Why did Corn Law repeal lead to the collapse of Peels government?

One of the historically significant and contentious issues during Peels second administration of 1841-46 was the repeal of the Corn Laws which had remained in place since Liverpools administration due the large and influential support base which it enjoyed. The Corn Laws were heavily supported by the aristocracy and the landed gentry as it provided security for their income; the income they accumulated was largely from the rent paid by tenant farmers to farm on the land owned by the land owners. Peel as leader of the Conservative party knew that the vast majority of his party were wealthy land owners who were strongly in favour of retaining the Corn Laws and also opposed any form of legislation that would put their income at risk. However despite the obvious contention which Corn Law repeal would cause it seems unclear to the casual observer how the repeal of trading regulation could have had the effect of abruptly ending an administration widely cited by historians as one of the most successful of the Victorian era. One of the most debatable factors surrounding Peels attempt to repeal the Corn Laws is Peels motivation for repeal especially since he was head of a party which was very openly opposed to the notion. Peel was home secretary during the perceived liberal tory governments of 1822-1830 which put forward some legislation highly atypical of Tory governments particularly economically; for instance the repeal of the Navigation Laws and the easing of trade restrictions on British colonies. Economic measures such as these appear to be instigating the basis of a free trade economy and to some extent these measures proved to be a success. Perhaps this gives an indication that the Corn Law repeal was due to Peels own experience of free trade measures introduced by the liberal Tory governments. Indeed Peel was once quoted as saying no alternative but to deal with the Corn Laws before a national calamity would force it on, this would suggest that Peel had already decided on Corn Law repeal before the Irish famine had even occurred and so it could be inferred that Peel had ideological reasons for the repeal of the Corn Laws. However historian Norman Gash is dismissive of the idea that Peels economic policies were the result of ideology; Gash argues that Peels policies were arrived at by a process of practical common sense rather than any doctrine. If Gashs belief of Peel being motivated by pragmatic rather than ideological reasoning is valid, then it would mean that the common accusations that Peel was swayed by pressure groups such as the Anti-Corn Law League were false. Therefore the league was not the cause of repeal of the Corn Laws and therefore also cause of the downfall of Peels second administration. The league had been set up in 1838 by two Manchester industrialists: John Bright and Richard Cobden. Bright and Cobden both believed strongly in the benefits of free trade they saw the Corn Laws as heavily damaging to British industry; because of this they set up the league to pressure for repeal. The league carried out their campaign against the Corn Laws using a highly organised and very strong campaign. Cobden and Bright made great use of media to spread the message of repeal to the public writing articles, founding anti Corn law newsletters and delivering lectures amongst other things. They attacked the Corn Laws from many angles such as arguing that repeal would promote international cooperation due to greater trade links; but also from a moral standpoint complaining about the immorality of the Corn Laws and of the privilege of landowners as a whole. The league soon gathered a large following much to the annoyance of much of Peels party. Many MPs despised the concept of single issue politics and of course many also virulently opposed the message that the league was attempting spread to put pressure on Westminster. However the establishment also saw the league as a threat of class war and were associated by some with Chartism who unlike the league was not completely opposed to using violent methods. Indeed Richard Cobden admitted after repeal I am afraid that most of us entered upon this struggle with the belief that we had some direct class interest in the question which validates the opinion held by much of the landed gentry that the Anti Corn Law League was motivated by class and not solely by economic reasoning. It could appear that Peel was unwilling to repeal the Corn Laws before 1846 due to his own resentment to the league and its secular agenda but also to avoid appearing to be influenced by the league and be seen as weak as a result. By 1846 the influence of the league which had been highly prominent in the late 1830s and early 1840s was dying down and so Peel it was possible to repeal the

Corn Laws without being accused of being led by the Anti Corn Law League. However despite this the perception of many in his party and that of many historians is that the league and its free trade teachings did influence Peel in his actions. For much of his party Peel appeared weak as a Prime Minister and many of his party felt Peel was betraying his own parties values due to the belief held by some that Peel was influenced or coerced by the league. The fact that Peel pledged to retain the Corn Laws as part of his 1841 manifesto further added to the great sense of betrayal felt by his own party. The official reason for the repeal of the Corn Laws was that repeal would provide some relief to those affected by the Irish famine of 1845-49. However it seems apparent that repeal had little if anything to do with Peels desire to repeal the Corn Laws. The Chancellor of the Exchequer Henry Goulburn wrote to Peel in November 1845 that repeal could not materially affect this years supply, or give us any corn which will not equally reach us under the law as it stands. Goulburns verdict that repeal could not improve the immediate supply of corn undermines the stance that Peel intended to repeal the Corn Laws in order to relieve the starving Irish people. This hole in Peels logic which he tried to sell to his party was one of the reasons which many felt he had ulterior motives for repeal. In the end the repeal was passed by Parliament but only with support from the Whigs; over two thirds of the Conservative Party voted against the repeal bill which is a vivid demonstration of his own partys disapproval of his actions and of the perceived betrayal of the members of his party. Peels administration did not end until Peel attempted to pass an Irish Coercion Bill later that year. This time both the Whigs and his own party voted against the bill which would have been easily passed were it not for the Conservative MPs wishing to deliver Peel a sentiment of their anger at his leadership. The failure to pass the Irish Coercion Bill showed to Peel that he had lost the support of his party making it impossible for him to operate effectively as a Prime Minister. As a result of this Peel resigned as Prime Minister causing a split in his party into Peelite and traditionalist factions which heavily damaged the solidarity of the party. The damage to the party proved to be long lived and it was not for 20 years that a Conservative government could be formed through an election, the Whigs took advantage of the split in the Conservative ranks to get themselves into government later that year and the weak and divided Conservatives were in no position to oppose them. The Corn Law repeal was by no means the only contentious issue of which Peel faced opposition from his party. Bills such as the Maynooth Grant in which Peel appeared to be holding his own backbenchers in a state of contempt also did large amounts of damage to party relations. It is clear though that the Corn Laws were the final straw for a party which had become dissatisfied with his leadership. The Corn Laws had taken centre stage in the establishment versus reformers trade debate which also encompassed many who saw it is a battle about class rather than economics. This added the sense of anger and betrayal felt by many which ultimately created the division in the party that destroyed the solidarity of the party and made them easy to topple.