 of Advocates Act, 1961. 8IA prior g.iz&tlaw may be affected by subsequent particular ActWhere the subject matter of a later particular Act was being governed by a general Act, such general law may be affected by later special law. To explain it further, where certain matters were being dealt with by a general law and subsequently the Legislature enacts a special law on such matters, then earlier general law is affected by the later special law. The basis of this doctrine is the principle of generalibus special.ia derogant which means that special things derogate from general things. In such case, operation of particular Act may have effect of partially repealing general Act. In Damji v. L.I.C.,3 it was held that Section 446 of Companies Act, 1956 is a general provision and Sections 15 and 41 of Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 are special provisions. Therefore the Company Court has no jurisdiction on the matters which fall within the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. In Municipal Board, Bareilly v. Bharat Oil Co. , the State Government had framed rules regulating levy of octroi in general by all Municipalities. Thereafter rules were framed by State Government for levy of octroi by Barielly Municipality. It was expressly provided that the new rules will 1. AIR 1963 sc 1561. 2. AIR 1977 Sc 36. 3. AIR 1966 Sc 135. 4. AIR 1990 sc 548.

apply in supersession of existing rules. It was held that there was deemed repeal of earlier rules. In Ratanial Adukia v. Union of india, Section 80 of Railways Act, 1890 provided for a forum where a suit for compensation for loss of life or of personal injury to, a passenger or for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or non-delivery of goods or animals against railway administration may be brought. Section 80 was held to be special provision of a self contained Code and it impliedly repealed in respect of suits covered by it the general provisions of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 441ffirmative enactment is not repealed bya subsequent affirmative ActOne affirmative enactment is not easily taken to be repealed by another later affirmative enactment. But if later Act is precise negative of whatever authority existed under earlier Act, the repeal shall be inferred. In Trust Mai Lachhmi Sialkoti Bradari v. Amritsar improvement Trust,2 Punjab Damaged Areas Act, 1947 was a temporary statute which was due to expire on 15.8.1949. Under this Act, a notification was issued in 1948. This notification declared a certain area as damaged area. Before expiry of Punjab Damaged Areas Act, 1947, a new Act, namely East Punjab Damaged Areas Act, 1949 was enacted. This new Act was brought into force from April 1949. The new Act did not contain any express provision for repealing the earlier Act, but it covered the same subject matter. Question was whether the notification could be deemed to be a notification under later Act. Contention was that earlier Act was impliedly repealed by later Act due to identical terms. It was held that where two enactments are entirely affirmative and identical, no question of inconsistency could arise. Where the operative terms of two enactments are identical and the enactments run parallel to each other, there\ would be no scope of application of doctrine of implied repeal. hgr onferral of similar powers under two enactments at different levels does not result -irr7 ipie. peaFfearlier ActIf the similar powers are conferred by two legislations at different levels, then implied repeal of earlier Act cannot be inferred. In Ramehandra Mawalal v. State of U.P., the Central Government made notification under Essential Commodities Act, 1955 fixing higher rate of price of an essential commodity. State Government issued an order under Defence of India Rules clarifying that the higher rate could not be charged in respect of the stock already existing since prior to upward revision of rate. It was held that the State Government was competent to issue the order. It was observed that there is no legal bar to creating two sources of power to achieve the same purpose and that there was no real inconsistency as the order of State was supplementary to Centres notification. ( implied repeal can be inferred if later law imposes different punishment? for same offenceWhere an offence created by an earlier Act is again described in a later Act and the later Act varies the procedure or 1. AIR 1990 SC 104.

2. AIR 1963 SC 976. 3. (1984) (Supp) SCC 28.

imposes different punishment for that offence, in such a case the earlier Act stands repealed by implication. But where offence described in later Act is different from offence described in earlier Act, this principle has no application. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Veereshwar Rao,1 Section 26 of General Clauses Act provides that where an act of omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be punished under either or any of those enactments; but shall not be punished twice for the same offence. Article 20 (2) of the Constitution directs that no person shall be prosecuted and punished for same offence more that once. Both these provisions apply only when two offences are same. But if offence under two enactments is not identical, none of these provisions shall apply. ffect and consequences of repeal A previous law may be repealed either expressly or by implication. In both the cases, the consequences are same. Following are the effects of repeal of an enactment (1) Later Act abrogates prior one. (2) Repealed Act ceases to exist and does not remain in force with effect from the date of repeal. (3) As per general law, except in relation to the past and closed transactions, a statute after repeal is completely obliterated as if it had never been enacted. As such, all rights and causes of action under repealed statute are destroyed. In Jayantilal Amrathlal v. Union of India,2 it was held that in order to see whether the rights and liabilities under the repealed law have been put to an end by the new enactment, the proper approach is not to enquire if the new enactment has by its new provisions kept alive the rights and liabilities under the repealed law but whether it has taken away those rights and liabilities. The absence of a saving clause in the new enactment preserving the rights and liabilities under the repealed law is neither material nor decisive of the question. (4) When an Act is repealed, all laws passed under it stand repealed unless there is a saving provision.

In Southern Petrochemical Industries Co. Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector,3 it was held that a notification which is duly issued will continue to govern unless repealed. In case the parent statute is repealed, the notification would also stand repealed unless and to the extent, saved by repealing Act. (5) No proceedings can be commenced or continued under an Act after its repeal. However, those cases remain unaffected by such repeal in which the proceedings have been brought to finality prior to repeal of the statute. The cases already completed shall not be reopened by the reason of repeal of 1. AIR 1957 SC 592. 2. AIR 1971 Sc 1193. 3. (2007) 5 scc 447.

law under which prosecution was made. In State of U.P. v. Jagmander Das,1 the Apex Court held that when a statute is repealed or comes to an automotive end by efflux of time, no prosecution for the acts done during continuance of repealed/expired Act can be commenced after date of its repeallexpiry because that would amount to enforcement at repealed or a dead Act. As a general rule, after repeal of a statute, the law which was in force at the commencement of the repealed statute, revives. Thus, where one statute A is repealed by a second statute B, and subsequently statute B is also repealed by a third statute C, the effect is that the first statute A revives, unless contrary is provided in the third statute C. However, this common rule has been abrogated by Sections 6 (a) and 7 of General Clauses Act, 1897. As a result, the present position is that the first Act is not so revived unless third Act makes an express provision to that effect. ,1) A law can be retrospectively amended to validate the transactions made under it, even after its repeal. In State of Rajasthan v. Mangilal Pindwal,2 there was a rule which permitted the Government to effect compulsory retirement of a government servant by paying three months salary. This rule was subsequently repealed and in its place, another rule was substituted. During the period earlier rule was in operation, a government servant was retired on payment of an amount as salary. When calculated later, the amount paid to that government servant was found to be short of three months salary. Meanwhile the rule, under which compulsory retirement was given, came to be repealed. As per the terms of the rule, the retirement was invalid because of non-payment of full amount of three months salary. Therefore, in order to validate the action, an amendment was brought to the rule after its repeal. This amendment was indeed retrospective but was effective for the period during which the old rule

remained in operation. According to amendment, Government could retire a government servant forthwith without paying him three months salary but entitling him to claim salary after retirement. The amendment was held to be valid. It was observed that since the repeal of law takes effect from the date of repeal and law repealed remains in operation for the period before its repeal without assistance of any saving clause for transaction past and closed, it can be retrospectively amended to affect such transactions even after its repeal. -4(When an existing statute is repealed by a temporary statute, it is a temporary repeal. After expiry of such temporary Act, the repealed Act revives. In Gooderham and Worts v. C.B. Corporation,3 it was held that the repeal effected by a temporary legislation was only a temporary repeal. When by the fiat of Parliament the temporary repeal expired, the original legislation automatically resumed its full force. No enactment of it was required. 1. AIR 1954 Sc 683. 2. AIR 1996 sc 2181. 3. AIR 1949 c 90.

,) According to common law the effect of repeal is that the statute is completely obliterated and all rights under repealed statute are destroyed. However, the rights and liabilities accrued under a law do not extinguish due to repeal of that law. Some citations to this effect are given below. In Aitken v. South Hams Distt. Council,3 the issue was relating to the fate of a notice, after issuance of which the law stood repealed. The Local Authority under Control of Pollution Act was empowered to serve a notice to a person directing him to abate the nuisance within a specified period. If the notice was not complied with, the Local Authority was also empowered to hold the contravener liable for criminal offence in accordance with the provisions of the Act. In this case a notice under the Act was served. After service of notice but prior to expiration of the period stipulated in the notice for compliance, the Act was repealed. The question was whether the notice was still effective after repeal of the Act under which it was issued and can punishment be imposed for non-compliance of the notice. It was held that the notice was effective and person contravening the notice was liable to be punished for the offence under the Act even though the Act was abrogated. In Hamilton Gell v. White,4 the question was whether right to receive compensation survived after repeal of law? A tenant of agricultural holding has a right to receive compensation from landlord if landlord serves a notice to him to quit with a view of an intended sale of holding. It was held that the right is an accrued right which will be preserved even after repeal of statute under which the right was conferred.

In Free Lanka Insurance Co. v. Ranasinghe,5 the issue was whether a person who sustains injury in motor accident has a right to claim damages from the insurer of motor vehicles even after repeal of statute? It was held that this right is an accrued right which is enforceable even after repeal of the enactment creating liability, even if the process of determination of amount is not complete before repeal. In Sakharam v. Manikchand,6 the question was whether the rights of a protected tenant survive after repeal of the Act? A tenant is deemed to be 1. AIR 1962 Sc 945. 2. AIR 1997 Sc 718. 3. (1994) 3 All ER 400. 4. (1922)- 2 KB 422. 5. (1964) 1 All ER 457. 6. AIR 1963 Sc 354. In State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar, GAJENDRA GAUKAR, J., observed that intention of temporary Act in repealing earlier Act will have to be considered and no general or inflexible rule in that behalf can be laid down. In State of Haryana v. Amarnath Bansal,2 Jind State Civil Services Regulation, 1945 was repealed by Pepsu Ordinance No.16 of Samvat 2005. The Ordinance survived for a period of six months, after which it expired. It was held that the Regulations did not revive after expiration of the Ordinance because the intention in repealing the Regulations was to repeal them absolutely.

protected tenant, if he has held the land for certain number of years and has personally cultivated the same. Such tenant has certain rights which were held to be accrued rights. These rights shall survive even after repeal of the statute. In Amadalavalasa Cooperative Agriculture and Industrial Society Ltd. v. Union of India,1 it was held that the Liability to take insurance policy for full value of factory or goods under Emergency Risks (Factories) Act, 1962 and Emergency Risks (Goods) Act, 1962 was absolute and could be enforced after expiry of these Acts, even if the full value of goods or factory was determined by authorized officer under these Acts after their expiry.

In Salchbhai Mulla Mohamadali v. State of Gujarat,2 the question was whether the liability remains even after the repeal of the rules giving rise to such liability? Under Chhota Udepur Forest Rules, 1934, the landholder was under liability not to cut trees in those forests which were declared to be reserved forests. It was held that the liability will survive even after repeal of these rules. In Odgen Industries Ltd. v. Lucas,3 the right of dependents of deceased workman to claim compensation was in question. Under Workmens Compensation Act, if a workman dies, the dependents have right to claim compensation. This right accrues only on death of workman and not at the time when injury causing death was sustained by workman. If the law is amended to enhance the compensation and such amendment takes effect after workman sustains injury but before he dies succumbing to those injuries, the employer is liable for enhanced payment as compensation. (10) Section 6 of General Clauses Act, 1897 provides the effect of repeal as under Where this Act, or any Central Act or regulation made after commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted 1. AIR 1976 SC 958. 2. AIR 1993 sc s35. 3. (1969) 1 All ER 121 (PC).

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