Contents

Acknowledgements ix

1 Introduction: The End of Development? 1

2 From Post-Modernity to Post-Development 12
2.1 Introduction 12
2.2 From Modernity to Post-Modernity 13
2.3 Post-Development and its Discontents 28
2.4 Conclusions 43
3 Discourse of Power or Truth? 45
3.1 Introduction 45
3.2 Archeologies and Genealogies 46
3.3 Discourse Ethics and the Problems of Application 59
4 Towards a Development of Least Violence? 74
4.1 Introduction 74
4.2 Deconstruction at First Sight 76
4.3 Ethics as First Philosophy 80
4.4 A Philosophy of the Least Violence 89
4.5 Undecidability and the Decision 95
4.6 Deconstruction, Politics, Development 106
4.7 Conclusions 114
5 New Social Movements: A Subject of Development? 117
5.1 Introduction 117
5.2 Social Movements and Permanent Revolution 124
5.3 An Islamic Politics of Least Violence? 132
5.4 Conclusions 140
6 Aid and the Principle of Least Violence 142
6.1 Introduction 142
6.2 Participation as a Development of Least Violence 146
6.3 Conclusions 158
7 Conclusion 160

Bibliography 165
Index 171
1 Introduction: The End of
Development?

Towards the end of the 1980s a crisis emerged in development

theory. Initially, this was referred to as the ‘impasse’. Most of the tra-
ditional theories that were used to examine and delineate
development were regarded as having fallen into doubt (e.g. mod-
ernisation theory, the various forms of underdevelopment theory
and more recently neo-liberalism). Leftist strategies of development
were at least partially, if not wholly discredited by the collapse of
communism, whilst theories that advocated a development path
based on the Western capitalist model were also seen as having
delivered few if any of the benefits that they had seemed to promise.
Many parts of the ‘Third World’ had been struggling under the
weight of accumulated debts to the industrialised countries for more
than a decade, while also attempting to apply the market-influenced
Structural Adjustment Programmes that had been forced on them
by the West, in particular the Washington institutions, the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Structural
adjustment was supposed to create the conditions for economic
growth in the Third World by removing obstacles to the efficient
operation of the free market. By the end of the 1980s (indeed up to
the present day) there was (and still is) little evidence that the
ubiquitous Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) had stimulated
any growth, or created conditions conducive to growth. Under these
circumstances it was hardly surprising that many of those involved
in development began to feel that the old theories had failed (a
notable exception included those practitioners and academics who
were associated with the Washington, and other aid institutions, that
had made a considerable intellectual and financial investment in
such strategies as SAPs). The question was where to go from that
position. Such was the nature of the ‘impasse’.
In the absence of any trustworthy theoretical grounding many
theorists have sought a path through the impasse by reference to the
body of theory variously known as ‘post-modernism’, or poststruc-
turalism. Post-modernism is associated with a wide body of theory

1
2 The End of Development?

by analysts as various as Jean Baudrillard, Jean Francois Lyotard,

Emmanuel Levinas, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Fredric
Jameson. Although post-modernism is notoriously difficult to
define, it is possible to point to certain themes, or tendencies, that
are associated with this type of thinking (post-modernity is too
diffuse to refer to it as a school of thought). In particular, post-
modernists tend to take a critical position with regard to the habits
of thought associated with modernity (although, as we shall see,
some of them are more sympathetic than others to the body of ideas
that is usually associated with modernity). Aspects of modern
thinking that are often subjected to post-modern critique include
the belief that history incorporates a teleology of progress, that if
one examines human history one can detect a process of progress
towards greater levels of civilisation, or towards human emancipa-
tion. Classical Marxist theory would represent one example of such
a teleological theory, in that human society is seen as progressing
from one socio-economic stage of development to another more
advanced one, the culmination of this process being achieved with
the establishment of communism, the most advanced form of
society, and the goal of history. Post-modern theorists would deny
that such a dynamic of progress is built into history, and would reject
the possibility that there could be such a thing as the goal of history.
History is viewed simply as a contingent succession of events. Post-
modernists would also tend to criticise what is often viewed as a
peculiarly modernist faith in the ability of humankind to improve
their conditions through science, broadly conceived as the ability to
mould and shape their world through the application of technology
and such methods as rational techniques of planning. This is not to
say that post-modernists argue that technology and planning never
result in the desired, or at least beneficial outcomes, although some
come quite close to such a position at times (e.g. Paul Feyerabend
on science). However, they are usually suspicious of the ability of
planners and social engineers to achieve their supposedly benign
objectives for society (and this is to leave aside the possibility that
they may express such benign objectives as a cover for less generally
beneficial aims).
The above does not amount to anything like a full definition of
post-modernism. However, it does indicate that certain problems
arise out of post-modernism for the related concepts of development
and aid. After all, most, if not all of the traditional development
theories, whether of the left or the right, took the form of teleolog-
 Introduction: The End of Development? 3

ical theories that envisaged development in terms of achievement

of some sort of societal end goal, such as communism in the case of
the former group, or capitalism in the case of the latter. Post-
modernists would not only dismiss leftist theorists who saw history
as a progress towards communism, but also pro-capitalist theories,
such as that of Rostow, who argued that all societies progressed
through five stages of development, culminating in the achievement
of high mass consumerism on the American model. It also follows
from the above observations that post-modernists would be critical
of the whole enterprise of development planning, both at the macro-
level of national and regional planning, and at the micro-level of
designing specific project interventions, such as an agricultural,
health or educational project. Indeed, there are plenty of examples
of development plans and projects that misfire for a variety of
reasons, including poor design, failure to anticipate operational or
other problems, bureaucratic inefficiency or lack of capacity and so
forth. Given the plenitude of such evidence and the post-modern
suspicion of teleology and planning, it is hardly surprising that the
theorists who took a post-modern route out of the impasse often
ended by taking a rejectionist position towards development.
One of the first examples of this post-development line of thinking
was The Development Dictionary, published in 1992. Its editor,
Wolfgang Sachs debunked development in the following terms:

The idea of development stands like a ruin in the intellectual

landscape. Delusion and disappointment, failures and crimes have
been the steady companions of development and they tell a
common story: it did not work. Moreover, the historical
conditions which catapulted the idea into prominence have
vanished: development has become outdated. But above all, the
hopes and desires that made the idea fly, are now exhausted:
development has grown obsolete. (Sachs, 1992: 1)

In the same volume, Gustavo Esteva provides a powerful critique of

the word ‘development’ examining its origins as a Western concept
and the way in which it has been used by imperial powers of
various stripes as a support for their own ideological projects of
domination. He also notes the changing content of the word, as it
has moved from denoting an essentially economic process of
growth to take on other connotations such as participation and
human-centred development (Esteva, in Sachs, 1992: 6–25). Sachs
4 The End of Development?

comments that ‘development has become an amoeba-like concept,

shapeless but ineradicable’, with ‘contours so blurred it denotes
nothing ...’ (Sachs, 1992: 4).
This renders it eminently clear that as far as the authors are
concerned the whole enterprise of development should be
abandoned as having done far more harm than good. Over the next
few years The Development Dictionary was joined by a number of
other volumes that variously used elements of post-modern theory
to critique, and often to reject the idea of development. Arturo
Escobar used critical techniques associated with Michel Foucault to
analyse and dismiss development as a discourse in Encountering
Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World published
in 1995. Discourse may be defined as referring to bodies of ideas and
concepts, or theory, which mediate power through their effects upon
the way we act (this is a rather simplistic definition, but discourse
will be dealt with in greater detail in future chapters). The same year
saw the publication of the reader edited by Jonathan Crush, Power of
Development, which gathered together a number of articles (including
an excerpt from Escobar’s book) that took a similar approach to the
analysis of development. M.P. Cowen and R.W. Shenton also used
techniques influenced by Foucault to trace the history of develop-
ment as an idea in Doctrines of Development (1996), although they
take a more nuanced approach of criticising what they see as the
negative and repressive content of the concept of development in
the hope of liberating it for a more progressive and emancipatory
reading. Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree edited The Post-Devel-
opment Reader (1997), in which they gathered a variety of readings
that were critical of aspects of development. In his afterword
Rahnema used elements of Foucauldian thought together with
aspects of Ghandian and Confucian thinking to argue for the
rejection of development. Esteva, together with Madhu Suri Prakash,
produced Grassroots Post-Modernism: Remaking the Soil of Cultures
(1998), which argued once again that development had done more
harm than good, and that emancipation of the world’s social
majorities (so-called because the majority of the world’s population
are those living at the grass roots in the Third World, although there
are concentrations of the poor in the North) is best left to
movements originating with those social majorities (a position
similar to that put by Escobar). Numerous periodical articles and
other publications could be cited that take a similar line. It would
seem that we have a new ‘post-development’ school of thought, or
 Introduction: The End of Development? 5

discourse, emerging, which coheres around the central contentions

that development has been harmful, and that consequently it should
be consigned to the dustbin of history in order to make way for new
strategies of emancipation associated with what are sometimes
referred to as ‘new social movements’ originating in the ‘Third
World’, such as the Zapatistas of Mexico.
This is a line of thought that many find persuasive given the
plentiful evidence of the ill effects that can be attributed to devel-
opment initiatives in many countries, and the evident bankruptcy of
so many of the theories that have been used to justify development.
There is also much persuasive analysis in the above-mentioned
volumes and associated post-development writings. Cowen and
Shenton’s analysis of the concept of development is undeniably
scholarly and cogent, revealing much about the body of ideas that
have fed into the genesis of development as a discourse. Similarly,
Escobar’s critique of neo-liberal development theory (particularly
that underlying the aforementioned SAPs) is trenchant, while Esteva
and Prakash provide some convincing arguments against develop-
ment policies predicated on human rights. One could point to other
instances of worthwhile analysis associated with post-development
thinking.
However, the point of this book is that the author fundamentally
disagrees with some of the main contentions of this line of thought.
This book will argue that the post-development school’s call for the
end of development is misconceived and precipitate and that its
view as to what should follow development raises problems that can
be more effectively solved within the context of a pro-development
approach. It is hoped that this book will make a contribution
towards the elaboration of such an approach.
What then is wrong with post-development thinking? In the first
instance it is worth observing that although many post-development
thinkers have made use of post-modern analysis, they have not
always used it particularly effectively, and they do not appear to have
read very widely. The majority of the above-mentioned authors have
tended to use the body of theory developed by Michel Foucault.
However, as we shall see, their use of his theory is incomplete in the
sense that they focus on techniques of analysis that he developed in
his earlier works, and they have failed to take on board all the
nuances that Foucault later added to these methods. Further, they
have failed to address some significant critiques of Foucault’s
methodology by such commentators as Jurgen Habermas. In
6 The End of Development?

addition there are many other post-modern or critical thinkers

whose ideas could have been examined such as Jacques Derrida and
Emanuel Levinas (whose ideas will be considered in Chapter 4 of this
book). One might also have expected a little more attention to be
paid to the work of Habermas, whose position as a prominent critic
of post-modernity should have alerted post-development analysts to
the fact that there are alternative positions to the ones that they have
embraced. A central argument running through this book will be
that a more thorough reading of some of these alternatives leads to
quite different conclusions than those asserted by the post-develop-
ment theorists.
For example, a common position in poststructuralist theory holds
that the meaning of any word, or signifier, will be characterised by
slippage from one context to the next. However, as we have seen,
Sachs and Esteva point out such slippage in the meaning of the word
‘development’ only as an occasion for derision. This book will argue
that any worthwhile definition of development will necessarily be
unstable. Furthermore, it will argue for a conception of development
that is centrally concerned with emancipation. In this sense devel-
opment may be considered as entailing achievement of the freedom
of a community, nation, or group, to pursue its own projects for real-
isation of a good life on the proviso that it does the least possible
harm to others. Such a definition can never be finalised inasmuch as
it connotes a wide variety of actual and possible projects. We shall
also use the work of Jacques Derrida to argue that any attempt at
presenting a complete definition is bound to fail since it will
inevitably omit and repress projects that may legitimately be
identified as falling within the ambit of development.
This implies that existing attempts to provide complete defini-
tions of development are likely to be exclusory and therefore
repressive. Some may be deliberately repressive as in the case of
movements that premise one group’s development as being
dependent on exclusion of another group. Others may be more open
being concerned with the emancipation of the social majorities in
the Third World. This reading of the development discourse is
suggestive that the word is a vigorously contested one. Indeed,
various interests compete to move this discourse in the directions
that they respectively favour, some of which might be deemed con-
servative in that they involve various forms of closure, whilst others
are more emancipatory. This contestation is not suggestive that
development is redundant, or in any sense a fit subject for ridicule.
 Introduction: The End of Development? 7

Rather, it is indicative that development is a contested ground. To

be sure, when conservative forces manage to gain control of the
development agenda the results for the social majorities are often
deleterious, as when the British Conservative Government of the
1980s used its aid budget to fund projects such as the notorious
Pergau Dam in Malaysia (which was condemned as being ecologi-
cally and socially harmful, as well as cost inefficient) on the proviso
that the Malaysian Government would buy British arms. However,
the converse of this is that progressive forces can campaign to
prevent such abuses and to move the development agenda in more
inclusive directions. The contention of this book is that there is more
to be gained by doing precisely that rather than taking a rejection-
ist position like the post-development theorists.
Those who subscribe to a post-development position would tend
to retort that progressive initiatives are certain to be coopted by con-
servative forces and turned against the interests of the social
majorities. Alternatively, they would argue that the development
discourse is itself based on Western ideas of progress and therefore
cannot help but take the form of an imposition of those ideas on the
South, thus repressing local cultures and interests. With regard to
the first point, it seems likely that conservative groups will try to
gain control of progressive initiatives, and in many instances they
may succeed – but does that invalidate the efforts of progressive
forces to gain control of the development agenda? To the extent that
their efforts result in activities that are beneficial to those at the grass
roots, surely not (on the proviso that the judgement of what is
beneficial is made by those at the grass roots rather than by a
bureaucrat from the aid agency). The second argument has more
complex ramifications in that it suggests that the development
discourse cannot help but be imperialist because it represents an
imposition of the power of one set of interests, what Esteva and
Prakash refer to as the social minorities (largely, though not exclu-
sively, concentrated in the North), over another set of interests, the
social majorities. However, as we shall see, it can equally be argued
that all discourses can be seen as impositions of power by one
interest over another. Moreover, the outcome of such an act of power
need not necessarily be wholly deleterious for those subjected to that
act. It could actually have beneficial effects. This line of argument is
suggestive that it is pointless to reject development for being
implicated with the application of power. Rather, it is indicative once
again that interests associated with the social majorities should
8 The End of Development?

endeavour to exert their power effectively to move the development

agenda in progressive directions that will benefit and empower the
social majorities.
It can also be argued that objective conditions in the Third World
demand an active effort to ensure that the development discourse is
won for the progressive agenda. There is much evidence to suggest
that the majority of people in the ‘Third World’ are experiencing
deteriorating living conditions. Escobar notes this, pointing out that
statistics on growing hunger, the ‘Third World debt crisis, and
destruction of the rain forest are all likely to be used to promote the
view that aid and development are necessary’ (1995: 213). He would
wish to resist such a conclusion given that he analyses development
as a discourse of power that is used to the detriment of the social
majorities. However, if we accept the above arguments that the
agenda set by the development discourse can be moved in an eman-
cipatory direction, Escobar’s argument falls. His fears that a
strengthened development discourse will be bad for the social
majorities would be borne out to the extent that development policy
is dominated by those who wish to exploit the Third World. But this
is not an inevitable outcome. The need to prevent such an outcome
makes it all the more urgent to exert pressure to ensure that an
emancipatory direction is taken. Indeed, it could be argued that a
moral impetus is active here directing those forces sympathetic to
the social majorities to actively campaign for a progressive develop-
ment discourse. It would be immoral for the North to evade its
responsibility to assist the social majorities at a time when their
living conditions are deteriorating, in some cases to the point where
life can no longer be supported.
This leads us to one of the difficulties raised by the post-develop-
ment scenario of emancipation led by the new social movements,
which is in essence an ethical problem. We have already observed
that an integral element of the post-development scenario (for most
though not all of the analysts mentioned above) is that the North
should cease intervening in the affairs of the social majorities
through its development policies. One might ask if this leaves any
acceptable role for the North in a post-development Third World, or
if any intervention is to be seen as interference? As we shall see, post-
development thinkers seem undecided on this and no clear position
has emerged. This question becomes even more complex if we pose
it in terms of intervention by the social minorities rather than by
the North. After all, many of the post-development thinkers are
 Introduction: The End of Development? 9

members of the social minorities even if they have originated in the

Third World. They work in Western universities, and many of them
have worked in aid organisations. Yet they clearly feel that their
intervention is justified. At the risk of presumption, one suspects
that they feel an obligation to intervene in the attempt to help those
who can be seen to be in need of assistance. A central contention of
this book is that members of the social minorities are ethically
obliged to assist the social majorities. However, it is clear that not all
forms of such intervention would be acceptable. The post-develop-
ment thinkers are correct to note that many of the interventions that
have taken place under the rubric of development have been
repressive and disruptive of local societies and cultures. In future
chapters we shall argue that there are ethically acceptable models for
provision of assistance available within the development discourse.
An ethical problem also arises with the post-development school’s
entrustment of the emancipatory project to the new social
movements. This category covers a wide variety of groupings and
organisations emanating from the grass roots of the Third World,
ranging through the Chipko Movement to preserve the forest in
Bangladesh, the Zapatistas of Mexico, Sendero Luminoso in Peru,
and the various Islamist movements operating in many parts of the
Middle East. Are we to take a relativist position in which the products
and characteristics of each culture are regarded as equally legitimate
and consequently argue that all of these movements are legitimate
representatives of emancipation in their respective areas of the
world? Most of the post-development thinkers give a very clear
negative answer to this contention. Some are to be accepted as
genuinely emancipatory movements while others are not. For
example, Esteva and Prakash embrace the Zapatistas as a genuine
post-development emancipatory movement, but reject any claims
that Islamic fundamentalist movements might have to such a status.
Their reasons for such a decision are never clearly explained. This is
a serious oversight. Clearly, we are all likely to feel that some
movements or causes are worthy of our support. It may be that their
objectives seem so meritorious that we feel a moral compulsion to
offer our support to them. Equally, there will be some organisations
that we feel unable to support, indeed, their objectives may seem so
undesirable that we feel obliged to oppose them. The crucial issue
here is the reasoning underlying our decision. In considering the
process of how we reach such decisions we must have reference to
another common position in post-modern thinking to the effect that
10 The End of Development?

we are all perspectival. This means that we are only able to think
from within our own perspectives, each of which is characterised by
its own normative biases and cultural, or other values. Consequently,
each of us is biased and what seems right and justifiable to one may
seem pernicious and wrong to another. The hostility to Islamic fun-
damentalism displayed by Esteva and Prakash may well seem like an
unreasonable prejudice to an observer from the Muslim world. In
deciding which causes we support as legitimate and which ones we
reject as harmful, or misguided, we are obliged to explain ourselves.
It seems inevitable to this author that such explanations will have an
ethical dimension given that they deal in classifying what is right, in
the sense of being worthy of support, and what is wrong, or unde-
serving of support. Given that we are operating across cultural
boundaries this is complicated because we are dealing with different
perspectives that have different ideas of what is right and what is
wrong. This suggests that we must have reference to an ethics that
is universal and that is not founded within a particular cultural
tradition with its partial biases. In future chapters we shall examine
the possibility for such an ethics. It will be argued that certain
elements of post-modern and critical thought, particularly that
associated with Derrida and Levinas, provide the basis for such an
approach that will enable us to make distinctions between the new
social movements.
To summarise, the central purpose of this book is to reject the calls
for the end of development, and to utilise post-modern and critical
theory to demonstrate that there can after all be forms of develop-
ment that are complementary to the emancipatory projects of the
new social movements. The character of this development would be
guided by an ethics based on the deconstructive thinking of Derrida,
which is in turn influenced by the ethical philosophy of Levinas.
The argument of the book will be organised as follows. Chapter 2
will initially examine some central themes in post-modern thinking,
particularly inasmuch as they have a bearing on the post-develop-
ment debate. It will then pass on to a more detailed consideration of
the post-development literature, demonstrating that it has imported
certain problems from post-modern thought, notably that of
relativism. In Chapter 3, we shall proceed to an examination of some
of the post-modern and critical literature that has been employed in
post-development thought. Firstly, the work of Foucault will be
examined to demonstrate some of the problems in his work that
have been ignored by such commentators as Escobar and Rahnema.
 Introduction: The End of Development? 11

A consideration of the critique addressed to Foucault by Habermas

will lead to an analysis of the latter’s work to assess what light it may
shed on questions pertaining to development. Chapter 4 will focus
on the work of Derrida and Levinas, explicating various attempts to
synthesise Derrida’s technique of deconstruction with the Levinasian
view of ethics. This chapter will culminate in a consideration of how
a deconstructionist ethics might be applied in a political context. In
Chapter 5 we shall examine a number of the new social movements,
applying the ‘ethical/deconstructive’ approach outlined in Chapter
4 to them. Chapter 6 will apply this viewpoint to aid policy and its
application, raising the questions as to what forms of development
aid actually assist in the emancipation of the social majorities and
are ethically acceptable, with a view to indicating the direction that
a viable development policy might take in the future.
Index
Compiled by Sue Carlton

al-Quaida group 132 Cambodia 114

al-Shaab group 138 Canada 69, 153
Allende, Salvador 144 capitalism 38, 108–9, 113, 117, 162
Alvarez, S. 120 and development 39, 116
American War of Independence categorical imperatives 84, 85
98–9, 103 change agents
An-Naim, A. 133–6 dangers of 153, 156, 157–8
apartheid 23 making contact 152–3
aporia 96–9 role of 146, 150–2
‘archaeology’ 47 understanding community 148–9
arche 24 Chiapas 124, 125, 128, 131
arche-writing 89–90, 92, 93, 95, 98, Chile 144
104 China 39, 114
Arkhoun, M. 132–3 Chipko 9, 158
arms industry 108 Clarkson, L. 38
aufhebung 97 class struggle 110, 111–12
autonomy, individual 19, 20, 38 closure 6, 110, 118, 123, 128–9
and consensus 163
Bacon, Francis 15 and exclusion 94, 97, 115, 117,
Baker, R. 137–8 126, 131
Bali 144 and revolution 113, 128
Bangladesh 9 COCEI (Coalition of Workers,
Barangay Amar Farmer’s Association Peasants and Students of the
153 Isthmus) 129–31, 140, 141,
Barangay Taludtod 154 163
Bauman, Z. 82 Cohen, J.N. 85
Bawtree, V. 4, 38 Colombia 31, 32
Beardsworth, R. 75, 92, 93–4, 96, communication 61
98 see also language; meaning
Benhabib, S. 62 Communism 1, 2, 111
Bennington, G. 75, 98, 104, 106 see also Marxism
Blaug, R. 62–8, 71, 72, 117, 126, communities, and ethical relation-
162 ship 86–7
Boran people, East Africa 37, 38 Comstock, D.E. 149–50
bottom-up development 32, 159, Confucius 40, 118
163 conscientisation (animation) 146,
see also participatory develop- 150, 151, 157
ment consensus 63, 68–70, 115, 127, 163
Boyle, Robert 15 Copernicus 14
Burke, E. 22 Cowen, M.P. 4, 5, 39, 40, 41–4
Burkey, S. 146, 148, 151–2, 154, 157 Critchley, S. 76, 80, 83–8, 96,
Burnell, P. 143–4 101–2, 106

171
172 The End of Development?
Crush, J. 4
cultural relativism 27, 35–7, 53,
69–70
Dagnino, E. 121–2, 123, 140, 141
Dahl, G. 38
decisions
and exclusions 91–3, 101, 105,
106
through ‘other in me’ 104–5
and undecidability 88–9, 95–106
deconstruction 74, 75, 76–80
and decision-making 104–5
and democracy 106–7
and difference 115
and ethics 84, 86, 88, 96, 103,
115
implications for action 105–14
as philosophy of least violence
89–95, 105, 115
see also principle of least
violence
and politics 78–9, 100–6, 115
and relationship to the other 96,
97
democracy 87–8, 94–5, 106–7, 113,
127–8
and exclusion 106, 107
promise of 109–10, 114
and vernacular societies 39–40
Derrida, J. 10–11, 74–80, 133
decision-making 95–8, 101, 106
linguistics 89–93, 95, 115
politics and ethics 100–14, 116,
161, 162
Descartes, R. 15, 16, 17, 24
development
benefits to people 31, 33, 50
capabilities and entitlements 43
concept of 3–4
as continuous process 162–3, 164
and emancipation 4–5, 6, 8, 9, 52
as harmful 4, 34, 38, 41, 115,
142, 145, 161
and imposition of power 7–8
need for 160
objectives of 162, 164
planning 2–3, 29
and politico-diplomatic consider-
ations 143–5
and power relations 28, 29–30
and progress 7, 8, 41
reform of 50
slippage in meaning 6
and women 31, 33
see also participatory develop-
ment
development agencies
and openness 63
support for NSMs 79
development discourse 29–32
as creator of Third World
problems 28–9, 31, 46, 48
history of 40–1
‘differance’ 78
discipline 47–8, 49, 56, 57, 58
discourse
and power 28, 45, 47, 49, 51,
57–8
and relativism 57
and truth 28, 51, 54, 56, 60
discourse ethics 59–73, 115, 162–3
and cultural difference 69–70,
71–2
implementation 63–8, 71
and judgements 65–6, 67–8
disempowerment 29, 63
Dreyfus, H.L. and S. 67
Dryzek, J.S. 64
Dupré, L. 13, 16, 25
‘economy of violence’ 93
Egypt 137–9, 144
Egyptian War 138
Ehteshami, A. 132
emancipation 4–5, 6, 8
as continuous process 150
and democracy 107
and NSMs 5, 9, 52
and participatory development
148, 158
Enlightenment 13, 20, 46
Escobar, A. 4, 5, 8, 28–33, 45, 50, 55
relativism 36, 43
top-down development 142, 143
Esteva, G.
concept of development 3, 6

critique of development 4, 5, 7
and emancipatory movements 9,
10, 12, 33–7, 124, 129, 131
relativism 35–7, 43
and vernacular societies 37, 118,
140
ethical relationship 59, 81, 82,
83–4, 85
and third party 86–8, 101, 102–3
and violence 95
ethics
as first philosophy 80–9
pervertibility of 104
and rigid systems 80, 88
universal 10
and violence 104
see also ethical relationship
ethnic cleansing 25, 53, 71–2
EU aid 144
exclusion 59, 73, 91–8, 129–30
and capitalism 108–9
and closure 94, 95, 97, 115, 117,
126, 131
and decisions 91–3, 101, 105, 106
and democracy 106, 107
and free speech 63
and violence 93, 94–6, 98, 103–4,
105, 115–16, 117, 131–2
Eyadema, General G. 144
fascism 131
Faurisson, R. 27
feminism 31, 72, 115
see also women
Fichte, J.G. 18
Flacks, R. 119, 123
Flynn, T. 47
Foucault, M. 4, 5, 10–11, 28, 45–59,
92
relativism 51–3, 72
validity of theories 51, 58
foundationalism 20–1, 23–6, 27–8,
45, 77–8, 115
and exclusions 43, 59, 62, 75, 89
and vernacular societies 39–40
Fox, R. 149–50
France 144
Fraser, N. 51
free market 1, 38, 112
Index 173
free speech 63–4
freedom 94, 103–4
Freire, P. 145–6, 157
French Revolution 22
Freud, S. 97
Fukuyama, F. 107
‘genealogy’ 47, 49, 56
globalisation 112, 120
God 14, 15, 16, 17, 19
Gramsci, A. 121, 122
Gulag Archipelago 22
Gulen, F. 139–40
Gulf War 138
Habermas, J. 5, 6, 45–6, 54, 59–73
and difference 115
ideal speech situation 61, 63–5,
117, 126, 163
Hand, S. 81
Hegel, G.W.F. 93, 110
Heidegger, M. 83
Held, D. 61
Heller, A. 23–4, 26
hierarchical observation 48
history, and progress 2–3
Hizb al-Wasat 138–9
Hobley, M. 155
Hobson, M. 75, 95
Hohengarten, W.M. 60
Holloway, J. 124–5, 126, 127, 128
Holocaust 25, 27, 96
human mind, and a priori
knowledge 17–18
humanism 46, 55
Husserl, E.G.A. 24
hypothetical imperatives 85
ideal speech situation (ISS) 61,
63–5, 68, 116, 117, 162–3
and evaluation of emancipatory
movements 128, 131, 141,
156–7, 164
implementation problems 71, 72
Ideas of Reason 21–2
ijtihad 134–5
IMF (International Monetary Fund)
1, 21, 63, 108, 109
India 148
174 The End of Development?

individualization 57 Lyotard, J.-F. 20, 21–3, 27, 74

Indonesia 144, 157
intervention, justification for 8–9, McNamara, Robert 145
159 mafia 108
intimidation 63–4, 67 Mahmoud, Ustadh 137
Iroquois, Canada 38 Malaysia 7
Islam mandar obedeciendo (command
centrist tendency 137–8, 139 obeying) 127, 129
and democracy 132 Marcos, F.E. (President of
and relativism 133 Philippines) 144
and tolerance 139 Marcos, Subcomandante 125–6
Islamic fundamentalism 9, 35, 116, Marglin, F.A. and S.A. 41
131–40, 163 Marx, K. 42, 107
Islamic truth 133 Marxism 2, 74, 75–6, 109–14, 161,
162
Java 144, 145 death of 107–8, 111
jizya poll tax 134 emancipatory promise of 109–10
Johnston, H. 121 and globalisation 112
Jordan, G. 120 materiality, mediated by discourse
Jucheticos 129, 130 30
judgement 99–100, 101 mauvaise conscience 81–2, 83
‘judicative’ practices 47 May, T. 24, 25, 77
justice 53, 54, 87–8, 102, 103 meaning
and context 90
Kant, I. 17, 18–19, 21, 23, 93–4 see also linguistics
Kemp, R. 63, 67 Megerssa, G. 38
Kenya 144 Melucci, A. 119–20, 121
knowledge metaphysics 24, 76–7
and doubt 15 metaphysics of origins 56–7
and exclusions 92–3 metatheories 20–3, 27, 40, 74, 160–1
grounding of 23–4, 26, 27–8 Mexico 5, 33
and power 28, 45, 46–9, 58 Millan, M. 126, 127
and reason 16, 17–19 min and jen 40, 116, 118
‘kosmos’ 13–14 minority interests 71–2, 106, 119
modernity 13–21
Laden, Osama bin 132 Moi, Daniel Arap 144
language 69, 83, 85, 89–93, 96, 115 Montaigne, Michel de 15
Latin America 148 morality 82–3
law 103–4 see also ethics
aporia of 96, 97–8 Mubarak, Mohammed 144
Lee, R. 132 Mugabe, Robert 114
Leibniz, G. 84 multiculturalism 70
Leninism 130
Levinas, E. 10–11, 59, 74–6, 80–7, NAFTA 124
95–6, 101–3 naskh 136, 137
linguistics 89–93 natural order 13–14
‘logos’ 13–14 nature
Lomé Convention 144 and science 14–15
Lorenzano, L. 127 unity of 19

Nazis/Nazism 25, 26, 27, 35
Nepal-Australia Forestry Project
(NAFP) 154–6
‘new commons’ 34, 35
New International 110, 111, 112,
113, 123, 141
new social movements (NSMs) 5,
79, 117–24, 131, 140–1
and authenticity 117–18, 129,
131
and common ground 111, 121–3,
140–1
and cultural politics 120–1
cultural relativism 53
emancipatory credentials 9–10,
35, 52–4, 79, 118, 129–31, 141,
163
in Islamic world 137–40
and permanent revolution 124–32
and social fragmentation 118–19,
120
and unaccountable power centres
119–20
Newton, I. 17, 18
Nicaragua 144
Nietzsche, F.W. 26, 28, 57
nihilism 12, 26, 54, 74
non-Muslims, and Islamic law
133–4
normalisation 48, 49, 50, 56, 57,
58, 59
norms, universally acceptable 61–3,
65–6
Norris, C. 27, 54, 77
nuclear weapons 108
Oakley, P. 146–8, 150–1, 152–3, 154,
157
Ockham, William of 14–15
Ojibway people, Canada 37
ontologisation 93, 95, 105
ontology 76–7, 80, 81, 82, 83, 87
oppositions/binary pairings 77–8,
86
oppression, spontaneous resistance
to 156, 157, 159
‘organic consistency’ 37
‘parallel economy’ 34, 35
Index 175
Participatory Action Research (PAR)
148–9
participatory development 32,
146–59
definitions of participation 146–7
and emancipation 148, 158
and empowerment 146, 147, 156
and interests of poor 155, 156
and need for external agency 148
post-development critique of
156–8, 164
and process of democratic
learning 149–50
Pelaez, E. 124–5, 126
penal system 47
performative contradiction 51, 58
Pergau Dam 7
perspectivism 26
Philippines 144, 156
Pippin, R. 18
Pol Pot, 114
political correctness 70
politics, and ethics 100–1, 103
Porter, D. 32, 44
post-development theory 3, 4–5,
28–43, 45, 50–1, 160
and post-modern thought 12–13
and violence of exclusion 116
post-modernism 1–3, 4, 5–6, 12–13,
21–8, 59
and relativistic nihilism 74, 75, 79
power centres, unaccountable
119–20
power/knowledge relationship,
ambiguity of 49, 50, 51, 54–6,
59
Prakesh, M.S.
critique of development 4, 57
and emancipatory movements 9,
10, 12, 33–7, 124, 129, 131
relativism 35–7, 43
and vernacular societies 37, 118,
140
principle of least violence 115, 145,
161–2, 163
and evaluation of emancipatory
projects/movements 117, 131,
141, 155, 159, 164
and revolution 114
176 The End of Development?
Principle of Preservation (P) 68, 71,
126
Project Aid 153, 154
proletariat 21–2, 23, 111
promise, Derrida’s concept of
109–10, 133
psychiatry, distorting madness 55,
56
Quebec 69
Qur’an 134–7
Rabinow, P. 49
‘radical alterity’ 78
Rafiq, Habib 138–9
Rahman, M.A. 146, 149, 154
Rahnema, M. 4, 11, 37–40, 118,
140, 156–8
reality 13–16, 18
reason 16–19, 26
reasoning subject 16, 17–18, 19, 23,
25
reciprocity conditions 62
relativism 12–13, 28, 59, 72, 74, 89,
115
cultural 27, 35–7, 53, 69–70
relativistic trap 26, 36, 45, 51,
56–7, 58, 75
repetition, and identity 90–1, 92,
93, 97
responsibilities, and conflict
100–1
revolution 113–14
Rondinelli, D. 142–3
Rorty, R. 27
Rostow, W.W. 3, 20, 162
Rouse, J. 51, 52, 53
Rubin, J. 129–30
Ryan, A. 75–6, 78–9
Sachs, W. 3–4, 6
San Andres Chicahuaxtla 33, 34
San Cristobal de las Casas 124
SAPRIN (Structural Adjustment
Participatory Review
International Network) 120
Sarilakas 153, 154, 156
Saussure, F. de 89–90, 91
Schuurman, F.J. 119
science
empirical investigation 14–15, 19
and interpretation 26
moulding nature 2, 15, 19–20
and religious belief 14–15, 19
self
care of 58–9
and the other 83
self-reliance 146, 153
Sen, A.K. 42–3
Sendero Luminoso 9, 12, 79
shari’a law 132–7, 139
Shenton, R.W. 4, 5, 39, 40, 41–4
Shining Path, Peru 35
Shura Council Political Parties
Committee 139
Sidahmed, A.S. 132
signs
and meaning 90–1, 97
see also linguistics
silencing 63–4, 67
Simons, J. 46, 53–4
skepticism 15, 19
Smart, B. 58–9
social majorities, and control of
development 7–8, 32–3
social minorities, and intervention
8–9
Somoza, García 114, 144
South Africa 23
Southern Africa 114
sovereignty 93–4
speech, and writing 77–8, 89–91
Sprinker, M. 113
state power, erosion of 119
Structural Adjustment Participatory
Review International Network
(SAPRIN) 120
Structural Adjustment Programmes
(SAPs) 1, 5, 21, 123
subject-object relations 21, 23, 25
subjection/subjectification 49, 50
sublime 21–2
Suharto, T.N.J. 145
Sunna 134–7
symmetry conditions 62
Taha, M.M. 136, 137
Taliban 132

Tarnas, R. 14
Taylor, C. 51, 69, 70
Third World debt 1, 108
Tibet 114
Togo 144
tolerance 70, 72, 115
top-down development 32, 34,
142–3
totalisation 76, 77, 80, 93, 97, 101,
105, 117
traditional societies 33–4, 37–8
see also vernacular societies
Training and Visit Extension 48
Transmigration Project, Indonesia
144
Triqui Indians 33, 118
trusteeship 41–4
truth 51, 54, 56, 60, 93
universal 14, 15, 21
Tukucha 155
Turkey 139–40
Umar, Second Caliph 135
unemployment, world 108
United Kingdom 144
United Nations 109
United Nations Decade for Women
31
United States 64, 144
universal truth 14, 15, 21
USSR 144
utopianism 82–3
validity claims 60–1, 69, 74
‘veridicative’ practices 47
vernacular societies
and capitalism 118
characteristics of 37–9, 118
and democracy 38, 39–40
and economic expansion 39
violence
inevitability of 105, 117, 161
see also principle of least violence
Visker, R. 54, 55, 57–8
Index 177
Walzer, M. 69, 70
Warnke, G. 69–70, 115
Warren, M. 69
Wasat Party see Hizb al-Wasat
Wassittiyah 137, 139
Weedon, C. 120
welfare system 49–50
White, S. 52
Wittgenstein, L.J.J. 67
women
and COCEI 130–1
and control of development
agenda 33
and development 31, 33
Muslim 133–4, 139
women, and Zapatistas 126, 129
Women in Development (WID) 31
Women’s Revolutionary Law 126,
129
World Bank 29, 48, 63
and conditionality 120
creating dependency 50
and exclusion 108, 109
and political considerations
144–5
SAPs 1, 21
World Conference on Agrarian
Reform and Rural
Development (WCARRD) 147
Wright, T. 82
Zapatista Army of National
Liberation (EZLN) 124, 128,
129, 131, 163
Zapatistas 5, 9, 12, 33, 124–9
avoiding exclusion 125–6, 131,
141, 163
and democracy 127–8
and gender equality 126, 129, 140
and ideal speech situation 128
and Marxist guerrillas 157
and permanent revolution 128–9
Zimbabwe 114
Zionism 96