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Author: Alexander Ohrn

Superisor: Jonathan lriedman

Institution: Department o Social Anthropology, Uniersity o Lund

Alexander Ohrn

- 1 -
*6789:;8
Neoconseratism deeloped in the context o liberal anti-communism rom the 1940s.
1he key intellectuals o this early period o neoconseratism, centred around Iring
Kristol, occupied themseles with issues such as the threat o communism, anti-
Americanism at home, adersary culture and the problems o social engineering.
loweer, by the mid 1990s as the end o the Cold \ar remoed their main ocus point
they declared neoconseratism dead.

1be !ee/t, tavaara represents a second generation o neoconseraties. 1his second
generation are not liberals mugged by reality` but are rather irmly conseratie albeit
with dierent angles. lurthermore, this second generation hae generated ar more
attention than Iring Kristol and his ellow traellers eer did, and are closely associated
with the Bush Doctrine and the war on terror.

1his paper studies the neoconseraties through a reading o 1be !ee/t, tavaara that
seeks to identiy the broad trends in neoconseratie thought since the end o the Cold
\ar through to and during the \ar on 1error. 1be !ee/t, tavaara oers such a
possibility as it was launched in 1995, when other neoconseratie media outlets were in
decline.

1his paper inds that that many o the mainstream critiques o the moement can be
supported by material rom the magazine. loweer, a narrow ocus on oreign policy
related to the \ar on 1error is insuicient to grasp the width o neoconseratie
thought as well as its internal inconsistencies. As such this paper inestigates a number
o issues not typically discussed but which resonate a neoconseratie legacy that
stretches back through the decades.




Alexander Ohrn

- 2 -
,<=>?' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ''''''''' 5:@>

0.1 Abstract 1
0.2 Index 2

1 Introduction 3
1.1 1heme 3
1.2 Structure 6
1.3 lypothesis and Method 8

2 1he listory o Neoconseratism 10
2.1 1he Larly Neoconseraties 11
2.2 Neoconseratie Lconomics and Other Issues 15
2.3 Anti-Communist Liberals and the Culture o Appeasement 18
2.4 1he Legacy o the Larly Neoconseraties 19

3 1be !ee/t, tavaara 1995-2005 23
3.1 Readership, Owner and lrequent Contributors 23

3.2 loreign Policy and Deence Issues 1995-2001 25
3.2.1 Case Lxample: China 26
3.2.2 Case Lxample: Iraq 29
3.2.3 Deence 33
3.2.4 Multilateralism 38

3.3 1he Culture \ar: 1he Moral labric o America 1995-2001 40
3.3.1 Lducation 40
3.3.2 Abortion and Luthanasia 42
3.3.3 Crime and Capital Punishment 45
3.3.4 Anti-Americanism 4

3.4 Deriing Idealistic lawkishness` rom 1be !ee/t, tavaara 2001-2005 49
3.4.1 \ar on 1error 51
3.4.1.1 1he New Rules: Illegal Combatants 54
3.4.1.2 \eapons o Mass Destruction 5
3.4.1.3 Pre-Lmption and Appeasement 59
3.4.2 1owards Imperial Sel Awareness 63

4 \idening the Context and Concluding Remarks 65

5 Bibliography
5.1 Primary Literature
5.2 Secondary Literature 8
Alexander Ohrn

- 3 -
A'' ,<89B=C;8DB<'

.the threat or the uture is not American power and American
strength, it would be American weakness and American withdrawal`
- \illiam Kristol
1


AEA'' +F>G>'
In recent years, neoconseratism has become part o the popular consciousness. In editorials
and articles throughout the media we are told how a cabal o neoconseraties coninced the
George \ Bush administration to go to war in Iraq. lor the irst time there is a broad based
agreement as to what Neocons beliee and what their agenda is.

In act, in the popular sense, neoconseratism can be summarised as the belie that America
has a duty to make the world a better place through actie interention. loweer,
neoconseratism used to be a ar more ambiguous concept that would not succumb to
straightorward deinitions such as hawkish interentionism` or a hard \ilson doctrine`.
Rather, Iring Kristol, known as the godather o neoconseratism` argued that this was so
because it was not an ideology but a persuasion` or a philosophical outlook.

Be that as it may, the early neoconseraties came together rom a range o backgrounds and
their writing was extremely proliic, discussing a seemingly endless range o topics.
Originating in liberal anti-communism, they hae criticised social engineering, the adersary
culture o the 1960s and the culture o appeasement` in oreign policy, as well as a myriad o
issues such as amily structure, airmatie action and economics.

Not so today. Practically eerything published by sel proclaimed neoconseraties these
days, is likely to be on subjects such as the Iraq, Iran or North Korea. \orks such as .v va
to rit ,2003, in which Daid lrum and Richard Perle ormulate a strategy or winning the
war on terror, or Robert Kagan`s Paraai.e c Porer ,2003,, which explains the righteousness
o utilising the might o the US military, hae become the standard by which the
neoconseraties are known to the general public.
2


\hen the neoconseraties are understood only rom a oreign policy perspectie, as does
Max Boot, reluctantly sel proessed neoconseratie, the continuity in neoconseratie
thought rom the Cold \ar to the war on terror can be described as hard \ilsonianism`:

Adocates o this iew embrace \oodrow \ilson`s championing o American
ideals but reject his reliance on international organizations and treaties to
accomplish our objecties.`
3


1his is howeer a alse continuity. \ilsonian idealism had little to do with the Cold \ar
neoconseraties, een i it too some degree is a air description o today`s neoconseraties.

1
\illiam Kristol interiewed in documentary, Director,\riter: Lugene Jarecki, \hy \e light` 2005 ,US: Sony Pictures
Classics, UK: BBC Storyille,
2
Daid lrum and Richard Perle, An Lnd to Lil: low to \in the \ar on 1error` 2003 ,New \ork: Random louse,
Robert Kagan, Paradise & Power: America and Lurope in the New \orld Order` 2003 ,London: Atlantic Books,
3
Max Boot, \hat the leck is a Neocon`` 1be !att treet ]ovrvat, December 30 2002, reprinted in Oiviov]ovvrat,
http:,,www.opinionjournal.com ,accessed on March 12 2006,
Alexander Ohrn

- 4 -
Rather, \ilsonian oreign policy rested heaily on principles o social engineering, something
which the early neoconseraties ehemently contested. 1he adocacy o regime change`
and nation building` as integral parts o the war on terror seems at odds with the earlier
project o reuting the appropriateness o social engineering.

1his paper rests on the hypothesis that neoconseratism has changed dramatically in ocus
oer the past decade. \hereas it would hae been easy to conclude that the eents o
September 11 2001 would hae acted as a transormer o the neoconseratie ocus, this
paper highlights how these attacks are better understood as a catalyst. 1he roots o hawkish
interentionism` go deeper, and can be traced back through the years preceding September
11 2001.

1he medium through which this paper inestigates the changing neoconseratie agenda is
1be !ee/t, tavaara. lounded and edited by \illiam Kristol, the son o aorementioned
Iring Kristol, this political magazine proides the backdrop, or ethnographic material, or
this study. As such it becomes impossibly tempting to not think o the contemporary
neoconseraties as a second generation, and posit their dierent outlook against idea that
they are not liberals mugged by reality` as Iring Kristol described himsel and his ellow
neoconseraties, but that these later neoconseraties they were in a sense raised
neoconseratiely.

Contrary to much o the criticism o the neoconseraties, this paper does not seek to place
them within the context o a conspiracy to dominate the world, where they play the role o
behind the scenes puppeteer shaping the opinions o inluential politicians. Rather it seeks to
shed some light on the alues and ideas o these neoconseraties. In particular, this paper
attempts to inestigate the second generation o neoconseraties.

As a group, the neoconseraties are obiously diicult to study in a strictly anthropological
manner. 1he by now outdated method o participant obseration would not hae been
applicable as the neoconseraties do not lie in isolated communities, nor is it possible to
identiy any accessible enues that requent. \hereas early anthropologists could rely on
their socio-political position to gain access to their subjects, the power balance is in this case
ar rom such in the case o this anthropologist.

1here is howeer an arena where intellectual ideas and worldiews are oiced and discussed,
the world o journals.

\hereas the early neoconseraties are closely associated with the two journals Covvevtar,
and Pvbtic vtere.t, !ee/t, tavaara has to a signiicant extent taken oer this role. \ith the
termination o Iring Kristol`s Pvbtic vtere.t in 2005, \illiam Kristol`s !ee/t, tavaara een
more clearly carries on the neoconseratie legacy.

1his paper is an inestigation o 1be !ee/t, tavaara rom its inception in 1995, across the
turn o the century, through its irst ten years o being published, to 2005. 1he choice o
time period is not only a conenient een decade, but it coers a most interesting period o
neoconseratie thought. It starts at a time when prominent neoconseraties such as
Norman Podhoretz had just announced the death o neoconseratism and had proclaimed
that it had by then been consumed by the wider conseratie moement. 1he
Alexander Ohrn

- 5 -
neoconseratie Cold \arriors had, it seemed, lost their cause as the iron wall crumbled and
ormer enemies transormed into tentatie ellow capitalists. Notable neoconseratie
lrancis lukuyama drew the conclusion that with the disappearance o the Soiet Union no
real threats now existed to the project o liberal democracy, and predicted in 1be va of
i.tor, ava tbe a.t Mav that perpetual peace and prosperity was shortly orthcoming.

1be !ee/t, tavaara thus picks up where its predecessors concluded and with the width o
topics that the neoconseratie persuasion` had long been associated with, ound no lack o
subjects or its weekly issues.

\hilst it continued the legacy o promoting a hard line oreign policy, oreign policy was ar
rom its major concern in the early years o its publication. lar more attention was deoted
to domestic issues such as airmatie action, education and gender relations. Not until 1998
does 1be !ee/t, tavaara begin to show signs o what is now known as the Neocon agenda,
the role o America as promoter and enorcer o liberal democracy on a global scale. 1he
amous editorial aaaav Mv.t Co in late 199, most likely synchronised with an open letter by
the Project or a New American Century, also headed by \illiam Kristol, oten reerred to as
the Neocon Maniesto, marked the beginning o a series o articles and editorials adocating
regime changing interention in Iraq.

1his idealistic hawkishness` has since the eents o September 11 2001 dominated the
attention o 1be !ee/t, tavaara and the term Neocon are by now solidly associated with an
aggressie interentionist oreign policy. 1his paper seeks to show how the contemporary
Neocon oreign policy position was not created by the attacks against the \orld 1rade
Centre and the Pentagon building, but was i signiicantly accelerated by these eents.
lurthermore, this paper also intends to show how the current image o the Neocons, the
idealistic hawkishness` is urther strengthened by the almost complete crowding out o any
other issues rom its major mouthpiece, 1be !ee/t, tavaara.
'

Alexander Ohrn

- 6 -
AEH'' !89C;8C9>'
1he irst section o this paper outlines the history o neoconseratism, rom its conception
in the 1940s until its alleged demise in the mid 1990s. 1he purpose o this historical
oeriew is to present the plethora o issues and topics addressed by the neoconseratie
cabal` oer a hal century. 1his is at best a condensed ersion o the eorts o a number o
historians, nor is it intended to proide thorough coerage o een major issues. Rather, the
emphasis is on topics that are on the periphery o the anti-communist mainstream o
neoconseratism. Considerable eort has been made to not present an oerly simpliied
account, but or more in-depth analyses and presentations please reer to, amongst other, the
ollowing works. Mark Gerson`s 1be ^eocov.erratire 1i.iov ,1996, reiews the
neoconseraties rom a positie perspectie and is as such able to deduce strands o
intellectual curiosity that more critical readers triialise. Murray lriedman`s 1be ^eocov.erratire
Rerotvtiov ,2003, is written rom a perspectie o dissent yet acknowledges the inluence o
the neoconseraties. Gary Dorrien is critical o the neoconseraties and 1be ^eocov.erratire
Miva ,1993, proides biographical portraits o some o the main characters o the early
neoconseraties. 1wo olumes that proide conenient access to some o the main texts by
neoconseraties are Iring Kristol`s ^eocov.errati.v, 1be .vtobiograb, of av aea ,1995, and
1be ^eocov Reaaer ,2004, edited by Irwin Stelzer.
4


1he second section inestigates the material published by 1be !ee/t, tavaara oer six years,
rom 1995 through 2001. 1his is a period in which \illiam Kristol and his co-editors lred
Barnes and John Podhoretz can be seen to continue down the path set by earlier
neoconseraties, dealing with much the same issues, less the threat o the Soiet Union. A
noteworthy dierence is also its strong Republican standpoint, something their predecessors
were reluctant to take gien their background as liberals and supposedly een as 1rotskyites.
1his is not to say that the seeds o hawkish interentionism` were not there, i anything this
is the period in which they were conceied. In a number o dierent oreign policy scenarios
commentators such as Robert Kagan and Charles Krauthammer lamented the Clinton
administration or its inability to order signiicant military action. linally in 1998 the
campaign to get rid o Saddam lussein was started, but een this was a short lied
engagement and a year ater the aaaav Mv.t Co editorial by Kristol the stream o articles
adocating regime change dried up.

1he third section presents the idealistic hawkishness` o this second generation o
neoconseraties and highlights the stark dierences in outlook compared to its predecessor.
1his section coers principally the period rom September 2001 to the summer o 2005.
Particular attention is paid to the concept o regime change itsel gien the paradox that
neoconseraties would become the most erent adocated o social engineering in the
Middle Last when it has been a key issue to ight speciically social engineering in domestic
policy.


4
Mark Gerson, 1he Neoconseratie Vision: rom the Cold \ar to the culture wars` 1996 ,Lanham, MD: Madison Books,
Murray lriedman, 1he Neoconseratie Reolution: Jewish intellectuals and the shaping o public policy` 2003
,Cambridge: Cambridge Uniersity Press,
Gary Dorrien, 1he Neoconseratie Mind - Politics, Culture, and the \ar o Ideology` 1993 ,Philadelphia: 1emple
Uniersity Press,
Iring Kristol, Neoconseratism, 1he Autobiography o an Idea` 1995 ,New \ork: lree Press,
Irwin Stelzer, 1he Neocon Reader` 2004 ,New \ork: Groe Press,
Alexander Ohrn

- -
1he inal section oers some concluding remarks. It has already been made clear that this
paper inds that the neoconseratie persuasion o the present day is drastically dierent
rom that o the liberal anti-communists who ormed neoconseratism`s early subscribers.
1he particular dierence that is highlighted and expanded upon in this section is the paradox
that the school o thought that housed some o the most erent critics o social engineering
in the 1950s and 60s hae by now become home to some o the most enthusiastic promoters
o analogous projects abroad. 1he inal section is also where this paper attempts to widen
the context and attempts are made at consolidating the indings o this paper with other
commentators` perspecties.


Alexander Ohrn

- 8 -
AEI'' /JKB8F>7D7':<='.>8FB='
At the same time as this paper got under way, the neoconseratie consensus that had
seemed so coherent during the past ew years was rocked. 1he publication o lrancis
lukuyama`s book .verica at tbe Cro..roaa. ,2006,, on the inasion o Iraq and USA`s role in
global politics was the irst major sign o dissent amongst the neoconseraties. Published as
.fter tbe ^eocov. ,2006, in the United Kingdom, the neoconseraties hae come under
considerable attack and gien the weight o the literature and other inestigatie material
pointing to the hollowness o the case presented as cause or military action in Iraq, the
neoconseraties are currently ar rom at their prime.
5


It has already been mentioned that this paper rests on the hypothesis that the
neoconseraties o the last ew years are distinctly dierent rom their predecessors. In
terms o a mission statement, it ought be said that it is the purpose o this paper to show
how idealistic hawkishness` or which the neoconseraties hae become known represents
a departure rom early neoconseratism, and that it makes sense to think o the
neoconseraties o 1be !ee/t, tavaara as a second generation o neoconseraties.

It is the intention o this paper to demonstrate such idealistic hawkishness` through a
thorough reading o 1be !ee/t, tavaara and highlight key issues within the neoconseratie
agenda.

1he methodology o this inestigation is as such a literary study, where the primary source o
ethnographic material consists o 483 issues o the magazine published between September
18 1995 and September 5 2005. All these issues hae been coered and whereas not all are
reerred to in the text below, the notes taken rom the reading and in particular the
requency o recurrence o particular themes hae guided this anthropologist in
understanding the signiicance o particular topics.

Literature studies are associated with a number o problems or anthropologists.

1he lack o dialogue is such a disadantage. \hilst it is not adised to rely on what the
subject o study say about themseles without qualiication, dialogue oers an opportunity
to check and eriy what importance the anthropologist gies to particular topics in
comparison to the subject`s perception o their importance.

In a literature study the role o the anthropologist is that o editor. 1o select what material to
include and what weight to gie particular issues is a discretionary process. 1his study has
attempted to present something o a cross section o 1be !ee/t, tavaara. Nonetheless,
undoubtedly others may ind the ocus skewed and unrepresentatie o the ethnographic
material.

\ritten culture is to a signiicant extent well edited and inely tuned or the purposes it is
intended to sere. It would thereore be an unsuitable medium to ask questions such as
\hat do the Neocons really think`, \hy do the Neocons so iercely deend the ideal o
liberal democracy and at the same time shun the counterculture associated with it` or other

5
lukuyama, lrancis, Ater the Neocons - America at the Crossroads` 2006 ,London: Proile Books,, America at the
Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconseratie Legacy` 2006 ,New laen: \ale Uniersity Press,
Alexander Ohrn

- 9 -
questions that seek to explore psychological root causes. 1he sel-image o the
Neoconseratie intellectual that could be deduced rom 1be !ee/t, tavaara is much too
inely crated to succumb to ready analysis. lor the purposes o this paper, which attempts
to inestigate the changes in neoconseratie causes, that is the contradictory changes in
their agenda, the sheer bulk o literary material that is 1be !ee/t, tavaara has proen quite
useul.

1he adantage then o a literature study is that the material remains intact and open or
reiew. \hereas a remote illage is not the same as the second ethnographer arries, the
material o this study will remain unchanged. 1his does o course not guard it, nor should it,
rom the wisdom oered by hindsight and urther reiew would no doubt oer additional
perspecties.
Alexander Ohrn

- 10 -
H'' +F>'/D78B9J'BL'%>B;B<7>9M:8D7G'
In understanding the neoconseraties o today, it will be useul to initially situate the irst
generation o neocons historically. 1hat is to say that the ideas harboured within what can
broadly be called neoconseratism as well as the indiidual neoconseraties themseles
must be understood within the context in which they emerged and the history they drew
upon. 1his section attempts to present the key ideas, indiiduals and institutions connected
with neoconseratism as they emerged in the 1940s and 1950s, and the particular eents and
social phenomena against which they deeloped.

1his section is not intended to gie neither a detailed narratie nor a thorough analysis o the
irst hal century o neoconseratism, but rather to introduce some o the main characters,
the major issues o concern or them as well as to assess the legacy o their intellectual and
political endeaours. lor a more in-depth historical reiew o the neoconseraties seeral
books are readily aailable, including but not only the works reerred to in this section. Mark
Gerson`s 1be ^eocov.erratire 1i.iov ,1996, reiews the neoconseraties rom a positie
perspectie and is as such able to deduce strands o intellectual curiosity that more critical
readers triialise. Murray lriedman`s 1be ^eocov.erratire Rerotvtiov ,2003, is written rom a
perspectie o dissent yet acknowledges the inluence o the neoconseraties. Gary Dorrien
is critical o the neoconseraties and 1be ^eocov.erratire Miva ,1993, proides biographical
portraits o some o the main characters o the early neoconseraties. 1wo olumes that
proide conenient access to some o the main texts by neoconseraties are Iring Kristol`s
^eocov.errati.v, 1be .vtobiograb, of av aea ,1995, and 1be ^eocov Reaaer ,2004, edited by
Irwin Stelzer. lor a more complete account o the history o neoconseratism I reer to
these works. Below is my abbreiation o that history.
6

'
'

6
Mark Gerson, 1he Neoconseratie Vision: rom the Cold \ar to the culture wars` 1996 ,Lanham, MD: Madison Books,
Murray lriedman, 1he Neoconseratie Reolution: Jewish intellectuals and the shaping o public policy` 2003
,Cambridge: Cambridge Uniersity Press,
Gary Dorrien, 1he Neoconseratie Mind - Politics, Culture, and the \ar o Ideology` 1993 ,Philadelphia: 1emple
Uniersity Press,
Iring Kristol, Neoconseratism, 1he Autobiography o an Idea` 1995 ,New \ork: lree Press,
Irwin Stelzer, 1he Neocon Reader` 2004,New \ork: Groe Press,
Alexander Ohrn

- 11 -
HEA' +F>'":9NJ'%>B;B<7>9M:8DM>7'
It is not possible to select any one eent or een a single issue against which the emergence
o neoconseratism can be understood. Rather seeral issues must be explored, and whilst
indiidual neoconseraties may perhaps ocus on a singular issue, or the broader
moement it is impossible to narrow it down to such.

loweer, it is interesting to note, and most o the literature on the neoconseraties place
considerable emphasis on it, that seeral o the ounders o some o the key journals and
think tanks that would later be associated with neoconseratism attended City College o
New \ork together. Most o the literature also emphasises that Iring Kristol, Iring lowe,
Daniel Bell and Nathan Glazer, were politically radical as students, with Kristol and lowe
supporting Leon 1rotsky.

As Micklethwait and \ooldridge puts it they .where too poor

and too Jewish to attend the Iy League.`
8
, which makes their original political position on
the let o the spectrum airly straightorward as this conormed to the working class` and
many immigrants` alues at the time.

Not all the early neoconseraties had a background similar to those o the New \ork
intellectuals rom City College. It has become common or journalists and indeed scholars to
reer to neoconseratism as a Jewish moement as many neoconseraties are o Jewish
heritage and hae oten been staunch supporters o Israel.
9


1he term neoconseratie` itsel was not inented by anyone to whom it applied, as political
categories seldom are. 1he term was reportedly irst used by Michael larrington, and it was
adopted by the critics o the liberal anti-communists moing urther away rom the liberal
let on more issues than the US policies related to the Cold \ar and the struggle against
communism.
10

'
Clearly the most colourul o the early neoconseraties were Iring Kristol. lis role as a
sort o centre or the relatiely small group within the liberal anti-communist intellectual
moement, which was later to constitute the neoconseratie moement, though Kristol
himsel preerred to think o it as a persuasion`, cannot be oerstated. 1he nickname
donned to him by his ellow traellers, the Godather` o neoconseratism is an indicator o
his success in generating resources and aiding other neoconseratie intellectuals in securing
grants and media exposure.

In Iring Kristol`s memoirs, ^eocov.errati.v, 1be .vtobiograb, of av aea ,1995,, a collection o
some o his papers, the width o the topics addressed by neoconseratie thinkers during the
20
th
century is well illustrated. By reiewing the concerns raised in his compilation gies us an
oeriew o the main concerns o Kristol`s writings, keeping in mind that whilst its preace
claims it to be a neutral collection o essays it no doubt relects the careully crated sel-
image o Kristol.
11

Murray lriedman, 1he Neoconseratie Reolution: Jewish intellectuals and the shaping o public policy` ,2003,, Page 28
8
John Micklethwait & Adrian \ooldridge, 1he Right Nation` ,London: Penguin Books, 2004, Page 2
9
Michael Lind, A 1ragedy o Lrrors` 1be ^atiov, lebruary 23 2004 http:,,www.thenation.com ,accessed on Noember 8
2006,
10
ibid.
11
Iring Kristol, Neoconseratism, 1he Autobiography o an Idea` 1995 ,New \ork: lree Press,
Alexander Ohrn

- 12 -
On the subject o adersary culture`, Kristol identiies a contradiction within liberal
democracy, namely that it seems to breed an intellectual elite that is deeply critical o the
ideals and alues upon which society rests. As such Bourgeois society to Kristol has seized to
go hand in hand with Bourgeois culture, that is to say that despite the American economy
being irmly capitalist, and haing been so almost exclusiely or a long time, the intellectual
elite does no longer propagate Bourgeois alues, but nihilism.

1hese sentiments howeer, are according to Kristol not limited to the intellectual elite, but
are strongly inhabited amongst those belonging to a new class o proessionals created by
liberal capitalism. 1his new class` consists o public sector proessionals such as scientists,
teachers and journalists, as well as the lawyers and doctors beneiting rom the expansion o
the public sector.
12
1he emergence o this new class was a consequence o the expansion o
higher education in the post-war period intended to proide skilled labour or the transition
rom an industrial to a post-industrial America.
13


Kristol`s strong opinions on the negatie inluence and contradictory nature o adersary
culture` hae led some historians to conclude that it was the neoconseraties` dissatisaction
with the questioning o societies ideals that cemented the abandonment o liberal or let
wing politics and accelerated the moe towards conseratism. 1o Micklethwait and
\ooldridge it was the early neoconseratie`s background in poor immigrant households
and or whom higher education proided an opportunity to leae poerty, that led them to
take particular aront in anti-Americanism and the destruction o uniersity property.
14


Michael Noak in particular has pointed to the paradox o the ethics o the New Class, an
ethics based on denial o sel-interest, whilst being direct beneiciaries o the political
application o their ideals o big goernment.

\hen discussing social reorm, Kristol argues that discussions that depend on a deinition o
justice are necessarily political. In an essay on social reorm in the 190s two problems in
particular are highlighted. lirstly, there is always a problem in deining the poor, and any
applicable poerty cut-o point is by deault arbitrary. Secondly, a poerty reduction scheme
that hands out money risks causing a poerty trap in which incenties to better one`s
situation are oset by the disincenties o in the process losing handouts.
15


1he conclusions that Kristol draws rom his analysis o social reorm are in themseles
twoold. lirstly, the lessons rom the ailure o the Great Society and \ar on Poerty o the
1960s, suggest to him that social initiaties that diide the American people are misdirected
and the mark o a successul social reorm |.| is to create greater comity among the
people.`
16
Lxamples o initiaties that he would aour are such as a children`s allowance
scheme and a national healthcare system, both applied equally oer all income groups.
Secondly, Kristol concludes that all social reorms are more than anything political actiities,

12
ibid. p.209
13
ibid. p.221
14
John Micklethwait & Adrian \ooldridge, 1he Right Nation` ,London: Penguin Books, 2004, Pages 2-3
15
Iring Kristol, Neoconseratism, 1he Autobiography o an Idea` Pages 202-203
16
ibid. p.202
Alexander Ohrn

- 13 -
and as such the success o social policies in the eyes o politicians are not measured in the
poerty reducing eect, but in the loyalties said policies create.
1


In a dierent essay on social justice, Kristol identiies the inherent conlict in the discussion
on income distribution and the airness o equality as the same as the conlict between liberty
and lack thereo. Len the concept o social justice` is politically charged in that social` in
this case does not mean that society ought to direct incomes towards a air` distribution set
by society, but rather that the goernment should promote a particular income distribution.
1he conlict thereore can be summed up as that the distribution o incomes in the liberal
capitalist economy only makes sense i liberty is the highest alue or political goal in itsel.
18

1his is howeer not how Kristol iews the intellectual elite aouring equality as social
justice. 1o Kristol they are as antagonists o liberty and the ree society. In conclusion then,
what speciic income distribution that is considered air` depend, according to Kristol, on
the particular history and traditions o the society in which the discussion takes place.

1he adersary culture, and its cultural nihilism, that Kristol strongly dislikes is howeer not
o the kind that a post-marxist perspectie might hae enisioned, o an intellectual elite that
leads the masses in the struggle against capitalism. Rather, Kristol argues that the experiences
o common people contradict those o intellectuals and act as antibodies` to the cultural
degradation aoured by the intellectuals.
19


1his in turn helps us understand how Kristol understands the inulnerability o liberal
democracy and the capitalist mode o production. A recurrent theme in Kristol`s texts is that
capitalism was the mode o production intended by the ounding athers, een though they
o course neer used that particular term.
20
1he American way o lie, what Kristol calls
bourgeois ethos`, closely resembling the rugality Max \eber used to explain the success o
capitalism in North America in 1be Prote.tavt tbic. ava 1be irit of Caitati.v, is according to
Kristol not necessarily, and certainly not in the 1960s, ound harboured by the intellectual
elite, but is rather to be ound amongst common people.
21


In Kristol`s commentaries on moral alues in his contemporary America, there is a certain
reerence or bourgeois alues` as he understands them. \hether he is discussing amily
relations, sexual promiscuity or welare, there is a sense that rather than looking or new
solutions to new situations, Kristol would rather reerse the processes and make new
situations less new, and as such the old and tested mechanism already embedded in local
culture can once again unction.

\hat is clear rom much o Kristol`s discussions is that he inds the prolieration o the title
intellectual` highly disturbing, perhaps een oensie, and at the root o what is wrong with
his contemporary America. 1he way in which he uses it is almost exclusiely to designate
someone as a liberal, and not primarily as someone with a philosophical predisposition. 1his
seems to be the position against which Kristol understands himsel, namely that o a liberal,
but o a philosophical origin other than that o his contemporary liberals. In understanding

1
ibid. p.204
18
ibid. p.256
19
ibid. p.134
20
ibid. p.211,258
21
ibid. p.12
Alexander Ohrn

- 14 -
American conseratism as in seeking to consere the institutions o liberal democracy, he
conersely understands his contemporary liberals as neosocialists` in that they seek to
achiee eer greater equality at the expense o liberty`
22
. 1he category, or title, o
neoconseratie in this sense would be to denote a thinker in between a liberal not holding
liberty as a alue worth deending, and a conseratie ailing to see how the institutions o
the state could help improing the human condition when utilised appropriately. As a
deinition this is much too ague and sounds much too like any deinition o reatotiti/ too
help us understand the irst generation o neoconseraties.




22
ibid. p.230
Alexander Ohrn

- 15 -
HEH'' %>B;B<7>9M:8DM>'";B<BGD;7':<='$8F>9',77C>7'
It is within the context o opposing communism that the neoconseraties` interest in
economics can be understood. 1here are two interlinked reasons to understand it as such.
lirstly, by the 190s when the neoconseraties, with Iring Kristol in the lead, took an
interest in economics, the only alternatie to capitalism that seemed real to them was
communism. \ith that as the alternatie, a neoconseratie support or capitalism was a
gien. Secondly, ollowing the schism between the early neoconseraties and liberal
intellectuals, whom the neoconseraties had come to iew as barely disguised
communitarians and a driing orce behind the new class` and adersary culture, the
neoconseraties did not beliee social or economic planning was een possible, gien the
complexity o economic theory.

Neoconseraties hae written on many aspects o economics, but the concept that is
perhaps best known and most inluential is that o supply side economics and the Laer
cure.

Jude \anniski became riends with Arthur Laer and his assistant Robert Mundell in the
early 190s. As a political writer, or the !att treet ]ovrvat he published an interiew with
Mundell titled It`s 1ime to Cut 1axes`. 1his attracted the attention o the neoconseraties
and in 195 Iring Kristol published \anniski`s essay 1he Mundell-Laer lypothesis: A
New View o the \orld Lconomy` in 1be Pvbtic vtere.t, in which the principles o supply-
side economics were presented. Gerson emphasises the simplicity o the theory, which
unlike most o its contemporary economics, appealed directly to human ingenuity`
23
. But it
was in one o the ootnotes o that essay, that the law o diminishing returns`, that at a
certain tax rate, tax reenue ceases to increase as people work less hard when they get to
keep less o their wage, was explained, a concept that was to be later known as the Laer
cure`. 1he cure itsel was not eatured in the original essay, but was supposedly conceied
on a napkin when \anniski and Laer had dinner with Richard Cheney, an aide to President
Gerald lord`s assistant Donald Rumseld.
24
Gerson argues that supply side economics was
well suited to the neoconseraties because it seemed to embrace common sense and
transerring .the power o creatie economic possibility into the hands o ordinary citizen
with the ision and the determination to transorm a ision into a reality`
25
. Gerson also
argues that more than an economic theory, supply side economics was a way o presenting
capitalism as a communitarian ision and spoke to the aspirations o the ordinary citizen
and maniested the American dream`
26
.

1his is where the writing o Michael Noak comes into play. lis 1be irit of Devocratic
Caitati.v ,1982, is an attempt to show how democracy is the consequence o capitalism.
Drawing on Daniel Bell`s model or society in 1be Cvttvrat Covtraaictiov. of Caitati.v ,196, in
which a techno-economic structure o society is intimately linked to its polity and culture,
Noak took this to mean that only particular combinations o political systems, economical
modes o production and cultural abrics were compatible.
2
1he only mode o production

23
Mark Gerson, 1he Neoconseratie Vision: lrom the Cold \ar to the Culture \ars` ,Lanham, MD: Madison Books,
1996, Page 203
24
ibid. pp.203-204
25
ibid. p.206
26
ibid. p.206
2
Michael Noak, 1he Spirit o Democratic Capitalism` 1982 ,New \ork: Simon and Schuster,
Alexander Ohrn

- 16 -
that was compatible with the plurality o democracy proed to be modern capitalism, and as
such Noak reuted what he perceied as the mainstream iew o the historical coincidence
o capitalism`s pairing up with liberal democracy and suggested that the two were more
closely linked than that. In act, the two are almost synonymous in Noak`s account. 1he
question then was what are the cultural traits associated with the two, and what can be done
to preent cultural degradation which would logically upset the bond between the three.
28


1o Bell there were in capitalism orces at play which themseles acted negatiely against the
cultural and personal traits that he associated with a successul bourgeois society, namely
hard work, prudence, thrit, deerred gratiication, amily loyalty, and a sense o the
sacred`
29
seemingly quoted straight rom Max \eber`s 1be irit of Caitati.v ava tbe Prote.tavt
tbic.. It is against this background that the neoconseratie criticism o the New Class,
adersary culture and American Liberalism must be understood. It is not because o the
speciic issues pursued by these other moements that they awoke such harsh criticism rom
the neoconseraties but because they threatened the balance between capitalism and liberal
democracy within the context o Noak`s democratic democracy. Lconomics to the
neoconseraties was not only a matter o inding methods or production or distributing
income, but rather directly linked to the political system o liberal capitalism. Liberal in the
sense aoured by the neoconseraties o course.

One o the issues within which the neoconseraties generated considerable inamy was that
o Norman Podhoretz stance is-a-is ethnic and racial relations. As an editor o Covvevtar,
he had shited the ocus towards issues o amily, but it was with the article M, ^egro Probtev
- .va Ovr. that he eoked intellectuals` anger and stirred public opinion. 1he idea raised by
Podhoretz in a polemic setting o Us` against 1hem`, no doubt as the Arican American
readership o Covvevtar, could not hae been signiicant, was based on obserations rom
his own childhood. le notes that they`, as in black children and youths, could do as they
pleased and were neer punished or misbehaing whilst Podhoretz and his ellow white
schoolmates were schooled in obeying authority and were punished i they ailed to do so.
1o Podhoretz, this diered greatly rom mainstream intelligentsia`s idea that as descendants
o slaes the Arican American population was oppressed, as in his own experience it was he
and other white youths who were araid whilst the black youths did as they pleased.
30


In the ollowing controersy Podhoretz claimed to hae simply praised the irtues o Arican
Americans, but as Gary Dorrien points out this praise is limited to an admiration o their
athletic bodies and as such one is more likely to think o dichotomies otherwise associated
with colonialist perspecties, Mind Body, Culture Nature, Us 1hem. Dorrien also
suggests that much o the controersy arose because o the liberal setting in which these
opinions were presented. lad they instead been published in a right wing journal such as
^atiovat vtere.t the article would most likely not gained much attention. 1he reason this
particular article is worth mentioning is because it helps show how the neoconseraties
diered rom traditional conseraties in that they were eager to substantiate their claims. In
this case it was done through Moynihan`s article on the Arican American amily, where it

Daniel Bell, 1he Cultural Contradictions o Capitalism` 196 ,New \ork: Basic Books,
28
Gary Dorrien, 1he Neoconseratie mind: Politics, Culture, and the \ar o Ideology` ,Philadelphia: 1emple Uniersity
Press, 1993
29
ibid. p.226
30
ibid.
Alexander Ohrn

- 1 -
was pointed out that a large proportion o black children were raised without the presence o
their ather.
31
As such the argument moed beyond Podhoretz obseration, and leaing the
liberal idea that racial conlict was due to the white man`s debt to their ormer slaes behind,
and pointed rather at one o the neoconseraties` old reliable social explanations, a
breakdown o traditional institutions, in this case the amily.



31
ibid.
Alexander Ohrn

- 18 -
HEI' *<8DO;BGGC<D78'2D6>9:N7':<='8F>'#CN8C9>'BL'*KK>:7>G><8'
1he culture o appeasement` to Podhoretz and other neoconseraties was the idea that
your enemy could be reasoned with and that it was possible to hae peace and riendly
relations without a clear hierarchy between nations. In the case applied to by Podhoretz the
enemy was the Soiet Union and the appeaser Jimmy Carter, but during the Second \orld
\ar the enemy was Nazi Germany and the appeaser Richard Chamberlain.
32


Carter ailed to appreciate the need or strategic superiority as a consequence o this culture
o appeasement`. Podhoretz ear was that US relations with the Soiet Unions were
deteriorating rom one o hostility to one o naiely imagined peace, a process o
linlandization` in that the unacknowledged ear o the Soiet Union lets goernments
negotiate treaties with the enemy and subsequently dismantling their military capacity to
enorce those agreements. As in the case o Britain ater the lirst \orld \ar, Podhoretz
attributed the culture o appeasement` in his contemporary United States to the inluence o
homosexual writers. 1he choice o homosexuals as the culprits seem to be based on an
argument akin to the one aboe, that is that the deining trait o homosexual men according
to Podhoretz was their reusal to be athers, and as such the reusal to accept the
responsibilities o atherhood, metaphorically related to leading a country in times o crisis or
war.
33


1he problems in US oreign policy were as such not so much about military spending as o
ideology. Podhoretz logic was that it did not matter how much was spent on military
resources i there was no intention or will to put them to use. 1hat was the real problem o
the culture o appeasement`, that war became unthinkable not a serious policy alternatie.
1o Podhoretz this was the situation Carter inherited and exacerbated, and it was deinitely
the case o Lurope which had become addicted to American military assistance. 1owards the
end o the Cold \ar, Podhoretz like most intellectuals and policy makers ailed to oresee
the extent o decline in the Soiet Union. As such Podhoretz perceied Gorbache`s policies
o glasnost` and perestroika` with suspicion. It was clear to Podhoretz that this was part o
an agenda to exploit the culture o appeasement` i it indeed was not complete and
irreersible linlandization`.
34




32
ibid.
33
ibid.
34
ibid.
Alexander Ohrn

- 19 -
HEP' +F>'2>@:;J'BL'8F>'":9NJ'%>B;B<7>9M:8DM>7'
By the mid 1990 seeral o the leading neoconseraties considered neoconseratism an
obsolete concept. Iring Kristol supposed that the neoconseratie persuasion` was
generational and Norman Podhoretz suggested that it had by 1996 been incorporated by the
wider conseratie moement.

\hat then o the neoconseratie legacy Murray lriedman suggests that such a legacy is
best understood in terms o the inluence the early neoconseraties had on a younger
generation o conseratie thinkers. In that sense the legacy o neoconseratism is to hae
inigorated the conseratie moement by inluencing thinkers able to utilise the language o
social science, but with a deeper understanding o social issues than paleoconseraties, and
most importantly, with the ability to project their ideas and arguments to a wider audience
than through traditional conseratie institutions.

lollowing the Republican Party`s election ictory in 1994, Mark Gerson notes that whilst
there was no direct between the neoconseratie journal 1be Pvbtic vtere.t and the ictory as
George \ill declared, the neoconseratie inluence cannot be denied. Gerson argues that:
.in the speeches o politicians such as Newt Gingrich, Bill Bradley, and een Bill Clinton,
there is ar more than an echo o old articles sitting in bound olumes o Covvevtar, and 1be
Pvbtic vtere.t`.
35
It could also be argued that the popularity o President George \. Bush`s
compassionate conseratism` with which he won the 2000 presidential election is an
indicator o the legacy o neoconseratism let or American conseratism, the ability to
speak with conidence on social issues without deaulting to the American constitution and
traditionally conseratie arguments.

In Gerson`s reiew o neoconseratism up until the mid 1990s, he deduces our principles
that hae gone as a red line throughout neoconseratie thinking.

lirst, that ife i. ivfivitet, covte`
36
, which is to say that the neoconseraties regarded the
complexity o the world to be beyond the manageability o een the indiiduals themseles,
and much less that o the goernment. Social engineering and political blueprints are
external, as opposed to the human problems, and thereore ail to produce the intended
eect without serious side eects.

Second, that Mav cav be gooa, bvt vav cav at.o be erit`
3
, a concept deried rom Ldmund
Burke and Reinhold Niebuhr, which Michael Noak presented in Covvevtar, in 192. 1he
sharp diision between good and eil is used to illustrate the ideals and nature o humans,
and that whilst most humans want to lie good lies they are capable o eil. In this sense,
those who try to lie according to good alues become the ictims o those who are eil as
those who are good see goodness in eeryone. I this weakness is oercome, then identiying
eil as eil is not enough, but physical orce must be an option.


35
Mark Gerson, 1he Neoconseratie Vision: lrom the Cold \ar to the Culture \ars` ,Lanham, MD: Madison Books,
1996, Page 350
36
ibid. p.16
3
ibid. p.1
Alexander Ohrn

- 20 -
1hird, that Mav i. a .ociat avivat`
38
, deried rom 1ocqueille, is to say that the
neoconseraties attach great alue to the social institutions that hae deeloped oer long
periods o time. 1his can be seen in contrast with social engineering and large scale
remodelling o societies. lor the neoconseraties thereore, a well unctioning society is
built by encouraging the institutions that inculcate irtue and prepare man to lie the good
lie both in priate and as a citizen o the public sphere.` and as .Politics and economics
are unctions o culture`
39
neither is separable rom the other.

lorth, Gerson argues that to the neoconseraties aea. rvte tbe rorta`
40
. \hilst their
contemporary intellectuals saw the world as progressing through, economic-, racial-, gender-
or sexual determinism, the neoconseraties consider ideas the most important determinant.
A society will only surie and progress i it has the ideological sel-conidence to deend its
principles`
41
.

Keeping in mind the disagreement in the early 1990s whether neoconseratism was by then
in its inal stage and largely incorporated into a modernised American conseratism as Iring
Kristol and others o the early neoconseraties hae argued or inigorated by a second
generation o neoconseraties rom a conseratie background as Dorrien suggests, we
now turn our inestigation to the later hal o the 1990s up until the present moment.
Despite the suggested inluence o the irst generation o neoconseraties it was ater the
eents o September 11 2001 that the neoconseraties entered the popular sphere as a
concept. As Neocons`, this latest generation o neoconseraties hae been considered
responsible or the United States responses to the attacks, not so much or the interention
in Aghanistan, but or the larger \ar on 1error. 1his inluence is largely attributed to two
institutions ounded by the literal heir to Iring Kristol, his son \illiam. 1he think tank
Project or the New American Century ounded in 1998 and the journal !ee/t, tavaara irst
issued in 1995 hae both published letters and articles urging the US goernment to take
action against Iraq in general and Saddam lussein in particular preceding the September 11
attacks, thus creating the perception that the US inasion o Iraq was not a response to
terrorism or an immediate threat, but a consequence o neoconseratie lobbying. 1he
ollowing section, constituting the bulk o this paper, is deoted to inestigating 1be !ee/t,
tavaara during the years 1995 through 2005, thus spanning the years preceding September
11 2001, the build-up to the declaration o a \ar on 1error, the interention in Aghanistan
and the inasion o Iraq. But beore dealing speciically with 1be !ee/t, tavaara and where
useul with the Project or the New American Century, we will briely look at the reasons or
considering the inluence o the neoconseraties part o a conspiracy to circument the
democratic process o the United States.

1he neoconseraties where not only intellectual thinkers, but inluential ones at that, and
this is in part why they are presently being described as the puppet masters o American
oreign policy. It is oten suggested that intellectuals lie in a world connected only through
journals, and this is certainly true or the neoconseraties with the correction that it is also a
world o think tanks.

38
ibid. p.1
39
ibid. p.18
40
ibid. p.18
41
ibid. p.19
Alexander Ohrn

- 21 -

1he early neoconseraties were to a large extent associated with journals such as Covvevtar,
and 1be Pvbtic vtere.t, and think tanks such as American Lnterprise Institute or Public Policy
Research and leritage loundation as has already been touched upon aboe, and whilst these
by no means hae lost their importance, it is in the Project or the New American Century
and 1be !ee/t, tavaara that we ind the more recent generation o neoconseraties.

1he two are both \ashington based, and een hae oices in the same building as
American Lnterprise Institute, on 1150 Seenteenth Street. \ith the sheer number o
ormer co-workers in these think tanks and journal haing ended up working or the George
\. Bush presidential administration it is not surprising that conspiracy theories hae
emerged. Micklethwait and \ooldridge ,2004, ind that more than a dozen ormer ALI co-
workers hae jobs there and Project or the New American Century hae had their letters to
President Clinton, concerning the toppling to Saddam lussein signed by amongst others
Donald Rumseld and Paul \olowitz.

But it is not these people in themseles that are the concern o this paper. It is their ideas. As
this section concludes this paper`s historical oeriew it may be useul to sum up the key
ideas o the early neoconseraties in order to compare these to the inluence that is
attributed to the later ones.

1his oeriew has only touched briely on the inluence o the writing o Leo Strauss on the
neoconseraties, but others attach ar more importance to this particular eature. 1his
translates into the conspiracy theory in two interdependent ways. lirstly, in the conspiracy
sense the discourse emphasises the reading o Strauss that suggests that the Straussians
aour a class o Plato`s philosopher kings, ruling the world rom behind the scenes and
through lies and subteruge. 1he Bush administration`s claim that Saddam lussein had
access to weapons o mass destruction and the ability to threaten America with these, which
by now is commonly considered a lie, is held as an example o Straussian inspired
politicking. Secondly, the number o Straussians in the Bush administration is signiicant, the
most prominent being Paul \olowitz, who was a student o Allan Bloom, Leo Strauss`
protg.
42


1his paper does not concern itsel signiicantly with the neoconseraties` connection to Leo
Strauss. 1his connection is made orceully by Shadia B. Drury. ler 1988 book 1be otiticat
aea. of eo trav.. was an attempt at exposing the teachings o Leo Strauss. 1o her, Leo
Strauss adocated manipulatie politics, where lies and deception were methods or
achieing a political agenda that opposed such ices. Virtues are as such only symbols
around which the population can rally, and to the political elite, these can be used
successully. In her 199 book eo trav.. ava tbe .vericav Rigbt she connects
neoconseraties such as Iring Kristol to the teachings o Strauss and argues that the
inluence on Kristol, and as such on neoconseratism, is signiicant.
43



42
John Micklethwait & Adrian \ooldridge, 1he Right Nation` 2004 ,London: Penguin Press, Pages 156-15
43
Shadia B. Drury, 1he Political Ideas o Leo Strauss` 1988 ,New \ork: St. Martin`s Press,, Leo Strauss and the American
Right` 199 ,New \ork: St. Martin`s Press,
Alexander Ohrn

- 22 -
Neil G. Robertson, in his reiew o eo trav.. ava tbe .vericav Rigbt, highlights that the
inluence o Strauss on Kristol does not need to be exposed as Kristol has oten cited Leo
Strauss as a major inluence. lurthermore, Robertson suggests that the nihilism that Drury
attaches to Strauss seems contradictory with Kristol`s staunch criticism o precisely nihilism.
Robertson does not argue that Drury is necessarily wrong about Strauss, but he argues that it
is not thereore the case that Kristol understands the nuances o Strauss` teaching in the
same way as she does.
44


As such the inluence o Leo Strauss on neoconseratism is beyond the scope o this paper.

By way o concluding this brie historical oeriew o neoconseratism, this paper has
shown how the early neoconseraties dealt with numerous topics across the American
political landscape. \hilst they may hae originated predominantly rom anti-communist
liberals, the Cold \ar was ar rom the only issue o importance to them. Rather, as this
section has shown, their project was a deence o a wider ideal, that o liberal democracy`.

As such, threats were not only external, as the Soiet Union, but internal, as adersary
culture. Social engineering grew popular amongst politicians in the post-war period and the
neoconseraties ehemently opposed such policies on the basis that society was ar too
complex to be micro managed by politicians. Rather, they promoted long standing cultural
alues drawn rom the Judeo-Christian tradition, which they perceied as more in line with
the morals o the people.

1he early neoconseraties hae been well documented and thoroughly analysed in academia
and the popular press, and this paper has suggested a number o sources aboe in addition
to this brie reiew.

44
Neil G. Robertson, Leo Strauss and the American Right` ,reiew, 1be ]ovrvat of Potitic., 1 1ot. 1, ^o. 1, Pages 261-263

Alexander Ohrn

- 23 -
3 The Weekly Standard 1995-2005
IEA' )>:=>97FDKQ'$R<>9':<='49>SC><8'#B<89D6C8B97'
1be !ee/t, tavaara was irst published on 18 September 1995. 1he ounding editors were
\illiam Kristol and lred Barnes, supported by largely the same writers that will be drawn
upon throughout the rest o this paper. 1his section gies a brie oeriew o the magazine`s
general structure in terms o unding, readership, distribution and its requent contributors.

1be !ee/t, tavaara is a current eents magazine oering comments on primarily American
domestic and oreign policy. 1his makes it an interesting source or the purposes o this
paper as it orces its writers and editors to engage with issues at a more supericial leel than
in academic literature. 1his also distinguishes the magazine ormat o publication rom that
o the think tanks associated with neoconseratism which hae a much greater editorial
control oer their material as they publish only a raction o the olume in open letters and
research papers. 1he voav. oeravai o think tanks is clearly less transparent than that o a
weekly magazine.

1he ollowing sections discuss some o the issues that hae been addressed in 1be !ee/t,
tavaara with airly high requency. As a current eents magazine ocused on American
politics the oerwhelming ocus has since its irst issue, with the exception o the immediate
post-September 11 period, been on the struggle between the Republican Party and the
Democratic Party. 1his is howeer not the ocus o this paper, and the ocus here is
primarily on neoconseratie positions with respect to speciic issues. 1his allows the paper
to explore not primarily the bipartisan politics o \ashington D.C., but rather the ideas,
alues and priorities aoured by the contributors o 1be !ee/t, tavaara.

1be !ee/t, tavaara`s readership is not the ocus o this paper, yet it may be useul to say a
ew words on the subject. 1be !ee/t, tavaara itsel announces on its webpage as
inormation or prospectie adertisers some basic demographic details o the readership. In
short the readership according to 1be !ee/t, tavaara`s 2003 subscriber surey is well
educated ,Some College or more: 95, College Degree or beyond: 6, and aluent
,Aerage llI: >193,000, Aerage Net \orth: >1,364,000, Own primary Residence: 92,
Aerage Market Value: >453,000, Percent owning securities: 93, Aerage alue o securities
holdings: >8,000, Aerage alue o lie insurance holdings: >535,000,. 1be !ee/t, tavaara
claims to hae an unrialled distribution system, where issues are hand deliered to .the
most powerul men and women in goernment, politics and the media.` to ensure that
.eery important player in the city gets a copy.`
45


Len i the demographic and socio-economic inormation proided by the magazine is
inadequate to draw conclusions as to who the readership is, a brie look at the magazine`s
adertisement conirms its claim o being read by the political elite o \ashington. 1he
typical ads included in the magazine is not aimed at general consumers, but is directed at a
dierent segment o society. A large portion o ads are policy adocating, suggesting that the
adertisers are coninced that the magazine`s sphere o inluence include policymakers and
their sta and think tanks drating policy suggestions.


45
http:,,www.weeklystandard.com ,accessed on Noember 2 2006,
Alexander Ohrn

- 24 -
Another important type o adertisement is or the armament industry. Ads or troop
transport helicopters or paramilitary security companies are clearly not aimed at consumers
but to those people in a position to decide on public spending or in interlinked positions.

1be !ee/t, tavaara is owned by News Corporation, one o the world`s largest media
conglomerates. Conspiracy prone websites hae written about how Rupert Murdoch, News
Corp`s CLO and owner, unded the magazine`s setup and still retains it despite it running at
a loss. \hether Murdoch inluences the magazine in any way is unclear. lormally howeer,
\illiam Kristol has an agreement giing him editorial independence.
46


1he extent to which a magazine or other publication can be associated with an ideology or
political moement depend on a number o ariables and must be assessed on a case by case
basis. Len where this paper reers to the editors and writers o 1be !ee/t, tavaara as the
neoconseraties`, this is not intended to be conused with a wider neoconseratie
moement. It would not be within the scope o this paper to assess the extent to which 1be
!ee/t, tavaara takes the same position as other neoconseratie publications.

loweer, many o the people associated with 1be !ee/t, tavaara are sel proessed
neoconseraties, and gien the relatiely small number o writers and editors that hae been
published in the magazine since its inception in 1995 there is reason to think o 1be !ee/t,
tavaara as a coherent political unit. 1his is not to say that this paper perceies it as either a
political moement or an outright lobbying group, but it is rather to acknowledge the
inluence o the ery small group o contributors and editors who hae been with the
magazine rom the ery start. \illiam Kristol, lred Barnes, Daid 1ell, Daid Brooks, Daid
lrum, Robert Kagan, Charles Krauthammer, Richard Starr and Matt Labash, constitute the
core o 1be !ee/t, tavaara. Consequently, the ollowing sections o this paper will
repeatedly reerence and quote these men, in outlining the issues that hae concerned 1be
!ee/t, tavaara oer its irst ten years o publication.

I anything, they are the neoconseraties o today. As an institution in this sense, 1be !ee/t,
tavaara is not immune to change, and in many respects this is what this inestigation has
shown. Neoconseratism as it was understood in the context o Iring Kristol and his
contemporaries writing is distinctly dierent rom the neoconseratism now associated with
\illiam Kristol and 1be !ee/t, tavaara.

46
John Cassidy, Murdoch`s Game` 1be ^er Yor/er, October 16 2006, http:,,www.newyorker.com ,accessed on Noember
1 2006,
Alexander Ohrn

- 25 -
IEH'' 4B9>D@<'5BND;J':<='&>L><;>',77C>7'ATTUOHVVA'
loreign policy is the area where Neocons` hae become a mainstream term to understand
how such policies as pre-emptie strikes, illegal combatants and the now seeming lies about
Iraq`s weapons o mass destruction, became implemented by the George \. Bush
Administration in the wake o September 11. 1his section inestigates how oreign policy
was discussed prior to those eents, and attempts to show how whilst some o the policies
adocated during the period 1995-2001 are reiterated in the post-September 11 period, the
magazine deals with a range o issues in this period that does not later it in the ramework
o the \ar on 1error. \hat this section seeks to illustrate is how the width o
neoconseratie oreign policy adocacy is ar wider than oten claimed, and that whilst a
military interention in Iraq, with the explicit purpose o toppling the goernment o
Saddam lussein, was adocated during this period it was ar rom the only, or the most
prominent, policy concern o 1be !ee/t, tavaara.

Neoconseraties had o course made a name or themseles in oreign policy beore 1be
!ee/t, tavaara was launched in 1995. As seeral o the sections aboe demonstrate the early
neoconseraties were in many ways centred on the threat o the spread o communism.
1he end o the Cold \ar has orced the neoconseraties as well as many other oreign
policy thinkers to rethink their positions.

1his paper gies two extensie examples in order to demonstrate how neoconseraties
dierentiate between conlicts in two major ways. Under certain circumstances, threats can
be deterred, as was conseratie policy during the Cold \ar. Under other circumstances
threats must be neutralised as was the case with Nazi Germany. 1hese lessons, and rom
others in neoconseraties` reading o history back to ancient Greece, are crucial to
understanding neoconseratie oreign policy recommendations.

Alexander Ohrn

- 26 -
IEHEA' #:7>'"?:GKN>W'#FD<:'
1he country perhaps most requently discussed in 1be !ee/t, tavaara is China, and in the
editorial to an issue deoted almost completely to the country and its role in the world, the
editors explain their take on the Chinese economic success story as one o uneen
deelopment. \hilst China has indeed gotten richer, it is an economic deelopment that is
accomplished without democratic reorm. As such the editors o 1be !ee/t, tavaara identiy
China as the next potential rogue superpower` in the wake o the collapse o the Soiet
Union.
4


\hereas most commentators on China tend to emphasise the tremendous economic
deelopment o the country since the late 1980s, but the neoconseraties attach little alue
to economic growth without the democratic reorms they associate with true deelopment.
1he presentation o China as a booming economy in the hands o a dictatorial regime is
clearly a rightening image to the neoconseraties.
48


Just as China`s economy has managed to transorm itsel, the neoconseraties o 1be !ee/t,
tavaara attach the moral alues o liberal democracy as intimately linked to the practice o
capitalism, as did the early neoconseraties, and they suggest that the Chinese population is
ready or a democratic transormation. Arthur \aldron compares the case o China to that
o Indonesia and suggests that the anger currently ented in the orm o anti-Americanism,
under the direction o the regime, could easily be redirected towards the regime itsel. A
democratic transormation through such means would clearly not be non-iolent, and
\aldron suggests that it would be in the best interest o the Chinese goernment to yield to
popular dissent and reorm on its own accord. Recently howeer, such a breakthrough was
resisted by the replacement on Zhao Ziayang`s reorm riendly goernment.
49


1he mainstream policy package that 1be !ee/t, tavaara is attacking is that o the Clinton
administration`s engagement` policy. 1he idea is that by trading with China ideas o liberty
would be coneyed parallel to commerce.
50
Aaron lriedberg suggests that whilst engagement
with China is not so much wrong on principle, it is simply not likely to succeed. le suggests
that similarly to the welare programmes and society building eorts criticised by
neoconseraties in the 1950s and 1960s, the engagement policy is attractie in theory but
unlikely to succeed in practice. In its practical implementation it needs to reward good`
behaiour and penalise bad` behaiour, which is ar too intricate to stand a likely chance o
success.
51
Christopher Cox, reiterates Robert Kagan`s criticism o engagement` and its
similarities with Marxist economic determinism
52
and points out that this notion is urther
lawed as he does not recognise any ree-market communism` with which such an exchange
would take place.
53


4
Lditorial, China: 1he Issue` !ee/t, tavaara, lebruary 24 199, Page 10
48
Daid 1ell, lor the Lditors, None Dare Call It 1yranny` !ee/t, tavaara, April 16 2001, Pages 16-1
49
Arthur \aldron, A Regime in Crisis` !ee/t, tavaara, May 24 1999, Pages 2-29
50
Lditorial, China: 1he Issue` !ee/t, tavaara, lebruary 24 199, Page 11
51
Aaron lriedberg, Broken Lngagement` !ee/t, tavaara, lebruary 24 199, Pages 12-13
52
Robert Kagan, \hat China Knows 1hat \e Don`t` !ee/t, tavaara, January 20 199, Pages 22-2
53
Christopher Cox, Land o the Un-lree` !ee/t, tavaara, lebruary 24 199, Pages 20-22
Robert Kagan, 1he Lnd o Lngagement` !ee/t, tavaara, Noember 10 199, Pages 20-22
Lditorial, Clinton`s China Syndrome` !ee/t, tavaara, April 2 1998, Pages -8
Arthur \aldron, \ishul 1hinking on China` !ee/t, tavaara, June 29 1998, Pages 25-29
Alexander Ohrn

- 2 -

Lngagement` is clearly not a aoured policy programme, and whilst occasional articles
expand on alternatie strategies there is no clear consensus as to what American oreign
policy should entail.

In seeral articles o 1be !ee/t, tavaara an unconentional policy programme is adocated,
signiicantly dierent in ormat, but not necessarily in attitude, to what the neoconseraties
would later be associated with in mainstream press and popular critiques. John Derbyshire
proposes a strategy that takes the orm o back talking the Chinese regime and taking a stand
on key issues. As such he suggests that Chinese culture is shame drien as opposed to by
guilt as \estern culture. A Chinese person will in this sense ell much more at ease with
doing something he himsel considers wrong and getting away with it, than a \esterner
would. On the contrary, the sense o shame deried rom public humiliation in the case o
an honest mistake or a mundane accident, is that much worse or the Chinese than the
\esterner. Stereotypical as it may seem, Derbyshire suggests that public humiliation o the
Chinese regime and exposure o the lies o the goernment, would likely spur popular
dissent and thus uel the moement to transorm and democratise China.
54


Derbyshire also adocates a strong American standpoint against Chinese interests in places
such as Nepal and 1aiwan.
55
As key issues or the Chinese they oer opportunities to show
strength that resonates through Chinese society, which leads us to how the example o China
helps in an understanding o the neoconseraties` o 1be !ee/t, tavaara attitude towards
oreign policy, namely their aderse eelings towards appeasement.

In an editorial ollowing the American sureillance aircrat essentially captured by the
Chinese air orce, though the speciic circumstances remain obscured, Robert Kagan and
\illiam Kristol argue that the national humiliation o the United States that was the George
\. Bush administration`s apologetic response to China is too closely akin to appeasement
or comort. As their argument goes, and this will be a recurrent eature in their take on
oreign policy, is that as the world`s sole superpower they hae a responsibility to assert their
inluence on other countries to promote alues associated with liberal democracy. In the
position as sole superpower, humiliation is not something to be taken lightly, but is in act a
orm o appeasement. Appeasement, to Kagan and Kristol, is the irst step towards armed
conlict as it projects the impression, in this case to China, o weakness which proides
incentie to urther challenge the authority o the United States.
56


Needless to say, we do not seek war with China. 1hat is what adocates o
appeasement always say about those who argue or standing up to an
international bully. But it is the appeasers who wind up leading us into war.`
5


Promoting democracy in China is what can be understood as the major neoconseratie
policy prescription or American relations with China. Rather than deending contemporary
American economic interests in and with China, such as trade and production, these are seen

54
John Derbyshire, 1he Chinese, 1oo, Desere to Be lree` !ee/t, tavaara, lebruary 14 2000, Pages 24-29
55
ibid.
56
Robert Kagan and \illiam Kristol, A National lumiliation` !ee/t, tavaara, April 16 2001, Pages 11-16
5
ibid. p.16
Alexander Ohrn

- 28 -
as obstacles to a irm line o action.
58
1he ailure o the United States goernment to connect
Chinese politics with American-Chinese trade, is to leading neoconseraties a key reason as
to why China has ailed to transorm into a liberal democracy. In short, the democratic
reorm moement in China is the ictim o American appeasement.
59


\hereas there is no consensus on what should be done, there is clearly a broad based
consensus on what should vot be done, to appease the Chinese dictatorial regime.
Containment` is oten adocated as the prudent strategy in dealing with China, but there is a
certain lack o clarity as to how containment leads to the goal o democratisation.


58
\illiam Kristol, Democracy in China` !ee/t, tavaara, June 25 2001, Page 11
59
Michael A. Ledeen, No 1yrants Allowed` !ee/t, tavaara, lebruary 24 199, Pages 28-29
Matthew Rees, Clinton`s China Commerce` !ee/t, tavaara, June 1 1998, Pages 24-26
Robert Kagan and \illiam Kristol, \ill China Pay No Price` !ee/t, tavaara, April 30 2001, Pages 9-10
Daid 1ell, lor the Lditors, An Lngagement with 1yranny` !ee/t, tavaara, April 30 2001, Pages 10-11
Alexander Ohrn

- 29 -
IEHEH' #:7>'"?:GKN>W',9:S'
1he country that the neoconseraties at 1be !ee/t, tavaara would come to be most closely
associated with in the post 9-11 period was Iraq. lollowing the irst Gul \ar, the Clinton
administrations o 1992-2000 did not pursue as hard lined oreign policy programme
towards Iraq as many neoconseraties would hae preerred. Consequently 1be !ee/t,
tavaara deotes considerable space to adocating alternatie strategies to containment, and
based on the 199 editorial and later theme issue entitled Saddam Must Go` many critics
hae argued that the neoconseraties used the eents o September 11 2001 as catalyst in
promoting an as o earlier established agenda. 1his section reiews the ideas and arguments
presented on the topic o Iraq in 1be !ee/t, tavaara oer the years 1995-2001 so as to
proide a background or comparison when we return to the case o Iraq in the post 9-11
period in a later section.

1be !ee/t, tavaara began to take an interest in Iraq in the late 1996 when the Iraqi regime
showed an increasing deiance to the international embargo and the partial oreign control o
their territory through the no-light` areas in the south and the north o Iraq.

Aaron lriedberg expresses the opinion that the Bush administration o the irst Gul \ar
made a mistake in not toppling Saddam lussein`s goernment ater ousting its orces rom
Kuwait. lriedberg does not expect the US goernment or its allies to go into Iraq to inish
the job in a oreseeable uture. Nor does he see any reason as to why it could be expected
that Saddam lussein`s regime would transorm. Rather he suggests that:

.there is nothing in his long and bloodstained past to suggest that can
somehow be transormed or transormed. Saddam is like a shark, he needs to
keep moing orward in order to surie.`
60


lriedberg argues that retaliatory action by the United States and its allies, such as the
launching o 44 cruise missiles in response to the Iraqi regime sending orces into Kurdish
territories in the north, an eent lriedberg`s article is centred around. lriedberg argues that
the United States should not seek to justiy its actions, but should the need arise, Iraq`s
breach o Resolution 688 ought to suice. 1o him action o this sort is necessary, and had
the risk o ciilian casualties not threatened to impair US coalitions, a larger and more
decisie attack would hae been preerable. 1o not send a signal o this sort to Saddam
lussein would itsel be a sign o appeasement and weakness, which is apparent in
lriedberg`s comparison o Saddam lussein`s troop moements to Nazi Germany and Adol
litler`s reoccupation o Rhineland in 1936.
61


1wo weeks later, the analysis lriedberg proposed, that the air strikes against targets in Iraq
was a proper course o action, is questioned in an editorial. \hat is not questioned is the
appropriateness o retaliatory action, but the choice o targets. \hilst the Iraqi actions had
been threatening, the American response ought to hae been disproportionate`:


60
Aaron lriedberg, A Proper Course in Iraq` !ee/t, tavaara, September 16 1996, Page 15
61
ibid. pp.12-15
Alexander Ohrn

- 30 -
.It should hae been designed not just to warn and contain Saddam but to
hurt him and undermine his control.`
62


Another week later, when it becomes clear that what had transpired a month earlier in Iraq
had been a collaboratie eort between Kurds and the Iraqi National Congress to oerthrow
Saddam lussein, that had been stopped dead in its tracks by Iraqi orces, the indignation at
1be !ee/t, tavaara is thinly eiled. Citing Paul \olowitz, Michael Ledeen compares the
eents to those at the Bay o Pigs, and accuses the Clinton administration o ailing to
proide support or their allies in northern Iraq. Ledeen suggests that American support,
such as air strikes against armoured ehicles, would not only hae signiicantly increased the
chances o the cov a`etat to succeed, it would hae sent the signal to other opposition groups
that the United States were serious about transorming the Middle Last.
63


1he issue mentioned aboe, where the inamous editorial Saddam Must Go` which was
ollowed two weeks later by a theme issue with the same title, were published on Noember
1 and December 1 199, respectiely. 1be !ee/t, tavaara had been largely quite about
issues relating to Iraq or about a year when they returned to the topic with a engeance. 1he
argument presented in the editorials and articles in these issues goes as ollows.

In the editorial entitled Saddam Must Go` two points are combined to lead to the
conclusion that Saddam lussein needs to be remoed rom power in Iraq. lirstly, they
argue that Saddam lussein`s goernment is actiely seeking to acquire weapons o mass
destruction. Second, they argue that containment o Iraq is becoming increasingly diicult as
Saddam lussein successully manages to manipulate the United States and its coalition
partners rom the Gul \ar into making concessions that weaken their possibilities o
oersight.
64


Unlike preious issues, where arguments in aour o air strikes and support o local
opposition groups, the editorial Saddam Must Go` argues in aour o the deployment o
ground orces. As has already been mentioned, 1be !ee/t, tavaara has argued that the irst
Gul \ar ended prematurely and that the proper course ought to hae been to hae taken
Baghdad.

\e know it seems unthinkable to propose another ground attack to take
Baghdad. But it`s time to start thinking the unthinkable.`
65


1he issue o December 1 199, was itsel entitled aaaav Mv.t Co, and its editorial 1be va of
Covtaivvevt explicitly argues that in light o the negotiations going on between the Iraqi
goernment and the international community it is clear to 1be !ee/t, tavaara that
containment is clearly not working. 1hey argue that what may appear to be a negotiation
around a status quo, Iraq is clearly achieing its target which is to decrease oreign oersight
o its weapons programmes.


62
Lditorial, Between Iraq and A lard Place` !ee/t, tavaara, September 30 1996, Page 11
63
Michael Ledeen, Bill Clinton`s Bay o Pigs` !ee/t, tavaara, October 1996, Pages 29-31
64
Lditorial, Saddam Must Go` !ee/t, tavaara, Noember 1 199, Pages 11-12
65
ibid. p.12
Alexander Ohrn

- 31 -
Containment is no longer enough. Rather than try to contain Saddam, a strategy
that has ailed, our policy should now aim to remoe him rom power by any and
all means necessary.`
66


In the issue at hand, on top o the hard lined editorial, a row o contributors make additional
points in strengthening the argument as to why the United States should act with orce in
Iraq. Zalmay M. Khalilzad and Paul \olowitz present a six point blueprint as to how the
toppling o Saddam lussein`s goernment could be achieed. lrederick \. Kagan reiterates
the need or ground orces, and Peter \. Rodman explains why the United Nations cannot
be expected to play a useul role in the campaign. lred Barnes, inally, indicts the Republican
Party or not taking a stronger stand against Saddam lussein`s Iraq and in aour o action
against it.
6


1his marks the beginning o a series o articles on Iraq oer the rest o the ollowing year,
beore 1be !ee/t, tavaara once again goes relatiely quite on the subject.

Apart rom a ew anonymous editorials, and een ewer articles by requent contributors, the
bulk o 1be !ee/t, tavaara`s writing on the topic o Iraq comes rom a single source. Six
articles by John R. Bolton during this period thereore stand out. Not so much in content as
in requency, almost hal the articles dealing directly with Iraq in the third year o 1be !ee/t,
tavaara`s publication are written by Bolton, which is augmented by the act that Bolton is
senior ice president o the American Lnterprise Institute as well as a ormer staer o the
George Bush administration.

Bolton`s argument is essentially an attack on the United Nations and on the Clinton
administration or its preerence or multilateralism oer unilateralism. \hat he suggests
boils down to a critique o the shit o policymaking with respect to the Persian Gul rom
the \hite louse to the United Nations and its Secretary General Koi Annan. 1he problem
identiied in that transition is that the United Nations is not willing to apply orce to Iraq,
nor is it sering the interests o the United States.
68


1he charge that the United Nations is unwilling to under any circumstance use orce is
played out by Bolton as a direct attack on Secretary General Annan. 1he argument is that o
appeasement, that any negotiation with Saddam lussein is in act strengthening the Iraqi
position and gies the regime legitimacy, thus allowing it to urther chip away at the
sanctions the coalition orces and the international community imposed ollowing the Gul
\ar.
69
Secretary General Annan is een depicted as a marionette dancing at the skilled hands
o Saddam lussein as his puppeteer.
0



66
Lditorial, 1he Lnd o Containment` !ee/t, tavaara, December 1 199, Page 13
6
Zalmay M. Khalilzad and Paul \olowitz, Oerthrow lim` !ee/t, tavaara, December 1, Pages 14-15
lrederick \. Kagan, Not By Air Alone` !ee/t, tavaara, December 1, Pages 15-16
Peter \. Rodman, U.N. Paralysis` !ee/t, tavaara, December 1, Pages 1-18
lred Barnes, 1he GOP, M.I.A.` !ee/t, tavaara, December 1, Pages18-19
68
John R. Bolton, Adrit in the Gul` !ee/t, tavaara, March 23 1998, Pages 10-14
69
John R. Bolton, Koi lour` !ee/t, tavaara, March 9 1998, Pages 12-13
0
John R. Bolton, Adrit in the Gul` !ee/t, tavaara, March 23 1998, Page 12
Alexander Ohrn

- 32 -
Against the alleiation o the economic sanctions against Iraq that were imposed during the
Gul \ar, Bolton argues that the purpose o the sanctions is to assist the UN Special
Commission and the weapon inspection programme. loweer, Bolton argues that the
international community and the Clinton administration ails to understand this mutually
supportie role o sanctions and inspections, and when iewed as discrete programmes the
conclusion that economic sanctions are highly repressie and the cause o suering or
innocent Iraqis is close at hand. Rather than alleiating sanctions, Bolton argues that the
suering is caused by the policy choices o the Baath regime in that their allocation o
reenue rom oil-or-ood` schemes is discriminating and instrumental. 1hese choices are
thus rewarded by the United Nations when sanctions urther undermined.
1


1he United Nations is not the only party inoled that is criticised by Bolton. 1he US
Congress along with the Clinton administration are both accused o an inability to act. 1o
Bolton, Congress has done little to reprimand a president that is ailing to act in the interest
o his country.
2
In short, what is at risk in negotiating with an adersary is credibility, and
Bolton clearly ears that this is once again an attribute that American oreign policy is losing.

I we are seen bending the knee to Iraq, our credibility, restored by President
Reagan`s rearmament and President Bush`s military and diplomatic conduct o
Desert Storm, will again be tarnished. 1o allies and opponents alike, it will seem
that the United States, in a lashback to the Carter administration 20 years ago, is
undergoing another humiliation in the desert.`
3


1o Bolton then, Saddam lussein is clearly winning the game played between him, President
Clinton and Secretary General Koi Annan. le suggests that there are three approaches to
dealing with Iraq, two o which are doomed to ail. Containment`, deterring weapons
prolieration and limiting such access, and the so called \hack-a-Mole` approach, the
Clinton administration policy o support or weapons inspection and economic sanctions
enorced by occasional air strikes when the aboe is disobeyed, are to Bolton lawed and
documented ailures. Rather, his argument lends itsel to the position that Saddam lussein`s
regime must be oerthrown.
4


In Robert Kagan`s comparison o Saddam lussein o the 1990s to Adol litler o the
1930s, he draws the conclusion that .nothing succeeds like success.`
5
, and notes that
this is not only true or dictators, as litler himsel had noted, but also to superpowers.
Kagan thus suggests that a irm oreign policy with respect to Iraq and a .successul
interention.`, would not only sere to change the regime o Iraq, but also to
.reolutionize the strategic situation in the Middle Last, in ways both tangible and
intangible, and all to the beneit o American interests`
6
.


1
John R. Bolton, 1he U.N. Rewards Saddam` !ee/t, tavaara, December 15 1998
2
John R. Bolton, Congress Versus Iraq` !ee/t, tavaara, January 19 1998, Pages 16-1
3
John R. Bolton, Saddam \ins` !ee/t, tavaara, August 24 1998, Pages 14
4
ibid. pp. 13-15
John R. Bolton, Surrendering to Saddam` !ee/t, tavaara, September 1998, Pages 1-18
5
Robert Kagan, Saddam`s Impending Victory` !ee/t, tavaara, lebruary 2 1998, Page 22
6
ibid. p.25
Alexander Ohrn

- 33 -
IEHEI' &>L><;>'
I it is not already clear rom the discussion aboe o how 1be !ee/t, tavaara has written o
select countries during the period 1995-2001, they do not perceie the world to be a
particularly sae place or American interests. In an article in 199 reiewing the Deense
Department`s Quadrennial Deense Reiew, lrederick \. Kagan argues that this report is
simply not based on reality, but on wishul thinking. le argues, and this is indicatie o the
general position o 1be !ee/t, tavaara, as is urther compounded by the examples below,
that the assumption that the world is a relatiely peaceul place since the end o the Cold
\ar, and that this proides a strategic pause` or American military inolement in oreign
policy, is simply wrong. Such an understanding o the world, according to Kagan, leads to
the dismantling o US military capability, which is in turn urther exacerbated by the oer
reliance on technology to replace bodies on the ground. 1he strategic pause` is to Kagan i
anything an opportunity to transorm the US military organisation, a costly but to him
necessary enterprise, rather than an opportunity to shit spending elsewhere.

In an editorial 1be !ee/t, tavaara notes some disparities in American politics with regards to
deence spending and American oreign policy in the camps o conseraties and liberals
alike. \hilst conseraties during the Cold \ar had aoured an aggressie containment o
the Soiet Union and had been willing to let this be eident in deence spending, they hae
since then backed away rom actie interentionism. Rather, the editors note that their
contemporary conseraties are more likely to adance a military intended to be used
exclusiely in deence o ital national security interests` while remaining prepared to spend
money on a deence they seem unprepared to put to use. 1he liberals on the other hand hae
a history o non-interentionist ideas that hae been abandoned in aour o what the editors
call neo-\ilsonian` oreign policy, that is interentions to stop humanitarian disasters such
as the ciil war in Bosnia, amine in Somalia and genocide in Rwanda and Burundi. Contrary
to the conseraties, the liberals are adocating interentions without proiding the military
with the necessary deence budget to accommodate such a oreign policy programme.
8


1his is reiterated by Robert Kagan who argues that deence spending is not guided by
studies o US strategic requirements, but by a need or a balanced budget. Rather he argues
that since the all o the Soiet Union, policymakers seem to lie under the imagination that
lrancis lukuyama`s idea o a world o liberal democracy or an unoreseeable uture,
whereas Kagan argues that such a world is ery much a work in progress, and that
.presering the current beneolent international enironment may be less expensie than
ighting the Cold \ar, but not that much less`.
9


lrederick \. Kagan points out that in the discussion oer deence spending, it is important
to think our dimensionally, that is to consider time a actor. As such to neglect the armed
orces, and an actie oreign policy programme, in times o relatie prosperity and peace is to
also neglect those armed orces or an unoreseeable and unpredictable uture.
80

lrederick \. Kagan, \ishul 1hinking on \ar` !ee/t, tavaara, December 15 199, Pages 2-29
8
Gary Schmitt, 1he Deense Deicit` !ee/t, tavaara, March 18 1996, Pages 30-32
Lditorial, Spend More on Deense` !ee/t, tavaara, July 29 1996, Pages 9-10
9
Robert Kagan, Don`t Cut Deense` !ee/t, tavaara, May 12 199, Pages 14-16
80
lrederick \. Kagan, 1he Armed lorces \e Desere` !ee/t, tavaara, June 1 1998, Pages 2-29
Alexander Ohrn

- 34 -
In seeral articles it is argued that the need or strategic superiority is ital and that the cost
to achiee such through a transormation o the military organisation cannot be aoided, but
that any cost to achiee national security is a cost worth while. It is also within this context
that the American missile deence system, going back to the Reagan Administration, is
discussed, namely as a strategic necessity.
81


Charles Krauthammer links the discussion o a missile deence system to the ailure o arms
control. At its simplest leel the argument goes that non prolieration treaties are respected
by the good guys` who do not pose a threat to begin with, but breached by the bad guys`
who are likely to use their weapons o mass destruction.
82


1he George \. Bush Administration coered by this portion o the paper did not aoid
attack either on deence issues. \illiam Kristol and Robert Kagan questions George \.
Bush`s commitment to deence spending, citing a decision to not ollow through on a
promised research and deelopment budget increase. 1hey repeat the idea that to reorm and
adapt the military to new threats signiicant spending is required, and that it is the
responsibility o the US president to secure such unds.
83


Gary Schmitt and 1om Donnelly present the recently elected president`s deence position in
a positie light, arguing that in making national deence an issue in the presidential campaign
and choosing Donald Rumseld and secretary o deence, the George \. Bush
Administration is in a good position to honour its proposed policy programme.
84


loweer, in a particularly interesting editorial, Robert Kagan and \illiam Kristol urge
Donald Rumseld and Paul \olowitz to resign in protest against the deterioration o the
deence budget. 1he criticism o the George \. Bush Administration is obious, as Kagan
and Kristol argues that at the current spending the military cannot be expected to adapt or
the uture, but in the best o cases merely be maintained whilst conditions around it changes,
thus rendering it eentually incapable o perorming its intended tasks. 1his is also an
editorial where writers such as Kagan and Kristol cement their position as Neocons` in
statements such as:

1o presere our superpower status, to remain the guarantor o international
peace and stability, and to deend our own ital interests, the United States must
be able to ight and deeat dierent aggressors in dierent parts o the world-
and at the same time.`
85



81
lrederick \. Kagan, More Bang And More Bucks` !ee/t, tavaara, Jan 25 1999, Pages 31-33
Matthew Rees, Going Ballistic` !ee/t, tavaara, lebruary 8 1999, Pages 14-15
Daid 1ell, or the Lditors, Spend it on Deense` !ee/t, tavaara, August 9 1999, Pages 11-12
Lawrence l. Kaplan, \ho Now Loathes the Military` !ee/t, tavaara , September 2 1999, Pages 13-16
Robert Kagan, or the Lditors, Bush`s Missile Deense 1riumph` !ee/t, tavaara, June 26 2000, Pages 11-12
82
Charles Krauthammer, Arms Control: 1he Lnd o an Illusion` !ee/t, tavaara, Noember 1 1999,
Pages 21-2
83
\illiam Kristol and Robert Kagan, No Deense` !ee/t, tavaara, lebruary 19 2001, Pages 9-10
84
Gary Schmitt and 1om Donnelly, Spend More on Deense - Now` !ee/t, tavaara, January 22 2001,
Pages 25-26
85
Robert Kagan and \illiam Kristol, No Deense` !ee/t, tavaara, July 23 2001, Page 12
Alexander Ohrn

- 35 -
1om Donnelly acknowledges that the George \. Bush Administration inherited a crippled
military rom the consecutie Clinton Administrations, yet emphasises in his commentary on
the deence budget that this problem is compounded rather than remedied by the limited
expansion o military spending.
86


James \ebb criticises what he perceies as a harmul implementation o political correctness
in the military. 1he issue under attack is the reason or admitting women into the armed
orces, a reason that according to \ebb is a oolhardy pursuit o equality. \ebb raises the
traditional issues, that introducing women in the military complicates the expedition o
military justice, by introducing a double standard, as well as that it complicates relations
between co-workers in isolated locations and pressed situations. loweer, where he ocuses
his critique is on the way the pursuit o equality is used as an attack on military culture.
8


1his attack he says, goes back 30 years to the Vietnam \ar were the elite was exempt rom
serice by a drat system that did not aect those enrolled in higher education. In \ebb`s
argument, this led to an emasculation o the social and political elite, which in turn led to a
lack o commitment to the military and an attitude that the opinions and perspecties o
military commanders were not o signiicance in reorming the military. 1he result, according
to \ebb, was the aorementioned introduction o women into the military organisation in
the pursuit o equality without regard or the practical problems. 1o \ebb this was clearly a
mistake, and he argues that policymakers need to start listening to military commanders.
loweer, the underlying logic o \ebb`s argument is that the military should not be the
scene o social engineering experiments, and that its role should irst and oremost be that o
achieing oreign policy ambitions and proiding a national deence.
88


1he problem or the military to maintain itsel as a discrete cultural entity, undamentally
separated rom the wider American culture is reiterated by A.J. Baceich in an article on a
emale Air lorce oicer discharged as a consequence o, amongst other issues, illicit sexual
behaiour. Baceich`s point is that the case illustrates a widening gap between ciilian and
military purposes. 1hat sexual liberalism is on the rise in ciilian society is taken or granted,
but what is pointed out is that the military`s sexual prudishness and adocacy o restraint is a
recent phenomenon most likely a consequence o it regarding itsel as inerse mirror image
o ciilian society. Sexual license, not restraint, has always been the hallmark o the warrior
class in all cultures. 1he problem that Baceich then that is emphasised is the need or
military proessionalism, or a military culture` that is acknowledged not only within the
military organisation but by ciilian elites as well.
89
1be !ee/t, tavaara eatures similar
arguments on other cases o disputed gender discrimination.
90


1he issue o women in the armed orces is howeer not the only way in which writers or
1be !ee/t, tavaara perceies the emasculation o the military organisation in recent years.
Quoting sensitiity training, the lack o respect or the traditions o combat units, and
political correctness as to how drill instructors are allowed to handle recruits, Matt Labash

86
1om Donnelly, Cheap lawks` !ee/t, tavaara, June 11 2001, Pages 14-15
8
James \ebb, 1he \ar on the Military Culture` !ee/t, tavaara, January 18 199, Pages 1-22
88
ibid.
89
A.J. Baceich, 1he De-Moralization o the Military` !ee/t, tavaara, June 9 199, Pages 24-26
90
Matt Labash, Pulling \ings O the \arriors` !ee/t, tavaara, May 18 1998, Pages 22-30
Kate O`Beirne, Babes in Arms` !ee/t, tavaara, May 15 2000, Pages 36-38
Alexander Ohrn

- 36 -
paints a sorry picture o the US military in 2001. In short, the argument goes that the trends
in ciilian society o a celebration o indiiduality and sel expression, inescapably leaks into
the armed orces as its recruits and ciilian policymakers are moulded by the society around
them. Conersely, the units praised by Labash as haing been able to maintain their identity
o a strong and proud warrior class, such as the US Marine Corps, are also the ones that do
not ail to ill their recruitment quotas. In Labash`s argument the military has responded to
the problems o illing recruitment targets by adapting the serice to suit the wishes o its
target market, youth ages 18-24, creating the identity crisis that Labash identiies as at the
heart o the issue.
91


1he reasoning aboe, that the warrior culture` o the armed orces is being eroded, be it
through the integration o women, or a wider emasculation as ciilian society leaes an
increasingly larger ootprint, is requently reiterated in 1be !ee/t, tavaara.
92


In summary then the neoconseraties o 1be !ee/t, tavaara iew the role o the military as
a guarantor o US supremacy and global hegemon. It is repeatedly emphasised that only
American military power and a willingness to use it can proide national security or the
United States, as well as encourage a beneolent world order. 1he idea is that liberal
democracy, peace and stability and its prolieration is a work in progress, a process that is
not spontaneous but created. One could o course iew it as an enorced or coerced process
towards peace and stability o a Roman model, but that would ail to encompass the emic
perspectie, that the writers or 1be !ee/t, tavaara beliee in the project o creating a
peaceul world order. No doubt are they ully aware that the interests o the United States
are not always congruent with those o other countries, not necessarily een with those o
their allies, hence the need or strategic supremacy. 1hey do howeer not iew themseles as
dominator, but rather as leader, as hegemon rather than Lmpire.

\hilst this position is intact in the post-September 11 period coered by this paper, it o
course becomes more ocused, and the enemy is gien a name. lence idea that the 1990s,
ollowing the end o the Cold \ar was only a temporary period o relatie peace and
prosperity requently acknowledged by 1be !ee/t, tavaara, and not a sustainable new world
order, was conirmed by the eents on September 11 2001. 1he threats discussed aboe
became all the more imaginable and assumed a sense o reality, and whether or not the
neoconseratie analysis as it was presented in 1be !ee/t, tavaara or in any o the other
media outlets or neoconseratie ideas were indeed correct is questionable, and there is
certainly no such consensus, quite the contrary. loweer, their analysis has seemed to gain
signiicant traction and their position on Iraq is oten cited as the reason the George \.
Bush Administration pursued a military strike against Iraq in 2003.

1his paper does not seek to come to a erdict o the alidity o contemporary oreign policy
issues, and to discuss the eents that hae ollowed the attacks on the 1win 1owers and the
Pentagon in 2001 is not appropriate in this section o this paper as it deals with issues not
tainted by those eents. Beore we conclude the period 1995-2001 it is prudent to discuss a

91
Matt Labash, 1he New Army` !ee/t, tavaara, April 30 2001, Pages 20-29
92
1ucker Carlson, Lmasculating the Marines` !ee/t, tavaara, lebruary 1 199, Pages 2-29
Matt Labash, low the Military Indoctrinates Diersity` !ee/t, tavaara, August 18 199, Pages 23-2
Alexander Ohrn

- 3 -
series o issues not related to oreign policy in order to illustrate the width o
neoconseratie thinking in 1be !ee/t, tavaara during this period.

Alexander Ohrn

- 38 -
IEHEP' .CN8DN:8>9:ND7G' '
In recent years the George \. Bush Administration has been criticised or taking American
oreign policy in a unilateralist direction and or shunning multilateral endeaours. In this
brie section the position o 1be !ee/t, tavaara is outlined and in short it can be said that it
is positie towards multilateralism when and only when it allows the United States to assume
a leadership position, but highly critical in cases where the United States are expected to
partly gie up its soereignty.

An issue that arose in the post-Cold \ar era was the possibility o an expansion o NA1O
to include some o the ormer Soiet states. 1he editors o 1be !ee/t, tavaara consider this
expansion a .logical ollow-on to our long and successul struggle against Soiet
communism.`
93
, and they argue that such an expansion is a natural step or America to
take in securing peace in Lurope. In short, they perceie the expansion o NA1O`s sphere
o inluence as a way o extending American inluence, not only in Lurope where the
expansion would occur, but also in the rest o the world:

1he enlargement o NA1O, in short, is only one piece in an oerall strategy o
bolstering and extending America`s global leadership.`
94


Jerey Gedmin sees the role o the United States as NA1O`s unquestioned leader. loweer,
he questions whether American politicians are able to handle the responsibility and suggests
that whereas the typical American doubts about the commitment o its Luropean allies do
not seem presently justiied, this is not the current threat to NA1O, but rather the United
States unwillingness to commit ground orces in their joint enterprises. In this sense Gedmin
argues that a leader that is not willing to risk their troops is not likely to be ollowed.
95


1he same attitude can be seen in reerse, in their lack o appreciation or the International
Criminal Court ,ICC,, and other international bodies attempting to negotiate multilaterally
according to a set o rules not under the discretionary control o the United States.

In an article titled 1be vtervatiovat Crivivat Covrt Mv.t Die, Daid lrum explains the problem
or the United States in accepting an international body with legislatie power oer American
actions. 1he problem is simple, it challenges American soereignty. loweer, in this case the
term soereignty requires some explanation as it does not only include legislatie and
executie power oer their domestic territory as the term is typically approximated, but in
the case o lrum American soereignty also includes the right to deend American interests
abroad. le neatly sums up his iew on both American internationalism and incompatibility
with the ICC:

Real internationalism is, now and always, internationalism that deends and
indicates American interests and American constitutional alues. It`s no paradox

93
Lditorial, NA1O: 1he More the Merrier` !ee/t, tavaara, July 21 199, Page 9
94
ibid. p.10
95
Jerey Gedmin, 1oasting NA1O` !ee/t, tavaara, April 19 1999, Pages 14-16
Alexander Ohrn

- 39 -
at all: 1hose who most want America to play a constructie role in the world
must most ehemently insist that the International Criminal Court be junked.`
96


In the aboe cited article and others the problem o the phrasing o the ICC charter are
expanded upon. 1he idea, according to the writers o 1be !ee/t, tavaara, is to be able to
prosecute oicials ordering military attacks on ciilian targets. loweer, many actions o
peacekeeping orces, along with American orces pursuing American interests, take place in
ciilian settings where ciilian casualties are an unortunate reality. lence, they suggest that
albeit claims o the unlikely prosecuting o American sericemen in the ICC, there is a clear
disparity between the word o the law and its spirit. 1hey suggest that whereas it is easy to
distinguish between war criminals` in a mundane setting, it is less clear in the legislatie
terminology o the ICC.
9


In the case o the ICC`s actions against ormer Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, Jeremy
Rabkin identiies the potential or the ICC charter as a tool or international conlict as
opposed to diplomacy. \ith the loose charter o the ICC and the many grey zones where
interpretation dictates who is a war criminal` and who is merely a statesman, many
neoconseraties ear that the ICC proides militarily weak, yet hostile, countries an
opportunity to attack American oicials. lrom their perspectie, the United States would
hae the incentie and the capability to retaliate in orce against any country seeking to
prosecute American statesmen or sericemen. In short, their take on international law is that
it is best let to politicians to deine as needed rather than leae it in the hands o lawyers and
judges as this would restrain uture goernment responses to unoreseeable scenarios, thus
hindering American soereignty.
98


1he neoconseratie attitude towards multilateralism in the second hal o the 1990s as
ound in 1be !ee/t, tavaara is quite simply summarised as resered towards any multilateral
project that does not recognise the United States as a leading igure. In the two cases
discussed here, those o NA1O and the International Criminal Court, that attitude is
obious. In the case o NA1O where they identiy the United States as its undisputed leader,
the writers o 1be !ee/t, tavaara are positie and conclude that it can still, in the post Cold
\ar period, sere the interests o the United States through its leadership. In the case o the
ICC howeer, which charter was written explicitly to aoid any country in an executie
leadership position, that attitude leads to a dierent conclusion. As the United States is
denied leadership, or een the eto right which to many neoconseraties is the only thing
making American inolement in the United Nations tolerable, they conclude that the ICC is
certainly not beneicial to American interests.



96
Daid lrum, 1he International Criminal Court Must Die` !ee/t, tavaara, August 10,August 1 1998, Page 29
9
ibid. pp.2-29
Jeremy Rabkin, 1his Court \ould Be Criminal` !ee/t, tavaara, June 26 2000, Pages 19-20
98
Llliot Abrams, lree Pinochet` !ee/t, tavaara, Noember 2 1998, Pages 15-16
Jeremy Rabkin, lirst 1hey Came lor Pinochet.` !ee/t, tavaara, Noember 12 1998, Pages 23-29
Alexander Ohrn

- 40 -
IEI' +F>'#CN8C9>'0:9W'+F>'.B9:N'4:69D;'BL'*G>9D;:'ATTUOHVVA'
IEIEA' "=C;:8DB<'
1he major educational issue adocated in 1be !ee/t, tavaara is that o school choice. School
choice does to a signiicant extent in the American case mean support or Catholic schools,
and in the debate around educational reorm, which reached all the way to the Supreme
Court as it was seen to iolate the lirst Amendment to the American constitution in that it
prohibits the goernment to inance religious actiities. Michael \. McConnell turns this
argument on its head and argues that the lirst Amendment was not, at the time o its
composing, intended to prohibit or at least impede religious groups per se, but rather to
prohibit or impede special interest groups. At the time o the political battles that led to the
amendment the concern was or the undue inluence o immigrants and Roman Catholicism,
but as McConnell argues the problem today is the reersed. 1he educational proession, in a
position to unduly inluence the youth is according to McConnell radically secular:

1hey are coninced that teaching their own cherished belies in the public
schools ,racial and gender equality, tolerance o dierse liestyles, and so orth,
is an education in true Americanism,` which is air and neutral toward all
groups in society, while nonpublic schools are sectarian.` In Justice Brennan`s
words, public schools impart a heritage common to all American groups,`
while nonpublic schools indoctrinate` children in diisie or separatist`
ideologies.`
99


1hus McConnell argues that whereas other \estern democracies hae embraced educational
choice as a guarantee o pluralism, the educational proessionals is to him the ones naely
belieing that a secular perspectie can by itsel guarantee that pluralism.
100


Some o the suggestions made by writers in 1be !ee/t, tavaara on educational reorm echo
strongly what the early neoconseraties or the conseratie moement at the time, it
proides it with arguments that are no dogmatic, but persuasie nonetheless. In two articles
by Chester L. linn rom Manhattan Institute, the second o which is in collaboration with
Nina Shokraii Rees rom the leritage loundation, propositions are made or reorm o the
educational system. 1he particular issue that is being conronted is the same idea that the
early neoconseraties opposed in social engineering, namely that a system o such
magnitude is ar too complex to be run rom top to bottom. 1he suggestion is to maintain
public support or the educational system but shed some o the red tape, ocus on the
indiidual child and a transparent National Assessment scheme.
101


An example o such reorm is that o Jeb Bush`s llorida where a oucher system has been
applied to combat the poor quality o public schools. 1he system allows children attending
some o the worst a grant i they change to an alternatie school, including priate and
religious schools. \hat is problematic with this solution as a conseratie strategy is that
1ucker Carlson points out that i only passed popular scrutiny because Jeb Bush was able to

99
Michael \. McConnell, School Choice in America` !ee/t, tavaara, December 21 1998, Page 25
100
ibid. pp. 21-25
101
Chester L. linn Jr., Getting Serious About Schools` !ee/t, tavaara, January 25 1999, Pages 2-30
Chester L. linn Jr. and Nina Shokraii Rees, llex 1hose Ld Muscles` !ee/t, tavaara, April 5,12 1999, Page 1
Alexander Ohrn

- 41 -
aoid addressing it as a oucher` system. \hilst Carlson acknowledges that it would likely
not hae passed in llorida had the general population thought o it as a oucher system,
gien the stigma attached to the concept, he still maintains that in the long term a political
strategy is not sustainable i it cannot be adocated in plain text.
102


Chester L. linn Jr., the most requent education commentator at 1be !ee/t, tavaara,
realises in 1999 that the propositions he had adocated oer the past years were not going to
pass in Congress. Rather, he argues that the educational system is likely to remain intact in
the oreseeable uture, or until an education ocused president is elected. linn`s prediction
rom the same year is that George \. Bush would be such a candidate.
103


1o the contributors to 1be !ee/t, tavaara the public school system is ailing because it has
the wrong priorities. Rather than ocusing on teaching skills such as at an elementary leel
reading and writing, sentence structure and grammar, the public educational system seres a
dierent agenda. In short it promotes the alues o the liberal middle class, the alues o the
liberal arts uniersity educated teachers and policymakers.
104
Some o the contributors blame
the uniersities or producing biased teachers, more interested in building multiculturally
minded citizens than equipping the children with the tools they need to become productie
citizens.
105


1he ailure o the public educational system is underscored by the popularity o scholarships
that inance alternatie, priate and religious schools. In the seeral articles raising literacy as
a major ailure o the public educational system, alternaties are raised that whilst they do
not seek to sole the problem by increased public unding, they don`t adocate a decrease in
unding neither. Rather, they point to cases where parental inolement, such as in choosing
what school to send their children to hae had positie results. 1hey also point to the better
track record o Catholic schools in terms o literacy and other indicators, and as an
alternatie already in place as opposed to the priate schools a oucher system would
generate in the longer run.
106


In short the problems that 1be !ee/t, tavaara has raised concerning education are airly
conentional. 1hey are concerned with the knowledge basis o primary and secondary school
graduates in the hard` subjects such as the natural sciences, mathematics and aboe all
Lnglish grammar and spelling. \hat is less conentional is where they perceie said problem
to hae originated, namely rom postmodernism which would hae it that truth does not
exist and that aours perspecties oer acts. 1his argument o course closely resembles that
raised by the early neoconseraties about the inluence o the New Class` and their
nihilism.

102
1ucker Carlson, Bush Beats the Blob` !ee/t, tavaara, May 1 1999, Pages 21-24
103
Chester L. linn Jr., A Real Lducation President` !ee/t, tavaara, September 20 1999, Pages 28-29
Chester L. linn Jr., 1he GOP Congress lails Again` !ee/t, tavaara, Noember 29 1999, Pages 14-16
104
Christopher Caldwell, Gore Curriculum` !ee/t, tavaara, June 1999, Pages 15-1
Catherine Siepp, Public School Conidential!` !ee/t, tavaara, October 16 2000 Pages 26-29
105
Lynne V. Cheney, \ho 1eaches the 1eachers` !ee/t, tavaara, August 9 1999, Pages 14-1
106
John J. DiIulio Jr., My School Choice: Literacy lirst` !ee/t, tavaara, October 19 1998, Pages 23-26
Ldmund Lynch, 1he Million Student March` !ee/t, tavaara, May 3 1999, Pages 1-18
Chester L. linn Jr., Bruno V. Manno, & Gregg Vanourek, `\hat i all Schools were Schools o Choice` !ee/t, tavaara,
June 19 2000, Pages 26-29

Alexander Ohrn

- 42 -
IEIEH' *6B98DB<':<='"C8F:<:7D:'
1he debate oer abortion is a requently reoccurring issue in the magazine and has been so
since the ery beginning. Another issue that is closely akin to abortion is that o euthanasia.
\hilst euthanasia is discussed less requently it is also a topic that 1be !ee/t, tavaara is not
prepared to let go o, and it is intimately linked to abortion in the neoconseratie analysis.

In the editorial o the second eer issue o the magazine, an editorial entitled 1aking
Abortion Seriously`, Daid 1ell urges the reader and the Republican Party to reocus the
abortion debate to the issue that an abortion is the taking o lie. 1his, he says, is an
opportunity or the Republican Party to rejuenate itsel and allow its constituency to see its
true colours by taking a irm pro-lie position. le argues that the ashion at the time was or
politicians to wae the issue around in a non-committing way so as to not oend either their
pro-lie constituents or pro-choice donors. Rather, he argues, the task o Republican
politicians should be to work actiely to change American alues on the issue, by themseles
being committed to the pro-lie cause.
10


1wo weeks later, Paul Greenberg compares abortion to slaery and picks up on their
common breach o the oundation o the American legal system:

1hose unalienable rights to lie and liberty Mr. Jeerson mentioned in the
Declaration seem to hae been eclipsed by a sad emphasis on the pursuit o
happiness. And or all the happiness that the unbridled right to an abortion is
supposed to make possible, no political question since slaery seems so heay
with guilt, and its denial.`
108


1his culture o death` to use Greenberg`s title, reers back to the early neoconseraties`
concern with nihilism as the consequence o the corrupted liberalism o the New Class`.
loweer, Greenberg pushes the point urther and talks o a slippery slope` that is not new
in human history, and along which the pursuit o happiness has slid beore. Nazi Germany
he points out was a consequence o enlightenment eugenics o the 1920s rom where he
picks the concept .tiebev.vvrertev ebev., or lie not worth liing.`
109
.

It is within this context o a slippery slope` that 1be !ee/t, tavaara`s conrontation with the
issue o euthanasia is interesting. In a ierce critique o Judge Stephen Reinhardt`s, a rational
suicide adocate, deence o a constitutional amendment dealing with the right to die`,
Daid 1ell links the possibility to end the lie o a patient suering terminal illness to ending
the lie o not only an unborn child, but more importantly an inant born with physical or
mental disabilities. 1his is clearly not what the law intends, but it is precisely how these
arguments o moral degradation goes, that a well intended act today has deastating legal
implications tomorrow.
110


1he debate oer partial birth abortion led 1be !ee/t, tavaara to bring back the discussion o
eugenics into that o abortion, as they argued that the current abortion practice allowed or a

10
Daid 1ell, 1aking Abortion Seriously` !ee/t, tavaara, September 25 1995, Pages 5-
108
Paul Greenberg, Culture o Death` !ee/t, tavaara, October 9 1995, Page 14
109
ibid. pp.14-16
110
Daid 1ell, Luthanasia lorror` !ee/t, tavaara, March 2 1996, Pages 9-11
Alexander Ohrn

- 43 -
selectie process that leads to unproportional abortions o handicapped children. Prenatal
testing oers the beneit o allowing parents to plan or a problematic birth ahead, but
1ucker Carlson argues that in reality it is chiely used to spot physically and mentally
handicapped children which subsequently leads to the choice o late abortion.
111


loweer, the neoconseratie position presented within 1be !ee/t, tavaara is not only one
o pro-lie. Daid lrum presents a position that embraces a pro-choice position, albeit
dierent rom mainstream ideas o pro-choice. lis concern is that the Republican Party has
long been dominated by a minority o pro-lie adocates whilst the igures or the opinions
o Republican oters suggests that there is a pro-choice majority. 1his he understands as an
indicator that the situation is not one o black or white. le suggests that most Republican
oters think dierently o abortion and in particular on legal abortion than the pro-choice
adocates and supporters o the Democratic Party. \hereas they seek a constitutional
amendment to guarantee the mother`s right to choose, lrum suggests that the Republican
oter`s pro-choice idea is more complex. Lssentially what lrum argues is that the Republican
pro-choice majority recognises that an abortion in the ery beginning o a pregnancy is
dierent rom a later abortion.
112


On the same track, Noemie Lmery suggests an approach or the Republican Party that
allows it to regain a iable position within the debate that in turn allows it to counter the
liberal pro-choice terminology that Lmery sees as undermining the moral abric, that is to
conceal abortion behind a medical terminology that she sees as .crated to kill moral
neres`
113
.

Rather her approach or the Republican position, that embraces the majority that is in aour
o legal abortion o some sort, is as ollows:

1. 1he Republican party is the party that thinks abortion is wrong. \e say it is
wrong, and we plan to reduce it through aggressie, though oluntary and non-
coercie, means.

2. \e regard our disagreements as disputes about tactics, oer means to one end.

3. \e intend to address abortion not as one issue only, but as a symptom and
cause o a social disorder, a sign o a rayed and decaying cultural context, in
which the alue o lie is at risk.`
114


As this is a position designed to combined idealism with the pragmatism o day-to-day
politics, rom the perspectie o a commentator not in a high-powered political position, the
actions on the political ield are somewhat less idealistic.


111
1ucker Carlson, Lugenics, American Style: 1he Abortion o Down Syndrome Babies` !ee/t, tavaara, December 2
1996, Pages 20-25
112
Daid lrum, \hy Pro-Choice lailed` !ee/t, tavaara, December 4 1995, Page 9
113
Noemie Lmery, Abortion and the Republican Party: A New Approach` !ee/t, tavaara, December 25 1995, Page 29
114
ibid. p.2
Alexander Ohrn

- 44 -
In a special issue on the issue that won`t go away`, Daid 1ell, lred Barnes and \illiam
Kristol all hae articles speciying how a pro-lie position can be used to urther the
Republican Party. \hat Kristol argues rom a point o statistics and 1ell using examples is
that the problem with a pro-lie ocus or the Republican Party is that whilst the American
population are pro-lie, or at least not completely pro-choice, they are largely ignorant as to
how radical the current abortion legislation is. lred Barnes shows how widening the
discussion to include partial birth abortion would oer considerable partisan adantages.
115

1o Barnes this is a problem caused by contemporary media`s pro-choice alignment. le
argues that i reporters were to spend as much time and eort dissecting the pro-choice
position as they do with the pro-lie camp the situation would most likely be dierent.
116


Dealing urther with abortion in a bipartisan setting is Matthew Rees, pointing towards Al
Gore`s changing position on the issue. Rees outlines Gore`s political career as one starting
with a pro-lie position and changing towards s weak pro-choice position as the political
circumstances changed around him.
11


In short, the abortion issue as it is dealt with in 1be !ee/t, tavaara can be seen to be diided
between two only partially oerlapping perspecties, those o ethics and politics. On the one
hand, writers in the magazines hae argued against abortion on the grounds that it leads
down a slippery slope where grae horrors lurk at the bottom. On the other, which is
arguably the dominant, the writers debate ways in which a political perspectie on abortion
can be incorporated into the Republican politicking position, where the aim is not to appeal
to ideals but to orge a position that appeals to the widest possible constituency. Returning in
2000, Lmery argues that thanks to the general public`s transition towards a pro-lie position
the two positions become combinable, that Republican pro-choice adocates should take a
stand against the more radical pro-abortion position o the political let, thus uniying the
Republican Party: 1here should be a political price to be paid or being too careless with
lie. Republicans ought to make Democrats pay it.`
118



115
Daid 1ell, 1he Issue 1hey \ant to Go Away`, lred Barnes, Partial Birth Politics`, \illiam Kristol, Roe Must Go`,
!ee/t, tavaara, January 19 1998, Pages -12
116
lred Barnes, A Pro-Choice GOP` !ee/t, tavaara, March 29 1999, Pages 14-15
11
Matthew Rees, Al Gore`s Great Abortion llip-llop` !ee/t, tavaara, March 29 1999, Pages 2-29
118
Noemie Lmery, An Appeal to GOP Pro-Choicers` !ee/t, tavaara, July 3 2000, Page 29
Alexander Ohrn

- 45 -
IEIEI' #9DG>':<=';:KD8:N'KC<D7FG><8'
Another ingredient in what can be labelled moral decay is the prealence o crime. 1his
section explores how 1be !ee/t, tavaara discusses the arious elements o crime preention,
deterrence and rehabilitation schemes.

In 199 contributors to 1be !ee/t, tavaara does acknowledge that the 1990s saw
improements in crime rates, but they maintain a position analogous to that o their
contemporary Americans that crime is one o the major problems in society. 1his does not
mean that they gie credit to the authorities or bringing crime down, but there are
competing arguments as to why crime has dropped and suggestions as to how to bring it
down urther.

\hilst the Republicans lost the presidential post in 1992, Michael Barone still attributes the
decrease in crime rates to key Republican ictories. By seizing control o Congress in 1994,
thus enabling them to reorm welare and Rudi Giuliani`s Zero 1olerance` policy as mayor
o New \ork, Barone argues that Republican`s managed to actually change the character o
society in a way that reduced not only crime rates but also welare dependency.
119


John J. DiIulio Jr. is less enthusiastic about the drop in crime rates, and his argument is that
they are merely a pyrrhic ictory and nothing to celebrate. le suggests that crime has
dropped as a consequence o a hard-line public policy combined with citizens choosing to
protect themseles by gathering in priately guarded gated communities. lis sentiment
towards the quality o lie under such conditions is clear in the ollowing statement:

An America in which crime is partially conquered by millions o citizens`
moing or locking themseles away rom the rest o society while oer 5 million
criminals are in custody on any gien day may be the best we can do or now, but
it is hardly a state o aairs desering o celebration.`
120


By 2000 Andrew Peyton 1homas notes that or the irst time since the 1960s crime is not
perceied as a national issue in the presidential election campaigning. \hat Peyton 1homas
suggests is that crime could sere as a key issue in generating otes or the Republican Party
i conseratie politicians had the courage to discuss policy in their own terms without
eeling obliged to incorporate liberal concerns into the argument. A hard-line policy on
crime would distinguish conseratie politicians rom the Democrats and reinigorate
crime` as a key electoral issue.
121


\ith regards to criminals sering prison sentences, 1be !ee/t, tavaara is aggraated by a
court ruling in 1998 that allow inmates to sue the correctional department on charges o
discrimination due to handicaps. As the writers predicted, and conirmed, the possibility has
put prisons in an impossible position, where the threat o law-suits make them ulnerable in
conlicts with inmates. \hereas the original court decision was intended to correct a perhaps
erroneous decision o the prison management, and perhaps an attempt to show how inmates

119
Michael Barone, 1he Good News is the Good News is Right` !ee/t, tavaara, September 8 199, Pages 23-25
120
John J. DiIulio Jr., A More Gated Union` !ee/t, tavaara, July 199, Pages 13-15
121
Andrew Peyton 1homas, Completing the \ar on Crime` !ee/t, tavaara, January 24 2000, Pages 19-21
Alexander Ohrn

- 46 -
ought to be treated more humanely, this is hardly what 1be !ee/t, tavaara adocates. Len
the notion that prison inmates should be able to demand to be treated in a particular manner
is mocked and seen as merely a nuisance that legislation stripping them o the possibility to
make law-suits against allegedly unair decisions.
122


Andrew Peyton 1homas attributes the hard-line incarceration policy that is prealent in the
United States as a key actor in the war on crime. But he argues that this is not enough on its
own. 1he solution to crime he argues: .ultimately lies within our culture and our
souls.`
123
, and in helping those incarcerated rom returning to a law-abiding lie ater their
sentence is sered, aith based programmes are adocated. 1hat by turning the inmates into
deout Christians, they would be less likely to commit crimes sounds more like a
paleoconseratie or a church based traditionalist initiatie than a neoconseratie project.
loweer, one can understand it as such i one appreciates that the een the early
neoconseraties acknowledged and appreciated that religion, and Christianity in particular,
were longstanding components in American culture. \hat a aith based programme does in
this sense is propagate an American identity, or community, that is seen to be acilitated by
religion.

Capital punishment is also hailed as a key component in bringing crime rates down. \illiam
1ucker shows that the death penalty is an eectie deterrent to iolent crime, homicide in
particular. Attacking a study presented in the ^er Yor/ 1ive. that suggested that capital
punishment did not act as a deterrent, 1ucker inds that by ocusing on states that execute
criminals, thus not including states with the death penalty, the result is quite dierent, with
igures that clearly show a relationship between the death penalty and decreasing homicides
rates. 1ucker also relies on statistical data analysed in the irst instance by Isaac Lhrlich,
Uniersity o Chicago, in 196 and updated in 2001 by economists rom Lmory Uniersity,
whose later analysis updated Lhrlich`s igure o eight deterred murders per execution to 18,
albeit with an estimated error o 10 that places the deterrence eect between 8 and 28 lies
saed per execution.
124


On the ethical side, Andrew Peyton 1homas points out that a problem with the death
penalty is that conicted prisoners spend ar too long on death row, a tripling o the time
spent 20 years ago.
125
loweer, this is more o a logistical problem than one o ethics, rather
the attitude is more that as a policy it achiees its intended result, and those executed hae
oreited their rights in committing the crime in the irst place.

1here is as such no real discussion o the ethics o capital punishment. 1ucker acknowledges
that there are alid debates on subsidiary issues, such as the execution o criminals with
mental handicaps, the role o DNA testing and so on, but maintains that the general debate
so ar hae presented the deendants o capital punishment as the .deenders o some
barbaric ritual.` whereas he argues that it .is a social policy that achiees targeted
results.`
126
.

122
Andrew Peyton 1homas, Disabling the Prisons` !ee/t, tavaara, April 2 1998, Pages 10-11
Roger Clegg, Disabling Our Prisons` !ee/t, tavaara, March 2 2000, Pages 16-1
123
Andrew Peyton 1homas, Completing the \ar on Crime` !ee/t, tavaara, January 24 2000, Page 21
124
\illiam 1ucker, Capital Punishment \orks` !ee/t, tavaara, August 13 2001, Pages 2-29
125
Andrew Peyton 1homas, Completing the \ar on Crime` !ee/t, tavaara, January 24 2000, Pages 19-21
126
\illiam 1ucker, Capital Punishment \orks` !ee/t, tavaara, August 13 2001, Page 29
Alexander Ohrn

- 4 -
IEIEP' *<8DO*G>9D;:<D7G'
Relatiely little was said in 1be !ee/t, tavaara during this period about anti-Americanism.
\hilst this paper does aour more requently recurring themes this is a particularly
interesting topic as it surges in importance ater September 11 2001, which makes the
apparent lack o concern with anti-Americanism prior to those eents all the more
important.

1he dierence between the New \orld and the Old \orld is a theme we shall return to in a
later section, but this is an appropriate moment to briely discuss what Jerey Gedmin on
behal o 1be !ee/t, tavaara perceies as Luropean anti-Americanism.

\ith the expansion o the Luropean Union and the moe towards ederalism, the common
currency, monetary policy and the relinquishing o soereignty, Jerey Gedmin concludes
that what makes it all possible is not the rationale o any immediate beneits, but rather a
shared anti-Americanism. Since the end o the Cold \ar the idea that the United States is
not only the only superpower in the world, but a particularly inconenient one or Lurope
has according to Gedmin become a commonplace notion. As such the Luropean Union and
the Luropean Monetary Union are methods or otherwise powerless Luropean countries
and politicians to counter American hegemony.
12


Gedmin suggests that this is not the oundation upon which successul co-operation and
alliances are built. 1o him there is a proound dierence in attitude, and he argues that
Americans iew Luropean military initiaties as a possibility to share the burden` o such
endeaours as peacekeeping, whereas Luropeans regard their military build-up as an
opportunity to share power`.
128
1his o course contradicts other claims that the Luropean
countries are not interested in, or prepared to police the world` as the United States is oten
accused o.

But the Old \orld is not only where they iew American hegemony negatiely. 1he arious
proinces o Canada were essentially uniied by the shared threat o American expansion to
the north. In Preston Jones`s reiew o J.L. Granatstein Yav/ee Co ove. Cavaaiav. ava .vti
.vericavi.v, it is emphasised how a sense o moral superiority has been nurtured in Canada,
against the backdrop o their American neighbours in the South. Jones notes how Canadian
anti-Americanism is more pronounced in the Anglophone parts o Canada, whereas in
Quebec, with its large separatist moement, relations with the United States are much less
strained. 1he reason then to Jones, or why ree trade with Canada is opposed in the
Anglophone parts, is that it threatens their Canadian identity.
129


lollowing an article in the ^er Yor/ 1ive. Magaive where prestigious contributors rom
some 18 countries were put together under the title or tbe !orta ee. |.. Under headlines
and themes such as Bloated`, Callous` and Vain` these contributors explore the less
appealing sides o what is presented as an American identity. Not surprisingly the reply rom
1be !ee/t, tavaara is an aggressie deence, not so much intended to highlight American

12
Jerey Gedmin, 1he New Lurope - Menace` !ee/t, tavaara, March 29 1999, Pages 19-23
Jerey Gedmin, Our Luropean Problem` !ee/t, tavaara, June 19 2000, Pages 13-14
128
ibid.
129
Preston Jones, Our Canadian Cousins` !ee/t, tavaara, October 19 1998, Pages 36-38
Alexander Ohrn

- 48 -
irtues, but to discredit the contributors themseles by attacking the stereotypes o their
respectie national identities.
130
It is a triial line o argument as it rests on the same type o
ague critique directed at weak stereotypes. lurthermore both sides in this debate` belong to
their respectie elites, and ironically exchange insults directed at their images o the other`s
general population.
'
In summary then o how 1be !ee/t, tavaara dealt with anti-Americanism during the years
1995-2001 one is tempted to say that they did not. 1he articles quoted aboe are marginal
and there is no red thread to connect them. Anti-Americanism is quite simply not a major
concern at this stage. \hen it does come to the surace and make it to the pages o the
magazine they do not talk o the type o anti-Americanism we today ace read about in
newspapers on a daily basis, but rather about the iews o their Canadian neighbours,
Luropean allies and oreign intellectuals.

1he only interesting point that 1be !ee/t, tavaara raises during this period with regards to
anti-Americanism is that o a growing discontent within the conseratie moement with the
moral decay o contemporary America.

1he concern amongst many conseraties is that democracy seems to be ailing them, that
the liberal democratic system is not bringing about a irtuous society, but rather one where
moral decency is second place to moral libertarianism. In this sense, court decisions
maniesting this notion in cases o abortion, gay rights and euthanasia pushes many
conseraties to ask whether the regime` and the people` are no longer the same, as the
legal ramework no longer represents what they perceie as the will o the American people.
lence 1be !ee/t, tavaara distinguishes between conseraties who retain their loe or
America and those who beliee that the purity o their ideas must be maintained and thereby
alienates themseles rom the political process and any chance o inluence. Brooks points
out that whilst abortion and euthanasia are no positie indicators o moral trends, he
maintains that the conseratie adances on issues such as school choice and airmatie
action shows that the liberal democratic system still oers possibilities or the conseratie
moement to inluence legal principles.
131


130
Andrew lerguson, 1hose Crazy Americans` !ee/t, tavaara, June 23 199, Pages 11-12
131
Daid Brooks, 1he Right`s Anti-American 1emptation` !ee/t, tavaara, Noember 11 1996, Pages 23-26
Alexander Ohrn

- 49 -
IEP' &>9DMD<@'X,=>:ND78D;'/:RYD7F<>77Z'L9BG'+F>'0>>YNJ'!8:<=:9='HVVAOHVVU'

A year ater the eents o September 11 2001 Charles Krauthammer stated on the coer o
1be !ee/t, tavaara that:

\e didn`t change ater all. 1hings changed, yes. llags waed. A president
emerged. 1he economy slid. 1he enemy scattered. Politics cooled. 1he allies
rallied. 1he allies chaed. Politics returned.

But re didn`t change. \e thought we would. Ater the shock o the bolt rom
the blue, it was said that we would neer be the same. 1hat it was the end o
irony. 1hat the pose o knowing detachment with which we went to bed
September 10 was gone or good.

Not so. Beore the irst year was out, it was back, all o it. Irony. 1riiality.
Vulgarity. lriolousness. \himsy. larce.

All the things no healthy society can lie without.`
132


loweer, whilst Krauthammer is reerring to the return to normality in politics, the return to
the usual bipartisan political process, 1be !ee/t, tavaara has not returned to the issues with
which it was preiously preoccupied.

1his section reiews some o the key issues dealt with in 1be !ee/t, tavaara during the
seenth year o its publication, 2001-2002. As this paper is not a deence o neoconseratie
thinking, merely an attempt to leel the debate, this section could be iewed as an attempt at
showing how the common iew o the neoconseraties, the image o the Neocon, is indeed
substantiated in such sources as 1be !ee/t, tavaara. 1ogether with the multitude o issues
discussed in earlier sections o this paper the ull picture o the neoconseraties up until the
eents o September 11 2001 is considerably more complex. 1he atermath o said eents
hae rendered 1be !ee/t, tavaara ar more ocused on the issues with which it is typically
associated these days, the war on terror, Iraq and the George \. Bush administration.

1he year ollowing the eents o September 11 2001 was in 1be !ee/t, tavaara not
surprisingly centred around terrorism, oreign policy and the role o the president. Other
issues were o course dealt with as well, but to a signiicantly lesser degree.

1his section will briely outline a number o key issues during this period. \hilst it is
problematic to neatly categorise articles, three partly oerlapping categories stand out,
oreign policy, the war on terror and war presidency.

1he categorisation o the neoconseraties as idealistic oreign policy hawks has been
presented in numerous articles in both scholarly journals and in the mainstream press.
133


132
Charles Krauthammer, \ear One` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, September 9 2002, Page 24
133
It is not within the scope o this paper to exhaustiely cite all articles dealing with the post September 11 oreign policy
hawkishness o the neoconseraties the ollowing hae inormed this paper:
1imothy J. Lynch, Kristol Balls: Neoconseratie Visions o Political Islam, 2005 ,Leicester: Uniersity o Leicester,, lirst
Drat
Alexander Ohrn

- 50 -
\hilst no other paper uncoered by this inestigation ocuses as heaily on 1be !ee/t,
tavaara as this paper, the topic has all but been exhausted and as such this section will only
draw on a selection o seminal articles in 1be !ee/t, tavaara.

\ithin the context o both the war on terror and oreign policy Iraq gets rejuenated
attention and the conlict between Israel and Palestine suraces as a recurrent interest. Saudi
Arabia is also discussed in great detail both as a oreign policy concern and with regards to
Osama bin Laden and the Al-Queda network.

1he neoconseraties hae become known as some o George \ Bush`s staunchest
supporters and whereas this was not oerly eident in the presidential campaign or during
the early months o his presidency, 1be !ee/t, tavaara celebrates him as war president. 1he
role o the president as spokesperson or international interentionism is o signiicant
importance in understanding applied idealistic hawkishness`.

1his structure o this section is intended to outline the major issues discussed in 1be !ee/t,
tavaara during the post September 11 period. As such it is essentially a checklist o the
magazine`s position on the issues under heaiest criticism rom initially let wing
commentators and more recently, the mainstream media. 1o construct this case o idealistic
hawkishness` as hae numerous editorials, political commentators and other pundits, rom
the material published in 1be !ee/t, tavaara is not diicult. 1here is an abundance o
material to choose rom, and this section cannot coer the entirety o the texts.

On almost any contentious issue in what is known as the Bush Doctrine` the
neoconseraties o 1be !ee/t, tavaara hae taken supportie positions. 1hey argue in
aour o pre-emption and the justiication o detention o enemies as illegal combatants.
1hey saw the claimed presence o weapons o mass destruction as justiication or going to
war in Iraq and argued that the link between Osama bin Laden`s Al-Queda and Saddam
lussein`s Iraq thus widening the war on terror to encompass Iraq. Drien by the idea o
spreading the ethos o liberal democracy, these positions constitute what is sometimes called
idealistic hawkishness` or hard \ilsonianism`. 1his is an account o idealistic hawkishness`
in 1be !ee/t, tavaara.
'
'


Naomi Klein, Baghdad \ear Zero - Pillaging Iraq in Pursuit o a Neocon Utopia` arer`. Magaive, September 2004
Michael Lind, A 1ragedy o Lrrors` 1be ^atiov, lebruary 23 2004, http:,,www.thenation.com ,accessed on Noember 6
2006,
1om Barry, Iraq \ar Product o Neocon Philosophy o Intelligence` 1be Rigbt !eb, lebruary 12 2004, http:,,www.irc-
online.org ,accessed on Noember 2006,
Marc Beeson, 1he Rise o the Neocons` and the Lolution o American loreign Policy` \ear Unknown ,Australia:
Uniersity o Queensland,
Alexander Ohrn

- 51 -
IEPEA' 0:9'B<'+>99B9'
1he war on terror has obiously dominated the media landscape oer the past ew years and
1be !ee/t, tavaara is no exception. 1he case or idealistic hawkishness` is most
coneniently situated within the context o the war on terror` and as such a general expose
o some o the related issues will sere as an introduction to the discussion o oreign policy
and George \. Bush as war president. 1o some extent this section has a haphazard
organisation where emphasis is on particular issues, without a guiding narratie. 1he purpose
o this structure is to highlight the ideas on particular issues without streamlining them into
an imposed structure where the arguments are reduced to conirming a preconceied logic.
1he general narratie, the generalisation o neoconseratie thought during this recent time
period will be returned to in the concluding section.

1he appropriate starting point or understanding the neoconseratie position on the war
on terror` is with Kagan`s and Kristol`s comments on President Bush`s speech where he
outlined his administrations policy intentions. 1he key issue that they highlight is the width
o its implications. 1hey emphasise that the war on terror cannot be understood as a
campaign against Osama bin Laden and Al-Queda or the 1aliban regime o Aghanistan, but
that these are only initial steps. 1o Kagan and Kristol these are appropriate and necessary
targets but they represent only a raction o the agenda President Bush commits his
administration to.
134


In the same issue 1be !ee/t, tavaara reprints an open letter rom the Project or a New
American Century rom September 20 2001, where ie issues in the campaign against
terrorism are highlighted. Predictably they argue that a .key goal, but by no means the
only goal |.| should be to capture or kill Osama bin Laden, and to destroy his network o
associates.`
135
loweer, they also argue that action need also be taken against Saddam
lussein`s regime in Iraq and that .een i eidence does not link Iraq directly to the
attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication o terrorism and its sponsors must include a
determined eort to remoe Saddam lussein rom power in Iraq.`
136
lezbollah are
included as an essential target, and Iran and Syria are mentioned as sponsors o terrorism
and possible dissenters oer action against lezbollah. Israel is mentioned as a key ally and it
is argued that U.S. policy must include support or Israel in its conlict with the Palestinian
Authority. linally, the letter argues that A serious and ictorious war on terrorism will
require a large increase in deense spending.`
13


Signatories include a number o requent contributors to 1be !ee/t, tavaara, as well as some
o the people who hae become known in mainstream press as Neocons, such as Richard
Perle and lrancis lukuyama.
138
1he later writing o the two will be returned to in the inal
section o this paper as they represent dierging actions o neoconseratism.


134
Robert Kagan and \illiam Kristol, 1he Right \ar` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, October 1 2001, Pages 9-10
135
\illiam Kristol et at, An Open Letter to the President` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, October 1 2001, Page 10, also aailable rom
PNAC website, http:,,www.newamericancentury.org, ,accessed on October 2 2006,
136
ibid.
13
ibid.
138
ibid.
Alexander Ohrn

- 52 -
Another reprint in the editorial section o 1be !ee/t, tavaara consisted o an excerpt o
President George \. Bush`s 1be ^atiovat ecvrit, trateg, of tbe |vitea tate. of .verica rom
2002.

1he document expresses so well so much o what 1be !ee/t, tavaara has
argued or oer the last seen years .`
139


In short what George \. Bush argues in the excerpted sections consists o the ollowing,
and it reads to some extent as a sort o abstract to what 1be !ee/t, tavaara would come to
argue in the years to ollow.

George \. Bush argues that unlike the Cold \ar where Bush argues that the United States
contained the Soiet Union by deterrence, today`s rogue states` are less likely to be dissuade
by such measures. Rather Bush argues that the appropriate policy is instead pre-emption. 1o
Bush rogue states` such as Iraq, are hae or are seeking to acquire weapons o mass
destruction, and it is within this ramework Bush is arguing in aour o pre-emptie attacks.
Another aspect o the war on terror is the deence spending required to win such as war.
1he idealistic aspects o this project and the sel assumed role o the Untied States are also
expressed in the excerpt:

lreedom is the non-negotiable demand o human dignity, the birthright o
eery person-in eery ciilization. 1hroughout history, reedom has been
threatened by war and terror, it has been challenged by the clashing wills o
powerul states and the eil designs o tyrants, and it has been tested by
widespread poerty and disease. 1oday, humanity holds in its hands the
opportunity to urther reedom`s triumph oer all these oes. 1he United States
welcomes our responsibility to lead in this great mission.
140


Gien the extent o this project, it comes as no surprise that the neoconseraties continued
arguing in aour o increased military spending in the United States. As this paper showed
in section 3.2.3 increasing deence spending is a long-standing intention o the
neoconseraties. loweer, in the decade between the Cold \ar and September 11 2001,
they constituted a minority. \ith the altered priorities o goernment and the general public,
deence spending became a ote-winning issue or members o Congress.

As such, unding is an issue that the neoconseraties returned to as the George \. Bush
administration made clear that the war on terror would be an extensie and indeinite
endeaour. 1om Donnelly is ery much in aour o the Bush Doctrine as outlined in the
^atiovat ecvrit, trateg,, but argues that the U.S. military is ill prepared to meet its ambitious
agenda. Donnelly concludes that National security doctrines that aren`t backed by adequate
orce are meaningless.`
141
1his is an argument we will return to in section 3.5.1.3 on the
subject o appeasement.


139
1he Lditors, A \inning Strategy` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, September 30 2002, Page 9
140
George \. Bush, A \inning Strategy` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, September 30 2002, Page 10
141
1om Donnelly, Still lollow Ater All 1hese \ears` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, December 9 2002, Page 15
Alexander Ohrn

- 53 -
Despite the subject o deence spending haing been whitewashed through its perceied
necessity in the post September 11 period, \illiam G. Mayer argues that the subject remains
taboo with respect to bipartisan debate. le cites the critique o Karl Roe`s recommendation
or the Republican Party to capitalise on its authority with the public with respect to its
tradition o supporting the armed orces.
142
\hereas he suggests that some subjects are too
important to be outside o the bipartisan debate, 1be !ee/t, tavaara would more oten than
not lament other commentators or suggesting an issue to be multiaceted.

John J. DiIulio Jr. reminds the readers o 1be !ee/t, tavaara that the current war is not a
war that can be ought with the armed orces alone. In a 2002 reiew o the Oice o
lomeland Security DiIulio argues that whilst the US military successully hae inaded
Aghanistan, homeland security depend not only on the might o American soldiers but on a
number o ederal and ciilian agencies throughout all the American states. In short, he seeks
to include ire-ighters, relie personnel and other support groups under the wider umbrella
o homeland security.

As this paper will not deote any urther space to deence issues, the preceding paragraphs
are intended as reminders o the width o the concept o deence and national security which
the neoconseraties hae adopted. 1his constitutes a general trend which would be diicult
to quantiy.

1he remainder o this section is deoted to discussing 1be !ee/t, tavaara`s coering o the
issues outlined in President Bush`s National Security Strategy along with related issues such
as unlawul combatants and appeasement.


142
\illiam G. Mayer, A Real National Security Debate` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, June 24 2002, Pages 1-18
Alexander Ohrn

- 54 -
IEPEAEA' +F>'%>R')CN>7W',NN>@:N'#BG6:8:<87''
1he war on terror would not be a real war without an enemy. In this case it was not entirely
clear as to whom that enemy was, and een more so, the general public knew ery little
about why people like Osama bin Laden and the Al-Queda network would host such strong
eelings o enmity towards the United States.
143


During its war on terror the George \. Bush administration declared that a number o its
capties were not to be gien the status o combatants`. Consequently these people exist in a
legal limbo and were reerred to as illegal` or unlawul` combatants, and the issue o illegal
combatants is perhaps the most controersial issue o the Bush Doctrine. 1be !ee/t,
tavaara has strongly aoured this legal exception on the basis that it is itally necessary to
national security.

1he distinction is made, as outlined aboe, that the war on terror is an actual war against an
enemy, een where that enemy is guilty only o acts that courts o law would deem crimes,
not acts o war. 1he war on terror is as such seen as a new type o war, or which old
imaginations o war cannot apply. 1his is true or the extralegal status o Camp X-Ray`s
prisoners in Guantanamo Bay, who are not deemed neither combatants nor non-
combatants, as such classiications would gie them certain rights according to
internationally sanctioned and agreed upon charters. By labelling the interned unlawul` or
illegal` combatants the U.S. in eect gae themseles ree rein to keep them indeinitely and
apply non-sanctioned methods o interrogation. 1here is to 1be !ee/t, tavaara a problem in
treating enemies like mere criminals, whereas war is external, crime is internal and the two
must be kept separate. 1he problem o a war consisting only o terror attacks is that the
enemy is oten internal and the type o problem the prison camp in Guantanamo Bay and
elsewhere around the world, imposes is a matter o making it possible to distinguish between
criminals and enemies. Lssentially a distinction between ciil and martial.
144


Daid 1ell deends the inringement on liberty that is the implication o the administrations
take on the legal status o its capties. Daid 1ell asks to what extent American ciil liberties
are aected by the notion o illegal combatants`, and inds that they are not aected
signiicantly or ordinary American citizen. lis argument is straightorward but simplistic
and short sighted. le argues that whilst .Unsympathetic characters should be treated
airly, too`
145
, he also inds that in particular cases these unsympathetic characters are
planning to commit acts o terrorism. In the case o Nabil al Marabh who was held on
suspicion o inolement with Al-Queda without access to a legal representation or eight
months. Reiewing al Marabh`s lie story 1ell inds that Nabil al Marabh |.|, is an
extremely dangerous ellow-a terrorist, in act. le is also, praise Allah, a prisoner o the

143
It is not within the scope o this paper to discuss the historical relationship between the United States and militants in
the Middle Last, but Chalmers Johnson`s presentation o the concept o blowback is a useul guide to this conlict.
Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: the Costs and Consequences o American Lmpire` 2000 ,New \ork: lenry lolt and Co.,,
1he Sorrows o Lmpire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the Lnd o the Republic` 2004 ,New \ork: Metropolitan Books,
144
Daid 1ell, 1reating Lnemies Like Criminals` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, August 12 2002, Pages -8
1homas Powers, Liberty and Justice or Almost All` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, June 16 2003, Pages 12-14
1homas l. Powers, Due Process or 1errorists` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, January 21 2004, Pages 22-25
145
Daid 1ell, Due Process or 1errorists` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, July 1 2002, Page 9-10
Alexander Ohrn

- 55 -
United States goernment, and it seems to us that American ciil liberties are more, rather
than less, secure as a consequence.`
146


Reuel Marc Gerecht argues that on a practical leel the treatment o prisoners in Iraq is not
likely to worsen the situation or create any uproar, reerring to a scandal in which
photographs o Iraqi prisoners are being humiliated by their American guards. Rather he
argues, such ciil liberties concerns are gien little importance in the Middle Last, where
according to Gerecht, practicality is more important than philosophy. le argues that to the
aerage Iraqi there are more pressing concerns than the well being o prisoners.
14


In short, 1be !ee/t, tavaara`s attitude to these and other practical issues related to the war
on terror are when they are in conlict with conentions such as human rights and een
American ciil rights, triialised.
148
1his attitude is interesting, in that the same writers will go
to great lengths to lament their political opponents oer triial disagreements oer American
policy. 1his incongruity can be understood as a lack o argument but is likewise indicatie o
their priorities.

Adam \olson criticises Deence Secretary Donald Rumseld`s likening o the war on terror
with the Cold \ar, in that the enemy is not a hostile yet rational nation as the Soiet Union
was, but a loose organisation o religious anatics. \hilst he suggests that the enemy is more
like the Nazis o Nazi Germany he notes that either comparison is likely to be lawed. Rather
he widens the issue o the mentality o the enemy with that o the states in which these
indiiduals originated and does as such imply a serious problem across the entire Middle
Last.

1he souls o men, Plato taught, are relections o the regimes that raise them.
In the Islamic world, where liberal democracies are scarce, so too are liberal
democrats. In contrast, anti-American sentiment is rie, and while mass
murderers like bin Laden and Atta remain a minority, they are cheered by the
thousands in the street, lauded by the goernment press, incited by imams, and
winked at ,when not openly encouraged, by their rulers. I the terrorists are to
be deeated in their war against the United States, the regimes that nurture
them will hae to be held strictly accountable, not merely contained.``
149


1he war on terror is a war in which the rules are made up as it goes along. lew are the
political scientists who would claim that there are actual rules o war, but with the extensie
agenda o the war on terror, this willingness to recategorise people holds deep imperial
implications. Antonio Agamben`s homo sacer` has been eoked by many o the critics o the
concept o illegal combatants. Slaoj Zizek suggests that when applied to the American war

146
ibid. p.10
14
Reuel Marc Gerecht, \ho`s Araid o Abu Ghraib` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, May 24 2004. Pages 30-33
148
Matt Labash, Guantanamo`s Unhappy Campers` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, lebruary 11 2002, Pages 28-32
1homas l. Powers, 1he Lnd o Gitmo Limbo` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, September 2 2004, Pages 21-24
lenrik Bering, 1he Good 1errorist` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, October 18 2004, Pages 22-23
leather Mac Donald, 1orturing the Lidence` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, January 24 2005, Pages 13-14
Reuel Marc Gerecht, \hat`s the Matter with Gitmo` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, July 4,11 2005, Pages 19-25
Lllen Bork, Men \ithout a Country` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, August 15,22 2005, Pages 13-14
149
Adam \olson, More Like Nazis 1han Commies` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, Noember 12 2001, Page 1
Alexander Ohrn

- 56 -
on terror it creates the distinction between human` and inhuman` with respect to those
designated outside o the law by those who draw their power rom the American project.
150

1his section seres as an indicator to how the writers o 1be !ee/t, tavaara regard the
enemy or een suspected enemies. 1here is in 1be !ee/t, tavaara a strong sense o
nationalism, in the sense that i you are not American you do not count. 1his resonates how
the war on terror is presented, as a war which i not won spells the end o America. 1his is
an issue which will be returned later.
Adding here a section on the coerage o the Patriot Act would hae urther highlighted
how the neoconseraties consider all conentions and other rights up or sacriice in the
war on terror.


150
Slaoj Zizek, \elcome to the Desert o the Real` 2002 ,London: Verso Books,
Alexander Ohrn

- 5 -
IEPEAEH' 0>:KB<7'BL'.:77'&>789C;8DB<'
On the topic o weapons o mass destruction, 1be !ee/t, tavaara has taken a perhaps
surprisingly strong position. Surprising in the sense that as political commentators they do
not possess priileged inormation nor are they inestigatie reporters generating
inormation hitherto not public.

In an editorial entitled !b, !e !evt to !ar Kagan and Kristol argues that the documented
stockpiles o chemical weaponry ater the irst Gul \ar and the Saddam lussein regime`s
inability or unwillingness to account or these to U.N. weapon inspectors, in itsel was a alid
cause or going to war. 1o Kagan and Kristol, Saddam lussein neer explained, or
attempted to, the whereabouts o Iraq`s chemical arsenal or the manner in which it had been
disposed o. 1o them this is a general consensus, and they argue that een i others are less
direct in this conclusion, een lans Blix, chairman o the U.N. inspectors, was dissatisied.
151


\ithin that context Kagan and Kristol argue that the our year intermission during which
Iraq banned the inspectors, the Saddam lussein regime had ample opportunity to
restructure Iraq`s weapons programmes. 1hey argue that whilst the Clinton administration
realised Iraq`s inractions it did little to hold Iraq accountable. 1his ailure, as we hae
discussed aboe, was to the neoconseraties at 1be !ee/t, tavaara directly emboldened
Saddam lussein. \hen this stalemate came to an end in 2002 when the U.N. Security
Council issued Resolution 1441 which required Iraq to comply with U.N. weapon inspectors
within 30 days, Iraq`s non-compliance was to 1be !ee/t, tavaara a catalyst but neer the
reason or war. 1he reason according to Kagan and Kristol is best summarised by
themseles:

1he reason or war, in the irst instance, was always the strategic threat posed
by Saddam because o his proen record o aggression and barbarity, his
admitted possession o weapons o mass destruction, and the certain
knowledge o his programs to build more. It was the threat he posed to his
region, to our allies, and to core U.S. interests that justiied going to war this
spring, just as it would hae justiied a Clinton administration decision to go to
war in 1998.`
152


1his is largely the same argument presented by Secretary o State Colin Powell in an
excerpted section o a speech to the U.N. Security Council reprinted in 1be !ee/t, tavaara.


151
Robert Kagan and \illiam Kristol, \hy \e \ent to \ar` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, October 20 2003, Pages -11
152
ibid. p.10
Alexander Ohrn

- 58 -
1he claim o weapons o mass destruction was the public reason or regime change in Iraq
to British Prime Minister 1ony Blair as well, but Irwin M. Stelzer emphasises that Blair saw
positie aspects in ousting Saddam lussein in its own right in addition to neutralising the
claimed threat o weapons o mass destruction. Stelzer cites Blair loosely and summarises his
position as:

1he world has a responsibility to interene when inaction means the slaughter
o innocents: A war that is about alues` rather than territory` is a just
war.`
153


loweer, een in 2004, a year ater President Bush proclaimed an end to major combat
operations and the United States ictorious, by whence mainstream iews on Iraq`s weapons
o mass destruction had swung to a consider such claims a ruse, or een a Straussian noble
lie`, \illiam Kristol deends 1be !ee/t, tavaara`s and the George \. Bush administration`s
position that Saddam lussein`s regime had possession o such weapons. 1o Kristol, there
are simply too many unanswered questions. Kristol urges the administration to orm a strong
and public position, something he suggests it has lost as public opinion swung on the matter
and he writes that:

.haing proessed such certainty about Saddam`s weapons o mass
destruction beore the war, the administration now seems intimidated by the
new conentional wisdom that Saddam had done away with his \MD.`
154


In a number o editorials and articles these points are reiterated, and there is little doubt that
the writers o 1be !ee/t, tavaara support the conclusion that the alleged weapons o mass
destruction were a alid reason or going to war.
155



153
Irwin M. Stelzer, No Regrets or Blair` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, October 13 2003, Page 1
154
\illiam Kristol, About 1hose Iraqi \eapons.` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, May 31 2004, Page 8
155
Stephen l. layes, Questions o Mass Destruction` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, June 23 2003, Pages 13-15
\illiam Kristol, Reality Check` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, October 13 2003, Page 9
Stephen l. layes, Case Closed` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, Noember 24 2003, Pages 20-25
\illiam Kristol, About 1hose Iraqi \eapons.` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, May 31 2004, Pages -8
Alexander Ohrn

- 59 -
IEPEAEI' 59>O>GK8DB<':<='*KK>:7>G><8'
Another set o issues that hae become closely associated with the neoconseraties within
the discussion o the war on terror, are pre-emption, regime change and appeasement.

\hilst deinitions o pre-emption and regime change would surely need to be conoluted,
the practical meaning o the two within the Bush Doctrine is more straightorward. Pre-
emption reers to the use o orce against states or groups to preent uture attacks rom
them on U.S. targets. Regime change reers to the toppling o the goernment o a state with
the purpose o transorming it into a democracy. Both issues are highly controersial.

In January 2002, Kagan and Kristol take the position that .lor the war on terrorism to
succeed, Saddam lussein must be remoed.`
156
It is a call or inasion, with the purpose o
toppling the regime. 1here is the mention o weapons o mass destruction, but they do not
try to present a case where Iraq constitutes an immediate danger. Rather, they calmly argue
that Saddam lussein has been a problem in the past and is likely to pose similar problems in
the uture. 1his is in short a case or a pre-emptie attack on Iraq.

1he neoconseratie case or pre-emptie attack is best summarised by Michael J. Glennon
in January o 2002. Pre-emption as a concept has become closely associated with what is
now known as the Bush Doctrine, and is the idea that a goernment can wage war pre-
emptiely to achiee a long term goal, runs contrary to the U.N. Charter. Glennon deends
the Bush Doctrine on the basis that oreign policy has long since ound the rigidity o the
U.N. Charter inconenient and has neer really abided by its conines. 1o Glennon, pre-
emptie attacks are quite straightorward. 1he conundrum in his article is not in its
implementation, but in the realisation that times o war is not the time or legal debates.
\hat he is adocating is simply an approach to oreign policy which is akin to martial law,
that is extralegal measures to deal with the current situation, and to worry about legalities
aterwards:

1here will be plenty o time to resume that discussion when the war on
terrorism is won. |.| Completing that ictory is the task at hand. And winning
may require the use o preemptie orce against terrorist orces as well as
against the states that harbour them.`
15


1he twin o pre-emptie strikes is nation building. Nation building is a strange eature in the
neoconseratie discussion o Iraq both beore and ater the war began. 1he way the term is
used is not mere reconstruction in terms o inrastructure, housing and ood supply, but
rather the nation building reerred to is ideological. 1he dictator or regime toppled is not to
be replaced by another that is worse or een similar, but by a liberal democracy.
158


156
Robert Kagan and \illiam Kristol, \hat 1o Do About Iraq` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, January 21 2002, Page 23
15
Michael J. Glennon, Preempting 1errorism` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, January 28 2002, Page 2
158
Robert Kagan and \illiam Kristol, \hat 1o Do About Iraq` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, January 21 2002, Pages 23-25
Matt Labash, Down and Out in Umm Qasr`, 1be !ee/t, tavaara, April 21 2003, Pages 21-23
Irwin M. Stelzer, lorgie 1hem lis Debts` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, April 21 2003, Pages 24-26
Stephen l. layes, 1he luture o Iraq, In Outline` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, July 28 2003, Pages 11-12
Vance Serchuk and 1om Donnelly, Nation Building, Ater All` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, April 11 2005, Pages 20-29
Stephen l. layes, 1he luture o Iraq, In Outline` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, July 28 2003, Pages 11-12
Alexander Ohrn

- 60 -

1he reason this is a strange eature is that nation building in this sense closely resembles
social engineering. Social engineering as the sections on the early neoconseraties discussed
was one o the tenets o the liberalism that the liberal anti-communists that were to become
neoconseraties did not agree with, and ehemently reuted throughout the 20
th
century.
1he second generation o neoconseraties` adoption o social engineering in Iraq and
Aghanistan is perplexing and in widening the context in the inal section, this will be
elaborated on.

1he much contested concept o an axis o eil` was supposedly coined by the \hite louse
speechwriter Daid lrum. lrum is also a requent contributor to 1be !ee/t, tavaara since
the ery irst issue in 1995. 1o hae a neoconseratie writer coin the perhaps most
controersial term in the current oreign policy paradigm has obiously aroused signiicant
attention. 1he discussion below o the neoconseratie oreign policy discussion since 2001
is centred around the axis o eil`, in order to gie an idea o their suggestion or U.S.
oreign policy with regards to Iraq, Iran and North Korea in the post September 11 debate.

\e will not deote any urther space here to the three countries constituting the axis o
eil`. As is no surprise they each receie signiicant attention, most o all Iraq, in 1be !ee/t,
tavaara. As we hae already dealt with country speciic case studies in the 1995-2001 period,
additional sections here appear redundant.

1he discussion on appeasement is readily linked to the axis o eil` grouping o Iraq, Iran
and North Korea in Bush`s 2002 State o the Union speech. \hilst widely criticised or
being simplistic, James D. Miller deends the expression not in terms o content but in terms
o message. le argues that the signal sent to the goernments o the three countries must be
clear and unwaering. 1he choice o the three rested on the oundation that these are
countries the Bush administration both morally disapproe o and that it intends to take
action against. Miller points out that a number o countries could hae been added to the list
i a moral standpoint was the only qualiier, notably China, but adding a country the U.S. is
not prepared to attack would hae weakened the threat to Iraq, Iran and North Korea.
159


1he concept o appeasement reeks o implications o shame, weakness and cowardice. 1his
is how 1be !ee/t, tavaara situates practically any opposition to US policy with regards to
the war on terror.
160


1here is in the same understanding o appeasement as weakness, a notion in 1be !ee/t,
tavaara that undamentally this is an American-Luropean diide.
161
Churchill was in this
sense much more o an American igure despite being British, to Chamberlain`s Luropean
attitude.

Robert Kagan deelops this subject urther in his book Paraai.e c Porer where he inds that
Luropean appeasement is a direct consequence o Luropean weakness. America on the

159
James D. Miller, Credible 1hreats` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, March 11 2002, Page 1
160
\illiam Kristol and Robert Kagan, Going \obbly` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, June 3 2002, Page 11
\illiam Kristol, Axis o Appeasement` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, August 26 2002, Pages -8
161
James \. Ceaser, America`s Ascendancy, Lurope`s Despondency` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, May 20 2002, Pages 23-26
Daid Gelernter, 1he Roots o Luropean Appeasement` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, September 23 2002, Pages 19-25
Alexander Ohrn

- 61 -
other hand does not hae to play the compromise card thanks to its deence spending and
does as such not lean towards appeasement.
162


Max Boot is quite aware o being politically incorrect when he argues that:

In centuries past, the wild and unruly passions o the Islamic world were kept
within tight conines by irm, oten ruthless imperial authority... |.| As
America slowly took oer Britain`s oersight role ater 1945, \ashington tried
sel-consciously to care out a dierent style o leadership |.| Unortunately
America showed something else - that we were weak, and could be attacked,
economically and physically and rhetorically, with impunity.`
163


le goes on to expand on a long list o countries and situations in which a lenient and post
colonial style o goernance or intererence has inlamed hatred against the United States
and let the impression o American weakness. It is unclear what Boot`s argument is and he
is not explicitly arguing in aour o a return to heay handed imperial strategies but he
leaes it hanging in the air as he points to the problematic situations which hae deeloped
in its absence.
164


1he neoconseratie aersion towards appeasement is longstanding and would be easily
recognised in the early anti-communist liberals that constituted the oundation o
neoconseratism in the 1950s and 1960s. Stephen Peter Rosen, a distinguished larard
scholar, discusses the complexities o dealing with the enemy, or more precisely tyrants, in
the January 21 2002 issue o 1be !ee/t, tavaara. le makes the distinction that certain
tyrants can be successully deterred whilst others hae to be disposed o, and he uses the
cases o Joseph Stalin and Adol litler as examples. 1he ability o deterrence to produce
results is a matter o communicating a threat that pain will be inlicted on someone else in
the uture, i certain actions are carried out. 1he business o deterrence, thereore, inoles
making people think in certain ways about the uture.`
165


1his success o deterrence thereore depends on two actors according to Rosen. Successul
deterrence does as such not only depend on the deterring state`s ability to retaliate promptly
i demands are not met, but also on the world iew o the threatened tyrant. 1his is to say
that a dictator who does not beliee that threats will be acted on, or who beliee retaliation
will be insigniicant or that any losses are acceptable, will not be inclined to succumb to
threats.
166


1he same argument was also ound in an article just two months ater September 11 2001, in
which Adam \olson draws on the arguments o George l. Kennan rom 194 that the
methods which deeated Nazi Germany would not be successul against the Soiet Union.
16



162
Robert Kagan, Paradise & Power, America and Lurope in the new world order` 2004 ,London: Atlantic Books,
163
Max Boot, 1he Lnd o Appeasement` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, lebruary 10 2003, Page 21
164
ibid. pp.21-28
165
Stephen Peter Rosen, low to Deal \ith 1yrants` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, January 21 2002, Page 28
166
ibid.
16
Adam \olson, More like Nazis than Commies` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, Noember 12 2001, Pages 14-1
Alexander Ohrn

- 62 -
lurther, in a crucially important article, 1od Lindberg argues that a war against Saddam
lussein speciically is crucial to the uture o deterrence. Lindberg reutes the notion that
deterrence and pre-emption are discrete and can useully be understood as separate.
Deterrence, to Lindberg depends on the possibility o pre-emption. Action against Iraq is as
such action with the purpose o signalling to prospectie enemies that disobedience can be
punished. le is speciically reerring to North Korea, but this can be extended to a long list
o countries, riends and oes alike.
168


It is through this argument that we can understand the ehemence o 1be !ee/t, tavaara
and other neoconseratie outlets in their insistence on connecting Iraq and urther the axis
o eil` to the war on terror. 1he oreign policy implications o the neoconseratie project i
understood primarily as hawkish interentionism is deeply imperialist and the next section is
a brie outline o the imperial sel awareness o American neoconseraties.


168
1od Lindberg, Deterrence and Preention` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, lebruary 3 2003, Pages 24-28
Alexander Ohrn

- 63 -
IEPEI' +BR:9=7',GK>9D:N'!>NL'*R:9><>77'
\hilst oreign policy has already been discussed aboe, U.S. oreign policy has changed
dramatically since late 2001. 1he war on terror has proided the current paradigm and the
neoconseraties are sometimes considered a major contributor to the ideological
oundations or an idealistic oreign policy.

Charles Krauthammer proides an article in which he discusses the new world order which is
a possible consequence o the attack on the United States in September 2001 and the deiant
position o one man, Osama bin Laden, against the world`s sole superpower.
169


Krauthammer`s argument is based on the notion that whilst hegemonies are rarely
uncontested and hae historically generated opposing coalitions, or a decade ollowing the
end o the Cold \ar there was no such dissent to U.S. hegemony. le argues that two
possibilities existed, a coalition between Russia and China, and a Russian led coalition
consisting o remnants o the Soiet Union. Neither materialised, and instead September 11
2001 represents the disclosure o the challenger to America`s hegemony, radical Islamists. As
such, to Krauthammer the implication o Al-Queda`s attack on the United States is the
challenge posed to American hegemony.

1o Krauthammer the issue lies not in hunting or particular indiiduals such as Osama bin
Laden, but to maniest American supremacy. 1o take on regimes that harbour` terrorists is a
method o sending the message to prospectie coalitions against the United States that such
actions will not be tolerated. le argues that \eaker states inariably seek to join coalitions
o the strong. lor obious reasons o saety, they will go with those who appear to be the
winners.`
10
, and in the case o America`s war on terror the key to U.S. success lies in its
show o orce and resole.

Krauthammer as such argues in aour o establishing a New \orld Order, as President
George l.\. Bush attempted, by establishing a coalition o major powers. Key to such a
coalition is to Krauthammer American leadership and to him the uture o liberal democracy
depends on it.

I the guarantor o world peace or the last hal century cannot succeed in a
war o sel-deense against Aghanistan,!,, then the whole post-\orld \ar II
structure-open borders, open trade, open seas, open societies-will begin
to unrael.`
11


1he new world order adocated by neoconseraties such as Krauthammer is not necessarily
new in any way. Rather it is a matter o conirming certain ideas as either true or alse. In this
sense some o America`s allies, with whom the U.S. shares undamental alues, would hae
their relations with the United States strengthened and strategic allies, with whom the U.S.
has dealt with or economical and geopolitical reasons but who are not seen to share an
ideological alue base with the United States, must be distanced.

169
Charles Krauthammer, 1he Real New \orld Order` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, Noember 12 2001, Pages 25-29
10
ibid. p.28
11
ibid. p.29
Alexander Ohrn

- 64 -

Paul \olowitz supposedly wrote a report in the early 1990s when he was sering under
Donald Rumseld outlining the case or an imperial strategy o world domination. lollowing
the all o the Soiet Union the United States remained the world`s only superpower and this
was according to \olowitz an opportunity or world domination that the United States
could not aord to orego. \olowitz was supposedly ordered to scrap the report as it was
considered to radical a strategy at the time. 1his inestigation has not been able to conirm
the existence o such a report.

1here a phrases in articles in 1be !ee/t, tavaara that so aptly captures this progression
towards imperial sel awareness. Noemie Lmery, in an article comparing George \. Bush to
larry 1ruman as presidents who did not want the wars they each came to ight, yet to her
mind perormed brilliantly, suggests that in a time when the United States was repeatedly
attacked inormally, through terrorism and taunt, .Bush connected these dots in a ery
ew minutes, in the ierce light projected by uel on ire. Such acts o cognition sae people
and nations.`
12
\e are in her words .Present at the Re-Creation.`
13


Another worthwhile mention is rom Kagan and Kristol`s call or an inasion o Iraq already
cited, which concludes that:

No step would contribute more toward shaping a world order in which our
people and our liberal ciilization can surie and lourish.`
14


\riters o 1be !ee/t, tavaara occasionally touch on terms such as hegemon`, world police`
and empire`. 1he preerred term in those moments o sel aware imperialism is Pax
Americana`.
15


Max Boot is one o the most outspoken neoconseraties at 1be !ee/t, tavaara and in his
article 1be Ca.e for .vericav veriati.v in October 2001 he argues that the United States must
accept its role as imperial power as a part o the war on terror.
16


1his positie attitude to imperialism is not repeated.

12
Noemie Lmery, Present at the Re-Creation` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, September 30 2002, Page 33
13
ibid. p.30
14
Robert Kagan and \illiam Kristol, \hat 1o Do About Iraq` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, January 21 2002, Page 25
15
Llliot A. Cohen and A.J. Baceich, A Deense Agenda or \illiam Cohen` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, March 3 199,
Pages 26-29
Daid Brooks, 1he Age o Conlict` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, Noember 5 2001, Pages 19-23
1om Donnelly and Vance Serchuk, A Bigger, Badder, Better Army` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, Noember 29 2004, Pages 16-19
16
Max Boot, 1he Case or American Imperialism` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, October 15 2001, Pages 2-30
Alexander Ohrn

- 65 -
P' 0D=><D<@'8F>'#B<8>?8':<='#B<;NC=D<@')>G:9Y7'
1his paper has inestigated the ideas o neoconseratism between two piotal points in its
history. lollowing the end o the Cold \ar, neoconseratism was declared dead by its major
contributors, yet nonetheless, more than a decade later, U.S. oreign policy cannot be
discussed without reerence to the neoconseraties.

In the autumn o 2006 neoconseratism was once again proclaimed dead, this time most
requently by external commentators, but also increasingly by its ellow traellers. loweer,
other than on the arena o oreign policy, such commentators and pundits hae dealt ery
little with the ideas o the neoconseraties. 1he early neoconseraties hae been
documented by historians and political scientists, and this paper has reiewed a number o
such treatises, written by neoconseraties themseles, more neutral scholars, as well as
critics. 1he contemporary generation o neoconseraties are howeer poorly coered,
despite the signiicant inluence o the ideology on contemporary conseratism it seems to
wield, and on compassionate conseratism` in particular.

1his reiew o 1be !ee/t, tavaara has as such attempted to rectiy this inormation
asymmetry, and it has ound certain incongruities along with a broader understanding o the
neoconseraties o today which goes beyond their oreign policy concerns. 1hese indings
are summarised below and an attempt is made at situating these in the wider discussion o
the American imperial project.

1he mainstream iew o the neoconseraties, or the neocons`, as they are commonly
reerred to suggests that a cabal o neocons` hae inluenced the George \. Bush
administration to inade Iraq and they are said to be responsible or linking Iraq to the wider
war on terror. 1his paper has not presented a conspiracy theory o the like that any web
search including a combination o the keywords neocon` and Iraq` would surely generate.
Rather it has presented a case or understanding the second generation o neoconseraties
as a product o a combination o actors.

One o the things this paper has sought to illustrate is how the material in 1be !ee/t,
tavaara can be used to create ery dierent perceptions o the neoconseraties. On the
one hand there is the orceulness o their take on oreign policy which really comes into
ocus in the years 2001-2005, and which constitutes what this paper reers to as idealistic
hawkishness`. On the other hand, there is in 1be !ee/t, tavaara ample eidence o the
continuity o the more intellectual side o neoconseratism, that is the neoconseratie
persuasion` as Iring Kristol, who reused to consider neoconseratism a political
moement, called it.

As this paper has argued these two aces o the neoconseratie ideology are not ully
compatible, and there is considerable tension between the two and in the present situation it
is air to say that idealistic hawkishness` has the upper hand.

Alexander Ohrn

- 66 -
Gal Beckerman has suggested that the arena where the neoconseratie moement will be
either indicated or oreer buried is Iraq.
1
As closely associated with the war in Iraq,
whether airly or not, it is clear that ailure in Iraq would be a major setback or the
neoconseraties, and would likely diminish their credibility on other issues. Presently,
ailure in Iraq scenario is in the conentional wisdom and mainstream press essentially a
truth.

Michael Lind in his critique puts it more bluntly, and to him the neoconseraties ought to
already hae been thoroughly discredited:

Unortunately or |the neoconseraties|, a political ideology can ail in the real
world only so many times beore being completely discredited. lor at least two
decades, in oreign policy the neocons hae been wrong about eerything.`
18


Consequently, the mainstream press has recently expressed the nearly unanimous erdict that
neoconseratism is now dead. 1he Noember 2006 mid-term election results, which
prompted the resignation o Secretary o Deence Donald Rumseld, and his replacement
with a political realist`, was seen as the deinite end to neoconseratie inluence oer
oreign policy. 1hat this would be a return to realist` oreign policy was immediately reuted
by lred Barnes who in 1be !ee/t, tavaara explains that the nomination o Robert Gates is
not a retreat on hitherto policy.
19


1his is in stark contrast to the Presidential election o 2004 which saw George \. Bush re-
elected. 1od Lindberg suggested just prior to the election that gien U.S. oreign policy in
the post September 11 situation was characterised as neoconseratie, the election was a
reerendum on neoconseratism. le suggested howeer, that whether or not Bush is re-
elected by the public, neoconseratism had in essence already won:

But win or lose, the indication o neoconseratism has already taken place,, in
that the Democratic candidate in 2004 has ound it impossible to run or the
Oal Oice on a platorm o its repudiation, but rather has embraced its central
strategic insights.`
180


1he neoconseratie moement has also seen considerable internal dissent. lrancis
lukuyama in his book .fter tbe ^eocov. ,2006,, published in North America as .verica at tbe
Cro..roaa. ,2006,, departs rom mainstream neoconseratism.
181
le argues that some o the
responses by the Bush administration, speciically those that were identical to the policies
adocated by neoconseraties inside and outside the administration, hae ailed and let the
United States worse o than had they not been implemented. le is reerring to the doctrine
o preentatie war and the inasion o Iraq.

1
Gal Beckerman, 1he Neoconseratie Persuasion` orrara, January 6 2006, http:,,www.orward.com ,accessed on
March 3 2006,
18
Michael Lind, A 1ragedy o Lrrors` 1be ^atiov, lebruary 23 2004, http:,,www.thenation.com ,accessed on Noember 6
2006,
19
lred Barnes, Son Knows Best` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, Noember 2 2006, Pages 12-13
180
1od Lindberg, 1he Reerendum on Neoconseratism` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, Noember 1,8 2004, Page 18
181
lrancis lukuyama, Ater the Neocons - America at the Crossroads` 2006 ,London: Proile Books,, America at the
Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconseratie Legacy` 2006 ,New laen: \ale Uniersity Books,
Alexander Ohrn

- 6 -

\hilst he argues that neoconseratie oreign policy is more complex than it is gien credit,
his account o its main components boils down to the same case this paper has made in
preious sections. lis critique o neoconseratism is limited to its application in the post
September 11 context, that is on the issues o preentatie war, regime change and nation
building in Iraq.

Rather he reers back to the early neoconseraties, whose experiences were shaped by the
Cold \ar, and to some extent the Second \orld \ar, and argues that the lessons rom that
earlier period or the neoconseraties could be abstractly summarised as our key ideas:

.a concern with democracy, human rights, and more generally the internal
politics o states, a belie that U.S. power can be used or moral purposes, a
scepticism about the ability o international law and institutions to sole serious
security problems, and inally, a iew that ambitious social engineering oten
leads to unexpected consequences and oten undermines its own ends.`
182


Charles Krauthammer in a response to one o lukuyama`s articles related to his subsequent
book, argues that lukuyama and others are mistaken to beliee that the neoconseratie
oreign policy doctrine, which he argues is the oundation o the Bush Doctrine, is in anyway
in decline. Rather he argues that i anything, the neoconseratie ision, once a position o
dissent, has now been adopted by a wide audience around the world. In a practical sense,
neoconseratie oreign policy has been disseminated throughout the ranks o those
implementing oreign policy operations in diplomacy and the armed orces.
183


1he remarkable act that the Bush Doctrine is, essentially, a synonym or
neoconseratie oreign policy marks neoconseratism`s own transition rom a
position o dissidence, which it occupied during the irst Bush administration and
the Clinton years, to goernance. Neoconseratie oreign policy, one might say,
has reached maturity.`
184


Richard Perle has echoed this sentiment in interiews, that neoconseratie oreign policy is
now the dominant paradigm in conseratie thought, and argues that the neoconseratie
inluence is not likely to disappear een i uture administrations does not include particular
indiiduals:

I ind one o the sillier ideas is the notion, and you hear it all the time, American
policy has been hijacked by a handul o people, and as soon as they are out o
there we are going to go back to the way it was. 1hey are wrong about that
because we are not the same people we were beore.`
185



182
lrancis lukuyama, Ater the Neocons - America at the Crossroads` ,London: Proile Books, Pages 4-5
183
Charles Krauthammer 1he Neoconseratie Conergence` Covvevtar,, July 5 2005, reprinted in rovtPage Magaive,
http:,,www.rontpagemag.com ,accessed on Noember 1 2006,
184
ibid.
185
Richard Perle interiewed in documentary, Director,\riter: Lugene Jarecki, \hy \e light` ,US: Sony Pictures Classics,
UK: BBC Storyille, 2005
Alexander Ohrn

- 68 -
1he perhaps most common usage o the term Neocon` is in the context o conspiracy
theories placing the neoconseraties as these puppeteers o the George \. Bush
administration. 1here are a number o these theories and this paper has consciously aoided
the temptation to include a discussion o their ideas so as to not distract rom the task at
hand, that is understanding the trends in contemporary neoconseratism and the changes it
has gone through in recent years.

1his paper does not strongly support the argument that the neoconseraties ran a lengthy
and drien campaign to persuade policymakers to go to war in Iraq. \illiam Kristol`s
editorial Saddam Must Go` is oten quoted as the starting point or such a campaign
186
, and
this paper does ind that or approximately one year ollowing the editorial`s publication in
1998 1be !ee/t, tavaara deoted considerable attention to Iraq and Saddam lussein.

1his is to say that whilst regime change in Iraq was a oreign policy target to the
neoconseraties, 1be !ee/t, tavaara aoured regime change by proxy, by supporting local
opposition groups such as that led by Chalabi and Kurdish militia groups. \hilst their
campaign included suggestions o a ground attack, it was not the only method adocated,
albeit the most proocatie.

In the wake o the eents o September 11 2001 this programme was resumed and 1be
!ee/t, tavaara took a number o heaily criticised positions. 1hey emphasised the existence
o a link between Saddam lussein`s regime in Iraq and Osama bin Laden`s Al-Queda
network. A claim now widely belieed to be wrong.

1hey were clearly strong adocators o a military inasion o Iraq during the build-up in
2002 and 2003, and staunch deenders o the Bush Doctrine and o George \. Bush himsel
since the apparent ailure to bring about a liberal democracy in Iraq.

1he Project or the New American Century is requently mentioned with respect to the
inasion o Iraq. 1his paper has not ocused on the Project or the New American Century
other than where their letters hae on occasions been reprinted in 1be !ee/t, tavaara.
loweer, in many ways there is o course signiicant oerlap and it seems air to say that the
two are in symbiosis with each other. As such, when \illiam Kristol states that: .I
wouldn`t exaggerate the inluence o the Project or the New American Century. It is a ery
small think tank but in some respects we argued or |.| elements o the Bush Doctrine
beore the Bush Doctrine existed.`
18
, he is in a sense also talking o the inluence o
neoconseratism itsel.

1he Project or the New American Century, initially ran out o 1be !ee/t, tavaara`s oices
and by largely the same people. Lxplicitly intended to generate support or American global
leadership, it has published a number o oreign policy recommendations in its letters and
papers. As a sort o newsletter, these letters are ar more to the point, and almost exclusiely
deoted to oreign policy. As such any study centred solely on PNAC publications would ail

186
Craig Aaron, Standard Issues` v 1be.e 1ive., October 6 2005 http:,,inthesetimes.com ,accessed on Noember 1 2006,
18
\illiam Kristol interiewed in documentary, Director,\riter: Lugene Jarecki, \hy \e light` ,US: Sony Pictures
Classics, UK: BBC Storyille, 2005
Alexander Ohrn

- 69 -
to incorporate the issues this paper has been able to coer gien its wider reading o 1be
!ee/t, tavaara.

As this paper has demonstrated, 1be !ee/t, tavaara adocated practically all the measures
and policies that we associate with the Bush administration`s war on terror, and did as
\illiam Kristol explained with reerence to the Project or the New American Century,
adocated many o these policies prior to the war on terror. 1he step rom adocacy to
inluence is howeer, signiicant. Rather, this paper is more supportie o regarding the
policy oerlap as deried rom a shared experience o reality.

In widening the context o this paper, the role o the neoconseraties can only be
understood in their entanglement in the second Gul \ar and their relationship to the
George \. Bush administration. \hilst this paper has attempted to study the
neoconseraties through 1be !ee/t, tavaara, as a source o ethnographic material o sorts,
other studies hae ocused more so on the indiidual neoconseraties themseles.

Imperial` is the way that many let wing commentators hae long used with scorn in
describing U.S. oreign policy. 1he discussion on the United States as an imperial power has
recently widened across the political ield and there are now serious academics and less
serious pundits both in aour o, and o course, ehemently opposed to imperialism.

Chalmers Johnson dates imperial tendencies in U.S oreign policy essentially to the Second
\orld \ar, in particular to the end when the United States bombed liroshima and
Nagasaki as deterrence, not to the Japanese, but to the Soiet Union, and represents as such
an act to establish a dominant position in the post-war world. Johnson does not theorise
Lmpire` but inds that the enormous military power o the United States which was built
during the Cold \ar, and its actiities, hae been largely concealed to the American public.
1he empire which Johnson is reerring to is the network o military bases that the U.S.
maintain throughout the world, the proessionalisation o its military and the power this is
intended to exude on potentially competitie countries.
188


Niall lerguson is remarkably honest about the imperial project, and argues that rather than
criticise the inrastructure and the policies as such, what is worth criticising is the tendency to
deny the imperial ambitions o the United States. In his accounts, empires eentually ail
chiely because they ail to embrace their nature`.
189
1he neoconseraties could be
understood in this sense, rom a positie perspectie, as the transormatie intellectuals
needed to reorm, not the application o policy, but how it is represented. 1his has by all
accounts ailed, nor has it been the conscious intention o the neoconseraties, and it is not
within the scope o this paper to speculate whether the neoconseraties hae been
instrumental in bringing the discussion on Lmpire to the surace.


188
Chalmers Johnson, Blowback - 1he Costs and Consequences o American Lmpire` 2000 ,New \ork: lenry lolt &
Co.,, 1he Sorrows o Lmpire - Militarism, Secrecy and the Lnd o the Republic` 2004 ,New \ork: Metropolitan Books,
189
Niall lerguson, Lmpire: 1he Rise and lall o the British \orld Order and the Lessons or Global Power` 2003
,London: Allen Lane,, Colossus: 1he Rise and lall o the American Lmpire` 2004 ,London: Allen Lane,
Alexander Ohrn

- 0 -
1he neoconseraties are or obious reasons o little interest to the progression o eents in
the context o world systems theory or global systemic anthropology, where the emphasis is
on capital ormation and capital decentralisation, in long term historical change.

\allerstein has criticised the imperial project o the United States and argued that it has been
in decline or seeral decades and that the contemporary war on terror is only a catalyst to
structural transormation. le traces the U.S. imperial project to the world recession in 183
and was at the end o the world wars o the 20
th
century irmly on its way to being an
imperial power.
190


1he trend in the United States which \allerstein identiies is generalised and theorised in
Jonathan lriedman`s account. lere the ocus is on capital accumulation and capitalist
distribution which is to say that a hegemon can only retain its dominance or so long, beore
structural transormations within its centre make it more proitable to inest elsewhere.
191

Capital dispersal away rom the centre, takes the shape o globalisation or colonisation and
the ormer is the mechanism through which the hegemon loses its dominance, and the latter
through which a sel-aware hegemon, an empire, extends its dominance as Niall lerguson
suggested.

loweer, both the early neoconseraties and the second generation o neoconseraties
can be useully situated within this context. 1he early neoconseraties deeloped within the
context o liberal anti-communism, the context in which the material and inrastructural
imperial oundation itsel deeloped, and they were actie adocates o not only the deence
industry, but the ideology o American greatness in all aspects o lie. In contrast, the second
generation o neoconseraties hae come to the surace during a period o hegemonic
decline and systemic transormation. 1he bewilderment o the lost cause o the struggle with
an obious enemy, the Soiet Union, makes the second generation o neoconseraties a
puzzle in that they now do not seek a single obious enemy against which to position
themseles. Rather, the neoconseratie project within the context o systematic
transormation is that o opposition to said system. Imperial oer-reach and grand strategies
is in this sense the symptoms o a hegemon gasping or breath, but does not go willingly.

Gary Dorrien, a critic o the neoconseraties, and one o the writers drawn upon in our
historical oeriew o the neoconseraties, is one o the oices situating the
neoconseraties as integral to the imperial project o the United States. laing coered the
early neoconseraties rom a historical perspectie he notes that the neoconseraties neer
really ound non-oreign policy related issues comortable, despite their insistence on
ighting a culture war` during the 1990s.
192


le does howeer argue that the inluence o the neoconseraties on the George \. Bush
administration was not signiicant until the eents o September 11 2001 made key players
more susceptible to ideas o unipolarist policies. As such, Dorrien inds that the
neoconseraties experienced eight years as critics o Clintonite oreign policy, and a urther

190
Immanuel \allerstein, 1he Decline o American Power: the U.S. in a Chaotic \orld` 2003 ,New \ork: New Press,
191
Jonathan lriedman and Christopher Chase-Dunn legemonic Declines: Past and Present` 2004 ,Boulder: Paradigm
Press,
192
Gary Dorrien, Imperial Designs - Neoconseratism and the New Pax Americana` 2004 ,New \ork: Routlegde,
Alexander Ohrn

- 1 -
seen months where they, in their high ranking appointments, had to continue along the
same path.
193


Dorrien argues that the neoconseratie project, the notion o perpetual war and nation-
building, are the key stones o an imperial project. As such he inds that the inasion o Iraq
to the neoconseraties was only a irst step. 1he neoconseratie project to Dorrien goes
beyond the present and is part o a world order constructed and maintained by the unipolar
orce o the United States.
194


Another way o situating the neoconseraties in the war on terror is as the apologists o the
military industrial complex. 1his is how the documentary !b, !e igbt, by ilm maker
Lugene Jarecki, situate the neoconseraties. Drawing on ormer President Dwight D.
Lisenhower`s arewell address in 1961, in which he warned o the deteriorating eects on
democracy that the military industrial complex asserts, Gwynne Dyer states that:

As Lisenhower said, the military industrial complex is really three components.
1here`s the military proessionals, there is deence industry, and there is congress.
1here is now a orth component and that is the think tanks.`
195


1he documentary places a heay emphasis on the role o think tanks, such as \illiam
Kristol`s Project or the New American Century, in creating reasons or the United States to
interene with its military around the globe. 1his argument is in many ways supported by a
study o 1be !ee/t, tavaara, which prides itsel with being hand deliered to eery member
o congress where the deence budget is negotiated. 1be !ee/t, tavaara has throughout its
publication been in aour o increasing deence expenditure as this paper has shown in
sections 3.2.3 and 3.4.1.

1his howeer, places the neoconseraties as subserient to the deence industry and this is
not how they are typically thought o. Gien their more general American politics and their
concern with anti-Americanism, national security and the American way o lie, it is not
completely realistic to understand them too narrowly as the protagonists o particular
industrial interests. 1his is not to say that there is no symbiosis. 1he segments o the
corporate sector which beneit rom American militarism and deence expenditure, clearly
also beneit rom the intellectual elite adocating such spending.

Michael Lind traces the deelopment o neoconseratism not only as originating on the let
wing o American politics, but argues that it has closely imitated the institutions and
analytical ramework o the ar let as well. As such he argues that today`s neoconseraties
are intellectual heirs not only o the early neoconseraties, but also o the 1rotskyites.

1his is contrary to the conclusion o this paper, which has demonstrated the how, what is in
this paper reerred to as the second generation o neoconseraties, are in many ways
disconnected rom the ideas held by the early neoconseraties. 1he idea o nation building`

193
ibid.
194
ibid.
195
Gwynne Dyer interiewed in documentary, Director,\riter: Lugene Jarecki, \hy \e light` ,US: Sony Pictures
Classics, UK: BBC Storyille, 2005
Alexander Ohrn

- 2 -
in particular clearly illustrates this disruption. 1his paper has outlined the rationale o nation
building` or the second generation o neoconseraties, and it is in stark contrast to the
disillusionment the early neoconseraties held with social engineering` as a concept and as
practised.

1hat is, the early neoconseraties were the staunchest critics o social engineering`, a
project comparable to the regime change and subsequent nation building` which 1be !ee/t,
tavaara adocated in the case o Iraq. 1his inconsistency is remarkable and suggests a
change within the neoconseratie ideology, which corresponds to the change in
participants.

1his suggests that neoconseratism cannot be studied as an institution which propagates its
intrinsic alues completely. I we take Iring Kristol`s word or it, neoconseratism is not an
ideology but a persuasion, a perspectie rom which the world is analysed and understood,
then the changing neoconseratie agenda would merely be a response to a changing
context.

1his study has ound nothing to suggest that neoconseratism is not an ideology, other than
perhaps its limited number o subscribers. As the number o sel-conessed neoconseraties
is slight, this would go a long way in understanding the dramatic change in perspectie, as it
makes the impact o inluential oices within the moement all the more noticeable. 1be
!ee/t, tavaara is one such oice and as the heirs to 1be Pvbtic vtere.t, it is now shaping and
relecting contemporary neoconseratism.

As such this paper has suggested that the change in participants is signiicant. 1he second
generation o neoconseraties did not deect rom other, oten let leaning, political
moements, but deected, i rom anywhere, rom the mainstream conseratie moement.
Rather they grew up with neoconseratism, or conseratism in the ashion o Ronald Reagan
and Margaret 1hatcher, where some o the key contributors are een sons o the early
neoconseraties, the \illiam and Iring Kristol, and John and Norman Podhoretz.

1his is a key distinction or this paper. An ideology such as neoconseratism cannot be
studied as greater than its constituent parts. All ideologies are clearly subject to change, as
the participants change. loweer, gien the relatie youth o neoconseratism, the lack o a
central text and the limited number o subscribers it is simply that much more susceptible to
change. 1his is likely how neoconseratism suried its irst death, and quite possible how it
will surie the setback caused by the current military ailure in Iraq.

Another way in which the neoconseraties hae been situated, and which this paper has
only touched upon briely, is as Straussians. lrom the writing and teaching o philosopher
Leo Strauss, the argument has been raised that the he adocated a particular role to the
intellectual elites o society, and the neoconseraties are oten cited as now illing that
position. 1he role o Strauss` intellectuals is to propagate a ision o the ideal society to the
general citizen and by cunning and deception strie to realise that ideal een i this inoles
acting in a manner counterintuitie to those ideals.

In the case o the neoconseraties this argument applies in the noble lie` o arguing or a
war with Iraq on the basis o it possessing weapons o mass destruction and as such posing
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an imminent threat` to the U.S. and its allies. 1his deception is in the Straussian sense benign
because its purpose is to propagate liberal democracy in the Middle Last.

One would o course think that such a Machiaellian argument would be applicable to all
hawkish politicians, but it is typically backed up by some oerlap o amous neoconseraties
with Leo Strauss and his students. Paul \olowitz or example was a student o Allan
Bloom, Strauss` closest student, oten reerred to as is disciple. Iring Kristol also expressed
a great degree o reerence or Leo Strauss as a political philosopher.

In reiewing 1be !ee/t, tavaara, this inestigation came across some reerences to Strauss
and Bloom, and een i it would be counterintuitie or the neoconseraties to publicly
announce their support or the philosopher i their methodology included deception o
noble lies`, a brie summary o these articles seems pertinent.

Peter Berkowitz in 2003 seeks to set the record straight, presumably to cast the
neoconseraties in a more beneolent light than the mainstream and alternatie press had
by then began to cast. le argues that the teachings o Strauss are widely misunderstood. le
does howeer concede that the Straussian inluence on neoconseratism is proound, albeit
not in the way it is oten thought o. le suggests that rather than a cynical and illiberal
philosopher, Strauss was a strong deender o liberal democracy, not because it was a perect
system, but because it was .the orm o goernment best suited to the protection and
enjoyment o human liberty`
196
.

1his is also how Berkowitz understands Strauss` adocacy o religion as a positie inluence
on society, despite his own atheism. In summary, Berkowitz identiies a selection o lessons
rom Strauss that the subsequent neoconseraties took to heart:

1he urgency o deending liberal democracy by encouraging its irtues,
combating its ices, and neer losing sight o its enemies is the great political
lesson that those o his students who became neoconseraties embraced.`
19


Berkowitz has also reiew Kenneth lart Green`s anthology on Leo Strauss, in which it is
argued that Strauss took his Jewish legacy seriously and deried many o his ideas rom
Judaism. Berkowitz argues that whilst it is impossible to categorise Strauss as a religious
belieer, he did hae a great deal o respect or the religious belies o others when they did
not undermine their intellect.
198


Religion is not a dominant topic o 1be !ee/t, tavaara, but there are a number o
reerences, and it would constitute an interesting ield o inquiry or other reiewers more
knowledgeable on the topic.

It is perhaps in Allan Bloom`s writing that we can ind more immediate oerlap. Bloom`s 1be
Cto.ivg of tbe .vericav Miva ,198, was an attack on the educational system and parenthood,

196
Peter Berkowitz, \hat lath Strauss \rought` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, June 2 2003, Page 14
19
ibid. p.15
198
Peter Berkowitz, 1he Reason o Reelation` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, May 25 1998, Pages 31-34
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which he considered responsible or the spread o nihilism and relatiism.
199
1his is o
course consistent with the attack on adersary culture which the early neoconseraties were
associated with. Bloom was a student o Leo Strauss, and 1be !ee/t, tavaara has deoted
occasional attention to him.
200


1his inestigation o the neoconseraties was originally conceied as a continuation o an
undergraduate paper in which it was argued that the current paradigm o misrepresentation
o the other` as a political tool on a hitherto unimaginable scale, potentially constituted the
end o anthropology. \hilst this paper was originally intended as a staunch critique o
neoconseratism, it did not materialise as particularly outright criticism. Rather what I
beliee that this paper presents is a more nuanced picture o the neoconseraties and 1be
!ee/t, tavaara than what is perhaps the norm. 1he typical presentation o neoconseraties
is either one o strong support, but more commonly one o ehement discontent.

In both cases attention is gien to detail, that is to particular statements on particular topics.
As such many reiews, such as some reerenced aboe, ocus on the 1998 PNAC letter to at-
the-time President Clinton, urging him to take action against Iraq and the editorial in 1be
!ee/t, tavaara Saddam Must Go` rom the year beore. 1hese are important articles, but
they constitute only a raction o the arguments and topics coered by the neoconseraties.

\hilst a study o the PNAC would hae generated a ar more oreign policy oriented reiew,
this reiew o 1be !ee/t, tavaara has reealed the width and breadth o neoconseratie
thinking during at least a portion o recent history.

\hat is in many ways the major conclusion o this paper, is that the neoconseraties as they
hae presented themseles and their key arguments, are more o an aberration in history
than it is norm. 1his is to say that the Neocon` as warmonger and idealistic oreign policy
hawk, is neither a new phenomena nor an exclusiely neoconseratie position, but what is
new about this scenario is that this has become the central tenet o the ideology, that with
which it is unequiocally associated with in popular and academic thought.

A reiew o the issues coered by the early neoconseraties, supports this claim. As does
statements and texts by recently deected neoconseratie lrancis lukuyama. In the days
beore the 2006 U.S. mid-term elections, prominent neoconseraties Kenneth Adelman,
Richard Perle and Daid lrum hae all publicly denounced the implementation o the Bush
Doctrine, which they themseles were instrumental in ormulating.
201
1his is perhaps better
understood as a tactic to distance themseles rom an increasingly unpopular \hite louse
administration than as a change in ideas.

\hilst the material proided by journalists such as Daid Rose, the journalist interiewing
Adelman, Perle and lrum, is ascinating, it merely conirms the mainstream iew o the
neoconseraties as nothing other than oreign policy hawks. Part o the problem is that it is
ery easy to pick out selections rom the material proided in print by 1be !ee/t, tavaara,

199
Allan Bloom, 1he Closing o the American Mind` 198 ,New \ork: Simon and Schuster,
200
\erner J. Dannhauser, My lriend, Allan Bloom` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, Pages 43-4
Pia Catton, Still Bloom-ing` 1be !ee/t, tavaara, June 2 199, Pages 12-13
201
Daid Rose, Neo Culpa` 1avit, air, Noember 3 2006, http:,,www.anityair.com ,accessed on Noember 6 2006,
Alexander Ohrn

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Covvevtar,, ormerly 1be Pvbtic vtere.t, and Project or the New American Century and
American Lnterprise Institute.

1he articles by Daid Rose also reconirm the methodological problem o the anthropologist
in dealing with subjects o considerable status and a political agenda which oerlaps that o
academia. Daid Rose gets access to these prominent neoconseraties at a time when they
choose to distance themseles rom the moement. 1his discretionary access would not be
satisactory to the anthropologist, nor would the clandestine methods o the inestigatie
reporter who could dig up connections but would lack oerarching context.

As such, the literary methodology o this paper does not uncoer secret relationships
between requent contributors and key members o the Bush administration, the deence
industry or congress. As an edited magazine, the texts in 1be !ee/t, tavaara conorm to the
broad agenda o the neoconseratie project. 1hereore, this study o the neoconseraties
through a single media outlet proides an opportunity to isolate the signiicant changes that
hae occurred oer the past decade.

1here are a number o key topics with which the neoconseraties are associated, the \ar
on 1error and Iraq being at the oreront. 1his paper has largely looked in the other
direction, and much o the ocus has been on the less requently cited topics. \hen the
editors o major newspapers proclaim neoconseratism dead today, we need to keep in mind
that the major neoconseraties did the same more than a decade ago. In the years between
the Cold \ar and the \ar on 1error, the second generation o neoconseraties, that o 1be
!ee/t, tavaara, remained releant to U.S. politics because they were able to speak with
authority on a range o topics, not primarily as oreign policy experts, but as bipartisan
analysts and eloquent critics o the Democratic Party as well as actions o the conseratie
moement.

In short, this is to say that the general understanding o the neoconseraties o today, as
Neocons`, is as much misleading as it is true. 1he neoconseraties hae pursued the oreign
policy their more reasonable critics accuse them o, a oreign policy programme that this
paper has reerred to as idealistic hawkishness`, primarily but not exclusiely since the eents
o September 11 2001. But their authority rests on a wider oundation, and as such this
paper does not consider it sel-eident that the ailure to bring about liberal democracy in
Iraq, automates the death o the ideology.

1here is a huge gap in the documentation o the neoconseraties. lollowing the irst death`
o neoconseratism in the early 1990s, it seems no one cared to inestigate what the retired
Cold \arriors` turned their attention to, and instead a number o historical and biographical
accounts o neoconseratism were produced. lollowing September 11 2001 the gaze o
media and academia was once again turned to the neoconseraties, and as the Bush
administration seemingly replicated what \illiam Kristol and his ellow traellers at 1be
!ee/t, tavaara and Project or the New American Century had argued in editorials and
open letters, there was widespread belie that they essentially directed the administration.

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1he gap in coerage howeer was neer bridged. 1here exist today only two ersions o the
neoconseraties, the Cold \arriors` and the Neocons`. 1hese categories are not enough.
1his paper has sought to nuance the picture painted o the second generation o
neoconseraties, the Neocons`, not with the purpose o indication or apology, but rather
to acilitate a critique based on a uller picture.


Alexander Ohrn

- -
U' [D6NDB@9:KFJ'
UEA' 59DG:9J'2D8>9:8C9>'

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