You are on page 1of 97

Network Security (Part 2)

Professional Certification NetworkSims PIX/ASA Configuration


Interfaces. Fixup. Static Routes. Access-lists. Failover. VPN.

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Prof Bill Buchanan, Leader, Centre for Distributed Computing and Security http://www.dcs.napier.ac.uk/~bill Room: C.63

Academic Element On-line test: 40% MCQ Test Coursework: Agent-based IDS Web-CT submission: 40% Web-CT submission .NET Security On-line test: 20% Network Security On-line test: 20%

On-line test
Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

W 2 3

Date 9 Feb 16 Feb

Academic 1: Security Fundamentals 2: IDS

Assessment

Lab/Tutorial Lab 1: Packet Capture Lab 2: Packet Capture (Filter) Lab 3: Packet Capture (IDS)

4 5 6 7 8 10 11 12 13 14

23 Feb 2 Mar 9 Mar 16 Mar 23 Mar 6 Apr 27 Apr 4 May 11 May 18 May

3: Encryption 4: Authentication (Part 1) MCQ Test 5. Software Security 6. Network Security

Lab 5: IDS Snort 1 Lab 6: IDS Snort 2 Lab 7: Private-key Encryption Lab 8: Public-key Encryption Lab 9: Log/Process/Hashing Lab 10: TCP Forensics Lab 11: Binary Analysis/Sig Det

Security Specialism Security Specialism MCQ Test

Security Specialism Security Specialism

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Network Security (Part 2)


Professional Certification NetworkSims PIX/ASA Configuration
Interfaces. Fixup. Static Routes. Access-lists. Failover. VPN.

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Bob

Alice

CIA
Applications (Integrated Security) Services (Integrated Security)

AAA

Application Communications (TCP, IP, and so on)

Network Infrastructure (Firewalls, Proxies, and so on)


Author: Bill Buchanan

Eve

Eve

Integration between the levels often causes the most problems


Author: Prof Bill Buchanan Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

CIA and AAAfirewall Stateful PIX/ASA

Firewall Switch Internet

Bob

Intrusion Detection System

Alice

Router Firewall Switch

Web server Email server FTP server Proxy server

Intrusion Detection System

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Example Infrastructure Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Switch

Firewall (Packet filter) Internet

Bob

Intrusion Detection System

Alice

Router (NAT)

Firewall (Statefull)

Web server Email server FTP server Proxy server

DMZ

Intrusion Detection System

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Example Infrastructure Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Cisco Switch

Cisco Firewall

Internet

Bob

Intrusion Detection System

Alice

Router (NAT)

Cisco PIX Cisco ASA 5500 Web server Email server FTP server Proxy server

DMZ

Intrusion Detection System

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Example Infrastructure Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Bob
Firewall (Packet filter) Internet

Switch

Application (FTP, Telnet, etc) L4. Transport (TCP) L3. Internet (IP)

Intrusion Detection System

L2. Network (Ethernet)

Physical security requires restricted areas and padlocked equipment


Firewall (Stateful)

Router (NAT)

Restricted areas

Web server Email server

DMZ

Restricted areas

Proxy server

VLAN 1

VLAN 2
Author: Prof Bill Buchanan Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Example Infrastructure Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

FTP server

Bob
Firewall (Packet filter) Internet

Switch

Application (FTP, Telnet, etc) L4. Transport (TCP) L3. Internet (IP)

Intrusion Detection System

L2. Network (Ethernet)

Different VLANs cannot communication directly, and need to go through a router to communicate
Firewall (Stateful)

Router (NAT)

Web server Email server

DMZ

Proxy server

VLAN 1

VLAN 2
Author: Prof Bill Buchanan Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Example Infrastructure Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

FTP server

Bob
Firewall (Packet filter) Internet

Switch

VLAN 1
Intrusion Detection System

Different VLANs cannot communication directly, and need to go through a router to communicate
Firewall (Stateful)

Router (NAT)

802.1q Trunk

Web server Email server

DMZ

Proxy server

VLAN 1

VLAN 2
Author: Prof Bill Buchanan Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Example Infrastructure Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

FTP server

Bob
Firewall (Packet filter) Internet

Switch

Application (FTP, Telnet, etc) L4. Transport (TCP) L3. Internet (IP)

Intrusion Detection System

L2. Network (Ethernet)

Screening Firewalls filter for IP and TCP packet details, such as addresses and TCP ports, for incoming/outgoing traffic

Router (NAT)

Firewall (Stateful)

Web server Email server FTP server

DMZ
Intrusion Detection System Proxy server

Alice

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Example Infrastructure Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Bob
Firewall (Packet filter) Internet

Switch

Application (FTP, Telnet, etc) L4. Transport (TCP) L3. Internet (IP)

Intrusion Detection System

L2. Network (Ethernet)

Stateful Firewalls filter for Application, IP and TCP packet details. They remember previous data packets, and keep track of connections

Router (NAT)

Firewall (Stateful)

Web server Email server FTP server

DMZ
Alice Intrusion Detection System Proxy server
Author: Bill Buchanan

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Example Infrastructure Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Bob
Switch

Firewall (Packet filter) Internet

Application (FTP, Telnet, etc) L4. Transport (TCP) L3. Internet (IP)

Intrusion Detection System

L2. Network (Ethernet)

All Application-layer traffic goes through the Proxy (eg FTP, Telnet, and so on) aka Application Gateways

Router (NAT) Firewall (Stateful)

Web server Email server FTP server

DMZ
Alice Intrusion Detection System Proxy server

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Example Infrastructure Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Professional Cert.
Author: Prof Bill Buchanan Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Routing & Switching

Design

Net Security

Service Provider

Storage Network

Voice

Wireless

CCIE Security

CCSP

CCNA Security

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Cisco Certification Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

CCNA ENT

CCNA

CCNA Security

CCSP

Core

642-504 SNRS Securing Networks with Cisco Routers and Switches

642-524 SNAF Securing Networks with ASA Foundation

642-533 IPS Implementing Cisco Intrusion Prevention System (IPS)

Option (select one)

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Cisco Certification Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

642-591 CANAC Implementing Cisco NAC Appliance

642-545 MARS Implementing Cisco Security Monitoring, Analysis and Response System

642-515 SNAA Securing Networks with ASA Advanced

Network Security

Stateful firewall CCSP Cert.

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall NetworkSims Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Software firewall
Host-based: Zone alarm

Hardware firewall

Cisco router With firewall (non-stateful)

CheckPoint firewall (software)


Runs within: Windows Server, VMWare LINUX

Cisco PIX/ASA (stateful)

LINUX iptables CheckPoint firewall (dedicated) Nokia

Hardware firewall: Optimized engine/architecture Copes better with large trafficBill Buchanan Author: Prof conditions Improved failover
Stateful firewall Firewalls PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Software firewall: Easy to reconfigure Slower Less expensive Can be used with a range of computers/OSs

Firewall rules. These are contained within ACLs (using the access-list and access-group commands), and block or permit traffic. A key feature of this is the usage of URL filtering which defines the Web pages which are allowed and which are not. Port blocking. These use the fixup command to change, enable or disable network services. Cut-through proxy. This allows the definition of the users who are allowed services such as HTTP, Telnet and FTP. This authentication is a single initial authentication, which differs from the normal proxy operation which checks every single packet.
Bob

Intrusion detection. These use the ip audit command to detect intrusions. Shunning. This, along with intrusion detection, allows a defined response to an intrusion.

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Encryption. This allows the PIX firewall to support enhanced encryption, such as being a server for VPN connections, typically with IPSec and tunnelling techniques such as PPTP.

Failover. This allows other devices to detect that a PIX device has crashed, and that another device needs to take its place. Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Network Security Stateful firewall

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Enterprise PIX 525. This has a 600MHz processor with 256MB RAM, and handles a throughput of 360Mbps for a maximum of 280,000 connections. It supports failover, and has the support for up to eight connections.

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Enterprise PIX 535. This has a 1GHz processor with 1GB RAM, and handles a throughput of 1Gbps for a maximum of 500,000 connections. It supports failover, and has the support for up to ten network interfaces.

ASA 5520 Intel Pentium 4, 2GHz 512MB RAM PIX 7.x, ASA 8.x IOS 8 interfaces Integrated VPN SSL VPN Throughput: 450Mbps 3DES: 225Mbps Max conn: 280,000 VPN peers: 750

PIX/ASA Configuration
Author: Prof Bill Buchanan Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Network Security PIX/ASAfirewall Stateful Config

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Network Security PIX/ASAfirewall Stateful Config

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

PIX/ASA firewall (ASDM) Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

PIX/ASA firewall (ASDM) Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

PIX 6.x # config t (config)# hostname freds (config)# domain-name fred.com (config)# ip address outside 192.168.1.1 255.255.255.0 (config)# interface e0 auto

(config)# hostname freds PIX/ASA 7.x/8.x (config)# domain-name fred.com (config)# int e0 (config-if)# ip address 192.168.2.1 255.255.255.0 (config-if)# no shutdown (config-if)# exit

E1 (inside) E0 (outside)

E2 (inf2)
Author: Bill Buchanan

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

PIX/ASA firewall Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

PIX 6.x # config t (config)# hostname freds (config)# domain-name fred.com (config)# ip address outside 192.168.1.1 255.255.255.0 (config)# interface e0 auto

(config)# hostname freds PIX/ASA 7.x/8.x (config)# domain-name fred.com (config)# int e0 (config-if)# ip address 192.168.2.1 255.255.255.0 (config-if)# no shutdown (config-if)# exit

E1 (inside) E0 (outside)

E2 (inf2)
Author: Bill Buchanan

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

PIX/ASA firewall Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

PIX 6.x

PIX/ASA 7.x/8.x

E1 (inside)

E2 (inf2)
Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

PIX/ASA PIX/ASA firewall Stateful firewall

Author: Bill Buchanan

E0 (outside)

PIX 6.x

PIX/ASA 7.x/8.x

E1 (inside)

E2 (inf2)
Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

PIX/ASA Configuring the interfaces Stateful firewall

Author: Bill Buchanan

E0 (outside)

E0 (outside)

E2 (inf2)
Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

PIX/ASA firewall Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

E1 (inside)

E0 (outside)

E1 (inside)

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Setting the default route Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

E2 (inf2)

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

E0 (outside)

E1 (inside)

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Setting the default route Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

E2 (inf2)

Network Security PIX/ASAfirewall Stateful Config

Perimeter gateway

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

10.1.1.254

E0
10.1.1.1 172.10.10.1

192.168.2.1

192.168.2.3

E1 E2

176.10.1.1

Perimeter gateway

172.10.10.2

192.168.2.5

176.10.1.2
Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall Setting routes PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Network Security PIX/ASAfirewall Stateful Config

Perimeter gateway

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

10.1.1.254

E0
10.1.1.1 172.10.10.1

192.168.2.1

192.168.2.3

E1 E2

176.10.1.1

Perimeter gateway

172.10.10.2

192.168.2.5

176.10.1.2
Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall Setting routes PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Network Security PIX/ASAfirewall Stateful Config

Perimeter gateway

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

10.1.1.254

E0
10.1.1.1 172.10.10.1

192.168.2.1

192.168.2.3

E1 E2

176.10.1.1

Perimeter gateway

172.10.10.2

192.168.2.5

176.10.1.2

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall Setting routes PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

(config)# show fixup fixup protocol ftp 21 fixup protocol h323 h225 1720 fixup protocol h323 ras 1718-1719 fixup protocol http 80 fixup protocol ils 389 fixup protocol rsh 514 fixup protocol rtsp 554 fixup protocol sip 5060 fixup protocol sip udp 5060 fixup protocol skinny 2000 fixup protocol smtp 25 fixup protocol sqlnet 1521 (config)# fixup protocol http 161 (config)# fixup protocol ftp 60 (config)# fixup protocol smtp 84

FTP requires a server port on the initiator. SQL*Net requires a negiotation on the connected port.

E2 (inf2)
Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA Fixup

Author: Bill Buchanan

E0 (outside)

E1 (inside)

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Network Security PIX/ASAfirewall Stateful Config

Perimeter gateway

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

10.1.1.254

E0
10.1.1.1 172.10.10.1

192.168.2.1

192.168.2.3

E1 E2

176.10.1.1

Perimeter gateway

172.10.10.2

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA NAT

Author: Bill Buchanan

192.168.2.5

176.10.1.2

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Network Security PIX/ASAfirewall Stateful Config

Perimeter gateway

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

10.1.1.254

E0
10.1.1.1 172.10.10.1

192.168.2.1

192.168.2.3

E1 E2

176.10.1.1

Perimeter gateway

172.10.10.2

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA PAT

Author: Bill Buchanan

192.168.2.5

176.10.1.2

Do not NAT!

10.1.1.254

E0
10.1.1.1 172.10.10.1

192.168.2.1

192.168.2.3

E1 E2

176.10.1.1

Perimeter gateway

172.10.10.2

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA PAT

Author: Bill Buchanan

192.168.2.5

176.10.1.2

Network Security PIX/ASAfirewall Stateful Config

Perimeter gateway

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

10.1.1.254

E0
10.1.1.1 172.10.10.1

192.168.2.1

192.168.2.3

E1 E2

176.10.1.1

Perimeter gateway

172.10.10.2

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Static mappings Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

192.168.2.5

176.10.1.2

10.1.1.254

E0
10.1.1.1 172.10.10.1

192.168.2.1

192.168.2.3

E1 E2

176.10.1.1

Perimeter gateway

172.10.10.2

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Static mappings Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

192.168.2.5

176.10.1.2

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Network Security PIX/ASAfirewall Stateful Config

Perimeter gateway

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

10.1.1.254

E0
10.1.1.1 172.10.10.1

192.168.2.1

192.168.2.3

E1 E2

176.10.1.1

Perimeter gateway

172.10.10.2

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Static mappings Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

192.168.2.5

176.10.1.2

10.1.1.254

E0
10.1.1.1 172.10.10.1

192.168.2.1

192.168.2.3

E1 E2

176.10.1.1

Perimeter gateway

172.10.10.2

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Static mappings Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

192.168.2.5

176.10.1.2

Network Security PIX/ASAfirewall Stateful Config

Perimeter gateway

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

10.1.1.254

E0
10.1.1.1 172.10.10.1

192.168.2.1

192.168.2.3

E1 E2

176.10.1.1

Perimeter gateway

172.10.10.2

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA ACL

Author: Bill Buchanan

192.168.2.5

176.10.1.2

10.1.1.254

E0
10.1.1.1 172.10.10.1

192.168.2.1

192.168.2.3

E1 E2

176.10.1.1

Perimeter gateway

172.10.10.2

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Static mappings Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

192.168.2.5

176.10.1.2

PIX/ASA Failover
Author: Prof Bill Buchanan Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Power supply failures, Primary reboot. Interface problems Memory Overflow.


40 U

UPS 1

5U

1U

1U

UPS 2

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA Failure

Author: Bill Buchanan

E2 (inf2) E0 (outside) E1 (inside)

MAIN
Failover cable

Either Prim (UR)/Sec (UR) Or: Prim (UR)/Sec (FO) Activation key is required!

STANDBY

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA Failover

Author: Bill Buchanan

UR Unrestricted licence (must be used for primary). FO Failover licence (for secondary). R Restricted licence (cannot be used).

Same PIX type Same RAM Same Flash memory. Same type and interfaces. Same software version. Same activation keys for DES or 3DES

E2 (inf2) E0 (outside) E1 (inside)

Hello

Failover cable

Hello

Sent on ALL interfaces, including failover connection.


Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA Failover

Author: Bill Buchanan

Hello messages are sent every 1-15 seconds on every interface. Hello time. (PIX default 15 second, ASA default 1 second) If messages are not received with the holdtime Holdtime (PIX default: 45 seconds 3 times hello time, ASA default: 15 seconds), failover happens. If secondary doesnt work, primary assumes control, and no failover.

Tests: Test 1. NIC status test. Up/down status of interface. Test 2. Network activity. Monitor for 5 seconds. If detected, cancel tests. Test 3. ARP test. Requests last 10 IP addresses in the ARP table. Test 4. Ping test. Broadcast ping of 255.255.255.255. If any replies the test is quit.

Failover cable Or Ethernet (LAN-based)

Standby

outside

e0 e2
inf2

e1

inside

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

On start-up config is automated copied over. All new commands are replicated. The write startby command sends the config to the secondary.

Either Prim (UR) Sec (UR) Or Prim (UR) Sec (FO) Activation key is required!

Failover cable Or Ethernet (LAN-based)

Standby

outside

e0 e2
inf2

e1

inside

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Stateful Restores everything. ARP table, Xlate, Fixup tables, ARP, routing information, IPSec/ISAKMP tables, MAC addresses, Hello messages. Secondary Inherits: IP addresses and MAC addresses of the primary. Primary Inherits: IP addresses and MAC addresses of the secondary. Require an additional Ethernet connection

e3

Stateful connection
e3

Failover cable
Author: Bill Buchanan

outside

e0 e2
inf2

e1

inside

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Non-stateful Only RAM config and session details. Secondary Inherits: IP addresses and MAC addresses of the primary. Primary Inherits: IP addresses and MAC addresses of the secondary. Lost: NAT translations and connections.

Failover cable Or Ethernet (LAN-based)

Standby

outside

e0 e2
inf2

e1

inside

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Standby

e2

Dedicated switch/hub

e2 outside

e0

e1

inside

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Non-stateful Only RAM config and session details. Secondary Inherits: IP addresses and MAC addresses of the primary. Primary Inherits: IP addresses and MAC addresses of the secondary. Lost: NAT translations and connections.

e3

Failover cable
e3
Author: Bill Buchanan

outside

e0 e2
inf2

e1

inside

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

myPIX (config)# failover active myPIX (config)# failover active myPIX (config)# failover ip address outside 157.202.212.2 myPIX (config)# failover ip address outside 157.202.212.2 myPIX (config)# failover ip address inside 73.105.56.11 myPIX (config)# failover ip address inside 73.105.56.11 myPIX (config)# failover ip address inf2 166.209.230.11 myPIX (config)# failover ip address inf2 166.209.230.11 myPIX (config)# failover poll 2 myPIX (config)# failover poll 2 myPIX (config)# show failover myPIX (config)# show failover

e3

Stateful connection
e3

Failover cable
Author: Bill Buchanan

outside

e0 e2
inf2

e1

inside

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

myPIX (config)# ip address outside 157.202.212.1 myPIX (config)# ip address LAN-based Failover outside 157.202.212.1

myPIX (config)# ip address inside 73.105.56.1 myPIX (config)# ip address inside 73.105.56.1 myPIX (config)# ip address inf2 166.209.230.1 myPIX (config)# ip address inf2 166.209.230.1 myPIX (config)# failover active myPIX (config)# failover active myPIX (config)# failover ip address outside 157.202.212.2 myPIX (config)# failover ip address outside 157.202.212.2 myPIX (config)# failover ip address inside 73.105.56.2 myPIX (config)# failover ip address inside 73.105.56.2 myPIX (config)# failover ip address inf2 166.209.230.2 myPIX (config)# failover ip address inf2 166.209.230.2 myPIX (config)# failover lan key mypix myPIX (config)# failover lan key mypix myPIX (config)# failover lan unit primary myPIX (config)# failover lan unit primary myPIX (config)# failover lan interface inf2 myPIX (config)# failover lan interface inf2 myPIX (config)# failover lan enable myPIX (config)# failover lan enable

e2

Stateful connection
e2

outside

e0

e1

inside

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

myPIX (config)# ip address inf2 166.209.230.2 myPIX (config)# ip address inf2 166.209.230.2 myPIX (config)# failover active myPIX (config)# failover active myPIX (config)# failover lan key mypix myPIX (config)# failover lan key mypix myPIX (config)# failover lan unit secondary myPIX (config)# failover lan unit secondary myPIX (config)# failover lan interface inf2 myPIX (config)# failover lan interface inf2 myPIX (config)# failover lan enable myPIX (config)# failover lan enable

LAN-based Failover

e2

Stateful connection
e2

outside

e0

e1

inside

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

VPN
Author: Prof Bill Buchanan Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Eve

Eve could eavesdrop on the public communications Untrusted network


Bob Alice

Gateway

Gateway

What is required is: Encryption. Authentication of devices (to overcome spoofing) Authentication of packets (for integrity)

Eve

Eve could change the data packets


Gateway

Eve

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall Issues involved PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Eve could setup an alternative gateway

Eve

Bob

Alice

Gateway

Gateway

Untrusted network What is required is: Encryption. Authentication of devices (to overcome spoofing) Authentication of packets (for integrity)
PPTP (Point-to-point Tunneling Protocol). Created by Microsoft and is routable. It uses MPPE (Microsoft Point-to-point Encryption) and user authentication. L2TP (Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol). Works at Layer 2 to Forward IP, IPX and AppleTalk (RFC2661). Cisco, Microsoft, Ascent and 3Com developed it. User and machine authentication, but no encryption (but can be used with L2TP over IPSec). IPSec. An open standard. Includes both encryption and Authentication.
Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Tunnellingfirewall Stateful methods PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Traffic is encrypted over the untrusted network.

Bob

Alice

Encrypted traffic Unencrypted traffic Tunelling mode (over untrusted connections) Unencrypted traffic

Bob

Alice

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Tunnelling mode or transport mode Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Transport mode. End-to-end (host-tohost) tunnelling

Bob Co. VPN VPN Alice Co.

Extranet VPN
VPN VPN Bob Co.

Bob Co.

Intranet VPN

VPN Bob Co.

Bob@ home

Remote Access VPN


Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Statefultypes VPN firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Firewall Switch Internet

Bob

Intrusion Detection System

Traffic only encrypted over the public channel


Alice

Traffic is encrypted and cannot be checked by firewalls, IDS, and so on

Router Firewall Switch

Web server Email server FTP server Proxy server

Intrusion Detection System

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Tunnelling mode or transport mode Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Firewall Switch Internet

Bob

Intrusion Detection System

Traffic only encrypted over the public channel


Alice

Firewall blocks all encrypted content and any negation of a tunnel

Router Firewall Switch

For IPSec (one of the most popular tunnelling Web methods): server UDP Port 500 is the port. If it is blocked there can be no tunnel. FTP server TCP Port 50 for IPSec ESP (Encapsulated Security Proxy server Protocol). TCP Port 51 for IPSec AH (Authentication Header)
Email server key exchange

Intrusion Detection System

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Blocking end-to-end encryption Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Authentication scope ESP Auth. ESP trailer IP packet (encrypted) ESP header IP header

The IPSec protocol has: ESP (Encapsulated Security Protocol). ESP takes the original data packet, and breaks off the IP header. The rest of the packet is encrypted, with the original header added at the start, along with a new ESP field at the start, and one at the end. It is important that the IP header is not encrypted as the data packet must still be read by routers as it travels over the Internet. Only the host at the other end of the IPSec tunnel can decrypt the contents of the IPSec data packet. AH (Authentication Header). This encrypts the complete contents of the IP data packet, and adds a new packet header. ESP has the weakness that an intruder can replay previously sent data, whereas AH provides a mechanism of sequence numbers to reduce this problem.

ESP transport mode method (Weakness: Replay attack)

IP packet contents

IP header

Authentication scope AH header New IP header

IP packet contents

AH transport method (Provides complete authentication for the packet) IP packet contents IP header
Author: Bill Buchanan

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA IPSec

IP IP

TCP TCP

Higher-level protocol/data Higher-level protocol/data

Version Version

Header length Header length

Type of service Type of service

Total length Total length Identification Identification 0 D M 0 D M Time-to-Live Time-to-Live Fragment Offset Fragment Offset Protocol Protocol

Header Checksum Header Checksum Source IP Address Source IP Address Destination IP Address Destination IP Address

1 ICMP Internet Control Message [RFC792] 6 TCP Transmission Control [RFC793] 8 EGP Exterior Gateway Protocol [RFC888] 9 IGP any private interior gateway [IANA] 47 GRE General Routing Encapsulation (PPTP) 50 ESP Encap Security Payload [RFC2406] 51 AH Authentication Header [RFC2402] 55 MOBILE IP Mobility 88 EIGRP EIGRP [CISCO] 89 OSPFIGP OSPFIGP [RFC1583] 115 L2TP Layer Two Tunneling Protocol
Author: Bill Buchanan

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA IPSec

VPN Bob Co.


Bob@ home

Remote Access VPN

Phase 1 (IKE Internet Key Exchange)


UDP port 500 is used for IKE Define the policies between the peers

IKE Policies
Hashing algorithm (SHA/MD5) Encryption (DES/3DES) Diffie-Hellman agreements Authentication (pre-share, RSA nonces, RSA sig).

isakmp enable outside isakmp key ABC&FDD address 176.16.0.2 netmask 255.255.255.255 isakmp identity address isakmp policy 5 authen pre-share isakmp policy 5 encrypt des isakmp policy 5 hash sha isakmp policy 5 group 1 isakmp policy 5 lifetime 86400 sysopt connection permit-ipsec

Phase 2
Defines the policies for transform sets, peer IP addresses/hostnames and lifetime settings. Crypto maps are exchanged
AH, ESP (or both) Encryption (DES, 3DES) ESP (tunnel or transport) Authentication (SHA/MD5) SA lifetimes defined Define the traffic of interest
crypto ipsec transform-set MYIPSECFORMAT esp-des esp-sha-hmac crypto map MYIPSEC 10 ipsec-isakmp access-list 111 permit ip 10.0.0.0 255.255.255.0 176.16.0.0 255.255.255.0 crypto map MYIPSEC 10 match address 111 crypto map MYIPSEC 10 set peer 176.16.0.2 crypto map MYIPSEC 10 set transform-set MYIPSECFORMAT crypto map MYIPSEC interface outside

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA IPSec

Author: Bill Buchanan

Public Key (Kpb1)

Public Key (Kpb2)

Shared key passed (DiffieHellman) used to encrypt all the data Kpv1 Public key is used to authenticate the device Hashed value Hashed value

Result

Challenge?
Author: Bill Buchanan

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Blocking end-to-end encryption Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

10.0.0.1

172.16.0.1

172.16.0.2

192.168.0.1

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall IPSec (PIX) PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

10.0.0.1

172.16.0.1

172.16.0.2

192.168.0.1

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

IPSec (PIX and Router) Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

No. Time 81 5.237402

Source 192.168.0.3

Destination 146.176.210.2

Protocol Info ISAKMP Aggressive

Frame 81 (918 bytes on wire, 918 bytes captured) Ethernet II, Src: IntelCor_34:02:f0 (00:15:20:34:62:f0), Dst: Netgear_b0:d6:8c (00:18:4d:b0:d6:8c) Internet Protocol, Src: 192.168.0.3 (192.168.0.3), Dst: 146.176.210.2 (146.176.210.2)

10.0.0.1

172.16.0.1

172.16.0.2

192.168.0.1

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

IPSec (PIX and Router) Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol Initiator cookie: 5ABABE2D49A2D42A Responder cookie: 0000000000000000 Next payload: Security Association (1) Version: 1.0 Exchange type: Aggressive (4) Flags: 0x00 Message ID: 0x00000000 Length: 860 Security Association payload Next payload: Key Exchange (4) Payload length: 556 Domain of interpretation: IPSEC (1) Situation: IDENTITY (1) Proposal payload # 1 Next payload: NONE (0) Payload length: 544 Proposal number: 1 Protocol ID: ISAKMP (1) SPI Size: 0 Proposal transforms: 14 Transform payload # 1 Next payload: Transform (3) Payload length: 40 Transform number: 1 Transform ID: KEY_IKE (1) Encryption-Algorithm (1): AES-CBC (7) Hash-Algorithm (2): SHA (2) Group-Description (4): Alternate 1024-bit MODP group (2) Authentication-Method (3): XAUTHInitPreShared (65001) Life-Type (11): Seconds (1) Life-Duration (12): Duration-Value (2147483) Key-Length (14): Key-Length (256)

VPN Bob Co.


Bob@ home

Remote Access VPN

C:\>route print =========================================================================== Interface List 10 ...00 1d 09 3f 49 8d ...... Broadcom NetLink (TM) Fast Ethernet 7 ...00 1f 3c 4f 30 1d ...... Intel(R) PRO/Wireless 3945ABG Network Connection 1 ........................... Software Loopback Interface 1 =========================================================================== IPv4 Route Table =========================================================================== Active Routes: Network Destination Netmask Gateway Interface Metric 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.3 25 127.0.0.0 255.0.0.0 On-link 127.0.0.1 306 127.0.0.1 255.255.255.255 On-link 127.0.0.1 306 127.255.255.255 255.255.255.255 On-link 127.0.0.1 306 192.168.0.0 255.255.255.0 On-link 192.168.0.3 281 192.168.0.3 255.255.255.255 On-link 192.168.0.3 281 192.168.0.255 255.255.255.255 On-link 192.168.0.3 281 224.0.0.0 240.0.0.0 On-link 127.0.0.1 306 224.0.0.0 240.0.0.0 On-link 192.168.0.3 281 255.255.255.255 255.255.255.255 On-link 127.0.0.1 306 255.255.255.255 255.255.255.255 On-link 192.168.0.3 281 =========================================================================== Persistent Routes: None Author: Prof Bill Buchanan
Before Stateful firewall VPN connecting to the PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

VPN Bob Co.


Bob@ home

Remote Access VPN


C:\>route print =========================================================================== Interface List 21 ...00 05 9a 3c 78 00 ...... Cisco Systems VPN Adapter 10 ...00 1d 09 3f 49 8d ...... Broadcom NetLink (TM) Fast Ethernet 7 ...00 1f 3c 4f 30 1d ...... Intel(R) PRO/Wireless 3945ABG Network Connectio 1 ........................... Software Loopback Interface 1 =========================================================================== IPv4 Route Table =========================================================================== Active Routes: Network Destination Netmask Gateway Interface Metric 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.3 25 127.0.0.0 255.0.0.0 On-link 127.0.0.1 306 127.0.0.1 255.255.255.255 On-link 127.0.0.1 306 127.255.255.255 255.255.255.255 On-link 127.0.0.1 306 146.176.0.0 255.255.0.0 On-link 146.176.212.218 281 146.176.1.0 255.255.255.0 146.176.0.1 146.176.212.218 100 146.176.2.0 255.255.255.0 146.176.0.1 146.176.212.218 100 ... 146.176.210.2 255.255.255.255 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.3 100 146.176.211.0 255.255.255.0 146.176.0.1 146.176.212.218 100 146.176.212.218 255.255.255.255 On-link 146.176.212.218 281 ... 255.255.255.255 255.255.255.255 On-link 127.0.0.1 306 255.255.255.255 255.255.255.255 On-link 192.168.0.3 281 255.255.255.255 255.255.255.255 On-link 146.176.212.218 281 Author: Prof Bill Buchanan =========================================================================== Persist
After connecting to the VPN Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

VPN Bob Co.


Bob@ home

Remote Access VPN 146.176.212.218 192.168.0.3 VPN connection 146.176.0.1

C:\>route print =========================================================================== Interface List 21 ...00 05 9a 3c 78 00 ...... Cisco Systems VPN Adapter 10 ...00 1d 09 3f 49 8d ...... Broadcom NetLink (TM) Fast Ethernet 7 ...00 1f 3c 4f 30 1d ...... Intel(R) PRO/Wireless 3945ABG Network Connectio 1 ........................... Software Loopback Interface 1 =========================================================================== IPv4 Route Table =========================================================================== Active Routes: Network Destination Netmask Gateway Interface Metric 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 192.168.0.1 192.168.0.3 25 127.0.0.0 255.0.0.0 On-link 127.0.0.1 306 127.0.0.1 255.255.255.255 On-link 127.0.0.1 306 127.255.255.255 255.255.255.255 On-link 127.0.0.1 306 146.176.0.0 255.255.0.0 On-link 146.176.212.218 281 146.176.1.0 255.255.255.0 146.176.0.1 146.176.212.218 100 146.176.2.0 255.255.255.0 146.176.0.1 146.176.212.218 100 Author: Prof Bill Buchanan ... =========================================================================== Persist After connecting to the VPN Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

All other traffic goes not on 146.176.0.0 network goes through non-VPN connection

Author: Bill Buchanan

VPN Bob Co.


Bob@ home

Remote Access VPN 146.176.212.218


C:\>tracert www.napier.ac.uk Tracing route to www.napier.ac.uk [146.176.222.174] over a maximum of 30 hops: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 2 36 31 43 48 45 49 58 59 57 ms ms ms ms ms ms ms ms ms ms 2 38 31 43 45 44 79 56 57 59 ms ms ms ms ms ms ms ms ms ms 6 38 30 43 45 45 49 56 57 58 ms ms ms ms ms ms ms ms ms ms
Before VPN connection

VPN connection

146.176.0.1

192.168.0.1 cr0.escra.uk.easynet.net [87.87.249.224] ip-87-87-146-129.easynet.co.uk [87.87.146.129] be2.er10.thlon.ov.easynet.net [195.66.224.43] linx-gw1.ja.net [195.66.224.15] so-0-1-0.lond-sbr4.ja.net [146.97.35.129] so-2-1-0.leed-sbr1.ja.net [146.97.33.29] EastMAN-E1.site.ja.net [146.97.42.46] vlan16.s-pop2.eastman.net.uk [194.81.56.66] gi0-1.napier-pop.eastman.net.uk [194.81.56.46]

C:\>tracert www.napier.ac.uk Tracing route to www.napier.ac.uk [146.176.222.174] over a maximum of 30 hops: 1 2 3 57 ms 58 ms 58 ms 58 ms 56 ms 59 ms 57 ms 57 ms 56 ms 146.176.210.2 www.napier.ac.uk [146.176.222.174] www.napier.ac.uk [146.176.222.174]
Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

After VPN connection


Author: Bill Buchanan

Traceroute for VPN Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

VPN Bob Co.


Bob@ home

Remote Access VPN 146.176.212.218


C:\>tracert www.intel.com Tracing route to a961.g.akamai.net [90.223.246.33] over a maximum of 30 hops: 1 2 3 4 5 3 35 32 46 46 ms ms ms ms ms 1 43 31 45 47 ms ms ms ms ms 1 36 32 45 47 ms ms ms ms ms
Before VPN connection

VPN connection

146.176.0.1

192.168.0.1 cr0.escra.uk.easynet.net [87.87.249.224] ip-87-87-146-129.easynet.co.uk [87.87.146.129] te7-0-0.sr0.enlcs.ov.easynet.net [89.200.132.109] 5adff621.bb.sky.com [90.223.246.33]

C:\>tracert www.intel.com Tracing route to a961.g.akamai.net [90.223.246.33] over a maximum of 30 hops: 1 2 3 4 5 3 35 32 46 46 ms ms ms ms ms 1 43 31 45 47 ms ms ms ms ms 1 36 32 45 47 ms ms ms ms ms


After VPN connection

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Traceroute for VPN Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

192.168.0.1 cr0.escra.uk.easynet.net [87.87.249.224] ip-87-87-146-129.easynet.co.uk [87.87.146.129] te7-0-0.sr0.enlcs.ov.easynet.net [89.200.132.109] 5adff621.bb.sky.com [90.223.246.33]

Network Security (Part 2)


Professional Certification NetworkSims PIX/ASA Configuration
Interfaces. Fixup. Static Routes. Access-lists. Failover. VPN.

Author: Prof Bill Buchanan Author: Prof Bill Buchanan

Stateful firewall PIX/ASA

Author: Bill Buchanan

Prof Bill Buchanan, Leader, Centre for Distributed Computing and Security http://www.dcs.napier.ac.uk/~bill Room: C.63

You might also like