October 14, 2007 No.

31

Are the U.S. and Turkey on a Collision Course?

Gallia Lindenstrauss

Turkish-American relations currently face two significant challenges. One has to do with
the Turkish inclination to enter northern Iraq in order to deal with Kurdish Workers’ Party
(PKK) fighters operating there. The other is connected with an upcoming U.S. House of
Representatives vote on a resolution to recognize as genocide the mass killings of
Armenians by the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Both challenges touch on very
sensitive issues for the Turks, who are convinced that the U.S. is insufficiently attentive
to their needs and demands.
The Turks have threatened to intervene in northern Iraq on several occasions since
the fall of Saddam Hussein but they now appear more determined than ever to do so. In
addition to the existing massive buildup near the border, the government has now decided
to ask for parliamentary approval to send forces into Iraq. This decision follows the
killing of 30 soldiers and civilians by the PKK in the last two weeks, in what are
considered unusually severe actions by the PKK. According to the Turks, the U.S. has
consistently failed to act against PKK fighters hiding in the area of Kandil in northern
Iraq and does nothing to prevent attacks on Turkey from that region.
The approval of the resolution by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on
October 10 prompted severe condemnation by Turkish leaders and led Turkey to summon
its ambassador in the U.S to Ankara for consultations. President Abdullah Gül accused
American politicians of sacrificing big issues for petty games of domestic politics. Given
the Democrat majority in the House, it was expected that the resolution would be
approved by the Foreign Affairs Committee despite strong opposition by the
Administration. Nevertheless, its passage has added to Turkish frustration at the state of
relations with the U.S., and the expected majority for the resolution in the full House in
November promises to contribute to further tensions in relations between the two
countries.
At first glance, there is no substantive connection between the recognition of the
Armenian genocide and the situation in northern Iraq. However, the action by the
Foreign Affairs Committee and the expectation of full House approval in November has
strengthened the perception of the Turks that they have less to lose in terms of Turkish-
U.S. relations if they do act in Iraq. Given that Turkey is more determined to do so and
less likely to heed to American warnings not to intervene, it is possible that the U.S. will
decide to minimize the negative consequences of Turkish intervention by providing at
least partial cooperation. The publication of reports about secret plans for such

1
cooperation suggests that the possibility has already been extensively discussed by the
two sides, notwithstanding American concerns about stability in the Kurdish-controlled
autonomous area in the north of Iraq and about a hostile reaction on the part of the Kurds,
who have been the most loyal American allies in Iraq. Indeed, these concerns suggest
that if the Turks do intervene, the Americans may also have to undertake more aggressive
actions. Given American failures in Iraq up till now, it is doubtful whether the
Administration can permit another failure in the form of unilateral Turkish intervention
seemingly in defiance of the U.S.
Such intervention would have negative consequences that could by neutralized, at
least with respect to Turkish-U.S. relations, if the Americans actually cooperated. By
contrast, Turkey is unwilling to compromise on the Armenian genocide issue and the
Administration cannot impose its will on Congress. It is therefore difficult to see how the
damage to bilateral relations of the likely forthcoming Congressional resolution can be
limited.
Turkish policy indicates that while Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and
President Gül are acting to promote domestic reforms that run counter to the Kemalist
legacy (e.g., abolishing the ban on the wearing of religiously-inspired headscarves in
universities), in foreign affairs they act in conformity with the hard-line Turkish tradition.
That is reflected in the intention to intervene militarily in northern Iraq and in the
ongoing campaign to confront anyone supporting the Armenian position on the issue of
genocide. It is true, of course, that close ties with the United States are also a
traditionally important component of Turkish foreign policy, but it is increasingly
difficult today for Turks to reconcile the contradiction between their interests and those of
the U.S. Since the American invasion of Iraq, Turkish public opinion has also become
more and more anti-American, and that influences decision makers to adopt
uncompromising positions regarding the Kurdish issue and ignore American attitudes.

Although Turkish-American relations appear to be headed toward a crisis, both sides

remain aware of the importance of those ties and therefore try to deal with the challenges
they face. For example, the Americans are concerned that Turkey might block a main
supply line to Iraq across the Turkish-Iraqi border or prevent U.S. aircraft from operating
out of Inçirlik air base. And while the Turks could act unilaterally in Iraq, cooperating
with the United States might enhance international legitimacy for such an action and
soften the negative consequences for Turkey’s (already poor) chances of being accepted
into the European Union; indeed, Turkey would probably prefer that the U.S. itself act
aggressively against the PKK so that Turkey would not have to. But despite the common
desire not to harm bilateral strategic relations, there is a clash between Turkish and
American interests that may very well further convulse the already complicated reality in
Iraq.