2006 14030

The Overshadowing of British Privateers by the British Royal Navy in the Eighteenth Century

Scott Abel

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2006 14030 In the period after the Act of Union in 1707 and the creation of the United Kingdom, the British people became less reliant on the use of privateers and chose to use the professional Royal Navy to act as the primary instrument of war at sea. Although private men-of-war and holders of the letter of the marque played an important role in the many wars that Great Britain was involved in, they began to play a secondary role towards the Royal Navy by the eighteenth century. Private ships of war were relegated to the important task of commerce raiding. Much of the honor and glory that was once bestowed upon private men of war in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, such as Sir Francis Drake and Sir Henry Morgan were eventually earned by professional career naval officers such as George Anson and Edward Hawke in the eighteenth centurys oceans and seas. There were quite a few reasons for the transition from private enterprise to state-run military operations. Private ships of war too often attacked enemies for only financial gain or prize money, rather than in the interests of the state, it became too impractical for private ships to raid enemy cities, and that the state was finally able to mount such operations. The vast expanses of the ocean prevented the relatively small English Navy of the 16th century to adequately carry out the will and protect the interests of England. To help compensate for these short comings of the Navy, private vessels and ships-of-war could be used in their place. Although kings had been hiring private vessels for centuries, King Henry VIII gave private ships commissions to fight his enemies.1 However, these private men of war or privateers did not necessarily act in the interests of their nation, but rather as business expeditions. For example, with exception of Sir Francis Drake, most

David J. Starkey, British Privateering Enterprise in the Eighteenth Century (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1990), p.21

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2006 14030 of the seventy-four privateer expeditions and 183 voyages around this time were not only small in scale, but all were privately launched in the hope that the expedition would be profitable.2 Sir Francis Drake was not only motivated by revenge, but also so that his investors and financial backers would be happy with their investment return. For example, when the Pelican, later renamed Golden Hind, went on its round the world expedition, Drake hoped to catch the Spanish by surprise as he entered the Pacific Ocean and raided the coast for anything of value. He seized the Spanish vessel, Neustra Seora de la Concepcin which yielded victuals, jewels, precious stones, thirteen chests of reales, eighty pounds of gold, and twenty six tons of silver valued at 360,000 pesos which allowed for Drakes investors to get a large return on their investment. 3 Not all of Drakes operations were for a joint stock company and some included military operations with soldiers and large numbers of vessels. One such example during the war against Spain was when an expedition of twenty two vessels and 2,300 men, which included trained soldiers, attacked the Cape Verde Islands, Santo Domingo, and Cartagena in 1586.4 On May 11, 1655, after a failed attempt to take the Spanish island of Hispaniola, Cromwells New Model Army landed in Jamaica.5 After six days, the Spanish on the island surrendered and most of the English fleet returned home.6 Jamaica was strategically located to allow for a base for buccaneers to raid and pillage the Spanish Colonies in the region which allowed the colony of Port Royal, Jamaica to become the most important buccaneering town in English possession. These buccaneers also helped
2 3

Kris Lane, Pillaging the Empire: Piracy in the Americas 1500-1750 (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), p.49 Ibid. p.40-45 4 Ibid. p. 51 5 N.A.M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Great Britain 1649-1815 (London: Penguin, 2004) p. 23 6 Ibid. p. 24

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2006 14030 the island to defend itself through an offensive campaign against Spanish possessions. Governor Edward DOyley of Jamaica authorized raids against the Spanish Colonies of Panama, Cartagena, Cumana, and Puerto Cabello until his replacement in 1661 by Lord Windsor.7 The most famous of these English buccaneers was Henry Morgan, who was also a privateer that usually acted with the blessings of Governor Modyford of Jamaica.8 In 1668, he sacked Puerto Principe, Cuba and Portobello, Panama with utter ruthlessness. His buccaneers were not necessarily all English, because he was able to recruit French buccaneers to his campaigns as well. In 1669, he led a bold attack against the Spanish in Lake Maracaibo and then he led his boldest raid inland to Panama where the buccaneers defeated Spanish cavalry and infantry. 9 He pillaged the city of its wealth and then burned it to the ground and by 1674, Morgan was given the title of Deputy Governor of Jamaica. Finally, Spain recognized Englands domain of some Caribbean islands in 1670 and England began to crack down on the buccaneers by the end of the decade. Buccaneers were too difficult to control and it was found preferable in the following century that the Royal Navy attack and hold towns. For example, although Gov. DOyley authorized buccaneering expeditions to sack various Spanish towns, these raids did not yield any wealth to him or the crown.10 Once these towns were sacked, the buccaneers had to leave or risk being killed by Spanish reinforcements, so these towns could not be held as a bargaining chip at the negotiation table. Although these

Kris Lane, Pillaging the Empire: Piracy in the Americas 1500-1750 (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), p. 106107 8 Ibid. p.114 9 Ibid. p.116-125 10 Ibid. p.114

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2006 14030 buccaneers had served their purpose, it would be preferable that loyal professional forces act as the offensive and defensive arm of the British military policy. Also, changes in ship design and needs for larger crew helped make the Navy more important for defeating enemy warships than private ships of war had done so in the past. Sir Francis Drakes flagship for his round the world voyage, the Golden Hind, had only fourteen deck guns.11 In 1645, a new fast and heavily armed type of warship was developed in England, the large Frigate; the first was named the Constant Warwick.12 These warships were fast and heavily armed. This frigate was originally constructed as a private warship, but was later sold to the state which demonstrates a tendency for the larger ships of war to be used by the states navy. Furthermore, there was competition between the private men-of-war, merchant fleet, and state warships to replenish the ranks of seamen during wartime, who were always in short supply.13 This was made even more difficult, because a private man-of-war generally needed a larger crew than a merchantman, because it needed the manpower to seize another vessel. Great Britain had no need for private ships of war to defend its Caribbean colonies by the eighteenth century. This was due to the establishment of bases within the region. In 1728, the Royal Navy established a naval base on the island of Antigua and constructed another naval base at Port Royal, Jamaica in 1735.14 This meant that the Royal Navy could be deployed in the region for prolonged periods of time without having to sail back to England for supplies and repairs. In 1693, an allied fleet had much difficulty staying at sea for more than two weeks, but changes in the way ships of the line
11 12

Kris Lane, Pillaging the Empire: Piracy in the Americas 1500-1750 (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), p.44 N.A.M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Great Britain 1649-1815 (London: Penguin, 2004), p. 216 13 David Starkey, The British Privateering Enterprise in the Eighteenth Century (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1990), p. 269 14 Jeremy Black, The British Seaborne Empire, (New Haven: Yale U. P., 2004), p. 103

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2006 14030 were supplied resulted in that by 1758, some had the capability to stay at sea for six months.15 This made it much easier to protect Great Britains interests in the region. For the most part, eighteenth century British privateers had been relegated to hunt for enemy commerce. While the Royal Navy played a much more important role in the Caribbean. One such role that was passed on from the privateer legacy to the Royal Navy was to capture Spanish ports in the Caribbean. In 1759, a British Officer named Edward Vernon used a relatively small naval force of six ships of the line to bombard and captured the city of Portobello.16 Before handing it back over to the Spanish, Vernon decided to demolish the forts guarding the city. This shows that the military has become the primary instrument of seizing Spanish cities. The Royal Navy was also becoming a force that could also play a role in commerce raiding. For example, Captain George Anson set off with six warships, two supply vessels, and 1,300 men to hunt for enemies of the British Crown in 1740.17 While in the Pacific of June, 1743 Anson and his crew spotted and captured the Spanish vessel, Neustra Seora de Coradonga which carried 1,313,843 pieces of eight and 35, 682 tons of silver. Anson completed his circumnavigation with his last ship, the Centurion, and 145 surviving crewmembers. However, this expedition would be either impossible or extremely difficult for a private organization, because the fleet was at sea for about three years and constantly needed to be supplied. Furthermore, the resources required for this expedition must have been enormous.

15

N.A.M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Great Britain 1649-1815 (London: Penguin, 2004), p.291 16 David Howarth, Sovereign of the Seas (London: Collins, 1974), 212 17 N.A.M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Great Britain 1649-1815 (London: Penguin, 2004), p.238-239

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2006 14030 During the Seven Years War, the of armed forces of Great Britain proved that they could take distant enemy possessions like Drake and the buccaneers, but also could hold enemy territory until wars end. For example, General Jeffrey Amherst besieged and captured Louisbourg in 1758, which a year later allowed for more resources to be put into the capture of Guadeloupe.18 With much of the Toulon squadron destroyed, the French were unable to mount an effective counterattack. Vice Admiral Charles Saunders with twenty ships of the line, Major General James Wolfe with 8,000 men, as well as two other armies invaded Frances possessions in Canada. Their success and Sir Edward Hawkes victory over the Brest Squadron resulted in Frances permanent loss of Canada. With Britains stunning success against France, they could turn their attention against the Spanish. British forces successfully capture the important port cities of Havana and Manila in 1762. By the eighteenth century, British private men-of-war were no longer successfully raiding the great towns of the Spanish Main. Attempts to revive the glory days of private warships were rare and difficult to organize.19 Using small fleet of private warships was an extremely difficult task, because of communication difficulties, lack of manpower, and large amounts of capital that were required. The large vessels that were required to intercept large enemy convoys required large crews and large amounts of capital to operate. It was preferable to engage enemy vessels before they joined their convoy escorts. One successful large scale privateer, Woodes Rodgers, was successful in plundering small scale Pacific Coast Spanish Settlements. Despite his reported seizure of

18

N.A.M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Great Britain 1649-1815 (London: Penguin, 2004), p.276-286 19 David Starkey, The British Privateering Enterprise in the Eighteenth Century (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1990), p.45-48

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2006 14030 106,000 on an initial investment of 13,188, not all of these funds were accounted for.20 These large scale operations were generally failures, because it was extremely difficult to find prizes valuable enough in the vast expanses of the ocean. Thus, these operations were unprofitable and in the eyes of the investors, a failure. In the eighteenth century British private ships of war operated mainly as commerce raiders and left the less profitable tasks to the Royal Navy. One might argue that there were instances when 18th century privateers engaged enemy warships and that there some large privateers with over 40 guns21. One might cite the example of the recapturing of the Solebay by the Bristol privateer, Alexander from French forces.22 However, one must remember that the navy was given the essential tasks to keep Great Britain sovereign, such as protecting British interests and Great Britain itself. Such instances of privateers engaging enemy warships yielded limited strategic advantages. Private ships of war were meant to capture enemy merchant vessels, so they were armed with anti-personnel weaponry and therefore, most private ships of war were not meant to engage in large pitched battles as the first rate warships were.23 Although British Privateers played an important role in the many wars of the eighteenth century, they were no longer as important as in previous centuries. This is due to the development of the Royal Navy and its ability to reach almost any coast in the civilized world at this time. This resulted in the lessening of the tactical and strategic value of private ships of war to the Royal Navy.

20 21

Ibid. p. 278 Ibid. p. 47 22 N.A.M. Rodger, The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Great Britain 1649-1815 (London: Penguin, 2004), p.324 23 David Starkey, The British Privateering Enterprise in the Eighteenth Century (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1990), p.39

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2006 14030 Works Cited: Black, Jeremy. The British Seaborne Empire. New Haven: Yale U. P., 2004. Howarth, David. Sovereign of the Seas London: Collins, 1974. Lane, Kris. Pillaging the Empire: Piracy in the Americas 1500-1750. London: M.E. Sharpe, 1998. Rodger, N.A.M. The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Great Britain 16491815. London: Penguin, 2004. Starkey, David J. British Privateering Enterprise in the Eighteenth Century. Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1990.

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