Pragmatism

Written by: critical (on Scribd.com)

April 96

A philosophy is to be taken as pragmatist if it follows three central doctrines.

Firstly, the rejection of foundationalism. Secondly, recognition of the role of human

cognition as an important survival tool in the propagation of humanity. Thirdly,

cognitive success should be seen in terms of a distinctly technological praxis.

In rejecting the universality imposed on the world by a foundationalist view,

historicism is embraced as a doctrine of important revelation in the absence of

foundationalist doctrines. Realism and idealism are rejected as independent

alternatives to one another and as meaningful paradigms of cognitive opposition. The

tacit condition that human cognitive powers are sufficient conditions for the survival

of the species. That these powers of thought including the various conceptual

frameworks we may devise (and have devised) are sufficiently based in the reality of

the world to provide survival conditions in the face of sustained adherence to them.

The framework of social interaction with the world has a continuous and instrumental

relation to our ability to survive and is a necessary condition to our survival in the

world. That our cognitive powers as a species do interact favourably with the world

and this social-technological praxis is indeed an assurance of survival (through the

device of being sufficiently based in reality).

An adequate account of the objects of inquiry of the world is not by any means

guaranteed by a competition between competing theoretical accounts of the world.

Our cognitive abilities to survive apparently do not require the survival of the fittest

ideas merely the survival of the fittest overall cognitive abilities as a species. As for

a certain or absolutely correct account of the things of the world relativism appears

to be the most precise adjudication between competing ideas -- a relativism that

accepts that competing ontologies may well both have similar claims on reality. The

correspondence theory of truth as well as dualist representations of good and bad

are rejected, and further, are considered to be the source of the false paradigm

that incompatible ontologies must be a perseverance of the good over the bad (evil).

The foci for modern philosophy as Margolis sees them are also amazingly very

well suited to the rest of what he has said in his paper. 1. Our interactive praxis with

the world is inescapably (fated to be) technological. 2. Non-empirical discoveries or

cognitive journeys are in fact a form of, or are closely related to (evolutionarily

speaking), empirical discovery. Naturally these two sentences are immensely

complementary perhaps even fundamentally circular bliss in a variety of ways -- the

majority of which have already been covered. The second foci entails a very similar

conceptualization to Heidegger's priorities of Dasein. The uniqueness of humans as

users of language who can thereby be the sole agents of discovery of the realm of

knowledge and ontology. Thus not only allowing for humanity to be a great inquirer in

a world with no competition but also relieving any worries that technology might be

its sole means of interface with the world. For the first foci of this paragraph it is

asserted that the

transcendental nature of humanities grasp on technology is evidence that it has

positive confirmation that reality is just as it envisions, most especially to the degree

that humanity has interventionist control over the world (nature). Thus the power

over something is considered proof positive that the empowered one also has explicit

understanding of and through that power. The second element of the first foci

asserts that our fundamental humanity as embodied by empirical questions is not

eclipsed by our transcendentality nor by the increasingly technological nature of our

interaction with the world -- there is nothing to fear. Not only is our technological

state of existence inescapable but it is also not inescapably fearful -- there is no

need to attempt to escape from our destiny of technological progress. Our social and
cognitive evolution will inexonerably continue toward increasing technology, toward

more control over nature. Thus combining the optimism of Marx's dialectic-

materialism with the optimism of Heidegger's historicity and aletheia with very little

of the pessimism of either (too little survival value in pessimism).

The key to the recovery of transcendental reflection lies, not surprisingly,

with social praxis and of course the inescapable technological praxis. Thus

transcendental questions will take the traditional forms, but without the skeptical

perspective interfering with all the fun. These transcendental questions will be the

voice of the society not of singular voices. And in the end these transcendental

collectives will become tools to modify our social praxis. Transcendental "inferences"

will become occupied with the conditions that provide for a singular system world. A

world system that allows differing theories that are not too radically opposed to be

comparable while precluding the possibility of having multiple possible worlds that can

not have even an inkling of understanding among them.