101 - STPATECIC STU0IES TEPh PAPEP

Indo - hyanmar PeIatIons and Its StrategIc ImpIIcatIons

Neerja Yadav
|A/|Sc - 1
st
Semester - 0epartment of 0efense and StrategIc AnalysIs
Pune UnIversIty
14
th
Nov, 2011









IntroductIon
|yanmar's geostrategIc locatIon, as sItuated at the trIjunctIon of South AsIa, Southeast AsIa and
East AsIa, enhances Its strategIc relevance to ndIa. |yanmar also occupIes a pIvotal posItIon In the
strategIes of ChIna, 8angladesh and ASEAN countrIes.
The ndIa|yanmar relatIonshIp has been enrIched by nIne vIsIts at the 77P level In the past
decade. The latest vIsIt was by PresIdent TheIn SeIn who heads a more representatIve government
than all hIs predecessors except one, namely PremIer U Nu. ThIs fact alone Imbued TheIn SeIn's
vIsIt wIth specIal sIgnIfIcance, but there are other factors too. A holIstIc assessment of hIs dIalogue
In 0elhI requIres a crItIcal look both at the bIlateral and regIonal dImensIons.
ndIa's only landbordered neIghbour of ASEAN; 8urma could well go on to be ndIa's strategIc
fulcrum Into South East AsIan club. For HIstory of 8urma - refer Annexure 1
The Current ScenarIo and Its ImpIIcatIons
The new presIdent has launched a bold programme of polItIcal and economIc reforms thIs |arch
end, and thIs has set the ball rollIng for the country's tryst wIth democracy. The movement for
change has gathered momentum In the past three months. The reconcIlIatIon effort wIth the Icon
of democracy Aung San Suu KyI, Is a posItIve development.

AccordIng to her, PresIdent TheIn SeIn wants to achIeve posItIve change and |yanmar Is In a
sItuatIon where changes are lIkely to take place.
SInce the vIsIt In July 2010 by hIs predecessor - SenIor Ceneral Than Shwe, the 'strong man' of the
prevIous mIlItary government - the Internal polItIcal landscape In |yanmar has undergone a
notIceable change. A wellplanned transItIon to guIded democracy, accompanIed by an Increased
quotIent of freedom for cItIzens, the release of polItIcal prIsoners, the adoptIon of reform agenda
and a gradually blossomIng reconcIlIatIon between the government and 0aw Aung San Suu KyI, has
generated optImIsm. EvIdently her polItIcal Influence, together wIth her freedom and vIsIbIlIty, are
on the rIse. 8ut prudence demands that the magnItude of change should not be overstated. The
Tatmadaw, I.e. the mIlItary, has agreed to try out a dIfferent method of governance (In whIch a '
cIvIlIan' government bears daytoday responsIbIlIty for the country's affaIrs), but red markers are In
place. PolItIcal forces are expected to behave responsIbly, ensurIng that publIc order and terrItorIal
IntegrIty are not jeopardIsed and no one asks for a fullfledged democracy In a hurry.
Two other Important trends markIng the backdrop should be noted. Dne relates to ChIna and the
other to ndIa. |yanmar's decIsIon to suspend the |yItsone dam project wIth ChIna as the maIn
benefIcIary, has Introduced new tensIons, but the two governments are lIkely to craft a modus
vIvendI soon. The ndIarelated factor Is that South 8lock, facIng crItIcIsm, has begun to strIve hard
to expedIte ImplementatIon of prevIous projects and to choose new projects that are susceptIble to
executIon wIthIn a shorter tIme frame.
Indo-urma PeIatIons - Future
SInce both countrIes emerged as sovereIgn natIonstates, ndIa and 8urma adhered to the fIve
prIncIples of peaceful coexIstence, formulated at 8andung Conference In 1954 as the core of theIr
foreIgn polIcIes. Popularly known as Panchsheel In ndIa.


These were:
(1) |utual respect for each other's terrItorIal IntegrIty and sovereIgnty;
(2) |utual nonaggressIon;
(J) |utual nonInterference In each other's Internal affaIrs;
(4) EqualIty and mutual benefIt; and
(5) Peaceful coexIstence. 8oth countrIes were also actIve In the nonallIance movements as
foundIng members In 1950s.
The foreIgn polIcy for every sovereIgn country Is fundamentally Intended to safeguard theIr natIonal
Interests abroad, and, as such, It Is more or less the extensIon of domestIc polIcIes, whIch can
broadly be descrIbed as: (I) consolIdatIon and preservatIon of natIonal Independence, (II)
safeguardIng of natIonal securIty, and (III) natIonal development. As part of theIr respectIve
"natIonal securIty" Interests, bIlateral relatIon between ndIa and 8urma has maInly focused on
"cooperatIon In combatIng InsurgencIes" along the ndo8urma border, especIally the ChIn, KachIn
and Naga Insurgent groups.
However, It has been changIng rapIdly sInce NarasImha Fao's govt. ndIa had obvIously changed Its
foreIgn polIcy towards 8urma for several reasons, IncludIng: (1) the perceIved need to contaIn the
ChInese Influence In South East AsIa, especIally In 8urma, (2)an urgent need to obtaIn energy
supplIes, especIally natural gas, from 8urma, and (J) the long term need to secure cooperatIon wIth
the 8urmese mIlItary regIme In combatIng InsurgencIes In North East ndIa (cf. Yhome, 2008:
85).WIth thIs changIng new polIcy, ndIa "offIcIally put to an end ... radIcal IsolatIon of |yanmar",
and decIded to "follow the dIplomatIc model of 'ConstructIve Engagement PolIcy' conducted by
ASEAN countrIes" (Egreteau, 200J: 1JJ).
As |yanmar provIdes an alternatIve route through the sea to landlocked and underdeveloped
Northeastern states, ndIa Is keen on furtherIng Its bIlateral relatIons wIth Its neIghbour. ChIna's
IncreasIng Influence In |yanmar pose a potentIal securIty challenge to ndIa whIch cannot be taken
lIghtly. |yanmar's hydropower and hydrocarbon potentIal have InvIted the attentIon and
Investment of varIous countrIes whIch enhances ndIan prospects of enterIng Into joInt venture wIth
foreIgn companIes.
|oreover Investment In both the sectors Is crucIal for ndIa's IncreasIng demand for energy
securIty. ndIa's desIre and efforts to expand Its outreach to Southeast AsIan natIons embedded In
the constructIon of TransAsIan HIghway and TransAsIan FaIl Network wIll remaIn unfulfIlled
wIthout takIng |yanmar Into the loop. |yanmar also holds the key to the ongoIng Insurgency In the
Northeast partIcularly |anIpur and Nagaland. Several Insurgents are belIeved to be operatIng from
safe havens In the western provInces of |yanmar.
ChIna already has a complIant PakIstan In ndIa's west and a ChIna complIant |yanmar actIng such
as PakIstan wIll add to more problems on ndIa's Eastern front. ChInese plans to construct roads
through Yunan and |yanmar wIll gIve ChIna easy access to the 8ay of 8engal and ndIan Dcean
whIch Is consIdered by ndIa as mare nostrum (our sea).
These plans are beIng seen wIth suspIcIon In the ndIan strategIc cIrcle. A road network wIll provIde
ChIna an alternatIve route to the StraIt of |alacca, where ndIan Navy has a strong foothold. EIghty
per cent of ChInese energy supply depends on the StraIt of |alacca. f ChIna's rIsIng economIc and
strategIc stakes are not balanced In |yanmar, New 0elhI wIll be left wIth lIttle or no choIce.
TakIng a cue from ChInese aggressIveness In seIzIng avaIlable opportunItIes, ndIa has adopted a
pragmatIc and realIst approach towards |yanmar. ndIa Is not only eyeIng the huge offshore gas
fIelds but also InvestIng In Infrastructure development IncludIng the Kaladan |ultI|odal TransIt
Transport Project |yanmar.
There exIsts great potentIal and the sky Is the lImIt when It comes to promotIng bIlateral trade.
However compared to ChIna, ndIan share Is neglIgIble. Even In the bIlateral trade between ndIa
and |yanmar trade balance has always remaIned In |yanmar's favour.

Even though |yanmar Is a sIgnatory to Nuclear NonProlIferatIon Treaty and also to the Nuclear
Weapons Free Southeast AsIa, It Is allegedly developIng Its own nuclear weapons.
As of now, nothIng concrete can be saId about Its nuclear desIgns. However, there Is no second
opInIon about ChInese assIstance behInd PakIstanI and North Korean nuclear weapons. ndIa cannot
afford to have one more nuclear power In Its vIcInIty, even If Its possIbIlIty Is slIm.
Therefore, ndIa needs greater Involvement In |yanmar through bIlateral and multIlateral
frameworks IncludIng ASEAN, |ekongCanga CooperatIon and 8|STEC. ndo|yanmar relatIons
have wItnessed ups and downs passIng through varIous phases from "close cooperatIon" through
"IdealIsm" and "realIsm." However the current sItuatIon appears promIsIng for both the countrIes.
8Ilateral trade Is ImprovIng wIth the current fIgures crossIng one bIllIon dollar mark. 0espIte the
fact that trade balance remaIns In |yanmar's favour, ndIa has enough sectors to Invest IncludIng
Infrastructure, hydropower, hydrocarbons, CT, 8T, jewellery, pharmaceutIcals and cooperatIon In
the fIeld of HF0.
CounterInsurgency cooperatIon and border management are two Important areas where ndIa
needs |yanmar on Its sIde. t the case of |yanmar, It Is always the mIlItary junta whIch choses to
engage wIth a foreIgn country and not the other way round. Fortunately thIs tIme |yanmar has
extended Its hand towards ndIa to enhance securIty cooperatIon. The hIgh level InteractIons from
both sIdes have sIgnIfIcantly Increased.
There are several problems that ndIa has been wItnessIng from across the border. Steps are beIng
taken to address the common problems faced by both the countrIes IncludIng demarcatIng the 164J
km shared border. The crossborder smugglIng of narcotIcs, small arms and ammunItIons are also
hIgh on the agenda of both the countrIes. The scope for enhancIng mIlItary cooperatIon Is
tremendous.
ndIa has not only gIven mIlItary aId to |yanmar In the past but also traInIng to Its securIty
personnel. 8oth countrIes have conducted joInt counterInsurgency operatIons to naIl down
Insurgents.
ndIa's Northeastern states share 98 percent of theIr border wIth the neIghbourIng countrIes I.e.
InternatIonal borders and have only a two percent lInkage wIth maInland ndIa. ThIs unIque feature
makes the regIon more vulnerable not only In terms of securIty, but also access to basIc amenItIes.
The rate of growth In the Northeastern states Is far slower than the natIonal average. ndIa
through Its Look East PolIcy has attempted to target these problems IncludIng; Insurgency and
underdevelopment In the Northeast and greater connectIvIty wIth Southeast AsIan natIons,
obvIously through |yanmar.
|yanmar Is also aware of the IncreasIng ChInese Influence and wants to avoId overrelIance on
ChIna by dIversIfyIng Its defence procurements and other Investments In Infrastructure of hIgh
relevance. The mIlItary junta has cautIously adopted a polIcy whIch Is rooted In the feelIng of
natIonalIsm and IdentIty whIch ndIa needs to understand, especIally the domestIc determInants of
|yanmar's polIcy towards rest of the world In general and Its neIghbours In partIcular.
ndIa should also focus on the geopolItIcal and polItIcomIlItary realItIes and how they Influence
polIcIes In |yanmar. For Instance, the generals In |yanmar have resorted to perIodIc actIons
agaInst Insurgent groups on Its western perIpherIes because |yanmar pays more attentIon to Its
border wIth ChIna.
Needless to mentIon that utmost attentIon Is paId to the areas InhabItIng people of 8urman/8amah
race who constItute 69 per cent of the populatIon. AccordIng to the UN |yanmar Is the thIrd
bIggest contrIbutor of refugees after AfghanIstan and raq. The refugee problem has affected
|yanmarThaIland relatIons and may affect relatIons wIth other Southeast AsIan natIons.
ndIa also needs to be prompt In Its approach whIle seIzIng the Investment opportunItIes In
|yanmar. There exIst enormous opportunItIes but the fIrst comers wIll get the better deal.
StrategIcally |yanmar has been and wIll remaIn Important for ndIa as It holds key to stabIlIty In
the Northeast, economIc and trade lInkages wIth the Southeast AsIan markets and stemmIng
ChIna's IncreasIng Influence In the regIon.

***


Re]erences:
1. ndc's Mycnmcr Polcy - An Alternctve Rocdmcp by Ann Koppuzhc, Resecrch ntern, No
ZZ, 1uly 2008
2. Strcteyc 0mensons o] ndoMycnmcr Relctons by 0r. Rc]esh Kcpoor - CLAWS
J. H.E Rc]v 8hctc - Erstwhle ndcn Ambcsscdor to Mycnmcr
4. Southcsccnclyss.ory
5. 0r. R. P. Ycdcv - Culturcl Attcche' to ndcn Ambcsscdor to Mycnmcr - 2001 2005













Annexure 1 - HIstory of urma
The UnIon of |yanmar, known as 8urma tIll 1989, Is the largest country by geographIcal area
(678,500 sq kms) In maInland Southeast AsIa. t Is bordered by ChIna on the northeast (wIth the
Hengduan Shan mountaIns as the boundary), Laos on the east, ThaIland on the southeast,
8angladesh on the west, ndIa on the northwest and the 8ay of 8engal to the southwest. DnethIrd
of |yanmar's total perImeter forms an unInterrupted coastlIne of 1,9J0 kIlometres. |yanmar and
ndIa share a border of over 1,600 kIlometers. The country's culture, heavIly Influenced by Its
neIghbours, Is based on Theravada 8uddhIsm.
Known human habItatIon In |yanmar goes back nearly 5000 years, from when the |on, consIdered
to be the fIrst InhabItants, settled In central |yanmar and along the eastern coast of 8ay of 8engal.
t Is belIeved that the |on establIshed some trade and cultural contacts wIth the early InhabItants
of ndIa. The 8urmans (orIgInally from Yunnan), who establIshed theIr fIrst kIngdom In |yanmar In
849 A.0., eventually absorbed the communItIes of the |on and Pyu people. KIng Anawrahta (r 1044
1077) set up the Pagan KIngdom brIngIng about the fIrst unIfIed state of |yanmar. KublaI Khan's
vIctory In 1287 started a perIod of contInual conflIcts that contInued for many centurIes. The
appearance of Europeans had lIttle effect on |yanmar due to these conflIcts, untIl they InfrInged
on the 8rItIsh Faj In 8engal. ThIs brought about 8rItIsh InterventIon (from 1824) and, though
Fangoon was occupIed In 185J, all of 8urma was formally annexed to 8rItIsh ndIa only In 1886.
8urma was admInIstered as a provInce of 8rItIsh ndIa untIl 19J7, when It became a separate
colony. Dne of the results of the 8rItIsh occupatIon was the flow of ChInese and ndIan ImmIgrants,
who tended to exploIt the 8urmans. ndIans were drafted In large numbers Into the colonIal army
durIng the three Anglo8urma wars In the 19th century, and about 400,000 ndIans were taken there
to run varIous publIc servIces. The persons of ndIan orIgIn on the eve of the Japanese InvasIon
numbered about 1.1 mIllIon.
Strong 8urmese resentment agaInst the 8rItIsh was notIced as early as 1919. t was often vented In
vIolent rIots that paralyzed Yangon on occasIon. |uch of the dIscontent was caused by a perceIved
dIsrespect for 8urmese culture and tradItIons, lIke the 8rItIsh not removIng theIr shoes upon
enterIng 8uddhIst temples or other holy places. When scandalIzed 8uddhIst monks attempted to
physIcally expel a group of shoewearIng 8rItIsh In EIndawya Pagoda (|andalay) In Dctober 1919,
the leader of the monks was sentenced to lIfe ImprIsonment for attempted murder. Such IncIdents
InspIred the 8urmese resIstance to use 8uddhIsm as a rallyIng poInt for theIr cause. 8uddhIst monks
became the vanguards of the Independence movement, and many dIed whIle protestIng. Students
were also actIve partIcIpants In antI8rItIsh actIvItIes.
NatIonalIst sentIments became more evIdent wIth the start of World War . A student leader, Aung
San (and hIs "thIrty comrades") went to Japan for "traInIng". Dn return, they founded the 8urma
ndependence Army (8A) In 8angkok (whIch was then under Japanese occupatIon) on 26 0ecember
1941, wIth the help of Japanese IntellIgence. When Fangoon fell In |arch 1942, the 8A formed an
admInIstratIon for the country that operated In parallel wIth the Japanese mIlItary admInIstratIon.
Dn 1 August 194J, the Japanese declared 8urma to be an "Independent" natIon, and Aung San was
appoInted War |InIster. Later, Aung San became skeptIcal of the Japanese promIses and made
plans to organIze an uprIsIng In 8urma (In cooperatIon wIth CommunIst leaders ThakIn Than Tun and
ThakIn Soe), wIth help from the 8rItIsh authorItIes In ndIa. Dn 27 |arch 1945, he led the 8NA In a
revolt agaInst the Japanese occupIers and helped the AllIes defeat the Japanese; and the 8rItIsh
establIshed a mIlItary admInIstratIon.
The AntIFascIst DrganIsatIon (formed In August 1944) was transformed Into the AntIFascIst
People's Freedom League (AFPFL), a unIted front consIstIng of the 8NA, the CommunIsts and the
SocIalIsts. The 8NA was gradually dIsarmed by the 8rItIsh, when the Japanese were drIven out of
8urma. Aung San turned down the rank of 0eputy nspector Ceneral of the 8urma Army and became
the mIlItary leader of the People's 7olunteer DrganIsatIon. He was popularly referred to as 8ogyoke
(meanIng Ceneral).
After cIvIlIan government was restored In 8urma In Dctober 1945, Aung San became the PresIdent
of the AFPFL In January 1946. n September, he was appoInted 0eputy ChaIrman of the ExecutIve
CouncIl of 8urma by the new 8rItIsh Covernor, and was made responsIble for defence and external
affaIrs. [ThIs was analogous to the appoIntment of Jawahar Lal Nehru as the 7Ice PresIdent of the
nterIm Covernment In ndIa, In June 1946.] The communIsts left the AFPFL, when Aung San and
others accepted seats on the ExecutIve CouncIl. Aung San (at the age of J1) was to all Intents and
purposes the PrIme |InIster. Dn 27 January 1947, Aung San and Clement Attlee sIgned an
agreement In London guaranteeIng 8urma's Independence wIthIn a year. n AprIl, the AFPFL won
196 out of 202 seats In the ConstItuent Assembly. Tragedy struck on 19 July 1947, when a gang of
armed paramIlItarIes broke Into the SecretarIat 8uIldIng and assassInated Aung San and sIx of hIs
cabInet mInIsters, who were partIcIpatIng In a meetIng of the ExecutIve CouncIl. [The assassInatIon
was allegedly carrIed out on the orders of polItIcal rIval U Saw, who was subsequently trIed and
hanged.] U Nu, (a former student leader) and ForeIgn |InIster 8a |aw took over the leadershIp of
the government and AFPFL.
The country became Independent on 4 January 1948, as the UnIon of 8urma. t became the
SocIalIst FepublIc of the UnIon of 8urma on 4 January 1974, before revertIng to the UnIon of
8urma on 2J September 1988. Dn 18 June, 1989, the State Law and Drder FestoratIon CouncIl
(SLDFC) adopted the name UnIon of |yanmar.
|IlItary Fule
CIvIlIan government ended In 1962 when Ceneral Ne WIn led a mIlItary coup and put U Nu In prIson.
|yanmar now has one of the longest survIvIng mIlItary regImes In the world. Ne WIn ruled for nearly
26 years and pursued polIcIes In the name of "8urmese Way to SocIalIsm". 8etween 1962 and 1974,
8urma was ruled by a FevolutIonary CouncIl headed by the general, and almost all aspects of
socIety (busIness, medIa, productIon IncludIng the 8oy Scouts) were natIonalIzed or brought under
government control. n an effort to consolIdate power, Ceneral Ne WIn and many top generals
"resIgned" from the mIlItary and took cIvIlIan posts. They held "electIons" under a oneparty
system and Ne WIn ruled 8urma between 1974 and 1988, through the 8urma SocIalIst Programme
Party (8SPP), whIch was the sole polItIcal party allowed to functIon. The 8urmese Way to SocIalIsm
adopted SovIetstyle natIonalIzatIon and central plannIng and was a kInd of an amalgam of
8uddhIsm and |arxIsm. 0urIng thIs perIod, 8urma became one of the world's most ImpoverIshed
countrIes. People whose ancestors were not from the orIgInal |yanmar races, I.e. SIno8urman
and ndo8urman communItIes, were classIfIed as "assocIate cItIzens or "resIdent alIens", wIth the
rIght to vote, but not allowed to be elected or hold government posItIons above a certaIn level.
ThIs and the wholesale natIonalIsatIon of prIvate enterprIses led to the exodus of about J00,000
8urmese ndIans.
Almost from the begInnIng of mIlItary rule, there were sporadIc protests agaInst It, many organIzed
by students, and were almost always vIolently suppressed by the government. Student protests
were vIolently broken up every year durIng 197477. Unrest over economIc mIsmanagement and
polItIcal oppressIon led to wIdespread prodemocracy demonstratIons throughout the country In
1988. SecurIty forces kIlled thousands of demonstrators. Ne WIn stepped down In July. Aung San
Suu KyI (the daughter of Aung San), In partnershIp wIth 8rIgadIer Aung CyI and Ceneral TIn U, trIed
to appease those who resented the mIlItary rule and was only partly successful. 0efense |InIster
Ceneral Saw |aung staged a coup In September and formed the State Law and Drder FestoratIon
CouncIl (SLDFC). n 1989, SLDFC declared martIal law after wIdespread protests. n July, Aung San
Suu KyI was placed under house arrest and Ceneral TIn U put In prIson.
n |ay 1990, the government held free electIons for the fIrst tIme In almost J0 years. The NatIonal
League for 0emocracy (NL0), the party of Aung San Suu KyI, won J92 out of a total 489 seats, and
60 of the votes. The electIon results were, however, annulled by SLDFC, whIch arrested most of
Its top leaders and declared that a nonmIlItary government could not be establIshed In |yanmar,
wIthout a new constItutIon. The award of the Nobel Peace PrIze to Aung San Suu KyI In 1991 put a
lot of pressure on the SLDFC. When Ceneral Than Shwe took over as SLDFC chaIrman In 1992,
many polItIcal prIsoners were released and Aung San Suu KyI was allowed vIsIts from her famIly; and
later allowed to meet a U.S congressman, a UN offIcIal and an AmerIcan reporter.
n 1992, SLDFC unveIled plans to create a new constItutIon through the NatIonal ConventIon, whIch
began 9 January 199J. When the mIlItary dIrected It to gIve It a major role In the government, NL0
party members walked out the conventIon. The NatIonal ConventIon contInues to convene and
adjourn. |any major polItIcal partIes, partIcularly the NL0, have been absent or excluded, and
lIttle progress has been made.
The State Law and Drder FestoratIon CouncIl was renamed as the State Peace and 0evelopment
CouncIl (SP0C) In 1997, wIth the same leadershIp as the SLDFC.
Dn 7 February 2008, SP0C announced that a referendum would soon be held relatIng to the new
ConstItutIon, and that electIons would be held by 2010. The referendum, held on 10 |ay 2008,
promIsed a dIscIplIneflourIshIng democracy for the country. The referendum Is seen by many as
an effort to "legalIse" the perpetuatIon of the mIlItary rule.
|yanmar Is no longer a pure mIlItary regIme. WIth the electIons In November 2010, a 'cIvIlIan'
government In place. An elected parlIament and regIonal assemblIes are functIonIng under the new
constItutIon.