THE THEORY OF LIBERTARIAN FREE WILL: A CRITIQUE AND RESPONSE TO WILLIAM HASKER

A Research Paper Presented to Dr. Greg Welty in partial fulfillment of the requirements for PHI 7640A: Philosophy of the Mind

Kevin P. McAloon Southeastern Baptist Theological Seminary December 2, 2011

1
INTRODUCTION Throughout the history of both philosophy and Christian theology, perhaps one of the most painstakingly debated subjects has been that of the nature of freedom possessed by the human will. Todays academic arena is no exception, and the mainstream contenders continue to battle along the same general lines of libertarianism vs. compatibilism. Although perhaps more known for his theories concerning open theism and middle knowledge, Dr. William Hasker is undoubtedly one of those contenders who advocates the former, and, like others, sees the possession of a libertarian free will as being central to both human worth and experience. He discusses these matters in a number of books and journals, and this paper will primarily, although not exclusively, focus on his discussion on the will set forth in his book, The Emergent Self.1 Through interacting with his material, I will be arguing that Dr. Haskers theories concerning the will are primarily a result of a faulty epistemology, and may be shown to be false once a true and reliable foundation for knowledge is established in its place. Because so much of this discussion will depend upon a firm understanding of the objective world that we humans are inescapably a part of, as well as the real awareness of Dr. Haskersas well as all thinking human beingslimitations as subjective products and interpreters of this world, I have set out first to take time to establish some preliminary groundwork that I believe is absolutely necessary towards properly interpreting his reasoning and why he reasons in such a way. I wish to be emphatic about the fact that what follows is in no way an ad hominem attack. It is an inconvenience that some of the most philosophically pertinent factors in these sort of discussions are those which, when brought down to earth, become the most personal. That being said, let the reader please keep in mind why some personal issues may be addressed, and to realize that they only serve to illustrate a faulty epistemic foundation and the errors which are its products.

William Hasker, The Emergent Self (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999). Some other works by Haskers that were consulted are Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God (New York: Routledge, 2009);Theological Incompatiblism and the Necessity of the Present: A Response to Michael Rota, Faith and Philosophy 28, no. 2 (April 2011): 224-229; The Triumph of God over Evil: Theodicy for a World of Suffering (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2008).

2
PROLEGOMENA: TRUE EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE REALITY WE CANNOT ESCAPE Since this is a philosophical discussion as opposed a theological one, I will attempt to argue from as much reason as possible without exhaustive appeal to Scripture or Church History; however, since this is also a Christian reaction against arguments made by one who gladly identifies himself as a brother in Christ, some appeal must be made to an authority both parties recognize in commonwithout a philosophical treatise on the validity truths such as the reality of an omniscient God, inspiration of Scripture, etc. This section will focus on our limitations as finite creatures in autonomously deriving truth from our surroundings; why Gods revelation is necessary for our quest for true knowledge about our world; and what Gods written revelation declares about mans current state and its effects on his interpretations and reasoning. Hopefully as we then place Hasker and his arguments under this microscope, we will be in a better position to clearly see any flaws that may be contained therein. To begin with, it is detrimental to understand our situation as finite and created beings and the limitations of pure autonomous scientific/philosophical inquiry in general. Most philosophers, including Hasker, derive their theories either from rationalism, empiricism, or some sort of combination of both. Reymond addresses the futility of these methods and sets forth mans inescapable plight as secondary and created beings: For the finite knower to begin from himself alone with any datum, whether that datum be subjective or objective, ideal or material, mental or nonmental, and to seek to understand it comprehensively and exhaustively must inevitably lead him to other data, but being finite he cannot examine any datum or all possible relationships of that one datum comprehensively or exhaustively, not to mention examine all the other data in the universe. Furthermore, there is no way he can be assured that the next datum he might have examined at the point at which he concluded his research in his finiteness would have accorded with all that he had concluded to that point. The only way to escape the force of this fact is to avoid the entire question of epistemology. The entire history of philosophy up to more recent times may be summarized as precisely mans rational effort, beginning with himself and accepting no outside help, to examine enough of certain chosen particularities of the universe To be somewhat more specific, men have attempted to come to knowledge and then to the justification of their claims to knowledge via the epistemological methods of rationalism and empiricism. 2 Although perhaps objectionable to many modern thinkersand hopefully by the end of this essay the reader will understand why these truths are the oftentimes objectionablethe fact of the matter is that human beings are creatures who are dependent upon the benevolence of a higher Authority and Knower to Robert Reymond, A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith, 2nd ed. (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson Inc, 1998), p. 111-112.
2

3
share with man that which He alone autonomously knows in Himself. Reymond expands on this elsewhere: Every fact that is enjoys its existence by virtue of some activity of God and thus carries with it its interpretation, placed upon it by God Himself by virtue of His creative activity, His providential care, and subsequent special revelation. For a man truly to know a fact would mean and that his interpretation of a given fact, discerned by whatever methods are available to him, would of necessity have to agree with Gods prior interpretation and we learn something about Gods prior interpretation of everything from Scripture. True knowledge would then be receptive reconstruction, that is, thinking Gods thoughts after Him, rather than creative construction, that is, interpreting for the first time by mans sciences the brute facts of the universe. 3

These are vital truths to keep in mind when approaching any philosophical discussion. Man is not simply a rational creature who can determine with his own fallible and finite abilities that which is infallibly true apart from Divine revelation. Not only this, but every thinker is also driven by inherent presuppositions that are latent within his mind before he even sets out to reason and interpret any fact; especially in regards to those topics which are most personal and dear to him. This is why, as Reymond says, inasmuch as what any man regards as factual is inevitably governed by a more basic philosophy of fact: value-governing, possibility-determining, religiously motivated presuppositions and starting points.4 Greg Bahnsen correctly notes:

All argumentation about alternate issues eventually comes to rest at the level of the disputants presuppositions. If a man has come to the conclusion and is committed to the truth of a certain view, P, when he is challenged as to P, he will offer supporting argumentation for it, Q and R. But of course, as his opponent will be quick to point out, this simply shifts the argument to Q and R. Why accept them? The proponent of P is now called upon to offer S, T, U, and V as arguments for Q and R. But all argument chains must come to an end somewhere. Ones conclusions could never be demonstrated if they were dependent upon an infinite regress of argumentative justifications, for under those circumstances the demonstration could never be completed. And an incomplete demonstration demonstrates nothing at all. Eventually all argumentation terminates in some logically primitive starting point, a view or premise held as unquestionable. In the nature of the case, these pre-suppositions are held to be self-evidencing; they are the ultimate authority in ones viewpoint, an authority for which no greater authorization can be given. 5

This may explain why, as Hasker confesses, that after centuries of debates between libertarians and Robert Reymond, The Justification of Knowledge (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co, 1976), p. 68
4 3

Ibid. p. 71.

Greg Bahnsen, A Biblical Introduction to Apologetics (Tyler, TX:Fairfax Christian Bookstore, 1976), p. 33-34; quoted in Ibid. p. 71.

4
compatibilist, to this day neither side is able to persuade the other. 6 I am stressing these points because they are inescapable factors when approaching any thinking persons interpretations and logic. Reasoning is not done in an objective vacuum; on the contrary, our fundamental and prior commitments shape our assessment of evidences and premises. As John F. Frame has stated, we are, in every sense, epistemically situatedhistorically, culturally, sociallyand we lack a Gods eye view of the world. Regrettably, no method exists for rising above our conditions that effects our thinking so that we may see the world apart from our filters of beliefs and values. 7 Dr. Kelly James Clark also sees this limitation of human thinking when he says, What people reason from determines the kinds of inferences that it is rationally permissible for them to accept.8 My question for Hasker and the reader will be whether or not there are any ingrained beliefs or values that may prevent him from noticing problems in his premises, and from accepting truths from opposing views in regards to the human will. Given this situation of mans limitations and need for an objective revealer of truth, we may now correctly see the importance of grounding ourselves upon an objective revelation greater than ourselves, which also, as we recognize our helplessness and surrender our epistemic autonomy to it, is able to correct our presuppositions and provide us with a firm foundation to reason from. 9 I may also add that this revelation is sufficient enough to reveal reasons why we may hold some erroneous presuppositions and why men are slow to correct them. As Christians who have been enlightened by the Logos and Spirit of the ultimate Authority and Knower, we believe that He has graciously given us the objective epistemological legging we need in His written Scriptures. They have provided a solution to mans need for an infinite reference point in order for knowledge to become a reality. Since there is comprehensive knowledge with God, real and true knowledge is possible for man, since God who knows all data exhaustively in all their infinite relationships can impart William Hasker, The Triumph of God over Evil: Theodicy for a World of Suffering (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2008), p. 154. John M. Frame, Classical Apologetics: A Presuppositionalists Response, in Steven B. Cowan, ed., Five Views on Apologetics (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 2000), p. 85.
8 7 6

Kelly James Clark, Reformed Epistemology Apologetics, in Ibid. p. 283.

This is in reference to material and propositional means of knowledge that may be observed by all men equally. There is no room here to discuss the more important and subjective role of a Divine Spirit and His method of illumination and revelation in regards to both natural and special revelation.

5
any portion of that true knowledge to man; and He has done so through His word. 10 Therefore, since this is a philosophical treatise I will now appeal to the only reliable foundation of knowledge in order to receive reliable premisesas opposed to those derived from opinions or desiresfrom which I may interact with Hasker and see whether or not he has done the same. God has revealed that man was originally created as a finite and dependent being with God as His sovereign and benevolent Source and Creator (Gen. 1-3; Lk. 4:4; 1 Cor. 4:7), whose worth was a derived worth by virtue of the One in whose image he was made (see Gen. 9:6, where bloodshed is wrong not because man is intrinsically valuable, but rather because he is made in the image of Another who is); but at some point man wanted to become like God, abandon his childlike dependence, and claim autonomy and knowledge apart from Him (Gen. 3:1-7). He went from being, like the rest of creation, God-centered in his dependence and purposes, and instead he has rebelled against this Sovereign and laid claim to his own supposed sovereignty, intrinsic worth, and beauty (Gen. 3:5-6; Ps. 2, Isa. 2:11). In a universe created by and for God, the centrum of authority for man shifted from God to himself. He demanded that he become his own god and authority, determining for himself what is true and what is false. Man continued to employ reason, but now man became his own standard. It became his nature to suppress Gods personal revelation to him. He did this by being preoccupied with his own ideals, purposes, and sin. 11 The result was, and is, that all men are now born by nature haters of God and incapable in themselves of truly submitting to Him rationally and volitionally because of their rebellion (Gen. 6:5; Ps. 58:3; Jer. 17:9; Jn. 3:19; Rom. 3:10-18, 8:7; 1 Cor. 2:14 Eph. 2:23). Even true believers who have been regenerated are capable of living and reasoning in the flesh (Rom 6:19; 1 Cor. 3:1-3; Gal. 5:16-17). These truths are especially pertinent and must be acknowledged when discussing mans ability to interpret the world. To exempt logic from the effects of sin is to deny the biblical premises which clearly set forth the extensiveness of human depravity. Observation is not a purely passive, objective process, but rather, as previously stated, includes a subjective element in which we very often see only what we want to see.12 As sinners who strive to live apart from God, the natural man is inevitably going to want to see that

10

Reymond, A New Systematic, p. 115. See Reymond, Justification of Knowledge, p. 19-20, 86. Steven K. Moroney, The Noetic Effects of Sin: A Historical and Contemporary Exploration of

11

12

6
which exalts man and diminish God and His reign over him. This effects our reasoning in all aspects of life to varying degrees, as all aspects of life are intimately connected with our relation to God; and, as Brunner points out, the more we a dealing with the inner nature of man , his attitude to God, and the way he is ruled and determined by Him, it is evident thatapart from gracesinful illusion becomes increasingly dominant: The nearer we come to the sphere of that which is connected with the personal being of God and man, which can no longer be perceived y reason but only by faith [or reliance and trust in God rather than ourselves] the more we shall see that the self-sufficient reason is a source of error.13 And perhaps one of the aspects of reality that is most connected to mans relationship with God, which magnifies everything that man is opposed to, and crushes every inherited illusion of godhood he has invented, is the subject of the freedom and/or inability of the human will; especially in regards to Gods sovereignty. If Dr. Haskers libertarianism is false, and the traditional view of Christian compatibilism is true, then it would fly in the face of everything the natural rebellious man desires by revealing his inferiority and Gods transcendence; his subordination and Gods total sovereignty; his utter dependence upon Gods sufficiency and grace; and the prerogative of God to do all things for His own glory because He alone contains all power and goodness in Himself. In light of biblical truth, it would be negligent not to take these weighty and intimate factors into consideration when analyzing ones argument on the surface. This does not prove any of Dr. Haskers arguments false, but I have rather attempted to appeal to an authority higher than him or I in order to paint the picture of the world we are both inescapably a part of. I will now go on to interact with the arguments directly, without a direct appeal to the particular biblical texts that address these issues; and ask the reader to deeply consider what has been set forth thus far, and to let these initial and foundational premises guide their thinking as they ask themselves: 1. What is Dr. Haskers epistemology and what protection does he provide for himself to avoid the dangers discussed above; 2. Is there a stark contrast between his acquisition of knowledge in these matters vs. the methods of those who have shifted their authority from Gods interpretations to their own; 3. Are there any latent presuppositions that guide his arguments and rejection of other positions; 4. In light of this reality, what

How Sin Affects Our Thinking (Lanham, MA: Lexington Books, 2000), p. 30 Heinrich Emit Brunner, Man in Revolt (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1946) p. 248; and The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, Dogmatics: Vol. II (Philadelphia, Westminster, 1952) p. 27; quoted in Ibid. p. 33.
13

7
may be the foundational motivations and desires that drive his reasoning?

DIALOGUE WITH DR. HASKER In Free Will and Agency, the fourth chapter of his book, The Emergent Self, Dr. Hasker puts forth his case why physical and psychological determinism should be rejected in light of the more plausible theory of libertarian free will. He defines libertarian freedom as such: N is free at t with respect to performing A= df It is in Ns power at t to perform A, and it is in Ns power at t to refrain from performing A, then there is nothing in the circumstances that obtain at t which prevents or precludes Ns performing A at t. Here prevent applies especially to circumstances that are causallyincompatible with Ns doing so.14 He explains that this view of freedom seems to be more empirically satisfying than deterministic theories, and this is a primary argument for his views.15 Contrary to most compatibilist theories, not only must an agent be free to act according to his will, but also his very will itself must have power over itself and influences upon it that may prevent or preclude it in choosing between alternatives. For libertarians, this is the basis for all moral responsibility. Hasker states, For them, responsibility is founded fundamentally in ones freely forming an effective intention (or, as it is sometimes called, a volition) to act in a certain way.16 In other words: the will is free to choose what it will will to choose. When confronted with the question as to why a person chooses a certain alternative at a certain time, and why it seemed more important to them at that time, Hasker says that the proper response for a libertarian is simply to reject the demand for such a contrastive explanation. He believes that this demand is equivalent to asserting determinism as an a priori requirement for successful explanation, which has no empirical basis. 17 He goes on throughout the chapter to discuss the Frankfurt counterexamples and various theories of libertarianism that he finds, for the most part, unsatisfactory; however this section will be dedicated to focusing on the above beliefs concerning libertarianism, their roots, and problems.

William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989, p. 66-67; quoted in Hasker, Emergent Self, p. 85.
15

14

Hasker, The Emergent Self, p. 82, 83-84, 100, 104 Ibid. p. 91. Ibid. p. 103-104.

16

17

8
Haskers Faulty Foundations To begin, I would first like to appeal to the previous section regarding the nature of man and his epistemic limitations in order to set the proper backdrop for interpreting Haskers arguments. It was previously set forth why strict empiricism that is grounded upon man and his own experience and subjective interpretations is an inadequate method on its own for acquiring true knowledge; however, as previously stated, it seems as if empiricism is Haskers primary appeal against various notions of determinism. In the very first sentence of the chapter Hasker states, Empirically speaking, there is not much of a case for determinism. The only direct empirical evidence for determinism is the existence of consistent, reliable, and accurate predictions of individual events. 18 Although obviously I do not wish to base my responses to Dr. Hasker on empirical terms, I would here briefly digress and candidly state that I do not believe that psychological and theological determinism could have more empirical validation for one who was not predisposed to reject the datum. Could we really say that, apart from either natural or divine intervention, a child who was raised all of her life by sadistic parents who taught her all of the supposed evils and atrocities of a certain race of men, would not be psychologically predisposed and determined to later choose those alternatives and actions which most agreed her ingrained dispositions? Dr. Hasker goes on further to say that common human sense and experience of autonomous libertarian freedom is sufficient enough to provide a reason for dismissing at the outset rational philosophical arguments pointing out the incoherence of such a notion: And when you are confronted with arguments purporting to show that agent causation is somehow incoherent, ask yourself seriously whether these arguments are so cogent as to warrant your giving up as unintelligible something that, absent special philosophical assumptions, seems entirely coherent and reasonable.19 Again, since we are subjective interpreters of this world, as well as sinful interpreters who are naturally predisposed to seek our own power and glory, this is an extremely dangerous line to take in any discussion concerning intimate matters such as this. Atheists suppress the truth that there is a God and base their interpretations and experience of the world in light of their rejection of Him; where would the apologist be if we substituted the term agent causation with atheism and gave them the same epistemological advice? In light of section one, I would

18

Ibid., p. 81; for other appeals to empiricism, see p. 82-84, 100, and 104. Ibid. p. 100, emphasis mine.

19

9
say emphatically that we indeed do need philosophical assumptions when discussing these mattersand whether we realize it or not, we all already contain and reason from various philosophical assumptions however we must obtain them from the revelation given to us by an infallible Source and Knower. Dr. Hasker does not seem to realize that he already does contains a multitude of philosophical assumptions, and it is only because he is basing his interpretations upon these that libertarian notions seem coherent and reasonable. This is why Cheung states: The Bible is opposed to what sinful man thinks. Proverbs, as with the rest of Scripture, does not teach common sense it teaches against it. By both definitions of the term, the Bible rejects common sense "normal native intelligence" has been crippled by the noetic effects of sin, and no Christian believes that the Bible teaches "the unreflective opinions of ordinary people." The Scripture is divine verbal revelation, not common sense.20 As we have seen, presuppositions are a, if not the, determining factor in what drives a mans thinking and why he either accepts or rejects certain notions; thus they are important to consider when weighing the arguments he makes. We also know, from the ultimate reliable source of true knowledge, that as a result of the Fall natural man is sinfully predisposed to seek his own glory, merit, and worth instead of the One who alone is worthy of all worship and honor. Consider the following statement from Dr. Hasker: It seems to me, also, that the sense of autonomy described by these philosophers [libertarians]the sense that we are, in a real sense, the architects of our own livesis an important component of the intrinsic worth and dignity that many of us want to ascribe to ourselves and other human beings.21 I would soberly ask: from where does this desire to esteem our own autonomous sovereignty, worth, and dignity come, especially in light of the biblical reality previously established? Would not such a personal, intimate, and inbred desire powerfully affect our ability to apprehend truth that may be contrary to it? I believe that this may indeed be the case here. Also, not to be cheeky, but it seems as if the dependency and grace described by many of the historical Christian theological compatibiliststhe sense that, God is, in a real sense, the Architect of our own liveswas an important component of the intrinsic worth, holiness, and right to sovereignty that many of them wanted to ascribe to God.22 Epistemologically, Biblical texts must be addressed in order to determine which of these Vincent Cheung, Renewing the Mind, http://www.vincentcheung.com/books/renewmind.pdf (accessed November 21, 2011).
21 20

Hasker, The Emergent Self, p. 85. I.e. Augustine, Wycliffe, Luther, Calvin, Knox, Edwards, Whitefield, Spurgeon, etc.

22

10
presuppositions are sound enough to build upon. To do so here is not the purpose of this essay, however it may be pertinent to consider how Dr. Hasker has attempted to do so in forming his argument. The evidence seems to indicate that he has not, but rather, occasionally appeals to certain texts that he believes support the presuppositions he brings into the them.23 For instance, in The Triumph of God over Evil, when denying divine sovereignty over the evil actions of men, Hasker mentions Matt. 23:37 and Hosea where God is attempting to call out to men (I would interject, His people) because He is unable to directly influence their wills or prevent the upcoming calamities.24 He does not seem to be interpreting these texts in light of the numerous passages which declare that God is in fact the one who decrees and brings calamity, as well as in a sense moves, opens, and hardens mens hearts and wills (Ex. 4:21; Deut. 2:30; 2 Chron. 25:20; 1 Sam. 10:9; Prov. 21:1; Isa. 45:7; Lam. 3:37-38; Amos 3:6; Acts 16:14; Rom. 9:18; etc.). In Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God, he appeals to the moral repudiation of the idea that God would be sovereign over the horrendous act of a Nazi soldier attacking a Jewish girl; however, although this does not diminish the moral atrocity of the former, he does not appeal to Gods decrees of far worse in the Old Testament; nor the holocaust of Jerusalem in 70 AD that was decreed as Gods judgment against rebellious Israel; nor the predetermination and sovereignty of God over the wills of the men who conducted the worst atrocity in the history of creation: the crucifixion of Christ. 25 I am not saying that Dr. Hasker does not have a right to be uncomfortable with these texts, nor should abandon any and all senses of freedom and justice he has; but rather I am saying that these texts upon which we are to build our structures of reality should shape our thinking regarding these matters, and must not be discarded because of prior philosophical commitments. It seems as if in regards to his views of libertarian free will, Dr. Hasker has done so. 26

It must be noted that the scarcity of biblical texts in many of Dr. Haskers philosophical works does not necessarily indicate a neglect of Scripture on his part, but rather may simply be a result of the nature and demographic of the academic community he is interacting with. He is not to be faulted in this; however, this brief discussion will focus on where he has actually used Scripture in support of his views.
24

23

Hasker, The Triumph of God over Evil, p. 152

See Hasker, Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God, p. 163; and, among other texts, specifically Acts 2:23 and 4:28. For example, see Emergent Self, p. 85 where Hasker says, How in reason can a person be held responsiblewhether for good or illfor doing what she was ineluctably determined to do by forces that were in place before she was born? His notion of forces also includes psychological factors such as desires and beliefs. This question is almost exactly that of those who opposed Pauls notions of free will and sovereignty, saying, Why does He [God] find fault? For who can resist His will? (Rom. 9:19).
26

25

11
Problems with Haskers Theory Among others, the primary problems with Haskers theory and argumentation arise from his refusal to accept the notion that human dispositions and desires determine the will. The issue is not with his views in regards to physical determinismfor even Christian compatibilists gladly assert that the freedom of the will consists in a freedom from absolute physical necessity 27but rather that he does not seem to want to concede that the soul of the human functions holistically, with the will being no exception, and that it is not an independent power or faculty functioning alongside the intellectual or appetitive faculties.28 This refusal to accept this limitation of freedom leads to many inconsistencies and dilemmas for libertarians.29 For example, Dr. Hasker asserts that the libertarian view insists that for an action to be free, it is not enough that a person be able to do what he most desires to do. Even if not subjected to external constraints and influences, nevertheless even if he is controlled by his desires the person cannot be said to really be free by libertarian definitions. It must be entirely within the persons power to equally free to choose one thing or the other.30 Edwards is correct in dissecting the implications of this statement when he recognizes that in arguments such as these, libertarians are attributing liberty of choice to the very will itself; however, will itself is not an agent that has a will: the power of choosing does not itself also contain a power of choosing. The one who has the power of choosing is the man, not the power of volition itself.31 There must be something guiding the will which inclines it one way rather than the other, and this is where libertarian arguments fall apart. Inevitably, by denying psychological determinism, the choices of the will revert back to chance and blind contingence as their ultimate influences. This becomes evident in Dr. Haskers discussion of agent causation. It must be said at the outset that among much elaboration upon Dr. OConners agent causation theory, Dr. Hasker discusses to some extent how he believes an agent may be properly said to act on these occasions, but he never answers the For one example see Gordon Clark, God and Evil: The Problem Solved (Hobbs, NM: The Trinity Foundation, 1996), p. 38-39. Stephen A. Wilson, The Possibility of a Habituation Model of Moral Development in Jonathan Edwards Conception of the Wills Freedom, Journal of Religion 81, no. 1 (Jan 2001): 55. All of which cannot be covered here. For a detailed exposition of many such problems, see Jonathan Edwards, The Freedom of the Will (Lafayette, IN: Sovereign Grace Publishers, 2001)
30 29 28 27

Hasker, Triumph of God over Evil, p. 150. Edwards, Freedom of the Will, p. 32.

31

12
very question that was supposed to be answered in the section: viz.,If free will cannot be explicated neither by causal necessary, nor by chance, nor by any combination of the two however subtle, then how are we to explicate this crucial notion?32 Despite this being the very purpose of the section he then actually goes on to dismiss this entire question, which asks why do people choose as they do, by saying that the libertarian should simply reject such a question because it implies notions of determinism! 33 Frankly I was shocked to see such a response, and believe that it is a result of Dr. Haskers absolute commitment to his position for the reasons set forth above. The truth is there is no satisfactory solution to this question in the libertarian scheme of things, and it leads to all sorts of logical and moral dilemmas. For instance, right before this statement, Dr. Hasker describes a person who has various reasons either for or against reading his chapter. He says that the person may believe that, among alternatives, they chose the reason for continuing to read because it seemed more important to them; however Hasker then goes on to say that it is important to see that the greater importance only came as a result from the way the choice was first made, and that it was not a preexisting condition which determined the outcome of the choice in advance. 34In other words, the person first chose the reason; therefore it then appeared to him as more important and reasonable. Could anything be contrary to experience and notions of rationality? If this be the true nature of choices, then people do not actually have true motivations or desires, but rather they first arbitrarily choose actions, which choices then result in their corresponding alternatives appearing desirable and important to their choosers. For Hasker this must be the case, because we have seen that he has already dismissed desires and motivations as determining factors in choices, and now he has dismissed reason as well. He goes on to say that when the aforementioned person is asked why one alternative was chosen rather than the other, the only sufficient answers for them to give would be to say Well, thats the way I decided, or At the time, thats what seemed most important. Again, the question of why they chose one way, and why one seemed more important than the other, Hasker totally dismisses as an unnecessary concession to deterministic requirements; thus conveniently avoiding the entire issue entirely. 35

32

Hasker, The Emergent Self, p. 99.

33 34

Ibid. p. 104. Ibid. p. 103. 35 Ibid. p. 103-104.

13
Elsewhere Dr. Hasker attempts to dispose his readers towards being skeptical of deterministic arguments when he encourages them to keep in mind that there is no apparent power or force compelling them to continue reading at that very moment. There would undoubtedly be various other options and reasons for putting the book down, and they could decide to break it off at any moment. 36 However, the question is not whether or not, if they so choose, they could cease reading; rather, the question that Hasker fails to see, is whether or not they could decide to break it off given the same situation if they did not have the superior desire to do sothat is, with all factors and reasons being exactly equal. I would hope that a person would have desires and reasons for doing what they are doing. Even if the reader may have other less prevalent desires and reasons for doing other things, at that exact moment these lesser considerations are overcome by the desires and reasons that result in reading the book (even if the desires are indirectly related to the action of reading, i.e. desires to find holes in Haskers arguments in order to write a philosophy paper, do well on a test, obey God, etc.). Again, all of these factors being equal at that exact moment of time, could a person actually decide to put down the book? What would be the nondeterministic determining factor that would produce this choice other than blind chance? We already have seen that Dr. Hasker simply avoids this enormously important question by dismissing it as irrelevant. Even Dr. Swinburne, who is a fellow libertarian, recognizes the utter power of desires upon our choices when he says that, Desires are like a stream which carries us onward unless we swim against it. And because desires are predictable, we find that much human action is predictable with quite high degrees of accuracy, and that, Humans can only resist desire in so far as they believe it good to do so.37 These would be deterministic statements if pressed a little further. For the first, it should be asked what would give the person enough strength to swim against certain desires? Could he do so if he did not have a stronger desire to swim against any particular opposing desire? For the second, is the deciding factor in resisting desire the belief that it is theoretically good to do so, or the desire to act upon that belief and to do good? An obese person who is addicted to sweets may know theoretically that it would better for them to abstain, but at the moment of temptation, without a stronger desire for the good that would result from abstinence, the greatest apparent good at that moment to the persons mind and will will be to indulge. As
36

Ibid. p. 100.

Richard Swinburne, The Evolution of the Soul . revised ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) p. 259 and 260, respectively.

37

14
Edwards notes, the will always is as the greatest apparent good is the word good, in that sense, includes in its signification the removal or avoiding of anything evil, or that which is disagreeable and uneasy. 38 As compatibilists throughout the centuries have noted, by refusing to accept that volitions are determined by a persons desires, libertarians are left with chance as the only ultimate cause for the wills choosing between alternatives. They demand a freedom from even internal necessity, and by denying desires and motivations any ultimate causal influence upon volitions, they are ascribing to the will a sort of liberty of indifference such that, when all is said and done, it must ultimately be free from all antecedent preponderation and inclination. As Edwards observes, if the will be already inclined, before it exerts its own sovereign power on itself, then its inclination is not wholly owing to itself: if when two opposites are proposed to the soul for its choice, the proposal does not find the soul wholly in a state of indifference, then it is not found in a state of liberty for more self-determination. The least degree of an antecedent bias must be inconsistent with their notion of liberty. 39 The greater this indifference, the greater liberty the will has. This inevitably leads to a moral conundrum in that, within this scheme of things, an action seems to be more free and therefore morally accountable only if a persons desire to do it did not casually influence their choice. Even psychological necessity must be taken out of the equation for choices to be praiseworthy. Dr. Hasker has stated that a parent would rather have a child who is free in this sense to love or obey the parent apart from a necessity upon the will.40 Is this the case? Would a parent rather have a child who obeys strictly out of seemingly arbitrary choices not necessarily produced or determined by the love and affection of the child toward the parent? Do we not in fact need a necessity upon the willi.e. good desires which casually determine good motivesin order for an action to be truly virtuous? Is this not the hope of the Resurrection? Although this is not a theological discussion, the fact that all orthodox Christians believe that Gods holy nature determines His holy will seems to end the discussion here. God, the supreme moral Agent and Fountain of all agency and virtue, is without this freedom which Dr. Hasker and others argue for. God is necessarily holy, and His will is necessarily determined to that which is good. His choices are determined by who He is. This is the Christian compatibilist position. To say that the will is determined by its strongest motive only means that it

38

Edwards, Freedom of the Will, p. 7-8. Ibid. p. 73. Hasker, Triumph of God over Evil, p. 155.

39

40

15
is not objectively self determined, but that in every rational volition the man is influenced to decide one way rather than another by something within him, so that the volition is a revelation of what he himself is.41 To conclude, like all men I believe that Dr. Haskers presuppositions are the determining foundations for his entire arguments, and the reasons why he cannot accept and avoids many of the rational objections by his opponents. I also have not found any reason to believe that these presuppositions of the importance of autonomous human sovereignty, worth, and dignity have been derived from Scripture; and in light of divine revelation, I have reason to believe that such desires and presuppositions are in fact possibly sinful manifestations of human pride and rebellionthings of which we are all prone to. I also do not believe subjective empiricism to be adequate enough to judge these matters, even apart from the presence of sin. As Dr. Clark points out, to empirically know for certain that a man had a libertarian free will, he would need to eliminate every external and internal factor that might be influencing him, as well as knowledge of every possible cause in both the past and present state of the universe. 42 Dr. Hasker repeats an argument similar to this in which Spinoza likens man to a stone, suggesting that if a stone, having been thrown into the air were suddenly to become conscious, it would suppose itself to be the source of its own motion, being then conscious of its actions yet unaware of the real cause of its behavior. 43 Hasker simply dismisses this as skepticism, and yet in doing so denies that this is the reality in mens lives. We may oftentimes observe in others their refusal to recognize the true reasons and causes for their actions, yet because perhaps maybe of our desire for self-determination we are slow to do the same for ourselves. Like a stone in mid-air, I would have never thought that the ultimate first cause for my moral failings was the action of a remote ancestor who lived some 6,000+ years in the past. Thank God that He has not left us with our own empiricism with which to fend for ourselves, and that there is more reliable and sure foundation upon which to interpret our world. May Dr. Hasker, the reader, and all men seek to uphold this gift, and seek to find whether or not it sets forth an alternative, more consistent, and God-glorifying view of the human situation than that which has been argued against thus far. D.A. Carson, Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility in Philo, Novum Testamentum XXIII, no.2 (1981), p. 289.
42 41

Clark, God and Evil, p. 42-43.

See Richard Taylor, Metaphysics, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974),p. 57; quoted in Hasker, Emergent Self, p.109-110.

43

16
BIBLIOGRAPHY Bahnsen, Greg. A Biblical Introduction to Apologetics. Tyler, TX:Fairfax Christian Bookstore, 1976. Quoted in Robert Reymond, The Justification of Knowledge, p. 71. Brunner, Heinrich Emit. Man in Revolt. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1946. Quoted in Steven K. Moroney, The Noetic Effects of Sin, p. 33. -----, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, Dogmatics: Vol. II. Philadelphia, Westminster, 1952. Quoted in Steven K. Moroney, The Noetic Effects of Sin, p.33. Carson, D.A. Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility in Philo. Novum Testamentum XXIII, no.2 (1981). Cheung, Vincent. Renewing the Mind. http://www.vincentcheung.com/books/renewmind.pdf (accessed November 21, 2011). Clark, Gordon. God and Evil: The Problem Solved. Hobbs, NM: The Trinity Foundation, 1996. Cowan, Steven B.; ed. Five Views on Apologetics. Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Publishing House, 2000. Edwards, Jonathan. Freedom of the Will. Lafayette, IN: Sovereign Grace Publishers, 2001. Flint, Thomas P. In Defense of Theological Compatibilism. Faith and Philosophy 8, no. 2 (April 1991): 237-243. Frankfurt, Harry G. Alternate Possibilies and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Philosophy 66, no. 23 (Dec 1969): 829-839. Hasker, William. God, Time, and Knowledge.Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989. Quoted in William Hasker, Emergent Self, p. 85. -----, The Emergent Self . Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. -----, The Triumph of God over Evil: Theodicy for a World of Suffering. Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2008. -----, Theological Incompatiblism and the Necessity of the Present: A Response to Michael Rota. Faith and Philosophy 28, no. 2 (April 2011): 224-229. -----, Providence, Evil, and the Openness of God. New York: Routledge, 2009. Moroney, Steven K. The Noetic Effects of Sin: A Historical and Contemporary Exploration of How Sin Affects Our Thinking. Lanham, MA: Lexington Books, 2000. Reymond, Robert. A New Systematic Theology of the Christian Faith. 2nd ed. Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson Inc., 1998. -----, The Justification of Knowledge. Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co, 1976. Rota, Michael. A Problem for Hasker: Freedom with Respect to the Present, Hard Facts, and Theological Incompatibilism. Faith and Philosophy 27, no. 3 (July 2010): 287-293. Swinburne, Richard. The Evolution of the Soul. Revised ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Taylor, Richard. Metaphysics,. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1974. Quoted in William

17
Hasker, The Emergent Self, p.109-110. Wilson, Stephen A. The Possibility of a Habituation Model of Moral Development in Jonathan Edwards Conception of the Wills Freedom. Journal of Religion 81, no. 1 (Jan 2001).