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SepLember 21 1949

C8 no L961
8LANDINA GAM8CA nILADC peLlLloner
vs
ICSL GU1ILkkL2 DAVID VICLN1L I IkANCISCC IACC8 ASSAD and SLLIM IACC8 ASSAD respondenLs

uelqoJo ulzoo ooJ llotes fot petltlooet
vlceote I ltooclsco fot tespooJeots



lL appears LhaL on Aprll 23 1943 8landlna Camboa Pllado broughL an acLlon agalnsL Sellm !acob Assad
Lo annul Lhe sale of several houses and loL execuLed durlng Lhe !apanese occupaLlon by Mrs Pllados
now deceased husband

Cn May 14 ALLorneys Chnlck velllla and 8alonklLa flled an answer on behalf of Lhe defendanL and on
!une 13 ALLorneys uelgado ulzon llores and 8odrlgo reglsLered Lhelr appearance as counsel for Lhe
plalnLlff Cn CcLober 3 Lhese aLLorneys flled an amended complalnL by lncludlng !acob Assad as parLy
defendanL

Cn !anuary 28 1946 ALLorney lranclsco enLered hls appearance as aLLorney of record for Lhe defendanL
ln subsLlLuLlon for ALLorney Chnlck velllla and 8alonklLa who had wlLhdrawn from Lhe case

Cn May 29 ALLorney ulzon ln Lhe name of hls flrm wroLe ALLorney lranclsco urglng hlm Lo dlsconLlnue
represenLlng Lhe defendanLs on Lhe ground LhaL Lhelr cllenL had consulLed wlLh hlm abouL her case on
whlch occaslon lL was alleged she Lurned over Lhe papers Lo ALLorney lranclsco and Lhe laLLer senL
her a wrlLLen oplnlon noL recelvlng any answer Lo Lhls suggesLlon ALLorney uelgado ulzon llores and
8odrlgo on !une 3 1946 flled a formal moLlon wlLh Lhe courL whereln Lhe case was and ls pendlng Lo
dlsquallfy ALLorney lranclsco

ALLorney lranclscos leLLer Lo plalnLlff menLloned above and ldenLlfled as LxhlblL A ls ln full as follows

vlCLn1L ! l8AnClSCC

ALLorneyaLLaw

1462 LsLrada Manlla

!uly 13 1943

Mrs 8landlna Camboa Pllado

Manlla hlllpplnes

My dear Mrs Pllado

lrom Lhe papers you submlLLed Lo me ln connecLlon wlLh clvll case no 70073 of Lhe CourL of llrsL
lnsLance of Manlla enLlLled 8landlna Camboa Pllado vs S ! Assad l flnd LhaL Lhe baslc facLs whlch
broughL abouL Lhe conLroversy beLween you and Lhe defendanL Lhereln are as follows

(a) 1haL you were Lhe equlLable owner of Lhe properLy descrlbed ln Lhe complalnL as Lhe same was
purchased and/or bullL wlLh funds excluslvely belonglng Lo you LhaL ls Lo say Lhe houses and loL
perLalned Lo your paraphernal esLaLe

(b) 1haL on May 3 1943 Lhe legal LlLle Lo Lhe properLy was wlLh your husband Mr Serafln Pllado and

(c) 1haL Lhe properLy was sold by Mr Pllado wlLhouL your knowledge on Lhe aforesald daLe of May 3
1943

upon Lhe foregolng facLs l am of Lhe oplnlon LhaL your acLlon agalnsL Mr Assad wlll noL ordlnarlly
prosper Mr Assad had Lhe rlghL Lo presume LhaL your husband had Lhe legal rlghL Lo dlspose of Lhe
properLy as Lhe Lransfer cerLlflcaLe of LlLle was ln hls name Moreover Lhe prlce of 110000 ln !apanese
mlllLary noLes as of May 3 1943 does noL qulLe sLrlke me as so grossly lnadequaLe as Lo warranL Lhe
annulmenL of Lhe sale l belleve lasLly LhaL Lhe LransacLlon cannoL be avolded merely because lL was
made durlng Lhe !apanese occupaLlon nor on Lhe slmple allegaLlon LhaL Lhe real purchaser was noL a
clLlzen of Lhe hlllpplnes Cn hls lasL polnL furLhermore l expecL LhaL you wlll have greaL dlfflculLy ln
provlng LhaL Lhe real purchaser was oLher Lhan Mr Assad conslderlng LhaL deaLh has already sealed
your husbands llps and he cannoL now LesLlfy as Lo Lhe clrcumsLances of Lhe sale

lor Lhe foregolng reasons l regreL Lo advlse you LhaL l cannoL appear ln Lhe proceedlngs ln your behalf
1he records of Lhe case you loaned Lo me are herewlLh reLurned

?ours very Lruly

(Sgd) vlCLn1L ! l8AnClSCC

v!l/8ag

ln hls answer Lo plalnLlffs aLLorneys complalnL ALLorney lranclsco alleged LhaL abouL May 1943 a real
esLaLe broker came Lo hls offlce ln connecLlon wlLh Lhe legal separaLlon of a woman who had been
deserLed by her husband and also Lold hlm (lranclsco) LhaL Lhere was a pendlng sulL broughL by Mrs
Pllado agalnsL a cerLaln Syrlan Lo annul Lhe sale of a real esLaLe whlch Lhe deceased Serafln Pllado had
made Lo Lhe Syrlan durlng Lhe !apanese occupaLlon LhaL Lhls woman asked hlm lf he was wllllng Lo
accepL Lhe case lf Lhe Syrlan should glve lL Lo hlm LhaL he Lold Lhe woman LhaL Lhe sales of real properLy
durlng Lhe !apanese reglme were valld even Lhough lL was pald for ln !apanese mlllLary noLes LhaL Lhls
belng hls oplnlon he Lold hls vlslLor he would have no ob[ecLlon Lo defendlng Lhe Syrlan

1haL one monLh afLerwards Mrs Pllado came Lo see hlm abouL a sulL she had lnsLlLuLed agalnsL a
cerLaln Syrlan Lo annul Lhe conveyance of a real esLaLe whlch her husband had made LhaL accordlng Lo
her Lhe case was ln Lhe hands of ALLorneys uelgado and ulzon buL she wanLed Lo Lake lL away from
Lhem LhaL as he had known Lhe plalnLlffs deceased husband he dld noL heslLaLe Lo Lell her frankly LhaL
hers was a losL case for Lhe same reason he had Lold Lhe broker LhaL Mrs Pllado reLorLed LhaL Lhe basls
of her acLlon was noL LhaL Lhe money pald her husband was !apanese mlllLary noLes buL LhaL Lhe
premlses were her prlvaLe and excluslve properLy LhaL she requesLed hlm Lo read Lhe complalnL Lo be
convlnced LhaL Lhls was Lhe Lheory of her sulL LhaL he Lhen asked Mrs Pllado lf Lhere was a 1orrens LlLle
Lo Lhe properLy and she answered yes ln Lhe name of her husband LhaL he Lold Mrs Pllado LhaL lf Lhe
properLy was reglsLered ln her husbands favor her case would noL prosper elLher

1haL some days afLerward upon arrlval aL hls law offlce on LsLrada sLreeL he was lnformed by ALLorney
lederlco Agrava hls asslsLanL LhaL Mrs Pllado had dropped ln looklng for hlm and LhaL when he
Agrava learned LhaL Mrs Pllados vlslL concerned legal maLLers he aLLended Lo her and requesLed her Lo
leave Lhe expeJleote whlch she was carrylng and she dld LhaL he Lold ALLorney Agrava LhaL Lhe flrm
should noL handle Mrs Pllados case and he should reLurn Lhe papers calllng Agravas aLLenLlon Lo whaL
he (lranclsco) already had sald Lo Mrs Pllado

1haL several days laLer Lhe sLenographer ln hls law offlce 1eofllo 8agodon showed hlm a leLLer whlch
had been dlcLaLed ln Lngllsh by Mr Agrava reLurnlng Lhe expedlenLs Lo Mrs Pllado LhaL 8agodon
Lold hlm (ALLorney lranclsco) upon ALLorney Agravas requesL LhaL Agrava LhoughL lL more proper Lo
explaln Lo Mrs Pllado Lhe reasons why her case was re[ecLed LhaL he forLhwlLh slgned Lhe leLLer
wlLhouL readlng lL and wlLhouL keeplng lL for a mlnuLe ln hls possesslon LhaL he never saw Mrs Pllado
slnce Lhelr lasL meeLlng unLll she Lalked Lo hlm aL Lhe Manlla PoLel abouL a proposed exLra[udlclal
seLLlemenL of Lhe case

1haL ln !anuary 1946 Assad was ln hls offlce Lo requesL hlm Lo handle hls case sLaLlng LhaL hls Amerlcan
lawyer had gone Lo Lhe SLaLes and lefL Lhe case ln Lhe hands of oLher aLLorneys LhaL he accepLed Lhe
reLalner and on !anuary 28 1946 enLered hls appearance

ALLorney lranclsco flled an affldavlL of sLenographer 8agodon ln corroboraLlon of hls answer ua7k8

1he [udge Lrylng Lhe case Ponorable !ose CuLlerrez uavld laLer promoLed Lo Lhe CourL of Appeals
dlsmlssed Lhe complalnL Pls Ponor belleved LhaL no lnformaLlon oLher Lhan LhaL already alleged ln
plalnLlffs complalnL ln Lhe maln cause was conveyed Lo ALLorney lranclsco and concluded LhaL Lhe
lnLercourse beLween Lhe plalnLlff and Lhe respondenL dld noL aLLaln Lhe polnL of creaLlng Lhe relaLlon of
aLLorney and cllenL

SLrlpped of dlspuLed deLalls and collaLeral maLLers Lhls much ls undoubLed 1haL ALLorney lranclscos
law flrm malled Lo Lhe plalnLlff a wrlLLen oplnlon over hls slgnaLure on Lhe merlLs of her case LhaL Lhls
oplnlon was reached on Lhe basls of papers she had submlLLed aL hls offlce LhaL Mrs Pllados purpose ln
submlLLlng Lhose papers was Lo secure ALLorney lranclscos professlonal servlces CranLlng Lhe facLs Lo
be no more Lhan Lhese we agree wlLh peLlLloners counsel LhaL Lhe relaLlon of aLLorney and cllenL
beLween ALLorney lranclsco and Mrs Pllado ensued 1he followlng rules accord wlLh Lhe eLhlcs of Lhe
legal professlon and meeL wlLh our approval

ln order Lo consLlLuLe Lhe relaLlon (of aLLorney and cllenL) a professlonal one and noL merely one of
prlnclpal and agenL Lhe aLLorneys musL be employed elLher Lo glve advlce upon a legal polnL Lo
prosecuLe or defend an acLlon ln courL of [usLlce or Lo prepare and drafL ln legal form such papers as
deeds bllls conLracLs and Lhe llke (ALklnson vs PowleLL 11 ky Law 8ep (absLracL) 364 clLed ln vol
88 AL8 p 6)

1o consLlLuLe professlonal employmenL lL ls noL essenLlal LhaL Lhe cllenL should have employed Lhe
aLLorney professlonally on any prevlous occaslon lL ls noL necessary LhaL any reLalner should have
been pald promlsed or charged for nelLher ls lL maLerlal LhaL Lhe aLLorney consulLed dld noL afLerward
underLake Lhe case abouL whlch Lhe consulLaLlon was had lf a person ln respecL Lo hls buslness affalrs
or Lroubles of any klnd consulLs wlLh hls aLLorney ln hls professlonal capaclLy wlLh Lhe vlew Lo obLalnlng
professlonal advlce or asslsLance and Lhe aLLorney volunLarlly permlLs or acqulesces ln such
consulLaLlon Lhen Lhe professlonal employmenL musL be regarded as esLabllshed (3 !ones
CommenLarles on Lvldence pp 41184119)

An aLLorney ls employedLhaL ls he ls engaged ln hls professlonal capaclLy as a lawyer or counselor
when he ls llsLenlng Lo hls cllenLs prellmlnary sLaLemenL of hls case or when he ls glvlng advlce Lhereon
[usL as Lruly as when he ls drawlng hls cllenLs pleadlngs or advocaLlng hls cllenLs cause ln open courL
(uenver 1ramway Co vs Cwens 20 Colo 107 36 848)

lormallLy ls noL an essenLlal elemenL of Lhe employmenL of an aLLorney 1he conLracL may be express or
lmplled and lL ls sufflclenL LhaL Lhe advlce and asslsLance of Lhe aLLorney ls soughL and recelved ln
maLLers perLlnenL Lo hls professlon An accepLance of Lhe relaLlon ls lmplled on Lhe parL of Lhe aLLorney
from hls acLlng ln behalf of hls cllenL ln pursuance of a requesL by Lhe laLLer (7 C ! S 848849 see
Plrach 8ros and Co vs 8 L kennlngLon Co 88 AL8 1)

SecLlon 26 (e) 8ule 123 of Lhe 8ules of CourL provldes LhaL an aLLorney cannoL wlLhouL Lhe consenL of
hls cllenL be examlned as Lo any communlcaLlon made by Lhe cllenL Lo hlm or hls advlce glven Lhereon
ln Lhe course of professlonal employmenL and secLlon 19 (e) of 8ule 127 lmposes upon an aLLorney Lhe
duLy Lo malnLaln lnvlolaLe Lhe confldence and aL every perll Lo hlmself Lo preserve Lhe secreLs of hls
cllenL 1here ls no law or provlslon ln Lhe 8ules of CourL prohlblLlng aLLorneys ln express Lerms from
acLlng on behalf of boLh parLles Lo a conLroversy whose lnLeresLs are opposed Lo each oLher buL such
prohlblLlon ls necessarlly lmplled ln Lhe ln[uncLlons above quoLed (ln re ue la 8osa 27 hll 238) ln facL
Lhe prohlblLlon derlves valldlLy from sources hlgher Lhan wrlLLen laws and rules As has been apLly sald ln
ln re Merron 22 n M 232 L8A 19178 378 lnformaLlon so recelved ls sacred Lo Lhe employmenL Lo
whlch lL perLalns and Lo permlL lL Lo be used ln Lhe lnLeresL of anoLher or worse sLlll ln Lhe lnLeresL
of Lhe adverse parLy ls Lo sLrlke aL Lhe elemenL of confldence whlch lles aL Lhe basls of and affords Lhe
essenLlal securlLy ln Lhe relaLlon of aLLorney and cllenL

1haL only coples of pleadlngs already flled ln courL were furnlshed Lo ALLorney Agrava and LhaL Lhls
belng so no secreL communlcaLlon was LransmlLLed Lo hlm by Lhe plalnLlff would noL vary Lhe slLuaLlon
even lf we should dlscard Mrs Pllados sLaLemenL LhaL oLher papers personal and prlvaLe ln characLer
were Lurned ln by her recedenLs are aL hand Lo supporL Lhe docLrlne LhaL Lhe mere relaLlon of aLLorney
and cllenL oughL Lo preclude Lhe aLLorney from accepLlng Lhe opposlLe parLys reLalner ln Lhe same
llLlgaLlon regardless of whaL lnformaLlon was recelved by hlm from hls flrsL cllenL

1he prlnclple whlch forblds an aLLorney who has been engaged Lo represenL a cllenL from LhereafLer
appearlng on behalf of Lhe cllenLs opponenL applles equally even Lhough durlng Lhe conLlnuance of Lhe
employmenL noLhlng of a confldenLlal naLure was revealed Lo Lhe aLLorney by Lhe cllenL (ChrlsLlan vs
Walalua AgrlculLural Co 30 Pawall 333 looLnoLe 7 C ! S 828)

Where lL appeared LhaL an aLLorney represenLlng one parLy ln llLlgaLlon had formerly represenLed Lhe
adverse parLy wlLh respecL Lo Lhe same maLLer lnvolved ln Lhe llLlgaLlon Lhe courL need noL lnqulre as Lo
how much knowledge Lhe aLLorney acqulred from hls former durlng LhaL relaLlonshlp before refuslng Lo
permlL Lhe aLLorney Lo represenL Lhe adverse parLy (8rown vs Mlller 32 App u C 330 286 l 994)

ln order LhaL a courL may prevenL an aLLorney from appearlng agalnsL a former cllenL lL ls unnecessary
LhaL Lhe ascerLaln ln deLall Lhe exLenL Lo whlch Lhe former cllenLs affalrs mlghL have a bearlng on Lhe
maLLers lnvolved ln Lhe subsequenL llLlgaLlon on Lhe aLLorneys knowledge Lhereof (8oyd vs Second
!udlclal ulsL CourL 274 7 31 nev 264)

1hls rule has been so sLrlcLly LhaL lL has been held an aLLorney on LermlnaLlng hls employmenL cannoL
LhereafLer acL as counsel agalnsL hls cllenL ln Lhe same general maLLer even Lhough whlle acLlng for hls
former cllenL he acqulred no knowledge whlch could operaLe Lo hls cllenLs dlsadvanLage ln Lhe
subsequenL adverse employmenL (lerce vs almer 1910 31 8 l 432 77 ALl 201 Ann Cas 1912S
181)

CommunlcaLlons beLween aLLorney and cllenL are ln a greaL number of llLlgaLlons a compllcaLed affalr
conslsLlng of enLangled relevanL and lrrelevanL secreL and well known facLs ln Lhe complexlLy of whaL ls
sald ln Lhe course of Lhe deallngs beLween an aLLorney and a cllenL lnqulry of Lhe naLure suggesLed
would lead Lo Lhe revelaLlon ln advance of Lhe Lrlal of oLher maLLers LhaL mlghL only furLher pre[udlce
Lhe complalnanLs cause And Lhe Lheory would be producLlve of oLher un saluLary resulLs 1o make Lhe
passlng of confldenLlal communlcaLlon a condlLlon precedenL le Lo make Lhe employmenL condlLloned
on Lhe scope and characLer of Lhe knowledge acqulred by an aLLorney ln deLermlnlng hls rlghL Lo change
sldes would noL enhance Lhe freedom of llLlganLs whlch ls Lo be sedulously fosLered Lo consulL wlLh
lawyers upon whaL Lhey belleve are Lhelr rlghLs ln llLlgaLlon 1he condlLlon would of necesslLy call for an
lnvesLlgaLlon of whaL lnformaLlon Lhe aLLorney has recelved and ln whaL way lL ls or lL ls noL ln confllcL
wlLh hls new poslLlon LlLlganLs would ln consequence be wary ln golng Lo an aLLorney lesL by an
unforLunaLe Lurn of Lhe proceedlngs lf an lnvesLlgaLlon be held Lhe courL should accepL Lhe aLLorneys
lnaccuraLe verslon of Lhe facLs LhaL came Lo hlm now Lhe absLlnence from seeklng legal advlce ln a
good cause ls by hypoLhesls an evll whlch ls faLal Lo Lhe admlnlsLraLlon of [usLlce (!ohn P Wlgmores
Lvldence 1923 SecLlon 2283 2290 2291)

Pence Lhe necesslLy of seLLlng down Lhe exlsLence of Lhe bare relaLlonshlp of aLLorney and cllenL as Lhe
yardsLlck for LesLlng lncompaLlblllLy of lnLeresLs 1hls sLern rule ls deslgned noL alone Lo prevenL Lhe
dlshonesL pracLlLloner from fraudulenL conducL buL as well Lo proLecL Lhe honesL lawyer from
unfounded susplclon of unprofesslonal pracLlce (SLrong vs lnL 8ldg eLc Assn 183 lll 97 47 L8A
792) lL ls founded on prlnclples of publlc pollcy on good LasLe As has been sald ln anoLher case Lhe
quesLlon ls noL necessarlly one of Lhe rlghLs of Lhe parLles buL as Lo wheLher Lhe aLLorney has adhered
Lo proper professlonal sLandard WlLh Lhese LhoughLs ln mlnd lL behooves aLLorneys llke Caesars wlfe
noL only Lo keep lnvlolaLe Lhe cllenLs confldence buL also Lo avold Lhe appearance of Lreachery and
doubledeallng Cnly Lhus can llLlganLs be encouraged Lo enLrusL Lhelr secreLs Lo Lhelr aLLorneys whlch ls
of paramounL lmporLance ln Lhe admlnlsLraLlon of [usLlce

So wlLhouL lmpugnlng respondenLs good falLh we neverLheless can noL sancLlon hls Laklng up Lhe cause
of Lhe adversary of Lhe parLy who had soughL and obLalned legal advlce from hls flrm Lhls noL
necessarlly Lo prevenL any ln[usLlce Lo Lhe plalnLlff buL Lo keep above reproach Lhe honor and lnLegrlLy
of Lhe courLs and of Lhe bar WlLhouL condemnlng Lhe respondenLs conducL as dlshonesL corrupL or
fraudulenL we do belleve LhaL upon Lhe admlLLed facLs lL ls hlghly ln expedlenL lL had Lhe Lendency Lo
brlng Lhe professlon of whlch he ls a dlsLlngulshed member lnLo publlc dlsrepuLe and susplclon and
undermlne Lhe lnLegrlLy of [usLlce

1here ls ln legal pracLlce whaL called reLalnlng fee Lhe purpose of whlch sLems from Lhe reallzaLlon
LhaL Lhe aLLorney ls dlsabled from acLlng as counsel for Lhe oLher slde afLer he has glven professlonal
advlce Lo Lhe opposlLe parLy even lf he should decllne Lo perform Lhe conLemplaLed servlces on behalf
of Lhe laLLer lL ls Lo prevenL undue hardshlp on Lhe aLLorney resulLlng from Lhe rlgld observance of Lhe
rule LhaL a separaLe and lndependenL fee for consulLaLlon and advlce was concelved and auLhorlzed A
reLalnlng fee ls a prellmlnary fee glven Lo an aLLorney or counsel Lo lnsure and secure hls fuLure servlces
and lnduce hlm Lo acL for Lhe cllenL lL ls lnLended Lo remuneraLe counsel for belng deprlved by belng
reLalned by one parLy of Lhe opporLunlLy of renderlng servlces Lo Lhe oLher and of recelvlng pay from
hlm and Lhe paymenL of such fee ln Lhe absence of an express undersLandlng Lo Lhe conLrary ls nelLher
made nor recelved ln paymenL of Lhe servlces conLemplaLed lLs paymenL has no relaLlon Lo Lhe
obllgaLlon of Lhe cllenL Lo pay hls aLLorney for Lhe servlces whlch he has reLalned hlm Lo perform (7
C!S 1019)

1he defense LhaL ALLorney Agrava wroLe Lhe leLLer LxhlblL A and LhaL ALLorney lranclsco dld noL Lake Lhe
Lrouble of readlng lL would noL Lake Lhe case ouL of Lhe lnLerdlcLlon lf Lhls leLLer was wrlLLen under Lhe
clrcumsLances explalned by ALLorney lranclsco and he was unaware of lLs conLenLs Lhe facL remalns
LhaL hls flrm dld glve Mrs Pllado a formal professlonal advlce from whlch as hereLofore demonsLraLed
emerged Lhe relaLlon of aLLorney and cllenL 1hls leLLer blnds and esLop hlm ln Lhe same manner and Lo
Lhe same degree as lf he personally had wrlLLen lL An lnformaLlon obLalned from a cllenL by a member
or asslsLanL of a law flrm ls lnformaLlon lmparLed Lo Lhe flrm (6 C! 628 7 C ! S 986) 1hls ls noL a
mere flcLlon or an arblLrary rule for such member or asslsLanL as ln our case noL only acLs ln Lhe name
and lnLeresL of Lhe flrm buL hls lnformaLlon by Lhe naLure of hls connecLlon wlLh Lhe flrm ls avallable Lo
hls assoclaLes or employers 1he rule ls all Lhe more Lo be adhered Lo where as ln Lhe presenL lnsLance
Lhe oplnlon was acLually slgned by Lhe head of Lhe flrm and carrles hls lnlLlals lnLended Lo convey Lhe
lmpresslon LhaL lL was dlcLaLed by hlm personally no progress could be hoped for ln Lhe publlc pollcy
LhaL Lhe cllenL ln consulLlng hls legal advlser oughL Lo be free from apprehenslon of dlsclosure of hls
confldence lf Lhe prohlblLlon were noL exLended Lo Lhe aLLorneys parLners employers or asslsLanLs
19vw!4L!u

1he facL LhaL peLlLloner dld noL ob[ecL unLll afLer four monLhs had passed from Lhe daLe ALLorney
lranclsco flrsL appeared for Lhe defendanLs does noL operaLe as a walver of her rlghL Lo ask for hls
dlsquallflcaLlon ln one case ob[ecLlon Lo Lhe appearance of an aLLorney was allowed even on appeal as
a ground for reversal of Lhe [udgmenL ln LhaL case ln whlch LhroughouL Lhe conducL of Lhe cause ln Lhe
courL below Lhe aLLorney had been suffered so Lo acL wlLhouL ob[ecLlon Lhe courL sald We are all of
Lhe one mlnd LhaL Lhe rlghL of Lhe appellee Lo make hls ob[ecLlon has noL lapsed by reason of fallure Lo
make lL sooner LhaL professlonal confldence once reposed can never be dlvesLed by explraLlon of
professlonal employmenL (nlckels vs Crlffln 1 Wash 1err 374 321 A L 8 1316)

1he complalnL LhaL peLlLloners remedy ls by appeal and noL by cettlototl deserves scanL aLLenLlon 1he
courLs have summary [urlsdlcLlon Lo proLecL Lhe rlghLs of Lhe parLles and Lhe publlc from any conducL of
aLLorneys pre[udlclal Lo Lhe admlnlsLraLlon of Lhe [usLlce 1he summary [urlsdlcLlon of Lhe courLs over
aLLorneys ls noL conflned Lo requlrlng Lhem Lo pay over money collecLed by Lhem buL embraces
auLhorlLy Lo compel Lhem Lo do whaLever speclflc acLs may be lncumbenL upon Lhem ln Lhelr capaclLy of
aLLorneys Lo perform 1he courLs from Lhe general prlnclples of equlLy and pollcy wlll always look lnLo
Lhe deallngs beLween aLLorneys and cllenLs and guard Lhe laLLer from any undue consequences resulLlng
from a slLuaLlon ln whlch Lhey may sLand unequal 1he courLs acLs on Lhe same prlnclples wheLher Lhe
underLaklng ls Lo appear or for LhaL maLLer noL Lo appear Lo answer declaraLlon eLc (6 C! 718 C!S
1003) 1hls summary remedy agalnsL aLLorneys flows from Lhe facLs LhaL Lhey are offlcers of Lhe courL
where Lhey pracLlce formlng a parL of Lhe machlnery of Lhe law for Lhe admlnlsLraLlon of [usLlce and as
such sub[ecL Lo Lhe dlsclpllnary auLhorlLy of Lhe courLs and Lo lLs orders and dlrecLlons wlLh respecL Lo
Lhelr relaLlons Lo Lhe courL as well as Lo Lhelr cllenLs (CharesL vs 8lshop 137 Mlnn 102 162 nW
1062 noLe 26 7 C ! S 1007) ALLorney sLand on Lhe same fooLlng as sherlffs and oLher courL offlcers ln
respecL of maLLers [usL menLloned

We conclude Lherefore LhaL Lhe moLlon for dlsquallflcaLlon should be allowed lL ls so ordered wlLhouL
cosLs

Moran C! CzaeLa aras lerla 8engzon adllla MonLemayor 8eyes and 1orres !! concur



THE ROLE OF THE FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION IN THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE LAWYER AND THE
COURT ITS LIMITATION AND EFFECTS.
I. INTRODUCTION

It is said that it is better to have an irresponsible press than to have a timid press because the
press is a catalyst oI public opinion. The right to criticize public acts, even judicial conduct, is
guaranteed by the Constitution but it must be exercised with responsibility. It has been said that
to say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious.
Considering that oI all classes oI proIessions, lawyers are most sacredly bound to uphold the law,
(Ex parte Wall, U.S. 265; cited in Malcolm Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 214), it is imperative
that they live by the law.
II. Constitutional basis of the freedom of expression

'No law shall be passed abridging the Ireedom oI speech, oI expression, or oI the press, or the
right oI the people to peaceably assemble and petition the government Ior redress oI grievances.
(Article III, Sec. 4, 1987 Constitution).
III. Code of Ethics of Lawyers
Canon 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the
judicial oIIicers and should insist in similar conduct by others.

Rule 11.03 The lawyer shall abstain Irom scandalous, oIIensive or menacing language or
behavior beIore the courts.

Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motive not supported by the record or have
no materiality to the case.
IV. Cases
1udicial conduct maybe criticized.

The guarantee oI Iree speech and a Iree press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The
administration oI law is a matter oI vital public concern. II the people cannot, criticize a judge in
the same manner as any public oIIicer, public opinion will be eIIectively muzzled. Attempted
terrorization oI public opinion on the part oI the judiciary would be tyranny oI the basest soil.
(U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731).
Official acts and conduct may be criticized.

In U.S. v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, it was said that complete liberty to comment on the oIIicial acts
oI public men is like a scalpel in the case oI Iree speech. The incision oI its probe relieves the
abscesses oI oIIicialdom. Men in the public liIe may suIIer Irom unjust accusation, but the
wound is assuaged by balm oI a clear conscience. Men have the right to attack, rightly or
wrongly, the policy oI a public oIIicial, with every argument which ability can Iind or
ingenuinely innervate. They may show, by arguments good or bad, such policy to be injurious to
the individual and to society.
Limitations on the right to criticize policies or official acts.
While people can criticize, the law does not permit them to Ialsely impeach the motives, attack
honesty, blacken the virtue, or injure the reputation oI that oIIicial. Men may argue, but they may
not traduce. Man may diIIer, but hey may not, Ior that reason, Ialsely charge dishonesty. Men
may look at policies Irom diIIerent points oI view, and see them in diIIerent lights, but they may
not, on that account Ialsely charge criminally, lack virtue, bad notions, or corrupt heart and mind.
Men may Ialsely charge that policies are bad, but they cannot Ialsely charge that men are bad.
(U.S. vs. Contreras, 23 Phil. 513).

* * * *

A newspaper reporter or editor who published an inaccurate account oI a closed-door
investigation oI a judge may be cited Ior contempt.
In In Re: Lozano vs. Quevedo, 54 Phil. 801, the Supreme Court said:
'The rule is well-established that newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass,
or inIluence the courts in the administration oI justice in attending a suit or proceeding constitute
criminal contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise aIter the
case is ended. IT is also regarded as an interIerence with the work oI the courts to publish any
matter which their policy requires should be kept private, as Ior example the secrets oI the jury
room, or proceedings in camera. (6 R.C.L., pp. 508-515).

The Organic Act wisely guarantees Ireedom oI speech and oI the press. This constitutional right
must be protected in its Iullest extent. The court has heretoIore given evidence oI its tolerant
regard Ior charges under the Libel Law which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall
continue in this chosen path. The liberty oI the citizens must be preserved in all oI its
completeness. But license or abuse oI liberty oI the press and oI the citizen should not be
conIused with liberty in its true sense. As important as is the maintenance oI an unmuzzled press
and the Iree exercise oI the rights oI the citizen is the maintenance oI the independence oI the
judiciary. Respect Ior the judiciary cannot be had iI persons are privileged to scorn a resolution
oI the court adopted Ior good purposes and iI such persons are to be permitted by subterranean
means to diIIuse inaccurate accounts oI conIidential proceedings to the embarrassment oI the
parties and the courts. (See also In Re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 575).
A lawyer may be dealt with in contempt if he publishes false statements relative
to the Court`s action on a pending case or otherwise indulging in speculation or
conjecture or airing illicit information.

His act cannot be justiIied under the Ireedom oI the press and the right oI the people to
inIormation on matters oI public concern.

While his rights are guaranteed, a publication, however, relating to judicial action in a pending
case which tends to impede, embarrass or obstruct the court and constitutes a clear and present
danger to the administration oI justice is not protected by the guaranty oI press Ireedom.

What is Iundamental is the principle oI conIidentiality oI all actuations oI, or records or
proceedings beIore a court in a pending action, which are not essentially public in character. As
Iar as the proceedings are concerned, those conIidential matters include, among others, raIIling
oI cases, deliberations and discussions oI the en banc or the division, draIts or decisions and
resolutions agreed upon by the members in consultation. (In Re: Atty. Emiliano Jurado, Jr.,
Adm. Matter No. 90-5-2373, July 12, 1990).
A lawyer may be guilty of indirect contempt of court for uttering statements
aimed at influencing and threatening the Court in deciding in favor of the
constitutionality of the Plunder Law.

The Supreme Court said that the judiciary, as he branch oI government tasked to administer
justice, to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving enIorceable and demandable
rights, and to aIIord redress oI wrongs Ior the violation oI said right, (Copez vs. Roxas 17 SCRA
756) must be allowed to decide cases independently, Iree oI outside inIluence or pressure. An
independent judiciary is essential to the maintenance oI democracy, as well as oI peace and order
in society. Further, maintaining the dignity oI courts and enIorcing the duty oI citizens to respect
them are necessary adjuncts to the administration oI justice. (Weston vs. Commonwealth, 77 SE
2d 405, 409 (1953).

Thus, Rule 71, Section 3 (d) oI the Revised Rule oI the Court authorizes the courts to hold liable
Ior criminal contempt a person guilty oI conduct that is directed against the dignity or authority
oI the court, or oI an act obstructing the administration oI justice which tends to bring the court
into disrepute or disrespect. (People vs. Godoy, 243 SCRA 64 (1995).

Respondents cannot justiIy his contemptuous statements asking the Court to dispel rumors that
iI would declare the Plunder law unconstitutional, and stating the a decision declaring it as such
was basically wrong and would not be accepted by the people as utterances protected by his
right to Ireedom oI speech.

Indeed, Ireedom oI speech includes the right to know and discuss judicial proceedings, but such
right does not cover statements aimed at undermining the Court`s integrity and authority, and
interIering with the administration oI justice. Freedom oI speech is not absolute, and must
occasionally be balanced with the liberty oI speech and oI the press, Ior they tend to destroy the
very Ioundation oI good order and as well-being in society by obstructing the course oI justice.
(State vs. Morcil, 16 Ask 384).

Clearly, respondents` utterances pressuring the Court to rule in Iavor oI the constitutionality oI
the Plunder law or risk another series oI mass actions by the public cannot be construed as Ialling
within the ambit oI constitutionally protected speech, because such statements are not Iair
criticism oI any decision oI the Court, but obviously are threats made against it to Iorce the Court
to decide the issue in a particular manner, or risk earning the ire oI the public. Such statements
show disrespect not only Ior the Court but also Ior the judicial system as a whole, tend to
promote distrust and undermine public conIidence in the judiciary, by creating the impression
that the Court cannot be trusted to resolve cases impartially and violate the right oI the parties to
have their case tried Iairly by an independent tribunal, uninIluenced by public clamor and other
extraneous inIluences. (Nestle Phils. Case).

It is respondent`s duty as an oIIicer oI the court, to uphold the dignity and authority oI the courts
and to promote conIidence in the Iair administration oI justice (In Re: Sotto) and in the Supreme
Court as the bulwark oI justice and democracy. Respondent`s utterances as quoted above, while
the case oI Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan was pending consideration by the Court, belies his
protestation oI good Iaith but were clearly made to mobilized public opinion and bring pressure
on the court. (Atty. Leonard de Vera, A.M. No. 01-2-03-SC, July 29, 2002).

In his Explanation submitted to the Court, respondent De Vera admitted to have made said
statements but denied to have uttered the same to degrade the Court, to destroy public
conIidence in it and to bring it into disrepute. He explained that he was merely exercising his
constitutionally guaranteed right to Ireedom oI speech.

The Court Iound the explanation unsatisIactory and held that the statements were aimed at
inIluencing and threatening the Court to decide in Iavor oI the constitutionality oI the Plunder
Law.

The ruling cannot serve as a basis to consider respondent de Vera immoral. The act Ior which he
was Iound guilty oI indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude.

Can this pronouncement be used to disqualiIy him Irom running Ior Governor in the IBP? No.


In Tak Ng v. Republic oI the Philippines cited in Villaber v. Commission on Elections, the Court
deIines moral turpitude as an 'act oI baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes his Iellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and
customary rule oI right and duty between man and man, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty or good morals. The determination oI whether an act involves moral turpitude is a
Iactual issue and Irequently depends on the circumstances attending the violation oI the statute.

In this case, it cannot be said that the act oI expressing one`s opinion on a public interest issue
can be considered as an act oI baseness, vileness or depravity. Respondent De Vera did not bring
suIIering nor cause undue injury or harm to the public when he voiced his views on the Plunder
Law. Consequently, there is no basis Ior petitioner to invoke the administrative case as evidence
oI respondent De Vera`s alleged immorality. (In Re: Petition to DisqualiIy Atty. De Vera, etc.,
Garcia, et al. vs. Atty. Leonard de Vera, et al., A. C. No. 6052, December 11, 2003).
A lawyer was sanctioned for conduct unbecoming when he claimed that the
1ustices committed acts of political partnership.

Canon 11 oI the Code oI proIessional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer should observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial oIIicers and, indeed, should insist on similar
conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and devious motives and questioning the
impartially, integrity, and authority oI the members oI the Court the lawyers has only seceded in
seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the dispensation oI justice.

The attention oI Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate oI rule 13.02 oI the Code oI
ProIessional Responsibility prohibiting a member oI the Bar Irom making such public statements
on a case that may tend to arouse public opinion Ior or against a party. Regrettably, Atty. Paguia
has persisted in ignoring the Court`s well-meant admonition.

On the 7th September 2003 issue oI the Daily Tribune, Atty. Paguia wrote to say

'What is the legal eIIect oI that violation oI President Estrada`s right to due process oI law? It
renders the decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo unconstitutional and void. The rudiments oI Iair play
were not observed. There was no Iair play since it appears that when president Estrada Iiled his
petition, ChieI Justice divide and his Iellow justices had already committed to the other party
GMA with a judgment already made and waiting to be Iormalized aIter the litigants shall have
undergone the charade oI a Iormal hearing. AIter the justices had authorized the proclamation oI
GMA as president, can they be expected to voluntarily admit the unconstitutionality oI their own
act?

Unrelentingly, Atty. Paguia has continued to make public statements oI like nature.

The Court has already warned Atty. Paguia, on pain oI disciplinary sanction, to become mindIul
oI his grave responsibilities as a lawyer and as an oIIicer oI the Court. Apparently, he has chosen
not to at all take heed. He was suspended indeIinitely Irom the practice oI law. (Estrada vs.
Sandiganbayan, et.al., G.R. No. 159486-88, November 25, 2003).

AIter Atty. Raul Gonzales was stripped oI his power oI investigation as Tanodbayan pursuant to
the 1987 Constitution, he hurled several attacks at the Supreme Court through the media. He was
suspended on the basis oI the same.

Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee oI Iree speech. No one seeks to deny him that
right, least oI all, the Supreme Court. What he seemed unaware oI is that Ireedom oI speech and
expression, like all constitutional Ireedoms, is not absolute and that Ireedom oI expression needs
occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements oI equally important public
interests. One oI these Iundamental public interests is the maintenance oI the integrity and
orderly Iunctioning oI the administration oI justice. There is no animosity between Iree
expression and the integrity oI the system oI administering justice. For the protection and
maintenance oI Ireedom oI expression itselI can be secured only within the context oI a
Iunctioning and orderly system oI dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, oI viable
independent institutions Ior delivery oI justice which are accepted by the general community. As
Mr. Justice FrankIurter puts it; 'x x x A Iree press is not to be preIerred to an independent
judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a Iree press. Neither has primacy over the other, both
are indispensable to a Iree speech. (Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan and Raul Gonzales, G.R. Nos.
74690-707 and 80578, Feb. 1, 1989).

Atty. Gonzales cannot invoke his right to expression as a lawyer.
A lawyer`s right to Iree expression may have been more limited than that oI a layman. A lawyer,
acting in a proIessional capacity, may have Iewer rights oI Iree speech than would a private
citizen. Neither the right oI Iree speech nor the right to engage in political activities be construed
or extended as to permit any such liberties to a member oI the Bar. A layman may, perhaps,
pursue his theories oI Iree speech or political activities until he runs a Ioul oI the penalties oI
libel or slander, or into some inIraction oI the statutory law. A member oI the bar can, and will,
be stopped at the point where he inIringes the Canons oI Ethics, and iI he wishes to remain a
member oI the bar, he will conduct himselI in accordance therewith. (Zaldivar vs. SB, G.R. Nos.
79690-707; Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, Oct. 7, 1988).

Suspension Ior subjecting the Supreme Court justice to threats.
In the case of In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987), a lawyer was
suspended indefinitely.
A letter individually addressed to some justices oI the Supreme Court is not covered by the
constitutional right to 'privacy oI communication when the same pertain to their exercise oI
judicial Iunctions.

To subject the threat and ordeal oI investigation and prosecution, a judge, more so a member oI
the Supreme Court Ior oIIicial acts done by him in good Iaith and in the regular exercise oI
oIIicial duty and judicial Iunctions is to subvert and undermine that very independence oI the
judiciary, and subordinate the judiciary to the executive. 'For it is a general principle oI the
highest importance to the proper administration oI justice that a judicial oIIicer exercising the
authority vested in him, shall be Iree to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension oI
personal consequences to himselI. Liability to answer to everyone who might Ieel himselI
aggrieved by the action oI the judge would be inconsistent with the possession oI this Ireedom,
and would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or
useIul. (Bradley vs. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335).

To allow litigants to go beyond the Court`s resolution and claim that the members acted with
deliberate bad Iaith and rendered an 'unjust resolution in disregard or violation oI the duty oI
their high oIIice to act upon their own independent consideration and judgment oI the matter at
hand would be destroy the authenticity, integrity and conclusiveness oI such collegiate acts and
resolutions and to disregard utterly the presumption oI regular perIormance oI oIIicial duty. To
allow such collateral attack would destroy the separation oI powers and undermine the role oI the
Supreme Court as the Iinal arbiter oI all justiciable disputes.
Limitations on right to criticize.

Like any other right, the right oI a lawyer to comment on or criticize the decision oI a judge or
his actuation is not unlimited. 'It is the cardinal condition oI all such criticism that it shall be
bona Iide, and shall not spell over the walls oI decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between Iair criticism, on the other hand, and abuse and slander oI courts and judges on the
other. A publication in or outside oI court tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass or inIluence
the courts in administering justice in pending suit, or to degrade the courts, destroy public
conIidence in them or bring them in any way into disrepute, whether or not there is a pending
litigation, transcends the limits oI Iair comment. Such publication or intemperate and unIair
criticism is a gross violation oI the lawyer`s duty to respect the courts. It is a misconduct that
subjects to disciplinary action. (In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562; In Re Gomez, 43 Phil. 376).

Moreover, where by law or resolution oI the Supreme Court proceedings, such as disciplinary
actions against judges and lawyers, must be conducted in secret or considered conIidential Ior
the proper administration oI justice until their Iinal adjudication, they should not be given
publicity by the press. And no one may publicly comment thereon during their pendency. For as
important as the maintenance oI an unmuzzled press and the Iree exercise oI the rights oI the
citizens is the preservation oI the independence oI the judiciary. Respect Ior the judiciary cannot
be adopted Ior good purpose and iI such persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to
diIIuse inaccurate accounts oI conIidential proceedings to the embarrassment oI the parties and
the courts. (In re Lozano, 54 Phil. 801; In re Abistado, 57 Phil. 668).
Right and duty of lawyer to criticize courts.
The rule is not, however, intended to prevent or preclude criticism oI the judicial acts oI a judge.
For the guarantees oI Iree speech and a Iree speech and a Iree press include the right to criticize
the judicial conduct. The administration oI the law is a matter oI vital public concern. Whether
the law is wisely or badly enIorced is, thereIore, a Iit subject Ior proper comment. II the people
cannot criticize a judge the same as any other public oIIicial, public opinion will be eIIectively
muzzled. Attempted terrorization oI public opinion on the part oI the judicial oIIicer would be
tyranny oI the basest sort. The sword oI Damocles in the hands oI a judge does not hand
suspended over the individual who dares to assert his prerogative as a citizen and to stand up
bravely beIore any oIIicial. The people are not obliged to speak oI the conduct oI their oIIicials
in whispers or with bated breath in a Iree government, but only in a despotism. (U.S. vs. bustos,
37 Phil. 731).

As a citizen and oIIicer oI the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right but also to
consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions oI courts and judges. 'Criticism
oI the courts has, indeed, been an important part oI the traditional work oI the lawyer. In the
prosecution oI appeals, he points out the errors oI lower courts. In articles written Ior law
journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncement oI courts and Iearlessly lays
bare Ior all to see the Ilaws and inconsistencies oI the doctrines. (In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562).

For no 'class oI the community ought to be allowed Ireer scope in the expression or publication
oI opinions as to the capacity, impartially or integrity oI judges than members oI the bar. They
have the best opportunities Ior observing and Iorming correct judgment. They are in constant
attendance in the courts. x x x. To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under
liability to be called to account and to be deprived oI his proIession and livelihood by the judge
or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to
be entertained, (Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Rep. 641; In re Almacen).

Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should expect critical evaluation oI their
perIormance. For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the
soil oI democratic society and nourished by the periodic appraisal oI citizens whom it should
serve. (In re Almacen; Austria vs. Masaquel, 20 SCRA 1247).
The doctrine of fair comment.
In Borjal vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999; 301 SCRA 1, it was said that Iair
commentaries on matter oI public interest are privileged and constitute a valid deIense in an
action Ior libel or slander. The doctrine oI Iair comment means that while in general every
discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed Ialse, because every man is presumed innocent
until his guilt is judiciary proved, and every Ialse imputation is directed against a public reason
in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation
to a public oIIicial may be actionable, it must either be a Ialse allegation oI Iact or a comment
based on established Iacts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long
as it might reasonably be inIerred Irom the Iacts.
Limitations and effects of the Right to Criticize 1udicial Acts.

The Ireedom oI expression rights cannot be a good deIense whenever a lawyer unduly criticizes
the courts. Neither does the doctrine oI qualiIied privilege communications and Iair criticism.
The reason is that, such a Ireedom is not a license to malign anyone.
Hence, lawyers have been suspended even as they invoked such freedom.

1. In Montecillo vs. Gica, 60 SCRA 243 (1974), a lawyer was suspended until Iurther orders
Irom the Court Ior alleging that the Justices knowingly rendered unjust judgment. He alleged that
they acted with intent and malice, iI not with gross ignorance oI the law in disposing oI the case
in his client.

2. In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562, a lawyer was suspended Ior having exceeded the boundaries
oI Iair criticisms.

3. In Paragas vs. Cruz, 14 SCRA 809, a lawyer was suspended because oI derogatory
statements in his Motion Ior Reconsideration.

4. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, a lawyer was held in contempt despite his avowals oI good Iaith
and his invocation oI the constitutional guarantee oI Ireedom oI speech.

5. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, Atty. Vicente Francisco was dealt with in contempt
Ior presuming that the Court is so devoid oI the sense oI justice.

In Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, 166 SCRA 316, Atty. Gonzales was suspended because oI charges that
the Supreme Court deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decision, necessarily implying
that the Justices betrayed their oath oI oIIice, merely to wreak vengeance upon him. This was
considered as constituting the grossest kind oI disrespect Ior the court. Such statements debase
and degrade the Supreme Court and the entire system oI administration oI justice.


.R. No. L-24438 1uly 30, 1965
ROSAURO PARAAS, petitioner,
vs.
FERNANDO A. CRUZ, 1udge of the Court of First Instance of Caloocan City;
THE CITY FISCAL OF CALOOCAN CITY and ELPO (EL PORVENIR RUBBER
PRODUCTS, INC.), respondents
R E S O L U T I O N
REYES, 1.B.L.,
In asking Ior reconsideration oI this Court's dismissal oI his petition Ior certiorari in the above-
entitled case, Atty. Jeremias T. Sebastian, acting as counsel de parte Ior petitioner Rosauro
Paragas, stated the Iollowing in his written motion, Iiled on May 22, 1965:
"The petitioner respectIully prays Ior a reconsideration oI the resolution oI this
Honorable Court dated April 20, 1965 on the ground that it constitutes a violation oI
Section 14 oI Rule 112 oI the Rules, oI Court promulgated by this very Hon. Supreme
Court, and on the Iurther ground that it is likewise a violation of the most important right
in the Bill of Rights oI the Constitution oI the Philippines, a culpable violation which is a
ground for impeachment."
... . The rule oI law in a democracy should always be upheld and protected by all means,
because the rule oI law creates and preserves peace and order and gives satisIaction and
contentment to all concerned. But when the laws and the rules are violated, the victims
resort, sometimes, to armed force and to the ways of the cave-men' We do not want
Jer:osa and Reyes repeated again and again, killed in the premises of the Supreme Court
and in those of the City Hall of Manila. Educated people should keep their temper under
control at all times! But justice should be done to all concerned to perpetuate the very liIe
oI Democracy on the Iace oI the earth."
Considering the Ioregoing expressions to be derogatory to its dignity, this Court, by Resolution
oI June 2, 1965, aIter quoting said statements required Atty. Sebastian to show cause why
administrative action should not be taken against him.
On June 18, 1965, counsel Iiled an "explanatory memorandum," stating:
When we said that the said violation is a ground Ior impeachment, the undersigned did
not say that he would Iile impeachment proceedings against the Justices who supported
the resolution. We said only what we said. The task oI impeaching the highest Justices in
this country is obviously not the task Ior a common man, like the undersigned; it is a
herculean task which only exceptional men, like Floor Leader Jose Laurel Jr., can do. In
addition to this, we do not have the time, the means and the strength Ior this purpose.
The assertion that "But when the laws and the rules are violated, the victims resort,
sometimes, to armed force and to the ways of the cave-men' We do not want Jer:osa and
Reyes repeated again and again, killed in the premises of the Supreme Court and in those
of the City Hall of Manila," is only a statement oI Iact and oI our wish. We learn Irom
observation that when the laws and the rules are violated, the victims, sometimes, resort
to armed Iorce and to the ways oI the cavemen, as shown in the case oI Luis M. Taruc
and in the case oI Jesus Lava, both oI whom went to the mountains when they were not
allowed to take their seats in the House oI Representatives and, according to the
newspapers, one was charged with murder and was Iound guilty. It was only recently that
Jesus Lava surrendered to the authorities. We had this sad recollection when we wrote the
underlined passage mentioned in this paragraph. While writing that BRIEF MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION, the thought oI Verzosa and Reyes Ilashed across the mind
oI the undersigned as the shooting oI those two government employees must have
resulted Irom some kind oI dissatisIaction with their actuations while in oIIice. We stated
or the undersigned stated that we are against the repetition oI these abominable acts that
surely disturbed the peace and order oI the community. Shall the undersigned be
punished by this Honorable Supreme Court only Ior telling the truth, Ior telling what
happened beIore in this Country? Our statement is clear and unmistakable, because we
stated "We do not want Verzosa and Reyes repeated ..." The intention oI the undersigned
is likewise clear and unmistakable; he is against the repetition oI these acts oI subversion
and hate!
We Iind the explanations submitted to be unsatisIactory. The expressions contained in the motion
Ior reconsideration, previously quoted, are plainly contemptuous and disrespectIul, and reIerence
to the recent killing oI two employees is but a covert threat upon the members oI the Court.
That such threats and disrespectIul language contained in a pleading Iiled in Courts are
constitutive oI direct contempt has been repeatedly decided (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil.
724; People vs. Varturanza 52 OII. Gaz. 769: Medina vs. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; De Joya vs. Court
oI First Instance oI Rizal, L-9785, Sept. 19, 1956; Sison vs. Sandejas, L-9270, April 29, 1959;
Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86). What makes the present case more deplorable is that the guilty
party is a member oI the bar; Ior, as remarked in !eople vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 580
Counsel should conduct himselI towards the judges who try his cases with that courtesy
all have a right to expect. As an oIIicer oI the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help
build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so
essential to the proper administration oI justice.
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in deIending the cause and rights oI his client,
should do so with all the Iervor and energy oI which he is capable, but it is not, and never
will be so, Ior him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding
without the propriety and respect which the dignity oI the courts require. (Salcedo vs.
Hernandez, |In re Francisco|, 61 Phil. 729)
Counsel's disavowal oI any oIIensive intent is oI no avail, Ior it is a well-known and established
rule that deIamatory words are to be taken in the ordinary meaning attached to them by impartial
observers.
A mere disclaimer oI any intentional disrespect by appellant is no ground Ior exoneration.
His intent must be determined by a Iair interpretation oI the languages by him employed.
He cannot escape responsibility by claiming that his words did not mean what any reader
must have understood them as meaning. (In re Franco, 67 Phil. 313)
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jeremias T. Sebastian is hereby Iound guilty oI direct contempt, and
sentenced to pay a Iine oI P200.00 within ten days Irom notice hereoI, or, in case oI deIault, to
suIIer imprisonment not exceeding ten (10) days. And he is warned that a subsequent repetition
oI the oIIense will be more drastically dealt with.
Beng:on, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, !aredes, Di:on, Regala, Makalintal, Beng:on, J.!.,
and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., is on leave.


.R. No. L-22979 1une 26, 1967
RHEEM OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
ZOILO R. FERRER, ET AL., respondents.
IN RE PROCEEDINS AAINST ALFONSO PONCE ENRILE, LEONARDO SIUION
REYNA, MANUEL . MONTECILLO, ENRIQUE M. BELO, OSCAR R. ONSIAKO,
and 1OSE S. ARMONIO, members of the Philippine Bar.
!once Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Belo for petitioners.
Jose T. Jalmonte for respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
SANCHEZ,
Contempt proceedings. The Iollowing Irom the motion to reconsider the decision herein, Iiled by
counsel Ior petitioners
One pitIall into which this Honorable Court has repeatedly Iallen whenever the question
as to whether or not a particular subject matter is within the jurisdiction oI the Court oI
Industrial Relations is the tendency oI this Honorable Court to rely upon its own
pronouncement without due regard to the statutes which delineate the jurisdiction oI the
industrial court. Quite oIten, it is overlooked that no court, not even this Honorable Court,
is empowered to expand or contract through its decision the scope oI its jurisdictional
authority as conIerred by law. This error is maniIested by the decisions oI this Honorable
Court citing earlier rulings but without making any reIerence to and analysis oI the
pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction oI the Court oI Industrial Relations. This
maniIestation appears in this Honorable Court's decision in the instant case. As a result,
the errors committed in earlier cases dealing with the jurisdiction oI the industrial court
are perpetuated in subsequent cases involving the same issue . . . .
It may also be mentioned in passing that this Honorable Court contravened Rule 2,
Section 5 oI the Rules oI Court when it applied the so-called "rule against splitting oI
jurisdiction" in its Decision in the present case. As applied by this Honorable Court, the
rule means that when an employee Iiles with the Court oI Industrial Relations numerous
claims relative to his employment but only one |oI| which is cognizable by said court
under the law, while the others pertain to other tribunals, that court has authority to
entertain all the claims to avoid multiplicity, oI suits. . . . .
drew Irom the Court an order directing counsel to show cause why they should not be dealt with
Ior contempt oI court.
In respondent attorneys' veriIied return, they oIIered "their most sincere apologies Ior the
language used" and stated that "|i|t was not and it has never been their intention to be
disrespectIul." They maniIested that the language "was the result oI overenthusiasm on the part
oI Atty. |Jose S.| Armonio, who thought best to Iocus the attention oI this Honorable Court to the
issue in the case, as not in any way meant to slight or oIIend this Honorable Court. They also
said that the unIortunate Motion Ior Reconsideration was prepared and Iiled by Atty. Armonio
who had been personally handling the case since its inception at the Court oI Industrial
Relations, and who had, perhaps, become too emotionally involved in the case."
Respondent members oI the law Iirm, namely, Attys. AlIonso Ponce Enrile, Leonardo Siguion
Reyna, Manuel G. Montecillo, Enrique M. Belo and Oscar R. Ongsiako assumed "Iull
responsibility" Ior what appears in the motion Ior reconsideration. They submitted, not as an
excuse, but as Iact, that not one oI the partners was able to pass upon the draIt or Iinal Iorm oI
the said motion, and that Atty. Armonio, an associate, prepared, signed and Iiled the motion
"without clearing it with any oI the partners oI the Iirm." The return winds up with an expression
oI deep regret about the incident, coupled with an earnest pledge that it "shall never happen
again."
Subsequent to the return, respondent attorneys appeared in court. Attys. Ponce Enrile and
Armonio were orally heard.wph.t
1. As we look back at the language (heretoIore quoted) employed in the motion Ior
reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks oI one pitIall
into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction oI the Court oI Industrial
Relations comes into question. That pitIall is the tendency oI this Court to rely on its own
pronouncements in disregard oI the law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the
decisions oI this Court blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making "any
reIerence to and analysis oI" the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction oI the industrial
court. The plain import oI all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in determining the
jurisdiction oI the industrial court, it has committed error and continuously repeated that error to
the point oI perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which reIuses to hew to the line drawn by
the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements
oI this Court on the jurisdiction oI the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those
statements detract much Irom the dignity oI and respect due this Court. They bring into question
the capability oI the members and some Iormer members oI this Court to render justice.
The second paragraph quoted yields a tone oI sarcasm when counsel labelled as "so-called" the
"rule against splitting oI jurisdiction."
1

By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become common place. Really, there could hardly be
any valid excuse Ior lapses in the observance thereoI. Section 20 (b), Rule 138 oI the Rules oI
Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: "To observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts oI justice and judicial oIIicers." As explicit is the Iirst canon oI legal ethics which
pronounces that "|i|t is the duty oI the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectIul
attitude, not Ior the sake oI the temporary incumbent oI the judicial oIIice, but Ior the
maintenance oI its supreme importance." That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly
incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor." And more.
The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be "with all good Iidelity . . . to
the courts." Worth remembering is that the duty oI an attorney to the courts "can only be
maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial oIIice which he is
bound to uphold."
2

We concede that a lawyer may think highly oI his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege.
And, he may suIIer Irustration at what he Ieels is others' lack oI it. That is his misIortune. Some
such Irame oI mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belieI that he may attack a
court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the
temples oI right. He should give due allowance to the Iact that judges are but men; and men are
encompassed by error, Iettered by Iallibility.
2. What we have beIore us is not without precedent. Time and again, this Court has admonished
and punished, in varying degrees, members oI the Bar Ior statements, disrespectIul or irreverent,
acrimonious or deIamatory, oI this Court or the lower courts.
3
Resort by an attorney in a
motion Ior reconsideration to words which may drag this Court down into disrepute, is
Irowned upon as "neither justiIied nor in the least necessary, because in order to call the attention
oI the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize
the Iorce thereoI, the many reasons stated in the motion" are "suIIicient," and such words
"superIluous."
4
It is in this context that we must say that just because Atty. Armonio "thought
best to Iocus the attention" oI this Court "to the issue in the case" does not give him in bridled
license in language. To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much more
eIIective, in calling the Court's attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle does not
run short oI expressions, emphatic but respectIul, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but
not oIIensive.
To be proscribed then is the use oI unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in
courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration, or which could have the eIIect oI
"harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source oI disorder, thus
undermining the Ioundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those
who are aggrieved turn Ior protection and relieI."
5
Stability oI judicial institutions suggests that
the Bar stand Iirm on this precept.
The language here in question, respondents aver, "was the result oI overenthusiasm." It is but to
repeat an old idea when we say that enthusiasm, or even excess oI it, is not really bad. In Iact, the
one or the other is no less a virtue, iI channelled in the right direction. However, it must be
circumscribed within the bounds oI propriety and with due regard Ior the proper place oI courts
in our system oI government.
6

We are not unmindIul oI counsel's statement that the language used "was not in any way meant
to slight or oIIend" this Court. Want oI intention, we Ieel constrained to say, is no excuse Ior the
language employed. For, counsel cannot escape responsibility "by claiming that his words did
not mean what any reader must have understood them as meaning."
7
At best, it extenuates
liability.
3. We now turn to the partners oI the law Iirm. They explained that not one oI them cleared the
motion in which the questionable portion appears. Their reason is that they were not in the oIIice
at the time said motion was Iiled which was the last day. They added that "it is the policy oI
the Iirm known to all its members and associates that only the partners can sign court pleadings
except in rare cases where, Ior want oI time or due to unexpected circumstances, an associate has
to sign the same." We understood Atty. AlIonso Ponce Enrile to have said in open court that in
his long years oI practice, he knows that it serves no useIul purpose to downgrade the dignity oI
the Court. We may overlook the shortcomings oI the members oI the law Iirm; except that, as we
see it, partners are duty bound to provide Ior eIIicacious control oI court pleadings and other
court papers that carry their names or the name oI their law Iirm. Seemingly, such control was
absent here.
In the end, we admonish Atty. Jose S. Antonio, with the warning that repetition oI this incident
will be dealt with accordingly. Let a copy oI this resolution be attached to his record.
Attention oI Attys. AlIonso Ponce Enrile, Leonardo Siguion Reyna, Manuel G. Montecillo,
Enrique M. Belo and Oscar R. Ongsiako is invited to the necessity oI exercising adequete
supervision and control oI the pleadings and other documents submitted by their law Iirm to the
courts oI justice oI this country.
So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Di:on, Makalintal, Beng:on, J.!., Zaldivar and Castro, JJ.,
concur.







G.R. No. L-31241 September 12, 1975
JESUS GALANO, BASILIO FLORES, SOLTICIO PLAZA, ISIDRO SAN JOSE,
PATRICIO ANASTACIO, RODOLFO DE LAS ARMAS, AMADO REGIS, PEDRO
CRUZ, FEDERICO MANUEL, EULOGIO MAKIRAMDAM, APOLONIO ALFONSO,
RODOLFO SANTIAGO, MOISES SOLORIA, BENJAMIN SANTOS, BENJAMIN
MARIANO, ANGEL GUISAMA, RUBEN MANAHAN, BILLARDO MERCADO,
ROBERTO SALVADOR, ELIGIO SALVADOR, RODENCIO CUEVAS, TEODORICO
SULIT, GODOFREDO DELA PAZ, and BENJAMIN FRANCISCO, petitioners,
vs.
NEMESIO ROXAS, personaIIy and as Mayor of San Mateo, RizaI, respondent.
O.F. Santos, Nolasco and Caunea and Ciriaco Lopez, Jr. and Associates for petitioners.
Jose W. Diokno for respondent.

BARREDO,
!etition denominated by petitioners as one for mandamus but actually one for 6uo
warranto praying in effect that respondent mayor be ordered to comply with the
following 1st indorsement dated August 13, 1969 of the Commissioner of Civil Service:
#espectfully returned to the Municipal' Mayor, San Mateo, #izal, the following proposed
appointments for patrolman in the San Mateo !olice Department, which were
disapproved by this Office in its 3rd ndorsement dated February 21, 1969 (copy
enclosed) to that office:
Name Position & Salary Effective date
&pon assumption of
1. Ernesto L Garcia !atrolman !1,560.00 duty
2. Claro Linco do do do
3. Sixto Alfonso do do do
4. Secosio C. Sulit do do do
5. !rimo Sedi do do do
6. Conrado de Belen do do do
7. Francisco Fernandez do do do
8. #icardo Clemente do do do
9. Arsenio Leal do do do
10. #icardo Mendoza, Jr. do do do
11. #enato T. Leal do do do
12. Conrado Sandalo do do do
13. Castor #ivera do do do
14. Vivencio Santos do do do
15. Angel Santos do do do
Attention is hereby invited to the pertinent recommendations of the Hearing Officer,
!olice Commission, in which the Civil Service Commission concurs in-re petition for
restoration of Messrs. Jesus Galano et al., of the San Mateo !olice Department and
which the !OLCOM en banc unanimously approved in its enclosed #esolution dated
August 7, 1969, to wit:
1. The resignations of the petitioners be declared null and void;
2. The petitioners be reinstated to their former positions in the San Mateo
!olice Department within 15 days upon receipt of this resolution and that
they be paid their salaries which they failed to receive during the period
they were unduly deprived of their position, "chargeable against the
Mayor pursuant to the decision of the Supreme Court in Nemenzo v.
Sabillano (G.#. No. L-20977, promulgated on September 7, 1968).
mmediate compliance is hereby directed.
(Sgd.)
ABELA
#DO
S&BD
O
Commi
ssioner
of Civil
Service
(Annex C, p. 62-#ecord.)
n the local elections of 1967, respondent Nemesio #oxas was elected mayor of the
Municipality of San Mateo, #izal. Shortly after he assumed office or more specifically
between January 2 and 6, 1968, there were filed with his office twenty-four (24)
resignations signed by petitioners Chief of !olice Jesus Galano and his twenty-three
co-petitioners, all members of the police department of said town. Together with said
resignations were their respective applications for terminal leave. These resignations
were accepted by respondent mayor and subsequently, on varying dates between
January 31, 1968 and June 30, 1968, corresponding payments on the applications for
leave were made by the municipal treasurer and duly received by petitioners.
As a result of the above resignations, only eight (8) policemen of the town remained.
With the police force thus badly depleted, two municipal councilors, Arriola and Valerio,
had to perform traffic and patrol duties. Soon enough, respondent mayor appointed
replacements to the positions vacated by petitioners.
&nder date of January 12, 1968, however, petitioners addressed separate letters to the
!olice Commission and the Civil Service Commission complaining that respondent
mayor had threatened them into filing those "courtesy resignations" and praying that the
same be declared null and void and the appointments of their respective replacements
be accordingly disapproved. The Civil Service Commission referred the matter for
investigation to the !olice Commission. On August 1, 1969, the Hearing Officer of the
!olice Commission who conducted the investigation submitted his report recommending
that the resignations of petitioners be declared null and void and that they be reinstated
to their former positions with corresponding payment of back salaries. This report was
approved by the !olice Commission en banc and forwarded to the Civil Service
Commission, with the result that the latter made the indorsement to respondent mayor
of August 13, 1969 quoted above. On September 4, 1969, respondent moved for
reconsideration but his motion was denied on September 25, 1969. Three days after
receiving this denial on October 3, 1969, i.e., on October 6, 1969, respondent made the
following indorsement to His Excellency, the !resident of the !hilippines:
#espectfully referred to His Excellency, Ferdinand E. Marcos, !resident of the #epublic
of the !hilippines, thru the Executive Secretary, Malacaang !alace, Manila, the 3rd
ndorsement dated September 25, 1969, by the Honorable Commissioner, Abelardo
Subido, Civil Service Commission, Manila, requesting this Office to reinstate Jesus A.
Galano, et als., former Chief of !olice, and 20 members of the San Mateo !olice
Department, San Mateo, #izal, respectively for your information and guidance.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 1, 1968, assumed office as Mayor of San Mateo, #izal, by virtue of the
sovereign mandate of the people of San Mateo, #izal, mindful of my duties and
responsibilities of my oath, my first and foremost duty is to look into the peace and order
obtaining in the community, and to my surprise some members of the San Mateo !olice
including the chief of police Jesus Galano were not performing their duties as expected,
they were loitering around the premises of the municipal building, only to find out that
they were planning to resign en masse for unknown reasons. called the attention of
some of them and warned the members that unless their resignations had been accepted
by me they should perform their duties, but despite of said warning they continued to defy
the same. On January 2, 1968, traffic and patrol duties had been abandoned day and
night, there were few members who were reporting for duties. From January 2-8, 1968,
inclusive letters of resignations have been pouring in my Office. To counteract this
insidious machination to paralyze my administration by the erstwhile members of the San
Mateo !olice, have to utilize the services of some councilors, myself, and few members
left to do the traffic and patrol duties. Believing that it would be unwise for me to keep
these men in the service, who showed indifference and apathy in the performance of their
sworn duties, have decided to approve their resignations and appoint new ones to fill-up
the existing vacancies in the interest of public service, public order, and public welfare.
LETTE#-COM!LANT
On January 16, 1968, a copy of a letter-complaint has been received by my Office
through the Acting Chairman, !olice Commission by the former members of the San
Mateo !olice, alleging among others that they were requested by me to submit courtesy
resignation, and further alleged that have coerced them into resigning. &pon receipt of
the letter-complaint and in reply thereto, stated that they resigned voluntarily. How could
coerce them? The truth of the matter was that was only able to see them individually
when they presented their letter of resignations duly indorsed by former chief Jesus
Galano for my signature, and subsequently by signing their individual voucher covering
the payment of their individual unused vacation and sick leave. Evidence showed that
some members have collected the money value of their accumulated vacation and sick
leave, which imply their voluntary resignations.
t is seemingly unthinkable, a Chief of !olice, like Jesus Galano, a Civil Service eligible,
completed the training course conducted by the !olice Commission, for Chiefs of !olice,
and 20 other members allegedly also Civil Service eligibles, who could be coerced by a
new Mayor to resign? Following this contention as per the !olice Commission fact finding
Committee, then they have no business to stay in the service. repeat, imagine 21 men
with arms, for cowardice, ignorance, and stupidity. f they do not know what are their
duties, rights, and privileges under existing laws, then it follows that they could not defend
the rights of their constituents whom they swore and pledged to protect under oath. How
could they execute the laws and enforce law and order? Why resign and ask for
restoration? Accordingly, requested them three (3) times to resign, again, if this is so,
and if they were in fact interested in their former positions, they should complain to the
Civil Service Commission or to the !olice Commission of the alleged coerced
resignations. What is ridiculous in the issue of coercion was they resigned first, then ask
to be restored in their former positions. The only logical conclusion to this undisputed fact
is that they wanted to resign, and in fact they resigned voluntarily, and used the Civil
Service Commission as an instrument to harrass my administration.
FACT FNDNG COMMTTEE
As a courtesy, upon invitation by both the Honorable Abelardo Subido, and the
Honorable Acting Chairman, Crispino de Castro, !olice Commission on different dates to
thresh-out these resignations of the former members of the San Mateo !olice, told
these gentlemen that there was no problem because they resigned voluntarily and so
can not do anything. Both on different occasions threatened me that if would not restore
petitioners to their former positions they would file criminal as well as administrative
charges against me.
Again, as a courtesy, submitted to the fact finding committee of the !olice Commission
for the purpose of ascertaining the true facts of the case. A series of hearings has been
conducted on April 25, May 23, June 21, July 12, August 6 and August 13, 1968. The last
hearing was on August 13, 1968, and finally on August 1, 1969, exactly one year after the
!olice Commission could release the findings. Aside from the apparent inaction of the
!olice Commission, its findings of facts and recommendations are devoid of merit, one
sided, biased, arbitrary and adverse to the evidence adduced during the hearings. There
was no single instance wherein petitioners have proved that coerced them into resigning
in the course of the hearings conducted by the fact finding committee and yet it say so. n
the light of the findings and recommendations of said committee, it is worthy to note that
the findings of coercion is a conclusion of purely infertile imagination and wanting of legal
basis.
CVL SE#VCE COMMSSON
For unknown reasons, may be because of the raging controversy between the erstwhile
members of the San Mateo !olice and myself from January 1, 1968 to date no
appointment extended by me to fill-up existing vacancies in the municipal government
has been approved and/or attested by Commissioner Subido, to the detriment of public
welfare, whether in the classified and unclassified service, as example is the appointment
of the Secretary of the Municipal Council, whose appointment under the law belongs to
the unclassified service and until this writing, has been pending for almost two years now
in the Civil Service Commission, and so do not receive his salary. Appointments in the
!olice Department eligibles and non-eligibles have been disapproved indiscriminately for
flimsy and trivial reasons.
For several occasions my municipality is the victim of fishing evidenced launched in the
guise of inspection and audit service of the !ersonnel nspection and Audit Service, Civil
Service Commission, fortunately the Commissioner and his authorized representatives
found nothing, because have nothing to hide, a clear sign of pure and simple
harrassment.
Mr. !resident, to prolong this dilemma and confusion prevailing in our community, would
in effect sow discontentment, demoralizes public service, and ultimately loses confidence
in our constituted government through no fault of YO&# EXCELLENCY, but by your
Commissioner Abelardo Subido, and so it is high time now Mr. !resident to use your
power in accordance with law to correct this evildoer in the public service, because you
alone is the hope to help us in our endeavor to bring the government nearer to the
people.
#ENSTATEMENT
n view of the foregoing, it is with deep regret that could not reinstate petitioners in their
former position as requested by Commissioner Subido, unless by order of a competent
court.
shall look forward for your immediate intervention in the premises and assuring you of
my full cooperation for the sake of good government.
(Sgd.)
NEMES
O M.
#OXAS
Mayor
(Annex K, pp. 470-172-#ecord.)
As far as this Court is informed, after respondent submitted copies of the transcript of
the proceedings in the !olcom and other pertinent documents, as required, to the Office
of the !resident, no further action has been taken by that office on respondent's
indorsement. And as respondent would not comply with the orders of the Civil Service
Commission, on November 20, 1969, the instant petition was filed with this Court.
Several issues are discussed extensively and creditably by both learned counsel in their
memoranda. For instance, relying on their respective evidence presented before the
Hearing Officer of the !olcom, petitioners and respondent insist on diametrically
opposite positions as to the root cause of the aforementioned resignations. !etitioners
maintain that respondent had practically coerced them to file their "courtesy
resignations" by threatening them that "baka mayroon pang mangyari" (something might
happen yet) if they refused. On the other hand, respondent contends that he had not
made any such threat and that, on the contrary, the "en masse" resignations of the
petitioner Chief of !olice and his co-petitioners was the culmination of a concerted
move deliberately planned and "master-minded" by the said Chief of !olice as soon as
respondent won as mayor, for the purpose of embarrassing his administration. n fact,
according to respondent, it is indisputable that he never talked to any of the petitioners
other than said Chief, and when he did so. he only spoke to him about the need to
cooperate for the good of the municipality and it was the latter who on his own accord
induced the resignation of his co-petitioners.
As already indicated, the !olcom did find petitioners' version to have been
substantiated, but respondent vigorously disputes the bases of its conclusions. Besides,
respondent posits that neither the !olcom nor the Civil Service Commission has the
authority to order the reinstatement in question, since only courts can do so.
To be sure, the question thus posed by the parties are quite interesting. But as We see
the situation of the case now before &s, We do not feel any need to indulge in any fact
finding regarding the real reasons behind the resignations in dispute. There are two
important points that have come to Our attention, the resolution of which should be
decisive and by reason of which We can prescind from having to pass on the other
issues joined by the parties.
First, We note that in effect, petitioners would have this Court sanction the action of the
Civil Service Commission of disapproving the appointments of those who have replaced
petitioners in their jobs. Verily, their removal would be a necessary consequence if We
should hold petitioners' resignation to be illegal and void. n either case, whether We
treat the matter of the disapproval of the appointments of said replacements
independently or as a corollary of our action on the resignations of petitioners, the plain
fact would remain that they have a vital interest in the outcome of the petition herein.
Consequently, this case cannot be decided without giving them an opportunity to be
heard. They are indispensable parties to these proceedings and their absence is fatal to
the authority of this Court to act, their "presence being a sine qua non of the exercise of
judicial power," (Borlasa vs. !olistico, 47 !hil. 345, at p. 347.)
Secondly, and this We will add in order to make the parties aware already of another
fatal and incurable defect of the case of petitioners and thereby save those concerned
from any further futile effort to pursue any judicial remedy, with the concomitant waste of
money and time, the unbending jurisprudence in this jurisdiction is to the effect that a
petition for quo warranto and mandamus affecting titles to public office must be filed
within one (1) year from the date the petitioner is ousted from his position. (Cui vs. Cui,
L-18727, Aug. 31, 1964, 11 SC#A 755; Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, L-22754, Dec. 31, 1965, 15
SC#A 710; Villegas vs. De la Cruz, L-23752, Dec. 31, 1965 15 SC#A 720; De la Maza
vs. Ochave, L-22336, May 23, 1967: 20 SC#A 142; Alejo vs. Marquez, L-29053, Feb.
27, 1971, 37 SC#A 762). And this period is not interrupted by the prosecution of any
administrative remedy. (Torres vs. Quintos, 88 !hil. 436.) Accordingly, after said period
has lapsed, the remedy of the aggrieved party, if any, lies exclusively with administrative
authorities. n the case at bar, the theory of petitioners themselves is that they were
separated from the service thru the ruse of accepting their "courtesy resignations"
between January 2 and 6, 1968 and the record shows that they were aware of the
supposed illegality of their ouster as early as January 10, 1968, the date of their
separate letters to the !olice Commission and the Civil Service Commission impugning
the action of respondent mayor. t is thus evident that in the premises, they are beyond
the help of the courts, their time to resort thereto having lapsed.
The reason is obvious. While it may be desirable that administrative remedies be first
resorted to, no one is compelled or bound to do so; and as said remedies neither are pre-
requisite to nor bar the institution of 6uo warranto proceedings, it follows that he who
claims the right to hold a public office allegedly usurped by another and who desires to
seek redress in the courts, should file the proper judicial action within the reglementary
period. As emphasized in Bautista vs. Fajardo, (38 !hil., 62), and Tumulak vs. Egay (46
Off. Gaz., 3683), (82 !hil., 828) public interest requires that the right of public office
should be determined as speedily as practicable." (Torres vs. Quintos, 88 !hil. 436, at p.
440.)
WHE#EFO#E, the petition is DSMSSED, without costs. The motion to declare
petitioner Galano in contempt of court is DENED for lack of merit, the alleged intent to
mislead the court not being beyond doubt.
akalintal, C.J., Fernando, A6uino and artin, JJ., concur.


G.R. No. L-43618 March 31, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO ANDAG y TAFALIA, defendant-appellant.
Jose O. Galvan for appellant.

TEEHANKEE, .93
&nder automatic review is the decision rendered on February 7, 1976 by the Circuit
Criminal Court of the Seventh Judicial District of !asig, #izal imposing on the accused
#ogelio Andag the supreme penalty of death for the crime of robbery with homicide.
The Court upon a review of the record accepts the Solicitor General's recommendation
for acquittal of the accused and in the absence of clear positive and direct evidence
linking the accused to the commission of the crime, reverses the trial court's judgment of
conviction for failure of the prosecution to discharge the burden of proving the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
The accused was charged by the Cavite assistant provincial fiscal in an nformation
dated April 26, 1974 and docketed as Criminal Case No. CCC-V-1439-Cavite, as
follows:
That on or about December 19, 1973 in the Municipality of General Aguinaldo, !rovince
of Cavite, !hilippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with a bolo and a piece of wood, with intent to gain, did, then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, rob, take, steal and carry away cash money in
the amount of TEN !ESOS and FO#TY CENTAVOS (!10.40), !hilippine Currency,
belonging to one Mamerto Alano, and on the occasion of said robbery, and as a
necessary means to commit the same, the above-named accused did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, assault, attack, beat and stab the
said Mamerto Alano, inflicting upon the latter wounds on the different parts of his body
which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of Mamerto #.
Alano.
Contrary to law, and with aggravating circumstances; 1) that the crime was committed at
nighttime and in an uninhabited place to facilitate the commission of the crime; 2) that the
crime was committed with evident premeditation; 3) that the crime was committed with
treachery without giving the victim a chance to defend himself, and without any risk or
danger to any defense that the victim might put and 4) that the accused took advantage
of superior strength.
#elying on purely circumstantial evidence and on the extra-judicial confession signed by
the accuse (which had been repudiated by him on the ground that the same had been
extracted from him by force and intimidation), the trial court reasoned out its guilty
verdict, as follows:
The corpus delicti in this case or the fact of death has been sufficiently proven by Exhibit
"C" which is the death certificate of the victim Mamerto Alano. While there is no direct
evidence in this case, there being no actual eyewitnesses to the killing incident,
nevertheless the guilt of the accused has been sufficiently proven by circumstantial
evidence. The following related circumstances unmistakably prove the guilt of the
accused. The accused knew that the victim was engaged in business who used to carry
sums of money, they being residents of the same place; that the accused knew of the
arrival of the copra truck in the evening of December 19, 1973, and he saw the victim on
that particular time and place as testified by Marcos Andag; that while the truck was still
parked in front of Marcos' house and while the practice had not yet begun, although he
was one of the participants in the drama, he left without permission from the group; that
not long after the victim was found lying prostrate on the roadside with stab wounds on
the different vital organs of his body and a few meters away from the corpse were a
guava trunk 2-1/2 inches in diameter and a piece of cloth slashed from the pocket of the
victim's pants; that the medical autopsy revealed that the injury suffered by the victim
could have been caused by a big wood or a hard object.
The foregoing events, the circumstances of slaying incident, the manner how it was
executed and the instruments used in the commission thereof, dovetail with the
admission of the accused as evidence by Exhibit "E".
The Court does not doubt the authenticity and truthfulness of the admission made by the
accused. The Court is convinced that the same was executed voluntarily and not the
result of undue influence or duress. Sgt. Vallejos had no valid reason to maltreat the
accused, they being complete strangers to each other before the incident. The Court is
convinced of the high discipline of military personnel under the New Society. t must be
noted that the admission was subscribed before a town judge who has sufficiently met
the requirements of law before subscribing the aforesaid confession. With this complete
turn-about denying the voluntariness of his admission and disregarding his affirmation of
the same before a town judge on trial, the accused now interposed the the defense of
alibi. t is a convenient scapegoat there being no eyewitnesses to the slaying incident.
Nonetheless to be given probative value the defense of alibi must be clearly and
sufficiently proven by evidence clearly showing that the accused had no chance at all to
perpetuate the crime; that it would have been physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime (!eople vs. #esayaga, L-23294, Dec. 26, 1973). By the accused's
testimony that the distance of his residence and the place of the commission of the crime
covers only a distance of less than a kilometer necessarily lead to the conclusion that he
had every opportunity to perpetrate the crime imputed against him. (pp. 11-13, Decision).
Having found the accused "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with
homicide, under Article 293 of the #evised !enal Code, in relation to section 1, Article
194 thereof as charged in the information", the trial court sentenced him "to suffer the
penalty of death; to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of !12,000.00; to pay
moral damages in the amount of !6,000.00 and another !6,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and to pay the costs."
1. t is at once evident that the fate of the accused lies with the admissibility or non-
admissibility of his extra-judicial confession, since as admitted by the trial court itself
there is no direct evidence nor actual eyewitnesses in this case and it is equally evident
that the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial court is too flimsy and
unsubstantial to justify the verdict of guilty.
The Court finds, as submitted by the Solicitor General and accused's counsel de oficio
that the extra-judicial confession is inadmissible for having been coerced from the
accused and for having been obtained in violation of the accused's constitutional right to
counsel and to be informed of such right.
1. n repudiating his extra-judicial confession, the accused testified that he was
intimidated and maltreated by !hilippine Constabulary agents; he was given "seven-up
treatment" on his nose; his ears were "banged"; he was beaten on the chest; And he
was kicked.
1
He further testified that while !C Sgt. Andres Vallejos was interrogating
him, a !C soldier in civilian clothes kept on boxing him.
2

On this score, the Solicitor General aptly observed that "the prosecution failed to
present any evidence to rebut appellant's claim, despite Sgt. Vallejos' allegation that
many persons were present during the investigation. t failed in the exercise of its task.
[!eople vs. Francisco, 74 SC#A 158 (1976)]. n fact, Sgt. Vallejos admitted that the
appellant, whom he claims executed the confession on January 6, 1974, had been in
"protective custody" since December 24, 1973, when he was arrested (pp. 11, 13, t.s.n.,
February 21, 1975). When asked if during the intervening period the appellant was
starved and tortured by his men, Sgt. Vallejos, instead of giving a categorical denial,
merely answered, " do not know". (p. 13, d.)."
The Court is not unmindful of the practice of some officers of the law resorting to illegal
and reprehensible tactics in order to coerce a person to sign a confession admitting his
guilt. Hence, the Court has repeatedly stressed that "the most painstaking scrutiny must
be resorted to by the trial courts in weighing evidence relating to alleged voluntary
confessions of the accused and the courts should be slow to accept such confessions
unless corroborated by other testimony."
3

nvoluntary or coerced confessions obtained by force or intimidation are null and void
and are abhorred by the law, which condemns the use of such cruel and inhuman
methods to secure a confession. All courts of justice have invariably rejected such
confessions not only because of their unreliability but more fundamentally on the ground
of humanitarian principles which abhor all forms of torture or unfairness toward the
accused in criminal proceedings. A coerced confession thus "stands discredited in the
eyes of the law and is as a thing that never existed."
4

The now Chief Justice had stressed in a 1971 case that "()t is likewise timely to impress
anew on police officials that the imperative requirements of truth and of humanity
condemn the utilization of force and violence to extract confessions from unwilling
victims. Crime must be punished and the guilty must not be allowed to escape. A
desirable end cannot, however, be attained by unconstitutional means. There should be
less than full respect for the law if in the process of enforcing it lawless methods are
employed. Once again, then, this Court is called upon to manifest in the strongest
language possible its abhorrence for the employment of force to compel a person to
sign a statement acknowledging guilt. A decent regard for the dignity that attaches to
every human being as such will be satisfied with nothing less."
5

2. The Solicitor General and counsel de oficio have likewise pointed out that accused-
appellant was not afforded his constitutional right to counsel and to be informed of such
right during the investigation. Sgt. Vallejos admitted on direct examination by Cavite
!rovincial Fiscal Narciso Salcedo that the accused-appellant insisted on having a
lawyer during the investigation but he was not able to secure a lawyer to assist the
accused-appellant on the unacceptable excuse that there were no available lawyers,
thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Considering the gravity of the charge that may be meted on the suspect therein, would you not
at your own initiative secure a lawyer when he said he is not going to have a lawyer of his own or
nobody could help him in this investigation of yours?
A: would like to look for a lawyer that time, but in town, there are no lawyers and that is why
was not able to get a lawyer to help him.
6

n fact, as stressed by the Solicitor General "the constitutional right to counsel has not
been afforded the accused-appellant. Lack of compliance with such a requirement is
evidenced not only by the testimony of the accused-appellant (pp. 7-8, t.s.n., July 10,
1975) but also by the very sworn statement itself. The said sworn statement starts as
follows:
Ang saksi ay napagpaliwanagan ng kanyang karapatan siya'y sumumpa at kusang loob
at buong layang nagsaysay gaya sa mga sumusunod:
1. Tanong Matapos maipaliwanag ang iyong karapatan na hindi ka maaaring pilitin na
magbigay ng salaysay kung hindi mo kagustuhan, ikaw ba ay nakahandang magsalaysay ng
katotohanan at walang iba kung di pawang katotohanan lamang sa salaysay na ito?
Sagot Opo.
7

t is thus clear that the accused was not even informed at the start of the investigation of
his right to counsel, much less afforded the service of counsel notwithstanding his
insistence. His "confession" is therefore plainly inadmissible in evidence under Article
V, section 20 of the 1973 Constitution which mandates that:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The Solicitor General has aptly submitted, citing agtoto vs. anguera
8
and the
Constitutional Convention's "adoption (of) &.S. Supreme Court rulings in the Miranda-
Escobedo cases," that "before a person under investigation for the commission of a
crime may be interrogated, he must first be warned that he has the right, among other,
'to the presence of an attorney and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.' The exercise of this right
may be availed of throughout the interrogation. While this right may be waived, the
individual must knowingly and intelligently waive said right and agree to answer
questions or make a statement even without the assistance of counsel. &nless and until
such warning and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence
obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against an accused," and that
consequently, the accused's "confession" is inadmissible in evidence.
n agtoto, the majority of the Court ruled that the cited constitutional proscription
applies only to confessions obtained after the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution on
January 17, 1973,
9
with the minority headed by the late Chief Justice Fred #uiz Castro,
the now Chief Justice and the writer dissenting and holding that such proscribed
confessions even if taken before January 17, 1973 but sought to be offered in evidence
after said date are inadmissible like coerced and involuntary confessions.
10
n the words
of the Chief Justice, "absent such a showing [of proper safeguards and warnings to the
accused] whatever statement or admission was obtained during such stage of custodial
interrogation is a worthless piece of paper.
n the case at bar, there is no question as to the inadmissibility of the accused's
"confession" since it was taken on January 6, 1974 long after the effectivity date of
January 17, 1973 of the 1973 Constitution and was offered in evidence much later. As
held in People vs. Jimenez
11
, such confessions obtained during custodial interrogation
by the police without proper safeguards and warnings to the accused that "he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used against him and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney either retained or appointed" are
"inadmissible in evidence to prove the guilt of appellant."
. The trial court also took into account the plea of guilty entered by the accused before
Municipal Judge Emmanuel Montoya of Gen. Aguinaldo, Cavite during the preliminary
investigation. This was plainly an improvident guilty plea that is of no worth. The records
show that accused-appellant was not represented by counsel at the proceeding, as
confirmed by Judge Montoya himself during the trial "because in that far, far away town,
there are no lawyers to be appointed."
12
The preliminary investigation was hastily
conducted. The contents of the confession were not read to the accused nor did Judge
Montoya allow the accused to read the same. t is significant to note, as observed by
the Solicitor General, that Judge Montoya failed to dentify the accused when he (the
Judge) testified in court.
13
The Court has said time and again that while justice
demands a speedy administration, judges are duty-bound to be extra solicitous in
seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his
plea and the import of an inevitable conviction.
14
Judge Montoya utterly failed in this
regard.
. We agree with the Solicitor General's submittal that the "evidence linking the
accused to the commission of the crime is grossly wanting." The circumstances
considered by the trial court in its decision, supra, as having proved accused-appellant's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt in place of direct and positive proof are weak, trivial
and unsubstantial.
The circumstance that the accused, who was a participant in a play to be presented on
Christmas day, left the place of rehearsal even before the practice had actually began,
was satisfactorily explained by him. He testified that he had to leave and go home after
one hour because he "did not feel good."
15
This was corroborated by his father who
testified that in the evening of December 19, 1973, his son #ogelio was in their house
sleeping.
Also considered as circumstantial evidence against the accused by the trial court was
his failure to attend the funeral rites of the victim. This cannot be considered as a sign of
guilt, and there is no evidence that the accused and the deceased were related to each
other, even if remotely. The accused, however, did attend the wake at the house of the
victim. n fact, there were also three youths in the community who did not attend the
burial of the deceased, two of whom were also participants in the rehearsal conducted
in Marcos Andag's house but this was not taken against them.
As to the circumstance that the accused knew that the victim was engaged in business
who used to carry large sums of money since they were residents of the same place
and that the accused knew of the arrival of the copra truck in the evening of December
19, 1973, suffice it to say that the accused was not the only resident of the place who
had knowledge of these facts. t may even be true that there are others more intimate or
closely associated with the deceased and therefore with better and much more accurate
information about him, but more of them has apparently been placed under the cloud of
suspicion. As the Solicitor General observed, "it is likewise strange that other than
Eufemio Cleofe, the persons who were with the victim in the business trip to Manila
were not investigated."
16
And, of course, the sum alleged in the information to have
been robbed by the accused from the victim, far from being a "large sum" was the
ridiculously petty sum of Ten pesos and forty centavos (!10.40) which completely
negates the circumstances cited by the trial court against the accused and indicates that
the real culprits did get away with the loot after killing the victim.
The Court;s pronouncement in People vs. Padirayan
17
may well be reiterated here,
thus: "t cannot be said that the stage of moral certainty as to the guilt of appellant was
reached. The liberty of a citizen would be rendered insecure if on proof tainted by
ambiguity and capable of a less sinister connotation, he could be held culpable. There is
the traditional respect for the finding of facts of the judge who presided at the trial, but
certainly it cannot be invoked where, as is quite apparent, circumstances of weight and
influence have either been overlooked or misinterpreted. What is more the acceptance
usually accorded to the conclusion reached by the court below inasmuch as it heard
and observed the witnesses testify cannot negate the constitutional presumption of
innocence."
!roof of the guilt of the accused should not be tainted with ambiguity.
18
The accused
has in his favor the presumption of innocence. This is a mandate of the fundamental
law. Even when the previous Organic Act did not so provide, a defendant, as held by
this Court in the early 1902 case of &nited States vs. Asiao (1 !hil. 304) "must be
presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proven by satisfactory testimony and even in
case there is reasonable doubt as to his innocence he is entitled to acquitta.
19
Only by
proof beyond reasonable doubt which requires moral certainty, "a certainty that
convinces and satisfies the reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it," may
the presumption of innocence be overcome.
20
The Court finds no such proof in the case
at bar.
ACCO#DNGLY, the decision of the lower court under review imposing the death
penalty on herein accused-appellant #ogelio Andag is hereby reversed and set aside
for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and he is
hereby acquitted of the charge against him. His immediate release is hereby ordered,
unless he is being held for some other lawful cause. Costs de oficio.
akasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and elencio-
Herrera, JJ., concur.
A6uino, J., took no part.
Abad Santos, J., is on leave.



Separate Opinions

BARREDO, concurring:
concur, with the suggestion that the proper authority investigate the taking by force of
the alleged confession of the accused so that they may be duly prescribed.


Separate Opinions
BARREDO, concurring:
concur, with the suggestion that the proper authority investigate the taking by force of
the alleged confession of the accused so that they may be duly prescribed.

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