Wei-Wu-Wei: Nondual Action Author(s): David Loy Reviewed work(s): Source: Philosophy East and West, Vol.

35, No. 1 (Jan., 1985), pp. 73-86 Published by: University of Hawai'i Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1398682 . Accessed: 01/12/2011 14:55
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David Loy Wei-wu-wei:Nondual action

... at the stillpoint, therethe danceis, But neitherarrestnor movement. And do not call it fixity, Wherepastand futureare gathered. Neithermovementfromnor towards, Neitherascentnor decline.Exceptfor the point, the still point, Therewouldbe no dance,and thereis only the dance. T. S. Eliot' Wei-wu-wei,"the action of nonaction," is the central paradox of Taoism and as a concept is second in importance only to the Tao itself, which incorporates it; Lao Tzu describes the action/nonaction of someone who has realized the Tao as wu-wei: ... Thus, the wise man deals with things through wu-weiand teaches through nowords. The ten thousand things flourish without interruption. They grow by themselves, and no one possesses them. (Chapter 2)2 The highest attainment is wu-wei and is purposeless (wei). (Chapter 38) When wu-wei is done, nothing is left undone. (Chapter 48) The other paradoxes of Taoism would seem to be derived from wu-wei,unless it is a coincidence that they are susceptible to expression in the same form: "the morality of no morality," "the knowledge of no knowledge," and so forth. As a paradox, wei-wu-wei is perhaps even more difficult to understand than the unconceptualizable Tao itself. In philosophy, discretion may be too much the better part of valor-this is apparently why Arthur Waley, in a long introduction to his translation of the Lao-tzu, discusses the concepts of Tao, te, ch'i, i, yinyang, the five elements, and Taoist yoga, yet defines wu-weionly in an unedifying footnote to chapter 3 of the text: "'non-activity', i.e. rule through te ('virtue', 'power') acquired in trance." 3 But explanations of wei-wu-wei have otherwise not been lacking. In Part One I shall consider a number of such interpretations and argue that they are incomplete without the more radical understanding of wu-wei as nondual action-that is, action in which there is no bifurcation between subject and object: no awareness of an agent that is believed to do the action as being distinct from an objective action that is done. This is not to claim that nondual action is the only meaning of wei-wu-wei. It may be a mistake to assume that any one particular interpretation must be the meaning of wu-wei,for here we may have a case of what Wittgenstein called "family resemblances": Rather than any one characteristic being common to all instances, there are various overlapping characteristics. In Part Two I make comparisons with some recent analytic work in the philosophy of mind and argue that, contrary to first appearances, its conclusions are consistent with and even support the claim that action can be nondual.
David Loy is a member of the Department of Philosophy, National University of Singapore.
of Press.All rights reserved. East 1985).? by the University Hawaii Philosophy andWest35, no. 1 (January

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(1) The simplest interpretation of wei-wu-wei is that it means doing nothing,

or as little as possible. This may be understood either politically or The as sees metaphysically/personally. politicalinterpretation wu-wei "themain behindtheLao Tzu'sconception government theminimum of as amount precept of externalinterference projectedonto the individualfrom those in power combinedwith an environment most conduciveto the individual's quest for 4 fulfillment." If one leavesthe peoplealoneandletsthemget on withit, personal socialproblems resolvethemselves-perhapsbecausepoliticalinterference will is moreoftenthe causeof suchproblems the thantheirsolution,as wascertainly caseduringthe Warring Statesperiod.Suchan interpretation wu-wei often of is of part of a more generalpolitical interpretation Taoism, which, it has been fits is This recognized, the Lao-tzubetterthan the Chuang-tzu.5 view of wu-wei also consistentwith the sole recordedreference wu-wei Confucius: to by The Mastersaid, "If anyonecould be said to have affectedproperorderwhile inactive(wu-wei),it was Shun. What was there for him to do? He remaining and simplymadehimselfrespectful took up his positionfacingdue south."6 his By regulating own conductso that it reflectsthe moralorder,the Confucian ruler sets a positive example and is thus able to influencehis subordinates withoutcoercingthem. But this does not necessarily imply wu-weitowardthe The emphasis Confucianism that the kingreignsbut does in is peoplegenerally. not rule. In the ideal administration, rulerdoes not personallyattend to the mattersof government dependsupon the charismatic but influence his virtue of thatthe king'sministers do (te);theredoes not seemto be the further implication not need to act. The emphasisin Taoism shifts from this need for a personal to whichallowsall socialandpoliticalorganization be to example an anarchism consistentwith the Tao.7The problemin eithercase is muchthe same.Despite the hopes of utopiansand economicconservatives, neitheris very practicable. suchgovernment workin an unthreatened traditional Perhaps might society,but I do not seehowit couldbe successful thecutthroat in Statesperiodnor, Warring in given its complexityand rapid transformation, our contemporaryinterdependentworld. Insofar as the meaningof wu-weiis political nonaction, it seemsto havelittlerelevance us today-perhaps unfortunately, the implifor if cationis that modernsocietycannotharmonizewith the Tao.
The personal interpretation of wei-wu-wei as literally "doing nothing" does

not fare much better,and in fact this view does not seem to have been very common. In his commentaryon the Chuang-tzu, Kuo Hsiang criticized it: the theoryof wuwei,somepeoplethinkthat lyingdown is betterthan "Hearing the walking.These people are far wrong in understanding ideas of Chuang Tzu."8 Nevertheless, Fung Yu-lan,afterquotingthis, wenton to add:"despite this criticism,it would seem that in their understanding ChuangTzu such of

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people were not far wrong."9This probablyrevealsmore about Fung than ChuangTzu, but I think that Fung is not completelywrong. In fact, such a which I shall offerlater, readingis consistentwith the nondualinterpretation, in that complete "not acting" requireseliminatingthe sense-of-selfwhich is inclinedto interfere. Noninterference not reallypossibleunlessone has disis the and sipatedthe fog of expectations desiresthat keepsone fromexperiencing worldas it is in itself(Tao),and thejudgmentthat "something mustbe done"is usuallypartof thatfog. JoshBillingssaidhe was an old manandhad had lots of troubles-most of whichneverhappened. most,of ourproblems Many,perhaps in our own minds,in an anxietywhich is projectedoutwardinto the originate environment. Whatmightbe seenas a corollary "doingnothing" knowingwhento stop. of is 77 Chapter of theLao-tzucomparesthe courseof natureto a bow:"Thatwhich is at the top is pulleddown;thatwhichis at the bottomis broughtup. Thatwhich is overfullis reduced; whichis deficient supplemented." Thusthemanwho is that abidesin theTao neverwantsto reachan extreme and,knowingthe righttimeto stop, is freefromdanger(chapters15 and 44). Nature,hereincludingman, is a occurs(chapsuccessionof alternations: whenone extremeis reacheda reversal ter 40), as with such naturalphenomenaas day-nightand summer-winterwhichinsightwaslaterelaborated the complexities the Yin-Yangschool. of into sees of (2) A morecommoninterpretation wei-wu-wei it as actionwhichdoes not force but yields. Ratherthan being a versionof doing nothing, this might be called "the action of passivity."Under the weight of a heavy snowfall, pine branches breakoff,butby bending,the willowcandropits burdenand springup again.ChuangTzu gives the exampleof the intoxicatedman who is not killed whenhe falls out of his carriagebecausehe does not resistthe fall. This would seemto be an argument alcoholism,butno: "Ifsuchintegrity the spiritcan of for be got from wine, how much greatermust be the integritythat is got from Heaven."10So wu-wei a recommendation be soft andyielding,as Lao Tzu's is to favoritemetaphor water.Oftenthe characterjoha translated "weakness," is as '1 but "weakness" unavoidably has negativeconnotationswhichdo not seemright in this context-especially sincejoh is usually (but not always:for example, 8 chapters and66)a meansto conquerin theend. It is becausewateris the softest and most yieldingthingthat it is able to overcomethe hardand strong. An apparentcorollaryof this (parallelto the corollarymentionedearlier)is thata veryslightactionmay be enoughto haveextraordinary results,if done at the righttime.Thisis "contemplating difficult with the easy, workingon the the one greatwiththe small"(chapter In particular, shoulddealwithpotentially 63). big problemsbeforethey becomebig (chapter64); the growthof the saplingis easyto affect,butnot thatof a maturetree.Bothof thesepointsseemundeniable, if limited,truisms; challengeis knowingwhenand how to apply them. the

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(3) Probably the most common interpretation of wei-wu-wei is action that is natural. Creel quotes several examples: The natural is sufficient. If one strives, he fails. Wang Pi12

(The Taoist saint) chooses this attitude in the conviction that only by so doing the 'natural' development of things will favour him. Duyvendak 3 According to the theory of "having-no-activity", a man should restrict his activities to what is necessary and what is natural. "Necessary" means necessary to the achievement of a certain purpose, and never over-doing. "Natural" means following one's Te with no arbitraryeffort. Fung Yu-lan14 The problem with such explanations is that they do not explain very much. As Creel asks, how can we distinguish natural from unnatural action? The term is so pliable that it ends up meaning whatever one wants it to mean-as all those who read the ingredients in "natural food" products know. Fung's use of "arbitrary" just pushes the question one step back-how do we distinguish arbitrary from not arbitrary?And is not the passing of such dualistic judgments condemned in Taoist literature?15Wang Pi equates the natural with not striving, and others with not making willful effort,16 but this, too, begs the question unless some criterion is offeredfor distinguishing willful from nonwillful action; otherwise we are left, like Fung, lying down. One suggested criterion is spontaneity,17 but at best that can be only a necessary and not a sufficient condition: The anger I spontaneously feel when someone steps on my toe, or runs off with my wife, is not necessarily a case of wu-wei. None of the preceding is a refutation of the view that wei-wu-weiis natural, nonwillful action, and so forth. The problem is rather that such descriptions do not in themselves go far enough; but allied with the proper criterion they may be valuable. In fact, the concept of nondual action that I shall offer can be seen as such a criterion. The root irruption of the natural order of things is man's selfconsciousness, and the return to Tao is conversely a realization of the ground of one's being-including one's own consciousness. If consciousness of self is the ultimate source of unnatural action, then natural action must be that in which there is no such self-consciousness-in which there is no awareness of the agent as being distinct from "his" act. (4) The main problem with understanding wei-wu-wei is that it is a genuine paradox: the union of two contradictory concepts-action ("... nothing remains undone") and nonaction ("nothing is done ... "). The resolution of this paradox must somehow combine both concepts, but how this can be anything other than a contradiction in terms is difficult to understand. So it is not surprising that some scholars have concluded that it is an unresolvable con-

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tradiction. Creel, for example, decided that this greatest Taoist paradox was probably unintentional, due to the juxtaposition of two different aspects in early Taoism: an original "contemplative aspect" and a subsequent "purposive aspect." The first denotes "an attitude of genuine non-action, motivated by a lack of desire to participate in the struggle of human affairs," while the second is "a technique by means of which one who practices it may gain enhanced control over human affairs." 18 The former is merely passive (hence "nonaction"), the latter is an attempt to act in and reform the world ("action"), and, as Creel emphasizes, these are not only different but "logically and essentially they are incompatible." 9 Creel admits that this interpretation is not to be found within the Taoist texts themselves, and recognizes that this puts him in the awkward position of claiming that the Chuang-tzu(more contemplative) is earlier than the compilation of the Lao-tzu (more purposive).20 What is worse, he must acknowledge that "we find 'contemplative' Taoism and 'purposive' Taoism lying cheek by jowl, and sometimes scrambled in a grand mixture, in the Lao Tzu and the Chuang Tzu,"but he tries to justify this by saying that men are seldom wholly governed by logic.21 I think that the problem is rather that, because Creel here is wholly governed by logic, he misses the fact that the paradox is resolved by a particular experience-the realization of Tao-which cannot be understood so logically. As with the Vedantic realization of Brahman and the Buddhist attainment of nirvana,this experience is nondual in the sense that there is no differentiation between subject and object, between self and world. The implication of this for action is that there is no longer any bifurcation between an agent, the self that is believed to do the action, and the objective action that is done. As usually understood, "action" requires an agent that is active; "nonaction" implies a subject that is passive, which does nothing and/or yields. The "action of nonaction" occurs when there is no "I" to be either active or passive, which is an experience that can be expressed only paradoxically. The simpler interpretations of wu-wei as noninterference and yielding view not-acting as a kind of action; nondual action reversesthis and sees nonaction-that which does not changein the action. That wei-wu-wei means nondual action is suggested in the Chuang-tzu, although not so much by the context of its references to wu-weias by its description of another, very similar, paradox. In contrast to the twelve instances of wu-weiin the Lao-tzu, there are some fifty-six occurrences in the Chuang-tzubut only three of these occur in the seven "inner chapters." 22 It is significant that two of these clearly describe more than noninterference or yielding: Now you have a large tree and are anxious about its uselessness. Why do you not plant it in the domain of non-existence, in a wide and barren wild? By its side you may wander in nonaction (wu-wei);under it you may sleep in happiness.23 Tao has reality and evidence, but no action (wu-wei) or form.24 Unconsciously, they stroll beyond the dirty world and wander in the realm of nonaction (wu-wei).25

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Butmoreimportant the paradoxwe findin chaptersix, whereNu Chuteaches is the Tao to Pu LiangI: gainedvision of the One ... was able to transcendthe distinctionof past and present... wasableto enterthe realmwherelife anddeathareno more.Then,to of of him, the destruction life did not meandeath,nor the prolongation life an he additionto the durationof his existence.He would follow anything; would receive anything.To him, everythingwas in destruction,everythingwas in bancemeansperfection.26
construction. This is called tranquillity-in-disturbance. Tranquillity in distur... Having disregarded his own existence, he (Pu Liang I) was enlightened ...

Here"tranquillity disturbance" "Peace-in-Strife" cannotmeana lack in 27) (or of activity.Rather,thereis a senseof unchanging peacein the midstof continual whichactivity destruction-and-construction-that ceaselesstransformation, is, his includeshis own. This is possibleonly becausePu LiangI first"disregarded own existence,"hence the overcomingof the duality of self and nonself and vision of the One." "gaining which It is significant one findsthesameparadoxin otherAsiantraditions that it maintainthe nondualityof subject and object. Not surprisingly, is most common in Chinese Buddhism,where Taoist influence is to be expected. is However,that wei-wu-wei a paradoxicalsynthesisof nonactionin action is moreclearlyrecognizedin Buddhism. Seng Chao maintainedin the ChaoLun thatactionandnonactionarenot exclusive: Thingsin actionareat the sametime alwaysin nonaction;thingsin nonactionare alwaysin action.28This claim is of in expounded thefirstchapter,"Onthe Immutability Things,"butthe pointis to be repeatedin chapter four, "Nirvana is Nameless": importantenough non-action,movementis alwaysquiescent.Throughaction, every"Through thingis actedupon, meansthat quiescenceis alwaysin motion."29One of the states earliestCh'antexts,the HsinHsinMingof the thirdpatriarch Seng-ts'an, twice that the awakenedmind transcendsthe duality of rest and nonrest,30 echoing the argumentof Nagarjunathat both motion and rest are incomprehensible and hence unreal (sunya).31 Probably the best-known example,

not definitely derivedfromTaoism,is foundin a passagefromthe Bhagavadgita whichexplicitlydescribesactionwhichis yet no action: He who in actionseesinactionandactionin inaction-he is wiseamongmen, he is a yogin,and he has accomplished his work. all abandonedattachmentto the fruit of works,ever content, without Having he any kind of dependence, does nothingthough he is ever engagedin work.

(IV, 18, 20)32

of The Sanskrit wordfor action,karman, suggestsan interpretation theseverses whichseesthemas recommending action that does not bringkarmicresults.In from the world of answerto the Buddhistand Yogic emphasison withdrawal socialobligation,the Gitaclaimsthatactiontoo mayleadto Krishnabecauseno karmanaccrues if an act is performed"without attachmentto the fruit of

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action."Thisdoesnot disagree of witha nondualinterpretation theseverses,but it. Lao Tzu, SengChao,and the Gtag be seento be describing may supplements differentaspects of the same experienceof nondual action. The difference betweenthe firsttwo is in whichhalf of the dualismof agent + actionis eliminated.TheTaoistwei-wu-wei the denialof an objectiveaction,that I perform is action. The Buddhistconcept of anatta and the "no mind" of Ch'an sonme emphasizethe denial of an agent, that I performsome action. But to deny a subjective agentor to denyan objectiveactionamountsto the samething,since eachhalfof the polarityis dependent of uponthe other.Theimportance the Gita is thatit implieshow thisbifurcation occurs.The senseof dualismarises passage becauseactionis donewithreference the fruitof action;thatis, becausean act to is performed withsomegoal or aim in mind:I do an actionin orderto gain some result.The Gitamaybe understood eithermorenarrowly proscribas particular selfishaction in favorof work "forthe maintenance the world,"or more of ing broadly as showing the problem with all intentionalaction. The Buddhist concept of karman,which emphasizesintention,is anotherexpressionof the broaderview:Although"good actions"may lead to pleasurable rebirthin the devarealm,that is still samisdra. must act in such a way as to escapeboth One Both good and bad karmicacts originate good and bad karmicconsequences. from dualism:In the formercase, the self manipulatesthe world for its own advantage;in the latter case, the self consciously works for the benefit of somethingor someoneelse. The only way to transcendthe dualismof self and otheris to act withoutintention-that is, withoutattachment a projected to goal to be obtained from the action-in which case the agent is the act. It is to attachment and identification withthought(thatis, the projected goal) which riseto a senseof dualitybetweenthe mindthatintendsand the body thatis gives used to attainthe intendedresult. But how does the nondualityof agent and act resolvethe paradoxof "the actionof nonaction"? One may acceptthe negationof a subject,in whichcase the action cannot be something"objective,"yet there is still an action. The answer that,whenone completely is becomes action,one losesthe sensethatit an is an action. also withall sensations action(whichdependentirelyon the limitednatureof of actions)-and henceit comes to resemble passivity. This is the activityof the humanbeing who has become whole:it has been callednot-doing,for nothingparticular, nothingpartialis at work in man and thus nothingof him intrudesinto the world. (Buber)33 As long as thereis the senseof an agentdistinctfromthe action, the act can be and only "partial" thereis the sensationof action due to the relationbetween them. Only in nondualaction can there be no sense of an ego-consciousness outside the action, for otherwisethere is a perspectivefrom which an act is
.... For an action of the whole being does away with all partial actions and thus

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observedto occur (or not occur). When one is the action, no residueof selfconsciousness to The is remains observethat actionobjectively. senseof wu-wei thatof a quietcenterwhichdoes not changealthoughactivityconstantly occurs, as in ChuangTzu's "Tranquillity-in-Disturbance." Suchan actioncan be experienced nondualonly if it is completeandwhole as in itself. It must not be relatedto anythingelse, for such relatingis an act of thought,which showsthat thereis thinkingas well as acting and the action is If only "partial." the nondual act is completein itself and does not referto that is, it simply is what it is somethingelse, it turns out to be meaningless: This pinpointsthe problemwith intention,since it is the reference to (tathatd). somegoal to be derivedfromthe act thatgivesthe act meaning.In contrast,the of ddnap&ramita Mahayanais generosityin which the giver, the gift, and the "Herea Bodhisattva gives a gift, recipientare all realizedto be empty(sunya): and he does not apprehenda self, a recipient,a gift; also no rewardof his giving."34Such "givingof no-giving"(as it might be termed)can be done "without becausethereis no intentiontiedto it. The best leaningon something" is giving,likethe bestactiongenerally, "freefromtraces,"in whichcase thereis not eventhe sensethat it is a gift. Nondualactionseemseffortless becausethereis not the dualityof one partof oneselfpushinganotherpart-in the case of physicalactivity,of an "I" which needs to exert itself in order to get the musclesto move. Rather, "I" am the muscles.Thisgivesinsightinto a numberof Zen koanssuch as the following: MasterShogensaid, "Whyis it that a man of greatstrengthcannotlift up his legs?" And he also said, "Wedo not use the tongue to speak."(Or: "It is not the tonguethat we speakwith.")35 This amounts to a denial of the mind-bodydualism. However, this is not materialism behaviorism. or is Ratherthannegatingthe psyche,the implication thatthebodyitselfis whollypsychic.ThePrajfiaparamita HeartSitra statesthat one who hasrealized emptiness all thingsactsfreelybecausehe is "without the of in hindrance the mind."Clearlythisis one way in whichmentaleventsinterfere withnondualaction, by sometimeskeepingone's physicalactionsfrom occurand ringnaturally spontaneously accordingto the situation.The nondual"psychic body,"whichknowshow to reactperfectlywell by itself,suffersa kind of due Asian martialartsusuallyinclude "hindrances." paralysis to psychological some meditationin theirtrainingin orderto avoid this, so studentscan react to spontaneously attackwithoutbeingparalyzed fearandwithoutneedingto by deliberate first. the in withdualisticactionis notjust "hindrance themind" However, problem but intentionin general: Cultivation of no usefor the attainment Tao. The onlythingthatone cando is of is to be freefromdefilement. Whenone'smindis stainedwiththoughtsof life and

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death, or deliberate action, that is defilement. The grasping of the Truth is the function of everyday-mindedness. Everyday-mindednessis free from intentional action, free from concepts of right and wrong, taking and giving, the finite and the infinite.... All our daily activities-walking, standing, sitting, lying downall response to situations, our dealing with circumstances as they arise: all this is Tao. (Ma-tsu)36 Ordinarymind is the Tao37 because, when they are free from intentional action, daily activities are realized to be nondual. This gives insight into how the "mindfulness of body" described in the Satipatthana Sitra, and Theravada vipassana practice in general, might function: In the slow "walking meditation" of vipassana, for example, one "lets go" of all intentions by concentrating on the act of walking itself. This also explains why those Zen koans which ask "Why ... ?" never receive a straight answer. "Unmon said, 'The world is vast and wide like this. Why do we put on our seven-panel robe at the sound of the bell?"' 38 From a contemporary Zen master's commentary on this case: ... Some of you are familiar with the last line of the mealtime sutra, "We and this food and our eating are equally empty." If you can acknowledge this fact, you will realize that when you put on your robe, there is no reason or "why" in it.... There is no reason for the "why" in anything! When we stand up, there is no reason "why". We just stand up! When we eat, we just eat without any reason "why". When we put on the kesa (seven-panel robe), we just put it on. Our life is a continuous just ... just ... just.39 This passage clarifies what "intentionless activity" means. From the usual perspective, it seems impossible to avoid intentions. We eat to satisfy our hunger, for example, and even taking a walk can be seen to have a purpose such as to relax. But the claim just presented is that even now actions of ours like dressing and eating are not purposive. "Intentionless activity" does not mean merely random and spontaneous action, but involves realizing the distinction between thought (the intention) and the action. The thought (for example, "time to eat") is whole and complete in itself; the act (eating) is also whole and complete in itself. It is when the two are not experienced wholly and discretely but only in relation to each other, the first as if "superimposed"upon the second, that action seems intentional and therefore dualistic, and there is the sense of an agent/mind that uses the act/body for the sake of.... In answer to such stock questions as "Why did Bodhidharma come from the West?"Zen masters such as Ma-tsu, Huang Po, and Lin-chi were apt to strike the student or shout in his ear. If the Tao is nonintentional, everyday-mind, such responses were not evasive. They were answers to the question, demonstrations of "why"-examples of nondual action, each of which is complete in itself. One day the world-honoured one (Sakyamuni Buddha) ascended his seat. Manjusri struck the gavel and said, "Clearly behold the Dharma of the King of the Dharma; the Dharma of the King of the Dharma is 'just this'." 40

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II

RecentWestern workin the philosophy mindhas developedthe viewthatthe of not is of consciousness maintained by memory,as the earlierempiricontinuity for cists believed,but by the streamof intentionalaction. StuartHampshire,
example, maintains this in Thoughtand Action:

to Britishempiricistssince Hume have tried, to their own dissatisfaction, the as represent continuityof a person'sconsciousness some bindingthreadof memoryrunningthroughthe separatedata of consciousness.But within the of trajectory an action,with its guidingintention,thereis alreadya continuity engaged throughchange,and, if it is truethat a consciouspersonis necessarily only by uponsomeaction,howevertrivial,this knowncontinuityis interrupted myself,as the sleepand by otherformsof unconsciousness.... I do distinguish innercorethatis the sourceof directed effort,fromall my passingstates,andit is actionthatgivesme the senseof thissenseof myselfas the sourceof meaningful my continuityfromthe presentinto the future.41 ... a conscious mind is always and necessarilyenvisagingpossibilitiesof action, of findingmeans towardsends, as a body is always and necessarily occupyinga certainposition.To be a conscioushumanbeing,and thereforea thinkingbeing, is to have intentionsand plans, to be tryingto bringabout a now certain effect.Wearetherefore alwaysactivelyfollowingwhatis happening actionis ineliminable as leadinginto whatis to happennext.Becauseintentional fromour notionof experience, also is temporalorder.42 so This seemsto contradictwhat has been maintainedin the first part of this mind"of the secondpassageto article,but it neednot. If we takethe "conscious mean "consciousness awareness) self," then this view about the relation of (or withwhatwas actionis consistent between"thesenseof myself"andintentional is claimedearlier.The only significant difference that, becauseHampshirebehe fromour notion of experience," lievesintentional actionto be "ineliminable does not envisionthe possibilityof nondualaction as a result of eliminating "the sourceof directedeffort."If intentionalaction wereeliminable,then the of implication Hampshire's positionis that this would also eliminatethe sense of self. Hampshire wrongwhen he claimsthat "a consciousmind is always is and necessarilyenvisagingpossibilitiesof action," for there is the counterof example meditation-an exampleverymuchto the point, sinceit is generally to be a veryimportant part,of the agreed part,and perhapsthe most important nonduality.It may be objectedthat in path for those who wish to experience on too, one has intentionsand makeseffortsto concentrate somemeditation, the for butthisis not thecasein thedeeperstagesof meditation, in samadhi thing, sense of self evaporates,and preciselybecauseall effort and intentioncease. of accountseemsvalidas an explanation the usualdualisticwayof Hampshire's On of but understanding experience, it does not amountto a critique nonduality. the contrary,if one accepts (as Hampshirecertainlywould not) a distinction and between sense-of-self nondualconsciousness, takeshis viewas referring and to the former,then his accountwouldagreewith the firstpartof this articlein as betweendualisticand nondualconsciousness due to the explaining difference

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intentionality. Hampshire's position is even implied by this account of nondual action, for his is a description of why experience seems to be dualistic. There is still a serious problem with Hampshire's account. His explanation of the continuity of consciousness as due to intentionality takes for granted what we usually cannot help but take for granted, some sort of causal relationship between intentions and actions. However, Hume pointed out, as a corollary to his critique of the causal relation, that no one can hope to understand how volition produces motion in our limbs: "That their motion follows the command of the will is a matter of common experience, like other natural events: but the power or energy by which this is effected, like that in other natural events, is unknown and inconceivable." 43 In other words, the relationship between intention and action, which normally we readily accept, is really incomprehensible. The implication of this is that intentionality-the sense of myself as the source of meaningful action, to use Hampshire's words-cannot provide my continuity through change, for that continuity between guiding intention and an action is itself philosophically inexplicable. One might be inclined to say that it is only consciousness which can bridge the gap; however, one then has not explained the continuity of consciousness but merely postulated it ad hoc to resolve the difficulty. This is a problem for those who, like Hampshire, presuppose a dualistic account of experience and therefore must attribute some type of reality to "the sense of myself"-thus reifying consciousness into a self, in effect. But having accepted Hume's critique, one cannot thereafter bring the self back in through the backdoor, as it were, as "continuity of consciousness." This inexplicable relation between intention and action is not a problem for the nondualist, who accepts that the consciousness of self is actually illusory and agrees that a fictive self has been postulated in order to bridge the "gap." The nondualist can accept this "gap" between thoughts and action-in fact he can deny any causal linkand this is why all actions are always nondual, even when not realized as such. Hampshire might try to bridge that gap between thought and action by agreeing on the one hand that the relation is incomprehensible yet asserting on the other that, as we experience in daily life, it is undeniable; as Hume said, "That their motion follows the command of the will is a matter of common experience...." But that this is undeniable is by no means true, as the history of the mind-body problem indicates. Nietzsche, for example, denies that intention is the cause of an event, and reverses Hume by extrapolating this denial of volition into a denial of the causal relation generally: Critique of the concept "cause" ... We have absolutely no experience of a cause; psychologically considered, we derive the entire concept from the subjective conviction that we are causes, namely, that the arm moves. But that is an error. We separate ourselves, the doers, from the deed, and we make use of this patterneverywhere-we seek a doer for every event. What is it we have done? We have misunderstood the feeling of strength, tension, resistance, a muscular

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the of feelingthatis already beginning the act, as the cause,or we havetakenthe will to do this or that for a causebecausethe action followsupon it-.... In summa: eventis neithereffectednor does it effect.Causeis a capacityto an 44 to produceeffectsthat has been super-added the events ... Onlybecausewe haveintroduced into "doers", thingsdoesit appear subjects, that all events are the consequencesof compulsionexertedupon subjectsexerted whom? by againby a "doer".Causeandeffect-a dangerous conceptas thatcausesand something long as one thinksof something uponwhichan effect
is produced.

... When one has graspedthat the "subject"is not somethingthat creates effects,but only a fiction,muchfollows. It is only after the model of the subjectthat we have inventedthe realityof theminto the medleyof sensations.If we no longerbelieve thingsand projected in the effective in subject,thenbeliefalso disappears effectivethings,in reciprothat we call things....4 cation,causeand effectbetweenthose phenomena ForNietzsche,intention thewillin general epiphenomena amounnot and are tingto thecauseof an action.Thisdenialof volition(byno meansuncommon46) wouldseemto implydeterminism, the conceptof nondualactionsuggests an but alternativethat escapes the usual dilemmaof freedomor determinism. The classicalstatementof that problemis dualistic in presupposing conscious a subjectwhose actionseitherare completelydetermined a causal chain (the by causalinfluence strongest reapseffect)or arefreefroma causalchain(or, rather, freefromcompletedetermination, since totallyuncaused,randomchoice does not seemto providefreedomin anymeaningful assume sense).Bothalternatives the existence a consciousselfdistinctfromits actionsand existentoutsidethe of causalchain-although its actionsmaybe totallydetermined external causes. by But if, as the nondualist thereis no self,this does not implycomplete maintains, for causal determinism, if thereis no subjectthen thereare also no "objective" factors.The deterministic view impliesa self, helplessbeforecausalinfluences whichstruggle to amongthemselves see whichis strongest,ratherlike medieval to see who willwin the haplesslady;but if thereis no hapless knightscompeting consciousness If here,the situationmust be understooddifferently. "libertyor freedomsignifiesproperlythe absence of opposition"(Hobbes47)then nonto freedom,sincethereis no "other" dualitywouldseemratherto implylimitless be opposed.Elsewhere have arguedthat the nondualistdenial of self (as in I is to that Buddhism) equivalent asserting thereis only the Self(as in Vedanta).48 the We would normallyinfer that the formerimplies completedeterminism, latterabsolutefreedom.However,if the universeis a whole (Brahman,Tao, and Vijinaptimatra, so forth)and if, as Hua Yen Buddhism developsin its image of Indra'sNet, each particular not isolatedbut containsand manifeststhat is that "does"the "I" whole,thenwhenever act it is not "I"butthe wholeuniverse actionor ratheris the action.If we acceptthatthe universe self-caused, thenit is acts freelywhenever is done. Thus, from the nondualistperspective, anything turnsout to be equivalentto absolutefreedom.49 completedeterminism

85

NOTES 1. From"Burnt Poems1909-1962(London: FaberandFaber, Norton,"in T. S. Eliot,Collected

1963), p. 191.

2. Thisandthe followingpassages fromthe Lao-tzu fromthe translation ChangChungare by and yuan,in Tao:A New Wayof Thinking by (Harper Row, 1975),withmodifications me;hereafter citedas Chang,Tao. citedas 3. Arthur Waley,The WayandIts Power(London:Allenand Unwin, 1968);hereafter is of The translation theLun-yu also not veryilluminatWaley,TheWay. definition givenin Waley's of the (The Analectsof ing: "wu-wei, phraseappliedby Taoiststo the immobility self-hypnosis" Confucius (London,1936),p. 193).
4. Roger T. Ames, "Wu-wei in 'The Art of Rulership' Chapter of Huai Nan Tzu," Philosophy

citedas Ames, "Wu-wei." Eastand West31, no. 2 (April1981):196;hereafter of 5. Seeibid.,pp. 196-198,andHerleeG. Creel,What Taoism?(Chicago, Is Illinois: University citedas Creel,Taoism. ChicagoPress,1970),pp. 44-47; hereafter 6. I haveborrowed Ames'translation, "Wu-wei," 194. p. 7. Compare Ames,"Wu-wei," 194, 197. pp. 8. Quotedin Creel,Taoism, 54. p.
9. Fung Yu-lan, A Short History of ChinesePhilosophy,p. 225, quoted by Creel, in Taoism,p. 54.

in 10. Waley'stranslation, TheWay. in Chan'stranslation The Wayof Lao Tzu(Bobbs-Merrill, 11. For example,see Wing-tsit 1963, in (Princeton,New Jersey:PrincetonUniversity Philosophy reprinted A SourceBook of Chinese 36, Press,1963),pp. 139-176,chapters 40, 52, 76, and 78.
12. Creel, Taoism, quoting Lao-Tzu, shang. 2a (chap. 2).

Tao 13. Ibid.,quotingDuyvendak's Te Ching,10-11.

14. Ibid., quoting Fung's A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, pp. 100-101. 15. Ibid., p. 53.

willfulaction" (Sung-peng 16. "The importantphrase,wu-wei,thus means "not-having Hsu, East "LaoTzu'sConception Evil,"Philosophy and West26, no. 3 (July1976):303). of is to 17. Ibid., p. 304: "It is important note that 'spontaneity' reallythe positivename for the of negative expression wu-wei." 18. Creel,Taoism, 74. Creelfirstarguedfor this view in "OnTwo Aspectsin EarlyTaoism" p. Is in his (1965).Botharereprinted What (1954)andrepeated positionin "OntheOriginof Wu-wei"
Taoism?

19. Ibid.,p. 45. 20. Ibid.,p. 46. 21. Ibid.,p. 45. 22. Ibid.,p. 54. 23. Fung Yu-lan,trans.,ChuangTzu,with commentary Kuo Hsiang(New York:Gordon by Press,1970),p. 40. 24. Ibid.,p. 117. 25. Ibid.,p. 125. 26. Ibid.,pp. 119-120,withemphasis me. by Tzu Works Chuang (NewYork:Columbia 27. Burton University Watson,trans.,TheComplete of Press,1968),p. 83.
28. See Chang Chung-yuan, Creativityand Taoism (New York: Julian Press, 1963), p. 10.

29. ChaoLunIV, 6:14b, quotedin Chang'sTao,p. 122. in 30. "When and no restceaseto be, thenevenonenessdisappears" rest (Fromthe translation Zen:Dawnin the West(New York:Anchor,1980),see pp. 187-188). PhilipKapleau, and 32. Radhakrishnan's translation,in Radhakrishnan Moore, eds., SourceBook in Indian New Jersey: Princeton Press,1957),p. 117. University (Princeton, Philosophy T. 2d 33. MartinBuber,I and Thou,trans.WalterKaufmann, ed. (Edinburgh: T. Clark,1970), as the p. 125.Thispage,whichdescribes I-Thourelationship "atonce ... passiveandactive,"shows he is that"I-Thou" a relationship, must In theambivalence Buber's of approach. orderto maintain
31. See the Malamadhyamakakdrikd, chap. 2.

86 Loy

but keepthe relatadistinctfrom each otherand deny nonduality; this passage,like manyothers, nonduality. suggests
34. Edward Conze, trans. and ed., Selected Sayings from the Perfection of Wisdom (Boulder,

Colorado: Press,1978),p. 67. Prajna

35. Mumonkan, case 20. 36. Quoted in Chang Chung-yuan, Original Teachings of Ch'an Buddhism(New York: Vintage,

1971),p. 130.
37. Mumonkan,case 19.

38. KounYamada,Gateless CenterPublications, Gate(Los Angeles,California: 1979),p. 86. 39. Ibid.,p. 88. 40. Case92 of TheBlueCliffRecord, and trans.ThomasCleary J. C. Cleary(Boulder, Colorado: of Shambhala, 1977), 571.Theexperience someChristian p. mysticsledthemto thesameconclusion: When[Jakob] Boehme speaking God'slife as it is in himselfhe refers it as "play"... Adam is of to 16:10].Adamfell oughtto havebeencontentto playwithnaturein Paradise [Mysterium Magnum whenthis play becameseriousbusiness, that is whennaturewas madean end insteadof a means. H. (Howard Brinton,TheMysticWill(New York:Macmillan, 1930),p. 218) Meister Eckhart: Do all you do, actingfrom the core of your soul, withouta single"Why".... Thus, if you ask a that genuine person, is, one whoactsfromhisheart: "Whyareyoudoingthat?"-he willreplyin the I onlypossible way:"Ido it because do It!"[The man]wantsnothing,seeksnothing,andhasno just reasonfor doing anything.As God, havingno motives,acts withoutthem, so the just man acts without motives. lifeliveson forits ownsake,needing reasonforbeing,so thejustmanhasno As no reason doingwhathedoes.(R. B. Blakney, for Eckhart and trans.,Meister (NewYork:Harper Row, 1941),pp. 127,241) 41. StuartHampshire, and Thought Action(London:ChattoandWindus,1960),p. 126. 42. Ibid.,p. 119.
43. David Hume, An Enquiry ConcerningHuman Understanding,Section 7, Part 1.

44. F. Nietzsche,TheWillto Power,trans.WalterKaufmann R. J. Hollingdale and (NewYork: Vintage,1968),no. 551,pp. 295-296. Nietzsche's emphasis. 45. Ibid.,no. 552, pp. 297-298. 46. "Thegreatest of facedby everydiscussion theWillis the simplefact thatthereis no difficulty othercapacityof mindwhoseveryexistencehas been so consistently doubtedand refutedby so Brace eminent series philosophers" a of Arendt,TheLifeof theMind(NewYork:Harcourt (Hannah Jovanovich, 1978),Vol. 2, p. 4).
47. Leviathan II, 21.

48. "Enlightenment Buddhism AdvaitaVedanta: Nirvanaand Mokshathe Same?" in and Are

InternationalPhilosophical Quarterly22, no. 1 (March 1982).

49. Thishas important deterministic for implications suchcompletely systemsas Spinoza's.