Assi gnm ent

Topic(s)

Notes Assignm /Slide s/Mis ent c

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ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS INTRO TO COURSE The border of criminal procedures: Daily interaction between citizens and police: Police are authorized by statute to be community caretakers. One statute says any lawful acts that are inerent in the duty to serve and protect the public, including enter or remain upon premises if it reasonably appears necessary to prevent serious harm to person or property, render aid to injured person, locate missing persons. Right to stop or redirect traffic to prevent serious harm to person or property, render aid, locate missing persons. Dube: 655 A.2d 338
State v Michael Dube (1995) 655 A.2d 338 Defendant (Dube) appeals his conviction of endangering the welfare of a child Defendant claims that the trial court erred in dismissing his motion to suppress evidence that Dube claims was obtained in violation of the 4th Amendment s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures Appellate court vacates the lower the court s Judgment, finding that the police s continued search without a warrant was violative of the 4th Amendment. Two police officers responded to a call from the custodian of an apartment building The custodian needed to perform emergency maintenance on the Defendant s apartment (who was not home) and wanted the police to accompany him, to verify that he was only dealing with the emergency Once in the apartment, the police were struck by the incredible smell of urine and feces and saw that urine and feces were littered all through the house

C h. 1, p p. 1 1 0 ( S ki p P r o bl e m 1 1 ) P R O B L E M : T h e P a rt y P at r

NOTE: the officers did not need to move or adjust anything in the apartment to see the unsanitary conditions of the apartment; the observations were made with their natural senses One officer called the Police Department to request a Department of Human Services caseworker and for an officer to bring a camera to the apartment The custodian finished his maintenance and waited out on the sidewalk while the police took photographs of the feces, followed by the DHS caseworkers touring the apartment When the Defendant returned home, he was charged with endangering the welfare of a child Arguments for Appeal Defendant argues that the initial entry into the apartment by the police was unlawful and violative of the 4th Amendment s protection against unreasonable searches a. Court dismisses this argument stating that the custodian had a statutory right to enter the apartment to fix the emergency and because the officers were assisting the custodian in a community caretaking capacity, their presence in the apartment in the apartment was justified b. Court points out also that because the officers observations were strictly visual and natural , their presence with the custodian was lawful 2) Defendant argues that even if the initial entry was lawful, the officer s continued presence in the apartment became unlawful a. The court agrees with this b. The officers continued presence in the apartment after the repairs were finished, was unlawful c. The officers needed to leave the apartment and get a warrant before conducting any more investigation If one assumes that in the absence of a search warrant, their must be a special justification for entering a premises, the court s ruling becomes much clearer. The special justification that the officers had was to assist the custodian in the repairs. Once that special justification ended, the default requirement (a warrant) returned.
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Lovegren: 51 p.3d 471

ol , R e a d: L a yi n g D o w n T h e L a w , A li bi .c o m , b y C h ri st ie C hi s h ol m C h. 1.

State v Michael Lovegren (2002) 51 P.3d 471 Defendant (Lovegren) appeals his conviction for driving under the influence Lovegren argues that his motion to suppress the evidence obtained when he was stopped , was improperly denied by the District Court Court upholds District Court decision At 3:05 AM, while on patrol, Officer Hofer noticed a car pulled off the side of the highway with the motor still running. As Hofer approached the car, he noticed Defendant in the driver s seat, seemingly asleep. Hofer failed to awaken the Defendant by knocking on the window, so he opened the door, which awakened Lovegren who blurted out that he had been drinking That statement coupled with the smell of alcohol and Defendant s bloodshot eyes, resulted in Hofer requiring Lovegren to complete field sobriety tests which he failed After failing, Lovegren was transported to the police station where a breathalyzer test was administered to him, which read: 0.115. Defendant was Mirandized and charged with driving under the influence of alcohol Defendant argues that the investigative stop performed by Officer Hofer was not justified because Hofer did not have a particularized suspicion [that there was criminal activity] Court determined that Officer Hofer did not need particularized suspicion of criminal activity Instead, the court states that Hofer was acting in his capacity as a community caretaker doctrine in checking on Defendant s welfare The court looked to other Jurisdictions to determine what exactly the community caretaker doctrine is and what it requires. They state that a peace officer has a duty to investigate situations in which a citizen may be in peril or need some type of assistance

, p p. 1 0 1 5 (s to p b ef o re M o r al e s) W A T C H : M a n B e at e n B y C o p s f o r a

from an officer Therefore, Hofer would have been derelict in his duties had he not checked on the welfare of a driver pulled off of the side of the road Finally, the court articulated a three part test to determine when the actions of an officer are justified under the doctrine: If there are objective, specific, and articulable facts that would lead an experienced officer to believe that a citizen requires aid, then the officer has a right to stop and investigate 2) If in need of aid, the officer may take appropriate action to help or mitigate the danger 3) Once the danger is mitigated or help is no longer needed, any further action by the officer would implicate the 4th Amendment s protection against unlawful seizures The court ruled that Hofer was justified under this three part test. Note however that the court justifies only the stop and opening of the door under the doctrine. This allowed the officer to assess the possible danger or needs of Defendant. Once the Defendant said he had been drinking and the officer noticed evidence confirming that, this provided the requisite particularized suspicion that Defendant claimed Hofer needed in the first place. Judgment affirmed. 1)

Note Brigham City v Stuart, 126 S. Ct. 1943 (2006), which upheld a warrantless entry into a home by the police because the police possessed, an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury. This falls under the community caretaking function

n e x a m pl e o f" B e at in g th e r a p, b ut n ot th e ri d e "

Problem: Stowe case 635 so. 2d 168: An injured guy was walking along the highway dripping blood from a cut on his arm. He was drunk. He made it clear that he did not want to accept the polices offer to help him. He says his right to be free from unreasonable searches or seizures was violated when the police forced medical help on him. The court ruled that it wasnt unreasonable (it was on a completely different topic) but one judge had a nice sounding dissent.

Notes: Community caretaker has been used to relax restrictions on search and seizure in some instances. Examples: Enter trailer after midnight to determine where 2 young boys lived; Enter home after smelling ammonia based on the concern that potential occupants would be harmed by fumes; enter residence if they have an objectively reasonable basis to believe an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with injury. However, decisions are all over the place and some courts think entering a home isnt a valid reason. Usually intent of officer doesnt determine whether it is community caretaking.

I- POLICE CITIZEN INTERACTIONS A. COMMUNITY CARETAKING

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QUE STI ONS TO CON SID ER

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What is the ordinary and proper role of the police? What legal rules govern the police? Are there areas not covered by rules? Is this a good or bad thing? Do police engage in activity that is something other than enforcing the criminal law? What do we learn from the Oregon statute and Indianapolis PD job description? What do we learn about proper and improper police conduct from the Dube and Lovegren cases? Are there rules that only apply to police when certain criteria are met, or are the police always bound by consistent rules?

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How do you reconcile the outcomes in Dube and Lovegren? What is the "community caretaker" / "public safety" doctrine? What does this doctrine allow/disallow? What are the limits to this doctrine? Is it consistent across jurisdictions? How do you apply the community caretaker doctrine to the Party Patrol Problem? Should normal rules requiring officers to obtain warrants before entering a home apply to the Party Patrol? Is it possible to distinguish between community caretakers and criminal-law

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enforcers? What is the linkage between police activity and procedural rules? What features of community caretaker functions make it acceptable to relax the procedural controls that apply to police work?

B. ENFORCEMENT OF CIVILITY- "You can beat the rap, but you can't beat the ride" Matson: passenger in dui arrest leaves vehicle, starts yelling at cop and blocking his path. Cop moved her aside with his hand and then arrests her. Court after appeals found that Matson had not intimidated officer and wasnt guilty. General rule: police have to endure incivility
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Why was Matson's conviction overturned? Why wasn't the Morris or Spry conviction (Note 1, p. 13-14) overturned? Are police in enforcing civility concerned with "interference" with arrests or government administration or are they concerned with affronts to their authority and dignity? Can police officers inflict low-level sanctions on citizens without much review by outside actors? As a lawyer, do you think officers require written guidance on when it is proper to use disorderly conduct charges against verbally abusive citizens? What does it mean to beat the rap, but not the ride? Why does this phrase matter?

C. CONTROL OF GANGS AND KIDS We will cover this in the next class session, but note from the introduction how these concepts can be connected to the concepts in Section A and B. C. CONTROL OF GANGS AND KIDS 1. CITY OF CHICAGO V. JESUS MORALES
Chicago Ordinance was passed in 1992 to disrupt loitering by gang members

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The Supreme Court of Illinois ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutional, the city of Chicago appealed U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and upheld the Illinois Supreme Court s ruling finding that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague in its language The City of Chicago had a number of gangs which was affecting the city

Chapter 1, pp. 14-39

both financially and criminally, as well as striking fear into its residents To combat this, the city passed an ordinance which prohibited, criminal street gang members from loitering with one another [or others] in a public place In effect, the officer would tell the suspected loiterer to leave the premises and if the loiterer refuses or does not comply, then the officer may arrest the suspect Respondents claim that the vagueness in the statute concerning exactly what sorts of activity the ordinance covers, makes it unconstitutional Because the ordinance defines loitering as remaining in any one place with no apparent purpose (emphasis added), the court states that this leads to such confusion as to what is and is not permissible under the statute that: Citizens of Chicago are not given proper notice of what is permissible; and 2) It seems to leave a great deal of discretion in the hands of police officers, which could be used discriminatorily or arbitrarily It is the language of with no apparent purpose that causes the plurality, as well as O Connor and Breyer in their concurrences, to strike down the ordinance. In his dissent, Justice Thomas claims that in fact this ordinance is not unconstitutional, in fact it simply gives the police a power that they have always had: preserving the peace Justice Thomas (and Scalia) believes that the statute gives the police the proper level of discretion, the same way that they are given it in regards to probable cause and reasonable suspicion Note that Justice Thomas seems to be referring to the community caretaker function of police in preserving the public peace Subsequent to the decision, the City of Chicago revised the language of the ordinance to make it more precise and less discretionary. 1)

2. NORMS, LEGITIMACY, AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

Article by lady who argues that cops should be involved in communities and interact with community leaders 3. ORDER MAINTENANCE 4. CURFEWS Majority opinion is that juvenile curfews are constitutional. Some states have disallowed them. Adult curfews: no longer allowed. Cites morales. Were used before civil rights movement. D. TRADITIONAL AND COMMUNITY POLICING 1. THE CRIMINAL PROCESS 2. UNDERSTANDING COMMUNITY POLICING Morales 527 U.S. 41 Juvenille Curfews, adult curfews

II- BRIEF SEARCHES AND STOPS A. BRIEF INVESTIGATIVE STOPS OF SUSPECTS 4th amendment gives right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oathor affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 3. This applies to Searches and Seizures, so where do stops fall? 4th amendment incorporates a strong preference for search warrants. exceptions to the warrant requirement are jealsoly and carefully drawn. Some exceptions exist. ( If there is a search or seizure, it must be justified by probable cause. 3 key cases that marked key changes, making this area of the law complex Katz (comceptual framework): public phone booth wiretap. Chapter 2, pp. 41-58

Supreme court says thats not ok because it was Katz, not the phone booth who was constitutionally protected. What you knowingly expose to the public, even in your own home is not a subject of 4th amendment protection, but what yu seek to preserve as private is protected. Terry (standard): Cop could pat down and stop jewelry robbing suspect because of reasonable suspicion dont have to get all the way to probable cause Camara (method): supreme court allowed granting warrants for municipal code building inspections. In other words, the government could search your property even without any individualized suspicion that the law was being broken. Created a reasonableness test balancing competing interests of need to search v. invasion which the search entails. Now look at 1)privacy interest of person 2) governments interest in conducting the search, 3) degree of intrusion from the search 3 types of stops: Conversations: not a stop at all. Officer doesnt need any justification for a conversation Stops: must have reasonable suspicion. Cant be long enough to qualify as an arrest. Also described as individualized suspicion or articulable suspicion. Arrests: Must have probable cause 1. Consensual Encounters and "Stops" Mendenhall:

2. Grounds for Stops: Articulable, Individualized Reasonable Suspicion Mendenhall 446 U.S. 544
U.S. v Sylvia Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544 Woman was observed by two DEA agents in Detroit Metro Airport fitting the profile of a drug courier

Mendenhall was arriving from Los Angeles, place of origin for much of the heroin found in Detroit 2) Last person to leave the plane and appeared to be nervous 3) Did not claim any luggage 4) Different airline for her return flight out of Detroit Agents approached her and asked to see her ID and papers Name on ID and on ticket did not match Asked her if she would accompany them to an office for further questioning She followed them to the office Asked if she would consent to a search of her person and told her she could decline She consented by saying, Go ahead Female agent arrived to conduct the search and again asked for consent She said yes The search turned up two packages of heroin Mendenhall was charged with possessing heroin. Key question of the case was whether or not Mendenhall was seized and if so when? Was there a seizure? When? When the agents approached her and asked her questions? a. Majority said no 2) When the agents asked for ID and boarding pass? a. Majority said no 3) When they moved her to the DEA office? a. No because there was consent Definition of seizure: within the meaning of the 4th Amendment only if in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he/she was not free to leave. (Page 50 in the text) 1)

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This is a pragmatic solution to allow police to speak to people casually. Court determines that Mendenhall had no reason to suspect that she could not end the conversation with the agents and leave.

Wilson 874 p.2d 215

Wesley Wilson v State (1994) 874 P.2d 215 While on patrol in his car, Officer Kamron Ritter observed Defendant (Wilson) limping severely while walking down a road at 12:31 AM. Ritter stopped to assist Wilson and to see what had caused the injury. Defendant claimed that he had twisted his ankle at a party, which also explained the smell of alcohol on his breath Per Department procedure, Ritter requested Wilson s identification and radioed the information in for a routine warrant check. This exchange was interrupted by Ritter s detection of smoke in the area and two motorists stopping to tell him that there was a fire nearby. Officer Ritter left Wilson to check on the fire but told him to stay in the area 8 minutes after leaving Wilson, Ritter returned to see that Wilson had limped about 40 feet away and Officer Ritter assisted Wilson in crossing the street so that he would avoid the danger of oncoming emergency vehicles Ritter then left Wilson again to assist in the fire fighting but told Wilson to wait While providing traffic control near the fire, Ritter received word that Wilson in fact had two outstanding arrest warrants Ritter, accompanied by another officer, approached Wilson and informed him of his outstanding warrants While talking to Wilson about the warrants, the officers noticed an oily (read: flammable) substance on his shirt and after feeling the substance Wilson remarked, What are you doing? I don t smell like

smoke. The officers arrested Wilson on the outstanding warrants While in custody, Wilson made incriminating statements about setting the fire from the night before Wilson argues that the stop was illegal and any evidence (statements) gained during the stop should be suppressed The state argued that this was not a stop at all and so it did not implicate the 4th Amendment at all. If it were a stop, the police needed reasonable suspicion before the seizure Which encounter can be characterized as a seizure ? Initial Encounter when Ritter noticed Wilson limping? a. No, this was simply Officer Ritter acting in his community caretaker capacity 2) Request by Ritter for Wilson s identification? a. No, this was consensual and there was nothing intimidating about it 3) Warrants check? a. No, there was no restriction whatsoever in Wilson s ability to move 4) Telling Wilson to stay in the area , which Wilson did not comply with? a. No, because Wilson did not stay there, so he could not have reasonably believed that he was not free to leave 5) Ritter returning from the fire to check on Wilson and physically assisting him in crossing the street? a. No, assistance in crossing the street given by an officer could not reasonably be seen as restricting one s freedom to leave 6) When Ritter told Wilson to wait at a street corner until he returned and Wilson complied? a. Yes, because at this point Officer Ritter had repeatedly returned to check on Wilson, because Officer Ritter could keep an eye on from where he was standing Wilson, and obviously Wilson did not think that he could leave Therefore, at this point Wilson s 4th Amendment protection against unreasonable seizures attached. The question becomes if whether or not this detention so that a warrant 1)

check could be completed is an unreasonable seizure. Yes it was unreasonable because Officer Ritter lacked any reasonable suspicion of prior criminal activity by Wilson and the initial reason for the stop, Wilson s safety, did not provide the requisite reasonable suspicion necessary.

If an officer stops a car for reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation, he can only stop you for as long as a normal traffic stop. However they can do some limited investigation of other crimes while youre stopped.
Two police officers boarded a bus bound from Miami to Atlanta Both officers had badges and one had a pistol in a pouch The officers picked out Defendant (without providing any reason or suspicion) and asked to inspect his ID and ticket The two officers stood in the aisle of the bus right in front of Defendant Everything was in order concerning his ID and ticket They announced that they were searching for drugs and asked for Defendant s consent to search his bags and told him that he did not have to consent He gave consent Cocaine was discovered The Supreme Court ruled that if by combining all of the circumstances present at the time, a reasonable person felt free to leave the scene and decline a search, the search was reasonable. They ruled that a reasonable person would have felt free to leave. What about consent? It seems that someone carrying contraband in his/her luggage would never freely consent to it being searched, so how could they feel free to leave? Court in Bostick says that the reasonable person standard set out in Mendenhall, presupposes an innocent person

Request for ID has to be justified by reasonable suspicion

2. Grounds for Stops To justify a stop, the government has to be able to articulate a reasonable suspicion that the person has commited or will commit a crime. What constitutes reasonable suspicion: considerably less than proof of wrongdoing, probable cause is thefair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found and reasonable suspicion is less than that. So you have to consider the totality of the circumstances. Must be more than a guess and based on objective, articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrants that intrusion. Due weight must be given not to an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch but to the specific. Another formulation says you can use factors based on facts of the situation. You can include: Demeanor of the suspect; 4. Gait and manner of the suspect; Knowledge officer has of suspsects background or character; If suspect is carrying anything and what hes carrying; Way the suspect is dressed including bulges in clothing; Time of day or night; Overheard conversation; Particular area; Information from 3rd parties; Who the suspect is with (if their conduct is reasonably suspect); Effort to conceal an article
State v Theodore Nelson (1994) 638 A.2d 720

Chapter 2, pp. 58-78

Officer Holmes was on routine patrol when he noticed an unoccupied car he knew belonged to a former neighbor of his (Moore) The car was parked in a nursing home parking lot that had recently been the site of thefts Officer Holmes parked adjacent to the parking lot so that he could observe the car (50-100 yards from the car) Soon another car parked next to Moore s car with two passengers, later identified as Moore and Defendant, Nelson The car shut off its engine and Officer Holmes observed the pair drinking from a 16 oz. can of Budweiser 45 to 50 minutes later, the pair split up and Nelson drove by the officer who promptly pulled him over To be clear, the reason for the stop was because the officer had observed Nelson drinking a can of beer and suspected Nelson was under the influence Nelson moved to suppress the evidence obtained from this stop, arguing that it was unlawful The court states that in order for an investigatory stop to be justified, the officer must have an articulable suspicion that criminal conduct has taken place, is occurring, or imminently will occur The court ruled that because Officer Holmes had only seen Nelson consume a can of beer in his truck over the course of an hour, which is not a crime, Holmes needed more to justify the stop Therefore the stop was unlawful and evidence gained from it must be suppressed.

State v David Dean (1994) 645 A.2d 634 Same court as in Nelson, decided 5 months after the Nelson decision Defendant David Dean appeals his conditional plea of guilty on charges of operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, claiming that the initial stop was not justified by reasonable suspicion While on patrol in a new residential development around 11:00 PM on

Tuesday, Officer Sampson noticed Defendant driving down a dead end road Because the development was uninhabited on weekdays and there had been reports of vandalism, Officer Sampson became suspicious of the car being there Officer Sampson stopped Defendant (Dean) solely to investigate why Dean was present at that time and place Note, no criminal conduct was observed by the officer It was during this stop that Officer Sampson noticed Defendant s intoxication The question the courts asks is whether or not the two facts (Dean s presence in a area of recent crime and the absence of any reason to be in an uninhabited area at night) create reasonable suspicion? The court states that taking those two facts along with the time of day (1100PM) yields reasonable suspicion. The court distinguishes this case from its prior decision in Nelson by the fact that Nelson was in the parking lot of an occupied nursing home not an uninhabited dead end street at 1100PM. Note, however that the events in Nelson took place around 130AM, a time much more suspicious than 1100PM The court rules that but for Dean s intoxication, [the stop] would have been a brief investigatory stop , therefore the intrusion would have been minimal had Dean simply been sober and explained what he was doing Justice Glassman (wrote the majority opinion in Nelson) dissented

Anonymous tips: can contribute to a reasonable suspicion finding only the police can find independent corroboration of significant details of the informat s information.

3. Pretextual Stops 4. Criminal Profiles and Race Wardlow 525 u.s. 119

Illinois v Wardlow (2000) 525 U.S. 119 High drug area drive through by police Four police cars were patrolling the area, looking for lookouts and customers to investigate the drug trade Large group of people, including Defendant holding an opaque bag Defendant looked at officer and then fled the scene Officer cornered him and performed a protective weapons pat down Felt something like a gun in the bag Was a gun with live ammo Arrested Defendant Question is whether or not officers had reasonable suspicion to perform a Terry Stop. Accordingly, we have previously noted the fact that the stop occurred in a "high crime area" among the relevant contextual considerations [and] nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion in a Terry analysis. The determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior High crime area is pertinent in the analysis The police action was justified. DISSENT by Stevens There are a number of other reasons why a person would flee the scene upon seeing police, many of them completely innocent Most states allow for flight to be considered in reasonable suspicion analysis but not dispositive

Do bad neighborhoods establish reasonable suspicion?

No, the officer must base his/her claim on their impressions of the situation but nature of the neighborhood may support suspicion W hen officers and courts refer to a neighborhood as high crime , often it is minority and poor neighborhoods they are talking about

Pretextual Stops: officer has a reason (or multiple reasons) to validly stop someone, can they use those reasons to stop them for another crime for which they dont have reasonable suspicion? Robinson 767 N.E. 2d 638 Whren stops: as a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. It is irrelevant whether a reasonable traffic officer would have made the stop. But the scope, duration and intensity of the stop are subject to judicial review. Majority of states use Whren, the rest presumeably use officer would have stopped

LABOR DAY NO CLASS 4. Criminal Profiles and Race B. BRIEF ADMINISTRATIVE STOPS Quarles 696 A.2d 1334: drug profile case with two guys on train Chapter 2, pp. 78-98 Profiles: a profile of a criminal on its own will not get to reasonable suspicion. However, it can be a factor. A minority of states has disallowed it even as a factor. Courts dont like overly broad profiles B. BRIEF ADMINISTRATIVE STOPS Narcotics checkpoints violate 4th amendment: Edmond: looks like you just weigh state interest v. inconvenience to drivers Dui checkpoints are fine Chapter 2, pp. 98-119

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License checkpoints are fine as long as cop doesnt get to decide which cars to pick arbitrarily Safety checkpoints seem to be fine Must have notice of checkpoints C. PLAIN VIEW "NON-SEARCHES" D. BRIEF SEARCHES OF INDIVIDUALS ("FRISKS") Edmond 531 u.s. 32 Bobic 996 p.2d 610 Bond 529 u.s. 334 NO CLASS ON WEDNESDAY SEPTEMBER 14th Note: Use the day off on Wednesday to get a head-start on Monday's assignment. The regular assignment is no longer than our usual assignments. However, in addition to our readings I've also provided a link to a series of highly recommended CALI exercises. I do not plan to review these exercises in class ---they are for you to complete on your own --- but I do think they are a very good review of most of the material we have covered up to this point in the semester. D. BRIEF SEARCHES OF INDIVIDUALS ("FRISKS") 1. Frisks for Weapons 2. The Scope of a Terry Search 7. Review Exercises (Mon day available at: Septe mber http://www.cali.org/lessonlink/1268/CRMPRO12/2109/jq 19th) There are two ways you can approach this: 1) RECOMMENDED: Complete all of the questions through Reasonable Suspicion Essay Question 9. Then stop, read Assignment Chapter 2, pp. 119-138

7(pp. 119-138) and afterwards come back to finish the exercises. OR 2) Complete all the questions before reading Assignment 7. This will allow you to familiarize yourself with the Terry "frisk" materials prior to reading Terry (but you will get many questions wrong because you won't yet know the material). Terry 392 U.S. 1 Wilson 805 n.e. 2d 968

III- FULL SEARCHES OF PEOPLE AND PLACES: BASIC CONCEPTS A. ORIGINS OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ITS ANALOGS 1. General Search Warrants 2. American Limits on General Warrants 3. The Language of the Fourth Amendment and Its Analogs B. PROBABLE CAUSE 8. 1. Defining Probable Cause 2. Sources of Information to Support Probable Cause a. Confidential Informants b. Anonymous sources Entick 95 eng. Rep 807 Brinegar v. united states 338 u.s. 160 Barton 594 a.2d 917 Utterback 485 n.w.2d 760 Chapter 3, pp. 139-167

9.

b. Anonymous sources

Chapter 3, pp.

3. Can a Statute or Rule Clarify the Assessment of Probable Cause (Skim) C. WARRANTS 1. The Warrant Requirement and Exigent Circumstances REPLACE Johnny Mann v. State with

167-173 Chapter 3, pp. 173-177 (skim) Chapter 3, pp. 177-178

Kentucky v. Hollis Deshaun King available in the 2011 supplement here:http://crimprocasebook.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/supp Kentucky v. Hollis 2011.pdf Deshaun King ava Raveytdts 691 n.w.2d 290 ilable in the 2011 supplem ent here. Chapter 3, pp. 182-183 (notes) 2. Requirements for Obtaining Warrants a. Neutral Detached Magistrate b. Particularity in Warrants 3. Execution of Warrants 4. So You Like Warrants? 10. a. Anticipatory Warrants dietrick 444 s.e.2d 47 clap 10 johns. 263 anyan 104 p.3d 511 Dodson 150 p.3d 1054 Chapter 3, pp. 183-208

b. Administrative Warrants (skim) D. CONSENSUAL SEARCHES 1. Components of a Voluntary Choice 11. 2. Third Party Consent

Chapter 3, pp. 208-214 (skim) Chapter 3, pp. 214-234

IV. SEARCHES IN RECURRING CONTEXTS A. PERSONS 12. 1. Searches Incident to Arrest 2. Intrusive Body Searches NO CLA SS ON MO NDA Y OCT OBE R 10th This is our B. HOUSES AND OTHER PLACES Assi gnm 1. The Outer Boundaries of Houses (homes, curtilage, open ent fields) for Wed 2. Workplaces nesd ay 3. Schools and Prisons (skim cases, read notes) Octo ber 12th 13. Chapter 4, pp. 254-274 Chapter 4, pp. 275-279 (skim) Chapter 4, pp. 279-281 Chapter 4, pp. Chapter 4, pp. 235-254

282-287 (skim) Chapter 4, pp. 287-290 D. EFFECTS (Note, we skipped C) 14. 1. Inventory Searches 2. Cars and Containers 15. V. ARRESTS A. IS IT A STOP OR ARREST? 16. B. ARREST WARRANTS C. POLICE DISCRETION IN THE ARREST DECISION D. PAPER ARRESTS: CITATIONS 17. E. USE OF FORCE IN MAKING ARRESTS VI. REMEDIES FOR UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES A. ORIGINS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE B. LIMITATIONS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 1. Evidence Obtained in "Good Faith" 18. Exclusionary rule Freemont 232 u.s. 383 Cahan 282 p.2d 905 Edmunds 586 a.2d 887 Chapter 6, pp. 383-410 Chapter 5, pp. 354-382 Chapter 5, pp. 327-354 Chapter 4, pp. 297-326

2. Causation Limits: Inevitable Discovery and Independent Source 3. Standing as a Limit to Challenging Illegal Searches and Seizures Rabon 930 a.2d 268 Bruns 796 a.2d 226 VII. TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY A. ENHANCEMENT OF THE SENSES Katz 389 u.s. 347 20. Kyllo 533 u.s. 27 Fitzgerald 864 a.2d 1006 Chapter 7, pp. 453-472 Chapter 6, pp. 410-428

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NO CLA SS 11/9 B. WIRETAPPING 1. Judicial Limits on Wiretaps 2. Statutory Wiretapping Procedures (critically important statutes) 21. ( 11/1 4) 3. Bugs on Agents Olmstead 227 u.s. 438 Fowler 139 p.3d 342 Goetz 191 p.3d 489 Chapter 7, pp. 473-503

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VIII. INTERROGATIONS

Chapter 8, pp. 519-540

A. VOLUNTARINESS OF CONFESSIONS 1. Physical Abuse and Deprivations 2. Promises and Threats 3. Police Lies Brown 297 u.s. 278 Swanigan 106 p.3d 39 Brisbon 957 a.2d 931

B. Miranda Warnings 1. The Miranda Revolution 2. "Triggering" Miranda Warnings a. "Custody" 23. b. Interrogation Miranda 384 u.s. 436 Elmarr 181 p.3d 1157 Innis 446 u.s. 291 Chapter 8, pp. 540-573

3. Form of Warnings C. Invocation and Waiver of Miranda Rights D. Effect of Asserting Miranda Rights 24. Reed 627 a.2d 630 Thompkins 130 s. ct 2250 Globe 877 so.2d 663 Chapter 8, pp. 573-608

Shatzer 130 s. ct 1213 E. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel During Investigations 25. FIN AL ASSI GN ME NT F. Miranda Cures 1. Cures and Remedies for Miranda Violations Appleby 221 p.3d 525 Seibert 542 u.s. 600 Chapter 8, pp. 609-631