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3 Municipality of Sta Fe vs Municipality of Aritao Petitioner: Municipality of Sta Fe Respondent: Municipality of Aritao Ponente: Azcuna Facts:In 1980, petitioner Municipality of Sta. Fe, in Nueva Vizcaya, filed before the RTC of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for the Determination of Boundary Dispute involving the barangays of Bantinan and Canabuan. The trial was almost over when the court realized its error. The court suspended the proceedings and referred the case to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Nueva Vizcaya. The Sanggunian adopted Resolution 64 adjudicating the two barangays as part of respondents territory. The Sanggunian approved the Committees recommendation but endorsed the boundary dispute to the RTC for further proceedings. In the RTC, respondent moved to consider Resolution 64 as final and executory. The RTC denied the motion ruling that since there was no amicable settlement in the Sanggunian, the latter cannot issue a decision favoring a party. The court held that, under the law in force, the purpose of such referral was only to afford the parties an opportunity to amicably settle with the intervention and assistance of the Provincial Board and that in case no such settlement is reached, the court proceedings shall be resumed. Respondent filed a motion praying for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction since the power to try and decide municipal boundary disputes already belonged to the Sanggunian. The RTC granted the motion. The CA affirmed.According to the CA, a new legislation can be given retroactive effect so long as it is curative in nature. Thus, the LGC vesting jurisdiction to the Sanggunian was given retroactive effect. Since the Local Government Code of 1991 is the latest will of the people expressed through Congress on how boundary disputes should be resolved, the same must prevail over previous ones. It must be emphasized that the laws on the creation of local government units as well as settling boundary disputes are political in character, hence, can be changed from time to time and the latest will of the people should always prevail. In the instant case, there is nothing wrong in holding that Regional Trial Courts no longer have jurisdiction over boundary disputes. Issue: WON the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction Held: No Ratio: October 1, 1917 (Revised Administrative Code)- jurisdiction with the provincial boards of the provinces in which the municipalities are situated; June 17, 1970 (RA 6128)- jurisdiction with the CFI of the Province where the municipalities are situated; February 10, 1983 (BP 337 or the 1983 Local Government Code); January 1, 1992 (LGC); - Sangguniang Panlalawigan where the municipalities are situated, appeal with the RTC. This Court agrees with petitioners contention that the trial court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint when it was filed on October 16, 1980 since the prevailing law then was Section 2167 of the RAC, as amended by Sec. 1 RA 6128, which granted the CFI the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of municipal boundary disputes. Municipality of Sogod reveal that it dealt with the trial courts dismissal of cases filed for lack of jurisdiction because at the time of the institution of the civil actions, the law in force was the old provision of Sec. 2167 of the RAC, which empowered the provincial boards, not the trial courts, to hear and resolve such cases. The difference in the factual setting notwithstanding, Municipality of Sogod still applies in the sense that similar thereto the pendency of the present case has also been overtaken by events the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and the enactment of the LGC of 1991. As shown above, since the effectivity of R.A. No. 6128, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has been the primary tribunal responsible in the amicable settlement of boundary disputes between or among two or more municipalities located in the same province. With the LGC of 1991, however, a major change has been introduced that in the event the Sanggunian fails to effect a settlement, it shall not only issue a certification to that effect but must also formally hear and decide the case within the reglementary period. Rule III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC of 1991 outlines the procedure for the settlement of boundary disputes. Unlike Ra 6128 and BP 337, the LGC of 1991 grants an expanded role on the Sanggunian concerned in resolving cases of municipal boundary disputes. Aside from having the function of bringing the contending parties together and intervening or assisting in the amicable settlement of the case, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is now specifically vested

Page 2 of 16 with original jurisdiction to actually hear and decide the dispute in accordance with the procedures laid down in the law and its implementing rules and regulations. This situation, in effect, reverts to the old rule under the RAC, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 6128, under which the provincial boards were empowered to investigate, hear the parties and eventually decide the case on the basis thereof. On the other hand, under the LGC of 1991, the trial court loses its power to try, at the first instance, cases of municipal boundary disputes. Only in the exercise of itsappe ll ate jurisdiction can the proper RTC decide the case, on appeal, should any party aggrieved by the decision of theSangguniang Panlalawigan elevate the same. The RTC correctly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Under the rules, it was the responsibility of the court to dismiss an action whenever it appears that [it] has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. Indeed, the RTC acted accordingly because at the time of the filing of the motion to dismiss its want of jurisdiction was evident. It was duty-bound to take judicial notice of the parameters of its jurisdiction as the choice of the proper forum was crucial for the decision of a court or tribunal without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time by this Court as it would never become final and executory. Likewise, the standing rule is that dismissal of a case for lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings since jurisdiction is conferred by law and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the action; otherwise, the inevitable consequence would make the courts decision a lawless thing. As correctly pointed out by the RTC it will be a futile act for the Court to rule on the case concerning a boundary dispute if its decision will not after all be followed by the people concerned because the decision is totally unacceptable to them. How then can the Court enforce its decision? Petitioner contends that the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the LGC of 1991 on the settlement of municipal boundary disputes should be applied prospectively. The Court is not unmindful of the rule that where a court has already 9.4 People v. Zeta FACTS: Appellant was found guilty of violating RA 145 for having collected fees in excess of 5% of the amount received by the claimant as compensation for services rendered. At the time the agreement was made the law in force was C.A. No. 675 which allowed a person to charge not more than 5% of any amount that the claimant would collect. The trial court in convicting appellant held that the agreement for the payment of a 5% fee on the amount collected was void and illegal. ISSUE: W/N RA 145 has a retroactive effect. HELD: No. It does not appear in the language of RA 145 that it should be given retroactive effect. There is a need of a law to tell the retroactivity of RA 145 for it to act on cases under the old law. Laws cannot be given retroactive effect unless it is specifically stated in the provision. Furthermore, strict construction on the law was made so as not to prejudice the constitutional right of the constructor and for the law not to have any retroactive effect. 9.5 BUYCO vs PNB Facts: The petitioner was indebted to respondent which was secured by a mortgage of real property. Petitioner is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment Certificate that is more than sufficient to cover the loan which he offered as payment for the deficit on April 24, 1956. Respondent denied the offered payment due to its amended Charter which provides that "...the authority herein granted shall not be used as regards backpay certificates", enacted on June 16, 1956 as RA 1576. Petitioner filed this case praying that the respondent be compelled to accept his Backpay Acknowledgment Certificate as payment of his obligation.

Issue: Can RA 1576 be applied retroactively?

Page 3 of 16

Decision: NO. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided" (Art. 4, New Civil Code). This has bearing on the case at bar inasmuch as the herein mentioned Act does not contain any provision regarding its retroactivity. Therefore, the present case should be governed by the law at the time the offer in question was made. 9.6 Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Co. v. Court of Appeals FACTS: Petitioner entered into an operating agreement with CUENCO-VELEZ whereby the said petitioner was granted the right to operate 12 mining claims belonging to the latter located at Toledo City, Cebu. Petitioner also entered into a similar agreement with BIGA COPPER; subject of this Operating Agreement are 31 mining claims of BIGA-COPPER likewise located at Toledo City, Cebu. However, of the total mining claims "leased" by petitioner from both CUENCOVELEZ and BIGA COPPER, 9 mining claims overlap. These 9 overlapping mining claims became the subject of administrative cases where CUENCO-VELEZ won. During the pendency of this appeal, CUENCO-VELEZ and BIGA COPPER, entered into a compromise agreement. This compromise agreement enabled BIGA-COPPER to eventually lay claim over the 9 overlapping mining claims. Due to the promulgation of P.D. 1281, a number of the defendants filed a supplemental motion to dismiss. They alleged that the operating agreement which BIGA COPPER signed with petitioner had already been revoked by a letter and that by reason of this rescission, the trial court is deemed to have lost jurisdiction pursuant to Sec. 7(a)(c) and Sec. 12 of P.D. 1281. ISSUE: W/N P.D. 1281 prevails. HELD: P.D. 1281 prevails for special laws prevail over statutes or laws of general application. 9.7 TAYAG vs. CA and LEYVA Facts: Siblings Juan Galicia Sr. and Celerina Labuguin entered into a contract to sell a parcel of land in Nueva Ecija to a certain Albrigido Leyva: o 3K upon agreement o 10K ten days after the agreement o 10K representing vendors indebtedness to Phil Veterans Bank o 27K payable within one year from execution of contract. Leyva only paid parts of the obligation. But even after the grace period for payment made in the contract and while litigation of such case, the petitioners still allowed Leyva to make payments. With regards to the obligation payable to the Phil Veterans bank by the vendee, as they deemed that it was not paid in full, such obligation they completed by adding extra amount to fulfill such obligation. This was fatal in their case as this is Leyvas argument that they constructively fulfilled the obligation which is rightfully due to him. (Trivia: It was Celerina, Juans sister, that paid the bank to complete such obligation). Petitioners claim that they are only OBLIGEES with regards to the contract, so the principle of constructive fulfillment cannot be invoked against them. Petitioners, being both creditor and debtor to private respondent, in accepting piecemeal payment even after the grace period, are barred to take action through estoppel. Issue: 1. WON there was constructive fulfillment in the part of the petitioners that shall make rise the obligation to deliver to Leyva the deed of sale? YES 2. WON they are still entitled to rescind the contract? NO, barred by estoppel. Held: 1. In a contract of purchase, both parties are mutually obligors and also obligees, and any of the contracting parties may, upon non-fulfillment by the other privy of his part of the prestation, rescind the contract or seek fulfillment (Article 1191, Civil Code).

Page 4 of 16 In short, it is puerile for petitioners to say that they are the only obligees under the contract since they are also bound as obligors to respect the stipulation in permitting private respondent to assume the loan with the Philippine Veterans Bank which petitioners impeded when they paid the balance of said loan. As vendors, they are supposed to execute the final deed of sale upon full payment of the balance as determined hereafter. 2. Petitioners accepted Leyvas delayed payments not only beyond the grace periods but also during the pendency of the case for specific performance. Indeed, the right to rescind is not absolute and will not be granted where there has been substantial compliance by partial payments. By and large, petitioners actuation is susceptible of but one construction that they are now estopped from reneging from their commitment on account of acceptance of benefits arising from overdue accounts of private respondent. 9.8 FRIVALDO VS. COMELEC Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by its President, Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. In his answer dated May 22, 1988, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad." He added that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy. In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was therefore not qualified to run for and be elected governor. They also argued that their petition in the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code. The ultimate purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his candidacy and election being null and void ab initio because of his alienage. Speaking for the public respondent, the Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines. His election did not cure this defect because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and the Omnibus Election Code. He also joined in the private respondent's argument that Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code was not applicable because what the League and Estuye were seeking was not only the annulment of the proclamation and election of Frivaldo. He agreed that they were also asking for the termination of Frivaldo's incumbency as governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he was not a Filipino.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.

Held: The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution. In the certificate of candidacy he filed on November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himself as a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983

Page 5 of 16 per the following certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright. This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love. Petition Dismissed. Petitioner JUAN G. FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender the same to the duly elected ViceGovernor of the said province once this decision becomes final and executory. 9.9 Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations FACTS: Petitioners were allegedly employees of Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, which required them to work 18 hours a day without giving them additional compensation. There was an amicable settlement but petitioners disclaimed having knowledge stating they did not authorize the filing. Respondent contends that petitioners are barred due to prescription under Sec. 7-A of C.A. No. 144, as amended by RA 1993. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 7-A of C.A. No. 144, as amended by RA 1993 to the effect that any action to enforce any cause under this Act shall be commenced within three years after such cause of action accrued; otherwise it shall be barred forever. HELD: It would have applied, provided that actions already commenced before the effective date of this act shall not be affected by the period prescribed. As the statute shortened the period of action accrued, it was contended that to give it retroactive effect would impair vested rights since it would operate to preclude the six years from their accrual. The court ruled that a statute of limitations is procedural in nature and no vested right can attach thereto nor arise therefrom. Because the statute shortened the period within which to bring an action and in order not to violate the constitutional mandate concerning due process, claimants whose claims were injuriously affected thereby should have a reasonable period of one year from the time the new statute took effect within which to sue on such claims. 9.10 People v. Moran FACTS:

Page 6 of 16 Appellant was punished for violating the Election Law. When the decision was published, it was increased to 6 months. Defendant alleges that the crime has already prescribed, pursuant to Sec. 71 of Act No. 3030, which was enacted by the Legislature on March 9, 1922. ISSUE: W/N Act No. 3030 is meant to apply to the Administrative Code and whether the said act should be retroactive with respect to Art. 22 and 7 of the RPC. HELD: Act No. 3030 is intended to be amendatory to several sections of the Administrative Code. Furthermore, Art. 22 of the RPC can only be invoked with reference to some other penal law. Hence with regard to Art. 7, the SC contends that Art. 22 should still apply to special laws. Also, the prescription of the crime is intimately connected with that of the penalty. A statute declaring prescription of a crime has no other purpose than to annul prosecution of the offender. When the statute makes no distinction, it makes no exception. Statutes are not construed to have retrospective operation as to destroy or impair rights unless such was clearly the intention. The new law shortening the time of prescription indicates that the sovereign acknowledges that the previous one was unjust and enforcing the latter would be contradictory.

10.2 Parras v. Land Registration Commission FACTS: Petitioner was required by the Land Registration Commissioner (LRC) to remit to the Commissioner's office, pursuant to Special Provisions of RA 2300, otherwise known as the Appropriations Act for the current fiscal year, the sum of P57.00 as estimated cost of publication in the Official Gazette of the initial notice of the hearing of the case. Petitioner refused to pay the said amount stating that such insertion is unconstitutional being as it is revenue-raising. He prays that he be exempt from such a deposit and that the LRC and the Director of Printing be ordered to publish the notice in the Official Gazette. ISSUE: 1. W/N petitioner can be exempted. 2. W/N the law states that persons will be made to pay for the publication. HELD: Petitioner was made to pay. The law that petitioner relies on was Sec. 114 of Act 496. The reenactment of the same law as RA 117 did not include the said provision of Act 496. 10.3 Mecano v. Commission on Audit FACTS: Petitioner seeks to nullify the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA) embodied in its Endorsement denying his claim for reimbursement under Sec. 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC), as amended. Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He was hospitalized for cholecystitis from March 26 to April 7, 1990, on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA. However, the reimbursement process was stalled because of the issue that the RAC Sec. 699 was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987. ISSUE: 1. W/N petitioner can claim from the COA. 2. W/N Sec. 699 of RAC was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987. HELD: Petition was granted. The question of whether or not petitioner can claim from COA is rooted on whether or not Sec. 699 of the RAC has been repealed. The Court finds that that section although not included in the reenactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 is merely under implied repeal, and the Court considers such implied repeal as not favorable. Also the Court finds that laws must be in accord with each other. The second sentence of Art. 173 of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that "the payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Sec. 699 of the RAC whose benefits are administered by the system (SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the government. 10.4 City of Davao v. RTC FACTS:

Page 7 of 16 GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of Public Auction, scheduling public bidding of its properties for non-payment of realty taxes from 1992-1994, amounting to the sum total of Php 295, 721.61. The auction was, however, subsequently reset by virtue of a deadline extension given by Davao City. On July 28, 1994, GSIS received Warrants of Levy and Notices of Levy on three parcels of land it owned and another Notice of Public Auction. In September of that same year, GSIS filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and/or Declaratory Relief with the Davao City RTC. During pre-trial, the only issue raised was whether sec. 234 and 534 of the Local Government Code, which have withdrawn real property tax from GOCCs, have also withdrawn from the GSIS its right to be exempted from payment of realty tax. RTC rendered decision in favor of GSIS. Hence this petition. ISSUE/S: Whether the GSIS tax exemptions can be deemed as withdrawn by the LGC W/N sec. 33 of P.D. 1146 has been repealed by the LGC HELD: Reading together sec. 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, as a general rule: the taxing powers of LGUs cannot extend to the levy of taxes, fees, and charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and LGUs. However, under sec. 234, exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons, including GOCCs, except as provided in said section, are withdrawn upon effectivity of LGC. GSIS being a GOCC, then it necessarily follows that its exemption has been withdrawn. Regarding P.D. 1146 which laid down requisites for repeal on the laws granting exemption, Supreme Court found a fundamental flaw in Sec. 33, particularly the amendatory second paragraph. Said paragraph effectively imposes restrictions on the competency of the Congress to enact future legislation on the taxability of GSIS. This places an undue restraint on the plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws. Only the Constitution may operate to preclude or place restrictions on the amendment or repeal laws. These conditions imposed under P.D. 1146, if honored, have the precise effect of limiting the powers of Congress. Supreme Court held that they cannot render effective the amendatory second paragraph of sec. 33, for by doing so, they would be giving sanction to a disingenuous means employed through legislative power to bind subsequent legislators to a subsequent mode of repeal. Thus, the two conditions under sec. 33 cannot bear relevance whether the LGC removed the tax-exempt status of GSIS. Furthermore, sec. 5 on the rules of interpretation of LGC states that any tax exemption, incentive or relief granted by any LGU pursuant to the provision of this Code shall be construed strictly against the person claiming it. The GSIS tax-exempt stats, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC but restored by the GSIS Act of 1997, sec. 39. The subject real property taxes for the years 1992-1994 were assessed against GSIS while the LGC provisions prevailed and thus may be collected by the City of Davao.

Page 8 of 16 10.7 People v. Almuete FACTS: Almuete, et. al. were charged with the violation of Sec. 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law (ATL). The accused, tenants of Fernando, allegedly pre-threshed a portion of their respective harvests without notifying her or obtaining her consent. The accused filed a motion to quash alleging that at the time of the supposed offense, there was no longer any law punishing the act. ISSUE: W/N pre-threshing was still a crime at the time the act was committed. HELD: Sec. 39 was impliedly repealed by the Agricultural Land Reform Code which was already in force at the time of the act. The ALRC suspended the ATL. It instituted the leasehold system and abolished the rice share tenancy system. The prohibition against pre-threshing is premised on the existence of the rice share tenancy system and is the basis for penalizing clandestine pre-threshing. The evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and the landholder from defrauding each other in the division of the harvests. The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenants act of pre threshing is evident by not re-enacting Sec. 39 of the ATL. A subsequent statute, revising the whole subject matter of a former statute operates to repeal the former statute. The repeal of a penal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal. 10.9 National Power Corporation vsArca Facts: 1)On December 26, 1963, the Philippine Power and Development Company(PPDC) and the Dagupan Electric Corporation (DEC), in their own behalf and on that of all the electric plant operators, who are members of the Philippine Electric Plant Owners' Association (PEPOA), filed an injunction suit to restrain enforcement by the NAPOCOR of a revised rate of charges for electric power and energy sold by the latter, which was scheduled to take effect on January 1, 1964. Thepetition alleged that: a) The disputed revised rates which would increase the cost incurred by PPDC (24%) and by DEC (30%) are unreasonable, excessive and unnecessary. b) The revised rates had not been approved by the Public Service Commission. c) That the unilateral revision by NAPOCOR of the rate and its imposition upon PPDC and DEC of the amended contracts embodying said new rates, without first submitting them to arbitration, was in gross violation of the provis ions of the current contracts between them PPDC and DEC prayed for a TROto prevent scheduled enforcement and issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. 2) NAPOCOR moved to dissolve the injunction based on the following reasons, among others: a) That the enforcement of the new rates will not violate any of the rights of the plaintiffs (PPDC and DEC) b) That the court has no jurisdiction to pass upon the reasonableness or necessity of the revised rates, the authority therefor allegedly belonging to the Public Service Commission. A motion to dismiss the petition was also filed, based on the same ground of lack of jurisdiction by the court. Motions filed by NAPOCOR were all denied. 3) Hence, NAPOCOR filed a petition of certiorari charging respondent judge Arca with grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the case and in not dissolving the TRO issued therein. Petitioner alleged that for a court to acquire jurisdiction over a case, it is not enough that it should have jurisdiction "over a portion of the subject matter of the complaint, "but upon all the issues brought up by the pleadings. According to petitioner, since the court below cannot determine the reasonableness of t he disputed revised rates, which is one of the issues raised in the petition, because the matter allegedly

Page 9 of 16 pertains to the Public Service Commission pursuant to Republic Act 2677, it is contended that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretio n in refusing to dismiss the case and to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction involved in this controversy. I ssue: WON Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 120 has been repealed by R.A. 2677 Held: NO. The petition for a writ ofcertiorari is denied, and the preliminary injunction heretofore issued is dissolved. Costs against petitioner National Power Corporation. Ratio Decidendi: , the authority to inquire into the rates of charges for services rendered by the NAPOCOR does not devolve upon the Public Service Commission. The enactment of R.A. 2677, which is a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed or withdrawnSection 2 of Commonwealth Act 120. A special statute, providing for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and applications, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law. In the case at bar, there is no indication of a legislative intent to repeal or abrogate provisions of the earlier special law. From the explanatory note to House Bill No. 4030, that later became Republic Act No. 2677, it was explicit that the jurisdiction conferred upon the Public Service Comm ission over the public utilities operated by government-owned or controlled corporations is to be confined to the fixing of rates of such public services," in order to avoid cutthroat or ruinous and unfair competition detrimental to operators and to the public interests." In the harnessing and distribution and sale of electric power to the consuming public performed by NAPOCOR, the contingency intended to be met by the legal provision under consideration would not exist. As stated in Manila Railroad Company vs. Lafferty, where there are two statutes, the to include other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general: one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. 10.10 Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals Facts: 1.Republic Act No. 4850 created the Laguna Lake Development Authority (Authority) a Government Agency that works toward environmentalprotection and ecology, navigational safety, and sustainable development. Thisagency is responsible for the development of the Laguna Lake area and thesurrounding provinces, cities and towns in view of the national and regional plans. 2.President Ferdinand E. Marcos then passed Presidential Decree No. 813 amending certain sections of R.A. No. 4850 as response to the deterioratingenvironmental condition of the Metropolitan Manila area and the surroundingareas of the Laguna de Bay. Problems include the environmental impact ofdevelopment of water quality, inflow of polluted water, increasing urbanizationand floods in Metropolitan Manila. 3.Sec. 1 of P.D. 813 established a policy of development with environmental management and control, among others for the Laguna Lake Development Authority. Special powers, pertinent to this case, were also granted underSec. 3. which include the exclusive jurisdiction of the Authority to issue new permit for the use of the lake waters for any projects or activities in or affecting

Page 10 of 16 the said lake including navigation, construction, and 4.operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. The Authority also has the power to collect fees for these activities and projects which may be shared with other governmental agencies and political sub-divisions. 5.The Authority was further empowered by Executive Order No. 927 which enlarged its functions and powers. Said Order also named and enumeratedtowns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term Laguna de Bay Region.The Chief Executive based this Order on an assessment that the land andwaters of the Laguna Lake Region are limited natural resources requiringjudicious management. 6.Under Sec. 2 of E.O. 927, the Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permit for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region. Coverage for Laguna de Bay Region included severalprovinces, cities and towns around the Laguna Lake.Under Sec. 3, thecollection of fees for the use of the lake water and its tributaries were enforcedby the Authority. 7.Then, Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991 was enforced. Municipalities around the Laguna Lake Region interpreted this law asdelegating the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within theirmunicipal waters. 8.Municipal governments started issuing fishing privileges and fishing permits tobig fishpen operators. These unregulated issuances of Mayors permits toconstruct fishpens were clear violations of the policies implemented by theAuthority. 9.To solve the problem, the Authority issues a notice to the general publicdeclaring as illegal all fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures inthe Bay Region that were not registered with the Authority. The notice includesa threat of penalty of demolition and imprisonment and/or fine. After a month, the Authority sent notices to the concerned owners stating that demolition shall be effected within 10 days. 10. Affected fishpen owners filed seven injunction cases against the Authority invarious trial courts. Authority filed a motion to dismiss the cases onjurisdictional grounds which was denied by the lower court. Temporaryrestraining order/writs of preliminary injunction was issued enjoining theAuthority from demolishing the structures in question. Authority appealed thecase to the Court of Appeals but the Court dismissed the consolidated petitionsof the Authority. CA established that LLDA is not a quasi-judicial agency of thegovernment and it cannot exercise quasi-judicial functions as far as fishpensare concerned. CA the Local Government Code of 1991 repealed the provisionsof the LLDA Charter thereby devolving the power to grant permits to the localgovernment units concerned. Authority appealed to the Supreme Court withpetitions for prohibition, certiorari and injunction against the respondents. Issue: WON the Laguna Lake Development Authority should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake insofar as the issuance of permits for fisheries privileges is concerned. Held: Yes. The LLDA should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake insofar as the issuance of permits for fisheries is concerned. Petitions for prohibition, certiorari and injunction are hereby granted,insofar as they related to the authority of the LLDA to grant fishing privileges withinthe Laguna Lake Region. Restraining orders and/or writs of injunction issued against the LLDA aredeclared null and void and ordered set aside for having been issued with graveabuse of discretion. Municipal Mayors of the Laguna Lake Region are hereby prohibited fromissuing permits to construct and operate fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culturestructures within the Laguna Lake Region. Previous issuances are null and void. The fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures put by operatorsby virtue of permits issued by Municipal Mayors within the Laguna Lake Region arehereby declared illegal structures subject to demolition by the LLDA. Ratio: (1)Provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA No. 7160) do not repeal the laws creating the LLDA. Therefore, LLDA maintains its exclusive authority over issuances of permits. -

Page 11 of 16 The charter of the LLDA is a SPECIAL LAW while the Local Government Code of1991 is a GENERAL LAW. A basic rule of statutory construction is that theenactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed tohave repealed a special law. When there is conflict between a general law and a special law, the special lawwill prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the generalstatute. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent law by mere implications. In Manila Railroad Company v. Rafferty, this basic rule is upheld with anexception when the subsequent general law has a manifest intent to repeal oralter the special law. In this case, such intent is not proven in this case. (2)Legislative intent is for the Authority to proceed with its mission of environmental protection, navigational safety, and sustainable development for the Laguna Lake Region. The power of the local government units, exercised through fragmentedmanagement policies, is interested in fishing privileges for REVENUEPURPOSES. In contrast, the power of the Authority is aimed at effectivelyregulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay Region for QUALITYCONTROL and MANAGEMENT. Thus, the Authority is in a better position tomanage the issuance of permits. (3)Charter of the Authority prevails because it is a valid exercise of POLICE POWER of the State. (4)Although the LLDA is not co-equal to the RTCs, LLDA is still a quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases that can issue cease and desist order (Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA). Padilla, J. (Concurring Opinion): I fully concur. But I just want to say guys that the LGUs can still impose on thosewho apply for permit with an additional local permit or license for revenue purposes.This would harmonize RA No. 4850 with RA No. 7160 (LGC 1991). 10.11 Gaerlan vs Catubig Facts: In the 1963 elections, among the registered candidates for councilors in the eight -seat City Council of Dagupan were Gregorio Gaerlan and Luis Catubig. The latter obtained the third highest number of votes and was proclaimed one of the elected councilors while the former lost his bid. Gaerlan went to the Court to challenge Catubigs eligibility for office on the averment of non-age. Catubig was born in Dagupan City on May 19, 1939. At the time he presented his certificate of candidacy on September 10, 1963, he was 24 years, 3 months and 22 days; on election day, November 12, 1963, he was 24 years, 5 months and 24 days; and at the time he took his oath of office as councilor on January 1, 1964,3 he was 24 years, 7 months and 13 days. Whether his age be reckoned as of the date of the filing of certificate of candidacy, or the election date, or the date set by law for the assumption of office the - result is the same. Whichever date is adopted, still, respondent was below 25 years of age. The judgment held Catubig ineligible and declared his seat vacant. Catubig appealed and alleged that the question of age eligibility should be governed not by R.A. 170, and not by R.A. 2259. Republic Act No. 484 amending, inter alia, Section 12 of the Dagupan City Charter, took effect on June 10, 1950; whereas, Republic Act No. 2259 became law on June 19, 1959 - nine years later. R .A . 170, as amended Sec. 12 x xx the elective members of the Municipality Board shall be qualified electors of the city, residents therein for at least one year, and not less than twenty- three years of age. xxx" R .A .2 2 5 9 Sec. 6.No person shall be a City Mayor, Vice-Mayor, or Councilor unless he is at least twenty-five years of age, resident of the city for one year prior to his election and is a

Page 12 of 16 qualified voter. Issue: Whether or not Sec. 12 of R.A. 170 of the Dagupan City Charter, as amended, has been repealed by Sec. 6 of R.A. 2259 Decision: Yes. The judgment appealed from was affirmed. The question of whether or not a special law has been repealed or amended by one or more subsequent general laws is dependent mainly on the intent of the Congress in enacting the latter. The discussions on the floor of Congress show beyond doubt that its members intended to amend o r repeal all provisions of special laws inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act No. 2259, except those which are expressly excluded from the operation thereof. In fact, Section 9 of R.A. 2259 states that All Acts or parts of Acts, Executive Orders, rules and regulations in consistent with theprovisions of this Ac t, are hereby repealed. Section 1 of R.A. 2259 makes reference to "all chartered cities in the Philippines, whereas Section 8 excludes from the operation of the Act "the cities of Manila, Cavite, Trece Martires and Tagaytay", and Section 4 contains a proviso exclusively for the City of Baguio, thus showing clearly that all cities not particularly excepted from the provisions of said Act are subject thereto. The only reference to Dagupan City in R.A. 2259 is found in Section 2 stating that voters in said city, and in the City of Iloilo, are expressly precluded to vote for provincial officials. Since Dagupan City is removed from the exceptions of R.A. 2259, it stands to reason itself that its charter provision on the age limit is thereby repealed. Until Congress decrees otherwise, we are not to tamper with the present statutory set-up. Rather, we should go by what the legislative body has expressly ordained. It is accordingly held that respondent is disqualified on the ground of non -age because at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, at the time of the election, and at the time he took his oath of office, he was below the age of 25 years. 11.3 AQUINO vs. COMELEC Facts: On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representativefor the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was aresident of the aforementioned district for 10 months. Faced with a petition for disqualification, he amended theentry on his residency in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Electionsdismissed the petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on amotion for reconsideration of the above dismissal, the Commission on Election later issued an order suspendingthe proclamation of Aquino until the Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Electionsfound Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence. Issue: Whether residency in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes domicile to warrant the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district. Held: The place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matterwhere he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that towhich the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The purpose is toexclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from takingadvantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. Aquinos certificate ofcandidacy in a previous (1992) election indicates that he was a resident and a registered voter of San Jose,Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. Aquinos connection to the Second District ofMakati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The intention not to establish apermanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying

Page 13 of 16 one. The shortlength of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and his claims ofother residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is not toacquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second Districtof Makati City. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections. 11.6 Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds. One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution. Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution

Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice. 11.7 ACORD vs. ZAMORA Facts: Pres. Estrada, pursuant to Sec 22, Art VII mandating the Pres to submit to Congress a budget of expenditures within 30 days before the opening of every regular session, submitted the National Expenditures program for FY 2000. The President proposed an IRA of P121,778,000,000. This became RA 8760, AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE, TWO THOUSAND, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES also known as General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the Year 2000. It provides under the heading ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS that the IRA for local government units shall amount to P111,778,000,000. In another part of the GAA, under the heading UNPROGRAMMED FUND, it is provided that an amount of P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion), apart from the P111,778,000,000 mentioned above, shall be used to fund the IRA, which amount shall be released only when the original revenue targets submitted by the President to Congress can be realized based on a quarterly

Page 14 of 16 assessment to be conducted by certain committees which the GAA specifies, namely, the Development Budget Coordinating Committee, the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of IRA as Programmed Fund, it appropriates a separate amount of P10 Billion of IRA under the classification of Unprogrammed Fund, the latter amount to be released only upon the occurrence of the condition stated in the GAA. On August 22, 2000, a number of NGOs and POs, along with 3 barangay officials filed with this Court the petition at bar, for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus With Application for Temporary Restraining Order, against respondents then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, then Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management Benjamin Diokno, then National Treasurer Leonor Magtolis-Briones, and the Commission on Audit, challenging the constitutionality of provision XXXVII (ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS) referred to by petitioners as Section 1, XXXVII (A), and LIV (UNPROGRAMMED FUND) Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the GAA (the GAA provisions) Petitioners contend that the said provisions violates the LGUs autonomy by unlawfully reducing the IRA allotted by 10B and by withholding its release by placing the same under Unprogrammed funds. Although the effectivity of the Year 2000 GAA has ceased, this Court shall nonetheless proceed to resolve the issues raised in the present case, it being impressed with public interest. Petitioners argue that the GAA violated the constitutional mandate of automatically releasing the IRAs when it made its release contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the President, rather than making the release automatic. ISSUE: WON the subject GAA violates LGUs fiscal autonomy by not automatically releasing the whole amount of the allotted IRA. HELD: Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides: SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. Petitioners argue that the GAA violated this constitutional mandate when it made the release of IRA contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the President, rather than making the release automatic. Respondents counterargue that the above constitutional provision is addressed not to the legislature but to the executive, hence, the same does not prevent the legislature from imposing conditions upon the release of the IRA. Respondents thus infer that the subject constitutional provision merely prevents the executive branch of the government from unilaterally withholding the IRA, but not the legislature from authorizing the executive branch to withhold the same. In the words of respondents, This essentially means that the President or any member of the Executive Department cannot unilaterally, i.e., without the backing of statute, withhold the release of the IRA. As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the just share of local governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass laws that might prevent the executive from performing this duty. To hold that the executive branch may disregard constitutional provisions which define its duties, provided it has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the Constitution amendable by statute a proposition which is patently absurd. If indeed the framers intended to allow the enactment of statutes making the release of IRA conditional instead of automatic, then Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution would have been worded differently. Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share of local governments is qualified by the words as determined by law, and not the release thereof, the plain implication is that Congress is not authorized by the Constitution to hinder or impede the automatic release of the IRA. In another case, the Court held that the only possible exception to mandatory automatic release of the IRA is, as held in Batangas: if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in which case what should be automatically released shall be a proportionate amount of the collections for the current fiscal year. The adjustment may even be made on a quarterly basis depending on the actual collections of

Page 15 of 16 national internal revenue taxes for the quarter of the current fiscal year. This Court recognizes that the passage of the GAA provisions by Congress was motivated by the laudable intent to lower the budget deficit in line with prudent fiscal management. The pronouncement in Pimentel, however, must be echoed: [T]he rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by legal methods. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. XXXVII and LIV Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the Year 2000 GAA are hereby declared unconstitutional insofar as they set apart a portion of the IRA, in the amount of P10 Billion, as part of the UNPROGRAMMED FUND 11.9 Sarmiento vs Mison, 156 SCRA 549 F: Petitioners brought this suit for prohibition in their capacity as taxpayers, members of the Bar and law professors, to enjoin respondent Commissioner of Customs from performing his functions on the ground that his appointment, w/o confirmation by the CA, is unconstitutional. HELD: Art. VII, Sec. 16, as orginally proposed by the Committe on Executive Power of the 1986 Con Com read: Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of a Commission on Appointment, shall appoint the heads of executive departments and bureaus, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. However, on motion of Comm. Foz, 2 changes were approved in the text of the provision. The first was to delete the phrase "and bureaus," and the second was to place a period (.) after the word "captain" and substitute the phrase "and all" w/ the phrase "HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY." The first amendment was intended to exempt the appointment of bureau directors from the requirement of confirmation on the ground that this position is low and to require confirmation would subject bureau directors to political influence. On the other hand, the 2nd amendment was intended to subject to confirmation only those mentioned in the frist sentence, namely: The heads of the exec. depts, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in the Consti, i.e., (1) Regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(2)] (2) Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission [Art. IX-B, Sec. 1 (2)]; (3) Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC [Art. IX-C, Sec. 1 (2)]; (4) Chairman and Commissioners of the COA [Art. IX-D, Sec. 1 (2)]; (5) Members of the regional consultative commission (Art. X, Sec. 18.) The rest of the appointments mentioned in sec. 16 are not subject to confirmation. These are: (1) all other officers of the Govt whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; (2) those whom the Pres. may be authorized by law to appoint; and (3) officers lower in rank whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the Pres. alone. 11.10 MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS. GSIS Facts: The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel Corporation. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Page 16 of 16

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Issue: Whether or Not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy and is therefore null and void. Held: The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus ordered that GSIS accepts the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for purpose.