Is Mills (negative) conception of freedom an adequate basis for the definition of what it means to be free within a society?

Mill being a negative liberty theorist gives his position on the philosophical problem of freedom through the Liberty Principle1. The advantage of his political theory is based on the simplicity of his argument.2 In order to define harmful actions, he comes to examine what can be a harmful action for an individual, and it is at this point that he introduces the tenet of the private and public spheres of actions. Critical points made in this essay concerning his theory mainly follow two trains of thoughts; firstly, problems which arise within his theory either because of lack of specificity or the inaccuracy of his arguments; and secondly, problems concerning his premises. The first kind of objections refers mainly to his opinion about individuals, that they are persons who get to know things from their experiences, keen on discovering the truth etc. Secondly, although, the idea of differentiating spheres is a radical one and seems to be beneficial for the people he doesnt provide us with clear and detailed separation of the two spheres. Mill himself implies that the criteria of separation are self-evident and based on calculations of the utility. Although utility is considered to have intrinsic value and to be the ultimate source of defining freedom, his theory doesnt provide us with adequate information concerning the production and calculation of it. But I am not going to elaborate further on that problems rather examine the premises of his theory. Firstly he seems to identify the notion of the non-coercion and non-interference with the notion of freedom3. Coercion is considered bad as such, although it could be applied to prevent another worse situation. This counterargument seems to emerge from our experience in life e.g. the state has imposed a limitation on roads and has
1

The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant Mill (2003), p. 80

Berlin (1969), pp. 118-172 Berlin (1969), pp. 118-172

invented rules and traffic lights. If I am a citizen of this state my freedom is automatically decreased, because I have to stop and stick to the traffic rules. However, there is a purpose, the protection of the citizens, which is equally good for all the people. Secondly, Mill based his whole theory on his conception that men are fascinated on discovering the truth and that through the liberties they are given they develop critical, imaginative and independent personality. How can we prove that the conditions of freedom can breed these kinds of valuable personalities? This liberal view is in contradiction with some evidence of history which shows that the love of truth is cultivated more in communities with military discipline, such as puritan Calvinists, and if this is true then Mills argument that liberty is a precondition for development of personalities that cultivate the truth falls to the ground.4 As I explained above, Mill rely simply on an opportunity-concept, where being free is a matter of what we can do, which are the opportunities we have and the only limits are external factors which may stop us. However, the experiments of life require a kind of self realization. This kind of view cannot rely on opportunity concept, because in order to be free to realize yourself and make decisions you should have already been awarded of your potential in life. Positive theorists on the other hand have argued that somebody is free to the extent that one has effectively determined his life and he has discriminated the motives of his actions exercise concept.5 If we are free to exercise certain capacities which are in a way blocked by an inner barrier then we are less free or not at all. Once negative theorists adopt a self realization view of freedom, then they are based on the exercise concept too. On Taylors view the path from negative to positive freedom is consisting of two steps. The first step is based on the stimulation of the fundamental difference in the conception of freedom. Nowadays liberal societies and negative theorists value selfrealization and argue that the exercise of freedom can be obscured by internal reasons;
4

Ibid pp.118-172 Taylor (1979), pp. 175-193

however they also claim that nobody in principle can have the authority to impose such guidance to others because it will destroy other necessary conditions of freedom. Positive theorists at this point would answer back that we cannot defend a view of freedom which doesnt involve some qualitative discrimination as to motive i.e. which doesnt impose some restrictions on motivation among the necessary conditions of freedom. Additionally, negative liberty scheme has no place for the notion of significance; rather it allows only quantitave judgments. The second step involves our understanding of ourselves as members of a society and not as absolutely independent of the influences of our social environment. Positive theorists claim that we do what we want in a certain canonical form of a society. Then being free is governing us collectively according to this canonical form. So the application even of our negative notion of freedom requires a background conception of what is significant and these values are cultivated in the limits of a society. Our attributions of freedom make sense in a more general background of values and purposes and how these are fulfilled or obscured. Furthermore our purposes can be frustrated by our own desires or fears. A mans freedom is then his capacity to exercise his freedom using his strong evaluation in order to distinguish his really important purposes. Because of the peoples disposition to make this distinction which involves their clarifying their thoughts, desires and emotions, the community can play this role of deciding about accepted behavior, values which would show the correct path to the people. If and only if the society adopts common values and codes, can a community live in harmony. As we observe, there is a difference in the conception of the correlation of community and individuals between liberal theorists such as Mill and communitarian theorists such as Charles Taylor. Taylor emphasizes the importance of the relationship of individuals with the community and argues that men can only define themselves in relation to a cosmic order, thus as he put it, people see themselves as parts of a society, like we see our hand as a part of our body.6 In this case liberties are a part of a role people adopt in a society, and roles are differentiated as in traditional societies,
6

Taylor (1975), pp. 410-14

where differentiation was a reflection of a hierarchical order. However, Mill supports a modern, revolutionary theory of individuals; accordingly men are self-defining subjectively, independent from the circumstances of the society they are born into. More analytically, in the liberal view individuals are free to choose the kind of life and the liberties they want, and afterwards they assess critically whether the society they live in is structured properly. 7 Alasdair Macintyre, while discussing the unity of life and tradition, makes some useful key thoughts. He argues that when we have to decide about ourselves we ask: what is good for me? The question rephrased is: how should I live out the unity of my life in the society and bring it to completion? And then we ask, what is good for a man? The answer to the second question is the common element from all the possible answers to the first question. However, an individual, in order to determine his conception of his final telos, should already have in mind an initial conception of good.8 The procedure of questing for a good life and by extension its liberties, is in a sense already bound by the society we live in, because we always inherit a basic mentality and outlook from our society, thus, as Sandel argues, community describes a mode of self-understanding. Moreover, being citizens of a society not only defines which liberties and restrictions we have but also what we are, in the sense that individuals should examine their position in the society and discover their role and liberties within it.9 Sandel claims that communal values are not just chosen by the citizens but are elements which compose their identity. It seems to me that he violates our selfunderstanding, without giving us any place for self discovery, however. Individuals are presented as being trapped in their societys concept of liberties, the good life, etc, incapable of judging the inherited values. Liberals and communitarians disagree on the role of the state, as Ralws summarize it the proper role of the state is to protect the free internal life of the community of
7

ibid pp. 410-14 Macintyre (1981), pp.203-206 Sandels (1982), pp. 150-2

interests in which persons and groups seek to achieve the ends and excellence to which they should be drawn.10 Communitarians, in contrast, argue that the state should enforce a public ranking of the potentials in life which should be followed?11 In trying to arrive at my own opinion on this, I have discovered that both theories have failed to give a fully rounded or complete understanding of the notion of freedom because they are absolute theories. Although neither my academic knowledge nor my depth of thought allow me to discover a new notion of freedom, I could argue that in real life peoples freedom depends on both factors (external factors and self-knowledge) and the variables which make an individual free are innumeral. I found very interesting Mills view on the progressive-individual, but I believe that it is not self-evident as a circumstance at all, thus I believe that the political representatives of the people should give these stimuli to the members of the community which would lead them discover their special and unique nature. Communitarians, on the other hand, are correct to remind us that the context of the society in which we live plays a vital role in giving meaning to the word freedom.

10

Rawls (1971), p. 543 Kymlicka (1990), p.230

11