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“Does Descartes succeed in his quest for certainty?

René Descartes (1596-1650) was a French philosopher who was very significant in
questioning the philosophical opinions, which had stood somewhat still since the
times of Aristotle and even Plato. He was educated at the Jesuit college of La Flèche
in Anjou from 1604-12, studying classics, logic, mathematics and the traditional
Aristotelian philosophy (it should be noted that Descartes was devoutly Christian
throughout his life although he did a great deal of sceptic thinking on all accounts).
From his school days Descartes was in poor health and was allowed to remain in bed
until 11am (he continued this custom until his death). He was only happy with
learning mathematics at school, with other subjects he disliked how many things were
unknown to him. Descartes graduated in Law from the University of Poitiers in 1616
and decided to enlist in military school. Descartes travelled greatly between 1620-28
when he decided to settle down in Holland. Descartes wrote his first extensive
discourse on Physics (“Le Monde”) while in Holland but upon hearing news of
Galileo’s house arrest he decided to hold back publishing. “Le Monde” was published
soon after Descartes’ death. Descartes was the first philosopher to consider the
relation of the mind to the body as a problem. He also believed that a person’s identity
is primarily not bodily, but of the mind – the “Ego cogito” – and that pain is spiritual,
not material (unlike Thomas Aquinas, for instance.)

Descartes’ “Meditations on First Philosophy” was published in 1641, the first


meditation being that of the things that we may doubt. In order for Descartes to find
what he could be certain of he decided to use a method of extreme scepticism,
although it must be noted that Descartes’ main aim was to overcome scepticism – he
used extreme scepticism to do this but was not a sceptic. He would discontinue to
consider a group of ideas when he found a single means by which they could be
considered uncertain. His intention was not to case doubt on individual belief but on
the sources of belief – to do the former would be a near impossible task. Descartes
first doubt is the disagreement of the learned, that is that one cannot trust the
authorities (religious authorities, Aristotle’s long standing philosophical beliefs) for
knowledge. His second doubt is the deceit of the senses. Descartes attempted to show
that all empirical beliefs are unreliable because the senses can be deceived.

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“I realised that it was necessary, once in the course of my life, to demolish everything
completely and start again right from the foundations if I wanted to establish
anything at all in the sciences that was stable and likely to last.” – René Descartes,
First Meditation on First Philosophy

However, by the end of Descartes’ First Meditation he had decided that he could not
be certain of anything, except arguably “I think, therefore I am.” Descartes third
doubt is his “Dream Argument.” He asks the reader to look at the case of being in a
dreaming state to convey his idea that the human senses can be very easily deceived –
dreams seem like reality when one is experiencing them. Descartes believed the
senses worked in the same way in a dreaming state as in reality and therefore
concluded it is impossible for one to tell when one is in a dreaming state or in reality.
He follows on however to somewhat contradict this point saying “since God made us
and provided us with senses they cannot be totally unreliable.” Nigel Warburton
sheds more doubt on the dream argument saying “…it is usually easy to distinguish
dreams from reality because dreams are full of weird ideas.” Descartes concludes the
First Meditation by saying that we can by no means be certain that what we interpret
from the senses is real.

“How often, asleep at night, am I convinced of just such familiar events-that I am


here in my dressing gown, sitting by the fire-when in fact I am lying undressed in
bed!” – René Descartes, First Meditation on First Philosophy

This argument does not conclude that we can be certain of nothing, as mathematical
propositions (a dreaming state would have the same mathematical truths, a square
could never have more or less than four sides for instance) and a possible external
world of some kind (what we see in our dreams must be like things which are real,
otherwise we would not be able to fathom such images) remain undefeated. It is also
arguable that the Dream Argument is self-refuting – “when in fact I am lying
undressed in bed” could seem to be said by Descartes in certainty but after being
deceived once is it ever possible to say something in certainty? This in turn begs the
question “can one ask oneself to imagine one is dreaming unless one is certainly
conscious?” – a point notably argued by Norman Malcolm. Descartes continues on to

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look at further potential uncertainties. He supposes that instead of a God being
supremely good and the source of truth, there is some malicious demon of the utmost
power and cunning that has employed all of his energies in order to deceive. This is
questioned later in the meditation however, when Descartes states that an evil demon
would not be allowed to interfere with one’s cognitive process by God – Descartes
being a firm believer in the Christian, all powerful God. However, what Descartes is
trying to say is that whatever an all powerful deity may be, being as it is all powerful,
it could deceive us to any extent. This is an illustration to show that nothing can be
absolutely certain, and by no means indicates that Descartes believed in such a
powerful demon or deity deceiving us – just that such deceit is possible. Descartes
believed it is within one’s power to deter influence by such a demon but on the other
hand, says:

“I am like a prisoner who is enjoying an imaginery freedom while asleep; as he


begins to suspect that he is asleep, he dreads being woken up, and goes along with
the pleasant illusion as long as he can…for fear that my peaceful sleep may be
followed by hard labour when I wake.” – René Descartes, First Meditation on First
Philosophy

This analogy with the prisoner is similar to that of Plato’s Cave. It is controversial
however, in that it indicates we may all be aware of reality but simply choose to not
“live in it.” This is known as the “Demon Argument” and is a much sturdier argument
than the Dream Argument. The argument ties in the Descartes’ belief in Dualism, in
which the mind could easily be possessed by an evil demon (the link between the
mental and the physical in the brain.) However, Dualism seems greatly flawed –
importantly, what could such a link in the brain consist of? With the Demon Argument
Descartes decided he had brought uncertainty to mathematical propositions and a
possible external world. He argues that a demon could have arranged the earth, the
sky, and extended things to appear to exist as they do, but in truth they are portrayed
falsely. Also, he points out that we could be deceived just as easily about
mathematical truths, although they seem so certain and irrefutable. It would seem with
this conclusion to the First Meditation that Descartes had failed in his quest for
certainty. However, to make such an assumption would be unwise, as even the Demon
Argument is penetrable, and Descartes’ chosen tactic of skepticism can also be

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criticised. Friedrich Hegel wrote that skepticism is self defeating as to complete the
skeptic outlook one must commit suicide.

So, on the one hand there was a tendency to lose all confidence in our ability to know
anything at all but on the other hand, the atmosphere of uncertainty allowed people to
entertain weird and wonderful theories. Descartes tried to avoid these two paths
however, and aimed to confound the sceptic whilst avoiding the fanciful. With this
accomplished he could then go on to build a new philosophical and scientific system
to replace that of Aristotle.

Philosophers have often contrasted the knowledge of the world acquired through the
senses with the knowledge acquired through reasoning. Leibniz, for example, spoke
of vérités de fait and vérités de raison; and Hume distinguished “experimental
reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence” from “abstract reasoning
concerning quantity and number.” Some statements seem to quite certainly be true:
1. Statements of identity, e.g. “The Princess is the daughter of the Queen,” “Seven
plus five equals twelve” – Kant would have classed this statement as synthetic not
analytic. He would have said that when one thinks of “7 + 5” one does not actually
have “12” in one’s mind and that one therefore adds something to the subject.
2. Statements asserting a subclass within a class, e.g. “All black cats are cats.”
3. Definitions, e.g. “There are one hundred centimetres in one metre.” Descartes
would say that his Demon Argument defeats this argument - mathematical
propositions would fit in here.
4. Stipulations, e.g. “A proposition is either true or false,” “It will either rain or not
rain”
5. Statements making implicit meanings explicit, “A positive integer is either even or
uneven.”

These groups of course overlap but are analytic propositions and therefore to deny
their truth would be self contradictory. One has to understand that for these
propositions to be defined as analytic the words within them have to have established
meanings and uses. Someone could claim, for instance, that the number three is
actually the same as the symbol (for four) “4.” However, this would seem very
illogical and absurd as it is veering away from fixity of meaning in communication to

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the most extreme degree. If one was to question the meaning of every word at every
encounter chaos would result and communication would be impossible. Thankfully,
we do have such fixity of the meaning of words and communication is possible.
Analytic propositions, then, are certain and immune from revision on the base of
empirical evidence.

Ayer declares that it is grammar that rules out saying that something is red and green
at the same time. But this explanation could seem inadequate. Language and grammar
could be considered simply just too changeable, trivial, superficial, parochial, and
imprecise. Also, that they fix only the outer limits of approved usage. Descartes hoped
for a perfect language – he looks for “clear and distinct” answers to many questions –
but was by no means the only philosopher to seek metaphysical simplicity by
analysis. Socrates, Leibniz, Locke, Hume, and Wittgenstein – a diverse collection –
among others have all used a deep, analytical approach. Could society even attain the
perfection of formal languages such as in “Principia Mathematica”? It seems not, but
then again it is questionable whether or not such perfection would ever be necessary.
It seems that language is complex and words understood to a high degree such that
one can communicate anything one has knowledge of without a problem. Wittgenstein
said:

“Our language can be seen as an ancient city; a maze of little streets and squares, of
old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this
surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform
houses.”

Language is not logic. There is no invariance in language; grammar has no essence;


syntax and morphology differ from language to language. Nothing in language
“corresponds with the world” or reflects “the grain of reality.” Languages can be
translated only roughly. None is ideal. There is no clear standard for perfection or
adequacy, as there is for a chess set with a pawn missing.

To conclude, Descartes did not succeed in his quest for certainty; he found he could
be certain of nothing. His “Demon Argument” was the final argument required to cast
doubt on anything and everything we may believe in. Descartes still held firm beliefs,

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and although he used scepticism in his quest for certainty, he was no sceptic.
However, he uncovered a new belief: Nothing, no matter how certain it may seem,
can be considered as a certainty.

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