Anthropology Running Head: WHY NOT A THIRD GENDER?

ON DON KULICKS TRAVESTI

Why Not a Third Gender? On Don Kulicks Travesti Gabriel Solorio University of California, Los Angeles

Anthropology Running Head: WHY NOT A THIRD GENDER? ON DON KULICKS TRAVESTI

Why Not a Third Gender? On Don Kulicks Travesti University of California, Los Angeles

Anthropology Keywords: gender, third gender, travesti, transvestite, homosexuality

Abstract The dominant North American understanding of gender is configured as a dichotomy. This binary includes man and woman and thus excludes any individuals that do not feel comfortable situating themselves or being situated in either of the two categories. Many people (e.g. Judith Butler) have attempted to make sense of why individuals and/or groups do not fit into this classificatory schema and suggest new ideas. Such a task has led to disagreements. One of the many disputes involves the notion(s) of a third gender. Here, I will attempt to explain how acknowledging a third gender may assist in collapsing our current binary gender system and could be a first step in replacing it with a polygender system that possesses far more potentiality for the creation of new modes of life. To begin, particular elements of Don Kulicks ethnography titled Travesti will be briefly summarized to lead into his account of thirdness and its implications; this summary will be followed by a discussion of general public recognition of a third gender in North America.

Anthropology Why Not a Third-Gender? On Don Kulicks Travesti The dominant North American understanding of gender is configured as a dichotomy.

This binary, simply, includes man and woman and thus excludes any individuals who do not feel comfortable situating themselves, or being situated, in either of the two categories. Many people, in large part academics (e.g., Judith Butler), have attempted to make sense of why individuals and/or groups do not fit into this classificatory schema and suggest new ideas. To no ones dismay, such a task has led to disagreements and disputes. One of the many disputes involves the notion(s) of a third gender. Here, I will attempt to explain how acknowledging (and eventually institutionalizing) a third gender may assist in collapsing our current binary gender system and could be a first step in replacing it with a polygender system that possesses far more potentiality for the creation of new modes of life. To begin, particular elements of Don Kulicks ethnography titled Travesti will be briefly summarized to lead into his account of thirdness and its implications; this summary will be followed by a discussion of general public recognition of a third gender in North America. In his ethnography, Kulick describes the lives of a group of travesti (i.e., transvestite) prostitutes living in the Brazilian city of Salvador. Travestis are born males (i.e., with male genitalia) that, generally, at an early age begin to practice bodily modifications (i.e., female hormone ingestion, silicone injection, etc.) to appear like a woman (Kulick, 1998, p. 91). But according to travesti imagination, any travesti who claims to be a woman is mentally disturbed (Kulick, 1998, p. 84). Unlike North American transsexuals who often believe that at birth they embody the wrong sex and seek to change it through sex reassignment surgery, travestis do not believe they embody the wrong sex nor do they believe their sex should ever be changed. Importantly, and in addition to identifying as males, travestis desire the same sex and are,

Anthropology generally, penetrated during sex with men. Kulick makes clear that although they are males,

travestis are not considered men nor do they consider themselves to be. To be considered a man, a male, during sex, may only penetrate his sexual partner(s), for if he is penetrated, in the eyes of the travesti, he is stripped of his manhood. Using such travesti logic, Kulick concludes that because travestis and women are penetrated (and, generally, do not penetrate) both share the same gender thus leading him to argue for the existence of the man and not-man gender binary (Kulick, 1998, p. 231). Along with proposing the existence of the Brazilian man and not-man gender binary, Kulick takes up the notion of a third gender and argues against it by discussing the possible implications that such language (and, ultimately, the acknowledgment of thirdness) has. According to Kulick (1998): Indeed, one of the greatest weaknesses of all ideas about thirdness is that, far from denaturalizing or displacing dichotomous systems of sex and gender, as proponents of such ideas have claimed, there is a real danger that theories of third gender in fact radically naturalize and reinforce traditional understandings of sexual dimorphism, by suggesting that individuals who do not fit the male-female binary fall outside it and transcend it, rather than disturb it, blur it or reconfigure it. Third gender language leaves the traditional male-female binary intact. Instead of expanding, nuancing, and complicating understandings of masculinity and femininity, third gender language seals those categories and locates fluidity, juxtapositions, ambiguity, and dynamics outside their borders, in the realm of the third. (p. 230) It is clear that Kulick sees problems with thirdness. He certainly presents his case and argument cogently. One could easily see how if another gender is acknowledged and became a part of general social and cultural discourse, the already existing gender binary may go untouched. But one could also, just as easily, see how the acknowledgement of a third gender (with no necessary relation to biological sex), along with other attempts to further destabilize the man-woman binary, could take part in exposing the current North American gender distinctions as having

Anthropology

through time materializedi and as being in no way natural or necessary. A third gender could actually serve as a point of reflection for the current two genders in the sense that it will, undoubtedly, share what were thought to be distinct characteristics naturally belonging to only men and/or women. A third gender could provoke psychological contemplation (perhaps on an unconscious level) amongst women and men in terms of what exactly natural gender characteristics are and just whom they belong to. Thus, thirdness could actually disturb and complicate understandings and dynamics of masculinity and femininity within the borders of the male-female binary, as Kulick would like to see. In Gender Trouble, Judith Butler questions the distinction between sex and gender (1990, pp. 6-7) and in referencing Butler, Kulick states, Butlers point is not only that sex does not determine gender, but also that sex stands in no particularly privileged or even necessary relation to gender (1998, p. 231). He continues, Gender does not even have to be about men and women and then introduces his man and not-man gender binary theory (Kulick, 1998, p. 231). It is clear that Kulick challenges the all-too-often assumed woman and man gender opposition but in so doing draws on masculinist and dichotomous logic to issue his challenge. He clearly shows that the traditional gender binary could easily be reconfigured but has also further strengthened masculinist and dichotomous logic and language as the only and necessary ways to understand, define, and structure gender systems, as if attempting to comprehend gender as understood by travestis had to take the form of man and not-man. (Heterosexual men, of course!, being that of which everything else is measured against.) Why not the feminine/effeminate and not-feminine/effeminate? Kulick (1998), in addressing such, states: [that he] partly [used the not-man category] for want of a culturally elaborated label and partly to foreground[his] conviction that the gender system that makes it possible for travestis to emerge and make sense is one that is massively oriented towards, if not determined by, male subjectivity, male desire, and male pleasure, as those are culturally

Anthropology elaborated in Brazil. (p. 229) But, in order to be male (or a man) one must avoid behaving or performing femininely (e.g., being sexually and anally receptive). So, therefore, couldnt one argue that, in actuality, the

orientation is toward femininity or effeminacy? Furthermore, if gender has no necessary relation to sex, as Butler and Kulick both argue, and if a third gender could actually disturb the malefemale binary, as argued above, why should gender even remain dichotomized? The acknowledgment of a third gender and how it could serve as a point of reflection for the two prevalent North American genders, and how each one of the two could serve as points of reflection for a third gender, is clearly only part of what is necessary to dislodge the current gender binary. In no way should one believe that by simply acknowledging (even institutionalizing) another gender that the current model will entirely collapse. A third gender will certainly be only one step in the displacement of the current schema. Furthermore, the existence of a third gender must work its way into general public discourse and not remain in the academic heavens. It must enter the larger real world, on the ground, and not remain a concept of academic gender or queer theory. Explaining the distinction between gender identity and social identity,ii Anne Bolin states: Gender identity and social identity may or may not converge in the individuals life or in a particular interaction (1996, p. 24). Undoubtedly Bolin is correct, but it is crucial that an attempt is made to bring cognizance of a third gender into a social/public context for fear it will never materialize on the ground. An example of the existence of a language that defines and incorporates more than two genders (in fact, more than even three) within a society or culture at a given time could be found in Margaret Meads Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies. In a footnote, Mead (2001 [1935]) states:

Anthropology The Arapesh [one of three societies Mead observed] speak a language that contains thirteen noun classes or genders, each one of which is distinguished by a separate set of pronominal and adjectival suffixes and prefixes. There is a masculine gender, a feminine gender, a gender that contains objects of indeterminate or mixed gender, and in ten other clauses whose content cannot be so accurately described. (p. 7) The aforementioned is only one case among several already historically and contemporarily identified non-binary gender systems.iii The acknowledgement of a third gender and the displacement of the dominant North

American gender binary system will certainly be difficult. With that in mind, the argument could be made that homosexuals are in a well-suited position for such an enterprise. According to Sherry Ortner, culture (i.e., every culture) at some level of awareness asserts itself to be not only distinct from but superior to nature, and that sense of distinctiveness and superiority rests precisely on the ability to transformto socialize and culturalizenature (1974, p. 73). Using this theoretical paradigm, Ortner ultimately argues that women are seen as closer to nature and that men are seen as closer to culture, thus offering a reason why females are subjugated by males and positioned in a second-class status cross-culturally. Using Ortners culture-nature theory, one could argue (and often does) that North American homosexuality is perceived as being positioned further away from nature and is often considered unnatural.iv Ironically, it is for this ascribed unnatural position that an argument could be made that homosexuals are not identically bound to the constraints and limitations of nature and to what is natural in the way that many uncritical heterosexuals often feel themselves to be, often believing that they are born straight and are simply either masculine or feminine, with little attention to and appreciation of fluidity. (Clearly, such rigidity greatly debilitates any possibilities of creating new ways of life and developing more critical perceptions of both sexuality and gender.) Homosexuals are in a position to claim unnaturality and use it to constructively produce

Anthropology new modes of being while at the same time, through example, influencing and altering (hetero)normative ways of life and understanding. Indeed, they could critically and actively participate in the acknowledgement of a third gender. Homosexuals, in fact, could rather easily claim thirdness itself. Imagining homosexuality as much more than simply a sexual act between members of the same sex, Foucault states:

I think thats what makes homosexuality disturbing: the homosexual mode of life, much more than the sexual act itself. To imagine a sexual act that doesnt conform to law or nature is not what disturbs people. But that individuals are beginning to love one another theres the problem. (pp. 136-137) The homosexual mode of life could be reconceptualized and understood as a third gender, if for any other reason at all, because many homosexuals defy normative ideas of what men and women should or should not do (i.e., desire the same sex and often contest ideas of masculinity as belonging to males and femininity as belonging to females). Although this idea may seem fairly far-fetched to some (probably more so to many gays and lesbians), I suggest that the idea of homosexuality as a third gender could be politically useful and strategic, and should be taken seriously and reflected upon. In conclusion, Kulick should be commended for his attempt to understand the Brazilian gender system, and gender at large, by proposing a new outlook on it, but one should notice that his proposition (i.e., man and not-man) is implicitly masculinist, heterocentric, and dichotomous. In fact, a third gender could contribute to the process of destabilizing, and to the eventual displacement of, the binary gender systems in both Brazil and North America. It is important for the general public, not only academics, to acknowledgev the existence and all of the possible implications a third gender has because if a third is recognized the process of constructing a new gender systemone that is not a binary and that is far more equitable and

Anthropology 10 inclusivecould be put in motion. This system could be a first step in the eventual development of a creative society and culture that contain a multiplicity of genders and modes of life.

Notes

Materialized as in the Butlerian concept discussed in Bodies That Matter, (1993, Pp. 4-12). See Traversing Gender: Cultural Context and Gender Practices by Anne Bolin for definitions. iii For another see Serena Nandas ethnography titled: The Hijras of India: Cultural and Individual Dimensions of an Institutionalized Third Gender Role and Two-Spirit People: Native American Gender Identity, Sexuality, and Spirituality edited by Sue-Ellen Jacobs, Wesley Thomas, and Sabine Lang. iv According to Michel Foucault, in an interview conducted by Stephen Riggins in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, [prior to the nineteenth century] Homosexual behavior was only considered to be a kind of excess of natural behavior, an instinct that is difficult to keep within certain limits. From the nineteenth century on, you see that behavior like homosexuality came to be considered an abnormality (1994, p. 128). v The term acknowledge has been used over creation or construction because the latter imply that others do not already identify as a third gender or recognize the existence of such in North America and across the globe. For example, reflecting on ideas of gender and effeminate homosexuals, Annick Prieur (1998) writes: The fact that penetrated males are not considered as completely male or yet as female raises the question of whether the jotas [an effeminate homosexual group in Mexico City] may be considered a third gender. The jotas frequently referred to themselves as something third neither men nor women. (p. 264)
ii

Also, refer to The Hijras of India: Cultural and Individual Dimensions of an Institutionalized Third Gender Role by Serena Nanda.

References Bolin, A. (1974). Traversing gender: Cultural context and gender practices. In S.P. Ramet (Ed.), Gender reversals and gender cultures: Anthropological and historical perspectives (pp. 22-51). New York and London: Routledge. Butler, J. (1993). Bodies that matter: On the discursive limits of sex. New York and London: Routledge. Butler, J. (1990). Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity. New York and London: Routledge. Foucault, M. (1997). Michel Foucault: An interview by Stephen Riggins. In P. Rabinow (Ed.), Ethics:

subjectivity and truth (pp. 121-133). New York: The New Press. Foucault, M. (1997). Friendship as a way of life. In P. Rabinow (Ed.), Ethics: subjectivity and truth (pp. 136-140). New York: The New Press. Jacobs, S.E., Thomas, W., & Lang, S. (Eds.). (1997). Two-spirit people: Native American gender identity, sexuality, and spirituality. Illinois: University of Illinois Press. Kulick, D. (1998). Travesti: Sex, gender and culture among Brazilian transgendered prostitutes. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. Mead, M. (2001 [1933]). Sex and temperament in three primitive societies. New York: Perenial. Nanda, S. (1993). The Hijras of India: Cultural and individual dimensions of an institutionalized third gender role. In D.N. Suggs and A.W. Miracle (Eds.), Culture and human sexuality (pp. 279293). California: Brooks/Cole. Ortner, S. (1974). Is female to male as nature is to culture?. In M.Z. Rabinow and L. Lamphere (Eds.), Woman, culture, and society (pp. 67-87). California: Stanford University Press. Prieur, A. (1998). Memas house, Mexico City: On transvestites, queens, and machos. California: The University of Chicago Press.