Crim Pro Digest 3

Criminal Procedure Rowena Daroy Morales
US v HEERY 25 Phil 600 TRENT; Oct 22, 1913

FACTS -Heery was charged with attempted murder, but was convicted of the lesser crime of maliciously inflicting serious injury upon Alex Sternberg, and was sentenced to one year and three months of prision correccional by the trial court. -On appeal, the decision was affirmed but case was remanded because it did not include the evidence of civil damages suffered by the offended party. -Then lower court, in its ruling, restated the conviction (of one yr to 3 months of prision correccional) and then included P50,500 for indemnity, with subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency. -Heery raised the question of double jeopardy, and the award being excessive. ISSUES 1. WON remanding the case for determination of civil damages and their assessment against the defendant are to be considered as a modification of the punishment, by increasing the penalty or otherwise, meted out to the defendant for the commission of the crime. (WON there is double jeopardy) 2. WON award was excessive HELD 1. NO. - Civil damages are no part of the punishment for the crime. - What was the effect of the action of this court in affirming that judgment as to the guilt and punishment of the accused and of reversing it as to the question of civil damage, with instructions to execute the punishment imposed and to try the civil branch of the case? Bearing in mind the broad line of demarcation between the civil liability of the accused and his criminal liability, the bare fact that his civil liability was determined and fixed had nothing whatever to do with the punishment imposed. The latter was not thereby affected. This time intervening between the judgment of guilt and the judgment of civil damages could in no way give to the latter the character of the former. - (That) the defendant might serve the term of imprisonment fixed by the court as the punishment for his crime, and after the sentence for civil
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expressly reserves the right to institute the civil action after the termination of the criminal case, if there be any reason therefor. (Art. 112 of the said Law of Criminal Procedure.) - "The right to bring the civil action, as reserved by the person damaged or prejudiced, after the termination of the criminal case, is only permitted, if there be any reason therefore, and so says the law, in the event that the judgment rendered in the criminal cause is a finding of guilt against the accused; but if the accused be acquitted, then the compliant in the civil action must be based on some fact and or cause distinct and separate from the criminal act itself." - The court then quotes from article 114 of the Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure provides: "When a criminal proceeding is instituted for the judicial investigation of a crime or misdemeanor, no civil action arising from the same act can be prosecuted; but the same shall be suspended, if there be one, in whatever stage or state it may be found, until final sentence in the criminal proceeding is pronounced. "To prosecute a penal action it shall not be necessary that a civil action arising from the same crime or misdemeanor be previously instituted." - Under the Spanish criminal law, an injured person had the right to intervene in the prosecution of the accused for the purpose of having his damages ascertained. The trial court was required to include the amount of these damages in the judgment of conviction. The plain provisions of section 107 of our criminal procedure, quoted supra, expressly preserves this right to the injured person. The refusal of the trial court to allow the injured person to introduce evidence as to his damages is, therefore, clearly prejudicial error. 2. YES. - There can be no objection to allowing the physicians' fees of P500 and P1,300 for the three months' salary, being the time the injured party was incapacitated from performing the work in which he was then engaged. The remainder, P48,700, appears to have been allowed on account of the permanent diminution of Sternberg's ability to earn money. The evidence of record does not establish such disability with that degree of certainly which will justify an award for that purpose. We have reached this conclusion after a most careful examination of all the testimony upon this point. Dispositive The award of damages is reduced to P1,800, the defendant to suffer subsidiary
damages and in case of his insolvency, he would have to return to prison to serve the subsidiary imprisonment by reason of his insolvency, being argued that this would constitute double jeopardy. It is well settled that execution against the person will issue in civil actions in case of personal injuries, and that this is not imprisonment for debt or punishment for crime. It is in lieu of the payment of the indemnity and is considered as a discharge thereof. If the payment of the indemnity is not punishment for the crime, the imprisonment in lieu thereof is not punishment for the crime. - As the civil liability is no part of the punishment for the crime, there would have been no question of double jeopardy... In the present case, the civil liability of the defendant was established, and the sole question determined upon the second trial was the amount of civil damages. The plea of double jeopardy can not be allowed. -On civil liability of persons accused of crime: - Springer vs. Odlin: "By General Orders, No. 58, section 107, the privileges secured by the Spanish law to persons claiming to be injured by the commission of an offense to take part in the prosecution of the offense and to recover damages for the injury sustained by reason of the same, are preserved and remain in force, and it is therein expressly provided that the court, upon conviction of the accused, may enter judgment in favor of the injured person, against the defendant in the criminal case for the damage occasioned by the wrongful act." - Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co.: "According to article 112 (Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure) the penal action once started, the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had been waived by the party injured or been expressly reserve by him for civil proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be enforced only on private complaint, the penal action thereunder should be extinguished." - Almeida vs. Abaroa (8 Phil. Rep., 178), was a civil action for damages brought the plaintiff against a person who had been previously acquitted on a criminal charge. It was held that his acquittal in the criminal action was a complete bar to a civil action for damages based upon the alleged criminal act of which the defendant had been accused. In the course of this decision it was said: - "Instituting a criminal action only, it will be understood, brings the civil action as well, unless the damaged or prejudiced person waives the same or

imprisonment, which in no event can exceed onethird of the principal penalty, in case of insolvency.
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from the accused in the criminal case which he may assert either in the same criminal case or in a separate action. - The failure of Parker to reserve her right to institute the civil action in the criminal case cannot in any way be deemed as waiver on her part to institute a separate civil action against PAL based on its contractual liability. 2. NO - The present civil case is directly interwoven with the criminal case in the sense that the main issue involved in both cases is the determination of the failure of Richard Parker to reach safely his destination or the determination of the cause of his death. This was the main reason that guided the lower court in postponing the hearing of the civil case until final judgment in the criminal case has been rendered. - Inasmuch as the power to grant or refuse continuances is inherent in all courts unless expressly limited by statute, and there is no showing that the lower court has abused its discretion is suspending the hearing, the petition for certiorari must fail. Dispositive Petition denied
SEPARATE OPINION MORELAND [concurring and dissenting]

The record being in this condition, I am inclined to believe that this court should not take up and discuss, much less decide, the question of former jeopardy. To do so it must not only hold, in violation of the provisions of section 24 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that it is unnecessary to plead the defense in the trial court but must also hold that it is unnecessary to introduce evidence in that court to substantiate the plea. The plea of former conviction or once in jeopardy should, according to established rules and the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, be substantiated by the production of the record of the former trial and the introduction of the same in evidence. That was not done in this case. While the evidence taken in the former trial was introduced in the present case for the purpose of establishing the extent of defendant's civil liability, the remaining part of the record was not introduced as evidence and was not, therefore, considered by that court. If it had been introduced as evidence, the government would have had the right to meet it and be heard upon it in that court. To permit the question to be raised here for the first time, and in the resolution thereof, to consider evidence that was never introduced in the trial court and which the government has never had an opportunity to meet in an orderly way, is not only to take the prosecution by surprise but is to establish a precedent which may be dangerous in practice and subversive of orderly procedure.
- PAL set up as special defense that the plane exploded in mid-air due to dynamite surreptitiously introduced into said air craft by criminal hands. A criminal case was already filed in CFI Camarines Norte against the supposed guilty parties. - When the case was set for the continuation of the hearing, PAL presented an oral motion for the suspension of the hearing, invoking (then) sec 1 Rule 107, of the Rules of Court, which provides that no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered. Parker vehemently opposed. - CFI suspended the hearing until the final determination of the criminal case which was then pending appeal in the SC. Petitioners Claim It was a mistake on the part of respondent judge to consider and apply Sec 1, Rule 107 of the Rules of Court, as her cause of action in the civil case is based on culpa contractual and not on the civil liability arising from the offense involved in the criminal case. Respondents Comments When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately, and that, inasmuch as petitioner had failed to expressly reserve her right to institute the civil action separately, she may not now institute another action under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code based on the act or omission complained of in the criminal action. ISSUES 1. WON CFI was correct in considering and applying Sec 1, Rule 107, of the Rules of Court 2. WON respondent judge erred in suspending the hearing HELD 1. NO - The present civil case is based upon a cause of action not arising from the civil liability involved in the criminal case instituted against the accused. The civil case is based on alleged culpa contractual incurred by PAL because of its failure to carry safely Richard Parker to his place of destination, whereas the criminal case involves the civil liability of the accused. - Rule 107 contemplates a case where the offended party desires to press his right to demand indemnity
YAKULT PHILIPPINES v CA [CAMASO] 190 SCRA 357 GANCAYCO; Oct. 5, 1990

NATURE Petition for review of decision of the CA FACTS - 5 year old Roy Camaso (standing on a sidewalk) was sideswiped by a motorcycle owned by Yakult Philippines and driven by its employee, Larry Salvado on Dec.1982. - An information was then filed on Jan.1983 against Salvado charging him with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries. - On Oct. 1984, a complaint for damages was filed in the RTC of Manila by Roy Camaso (represented by his father, David) against Yakult and Salvado. The RTC decided in favor of the Camasos and held the defendants (herein petitioners) jointly and severally liable for damages, which then moved said
PARKER v PANLILIO and PHIL AIR LINES 91 PHIL 1 BAUTISTA ANGELO; March 5, 1952
NATURE Certiorari and mandamus FACTS - Asuncion Parker and her minor daughter Kathleen filed a complaint for damages against Philippine Air Lines, Inc., based on the alleged failure of PAL to carry safely Richard Parker from Daet, Camarines Norte to Manila.

defendants Yakult and Salvado to appeal the judgment. They also filed a peitition for certiorari in the CA challenging the RTCs jurisdiction in the civil case. Their argument was that the civil action for damages for injuries arising from alleged criminal negligence, there being no malice, cannot be filed independently of the criminal action and that under Rule 111 Sec.1 of the 1985 Rules of Crim. Pro., such a separate civil action may not be filed unless reservation thereof is expressly made. - The CA on Nov. 1989, dismissed the petition and the subsequent MFR. ISSUE WON a civil action instituted after a criminal action was filed can prosper even if there was no reservation to file a separate civil action HELD YES - Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without previous reservation in the criminal case, it was nevertheless instituted before the prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action, and the presiding judge handling the criminal action was duly informed thereof, such that no damages was awarded in the disposition of the criminal action. Reasoning - Under the aforecited provisions of the rule, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. - Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. It is also provided that the reservation of the right to institute the separate civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. ** The SC considered the actual filing of the civil action far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation that should be made by the offended party before the prosecution presents its evidence. It added that the purpose of this rule requiring reservation is to prevent the
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criminal action, the dismissal of the criminal case brought with it the dismissal of the civil action.) - Private respondent admits that he did not reserve the right to institute the present civil action against Andayas employer. He contends, however, that the rights provided in Arts. 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code are substantive rights and, as such, their enforcement cannot be conditioned on a reservation to bring the action to enforce them separately. ISSUE WON despite the absence of reservation, Boado may nonetheless bring an action for damages against petitioner under the Art.2176, 2180 and 2177 of the Civil Code and Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act or omission. Dispositive petition DENIED. CA decision AFFIRMED.
MANIAGO vCA (BOADO) 253 SCRA 674 MENDOZA; February 20, 1996
FACTS - Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in transporting employees of the Texas Instruments, Inc. from Baguio City proper to its plant site at the Export Processing Authority in Loakan, Baguio City. - One of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by private respondent Alfredo Boado along Loakan Road, Baguio City. As a result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries was filed against petitioners driver, Herminio Andaya, with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City - A month later, a civil case for damages was filed by private respondent Boado against petitioner himself - Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case against his driver. But the trial court denied petitioners motion on the ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed independently of the criminal action, in addition to the fact that the petitioner was not the accused in the criminal case. - CA dismissed his petition - There is no dispute that private respondent, as offended party in the criminal case, did not reserve the right to bring a separate civil action, based on the same accident, either against the driver, Herminio Andaya, or against the latters employer, herein petitioner Ruben Maniago. - petitioner argues that the civil action against him was impliedly instituted in the criminal action previously filed against his employee because private respondent did not reserve his right to bring this action separately. (The records show that while this case was pending in the Court of Appeals, the criminal action was dismissed on July 10, 1992 for failure of the prosecution to file a formal offer of its evidence, with the consequence that the prosecution failed to prosecute its case. Accordingly, it seems to be petitioners argument that since the civil action to recover damages was impliedly instituted with the
HELD NO Ratio The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule 111, 1, otherwise it should be dismissed. 1 quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case. The right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action. Reasoning A. There are statements in some cases implying that Rule 111, 1 and 3 are beyond the rulemaking power of the Supreme Court under the Constitution. A careful examination of the cases, however, will show that approval of the filing of separate civil action for damages even though no reservation of the right to institute such civil action had been reserved rests on considerations other than that no reservation is needed. - In Garcia v. Florido the right of an injured person to bring an action for damages even if he did not make a reservation of his action in the criminal prosecution for physical injuries through reckless imprudence was upheld on the ground that by bringing the civil action the injured parties had in effect abandoned their right to press for recovery of damages in the criminal case. - In Abellana v. Marave in which the right of persons injured in a vehicular accident to bring a separate action for damages was sustained despite the fact

that the right to bring it separately was not reserved. But the basis of the decision in that case was the fact that the filing of the civil case was equivalent to a reservation because it was made after the decision of the City Court convicting the accused had been appealed. - In Jarantilla v. CA the ruling is that the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case for physical injuries through reckless imprudence on the ground of reasonable doubt is not a bar to the filing of an action for damages even though the filing of the latter action was not reserved. This is because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code which provides that when an accused is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. This ruling obviously cannot apply to this case because the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case against the driver is the fact that the prosecution failed to prove its case as a result of its failure to make a formal offer of its evidence. - the rulings in these cases are consistent with the proposition herein made that, on the basis of Rule 111, 1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civil liability is, as a general rule, impliedly instituted with the criminal action, except only (1) when such action arising from the same act or omission, which is the subject of the criminal action, is waived; (2) the right to bring it separately is reserved or (3) such action has been instituted prior to the criminal action. Even if an action has not been reserved or it was brought before the institution of the criminal case, the acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal is based on a finding that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code. - Through all the shifts or changes in policy as to the civil action arising from the same act or omission for which a criminal action is brought, one thing is clear: The change has been effected by this Court. The new rules require reservation of the right to recover the civil liability, otherwise the action will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal action. - Contrary to private respondents contention, the requirement that before a separate civil action may be brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of orderly procedure. - It is the conduct of the trial of the civil action - not its institution through the filing of a complaint - which is allowed to proceed independently of the outcome of the criminal case.
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Petition for review after a motion for reconsideration of respondent court judgment was denied FACTS - In the afternoon of June 24, 1991, a Toyota Lite Ace Van being driven by its owner Annie U. Jao and a passenger bus of herein petitioner San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. (hereafter, SILI) collided with each other at the intersection of Julia Vargas Avenue and Rodriguez Lanuza Avenue in Pasig, Metro Manila, totally wrecking the Toyota van and injuring Ms. Jao and her two (2) passengers in the process. - A criminal case was thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig on September 18, 1991 charging the driver of the bus, herein petitioner Eduardo Javier, with reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical injuries. - About four (4) months later, or on January 13, 1992, herein private respondent Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation (PISC), as insurer of the van and subrogee, filed a case for damages against petitioner SILI with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, seeking to recover the sums it paid the assured under a motor vehicle insurance policy as well as other damages, totaling P564,500.00 (P454,000.00 as actual/compensatory damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; P50,000.00 as attorney's fees; P10,000.00 as litigation expenses; and P500.00 as appearance fees.) - With the issues having been joined upon the filing of the petitioners' answer to the complaint for damages and after submission by the parties of their respective pre-trial briefs, petitioners filed on September 18, 1992 a Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Civil Proceedings grounded on the pendency of the criminal case against petitioner Javier in the Pasig RTC and the failure of respondent PISC to make a reservation to file a separate damage suit in said criminal action. This was denied by the Manila Regional Trial Court in its Order dated July 21, 1993 - After their motion for reconsideration of said July 21, 1993 Order was denied, petitioners elevated the matter to this Court via petition for certiorari which was, however, referred to public respondent Court of Appeals for disposition. On February 24, 1995, a decision adverse to petitioners once again was rendered by respondent court, upholding the assailed Manila Regional Trial Court Order. Hence, this petition for review after a motion for reconsideration of said respondent court judgment was denied.
B. There is a practical reason for requiring that the right to bring an independent civil action under the Civil Code separately must be reserved. It is to avoid the filing of more than one action for the same act or omission against the same party. Any award made against the employer, whether based on his subsidiary civil liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code or his primary liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, is ultimately recoverable from the accused. - In the present case, the criminal action was filed against the employee, bus driver. Had the driver been convicted and found insolvent, his employer would have been held subsidiarily liable for damages. But if the right to bring a separate civil action (whether arising from the crime or from quasi-delict) is reserved, there would be no possibility that the employer would be held liable because in such a case there would be no pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused. In such a case the institution of a separate and independent civil action under the Civil Code would not result in the employee being held liable for the same act or omission. The rule requiring reservation in the end serves to implement the prohibition against double recovery for the same act or omission. - Nor does it matter that the action is against the employer to enforce his vicarious liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. Though not an accused in the criminal case, the employer is very much a party, as long as the right to bring or institute a separate action (whether arising from crime or from quasi delict) is not reserved. The ruling that a decision convicting the employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to its civil liability but also with regard to its amount because the liability of an employer cannot be separated but follows that of his employee is true not only with respect to the civil liability arising from crime but also with respect to the civil liability under the Civil Code. Dispositive The decision appealed from is REVERSED and the complaint against petitioner is DISMISSED.
SAN ILDEFONSO LINES, INC. v CA (PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION) 300 SCRA 484 MARTINEZ; April 24, 1998
NATURE

ISSUES
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1. 2.
WON an independent civil action based on quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code can be filed if no reservation was made in the said criminal case WON a subrogee of an offended party can maintain an independent civil action during the pendency of a criminal action when no reservation of the right to file an independent civil action was made in the criminal action and despite the fact that the private complainant is actively participating through a private prosecutor in the aforementioned criminal case
HELD 1. NO - On the chief issue of "reservation", at the fore is Section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which reads: "Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. -- In the cases provided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action which has been reserved may be brought by the offended party, shall proceed independently of the criminal action, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." - Even though these so-called "independent civil actions" based on the aforementioned Civil Code articles are the exceptions to the primacy of the criminal action over the civil action as set forth in Section 2 of Rule 111, it is easily deducible from the present wording of Section 3 as brought about by the 1988 amendments to the Rules on Criminal Procedure -- particularly the phrase " which has been reserved" -- that the "independent" character of these civil actions does not do away with the reservation requirement. In other words, prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these independent civil actions can be instituted and thereafter have a continuous determination apart from or simultaneous with the criminal action. - According to Justice Jose Y. Feria, remedial law expert and a member of the committee which drafted the 1988 amendments, whose learned explanation on the matter was aptly pointed out by petitioners, the 1988 amendment expands the scope of the civil action which is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless waived, reserved or previously instituted. Under the present Rule as amended, such a civil action includes not only recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal
Code and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, but also damages under Article 2176 (quasi-delicts) of the said code. - It should be noted that while it was ruled in Abella vs. Marave (57 SCRA 106) that a reservation of the right to file an independent civil action is not necessary, such a reservation is necessary under the amended rule. Without such reservation, the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless previously waived or instituted. - Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrow the words of the Court in "Caos v. Peralta":" to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short, the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants." 2. NO - Private respondent PISC, as subrogee, is not exempt from the reservation requirement with respect to its damages suit based on quasi-delict arising from the same act or omission of petitioner Javier complained of in the criminal case. As private respondent PISC merely stepped into the shoes of Ms. Jao (as owner of the insured Toyota van), then it is bound to observe the procedural requirements which Ms. Jao ought to follow had she herself instituted the civil case. Dispositive The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 24, 1995 and the Resolution dated April 3,1995 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof are reversed. The "manifestation and motion to suspend civil proceedings" filed by petitioners is granted.
MARCIA v CA (PAJE and VICTORY LINER) 120 SCRA 190 RELOVA; January 27, 1983
NATURE Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioners against private respondents in the concept of an independent civil action for damages for physical injuries resulting from reckless imprudence.
FACTS - On December 23, 1956, in the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, a passenger bus operated by private respondent Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee, private respondent Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to herein petitioners, Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. Thereupon, an information for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against Felardo Paje in the CFI of Pampanga. - On January 23, 1957, an action for damages was filed in the CFI of Rizal by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap, together with their respective parents, against the Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje, alleging that the mishap was due to the reckless imprudence and negligence of the latter in driving the passenger bus. - While said Civil Case was in progress in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the criminal action proceeded in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. The accused Felardo Paje was convicted of the offense charged. However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, he was acquitted with the CA holding that "CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE is WANTING in this case, and that appellant was NOT even guilty of CIVIL NEGLIGENCE. Insofar as appellant was concerned, the CA held that this was a case of PURE ACCIDENT." - As a consequence, herein private respondents, defendants in Civil Case of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, moved for the dismissal of the complaint invoking the decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting Felardo Paje and citing Section 1 (d), Rule 107 of the Rules of Court (now Section 3 (c), Rule 111 of the New Rules of Court). On August 10, 1966, the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision dismissing plaintiffs' complaint against the defendants Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje. Petitioners appealed the case to the CA, which basically affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, this recourse. ISSUE WON the decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting the accused in reckless imprudence on the ground that the incident was accidental, extinguished by implication the civil action for damages HELD YES Ratio Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that

the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. Since, the CA found that this case was of pure accident, it is as good as saying as if he did not commit the crime charged. There being no crime committed, no civil liability arises. Reasoning - It is the stand of herein petitioners that Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, not Section 3 (c) thereof, should apply in the case at bar. "Sec. 2. Independent civil action. - In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." - We do not agree. Section 2 of Rule 111 merely refers to the institution of an independent civil action without waiting for the filing or termination of the criminal action and requires only preponderance of evidence to prosper and not proof beyond reasonable doubt as required for conviction in criminal cases. However, an acquittal based on the finding that the facts upon which civil liability did not exist, bars the filing of an independent civil action if it is based on the crime. As early as 1952, We have held in the case of Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Company, 91 Phil. 672, that "the acquittal of the accused from the criminal charge will not necessarily extinguish the civil liability unless the court declares in the judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Where the court states 'that the evidence throws no light on the cause of fire and that it was an unfortunate accident for which the accused cannot be held responsible,' this declaration fits well into the exception of the rule which exempts the accused, from civil liability." - Also, the charge against Felardo Paje was not for homicide and physical injuries but for reckless imprudence or criminal negligence resulting in homicide (death of Clemente Marcia) and physical injuries suffered by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. They are not one of the three (3) crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the Civil Code and, therefore, no civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution.
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HELD NO - The dismissal did not in any way affect the right of Zenaida Cirilo to institute a civil action arising from the offense. - Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Reasoning -Generally, every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. Criminal Liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. -The two proceedings involved are not between the same parties (the criminal action is between the State and the defendant and the civil case is between the offended party and the defendant). Also, there are different rules as to the competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal and civil proceedings.(criminal action proof beyond reasonable doubt; civil actionpreponderance of evidence) - In this case the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist.
NATURE Petition for review from the decision of the CA FACTS - On Sept. 8, 1973 Conrado Bunag Jr. brought Zenaida Cirilo to a motel or hotel where they had sexual intercourse and later that evening he brought Zenaida to the house of his grandmothers house where they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days until Sept. 29, 1973. They filed their application for marriage license with the Local Civil Registral of Bacoor, Cavite. However, after a few days, Conrado filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage license. Plaintiffs Claim Conrado Bunag Jr. abducted her in the vicinity of San Juan de Dios Hospital in Pasay City and brought her to a motel where she was raped. Afterwhich he said that he would not let her go unless they get married, as he intended to marry her , so much so that she promised not to make any scandal and to marry him. They went to his gradmothers house and lived together as husband and wife for 21 days until Bunag Jr. left and never returned which humiliated Zenaida and compelled her to go back to her parents. Respondents Comment Conrado Bunag Jr.and Zenaida Cirilo had earlier made plans to elope and get married (same as first set of facts) . And that the reason why Conrado broke off their plan to get married was their bitter disagreements over money and Zenaidas threats to his life. - The Cirilos filed a complaint for damages against Conrado Bunag Jr. and his father Conrado Bunag Sr. (Zenaidas uncle claims that Bunag Sr. assured them that the couple were to be married). The Trial Court ordered Bunag Jr. to pay damages (80Kmoral damages,20K-exemplary damages, 20ktemperate damages and 10k attorneys fees) Bunag Sr. was absolved from any and all liability.CA affirmed in toto - Bunag Jr contends that both the trial court awarded the damages on the basis of a finding that he is guilty of forcible abduction with rape,despite the prior dismissal of the complaint therefore filed by Zenaida with the Pasay City Fiscals Office. ISSUE WON the Fiscals dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape extinguished the civil liability of Conrado Bunag Jr
JARANTILLA v CA JIMENEZ v AVERIA ROJAS v PEOPLE (ALIKPALA) 57 SCRA 243 FERNANDO; May 31, 1974
NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition FACTS - Rojas was charged w/ violation of Art.319 (Removal, sale, pledge of mortgaged property) of RPC for executing a new chattel mortgage on personal property (Caterpillar Tractor) in favor of another party w/o the consent of the previous mortgagee. After the criminal case was instituted, a civil case was filed against him by the offended party (CMS Estate) for the termination of a management
BUNAG JR. v CA (CIRILO) 211 SCRA 440

contract, one of the causes of action of which consisted of petitioner having executed a chattel mortgage when a prior chattel mortgage was still valid and subsisting, thus giving lie to his express manifestation that the property was free from all liens and encumbrances. - Note: the trigger for the filing of information re: art.319 violation was the filing of 5 estafa cases against Rojas. - CFI Judge Alikpala ordered the arraignment, then the trial for the criminal case. Rojas filed an action for certiorari against the arraignment order, and prohibition against the order setting the trial, based on the civil action for the revocation of the management contract. He contended that a prejudicial question was involved, thus he could no longer be tried pending the termination of the civil suit. The respondents, in turn, contended that the resolution of the civil case will not determine the liability of Rojas in the criminal case (not a prejudicial question); and even granting that there was a prejudicial question, the cases could proceed independently pursuant to Art.33 of CC, which provides: In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. ISSUE WON the is a prejudicial question, thus requiring the resolution of the civil action for the determination of the criminal case HELD NO Ratio: A prejudicial question, which is must be determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court, is not present in this case. Reasoning: - It is indispensable then for this petition to succeed that the alleged prejudicial question must be determinative of the criminal case before respondent Judge. It is not so in this case. - Pisalbor. v. Tesoro: CFI erred in holding that the criminal case should be suspended. In the present proceedings, the civil case does not involve a question prejudicial to the criminal case, for to whomsoever the land may be awarded after all the evidence has been presented in the civil case, may not affect the alleged crime committed by the notary
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FACTS - April 27, 1978 - Luis Pichel filed a COMPLAINT against Alejandro Ras and Bienvenido Martin before CFI Basilan praying for the nullification of the deed of sale executed by Ras in favor of Martin and for the declaration of the prior deed of sale allegedly executed in his favor by the defendant Alejandro Ras as valid. - RAS ANSWER > they never sold the property to Pichel > the signatures appearing in the deed of sale in favor of plaintiff Pichel were forgeries > therefore the alleged deed of sale in Pichel's favor sought to be declared valid was fictitious and inexistent - September 5, 1978 - while Civil Case was being TRIED before CFI Basilan, the Provincial Fiscal of Basilan filed an INFORMATION for Estafa (criminal case) in the same court against Ras arising from the same double sale subject matter of the civil complaint filed by Luis Pichel. - November 6, 1978 - petitioner filed a MOTION FOR SUSPENSION OF ACTION in said Criminal Case claiming that same facts and issues were involved in both the civil and criminal case and that the resolution of the issues in the civil case would necessarily be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. - December 4, 1978 - Provincial Fiscal of Basilan filed his opposition on - December 12, 1978 - respondent judge saw no prejudicial question and accordingly denied the motion ISSUE WON civil case would be prejudicial to the criminal case given that they would discuss same facts and issues HELD YES - there appears to be a prejudicial question in the case at bar, considering that Ras' defense in Civil Case of the nullity and forgery of the alleged prior deed of sale in favor of Pichel (plaintiff in the civil case and complaining witness in the criminal case) is based on the very same facts which would be necessarily determinative of Ras' guilt or innocence as accused in the criminal case. Ratio A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The
public, which is the subject of the criminal case. But, even supposing that both the civil and the criminal case involve the same question and one must precede the other, it should be the civil case which should be suspended rather than the criminal, to await the result of the latter. - Dela Cruz v City Fiscal: Regardless of the outcome of the pending civil case for annulment of the affidavit of adjudication, determination of the charge of falsification would be based on the truth or falsity of the narration of facts in the affidavit of adjudication, * * *. Therefore, the civil case aforementioned does not involve a prejudicial question. - Benitez v. Concepcion, Jr (more analogous): the fact that the principal issues in both cases are the same and did arise from the same facts would not show any necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case. - Isip v. Gonzales: there is a prejudicial question only when the matter that has to be priorly decided by another authority is one the cognizance of which pertains to that authority and should not, under the circumstances, be passed upon by the court trying the criminal case. - Moreover, Art.33 explicitly provides that in cases of xxx fraud, xxx, a civil action for damages entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action SHALL proceed independently of the criminal prosecution xxx. - in this case, fraud is the basis for both the civil and criminal actions, thus they are to proceed independently. The invocation of the doctrine of prejudicial question is thus attended with futility. Personal note: ang pangit ng case. theres realy no discussion, puro citations, thats why this digest is also full of it. Dispositive Petition DENIED.
RAS v RASUL 100 SCRA 125 TEEHANKEE; September 18, 1980

NATURE Petition to review and set aside the order of respondent Judge dated December 12, 1978 of criminal case in CFI Basilan denying petitioner's motion as accused therein to suspend proceedings due to the existence of a prejudicial question in Civil Case of the same court

prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. Reasoning - For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of the civil, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in said civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. - If the first alleged sale in favor of Pichel is void or fictitious, then there would be no double sale and petitioner would be innocent of the offense charged. A conviction in the criminal case (if it were allowed to proceed ahead) would be a gross injustice and would have to be set aside if it were finally decided in the civil action that indeed the alleged prior deed of sale was a forgery and spurious. Dispositive Order of respondent judge in Criminal Case dated December 12, 1978 is hereby set aside. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on May 16, 1979 is hereby made permanent and respondent judge is enjoined from proceeding with the arraignment and trial of the criminal case unless the civil case shall have been finally decided and terminated adversely against petitioner.
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The issues raised in the three cases do not involve the pivotal question of who planted the sugar can and, therefore, are not determinative juris et jure of guilt or innocence in the Criminal Case. Reasoning - A prejudicial question is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused., and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. - In the case at bar, the issues raised would not constitute a prejudicial question to the Criminal Case. The Intestate Case involves only the co-heirs and the facts involved are totally unrelated to the Criminal Case. Even if the Intestate Court should annul the division and uphold the co-ownership, that would not be determinative of the criminal responsibility of private respondents for theft of the sugar cane, which petitioner claims he planted in good faith by virtue of the valid lease agreement. The Ejectment Case also does not constitute a prejudicial question to the Criminal Case. It involves the issue of possession between co-owners. A decision therein in favor of Democrata would not affect the rights of Librodo, which spring from the lease contract. With regard the Damages case, it is actually the civil aspect of the Criminal Case as the two cases are of the same facts, and the entitlement to damages being predicated on the unlawful taking treated of in the Criminal Case, no necessity arises for that civil Case to be determined ahead of the Criminal Case. Dispositive In the absence of a prejudicial question, the order of the judge is set aside and he is instructed to proceed without delay with the trial of the criminal case.
LIBRODO v COSCOLLUELA, JR. (GUANTERO) 116 SCRA 303 MELENCIO-HERRERA; August 30, 1982
NATURE Petition for certiorari to review Negros CFI order FACTS - Felipe Rivera died leaving certain properties in San Carlos, Negros Occidental. His estate was settled in a special proceeding on November 24, 1976 and was terminated on the basis of a Project of Partition among Rufino Rivera Damandaman, Democrata Guantero, and Zosimo Guantero. - Rufinos share of the estate comprise of lots designated as Lots 559-B, 1906-B, 1910-B, and a901B which were all sugar lands. On January 18, 1977,
Rufino leased the properties to Dr. Librodo, the petitioner, for a period of ten agricultural crop years. - On August 31, Democrata filed a petition to re-open the intestate proceeding on the ground that she was not present when the subdivision plan was submitted and that the judgment has not become final as the boundaries on the partition have not been platted. - In the meantime, according to the petitioner, private respondents, Guanteros, harvested the sugar canes he planted on the land he leased from Rufino. On August 10, 1978, a Criminal Case (the Criminal Case) was filed against the respondents for theft demanding damages amounting to Pesos 15,120.00. During the pendency of the Criminal Case, another case for damages (the Damages Case) against the private respondents alleging damages to the petitioner caused by the private respondents theft of the sugar canes and their occupation of the leased properties thus preventing him from cultivating or taking possession of the same. He alleged that this resulted in his being deprived of income for two years amounting to Pesos 78,280.00. - In their answer, respondents asserted that the lots are still under co-ownership among the heirs and that this is the subject of another special proceeding (the Intestate Case). That said, Democrata contended that Rufino could not execute the lease contracts without her conformity without her conformity as co-owner. The Guanteros filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the Criminal Case on the ground of pendency of the Damages Case, the Intestate Case, and the ejectment case (the Ejectment Case) which was filed by Rufino against Democrata on January 13, 1977. - The respondents took the position that the various cases focused on the issues of possession and ownership of the lots involved as well as of the improvements thereon, hence, determinative of their guilt in the criminal action and hence constitutive of a prejudicial question. - Despite the objections made by the petitioner, the lower court issued the order finding that a prejudicial question existed and suspending the Criminal case proceeding. Hence this appeal. ISSUE WON the issues raised in the three cases mentioned involve a prejudicial question that warrants a suspension of the Criminal Case HELD NO
BALGOS v SANDIGANBAYAN 176 SCRA 287 GANCAYCO; August 10, 1989

NATURE Petition to review the decision of Sandiganbayan FACTS

- Balgos et al were charged with violation of Section 3(c) of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act, as amended, in an information that was filed with the Sandiganbayan by the Special Prosecutor which was approved by the Deputy Tanodbayan, after a preliminary investigation. - Lim, the plaintiff and prevailing party in Civil Case No. 4047 filed a complaint for rescission of the sale of the car by Juanito Ang to private respondent Leticia Acosta-Ang for being allegedly in fraud of creditors. The said complaint was filed with the RTC of Nueva Vizcaya. On the same day, petitioners filed a motion for reinvestigation in the Tanodbayan. The same was granted. - The Tanodbayan ordered to dismiss the case for lack of merit and to withdraw the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 11414 as soon as possible in the interest of justice. - Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to withdraw the information against petitioners. This was denied. - BAlgos et al filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the criminal case against them on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question in Civil Case No. 5307. This was likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan. ISSUE WON the denial by the Sandiganbayan of the motion to withdraw the information and of another motion to suspend proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question in a pending civil action constitute a grave abuse of discretion. HELD NO. - While the public prosecutor has the sole direction and control in the prosecution of offenses, once the complaint or information is filed in court, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case and all subsequent actions that may be taken by the public prosecutor in relation to the disposition of the case must be subject to the approval of the said court. Before a re-investigation of the case may be conducted by the public prosecutor, the permission or consent of the court must be secured. And if after such reinvestigation the prosecution finds a cogent basis to withdraw the information or otherwise cause the dismissal of the case, such proposed course of action must be addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
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establish that they acted in good faith in proceeding with the execution on the car even they were presented evidence tending to show it did not belong to Juanito Ang anymore. - The denial of the motion to suspend the criminal proceedings on the ground of the pendency of a prejudicial question in Civil Case No. 5307 is well taken. The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play usually in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because whatsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. - The pending civil case for the annulment of the sale of the car to Leticia Ang is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the petitioners for the acts allegedly committed by them in seizing the car. Even if in the civil action it is ultimately resolved that the sale was null and void, it does not necessarily follow that the seizure of the car was rightfully undertaken. The car was registered in the name of Leticia Ang six months before the seizure. Until the nullity of the sale is declared by the courts, the same is presumptively valid. Thus, petitioners must demonstrate that the seizure was not attended by manifest bad faith in order to clear themselves of the charge in the criminal action. Dispositive The petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the restraining order dated June 6, 1989 is hereby lifted. No costs.
- The only instance when the appellate court should stay the hand of the trial court in such cases is when it is shown that the trial court acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction or otherwise committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to such lack or excess of jurisdiction. - Petitioners are public officers charged with having violated Section 3(c) of RA 3019, for evident bad faith and manifest partiality in enforcing the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 4047 against a Mustang car registered in the name of Leticia Acosta-Ang (complainant) who is not the judgment debtor thereby causing undue injury to said complainant and giving unwarranted benefits to the judgment creditor in said case. - Upon reinvestigation of the criminal case by the Tanodbayan, he found evidence tending to show that the sale of said car to the complainant by Juanito Ang, the judgment debtor, was a sham intended to defraud his creditors; that the deed of absolute sale which ostensibly was executed before a notary public appeared to be fictitious inasmuch as the entry of the document in the notarial register of said notary public on said date referred to a catering contract of other parties; that the certificate of registration of the car was issued to complainant only on June 13, 1984 which showed that the document of sale was actually executed only on or about the same date, that is, seven days after Juanito Ang received copy of the adverse decision in Civil Case No. 4047; and that upon the execution of the judgment, the car was found in the possession of Alvin, the son of Juanito Ang, who admitted that the car belonged to his father by showing the receipt of its repair in the name of Juanito Ang. This is the basis of the motion for withdrawal of the information of the Tanodbayan. - The respondents are aware that the complainant is not a party to the civil case filed by the creditor against spouses Juanito and Lydia Ang and that a writ of execution cannot be implemented validly against one who is not a party to the action. All these, coupled with the under haste in which the levy on the Mustang car was made without first ascertaining the true owner thereof demonstrate quite convincingly the evident bad faith and manifest partiality of the respondents, thereby giving unwarranted benefits to the judgment creditor to the damage and prejudice of the complainant. - Although at the reinvestigation, the Tanodbayan was persuaded that in fact the sale of the car to Leticia Ang was fraudulent, this did not necessarily clear petitioners of the aforesaid Anti-Graft charge against them. Still the burden is on the petitioners to
UMALI v IAC (EDANO) 219 SCRA 339 PADILLA; June 21, 1990
NATURE Review on certiorari FACTS - Petitioners (Umali, Calleja, Ledesma) are officers of the Orosea Devt Corporation. Sometime on Sept. 4, 1979, Umali purchased from spoused Homorio and Solina Edano a lot in Mulanay, Province of Queazon for P1, 036,500 payable on 4 installments (P225,000, P271,500, P270,000, P 270,000) They issued for this purpose 4 checks drawn against the Chartered Bank, Manila Branch. The first check for P225,000.00 was honored upon its presentment. By arrangement the petitioners made with the Edano spouses, a deed of

absolute sale in the name of Orosea Devt Corp. was executed even of the full purchase price has not yet been fully paid. Thereafter, OROSEA secured a loan of P1,000,000.00 from the Philippine Veterans Bank using this property as security. When the check for the second installment fell due, petitioners twice asked for deferment. The checks they have issued were dishonored. As a consequence of the dishonor of these checks, the Edano spouses filed a complaint for estafa against petitioners. - The information was filed by the Provincial Fiscal against petitioners on May 21, 1981, and it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1423-I. Arraignment was set on September 4, 1981 but petitioners failed to appear. It was reset to October 5, 1981 but this was postponed upon motion of petitioners. - On October 14, 1981, OROSEA filed a Complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon against the Edano spouses for the annulment/rescission of the Contract of Sale for which the petitioners issued the checks, subject of the criminal case. - The estafa case was again set for arraignment. This was postponed. With the entry of a new counsel, petitioners filed a motion to quash the estafa case, on ground of improper venue, but this motion was withdrawn by petitioners before it could be resolved. - The arraignment was again postponed thrice. Petitioners then filed a 'Motion to Suspend Arraignment and Further Proceedings, with a Supplemental Motion To Suspend Proceedings. This was opposed by the Provincial Fiscal of Quezon. Resolving the motion to suspend, respondent Judge issued his orders, now under question, denying the motion. CFI of Zambales also denied the same motion. A petition for certiorari is filed with CA and CA affirmed. ISSUE WON proceedings should be suspended until the civil case is disposed of, since CV No. 8769 involves a prejudicial question. HELD NO. - CV No. 8769 seeks the annulment of the deed of sale in favor of Orosea on the gound that there was fraud in misrepresenting that the land is free from all liens and encumbrances, and that it is not tenanted, when in truth and fact, the land is covered by the land reform program and that vast portions thereof are timber land, hence, allegedly indisposable public land. Therefore, according to petitioners, CV No. 8769 involves issues, the resolution of which will
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- On appeal, CA modified the decision, convicting him of abduction with consent. - Valdepenas filed MFR and new trial contesting the findings of CA, to the effect that complainant was below 18 y/o at the time of the occurrence. Motion was granted. The decision was set aside and the case was remanded to the CFI - CFI rendered decision reiterating findings of CA. Petitioner again appealed to CA which affirmed the CFI decision. - MFR was filed on the ground that lower court had no jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the action wrt the offense of abduction with consent. MFR was denied Petitioners claims there was no complaint for abduction with consent filed and that the lower court acquired no jurisdiction over his person or over the crime of abduction with consent. ISSUE WON CA erred in not reversing he decision of the TC for lack of jurisdiction over the accused and the subject matter of the action for the offense abduction with consent HELD NO. - Jurisdiction over the person of an accused is acquired upon either his apprehension, with or without warrant, or his submission to the jurisdiction of the court. It is not claimed that petitioner had not been apprehended or had not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. His actions show that he never questioned the judicial authority of the CFI, the justice of peace and the CA. He is deemed to have waived whatever objection he might have had to the jurisdiction over his person, and, hence, to have submitted himself to the Court's jurisdiction. His behavior - particularly the motions therein filed by him implied, not merely a submission to the jurisdiction thereof, but also, that he urged the courts to exercise the authority thereof over his person. - On the other hand, it is well settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action is and may be conferred only by law. That jurisdiction over a given crime, not vested by law upon a particular court, may not be conferred thereto by the parties involved in the offense; and that, under an information for forcible abduction, the accused may be convicted of abduction with consent. Art 344 (3) RPC states that: ". . . the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her
determine whether or not petitioners are criminally liable in CR No. 1423-I. They further argue that, if and when the court hearing CV No. 7869 annuls the subject deed of sale, then, their obligation to pay private respondents under the said deed would be extinguished, resulting in the dismissal of CR No. 1423-I. The contracts are thus voidable with the existence of fraud vitiating their consent. - However, it cannot be denied that at the time the acts complained of in the estafa case were committed, the deed of sale they seek to be annulled, was still binding to the parties. - The two (2) essential elements for a prejudicial question to exist are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue in the civil action determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. - Given the nature of a prejudicial question, and considering the issues raised in CV No. 8769 and CR No. 1423-I, we agree with the ruling of the respondent Court of Appeals that the resolution of the issues in CV No. 8769 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the petitioners-accused in CR No. 1423-I, hence, no prejudicial question is involved between the said two (2) cases. Dispositive WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated 23 September 1982 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 14504 is hereby AFFIRMED.
VALDEPENAS V PEOPLE 16 SCRA 871 CONCEPTION; April 30, 1966

NATURE Appeal by Maximino Valdepenas from a decision of the CA, affirming that of the CFI of Cagayan, convicting him of the crime of abduction with consent. FACTS - Jan 25, 56 Ester Ulsano filed with the justice of peace a criminal complaint charging Valdepenas with forcible abduction with rape of Ester Ulsano. After the preliminary investigation, the second stage of which was waived by Valdepenas, the justice of peace found that there was probable cause and forwarded the complaint to the CFI. - CFI found him guilty as charged and sentenced him accordingly.

parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case, if the offended has been expressly pardoned by the above- named persons, as the case may be". - Art 344 RPC does not determine the jurisdiction of our courts over the offense therein enumerated. It could not affect said jurisdiction, because the same is governed by the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by RPC, which deals primarily with the definition of crimes and the factors pertinent to the punishment of the culprits. The complaint required in said Article 344 is merely a condition precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties. And such condition has been imposed "out of consideration for the offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial." - The gist of petitioner's pretense is that there are some elements of the latter which are not included in the former, and, not alleged, according to him, in the complaint filed herein, namely: 1) that the offended party is a virgin; and 2) that she is over 12 and under 18 years of age. The second element is clearly set forth in said complaint, which states that Ester Ulsano is "a minor . . . 17 years of age . . .", and, hence, over 12 and below 18 years of age. - As regards the first element, it is settled that the virginity mentioned in Art 343 RPC, as an essential ingredient of the crime of abduction with consent, should not be understood in its material sense and does not exclude the idea of abduction of a virtuous woman of good reputation because the essence of the offense "is not the wrong done to the woman, but the outrage to the family and the alarm produced in it by the disappearance of one of its members." - The complaint in the case at bar alleges not only that Ester Ulsano is a minor 17 years of age, but also that petitioner "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously" took her by force and violence . . . against her will and taking advantage of the absence of her mother" from their dwelling and carried "her to a secluded spot to gain carnal intercourse with the offended party against her will, using force, intimidation and violence, with lewd designs." This allegation implies that Ester is a minor living under patria protestas, thus leading to the presumption that she is a virgin apart from being virtuous and having a good reputation. The presumption of innocence includes that of morality and decency, and of chastity.
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attempted murder case be he believed that the decision of CA is void because Lahoys appeal ought to have been certified to the Supreme Court by the CA because the attempted murder imputed to Lahoy was committed on the same occasion and arose out of the same occurrence as the murder imputed to him and Plateros in this case, as contemplated in section 17(1), formerly section 17(4) of the Judiciary Law, which reads: "SEC. 17, Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. -x x x " x x xx x x x x x "The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts herein provided, in "(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment; and those involving other offenses which, although not so punished, arose out of the same occurrence or which may have been committed by the accused on the same occasion, as that giving rice to the more serious offense, regardless of whether the accused are charged as principals, accomplices or accessories, or whether have been tried jointly or separately; x x x." - In other words, the attempted murder case like the instant murder case, comes within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the SCt and should have been decided together with the instant murder case. ISSUES On Attempted Murder Case 1. WON the decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting Lahoy of attempted murder should be set aside for lack of appellate jurisdiction or as a lawless thing On Murder case 2. WON the guilt of Lahoy and Plateros was proven beyond reasonable doubt 3. WON there was conspiracy between Lahoy and Plateros 4. WON the crime should be categorized as simple homicide only and not murder HELD 1. NO. Ratio: The rule in section 17(1) is designed to avoid conflicts between the decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals in cases involving offenses which arose from the same occurrence or which were committed on the same occasion usually by the same accused.
Dispositive Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner Maximino Valdepenas. It is so ordered.
PEOPLE v PLATEROS 83 SCRA 401 AQUINO; May 30 1978

FACTS One night, Pedro Candel together with other pedicab drivers and Tomas Metucua, a second year college student drank beer in the kitchenette. Seated at another table were Warlito Plateros and Murillo Lahoy who were also drinking beer. - Metucua and Plateros were rivals for the affection of Estrella Silamro, the cashier in the kitchenette. When Metucua was talking with Estrella, his alleged sweetheart, Plateros went near them and refused to leave them, thereby annoying Metucua. - At about midnight. Piquero, Candel and Aora, accompanied by Metucua, left the kitchenette and went to their pedicab. Candel was seated in the sidecar of the tricycle. Metucua sat on the driver's seat. Lahoy and Plateros came out of the kitchenette. Lahoy appeared to be angry, hostile and menacing. Without any warning, he stabbed Candel (maybe thinking that it was Metucua who was inside the pedicab because Candel is the driver abberatio personae) two times. Plateros also stabbed Candel. Moved by the instinct of selfpreservation, Candel jumped out of the sidecar. He fell on the ground face down. Lahoy allegedly stabbed Metucua. Then, Plateros and Lahoy fled from the scene of the assault, - Candel was brought to the hospital but he died on that same morning. Procedure - Two informations were filed in the Court of First Instance of Bohol accusing Plateros and Lahoy of (1) Murder of Candel and (2) Attempted Murder of Metucua. - The trial court tried the two cases jointly and rendered only one decision. Plateros and Lahoy were found guilty of murder, sentencing each of them of reclusion perpetua. In that same decision, the trial court convicted Lahoy of attempted murder (Plateros, his co-accused, was acquitted) of Metucua. - Lahoy appealed to the Court of Appeals and the CA acquitted him. - The murder case was elevated to SC for review. Together with it, the Solicitor General elevated the

However, that general rule has an exception. Where, by allowing the Court of Appeals to decide a can involving an offense, which is not punishable by death or reclusion perpetua but which arose out of the same occurrence or was committed on the same occasion, as the case involving an offense punishable by death or reclusion perpetua pending in this Court, there will be no conflict between the decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals, the former case need not be elevated to this Court (People vs. Cario, 101 Phil. 1206). The rationale of that exception to the general rule is found in the maxim: Cessanie ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex. (The reason for the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases.) Reasoning: - The doctrine of the Cario case may be applied in this case because here there can be no conflict between the decision of the Court of Appeals and this Court's decision in the instant murder case inasmuch as the victims in the two cases are different. The attempted murder case decided by the Court of Appeals involved the wounding of a certain Tomas Metucua whereas, in the instant murder case the victim was Pedro Candel. The acquittal of Lahoy in connection with the wounding of Metucua would not affect the determination of his guilt or innocence in connection with the death of Pedro Candel. - This holding does not in anyway emasculate the rule in section 17(1) that criminal cases appealed to the Court of Appeals, involving offenses which arose out of the same occurrence, or which were committed on the same occasion as the offense punished by death or reclusion perpetua should be certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals. It is this Court that would determine whether or not the cases appealed to the Court of Appeals should be decided together with the case appealed to this Court. 2. YES The feeble denials of Plateros and Lahoy (who admittedly were near the owns of the crime, when it was perpetrated) cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal declarations of the eyewitnesses, Aora and Piquero, that the appellants were the authors of the stab wounds which caused Candal's death. Their guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. 3. YES. There was a conspiracy between Plateros and Lahoy as shown in their concerted efforts to injure Candel. Plateros and Lahoy, as boon companions, had been together since four o'clock in the afternoon. They had gone to different places and repaired twice to the
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-At the time of the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty under Art 315 of the RPC was arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional it is minimum period, falling well within the jurisdiction of the City Court. But when the information was filed, PD 818 had increased the imposable penalty to prision mayor in its medium period. -The real question raised by petitioner is whether the said doctrine disregards the rule against retroactivity of penal laws. It has been repeatedly held that in criminal prosecutions, jurisdiction is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender in after trial but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes. Once jurisdiction is acquired by the Court in which the information is filed, it is retained regardless of whether the evidence proves a lesser offense which carries a penalty that would otherwise fall within the jurisdiction of an inferior court. -In the instant case, should the information be refiled with the RTC, the court may not impose a more onerous penalty upon Lagon. Although the RTC retains subject-matter jurisdiction to try and decide the refiled case under PD 818, given the date of the commission of the crime (before effectivity of PD 818), the lower penalty provided in Art 315 (otherwise within the jurisdiction of the City Court) should be imposed. Dispositive WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY the petition
kitchenette. They were together when they left the scene of the stabbing. 4. NO Lahoy and Plateros, who could have stabbed Candel or Metucua inside the kitchenette, did not do so. They waited for Metucua and the pedicab drivers to leave the kitchenette. Their intention was to make a surprise attack without any risk to themselves. The assault was deliberate, sudden and unexpected. That is the characteristics manifestation of treachery (alevosia). Hence, the killing was properly categorized as murder by the trial court (Art. 14(16), Revised Penal Code). Dispositive WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is affirmed with costs against the appellants. They are entitled to credit for their preventive imprisonment under the conditions laid down in article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
PEOPLE v LAGON 185 SCRA 442 FELICIANO.: May 18, 1990

FACTS -On July 7 1976 a criminal action was filed with the City Court of Roxas charging Lagon with estafa for allegedly issuing a P4,232 check as payment for goods knowing she had insufficient funds. However on Dec. 2, as the trial commenced, the City Court dismissed the information on the ground that the penalty prescribed by law for estafa was beyond the courts authority to impose. Hence this petition for review. ISSUE WON the City Court had jurisdiction over the case HELD NO - It is settled doctrine that jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is determined by the law in effect at the time of the commencement of the criminal action and not the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense charged. -Under Sec 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the CFI to try parties charged with an offense within their respective jurisdictions, in which penalties provided do not exceed prision correccional or fines no exceeding P6,000 or both.
ZALDIVIA V REYES, JR. 211 SCRA 277 CRUZ; July 3, 1992

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS The petitioner Lus Zaldivia is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal, allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. The referral-complaint of the police was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (OPP) of Rizal on May 30, 1990 and the information was filed with the MTC of Rodriguez, presided by Judge Andres Reyes, Jr., on October 2, 1990. - The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but the

motion was denied. On appeal, the RTC of Rizal affirmed the denial of the motion. Petitioners claims In this petition, the petitioner argues that the charge against her is governed by the following provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure (RSP): Section 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the procedure in the MetTC, the MTC, and the MCTC in the following cases: B. Criminal Cases: 3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances; . - Petitioner also invokes Act No. 3326, "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows: Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months. Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. - Petitioner concludes that as the information was filed way beyond the two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge against her should have been dismissed on the ground prescription. Prosecutions position The prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the complaint against her with the OPP. The SolGen invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (RCP), providing as follows: Section 1. How Instituted For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follows: b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the MTC and MCTC, by filing the complaint directly with the said courts, or a complaint with the fiscal's office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal. In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged.
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negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos. - These offenses are not covered by the RSP. Under Section 9 of the RSP, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actual filed in court and not on any date before that. - This interpretation is in consonance with the aforequoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the SolGen that they include administrative proceedings. At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the RSP and the RCP, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and the RCP, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. - The prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the OPP on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the MTC of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed. Dispositive Petition is GRANTED. Case is DISMISSED on the ground of prescription.
Respondent maintains that the filing of the complaint with the OPP comes under the phrase "such institution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases, without distinction, including those falling under the RSP. ISSUE WON the offense has prescribed HELD YES - The filing of the complaint in the MTC, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two months before the promulgation of the RSP on August 1, 1983. On the other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been incorporated therein with the revision of the RCP on January 1, 1985, except for the last paragraph, which was added on October 1, 1988. - Sec. 1 of the RCP begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the RSP. - The charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by the RSP and not the RCP. - Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the MTC and MCTC," the obvious reference is to Section 32 (2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts: (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal
LOPEZ v CITY JUDGE 18 SCRA 616 DIZON, October 29, 1966

NATURE

Petition for review on Certiorari and Prohibition FACTS -Petitioners (Roy Villasor, Angelina Meijia Lopez and Aurora Mejia Villasor) and other heirs of spouses Manuel Meijia and Gloria Lazatin entered into a contract with respondent Trinidad Lazatin for the development and subdivision of 3 parcels of land belonging to the intestate estate. Lazatin transferred his rights to Terra Devt Co (TDC). -Petitioners and co-heirs filed an action in CFI QC for rescission of said contract with Lazatin for alleged gross and willful violation of its terms. -Respondents (Lazatin and TDC) filed with Fiscals Office of City of Angeles a complaint against petitioners for violation of A172 in relation to A171, par4, RPC. Preliminary investigation conducted. Fiscal filed with Court in Angeles City information charging petitioners with crime of falsification of private document. Allegedly, Aurora and Angelina made it appear that they were the guardians of minors George and Alexander Meijia (sons of the spouses?) when they werent the guardians at the date of the execution of the document, a certain Carolina M. de Castro was the judicial guardian of the said minors). -Petitioners asked for a reinvestigation. Angeles City Fiscal reinvestigated to give them opportunity to present exculpatory evidence. After reinvestigation, parties charged moved for the dismissal of the case mainly on the ground that the City Court of Angeles had no jurisdiction over the offense because the private document that contained the alleged false statement of fact was signed by them outside the territorial limits of said city (One in Makati, the other one in QC). -However, the resolution of their motion to dismiss was delayed and the City Court already set their criminal case for arraignment. Petitioners secured several postponements of the arraignment. But since City Fiscal continually failed to act on their motion to dismiss, petitioners filed a motion to quash instead, on the ground that court had no jurisdiction. Respondents (with conformity of City Fiscal) filed an opposition to the motion to quash. Respondent judge denied motion to quash, set arraignment. So petitioners filed present action. ISSUE 1. WON City Court of Angeles City had jurisdiction to try and decide the criminal case for alleged falsification of a private document allegedly done by the parties named in the info even if the acts of
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enter his plea of not guilty and go to trial and, if convicted, raise on appeal the same legal questions covered by his motion to quash. In this as well as in other jurisdictions, however, this is no longer the hard and fast rule. -The writs of certiorari and prohibition, as extraordinary legal remedies, are, in the ultimate analysis, intended to annul void proceedings; to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice. Reasoning. In several cases, the court already took cognizance of said writs, overlooking the flaw in the procedure followed in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice. The lack of jurisdiction of the City Court of Angeles is patent and it would be highly unfair to compel the petitioners to undergo trial in said court and suffer all the embarrassment and mental anguish that go with it. Dispositive WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the offense charged in the information filed in Criminal Case No. C-2268 of the City Court of Angeles City is not within the jurisdiction of said court and that, therefore, said court is hereby restrained and prohibited from further proceedings therein. Costs against the private respondents.
falsification was allegedly done in Makati and QC, and thus outside the jurisdiction of said court Other procedural issues 2. WON the motion to quash was improper, and should not be allowed since by filing the said motion, the petitioners necessarily assumes the truth of the allegation of the information to the effect that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles City 3. WON the prayer for writs of certiorari and prohibition is proper HELD 1. NO. Ratio. The place where the criminal offense was committed not only determines the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction [US vs. Pagdayuman]. Reasoning. Petitioners are charged with having falsified a private document, not using a falsified document, so it is essential to determine when and where the offense of falsification of a private document is deemed consummated or committed. The crime of falsification of a private document is consummated when such document is actually falsified with the intent to prejudice a 3rd person, whether such falsified document is or is not put to use illegally. The improper and illegal use of the document is not material or essential element of the crime of falsification of a private document [US vs. Infante, US vs. Barreto] 2. NO Ratio. The motion to quash now provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court is manifestly broader in scope than the demurrer, as it is not limited to defects apparent upon the face of the complaint or information but extends to issues arising out of extraneous facts, as shown by the circumstance that, among the grounds for a motion to quash, Section 2 of said Rule provides for former jeopardy or acquittal, extinction of criminal action or liability, insanity of the accused etc., which necessarily involve questions of fact in the determination of which a preliminary trial is required. Reasoning. The argument of the respondents refer to the now obsolete demurrer to an information. 3. YES Ratio. The general rule is that a court of equity will not issue a writ of certiorari to annul an order of a lower court denying a motion to quash, nor issue a writ of prohibition to prevent said court from proceeding with the case after such denial, it being the rule that upon such denial the defendant should
PEOPLE v YABUT 76 SCRA 624 MARTIN; April 29, 1977

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of Orders of CFI Bulacan FACTS - Cecilia YABUT was accused of ESTAFA by means of false pretenses before the CFI Bulacan. She, as treasurer of the Yabut Transit Lines, made out 3 checks in the total sum of P6, 568.94 drawn against the Merchants Banking Corp (located in Caloocan City), payable to Freeway Tires Supply. The checks were dishonored because of insufficient funds. Yabut failed to deposit the necessary funds to cover the checks. - Instead of entering a plea, YABUT filed a MOTION TO QUASH contending that: (1) the acts charged do not constitute the offense as there is no allegation that the postdated checks were issued and delivered to the complainant prior to or simultaneously with the delivery of the merchandise; (2) estafa is not

indictable when checks are postdated or issued in payment of pre-existing obligations; (3) venue was improperly laid because checks were issued and received by complainant in Caloocan, Yabuts office. - The People opposed and maintained that new law on checks, RA 4885, amending Art. 315 par.2(d) RPC, penalizes the postdating and that Malolos court can exercise jurisdiction since the last ingredient of the case, damage, transpired in Bulacan (residence of the complainant) after the dishonor of the checks for lack of funds. - The judge quashed the information for the reason of improper venue. The other issue was not resolved by the judge. - Peoples MFR for this dismissal was denied. ** This is actually a decision for two petitions: the other case involved Cecilias husband, GEMINIANO who was also charged with estafa, in his capacity as the President of Yabut Transit Lines. The exact same thing happened in his case (motion to quash -> improper venue reason -> quashed -> MFR denied). ISSUE 1. WON CFI Bulacan had jurisdiction over the case 2. WON new law punishes the postdating or issuance thereof in payment of a pre-existing obligation 3. WON facts charged in the informations constitute estafa HELD 1. YES Ratio Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check under Art. 315 par 2(d) of the RPC may be a transitory or continuing offense. Its basic elements of deceit and damage may independently arise in separate places. In the event of such occurrence, the institution of the criminal action in either place is legally allowed. - The venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was executed and delivered to the payee. Reasoning Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the ROC: In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the Court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place. - The estafa charged in the 2 informations involved here appear to be transitory or continuing in nature. Deceit has taken place in Malolos (thru issuance and delivery of worthless checks), while the damage in Caloocan, where the checks were dishonored by the drawee banks there. - The place where the bills were written, signed or dated does not necessarily fix the place where they
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were executed. What is decisive is the delivery of the instrument which is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation. - The receipt of the bad checks by a certain Yambao in Caloocan cannot be taken as delivery of the checks to Freeway Tires because he did not take delivery of the checks as holder. - Place of business of Freeway Tires is at Malolos, Bulacan from where the tire and gas purchases were made by the private respondents. Payment should then be considered effected there. 2. YES - Due to the absence of concrete evidence on the specific nature of the obligation assumed or supposedly discharged by the issuance of the bad checks, resolution of this controversial issue on the basis of the averments in the informations alone is not ripe. 3. YES Reasoning In considering a motion to quash based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the point of resolution is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would meet the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law. Facts alleged should be taken as they are. Dispositive Appealed orders ordering the quashal of the estafa informations against the two private respondents are reversed and set aside. Arraignment of the private respondents in the criminal cases should be set at the earliest date, and thereafter, the trial on the merits to proceed immediately.
SEPARATE OPINION TEEHANKEE [concurring]

- The motion to quash on the ground of improper venue must yield to the express allegations of the informations, bearing in mind that what determines jurisdiction are the allegations in the information and that venue is sufficiently conferred wherein any one of the essential ingredients of the offense charged took place. It also imports on the part of the accused a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information.
AGBAYANI v SAYO 89 SCRA 699 AQUINO; April 30, 1979

NATURE Instant petition for certiorari and prohibition
FACTS -Conrado B. Mahinan, a lawyer, was the manager of the Cagayan Valley Branch of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) stationed at Cauayan, Isabela. Among his subordinates were Wilson Agbayani, Carmelo N. Bautista, Pablo R. Pascual, and Renato Romeo P. Dugay. -On March 8, 1976, Mahinan filed with the fiscal's office at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya a complaint for written defamation against Agbayani, Bautista, Pascual and Dugay. -On July 23, 1976, the provincial fiscal of Nueva Vizcaya filed in the Court of First Instance of that province an information for libel charging Agbayani, Bautista, Pascual and Dugay with having maliciously made defamatory imputations against Mahinan on or about February 17, 1976 in Bambang, Nueva Vizcaya. -Quoted in the information were the affidavits of Pascual and Bautista signed at Cauayan, Isabela, Bautista's undated letter asking for Mahinan's dismissal, and Agbayani's "unusual incident report" subscribed and sworn to before a Manila notary and enclosing documentary evidence to support his charges of malversation and falsification against Mahinan and praying for the latter's separation from the service. -According to the information, all those documents allegedly depicted Mahinan "as an incorrigible managerial misfit, despoiler of public office, spendthrift of GSIS funds, inveterate gambler, chronic falsifier", and an "unreformed ex-convict". -The four accused filed a motion to quash contending that the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya has no jurisdiction over the offense charged because Mahinan was a public officer holding office at Cauayan, Isabela when the alleged libel was committed and, under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense charged comes within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Isabela. They argued that the provincial fiscal of Nueva Vizcaya had no authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and to file the information. -It was denied by the trial court in its order of April 25, 1977 on the ground that Mahinan was not a public officer within the meaning of article 203 of the Revised Penal Code since the insurance business of the GSIS is not an inherently governmental function. -After petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of that order was denied, they filed in this Court the instant petition.

ISSUE WON the CFI of Nueva Ecija was the proper venue of the criminal action for written defamation filed by Mahinan HELD NO -There is no issue as to whether Mahinan is a public officer. As GSIS branch manager, he is unquestionably a public officer. -Article 360, which lays down the rules on venue in cases of written defamation and which specifies the officer or court that should conduct the preliminary investigation, reads as follows: ART. 360.Persons responsible. . . . "The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense: "Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is printed and first published "Preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written defamations as provided for in the chapter shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where such actions may be instituted in accordance with the provisions of this article. ". . . ." (As amended by Republic Act Nos. 1289 and 4363) - Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed. Under that rule, the criminal action is
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-The information in this case is defective or deficient because it does not show that the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya, where it was filed, has jurisdiction to entertain the criminal action for written defamation initiated by Mahinan against the petitioners and that the provincial fiscal of that province had the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation. -Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction Dispositive Petition granted. The trial court's order denying petitioners' motion to quash is set aside. It is directed to dismiss Criminal Case No. 509, the libel case against the petitioners, without prejudice to the filing of another criminal action for written defamation in the Court of First Instance of Isabela
transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue. -Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place. -Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted so as to prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of out-oftown libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts -The rules on venue in article 360 may be restated thus: 1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published. 2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense. 3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. 4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense. -As a corollary, the preliminary investigation of the criminal action for written defamation shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where such action may be instituted. -Applying the foregoing rules, the proper venue of Mahinan's criminal action for written defamation against the petitioners is the Court of First Instance of Isabela, since as a GSIS branch manager, he was a public official stationed at Cauayan, Isabela and the alleged libel was committed when he was (as he still) in the public service. The preliminary investigation of the complaint should have been conducted by the provincial fiscal of Isabela, or by the municipal judge of Ilagan, the provincial capital, or by the Court of First Instance of the same province. -The criminal action could have been filed also in the Court of First Instance of the province or in the city court of the city where the libel was printed and first published.
CATINGUB v CA (PCSO) 121 SCRA 106. GUERRERO; March 25, 1983.

NATURE This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 38698-R entitled "PEDRITO L. CATINGUB, Petitioner, versus HON. RICARDO C. PUNO, Judge of the CFI Manila, Branch 24, and the PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE, Respondents." FACTS - Catingub was designated Temporary Sales Supervisor of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) assigned at the Cagayan de Oro Branch. As such, he received sweepstakes tickets on consignment, with the express obligation to turn over the proceeds of the sales of these tickets to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. Later, he was informed by the Auditing Examiner of the PCSO, Cagayan de Oro Branch that he has been found short of P12,307.45. Petitioner was ordered to explain the shortage in writing and to produce the missing amount. He failed to do so. His services were terminated without prejudice to whatever court action the PCSO will take for the recovery of the amount involved. In a letter, petitioner proposed to the General Manager of the PCSO, Manila, to settle his shortages by making monthly payments in the amount of at least P200.00, which proposal was, however, denied by the General Manager (there was already an admission in this letter). -Catingub, was charged with the crime of malversation (take note: crimes of estafa and

malversation are similar in nature: difference is that the funds in malversation are public in character) in the Court of First Instance of Manila. He filed motion to dismiss after arraignment on the sole ground that "the prosecution made a wrong choice of jurisdiction." He contended that "on the basis of the prosecution's evidence, the offense charged, together with all its essential ingredients occurred and the consummation thereof (was) completed, in Cagayan de Oro. -TC and CA dismissed motion hence this petition before the SC ISSUE WON CFI of Manila has jurisdiction to continue with the trial of the offense as charged in view of the evidence presented by the prodecution HELD YES. - Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, Sec. 14(a) provides: "Sec. 14. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place. -Petitioner could have been charged and tried in Cagayan de Oro City for it is not disputed that he received the sweepstakes tickets from the PCSO, Cagayan de Oro branch. The essential ingredient of receiving the sweepstakes tickets took place in Cagayan de Oro City. He could also be charged in the City of Manila since the final accounting must be rendered in the Central Office, Manila. This is therefore, a case of concurrent jurisdiction by the proper court of the place wherein "anyone of the essential ingredients thereof took place." But the choice of venue lies with the prosecuting officer and not with the accused. Dispositive Decision of CA Affirmed. Remand to the trial court for further proceedings in the ordinary course of law
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(1) Deceit took place in Pampanga, where it was uttered and delivered. The rule is that the issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who takes it as a holder, which means the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer, thereof, who in this case is the Financial Officer of SMC (2) Damage took place in Bulacan, where the check was dishonored by the drawee bank. - Therefore, jurisdiction may be entertained by either the Bulacan or the Pampanga court. BP 22 violation - In respect of the Bouncing Checks Case, the offense also appears to be continuing in nature. It is true that the offense is committed by the very fact of its performance; and that the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the fact of dishonor of a check but also the act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check. The case, therefore, could have been filed also in Bulacan. The determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check. However, it is likewise true that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an essential ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or another. Accordingly, jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga. - Jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the Information, which are controlling. The Information filed herein specifically alleges that the crime was committed in San Fernando, Pampanga, and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Court below. 2. NO The case was dismissed not on merits but on the erroneous conclusion of the judge that his court had no jurisdiction over the case. The dismissal being null and void, the proceedings before the RTC cant be said to have been lawfully terminated. Therefore, there is no second proceeding to place the accused in double jeopardy. Dispositive Petition granted. Judge is ordered to reassume jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 2800 and 2813 of his Court and to render judgment of either conviction or acquittal in accordance with the evidence already adduced during the joint trial of said two cases.
- Manuel Parulan is a wholesale dealer of San Miguel Corp (SMC). He issued two checks in favor of SMC (P86,071.20 and P11,918.80) that were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. - The checks were received at the SMC Bulacan branch, then forwarded to the SMC Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga. - SMC Finance Officer deposited the check in BPI San Fernando, Pampanga branch. - (Parulans bank is Planters Development Bank in Bulacan) - SMC filed for violation of BP22 (1st check) and for estafa under par. 2d1 (2nd check) with the RTC in Pampanga. - After hearing the facts and evidence, Judge Grospe of the Pampanga RTC dismissed the case because he said that the two essential elements, deceit and damage, of the offenses charged occurred and took place in Bulacan. DECEIT took place when Parulan gave the checks to SMC in Bulacan, with the false assurance that it had sufficient funds. DAMAGE occurred at the moment the checks issued by the accused were dishonored by the Planters Development Bank, the drawee bank, at Santa Maria, Bulacan which received them from the BPI, San Fernando, Pampanga branch for clearing purpose. ISSUES 1. WON any of the essential elements of the offenses charged occurred or took place within the jurisdiction of RTC Pampanga. 2. WON this petition for Certiorari places accused in double jeopardy. HELD 1. YES - A person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or province where the offense was in part committed. In transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province and some in another, the Court of either province has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first Court taking cognizance of the Case will exclude the others. ESTAFA under par 2d - Elements:
1
PEOPLE v GROSPE 157 SCRA 154. MELENCIO-HERRERA ; January 20, 1988

FACTS
Art. 315, par. 2(d) states: 'By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check
BALA v MARTINEZ 181 SCRA 459

MARTINEZ; January 20, 1999
NATURE Petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to review the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila FACTS - The petitioner had been indicted for removing and substituting the picture of Diazen which had been attached to her United States of America passport, with that of Notarte, in effect falsifying a genuine public or official document. The trial court adjudged petitioner Bala in Criminal Case No. 24443, guilty of the crime of falsification of a public document. The petitioner seasonably appealed, but the Court of Appeals, on April 9, 1980, affirmed in toto the lower court's decision. After the case had been remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment, the petitioner applied for and was granted probation by the respondent judge in his order dated August 11, 1982. The petitioner was then placed under probation for a period of one (1) year, subject to the terms and conditions enumerated therein. - The probationer (petitioner) asked his supervising probation officer for permission to transfer his residence from BF Homes to Phil-Am Life Subdivision in Las Pias specifically 33 Jingco Street. The probation officer verbally granted the probationer's request as he found nothing objectionable to it. - By the terms of the petitioner's probation, it should have expired on August 10, 1983, one year after the order granting the same was issued. But, the order of final discharge could not be issued because the respondent probation officer had not yet submitted his final report on the conduct of his charge. Subsequently, the respondent People of the Philippines, through Assistant City Fiscal Jose D. Cajucom of Manila, filed a motion to revoke the probation of the petitioner before Branch XX of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, presided over by the respondent judge. The motion alleged that the petitioner had violated the terms and conditions of his probation. - On January 4, 1984, the petitioner filed his opposition to the motion on the ground that he was no longer under probation, his probation period having terminated on August 10, 1983, as previously adverted to. As such, no valid reason existed to revoke the same, he contended. As if to confirm the Manila Assistant City Fiscal's motion to revoke the petitioner's probation, the respondent probation officer filed on January 6, 1984, a motion to
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applied for probation in the then CFI of Manila, he was a resident of Las Pias as he is up to now, although in a different subdivision. As pointed out earlier, he merely moved from BF Homes to Philam Life Subdivision 33 Jingco Street, also in Las Pias. On the other hand, pursuing the petitioner's argument on this score to the limits of it logic would mean that his probation was null and void in the place, because then the Manila CFI was without jurisdiction to grant him probation as he was a resident of Las Pias. It is therefore incorrect to assume that the petitioner's change of abode compels change of venue, and necessarily, control over the petitioner, to the Executive Judge of the RTC of his new residence. Thus, in the apportionment of the regional trial courts under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Las Pias is one among the municipalities included in the National Capital Judicial Region (Metro Manila) with a seat at Makati. 18 Needless to say, the Regional Trial Court in Makati, like the Manila Regional Trial Court, forms part of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region. 19 Accordingly, the various branches of the regional trial courts of Makati or Manila under the National Capital Region, are coordinate and co-equal courts, the totality of which is only one Regional Trial Court. Jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges. In other words, the case does not attach to the branch or judge. Therefore, in this case, RTC Branch XX of Manila, which granted the probation, has not lost control and supervision over the probation of the petitioner. Dispositive Petition dismissed
terminate Manuel Bala's probation, at the same time attaching his progress report on supervision dated January 5, 1984. The same motion, however, became the subject of a "Manifestation," dated January 10, 1984, which stated that the probation officer was not pursuing the motion to terminate dated January 6, 1984; instead, he was submitting a supplemental report which recommended the revocation of probation "in the light of new facts, information, and evidences." - Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and/or strike out the motion to revoke probation, questioning the jurisdiction of the court over his case inasmuch as his probation period had already expired. Moreover, his change of residence automatically transferred the venue of the case from the RTC of Manila to the Executive. Judge, of the RTC of Makati which latter court include under its jurisdiction the Municipality of Las Pias the probationer's place of residence, invoking Section 13, P.D. No. 968, which provides Sec. 13. Control and Supervision of Probationer. ... Whenever a probationer is permitted to reside in a place under the jurisdiction of another court, control over him shall be transferred to the Executive Judge of the, Court of First Instance of that place, and in such a case a copy of the probation order the investigation report and other pertinent records shall be furnished to said Executive Judge. Thereafter. the Executive Judge to whom jurisdiction over the probationer is transferred shall have the power with respect to him that was previously possessed by the court which granted the probation. - The respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. ISSUE WON his transfer of residence automatically transferred jurisdiction over his probation from the Manila Regional Trial Court to the same court in his new address. HELD NO - In criminal cases, venue is an element of jurisdiction. Such being the case, the Manila RTC would not be deprived of its jurisdiction over the probation case. To uphold the petitioner's contention would mean a depreciation of the Manila court's power to grant probation in the first place. It is to be remembered that when the petitioner-accused
PEOPLE v SOLA 103 SCRA 393 FERNANDO; March 17, 1981

FACTS - September 15, 1980: acting on the evidence presented by the Philippine Constabulary commander at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental, the CFI issued a search warrant for the search and seizure of the deceased bodies of 7 persons believed in the hacienda of Pablo Sola at Sta. Isabel, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental. - September 16, 1980: elements of the 332nd PC/INP Company proceeded to the place of Sola. Diggings made in a canefield yielded two common graves containing the 7 bodies.

- September 23 and October 1, 1980: the PC provincial commander filed 7 separate complaints for murder against the accused Pablo Sola, Francisco Garcia, Ricardo Garcia, Jose Bethoven Cabral, Florendo Baliscao and 14 other persons of unknown names. - After due preliminary examination of the complainant's witnesses and his other evidence, the municipal court found probable cause against the accused. It thus issued an order for their arrest. - Without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail for their temporary release. Sola, Garcia and Cabral posted bail and have since been released. -The witnesses informed the prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at the CFI Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least two of the accused are officials with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have been released on bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large. Indeed, there have been reports made to police authorities of threats made on the families of the witnesses. - February 11, 1981: petition for cancellation of bail bonds and change of venue was filed. - February 12, 1981: the Court required the comment of the Solicitor General as well as of the private respondents. - March 4, 1981, the Comment was submitted by Solicitor General Mendoza. It opened with this preliminary statement: "The present petition was filed by the private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 1700-1706, People v. Pablo Sola, et al., pending trial before the CFI of Negros Occidental. Rightly, any petition before this Honorable Court on behalf of the People of the Philippines can, under the law, be instituted only by the Solicitor General. The assertion of the petitioner private prosecutors that they are instituting the action 'subject to the control and supervision of the Fiscal' will not, therefore, improve their legal standing." Nonetheless, it adopted the two-pronged trusts of the petition: 1. the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in the criminal cases mentioned above, and 2. the petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of justice. - March 15, 1981: The Court Resolved to: (a) [Note] the comment of the Solicitor General on the urgent petition for change of venue and cancellation of bail
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incriminating proof. But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true." - It does not suffice that the questions asked by the municipal judge before bail was granted could be characterized as searching. That fact did not cure an infirmity of a jurisdictional character. On change of venue - 1973 Constitution: The Supreme Court could order "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice." - People v. Gutierrez: To compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been established." It may be added that there may be cases where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some individuals, be less than terrifying, but the question must always be the effect it has on the witnesses who will testify. The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of venue. As a matter of fact, there need not be a petition of this character filed before this Court. Such a plea could have been done administratively. In this particular case, however, there is justification for the procedure followed in view of the fact that along with the change of venue, the cancellation of the bail bonds was also sought. Dispositive The assailed order of Judge Gasataya granting bail to private respondents is nullified, set aside, and declared to be without force and effect. Exec. Judge Alfonso Baguio of the CFI of Negros Occidental, to whose sala the cases had been transferred is directed forthwith to hear the petitions for bail of private respondents, with the prosecution being duly heard on the question of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the respondents is strong. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
bonds, adopting the plea of the petition, namely, (1) the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in the 7 Criminal Cases, and (2) the petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of Justice; (b) [Transfer] the venue of the aforesaid criminal cases to Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City, presided by Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio, considering that District Judge Ostervaldo Emilia of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental, Branch VI at Himamaylan has an approved leave of absence covering the period from January 12 to March 12, 1981 due to a mild attack of cerebral thrombosis and that the said Branch V is the nearest court station to Himamaylan: and (c) [Await] the comment of respondents on the petition to cancel bail, without prejudice to the public officials concerned taking the necessary measures to assure the safety of the witnesses of the prosecution." Thus, the issue of a change of venue has become moot and academic. ISSUE WON the bail bonds should be cancelled HELD YES Ratio Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground. (People v San Diego) Reasoning - Bail was granted to the accused without hearing the prosecution -Justice Cardozo: "The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of
PEOPLE v FELICIANO GOROSPE and RUFINO BULANADI 129 SCRA 233 ABAD SANTOS; May 15, 1984
FACTS - In a verified Complaint filed on October 8, 1974 with the Municipal Court of Pulilan, Bulacan, Anastacia de

Jesus (14 yrs old) accused Gerardo Fajardo, Rufino Bulanadi and Feliciano Gorospe of the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape. - The crime was said to have been committed on September 30, 1974, starting in Plaridel, Bulacan, thru Pulilan, and thence to Talavera, Nueva Ecija (in a hut where she was detained for 9 days and sexually abused during the night. She was made to lose her consciousness first by waiving a hankerchief on her face before they abducted her and eventually taking her to said place.) - Municipal Judge Alfredo V. Granados of the Municipal Court of Pulilan received the complaint and conducted a preliminary investigation, first stage. - October 25, 1974: the Complaint was amended. - Rufino Bulanadi and Feliciano Gorospe were again named but Gerardo Fajardo was dropped and Oscar Alvaran was named instead. -The date when the crime was said to have been committed was changed from September 30, 1974 to September 25, 1974. - Again Judge Granados conducted a preliminary investigation and on November 18, 1974, he issued an order for the arrest of Bulanadi, Gorospe and Alvaran and fixed their bail at P15,000.00 each. -Bulanadi and Gorospe posted the requisite bail. Alvaran remained at large. -The second stage of the preliminary investigation was set on February 5, 1975, but on that day, neither Bulanadi or Gorospe appeared for which reason, Judge Granados declared that they had waived their right thereto and elevated the case to the CFI of Bulacan. - March 19, 1975: Provincial Fiscal Pascual C. Kliatchko filed with the CFI of Bulacan an Information for forcible Abduction with Rape against Gorospe and Bulanadi. But said information was later on amended. -Judge Nelly L. Romero Valdellon started the trial of the case on October 15, 1975. -The accused and their counsel de parte had long been notified that the case was to be tried on that day but they did not appear so the former were tried in absentia. -After hearing part of the testimony of Anastacia de Jesus, the complainant, Judge Valdellon was transferred to Metro Manila and she was replaced by Judge Fidel P. Purisima who finished the trial. -But Judge Purisima inhibited himself from deciding the case because J. Granados is his first cousin by affinity (to make sure that the decision to be rendered in this case shall be above suspicion) -So it was Judge Jesus R. de Vega who decided the case
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71 Phil 216 LAUREL; January 13, 1941
NATURE Certiorari and mandamus FACTS - Hashim was caught in possession of counterfeit treasury certificates, but was released upon filing of bond. Complaint was filed with Office of City Fiscal and after investigation of fiscal, information was lodged. Case was docketed and Judge issued arrest warrant. Petitioners counsel filed motion asking fiscal to furnish clerk of court w/ testimony of witnesses who testified at preliminary investigation. Fiscal opposed. - Counsel for petitioner put in motion that should his first motion be acted upon adversely, that Court itself conduct the investigation under Sec 4 of Rule 108. Fiscal opposed. - Petitioners counsel asked that warrant of arrest be cancelled and the court conduct preliminary investigation. Judge denied motions and the MFRs. Hence the instant certiorari and mandamus petition. ISSUE WON in prelim investigation by fiscal, accused is entitled to be informed of substance of testimony and evidence against him HELD NO - Prelim investigation by fiscal is not within purview of Sections 13 and 11 of Rule 108. Sec 13 deals with transmission of records requirements and Sec 11 deals with prelim investigation by justices of peace and judges for purpose of issuance of warrant. - Sec 2, Act No 612: In cases triable only in CFI, defendant shall have speedy trial, but shall not be entitled as of right to a prelim investigation where prosecuting attorney, after investigation, shall have presented an information against him. - THE RIGHT TO A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS STATUTORY, NOT CONSTITUTIONAL. Its purpose is to secure the innocent against hasty prosecutions and protect him from public accusation, and also to protect the State from useless prosecutions. This investigation is called preliminary, to be followed by trial proper. Investigating judge or prosecuting officer acts upon probable cause and reasonable belief, not upon proof beyond reasonable doubt. - In this case, to ask for abstract of testimony at that
CFI: found Gorospe and Bulanadi guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape committed against Anastacia de Jesus as charged in the information; sentenced each of the accused to suffer 2 perpetual penalties of reclusion perpetua to be served in accordance with Art. 70 of the RPC, with all the accessory penalty of the law; to indemnify de Jesus in the amount of P40,000.00 for actual exemplary and moral damages, and to pay the costs. ISSUES 1. WON there was error in filing the complaint since it was not filed in Plaridel, Bulacan or Talavera, Nueva Ecija but in Pulilan, Bulacan (and if yes, then WON an error was by the CFI of Bulacan in hearing the said case and not by the CFI of Nueva Ecija) 2. WON Judge Vega had authority to hear the case (***there are other issues but no longer related to the topic venue so I didnt include them anymore ~ eoc) HELD 1. NO - The Municipal Court of Pulilan had jurisdiction because the abductors and their captive passed Pulilan on their way from Plaridel to Talavera. And the CFI of Bulacan [as well as the CFI of Nueva Ecija] had jurisdiction because essential elements of the offense took place in Bulacan [and also in Nueva Ecija]. Reasoning Abduction is a persistent and continuing offense. (U.S. vs. Bernabe, 23 Phil. 154 [1912]). - Hence it may be "tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place." (Rules of Court, Rule 110, Sec. 14[a]). 2. YES. - Judge de Vega had the power to decide the case. Reasoning "Where a court of first instance is divided into several branches, each of the branches is not a court distinct and separate from the others. Jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges, so that when a complaint or information is filed before one branch or judge, jurisdiction does not attach to said branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the others. Trial may be had or proceedings may continue by and before another branch or judge." [Lumpay, et al. vs. Moscoso, 105 Phil. 968 (1959)]. Dispositive The judgment of the Court a quo is hereby affirmed in all respects.
HASHIM v CITY FISCAL OF MANILA

stage for no other purpose than to scrutinize the same is, in effect, to ask for another prelim investigation.
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proceed with the trial of the case properly within its jurisdiction. Reasoning - The offenses charged against petitioners for Trespass to Dwelling, Grave Threats and Physical Injuries were all within the jurisdiction of the City Court. The complaints could be filed directly with the City Court which is empowered to conduct a preliminary examination for purposes of issuance of warrants of arrest, and thereafter to proceed with the trial of the cases on the merits. The preliminary investigation proper conducted by the City Fiscal could have been dispensed with. Neither did the earlier order of dismissal of the complaints by the investigating fiscal bar the filing of said complaints with the city court on the ground of double jeopardy. - The prescriptive period of a crime depends upon the penalty imposed by law. The penalties for the crimes charged are: arresto mayor for Trespass to Dwelling, Grave Threats and Less Serious Physical Injuries; and arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period for Serious Physical Injuries. The prescriptive period of offenses punishable by arresto mayor is 5 years, while crimes punishable by correctional penalties prescribe in 10 years. The complaints were filed with the City Court only 9 months from said occurrence. - The re-investigation sought by petitioners applies only to instances where a case is cognizable by the Court of First Instance but filed with the City Court for purposes of preliminary investigation only and thereafter dismissed by the latter on the ground that no prima facie case exists. However, for cases cognizable by inferior courts and filed with the same not only for purposes of preliminary investigation but for trial on the merits, the Office of the City Fiscal has no authority to re-investigate. On Preliminary Investigation: - Purpose: to protect the accused from the inconvenience, expense and burden of defending himself in a formal trial unless the reasonable probability of his guilt shall have been first ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a competent officer; and to protect the state from having to conduct useless and expensive trials. - Stages: (1) the preliminary examination of the complainant and his witnesses prior to the arrest of the accused to determine whether or not there is ground to issue a warrant of arrest; (2) preliminary investigation proper, wherein the accused, after his arrest, is informed of the complaint filed against him and is given access to the testimonies and evidence presented, and he is also permitted to introduce
TANDOC v RESULTAN 175 SCRA 37 PADILLA; July 5, 1989

NATURE Petition for certiorari to annul orders of the City Court of San Carlos FACTS - October 19, 1980: Respondents entered the store and dining room of the Pacita Tandoc without her permission. There was an altercation between Tandoc and respondent, Arnold Payopay, regarding the stoning of the store and house. Payopay picked up stones and struck Tandoc but instead her helper, Bonifacio Menor, was hit and suffered physical injuries which according to the medico-legal certificate will heal in more than 30 days. Beda Acosta, who was behind Arnold Payopay, picked up the stone and struck Tandoc but her helper, Fred de la Vega, was hit instead and suffered injuries which injury will heal in less than 9 days. - 19 October 1980: a criminal complaint was lodged with the Office of the City Fiscal with the charges of Serious Physical Injuries, filed by Bonifacio Menor against Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay; Slight Physical Injuries, filed by Fred de la Vega against Beda Acosta, and Trespass to Dwelling, filed by Pacita Tandoc against Arnulfo Payopay, Beda Acosta, Manuel Cancino, Nadong Fernandez and Arturo Syloria. - 2 December 1980: Arnulfo Payopay and his father Conrado Payopay, Sr., together with Manuel Cancino, also filed a complaint with the Office of the City Fiscal, against Pedro Tandoc, Pacita Tandoc, Rudy Diaz, Fred Menor, Rogelio Ercella, Juan Rosario and Fred de la Vega, with the charges of Trespass to Dwelling, Serious Oral Defamation, Grave Threats and Physical Injuries - 10 December 1980: the investigating fiscal found reasonable ground to believe that respondents Arnulfo Payopay, Beda Acosta, Manuel Cancino, Nadong Fernandez and Arturo Syloria committed the crimes charged. Informations were filed with the City Court. - With respect to the criminal complaint filed by Arnulfo Payopay and Manuel Cancino against petitioners for Serious Oral Defamation, Grave
Threats and Physical Injuries, the Office of the City Fiscal recommended the dropping of said charges because they "were found to be in the nature of a counter charge, the same having been filed after more than 1 month from the date of the alleged incident." However, as to the charge of Trespass to Dwelling filed by Conrado Payopay, Sr. against Pedro Tandoc, a prima facie case was found by the investigating fiscal. Thus, an information was filed with the City Court. - 28 July 1981: Arnulfo Payopay, Conrado Payopay, Sr. and Manuel Cancino, directly lodged with the City Court of San Carlos City the following criminal complaints: (1) against Pedro Tandoc, Rogelio Ercella, Rudy Diaz, Juan Rosario and Fred Menor for Serious Physical Injuries, filed by Arnulfo (Arnold) Payopay; (2) against Rudy Diaz, Juan Rosario and Fred Menor for Trespass to Dwelling, filed by Conrado Payopay, Sr.; (3) against Pedro Tandoc, Rudy Diaz, Juan Rosario and Fred dela Vega for Less Serious Physical Injuries, filed by Manuel Cancino; (4) against Pedro Tandoc, Rudy Diaz, Rogelio Ercella, Juan Rosario & Fred Menor for Grave Threats to Kill, with Arnulfo Payopay as private complainant. - 13 August 1981: City Court, after conducting a preliminary examination of the 4 aforementioned cases, found reasonable ground to believe that the offenses charged may have been committed by the herein petitioners and that the latter were probably guilty thereof. - The issuance of warrants of arrest was ordered against them, although said warrants were later suspended upon motion of the petitioners. - A motion for reconsideration was denied. - Petitioners moved for a re-investigation of the cases by the Office of the City Fiscal. The court a quo denied said motion. Petitioners sought a reconsideration of said order, but it was likewise denied. ISSUE WON the city court has the power and authority to conduct a new a preliminary examination of charges, which were previously the subject of a preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the City Fiscal and thereafter dismissed by the latter. HELD YES Ratio As long as the offense charged has not prescribed, the city court has the power and authority to conduct a preliminary examination and

evidence in his favor. The purpose of this stage of investigation is to determine whether or not the accused should be released or held before trial. - Nature: merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information; not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy. - Under Section 10, Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of an inferior court, as well as in cases within the concurrent jurisdiction of the city courts or municipal courts with Courts of First Instance, the accused was not entitled to be heard in a preliminary investigation proper. The reason behind this rule is as follows: " The loss of time entailed in the conduct of preliminary investigations, with the consequent extension of deprivation of the accused's liberty, in case he fails to post bail, which at times outlasts the period of the penalty provided by law for the offense, besides the mental anguish suffered in protracted litigations, are eliminated with the assurance of a speedy and expeditious trial for the accused, upon his arraignment (without having to undergo the second stage of the preliminary investigation), and of a prompt verdict on his guilt or innocence. On the other hand, the so-called first stage of preliminary investigation or the preliminary examination, conducted by the duly authorized officer, as borne out by the examination and sworn written statement of the complainants and their witnesses, generally suffices to establish the existence of reasonable ground to charge the accused with having committed the offense complained of." - The result of a preliminary investigation can neither constitute nor give rise to the defense of double jeopardy in any case, because such preliminary investigation is not and does not in itself constitute a trial or even any part thereof. In order that the defense of jeopardy may lie, there must be a former judgment, either of acquittal or of conviction, rendered by a court competent to render the same, not only by reason of the offense committed, which must be the same or at least comprised within it, but also by reason of the place where it was committed. Dispositive Petition dismissed.
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remanding him for trial based upon a preliminary trial held in accordance with the provisions of law HELD YES. Ratio The right of an accused not to be brought to trial except when remanded as the result of a preliminary examination before a committing magistrate or, within the city of Manila, not to be brought to trial except in pursuance of like proceeding or the proceeding substituted by law, is a substantial one. Its denial, over the objection of the accused is prejudicial error, in that it subjects the accused to the loss of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Reasoning The accused was brought to trial, over his objection without having been committed or remanded for trial by an investigating magistrate. The justice of the peace who held the preliminary investigation dismissed the original complaint against the accused, being of opinion that there was no probable cause to believe him guilty of the offense; and although a so-called report of the proceedings was forwarded to the fiscal and doubtless submitted to the trial judge, original jurisdiction to commit the accused for trial as result of those proceedings was vested exclusively in the justice of the peace before whom they were had. - The order of the justice of the peace discharging the accused did not operate as a final acquittal, and was not a bar to re-arrest and prosecution for the offense originally charged. If the fiscal was not satisfied with the action of the justice of the peace, he could have secured the arrest of the accused upon a new complaint, and sought an order remanding the accused for trial in a second preliminary investigation had before either the justice of the peace who held the first investigation or before the judge of the CFI in the exercise of his functions as a committing magistrate. (Act 1627, Sec. 37) - But it would manifestly defeat the end sought to be attained by the provisions of law for the holding of preliminary investigations if either the fiscal, or the trial judge, or both acting together were permitted to make use of the record of the proceedings had before a justice of the peace at a preliminary trial, as a result of which the accused was discharged, for the purpose of bringing the accused to trial despite the order of discharge and over his objection based on the ground that he has not been remanded for trial as a result of a preliminary trial. Dispositive Judgment convicting and sentencing the
UNITED STATES v MARFORI 35 Phil 666 CARSON; December 9, 1916

FACTS - CASIANO MARFORI was convicted of the crime of injurias graves (aggravated slander), and sentenced to six months and one day of destierro (banishment) for a distance of 25 kilometers from the municipality where the crime was committed, to pay a fine of P65, together with subsidiary destierro as prescribed by law on failure to pay this fine and to pay the costs. The complaint charges him of having spoken of the complainant in a manner which reflected adversely upon her virtue and good name in the presence of several witnesses. - The complaint was originally filed in the court of a justice of the peace who held a preliminary investigation and discharged the accused on the ground that he was not guilty of the crime with which he was charged. - A report of the proceedings was forwarded to the provincial fiscal by the justice of the peace. The complaining witness renewed the complaint in the CFI. An information was filed in that court and Marfori was brought to trial without further proceedings. - Upon arraignment, when Marfori was called upon to plead, his counsel declined to proceed on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction to bring Marfori to trial, no order remanding him for trial having been issued by a competent magistrate as a result of a preliminary trial (old term for PI, I think) held in accordance with law. - The trial judge overruled the objections of counsel, and ordered the parties to proceed with the trial on the ground that the report of the proceedings had at the preliminary trial held by the justice of the peace disclosed a reasonable probability that the crime charged had been committed and that the accused had committed it; that the justice of the peace had erred in discharging the accused; and that he should have remanded the accused for trial. - Marforis counsel then exempted to the ruling and insisted on the right to a preliminary trial. Marfori refused to enter a plea so that the court was compelled to direct the entry of a plea of not guilty in his behalf. ISSUE WON the trial court erred in bringing the accused to trial, over his objection, in the absence of an order

accused REVERSED with the costs of both instances de officio and the record REMANDED to the court below for further proceedings.
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that they had conducted a preliminary investigation in the case The two accused pleaded not guilty. Criminal Case No. 3128.-- Prudencio Cichon, Jesus F Atilano and Pedro Cuento were charged with Estafa thru falsification of public/official documents. No certification that a preliminary investigation of the case had been made by the prosecutors. So District Judge himself made the preliminary investigation and once satisfied that a prima facie case against the three accused existed, issued warrants for their arrest on the same day. At the arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty. - On June 22, 1966, the accused in the four (4) cases, thru their counsel, filed a MOTION TO DECLARE INFORMATIONS AND WARRANTS OF ARREST null and void on the ground that the prosecution failed to observe the provisions of Section 13 and 14 of Rule 112 of the New Rules of Court regarding preliminary investigation and prayed the court to cancel the warrants of arrest issued. - On September 27, 1966, the lower court, for lack of merit, denied the aforesaid motion. - Upon a motion for reconsideration filed by the accused, thru counsel, the lower court, on November 2, 1966, reversed its former ruling and ordered the dismissal of all the four (4) cases against them, without prejudice to the refiling of the same. ISSUE WON the trial court erred in dismissing these cases on the ground that the preliminary investigations conducted therein were not in accordance with Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 112, in relation to Rule 144 of the Revised Rules of Court. HELD YES Ratio The preliminary investigations in these four (4) cases were terminated in 1962, or before the New Rules of Court took effect on January 1, 1964. Rules 112 and 113 thereof cannot, therefore, apply to these cases at bar. Reasoning The government prosecutors certified under oath that they had conducted a preliminary investigation in said cases. And, in Criminal Case No. 3128, it was District Judge Gregorio Montejo who conducted the preliminary investigation and, finding the existence of a prima facie case, ordered the arrest of the defendant. It is clear, therefore, that the required investigations were complied with.
PEOPLE v OVILLA 65 Phil 722 VILLA-REAL; June 27, 1938

NATURE This is an appeal by the offended party, Petra Flores, from the order of the Court of First Instance of Laguna. FACTS - ORDER OF CFI:"The provincial fiscal having filed a motion in the above entitled case praying for the dismissal of the case, and the court having found meritorious the reasons alleged therein, add case is hereby dismissed, as prayed, with costs de oficio, and the bond filed for the temporary release of the accused is hereby ordered cancelled. It is so ordered." ISSUE WON the provincial fiscal has authority to conduct another preliminary investigation and thereafter ask the Court of First Instance to dismiss the criminal case remanded by the justice of the peace, after the latter had conducted the preliminary investigation and issued an order to the effect that there was probable cause to prosecute the offense charged which falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance." HELD After a criminal case has been remanded by the justice of the peace to the Court of First Instance which has jurisdiction to try it on the merits, and before the provincial fiscal has filed the necessary information, the latter not only has the power but also the duty to investigate the facts upon which the complaint filed in the justice of the peace court was based, to examine the evidence submitted to the justice of the peace and such other evidence as the parties may deem proper to submit on their own free will or on demand of the fiscal, for the purpose of determining whether there is at least prima facie evidence establishing the guilt of the accused and overcoming the presumption of innocence in his favor. If after he has done all this and considering all the circumstances of the case, the fiscal believes that the evidence is not
sufficient to establish prima facie the guilt of the accused, he should submit to the court before which the case is pending the corresponding motion for dismissal. The provincial fiscal of Laguna complied with all these requirements before asking for the dismissal of the present case, thereby keeping within the powers conferred upon him by section 1687 of the Revised Administrative Code. Dispositive Finding no merit in the sole error assigned by the appellant, the offended party in this case, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed,' with costs against the appellant.
4.
PEOPLE v VELOSO PEOPLE v GOMEZ 117 SCRA 72 RELOVA; September 30, 1982
FACTS - In 1962, four (4) informations were filed by the prosecuting fiscals before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City. They were as follows:
1.
Criminal Case No. 3083.-- Edilberto Gomez, Prudencio N. Cichon, Cesar V. Castillo, Pedro Cuento and John Doe charged with Estafa thru falsification of public/official documents. The prosecuting officers certified under oath that they had conducted a preliminary investigation of the case in accordance with law; and that they believed that the offense charged had been committed and the accused were probably guilty thereof. The corresponding warrant of arrest for each of the accused was accordingly issued. The accused Pedro Cuento and Cesar Castillo pleaded not guilty. Criminal Case No. 3084.-- Estafa thru falsification of public/official documents against Lorenzo Delantar, Prudencio Cichon, Jesus F. Atilano and two other unidentified persons, Richard Doe and John Doe. The prosecution also certified under oath that they conducted a preliminary investigation of the case Upon arraignment, Jesus Atilano, Prudencio Cichon and Lorenzo Delantar pleaded not guilty. Criminal Case No. 3088.-- Estafa thru falsification of public/official documents was filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City against Prudencio Cichon and Paulino Duma, Also has certification of the State Prosecutors
2.
3.

- But then, assuming that the informations did not contain the requisite certificates regarding the Fiscal's having held a preliminary investigation, the omissions are not necessarily fatal. The absence of preliminary investigations does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. If there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court, "instead of dismissing the information, should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted." (People vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478). The defendants in these cases did not question the validity of the informations on the ground of defective certifications or the right to preliminary investigations before they entered the plea of not guilty. They filed the motion to declare informations and warrants of arrest null and void only after more than one (1) year thereafter. Consequently, when they entered a plea of not guilty, they thereby waived all objections that are grounds for a motion to quash, except lack of jurisdiction or failure of the information to charge an offense. Thus, they waived the right to a preliminary investigation when they failed to invoke it prior to, or at least at, the time of the entry of their plea in the Court of First Instance. Dispositive ACCORDINGLY, the order dated November 2, 1966 of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga is set aside and the said court is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of the said criminal cases.
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"Warrant of arrest, when issued. - If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer that the offense complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest." -the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's certification and require the submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause. Without the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other evidence which, as a matter of longstanding practice had been attached to the informations filed in his sala, respondent found the informations inadequate bases for the determination of probable cause -Also, Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases, is applicable to some of the crimes in the said informations. This rule requires that the complaint or information must be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and of his witnesses in such number of copies as there are defendants plus two (2) copies for the court's files -judge also did not commit grave abuse of discretion in remanding some of the cases to the City Fiscal for further investigation. From the informations and affidavits presented to him, he found the charges patently without basis or merit. For respondent to issue the warrants of arrest and try the accused would only expose the latter to unnecessary harrassment, anxiety and expense. And as already pointed out, under the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases, the respondent judge has the power to order the outright dismissal of the charge if, from the information and the affidavits attached thereto, he finds the same to be patently without basis or merit
-respondent judge set a hearing to determine the propriety of issuing warrants of arrest. After hearing, judge issued orders requiring petitioners to submit to the court the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence in support of the informations to aid him in the exercise of his power of judicial review of the findings of probable cause by petitioners -petitioners filed two separate motions for reconsideration stating that they were authorized to determine the existence of probable cause ni a preliminary investigation and that their findings constitute sufficient basis for the issuance of warrants of arrest. -respondent justifies his order as an exercise of his judicial power to review the fiscal's findings of probable cause. He further maintains that the failure of petitioners to file the required affidavits destroys the presumption of regularity in the performance of petitioners' official duties, particularly in the light of the long standing practice of the Office of the City Fiscal of Butuan of attaching to the informations filed with the court the affidavits of prosecution witnesses and other documentary evidence presented during the preliminary investigation -judge denied motion. And asked the submission of documents earlier asked for. *eventually, petitioners submitted the documents rendering the case mute (haha) and academic. But the Court decided to tackle the issue nonetheless. Some warrants were granted, some were remanded to ISSUE WON the respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest, compel the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other documentary evidence presented during the preliminary investigation HELD NO. -The primary requirement for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of probable cause (Sec. 3, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution). P.D. No. 911 authorizes the fiscal or state prosecutor to determine the existence of probable cause. - There is thus no dispute that the judge may rely upon the fiscal's certification of the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But this does not bind the judge to issue a warrant - Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court::
PLACER v VILLANUEVA 126 SCRA 463 ESCOLIN; December 29, 1983

FACTS -petitioners the City Fiscal of Butuan City and his assistants filed in the City Court of Butuan certain informations and certified them as follows: that a preliminary examination has been conducted by me in this case, having examined the complainant and his witnesses; that on the basis of the sworn statements and other evidence submitted before this Office, there is reasonable ground to believe that the crime charged has been committed and that herein accused is probably guilty thereof.
GO v CA (PELAYO) 206 SCRA 138 FELICIANO; February 11, 1992

NATURE Petition for review on certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS

- July 2, 1991 Eldon Maguan entered a one-way street (Wilson St.) from the opposite direction (counterflow), heading towards P. Guevarra St. In so doing, he nearly collided with the car of accused Rolito Go. Go got out of his car and shot Maguan. - A security guard of a nearby bake shop witnessed the event and was able to note the plate number of the petitioner. The car was eventually traced to an Elisa Ang Go, wife of the accused. - The police were informed that the petitioner had a meal at the bake shop where his credit card was used to pay for the transaction. Police were able to identify the card owner as the accused Go and when his picture was shown to the security guard who positively identified him as the supposed assailant. Police then launched a manhunt for Go. - July 8, 1991 Go presented himself in the San Juan police station with his two lawyers in tow to verify reports that he was being hunted down by the police. 1. The police detained Go and a COMPLAINT for FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE was filed against him. 2. Asst. Prov. Prosecutor Villa Ignacio informed Go, in the presence of his lawyers, of his right to avail of preliminary investigation but in so doing, Go had to waive the provisions in Art. 125, RPC. Go refused. - July 9, 1991 Maguan died as a result of his gunshot wounds before an INFORMATION could be filed. - July 11, 1991: 3. The prosecutor filed an INFORMATION for murder, instead of an information for frustrated homicide. The prosecutor stated that no preliminary investigation was conducted because Go refused to waive provisions of Art. 125, RPC. 4. Gos counsel filed an OMNIBUS MOTION FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE AND PROPER PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION with the allegations that an illegal warrantless arrest had been effected and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted and prayed that Go be released on bail. - July 12, 1991: 5. Go filed an urgent EX-PARTE MOTION FOR SPECIAL RAFFLE in order to expedite action on the bail recommendation. The cash bond was approved and Go was released from jail. - July 16, 1991: 6. Prosecutor filed a MOTION FOR LEAVE TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION and prayed that the court proceedings be suspended momentarily.
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for carrying out a preliminary investigation. Go was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any conditions. ISSUES 1. WON the warrantless arrest was lawful 2. WON the accused Go had waived his right to preliminary investigation HELD 1. NO, the warrantless arrest was not lawful Ratio Rule 112, Sec. 7 states that a complaint for information can be filed sans preliminary investigation when a person has been lawfully arrested without a warrant except than an affidavit should be executed by the person who was responsible for the arrest. But the person arrested can ask for preliminary investigation by the proper officer before the complaint or information can be filed. In this case, the person arrested must waive the provisions of A125, RPC with the assistance of counsel (a lawyer or another person of his choice if a lawyer is not available). He may also apply for bail despite the waiver and the investigation must terminate within 15 days. Reasoning - Umil vs. Ramos only applies to continuing crimes so it does not apply in the case at bar. Murder is not a continuing crime because it happens in one place at a particular point in time and ends there as well. - The warrantless arrest does not follow the requisites in Rule 113, Sec. 5 because: >The arrest took place 6 days after Maguan was shot whereas the RoC provide that the crime should have been just committed, is about to be committed or is being committed. >None of the arresting officers had personal knowledge of the facts indicating that Go was the gunman as required in the RoC. The information that the police had was derived from eyewitness accounts. - When Go walked into the police station 6 days after Maguan was shot, he did not surrender (so as not to imply that he committed the crime) nor was he arrested but he placed himself in the disposal of the police authorities. 2. NO, Go had not waived his right to preliminary investigation. Ratio The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment.
7. The trial court granted LEAVE to conduct preliminary investigation and cancelled the arraignment scheduled on August 15, 1991. - July 19, 1991: 8. Go contended through a PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS that the information was null and void because no preliminary investigation had been conducted. - July 23, 1991 Go surrendered to the police and the judge set the arraignment on August 23. - August 23, 1991: 9. Respondent judge issued a commitment order for Go. Upon arraignment, a plea of not guilty was entered because Go refused to enter a plea. 10. Go filed a PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS and the CA issued the writ. The petition for habeas corpus was consolidated with the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. - September 19, 1991 The trial started and the prosecution presented its first witness. This was followed by three more witnesses on October 3, 1991. - September 23, 1991 The CA dismissed the petition for habeas corpus and the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus on the following grounds, among others: a) Validity of the warrantless arrest because the crime had been freshly committed. He was positively identified by the witness and his identity had been established when he came to the police station. b) Waiver of the right to preliminary investigation when he did not invoke it properly and waiver of any irregularity in his arrest when accused posted bail. c) Validity of the information against the accused precluded the grant of the petition for habeas corpus Petitioners Claim: Go contends that the crime had not been just committed because of the 6-day disparity. - None of the police officers who arrested him had any personal knowledge of the crime. Respondents Comments: Go had been validly arrested because the crime had been committed 6 days before he was arrested. - Invoking Umali vs. Ramos where the Court upheld that a warrantless arrest was valid 14 days after the crime was committed. - The prosecutor proceeded under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition

Reasoning - The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. - The nature of the crime demanded that a preliminary investigation be conducted. Go did ask for a preliminary investigation from the start. On the day the information for murder was filed, he also filed an OMNIBUS MOTION for IMMEDIATE RELEASE and PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. The Court is not ready to ignore that act by Go and consider it as a waiver based simply on the contention of the SolGen that the motion should have been filed with the trial court and not the prosecutor. - According to Crespo vs. Mogul: The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. - However, in the case at bar, Gos omnibus motion asked for a PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION not REINVESTIGATION as discussed in Crespo vs. Mogul. The Prosecutor also filed a MOTION for LEAVE TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION so the omnibus motion of Go was, in effect, filed in the trial court. Go did ask for a preliminary investigation on the very day that the information was filed without such preliminary investigation, and that the trial court was 5 days later apprised of the desire of the petitioner for such preliminary investigation. - There was no waiver of the right to preliminary investigation because Go had vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment. At the time of his arraignment, petitioner was already before the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and mandamus precisely asking for a preliminary investigation before being forced to stand trial. - Gos act of posting bail cannot be deemed to be a waiver of his right to preliminary investigation. Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the
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- There was no waiver of the right to preliminary investigation even if Go freely participated in his trial and his counsel even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. - Go had from the start demanded a preliminary investigation and that his counsel had reluctantly participated in the trial only because the court threatened to replace him with a counsel de oficio if he did not. The petitioner was virtually compelled to go to trial. Such compulsion and the unjustified denial of a clear statutory right of the petitioner vitiated the proceedings as violative of procedural due process. - It appears that the trial court has been moved by a desire to cater to public opinion to the detriment of the impartial administration of justice. The petitioner as portrayed by the media is not exactly a popular person. Nevertheless, the trial court should not have been influenced by this irrelevant consideration, remembering instead that its only guide was the mandate of the law.
cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release. Obiter - However, contrary to petitioner's contention, the failure to accord preliminary investigation, while constituting a denial of the appropriate and full measure of the statutory process of criminal justice, did not impair the validity of the information for murder nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. - In the case at bar, a trial for merits had already commenced and the prosecution had already presented 4 witnesses. > This, however, still entitles the accused to preliminary investigation. Trial on the merits should be suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary investigation should accorded to petitioner, even if eventually, the prosecutor may or may not find probable cause. The point is that Go was not accorded his proper rights. > As for bail, Go is still entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right. Should the evidence against the accused be strong, the bail can then be cancelled. > To hold that the rights of Go were obliterated by the presentation of evidence in the proceedings in the trial court would be to legitimize the deprivation of due process. Dispositive ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Order of the trial court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 September 1991 hereby REVERSED. - The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary investigation of the charge of murder against petitioner Go, and to complete such preliminary investigation within a period of fifteen (15) days from commencement thereof. The trial on the merits of the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court shall be SUSPENDED to await the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. - Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a cash bail bond of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). This release shall be without prejudice to issue, should the any lawful order that the trial court Office of the Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of all at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.
GUTIERREZ [concurring]
- The need for a trial court to follow the Rules and to be fair, impartial, and persistent in getting the true facts of a case is present in all cases but it is particularly important if the accused is indigent; more so, if he is one of those unfortunates who seem to spend more time behind bars than outside.
GRIO-AQUINO [dissenting]
- After 4 witnesses have already testified, among them an eyewitness who identified the accused as the gunman and a security guard who identified the plate number of the gunman's car, there is no need to conduct a preliminary investigation the sole purpose of which would be to ascertain if there is sufficient ground to believe that a crime was committed (which the petitioner does not dispute) and that he (the petitioner) is probably guilty thereof (which the prosecutor, by filing the information against him, presumably believed to be so). - This case did not suffer from a lack of previous investigation. Diligent police work, with ample media coverage, led to the identification of the suspect who, 7 days after the shooting, appeared at the San Juan police station to verify news reports that he was the object of a police manhunt. There witnesses identified him to be the assailant. - It should be remembered that as important as is the right of the accused to a preliminary investigation, it is not a constitutional right. Its absence is not a ground to quash the information. It does not affect
SEPARATE OPINION CRUZ [concurring]

the court's jurisdiction, nor impair the validity of the information, nor constitute an infringement of the right of the accused to confront witnesses. - The petitioner's motion for a preliminary investigation is not more important than his application for release on bail, just as the conduct of such preliminary investigation is not more important than the hearing of the application for bail. The court's hearing of the application for bail should not be subordinated to the preliminary investigation of the charge. The hearing should not be suspended, but should be allowed to proceed because the parties will have an opportunity to show not only: (a) whether or not there is probable cause to believe that the petitioner killed Eldon Maguan, but more importantly (b) whether or not the evidence of his guilt is strong. The judge's determination that the evidence of his guilt is strong would naturally foreclose the need for a preliminary investigation to ascertain the probability of his guilt. - Go was indeed arrested by the police. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest
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case should be remanded to the office of the Ombudsman for him or the Special Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation. 2. NO - Since the petitioner is an incumbent public official charged in a valid information with an offense punishable under the Constitution and the laws, the laws command that he shall be suspended from office pendent lite must be obeyed. His approved leave of absence should not be a bar to his preventive suspension for, as indicated by the Solicitor General, and approved leave, whether it be for a fixed of indefinite period may be cancelled or shortened at will by the incumbent. However, since the preventive suspension has exceeded the reasonable maximum period of ninety days provided in Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, it should now be lifted. Dispositive Petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted.
the Tanodbayan to file the information without the approval of the Ombudsman after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. - June 30, 1988, the SC annulled the information - Upon the annulment of the information against the petitioner, the Special Prosecutor sought clearance from the Ombudsman to refile it - The Ombudsman granted clearance but advised that some changes be made in the information previously filed - A new information was filed in the Sandiganbayan - Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information for being invalid because there had been no preliminary investigation and defective because the facts alleged do not constitute the offense charged. - The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash - The Special Prosecutor filed a motion to suspend accused pendente lite. Over the objection of the accused the Sandiganbayan ordered his suspension pendente lite from his position as PCGG Commissioner and from any other office he may be holding. ISSUES 1. WON the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to quash the information 2. WON the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in suspending the petitioner from office despite the Presidents having previously approved his indefinite leave of absence until final decision in the case HELD 1. YES - A new preliminary investigation of the charge against the petitioner is in order not only because the first was a nullity but also because the accused demands it as his right. Moreover, the charge against him had been changed as directed by the Ombudsman. The petitioners right to a preliminary investigation of the new charge is secured to him by Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. That right of the accused is substantial and its denial over his opposition is a prejudicial error in that it subjects the accused to loss of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Since the right belongs to the accused, he alone may waive it. If he demands it, the State may not withhold it. However, as the absence of a preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash the complaint or information, the proceedings upon such information in the Sandiganbayan should be held in abeyance and the
ALLADO v DIOKNO ROBERTS v CA REPUBLIC v CA CASTILLO v VILLALUZ BALGOS v SANDIGANBAYAN [SUPRA, PAGE ] RODIL v GARCIA 104 SCRA 362 FERNANDO; May 13, 1981
NATURE Writ of Certiorari FACTS -Counsel for Reynaldo Rodil who was charged with murder, asks to recall witnesses for the prosecution to enable such counsel to cross-examine them, on, to quote his words, "clarificatory and amplificatory matters" which was denied by Municipal Judge Segundo M. Garcia of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque. -What is prayed for is not only that such order denying counsel's request to recall government witnesses be set aside and nullified, but also that bail be granted petitioner, a petition to that effect having
DOROMAL v SANDIGANBAYAN (OMBUDSMAN and SPECIAL PROSECUTOR) 177 SCRA 1989 GRINO-AQUINO; September 7, 1989
NATURE Petition for Certiorari FACTS - October 1987, the Special Prosecution Officer conducted a preliminary investigation of the charge against petitioner, Quintin Doromal, a former commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in connection with his shareholdings and position as president and director of the Doromal International Trading Corporation which submitted bids to supply equipment to the DECS and the National Manpower and Youth Council. - January 25, 1988, Special Prosecution Officer filed in the Sandiganbayan an information against petitioner. - The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the SC questioning the jurisdiction of

been denied with a subsequent motion for reconsideration still undecided. -Respondents were required to comment and the Court likewise issued a temporary restraining order. Such a comment was submitted on behalf of respondents by the Solicitor General seeking the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the right to cross-examine in a preliminary investigation is not a right granted an accused and that the exercise of discretion by respondent Judge considering the evidence of record sufficed to justify denial of the application for bail. -An examination of the record, as well as the pertinent doctrines, makes evident that the jurisdictional issue posed arises from the failure to accord petitioner a hearing on his application for bail. -A resolution of that question in the sense of respondent Judge affording petitioner his day in court is equally decisive of the other issue, whether or not counsel for petitioner could recall witnesses for the prosecution for the purpose of asking clarificatory questions. That he could very well do when they testify to prove evidence of guilt is strong. Under the present state of the law, it cannot be said that the right to cross-examine is guaranteed an accused at the stage of preliminary investigation. ISSUE WON counsel for petitioner could recall witnesses for the prosecution for the purpose of asking clarificatory questions (that he could very well do when they testify to prove evidence of guilt is strong) HELD YES. Counsel could recall the witnesses. - The Judge issued the denial for bail on the basis of the motion of petitioner that he be granted such right and the opposition filed by the First Assistant Provincial Fiscal without conducting any hearing on such motion. Clearly, he acted on the mistaken belief that the presentation of evidence by the prosecution for the purpose of the issuance of the warrant of arrest, the preliminary examination proper, suffices for the denial of the plea for bail. In the latest case on the subject, People v. Sola, decided on March 17, 1981, this Court relying on People v. San Diego, nullified an order of a municipal judge named respondent in that case as he granted bail to the accused without hearing the prosecution. The
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granted the request and thus avoided the necessity of a petition of this character having to be filed. The interest of a more speedy and a more efficient administration of justice would be best served if there is a greater awareness on the part of judges that in addition to safeguarding the express rights of an accused person, a matter mandated by the Constitution or the Rules of Court, they should likewise exercise their discretion in such a way that the purpose of a preliminary investigation, the avoidance of groundless or vindictive prosecutions, could be attained in as fair and objective manner as possible. Dispositive WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted. The order of respondent Judge denying bail is set aside. He, or whoever is now the Municipal Judge of Santa Cruz, Marinduque, must set forthwith the hearing on the application for bail of petitioner, to be conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and this opinion. No costs.
present case is much stronger; it is the accused himself, the explicit beneficiary of the constitutional right, who was not heard. - There was misapprehension on the part of respondent Judge of the import of the ruling in Ocampo v. Bernabe citing that The regular trial is, to a limited extent at least, anticipated. While the guilt or innocence of the accused is not to be determined, the quantity and character of the proofs on this point are, for the special purpose in hand, necessarily considered. Occasionally much time is thus consumed, and the court's attention is correspondingly diverted from other business. But these objections cannot avail against a positive constitutional command; if the Constitution requires the court to determine for itself whether or not the proof is evident or presumption great in a given case, all considerations of expediency or convenience, however potent they might be at the common law, must give way.'" This is so because the procedure to be followed in the hearing on an application for bail, while summary in character, is not to be a mere sham or pretense. It must not be an exercise in futility. The accused is not to be denied his day in court. - While it could be said that that the refusal of the Justice of the Peace to allow the defense to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses presented prior to petitioner's arrest, cannot be utilized as argument for the contention that the prosecution should not have been allowed to cross-examine the defense witnesses and that an accused is not entitled to crossexamine the witnesses presented against him in the preliminary investigation before his arrest, this being a matter that depends on the sound discretion of the Judge or investigating officer concerned (People v. Ramilo, \Dequito v. Arellano, Bustos v. Lucero) it could still be argued that the judge is not a ministerial officer reduced to recording what takes place and what witnesses say in the examination. Above all, his is the great responsibility of safeguarding the accused from groundless or vindictive prosecution. If the justice of the peace is to ascertain, as he must, whether a crime has been committed and, if so, whether there is probable cause that the accused committed it, his authority cannot be confined as in a straight jacket to the stiffness of medieval and outmoded technicalities of practice. It thus appears clearly that in the exercise of his discretion respondent Judge could have
PANGANDAMAN v CASAR 159 SCRA 599 NARVASA; April 14, 1988

FACTS - On July 27, 1985, a shooting incident occurred in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del Sur, which left at least five persons dead and two others wounded. What in fact transpired is still unclear. According to one version, armed men had attacked a residence in Pantao, Masiu, with both attackers and defenders suffering casualties. Another version has it that a group that was on its way to another place, Lalabuan, also in Masiu, had been ambushed - The next day, a lawyer (Atty. Batuampar) of one of the widows filed a letter-complaint with the fiscal, asking for a full blast preliminary investigation. The letter adverted to the possibility of innocent persons being implicated by the parties involved on both sides none of whom was, however, identified and promised that supporting affidavits would shortly be filed. Immediately the Provincial Fiscal addressed a "1st indorsement" to the respondent Judge, transmitting Atty. Batuampar's letter and requesting that "all cases that may be filed relative .. (to the incident) that happened in the afternoon of July 27, 1985," be forwarded to his office, which "has first taken cognizance of said cases.

- On August 10, 1985, a criminal complaint for multiple murder was filed. On the same day, respondent Judge examined personally the 3 witnesses. Thereafter, the Judge approved the complaint and issued a warrant of arrest against the 14 petitioners (who were named by the witnesses) and 50 "John Does. - On Aug 14, 1985, an ex-parte motion was filed by Atty. Batuampar seeking recall of the warrant of arrest and subsequent holding of a "thorough investigation" on the ground that the Judge's initial investigation had been "hasty and manifestly haphazard" with "no searching questions" having been propounded. The respondent Judge denied the motion for "lack of basis;" hence the present petition. ISSUE WON the respondent Judge had the power to issue the warrant of arrest without completing the entire prescribed procedure for preliminary investigation HELD YES. - What the Rule provides is that no complaint or information for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court may be filed without completing that procedure. Sec. 6 of Rule 112 clearly authorizes the MTC to issue a warrant even before opening the second phase. - This was equally true under the former rules, where the first phase of the investigation was expressly denominated "preliminary examination" to distinguish it from the second phase, or preliminary investigation proper - Sec 3 of rule 112 consists of 2 phases: - The first phase consists of an ex-parte inquiry into the sufficiency of the complaint and the affidavits and other documents offered in support thereof. And it ends with the determination by the Judge either: (1) that there is no ground to continue with the inquiry, in which case he dismisses the complaint and transmits the order of dismissal, together with the records of the case, to the provincial fiscal; or (2) that the complaint and the supporting documents show sufficient cause to continue with the inquiry and this ushers in the second phase. - This second phase is designed to give the respondent notice of the complaint, access to the complainant's evidence and an opportunity to submit counter-affidavits and supporting documents. At this stage also, the Judge may conduct a hearing and propound to the parties and their witnesses questions on matters that, in his view, need to be
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- March 17, 1989: at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport (Masbate, Masbate), Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante, another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. - For the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator, Harry O. Tantiado, TSg (Legaspi) filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing, among others, Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate, Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident. - July 31, 1989: after the preliminary investigation court released an order stating after that a probable cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused in the amended complaint. - August 29, 1989: records of the case were transmitted to Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate. Respondent Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane was designated to review the case. On September 22, 1989, Fiscal Alfane issued a Resolution which affirmed the finding of a prima facie case against the petitioners but differed in the designation of the crime (he said it should be MURDER for each case, with serious physical injuries). Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate informations of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no bail. - Respondents Lims filed a verified petition for a change of venue. Court granted the petition. The case was raffled to Judge Nemesio Felix. - Lims then prayed for the following: 1. An order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its personal determination of the existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as its determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally convinced of such probable cause.
clarified. The second phase concludes with the Judge rendering his resolution, either for dismissal of the complaint or holding the respondent for trial, which shall be transmitted, together with the record, to the provincial fiscal for appropriate action. - The argument, therefore, must be rejected that the respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant of arrest against petitioners without first completing the preliminary investigation in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The rule is and has always been that such issuance need only await a finding of probable cause, not the completion of the entire procedure of preliminary investigation - Also without appreciable merit is petitioners' other argument that there was scarcely time to determine probable cause against sixty-four persons (the fourteen petitioners and fifty "Does") within a matter of hours on a Saturday when municipal trial courts are open only from 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. Nothing in the record before this Court belies or discredits those affirmations which have, besides, the benefit of the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. - Insofar, however, as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) "John Does" not one of whom the witnesses to the complaint could or would Identify, it is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional and once anathematized as "totally subversive of the liberty of the subject." Clearly violative of the constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized, the warrant must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be voided. Dispositive Warrants against petitioners upheld; warrants against John Does denied
SAMUL DE v SALVANI TANDOC v RESULTAN [SUPRA, PAGE ] LIM vFELIX 194 SCRA 292 GUTIERREZ; February 19, 1991
NATURE Review for certiorari. FACTS

2. Movants be given ample opportunity to file their motion for preliminary investigation as a matter of right; - In another manifestation, the Lims reiterated that the court conduct a hearing to determine if there really exists a prima facie case against them in the light of documents which are recantations of some witnesses in the preliminary investigation. The respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit. ISSUE WON a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists. HELD NO Ratio A Judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him, he issues a warrant of arrest. Reasoning - Respondent Judge committed a grave error when he relied solely on the Prosecutor's certification and issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 without having before him any other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause. If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion. - The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification - Art. III, Sec. 2. (Constitution)
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or go over the records of the Prosecutor's investigation page by page and word for word before he acts on each of a big pile of applications for arrest warrants on his desk, he or she may have no more time for his or her more important judicial functions. Dispositive Petition is granted.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. - What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In doing so, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedures, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. - Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examinations and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. - The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper - whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial - is the function of the Prosecutor. - The power to make a preliminary examination for the purpose of determining whether probable cause exists to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest (or search warrant) has been and remains vested in every judge by the provisions in the Bill of Rights in the 1935, the 1973 and the present [1987] Constitutions securing the people against unreasonable searches and seizures, thereby placing it beyond the competence of mere Court Rule or Statute to revoke. - The problem lies with warrants of arrest especially in metropolitan or highly urban areas. If a Judge has to personally question each complainant and witness
STONEHILL v DIOKNO 20 SCRA 383 CONCEPCION; June 19, 1967

NATURE Original action in the SC. Certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, injunction. -Petitioners: Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck; accused in certain deportation cases -Respondents-prosecutors: DOJ Sec Jose W. Diokno, NBI Acting Director Jose Lukban, Special Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal, Jr. and Manila City Asst. Fiscal Maneses G. Reyes -Repondents-judges: Judge Amado Roan of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Judge Roman Cansino of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Judge Hermogenes Caluag of CFI Rizal Quezon City Branch, Judge Eulogio Mencias of CFI Rizal, Pasig Branch, and Judge Damian Jimenez of the Municipal (now City) Court of Quezon City. FACTS -Upon application of the respondents-prosecutors, respondents-judges issued a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners and/or the corporations of which they were officers, directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers) as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense" of "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code." Petitioners claim that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court; that the

searches and seizures made in pursuance thereof are illegal; and that evidences obtained therein are consequently inadmissible. Respondents/prosecutors comments (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures. Procedure: -March 22, 1962: SC issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. -June 29, 1962: the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners. NOTE: The ponencia splits the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question into two (2) major groups: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners. ISSUES 1. As regards the first group, WON petitioners have a cause of action 2. As regards the second group, WON the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid (and, WON said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners) HELD 1. NONE. -The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. -Petitioners may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 2. NO.
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by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. If he has no such evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause. Foreign references cited to support this contention 1. Judge Learned Hand: Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed. 2. Weeks v US (1914): The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land. 3. Mapp v Ohio (1961): all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a State court. *Without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. *The exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure is the most important constitutional privilege. *The purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter -- to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way -- by removing the incentive to disregard it." *We can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise, to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice. Obiter -In their MFR, petitioners further alleged possession of and control over the records, papers and effects
-1935 Constitution (Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3) provides (a) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (b) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. -Search warrants, issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed offenses as abstract as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code" do not satisfy the constitutional requirements because no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. It was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, which presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions in violation of a given penal provision. -General search warrants are outlawed because they place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. -To prevent the issuance of general search warrants, SC amended Sec. 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court by providing in the Revised Rules of Court that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense." -Search warrants authorizing the seizure of books of accounts and records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal contravene the explicit command of the Bill of Rights that the things to be seized should be particularly described and defeat its major objective of eliminating general warrants. -SC resolved to adopt the doctrine in Mapp v Ohio (1961) and to finally abandon the 1948 ruling in Moncado vs. People's Court, 80 Phil. 1.
(*The latter case (citing Wigmore) held that illegally seized evidence is admissible, as long as it is relevant, but without prejudice to the criminal liability of the peace officers who made the seizure, for violation of domicile or under any other provision of the Penal Code. Justices Perfecto, Bengzon, Briones & Paras dissented from the majority opinion. ~marge~*)
-The exclusionary rule is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. -The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. If there is competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime

found in the offices of the corporation, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof. -SC disposed of them by saying that this new theory was advanced, not in their petition or amended petition, but in the MR. At any rate, it is best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future. Dispositive Writs granted in part and denied in part; MR denied.
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LUNA v PLAZA 26 SCRA 310 ZALDIVAR; November 29, 1968
FACTS - A criminal action was commenced by T-Sgt. Candido Patosa, PC investigator against Simon Luna, by filing with respondent Municipal Judge Lorenzo M. Plaza, of the Municipal Court of Tandag, charging the petitioner, with the crime of murder.
- Supporting the complaint were sworn statements of the witnesses for the prosecution, in the form of questions and answers taken by T-Sgt. Patosa, and subscribed and sworn to before the respondent Judge at the time of the filing of the complaint.
SEPARATE OPINION CASTRO [concurring and dissenting]

-Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated that they have legal standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects seized in the places other than the three residences adverted to above, the opinion written by the Chief Justice refrains from expressly declaring as null and void the such warrants served at such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures made therein, and leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future." -It is with this position that Justice Castro is not in accord. -He says that All the search warrants, without exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful. -He argues that assuming that the petitioners have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers, things and effects seized from places other than their residences, this cannot in any manner affect, alter or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the said warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain illegal. -He insists that, upon the pleadings submitted to SC, the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of the documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other than their family residences. -Since our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in the many years of judicial construction and interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as doctrinal the
pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals. -The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be summarized as follows: (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b) ownership and/or control or possession actual or constructive -- of premises searched gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved person," gives "standing." -An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all were directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally, followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. The three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the "office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same as those declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in all the other search warrants. -Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under their personal control. -SC, at all events, should order the return to the petitioners all personal and private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from their residences or corporate offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other places were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the petitioners. -If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the objects of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be: (a) personal or private papers of the petitioners, and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations.
- The respondent Judge examined the prosecution witnesses by reading to them "all over again the questions and answers" in their statements in writing, and the witnesses-affiants declared before said Judge that the questions were propounded by TSgt. Candido Patosa, and that the answers were made by them. - The affiants signed their respective affidavits in the presence of the respondent Judge, who also signed after the usual procedure of administering the oath. - Considering the answers of the affiants to the, questions contained in their sworn statements, together with the postmortem and autopsy report on the dead body of the victim Jaime Diaz Ng, the certificate of death, the sketch showing the position of the victim and the accused, the respondent Judge opine that there was reasonable ground to believe that the crime of murder had been committed and the amused was probably guilty thereof. - Respondent Judge issued the order and warrant of arrest, specifying therein that no bail should be accepted for the provisional release of the accused. - Upon motion of petitioner upon the ground that the evidence of guilt was not strong, respondent Judge issued an order, granting bail,; which order, however, respondent Judge later revoked, and petitioner was denied bail. - The case was subsequently remanded to the CFI of Surigao del Sur, after petitioner filed a waiver of his right to preliminary investigation. - Respondent Provincial Fiscal filed an information charging petitioner with the crime of murder. The petitioner was detained in the provincial jail. - Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the CFI of Surigao del Sur, claiming that he was being deprived of liberty without due process of law, on the ground that the imprisonment and detention

was the result of a warrant of arrest issued by respondent Judge in violation of Republic Act No. 3828, and praying for the annulment of the order for his arrest and his discharge from confinement. - Respondents filed their answer, alleging that Republic Act Nor. 3828 had been substantially complied with; that a motion to quash, and not a petition for habeas corpus was the proper remedy, and that petitioner's application for bail constituted a waiver of the right to question the validity of the arrest. - The CFI of Surigao del Sur ruled that respondent Municipal Judge had substantially complied with Republic Act No. 3828, and consequently denied the application for the writ of habeas corpus, and dismissed the case. - Hence the appeal. Petitioners Claim Republic Act No. 3828 imposes on a municipal judge, before he can issue a warrant of arrest, two specific duties, to wit: (1) personally examine the complainant and witnesses with "searching questions and answers," which means that the judge must cross-examine them in case their affidavits are presented; and (2) said examination must be reduced to writing and form part of the records of the case. The record of the instant case, does not show that said examination was performed by respondent Judge notwithstanding his testimony to the effect that he adopted the questions propounded to each of the prosecution witnesses by T-Sgt. Patosa. And assuming that the adoption of the questions made by T-Sgt. Patosa constituted substantial compliance with the requirement that the judge should examine the witnesses by asking searching questions, still the second requirement, that of reducing to writing the said procedure of adoption, has not been compiled with; and so, Republic Act No. 3828 was still violated, and the issuance of the warrant of arrest was in violation of said Act and the Constitution and constituted denial of due process. ISSUES 1. WON the trial court erred in giving absolute credence to the testimony of respondent Municipal Judge. 2. WON the requirements of Republic Act No. 3828 was satisfied. 3. WON the issuance of the warrant of arrest was a violation of the Constitution and of procedural due process. 4. WON the trial court erred in denying the writ of habeas corpus.
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his age, education, status, financial and social circumstances, his attitude toward the investigation, social attitudes, opportunities to commit the offense; the victim, his age, status, family responsibilities, financial and social circumstances, characteristics, etc. The points that are the subject of inquiry may differ from case to case. - The questions, therefore, must to a great degree depend upon the Judge making the investigation. At any rate, the court a quo found that respondent Judge was "satisfied that the questions and answers contained in the sworn statements taken by T-Sgt. Patosa partake of the nature of his searching questions and answers as required by law," so the respondent Judge adopted them. 3. NO - The Constitution, in Section 1 (3), Article III, provides that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. - The constitutional requirement of examination of witnesses under oath was, as shown above, fulfilled. The existence of probable cause depended to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. Respondent Judge found that there was a probable cause, as stated in his order of arrest. - Preliminary examination is not an essential part of due process of law. Preliminary examination may be conducted by the municipal judge, prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest, either in the presence, or in the absence, of the accused. - The record shows that herein petitioner waived the preliminary investigation before respondent Municipal Judge, and instead, he riled a petition for bail. This conduct of petitioner indicates that he had waived his objection to whatever defect, if any, in the preliminary examination conducted by respondent Judge prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest. 4. NO - Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides in part, as follows: "Sec. 4 When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge ... and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process ... or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed ... " - All the conditions, in the afore-quoted Section 4, set forth to deny the writ, are present in the instant case.
HELD 1. NO - As a general rule, the lower court's findings, as to the credibility of witnesses will not be interfered with by appellate courts. Since petitioner appealed directly to this Court he must, raise only questions of law and he has thereby waived the right to raise any question of fact, and the findings of facts of the trial court, under the rules and precedents, must be deemed final and binding upon this Court. 2. YES. - As provided in Republic Act No. 3828 Before a municipal judge may issue a warrant of arrest, the following conditions must first be fulfilled: (1) he must examine the witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; (3) the examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers. - The first condition was fulfilled. The trial court found as a fact that "the respondent judge personally examined the witnesses for the prosecution; that respondent judge adopted as his own personal examination the questions asked by T-Sgt. Patosa as appearing in the written statements, which he read over again to the witnesses together with the answers given therein, asking the witnesses whether said answers were theirs, and whether the same answers were true, to which the witnesses answered in the affirmative. Republic Act No. 3828 does not prohibit the municipal Judge from adopting the questions asked by a previous investigator. - The second condition was also fulfilled. The trial court found that the complaint was "supported by statements of the witnesses under oath." The record also shows there were documents to have been subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge. - The third condition was likewise fulfilled. The examination of the witnesses was written down, in the form of searching questions and answers. The term searching questions and answers" means only, taking into consideration the purpose of the preliminary examination which is to determine "whether there is a reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial," such questions as have tendency to show the commission of a crime and the perpetrator thereof. What would be searching questions would depend on what is sought to be inquired into, such as: the nature of the offense, the date, time, and place of its commission, the possible motives for its commission; the subject,

- Petitioner is detained and is in the custody of the respondent Provincial Warden by virtue of the order of arrest and the order of respondent Judge, to confine petitioner in the provincial jail. It is not disputed by petitioner that respondent Judge had jurisdiction to issue the warrant of arrest and the order of commitment under the provisions of Section 47, Republic Act No. 409, as amended by Republic Act No. 1201, although petitioner did question the validity of the warrant of arrest for allegedly having been issued in violation of Republic Act No. 3828 which was found to be untenable. - The remedy available to the petitioner herein, under the circumstances stated in this opinion, is not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus but a petition to quash the warrant of arrest or a petition for a reinvestigation of the case by the respondent Municipal Judge or by the Provincial Fiscal. - The Court stressed that what has been stated in the opinion was not intended to sanction the return to the former practice of municipal judges of simply relying upon affidavits or sworn statements that are made to accompany the complaints that are filed before them, in determining whether there is a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. - That practice is precisely what is sought to be voided by the amendment of Section 87 (c) of Republic Act 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948) which requires that before a municipal judge issues a warrant of arrest he should first satisfy himself that there is a probable cause by examining the witnesses personally, and that the examination must be under oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers. - It is obvious that the purpose of this amendment is to prevent the issuance of a warrant of arrest against a person based simply upon affidavits of witnesses who made, and swore to, their statements before a person or persons other than the judge before whom the criminal complaint is filed. Dispositive The decision of the trial court appealed from, was affirmed. Costs against petitionerappellant.
a2010
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Criminal Procedure Rowena Daroy Morales

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Criminal Procedure Rowena Daroy Morales

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Criminal Procedure Rowena Daroy Morales

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Criminal Procedure Rowena Daroy Morales

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Criminal Procedure Rowena Daroy Morales

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Criminal Procedure Rowena Daroy Morales

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