A

AreWe Winning?
C h r i s t i n e B a r t o l f a n d B e r n a r d

Measuring Progress in the Struggle Against al Qaeda and Associated Movements

09
REPORT 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001

I .

F i n e l

America Intro textneeds a new national security vision for this new era and a dialogue at home that is as robust as it is realistic.

Mission I. Title Title

The American Security Project is organized around the belief that honest public discussion of national security requires a better-informed citizenryone that understands the dangers and opportunities of the twenty-first century and the spectrum of available policy responses.

Security is a fundamental responsibility of government. In the new millennium, however, U.S. national security policy has not kept pace with rapidly changing threats to American interests. Globalization has quickened, but the United States has not built alliances or institutions to protect and advance American security. Terrorists have expanded their reach and lethality, but the moral authority of the United States is at an all-time low. Changes in the Earths climate are more evident every day, but the United States has failed to act, alone or with allies, to avoid disaster.

America needs a new national security vision for this new era and a dialogue at home that is as robust as it is realistic. Yet the quality of our discussion on national security has been diminished. Fear has trumped conversation. Artificial differences have been created and real differences have been left unexamined. The character of our national dialogue has grown increasingly shrill while the need for honest discussion has grown more urgent.

Only by developing real analysis and thoughtful answers can a genuine foreign policy consensus be rebuilt for a dangerous and decisive age. Only then will America again marshal all her resourcesmilitary, diplomatic, economic, and moralto meet the challenges of a complex world.

A r e

W e

W i n n i n g ?

Board of Directors

09 REPORT
Lieutenant General Daniel Christman, USA (Ret.)
United States Chamber of Commerce

The Honorable Richard L. Armitage

Armitage International

Brigadier General Stephen A. Cheney, USMC (Ret.)

Marine Military Academy

Nelson W. Cunningham
McLarty Associates

The Honorable Kenneth M. Duberstein

The Duberstein Group

Vice Admiral Lee Gunn, USN (Ret.)

ASP President

The Honorable Chuck Hagel

The Honorable Gary Hart

ASP Chairman

Lieutenant General Claudia Kennedy, USA (Ret.)

Population Action International

The Honorable John Kerry

United States Senate

2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001

General Lester L. Lyles, USAF (Ret.)

The Lyles Group

Ed Reilly
FD International

The Honorable Warren B. Rudman

StonebridgeInternational LLC

Mission

NO UNCERTAIN YES

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R E P O R T

Introduction
The war on terror has morphed from an imprecise, but comprehensible, concept into little more than a cudgel to be wielded in American domestic political debates by both the left and the right. What ought to be a policy debate over threats and consequences, risks and capabilities, ends and means is insteadtoo oftenan opportunistic weapon used without reference to logic or facts in order to gain political advantage. The result is a dizzying set of changing assessments that encourages skepticism and cynicism instead of consistency and clarity. Ultimately, any approach to the challenge posed by al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM) must acknowledge several basic propositions: First, the threat is very real and likely to endure. Second, any progress is likely to be incremental and will require years of prudence and consistency to institutionalize. Third, our adversaries are strategically savvy and will continually adapt to our actions to achieve their goals. Complacency can quickly turn into catastrophe. Our goal in the Are We Winning? series is to provide empirical data as the foundation of reasoned discussion and principled debate. To this end, the American Security Project has developed 10 criteria to measure progressor lack of progressin the struggle against anti-American Islamist terror groups such as al Qaeda. These metrics are designed to be both reproducible and as objective as possible. They are intended to comprise a holistic approach, examining causes and processes associated with the threat, in addition to outcomes.

Developments Since Are We Winning 008

Our report last year highlighted important trends. In particular, violence by AQAM seemed to have stabilized, though at historically high levels. Illicit markets continued to provide substantial financial resources for use by criminal and terrorist organizations. Several terrorist organizations had been dramatically

 

A r e W e W i n n i n g ?

weakened through popular rejectionas in Iraqand effective strikes against leadership targetsas in the Philippines and Indonesia. The terrorist safe haven in northwest Pakistan and the growing sophistication and productivity of the al Qaeda media apparatus, however, were major sources of concern. This year, our report strikes a more hopeful note. While the level of Islamist violence remains highand has indeed climbed significantly since our last full reportthere is a growing consensus among analysts that al Qaeda is increasingly isolated and starved of funds. For the first time since we began this series of reports, there is compelling evidence to suggest that the strength of al Qaeda has begun to diverge significantly from the general level of Islamist violence. The resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan does not seem to have bolstered al Qaedas fortunes. In North Africa, al Qaedas standing has suffered significantly, with the renunciation of al Qaeda affiliation by the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, reversing a 2007 decision. We explore these trends in detail in the following sections.

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2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001

A Note About Terminology

There has been a great deal of debate over the appropriate use of various terms associated with the war on terror, among government officials and policy experts alike. The American Security Project has chosen to adjust its use of terminology. While in the past we framed the issue as examining the level of violent jihadism, we are now focusing our assessment on al Qaeda and Associated Movements (AQAM). The AQAM label is narrower than our previous terminology, but allows us to highlight what we believe is the key trend of the past 12 months: namely, the increasing divergence between the fortunes of Islamist groups generally and al Qaeda more narrowly. This divergence is significant because the key differentiator of al Qaeda is its strategic orientation on the far enemythat is, the United States and the West. To the extent that al Qaeda is on the wane, this trend suggests that many movements that had flirted with internationalizing their focus have now chosen to focus instead on local issues. Unfortunately, our ability to disaggregate data is imperfect. As a consequence, in several sections we continue to cite trends in the number of Islamist attacks as coded by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Finally, in this years report, we grouped our metrics in order to improve readability, rather than trying to order them according to our perception of their relative importance.

Introduction

YES

NO

UNCERTAIN

2 0 0 9

R E P O R T

The metrics in this report are color coded according to our findings based on the question:
Do trends in this indicator demonstrate progress in the struggle against al Qaeda and associated movements?
NO UNCERTAIN YES

Summary of Findings
I. Number of Terrorist Incidents
The level of Islamist terrorism around the world continues to increase, with increases in violence in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia more than off-setting improvements in the situation in Iraq.

II. State of the AQAM Leadership

Although al Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri remain at large, AQAM leaders are on the run, as unmanned drones target important organizational decision makers and operational cadres.

III. Terrorist Financing

Although reliable information remains sporadic, there is increasing evidence to suggest that while radical Islamist groups continue to have access to significant funds, al Qaeda in particular may be undergoing a profound funding crisis.

IV. Al Qaeda Associated Movements

The al Qaeda brand seems to be in retreat after several years of increased reach, and there is evidence to suggest that Islamist movements are increasingly refocusing on local issues rather than joining al Qaeda in launching a global struggle. Al Shabaab in Somalia is the one prominent outlier in this trend.

V. Ungoverned Spaces
Ungoverned spaces continued to provide safe havens for terrorist groups, and weak governance remains a major factor in spawning and sustaining radical insurgent movements.


A r e W e W i n n i n g ?

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2009 2008 VI. International Cooperation Against Terrorism 2007 While many countries still need to fully implement United Nations counterterrorism measures, regional initiatives continue to build state capacity and data sharing. 2006 2005 VII. State Sponsorship of Terrorism 2004 Active state sponsorship remains at historically low levels; however, the large number of states that tolerate some level of presence by known terrorist groups complicate counterterrorism efforts. 2003 2002 VIII. Public Attitudes in the Muslim World Although views of the United States remain negative, public support for al Qaeda and terrorist tactics 2001 has dropped significantly.

IX. Public Attitudes in the United States

Public opinion has remained relatively stable for two years, despite the change in administration. Americans remain fearful of terrorism, but no longer see the issue as paramount.

X. Economic Prosperity and Political Freedom

Although poverty and political oppression persist at high levels throughout the Muslim world, trends in both sets of indicators continue to improve. The Muslim world also weathered the international financial crisis noticeably better than many other regions.

Findings

NO UNCERTAIN YES

2 0 0 9

R E P O R T

The level of Islamist terrorism around the world continues to rise, with increases in violence in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia more than offsetting improvements in the situation in Iraq.

I. Number of Terrorist
Islamist violence around the world spiked again over the past year. There were 671 Islamist incidents excluding attacks in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Israel in 2008.1 If the pace of the first two quarters of 2009 continues, there will be a total of over 1,000 such attacks this year. In past editions of Are We Winning? we have noted flattening trends, but in each case our analysis has been confounded by new spikes beginning shortly after the publication of our reports. Given this history, we report again, with diminished confidence in the predictive value that attacks by Islamist groups seem to have again stabilized. The number of terrorist incidents has ranged between 211 and 228 for four straight quartersfrom July 2008 to June 2009. The number of casualties from Islamist terrorism jumped dramatically in the second quarter of 2009 to 4,736 up from 2,185 in the preceding quarter. However, this increase is almost wholly attributable to the NCTCs decision to count the 2,000 Pakistanis used temporarily as human shields during the May 2009 Buner offensive in Pakistan as casualties of Islamist terrorism.2 We have argued in the past that casualty figures provide unreliable trend lines, and this is a clear demonstration of that dynamic. There are important developments to address in several key theaters: In Iraq, terror attacks by Islamist groups have declined by roughly 70% from the

Incidents
INCIDENTS OF ISLAMIST TERRORISM IN 008
m 0 m 1-10 m 11-20 m 21-50 m >50

Source: NCTC Worldwide Incidents Tracking System

CHANGE IN INCIDENTS OF ISLAMIST TERRORISM FROM 007 TO 008

m NO RECORDED INCIDENTS m >50% DECREASE m 0-50% DECREASE m 0-50% INCREASE m >50% INCREASE

Source: NCTC Worldwide Incidents Tracking System


Do trends in this indicator demonstrate progress in the struggle against al Qaeda and associated movements?

250 Number of INcIdeNts 200 150 100 50

INCIDENTS OF ISLAMIST TERRORISM (Excluding iraq, afghanistan, and israEl)

Source: NCTC Worldwide Incidents Tracking System
1-04 3-04 1-05 3-05 1-06 3-06 1-07 3-07 1-08 3-08 1-09 2-09

date (Quarter-Year)

5000 Number of casualtIes 4000

CASUALTIES OF ISLAMIST TERRORISM (Excluding iraq, afghanistan, and israEl)

peak levels reached in 2007, with the rate of incidents apparently stabilizing at roughly 50 per quarter. This is a signif- icant decline, but it should be noted that only Afghanistan, Israel, Pakistan, and Somalia have more attacks on average. In Afghanistan, attacks by Islamist groups in 2009 have increased by rough- ly 15% over the record levels document- ed in 2008. If anything, this understates the increase in violence, since attacks on military targets are not technically classified as terrorist incidents. In Pakistan, attacks have dramatically increased from 81 in the first two quarters of 2008 to 220 in the first two quarters of 2009. This figure also understates the increase in violence, since many attacks in Pakistan are not attributed to a particular terrorist group but are almost certainly Islamist attacks. In Somalia, attacks have also dramatically increased from 51 in the first two quarters of 2008 to 165 during the same period of 2009. Developments in Somalia are particularly problematic, and will be discussed in more detail under Metric IV: Al Qaeda Associated Movements.

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2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001

3000 2000 1000 0

Source: NCTC Worldwide Incidents Tracking System

1-04 3-04 1-05 3-05 1-06 3-06 1-07 3-07 1-08 3-08 1-09 2-09

date (Quarter-Year)

INCIDENTS OF ISLAMIST TERRORISM IN IRAQ

200 Number of INcIdeNts

150

100

50

1-04

3-04

1-05

3-05

1-06

3-06

1-07

3-07

1-08

3-08

1-09

2-09

Source: NCTC Worldwide Incidents Tracking System

date (Quarter-Year)

300 Number of INcIdeNts 250 200 150 100 50 0

INCIDENTS OF ISLAMIST TERRORISM IN AFGHANISTAN

Terrorist Incidents
Source: NCTC Worldwide Incidents Tracking System
3-07 1-08 3-08 1-09 2-09 1-04 3-04 1-05 3-05 1-06 3-06 date (Quarter-Year) 1-07

Taken together, the level of Islamist terrorism continues to increase. As we will discuss in other sections, there is reason to believe that this general rise does not necessarily increase the risks faced by the United States. However, since we continue to believe that the total number of Islamist terror attacks is a useful metric, any additional positive developments must be weighed against this general trend.

NO

UNCERTAIN

YES

2 0 0 9

R E P O R T

Although al Qaeda leaders Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri remain at large, AQAM leaders are on the run, as unmanned drones target important organizational decision makers and operational cadres.

II. State of the AQAM

Indonesian police conducted a raid in Central Java, killing Noordin Top and three other terrorists in early September 2009.3 The event was likely a coup de grace against Islamist terrorism in Southeast Asia and in particular Indonesia, where Top led a Jemaah Islamiah (JI) splinter group and organized multiple bombings in Jakarta including the 2003 Marriot hotel bombing, the 2004 Australian embassy bombing, 2009 Marriot-Ritz-Carlton bombings as well as the 2005 Bali bombings.4 Indonesian President Yudhoyono has rigorously cracked down on terrorist organizations in the country. In late 2008, three of the four terrorists convicted in the Bali 2002 attack were executed.5 Before the September 2009 Jakarta hotel attack, JI affiliates had not committed a successful large-scale attack since 2005. Only Abu Bakar Bashir remains as spiritual leader to the group. Although Bashir has been convicted of conspiracy charges related to a terrorist attack, he has never been convicted under terrorist charges.6 One can hope that the lack of leadership in JI will result in a decline similar to the Philippines-based terrorist organization Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). ASG now has no leadership and the quality and quantity of its terrorist attacks have declined. While still active, the group has largely focused on criminal activities, including kidnapping local Christians and foreigners for profit.7 While Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri remain at large, unmanned drone attacks continue to kill other high-ranking al Qaeda leaders. Thus far, drones operated by the CIA have killed 11 of the United States initial top 20 al Qaeda targets and four additional targets from the updated list.8 Drone attacks make it difficult for terrorist leaders to fulfill their roles in the organization, including in the areas of fundraising, recruiting, and operational planning. Increased U.S. intelligence capabilities, particularly in Pakistan, have been important in drone targeting. Better intelligence has

Leadership
i
e at larg
Osama bin Laden: he is the founder and leader of al qaeda. Born in saudi arabia to an affluent family with more than 50 siblings, he first took an interest in violent islamism when he became involved in the Muslim Brotherhood. he later fought with the Mujahideen in afghanistan against the soviets. after using sudan as a base for training camps in the early 1990s, he fled counter-terrorist efforts there to settle in afghanistan.14 Ayman al-Zawahiri: he is al qaedas second in command, and has increasingly taken the helm as the face, voice, and inspiration of the organization. in his home country of Egypt, he began organizing violent islamists at the age of 15. he met Osama bin laden, while working as a surgeon for the red crescent society in 1980.15 Mohamad Noordin Top: he was an important officer, recruiter, bombmaker, and trainer for Jemaah islamiah, and linked to several bombings in indonesia including the Bali bombings in 2002 and the bombing of two Jakarta hotels. On several occasions, authorities have incorrectly reported him dead, but in september 2009 dna evidence confirmed he was killed during a police raid in indonesia.16 Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan: Wanted in connection with the 2002 attacks on a hotel and an israeli airliner, nabhan is thought to be one of the original members of the al-qaeda East africa cell and may have been connected to the 1998 u.s. embassy bombings in Kenya and tanzania. he was killed during a raid in september 2009 by u.s. navy seals in somalia.17 Usama al-Kini: Killed by a u.s. air strike in south Waziristan in January 2009, al-Kini was the external operations chief for al qaeda. he was wanted for the 1998 u.s. embassy bombings in Kenya and tanzania and is thought to be responsible for the Marriot hotel bombing in islamabad.18 Baitullah Mehsud: he was the leader of the taliban movement in Pakistan. numerous attacks in Pakistan, including the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, are attributed to Mehsud. he was killed in a cia drone attack in august 2009.19

i KILLED

i
ikilled i

i
iat large

i
i

i
killed

i
ikilled

8
Do trends in this indicator demonstrate progress in the struggle against al Qaeda and associated movements?

i KILLED

i
i

i
i i

i
i i

Abu Jihad al Masri: Known as al qaedas head of propaganda and chief of intelligence. he was an al qaeda commander in Egypt and responsible for several attacks inside the country. he also authored a publication describing the u.s. intelligence communitys structure and weaknesses. Masri was killed by a u.s. missile strike in north Wazieistan.20

09 REPORT
also revealed al Qaeda is struggling to raise funds. Subsequently, it is having more trouble recruiting and equipping fighters.9 A lack of funding as well as continued U.S. targeting of al Qaeda leaders and facilitators may be behind the dramatic decline in As-Sahabsal Qaedas media wingproduction quantity and quality. As-Sahab has in the past produced very sophisticated videos featuring well-crafted English subtitles and green-screen technology.10 The annual number of messages As-Sahab produced decreased from 97 in 2007 to 49 in 2008below 2006 levels.11 AQAM groups remain active on the Internet; Shumukh Al-Islam, Al-Falluja, and Al-Shura are some of the more AIRSTRIKES INSIDE PAKISTAN
YEAR NUMBER OF AIRSTRIKES /0/0 PROJECTED//0 YEAR

prominent websites. These websites provide a venue for radical propaganda, a forum to discuss ideology, and a starting place for recruitment. However, as they rise in popularity, they become more susceptible to counterterrorism efforts. In June 2009, Al-Shura, typically a reliable source of news on radical group movements, published what turned out to be a fake communiqu.12 On September 11, 2009, the major AQAM forums were hit by a coordinated cyber attack that temporarily took several down. During the same time, a previously defunct website came back onlineto strong speculation that it was being run by the U.S. intelligence community.13 Episodes such as these damage the credibility and confidence of the AQAM community in these websites and online forums and thus undermine their ability to further terrorist goals. ANNUAL AS-SAHAB PRODUCTIONS
NUMBER OF PRODUCTIONS     8 7 
100 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 0

2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

10 20 30 40 50

2002 2003 2004 2006 2007 2008

Source: The Long War Journal

2009

AQAM Leadership
Source: IntelCenter

60

NO

UNCERTAIN

YES

2 0 0 9

R E P O R T

Although reliable information remains sporadic, there is increasing evidence to suggest that, while radical Islamist groups continue to have access to significant funds, al Qaeda in particular may be undergoing a profound funding crisis.

III. Terrorist Financing

Estimated Cost of Executing Major Terrorist Attacks
EAST AFRICA EMBASSY BOMBINGS
DATE: AUGUST 7, 8 COST: $0,000

USS COLE ATTACK

DATE: OCTOBER , 000 COST: $0,000

ATTACKS ON NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

DATE: SEPTEMBER , 00 COST: $00,000

BALI NIGHTCLUB BOMBINGS

DATE: OCTOBER , 00 COST: $0,000

MADRID TRAIN BOMBINGS

DATE: MARCH , 00 COST: $0,000

LONDON TRAIN AND BUS BOMBINGS

DATE: JULY 7, 00 COST: $,000-$0,000

INDIVIDUAL IED ATTACK IN IRAQ7

DATE: NUMEROUS COST: $00

MUMBAI ATTACKS8
DATE: NOVEMBER -, 008 COST: $70,000

JAKARTA HOTEL ATTACKS

DATE: JULY 7, 00 COST: $00,000

0
Do trends in this indicator demonstrate progress in the struggle against al Qaeda and associated movements?

T
TAJIKISTAN

On October 12, 2009, U.S. Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorist Financing, David Cohen, argued, We assess that al Qaeda is in its weakest financial condition in several years, and that, as a result, its influence is waning.30 This assessment seems to track with the decline in al Qaeda institutional capacity detailed in our second metric. However, while we have no reason to doubt the Treasury Departments assessment, we also have no independent capacity to verify the argument empirically. Furthermore, according to a report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. officials in Afghanistan said the CIA and the Pentagons Defense Intelligence Agency estimate annual Taliban revenue from drugs at about $70 million a year.31 This is significantly lower than the $400 million figure estimated by the UN Office on Drug and Crime in 2008. Indeed, the UN revised those figures downward in 2009 and noted, The bottom is starting to fall out of the Afghan opium market, reporting a 22% decline in Afghan poppy production.32

OPIUM CULTIVATION AND TALIBAN PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN 2007-2009

UZBEKISTAN UZbEkISTAN

TAjIkISTAN

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2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001
PAkISTAN

TURkMENISTAN TURKMENISTAN

PAKISTAN

IRAN IRAN

m LIghT PRESENCE m SUbSTANTIAL PRESENCE m ENTRENChED PRESENCE

CULTIVATION YEAR: m 2007 m 2008 m 2009

Source: Map combines elements taken from both the UNODC and the Senlis Council.

Not only is less opium being produced, there is also increasing evidence that al Qaeda is not benefitting from even this declining revenue stream. As the Senate Foreign Relations Committee argued:

POPPY CULTIVATION IN AFGHANISTAN

YEAR HECTARES

(A UNIT Of AREA EQUAL TO 10,000 SQUARE METERS, EQUIVALENT TO 2.471 ACRES)

Surprisingly, there is no evidence that any significant amount of the drug proceeds go to al Qaeda. Contrary to conventional wisdom, numerous money laundering and counter-narcotics experts with the United States Government in Afghanistan and Washington said flatly that they have seen no indication of the Taliban or traffickers paying off al Qaeda forces left inside the country.33

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

,000 ,000 8,00

8,000
7,000 80,000 ,000 0,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 Source: UNODC

Again, we are not able to confirm this independently, but the conclusions of the U.S. intelligence community reported by the Senate Committee have elicited no significant disagreements from outside analysts. By contrast, the Afghan Talibanknown also as the Quetta Shura Talibanseems to be quite well funded, with revenues coming from taxes on opium production, contributions from wealthy supporters abroad, and the income from kidnapping and other criminal activities.34 The gap between the financial health of the Taliban and that of al Qaeda is one of the most interesting developments of the past year, even if the implications of this development remain speculative.

Financing
2 0 0 9



NO

UNCERTAIN

YES

R E P O R T

The al Qaeda brand seems to be in retreat after several years of increased reach, and there is evidence to suggest that Islamist movements are increasingly refocusing on local issues rather than joining al Qaeda in launching a global struggle. Al Shabaab in Somalia is the one prominent outlier in this trend.

IV. Al Qaeda -Associated

Movements

North Africa

South Asia

In July 2009, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group issued a statement criticizing indiscriminate bombings and the targeting of civilians, saying that violence did not achieve the aims of the group in removing oppression.35 While al Qaeda remains active in the region, this is a significant blow given the very public embrace of the group by al Qaeda number two Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2007. By contrast, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)formerly the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combatremains actively focused on its declared intention to attack Western targets.36 However, in practice, AQIM activities have focused on two types of operationsattacks on security forces and kidnapping for ransom.37 At this point, AQIMs declared intention to strike at the West remains at odds with its apparent reach. By late 2007, al Qaeda affiliates were active throughout North Africa, leading to expectations of a new campaign against easily accessible European targets. Thus far, these fears have not been realized.

Islamist violence has increased dramatically in South Asia since our last full report, issued in September 2008. Terrorism has increased in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. In addition, the Pakistani terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba was responsible for the spectacular attack in Mumbai in November 2008 that left at least 173 dead and 308 wounded over the course of nearly three days of fighting.38 For the countries in the region, these developments are extremely troubling and destabilizing. One of the most significant threats to international peace is the possibility of Pakistani-based terrorist groups provoking a conflict between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. However, from an American perspective, this increase in violence, though raising significant strategic concerns, does not necessarily portend increased anti-American terrorism. The vast majority of the increase in violence is attributable to groups that have an explicitly local focusLashkar, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, and the Quetta Shura Taliban in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda increasingly seems to be a splinter group, rather than a unifying movement.


Do trends in this indicator demonstrate progress in the struggle against al Qaeda and associated movements?

09 REPORT
East Africa
C

Southeast Asia

The situation in East Africa continues to worsen. Not only has Al Shabaab become increasingly entrenched in Somalia, its leadership has on several occasionsstarting at least in September 200839sought to link itself to al Qaeda. In 2009, a series of Al Shabaab offensives entrenched Islamist control in southern Somalia.40 The raid on September 14, 2009 by U.S. special operations forces that killed Saleh ali Saleh Nabhan in Somalia seems to have reinforced anti-American and anti- Western sentiment,41 and even prompted a reprisal attack against African Union peacekeepers.42 Whereas Islamist movements in North Africa and South Asia seem to be returning to their roots and addressing local grievances, the conflict in East Africa is at great risk of becoming internationalized. This is of particular concern given the large, legal Somali community in the United States, and the compelling evidence that Al Shabaab is recruiting actively in the United States, creating a pool of radicals potentially able to enter the country legally.43

The July 17, 2009 bombings of two hotels in Jakarta, Indonesia temporarily rekindled fears of a resurgence of Jemaah Islamiah

(JI).44 However, the killing of Noordin Top in September 2009 after many false reports of his capture or deathdemonstrated that authorities in Indonesia have retained the upper hand in containing the threat of violent Islamist groups.45 Top was the leader of a splinter group of JI, and was seen as al Qaedas closest ally in the region. There continues to be a steady level of violence in the Philippines, but groups such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front seem to remain focused on local issues, and are apparently willing to return to negotiations with the government.46 The Abu Sayyef Group (ASG), another key al Qaeda affiliate in the past, by contrast, seems to have collapsed into little more than a criminal gang.

2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001

Affiliated Movements

YES

NO

UNCERTAIN

2 0 0 9

R E P O R T

Ungoverned spaces continued to provide safe havens for terrorist groups, and weak governance remains a major factor in spawning and sustaining radical insurgent movements.

V. Ungoverned

Spaces

The challenge of poor governance is an issue that has received a management of the threat posed by transnational terrorism. A lack great deal of attention during debates in the United States over the war in Afghanistan. Many proponents of an increased American of government capacity allows terrorist groups to find sanctupresence in the countryincluding theater commander General ary. In some cases, the collapse of government authority creates Stanley McChrystal48have placed the governance issue front an opening for extremist groups to gain legitimacy through the and center. They have proposed nothing less than a comprehenprovision of public goodsminimally security, but in many cases sive nation-building project designed to build effective and services as well. responsive governance in the country in order to defeat the Islamist insurgency challenging the Kabul government for legitimacy. Over the past year, there were no significant changes in the The challenge of ungoverned spaces remains a core issue in the governance indicators that track a countrys ability to control its territory effectively, according to the World Bank.47 There A major problem for the implementation of this nation-building strategy remains poor governance across the border in Pakistan. The remains a vast ungoverned zone in the center of Africa, stretching Pakistani Army has taken steps to reassert military control over areas from Chad to the Congo, which is susceptible to exploitation. Of previously ceded to Islamist insurgents, but effective governance particular concern are Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia, where poor has yet to be established.49 As a consequence, it is likely that despite governance and the presence of extremist groups combine to create military gains, Pakistan will continue to face a significant insurgency and continue to harbor radical groups, including al Qaeda. particular danger zones. GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS (PErcEntilE ranKing)
m 0-10 m >10-25 m >25-20 m >50-75 m >75-90 m >90



Source: World Bank

Do trends in this indicator demonstrate progress in the struggle against al Qaeda and associated movements?

Karachi

in last years report, we highlighted the emerging threat posed by ungoverned urban spaces, raising the issue of Karachi in particular. Media reports have since confirmed the danger. according to the New York Times:50 Karachi, Pakistantaliban fighters have long used this city of 17 million as a place to regroup, smuggle weapons and even work seasonal jobs. But recently they have discovered another way to make fast money: organized crime.

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2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001

the police here say the taliban, working with criminal groups, are using Mafia-style networks to kidnap, rob banks and extort, generating millions of dollars for the militant insurgency in northwestern Pakistan. the devastating terrorist attack in Mumbai was also planned to a significant degree in the suburbs of Karachi, though supported by training camps in more rural parts of the country.51

as the number of developing world mega-cities continues to grow, it is likely that Karachi is a harbinger of things to come rather than a unique nexus of radicalism, poor governance, and criminality.

Ungoverned Spaces

NO UNCERTAIN YES

2 0 0 9

R E P O R T

While many countries still need to fully implement United Nations counterterrorism measures, regional initiatives continue to build state capacity and data sharing.

VI. International Cooperation Against Terrorism

International Community
The United Nations provided a foundation for an international counterterrorism legal regime in Security Council Resolutions 1390, 1452, 1455, and 1456. Pursuant to these resolutions, nations are urged to freeze the funding and assets of terrorist organizations and individuals who participate in such activities, to prevent the travel of these individuals, and to prevent the supply of arms and related materials to such people and organizations. While all countries were called on to become parties to this and other past terrorist conventions, actual cooperation has varied.52 While Resolution 1390 provided the groundwork for international counterterrorism cooperation, additional conventions are needed to resolve issues and holes in the current international framework. Specific issues to address are: the legal status of rendition; the rights and status of suspected members of terrorist organizations; and the obligations of states to prevent attacks emanating from their soil, and on the flip side, the rights of states to act against threats coming from non-state actors emanating from another country.


Do trends in this indicator demonstrate progress in the struggle against al Qaeda and associated movements?

Regional Initiatives

09 REPORT
Southeast Asia/Australia:
b Institutions in Southeast Asia and Oceania have had a significant impact on the capacity of counterterrorism in the region. Groups including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counterterrorism are utilized by the United States, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Australia to provide training courses, conduct research, and build counterterrorism capacity in the region.55 ASEAN has particularly focused on an EU/ASEAN partnership meant to increase sharing among law enforcement agencies between the regions.56 The Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative is a plan sponsored by the United States to use civil and military agencies for counterterrorism purposes in the region. The plan is intended primarily to build capacity and increase government effectiveness, so as to prevent the growth of terrorist organizations in the region. Members include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal. In late 2007, the program was folded into the newly created United States Africa Command (AFRICOM).57

European Union:

There are continued efforts within the European Union (EU) to share information and best practices, as well as facilitate capacity building in poorer European countries. There has been a recent emphasis by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe on public-private partnerships meant to engage civil society, the media, business interests, and industry on counterterrorism measures.53 The United States and Europe finally agreed in March 2009 on the Safe Harbor Framework for data protection and privacy and bridged the gap between different approaches to data privacy.54

2009 2008 Northwestern Africa: 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001
C

International Cooperation
b

7

NO

UNCERTAIN

YES

2 0 0 9

R E P O R T

Active state sponsorship remains at historically low levels; however, the large number of states that tolerate some level of presence by known terrorist groups complicate counterterrorism efforts.

VII. State

Sponsorship of Terrorism

Only a small number of countries are failing to cooperate in some manner with the U.S. governments counterterrorism efforts. The State Department specifies four countries as completely uncooperativeIran, Syria, Cuba, and Sudanand designates them as state sponsors of terror.58 It does not differentiate, for example, between those countries who are genuine partners in counterterrorism and those who tolerate terrorist organizations within their borders or turn a blind eye to terrorist fundraising. Other countries have good intentions, but lack the capacity to comply. U.S. government reports on terrorism are unfortunately not solely dependent on counterterrorism cooperation. The country reports vary in details and designation according to the greater political picture. For example, the government no longer details Turkmenistans abuse of counterterrorism measures. North Korea was only recently dropped off the state sponsorship list, despite only a cursory mention of actual state sponsorship. Countries that have strong diplomatic and economic relations with countries designated as state sponsors of terror are not rebuked in reports. Designations and details in these State Department reports should therefore be taken as an informative, but political, worknot as a full description of a countrys counterterrorism efforts. Nonetheless, we believe that it is possible to disaggregate countries into a number of analytically useful categories. Active state sponsorship of terrorism remains at historically low levels. Even countries that demonstrably support terrorist organizations are mostly guilty of supporting groups that have attributes of quasi-statehoodparticularly Hamas and Hezbollah. State support for purely terrorist organizations is less common, reflecting the established international consensus that terrorism is illegitimate. Iran is the only country that seems to support groups that are actively targeting Americans, particularly in Iraq.59 Pakistans policies are also troubling. While it is possible that Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is a rogue element within the Pakistani government, it seems more likely that ISIs support for anti-Indian terrorismparticularly Lashkar-e-Taiba, which was responsible for the devastating Mumbai attacksreflects a deliberate state policy of using terrorism in support of strategic objectives.60 This report indentifies five levels of state sponsorship and toleration of terrorist activity, based on a country-by-country assessment of the U.S. Department of States Country Reports on Terrorism.61 The categories are listed below, in declining order of severity.

8
Do trends in this indicator demonstrate progress in the struggle against al Qaeda and associated movements?

STATE SPONSORSHIP OF TERRORISM

m ACTIVE SPONSORS m AgREEMENTS WITh TERRORISTS m TOLERATE fUNDRAISINg m TOLERATE PRESENCE m fAILURE TO PROSECUTE/fAILURE TO PASS OR IMPLEMENT LAWS m AbUSE Of COUNTERTERRORISM fOR DOMESTIC REPRESSION

09 REPORT
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001

Source: Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism

Active sponsors are countries that directly support terrorist organizations with funds, arms, and intelligence. They also provide political support to terrorist groups and largely refuse to cooperate with international efforts to reign in terrorism. In the second category are states that negotiate agreements with terrorists. These agreements include offers of amnesty in return for unverified cooperation, as well as regional autonomy agreements that institutionalize ungoverned spaces. The next category of states includes those that tolerate fundraising and knowingly allow agents of terrorist groups to operate on their soil and openly solicit funds for their activities abroad. In the fourth category, there are states that tolerate the presence of known terrorists on their soil and fail to either arrest or extradite terrorist operatives. Countries that have failed to pass laws and regulations to enforce their international obligations constitute the fifth category. This is distinct from countries that simply lack the capacity to implement their laws. Additionally, there are those states that formally cooperate with counterterrorism efforts, but whose actions are actually at odds with the goals of the effort. These are states that use counterterrorism as a shield for domestic repression. Though these states may be cooperative, their actions ultimately delegitimize counterterrorism efforts and ought to be condemned.

State Sponsorship

NO UNCERTAIN YES

2 0 0 9

R E P O R T

Although views of the United States remain negative, public support for al Qaeda and terrorist tactics has dropped significantly.

VIII. Public Attitudes in the Muslim World

President Obamas June 4, 2009 speech in Cairo to the Muslim world garnered enormous attention and contributed to his winning the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize.62 In it, he spoke of transforming the way the United States conducts diplomacy and encouraged Muslim communities to isolate extremists. He emphasized that America and Islam were not incompatible and that the United States was not at war with the religion. His speech addressed some of the major public diplomacy challenges the United States faces in the Muslim world, which has historically had unfavorable views of America and has been suspicious of its goals.63 Despite President Obamas election, polls conducted in April and May 2009 in six major Muslim-majority countries did not show a rise in favorable attitudes towards the United States. There was, however, a notable shift away from very unfavorable to somewhat unfavorable responses. Preliminary polls conducted after the presidents Cairo speech suggest that there was only a slight increase in favorable opinion expressed in Turkey and the Palestinian Territories.64 While public opinion towards the United States barely budged in the Spring 2009 polls, Pakistani views of al Qaeda have dramatically changed, with only 9% supporting the terrorist organizationa decrease from 25% the previous year. Their confidence in Osama bin Laden has also declined by a significant 18%.65 Overall, there has been a decrease in Muslims who are willing to support terrorism and terrorist tactics. According to Pew surveys, there has been a significant decrease in support for attacks on civilians and suicide bombings since 2002. This trend is particularly evident in Pakistan, Jordan, and Turkey: between 2005 and 2009, there has been a decrease of 20%,

PAKISTANI VIEWS OF U.S. MOTIVES Please tell me if you think the following are or are not u.s. goals: to weaken and divide the islamic world.
m DEfINITELY / PRObAbLY m DEfINITELY NOT / PRObAbLY NOT m REfUSED / DONT kNOW

008

00
%

8%

0%

%

7%

88%

Source: WorldPublicOpinion.org

0
Do trends in this indicator demonstrate progress in the struggle against al Qaeda and associated movements?

45%, and 10%, respectively, in support of the belief that attacks on civilian targets are justified.66 So while, overall, Muslim populations are increasingly unsympathetic to terrorist organizations, they continue to have antipathy towards the United States. A small percentage of Muslims make up the pool of potential terrorists, but the pool does not need to be large for terrorist organizations whose members number only in the tens of thousands. While the local population may not agree with terrorists means, they often understand (and even sympathize with) their motivations, and thus often tolerate their presence. Eighty-eight percent MUSLIM ATTITUDES OF THE U.S. generally speaking, is your attitude towards the united states:
m 2006
ATTITUDE

of Pakistanis believe it is a U.S. goal to weaken and divide 67 Islam. Only 24% favor the U.S.-led effort to fight terrorism. There is a general mistrust of U.S. intentions in Pakistan, but the news is not all grim. Ninety-one percent of Pakistanis believe that terrorism is a very large problem in their country and more than three-fourths are concerned about the rise of violent extremism in Pakistan. In other words, Americans and Pakistanis are worried about many of the same issues. This, coupled with the lack of Pakistani support for terrorist organiza- tions and methods, suggests that there may be a window of opportunity for the United States to increase its standing in the Pakistani public by addressing common issues. PAKISTANI ATTITUDES OF AL QAEDA generally speaking, is your attitude towards al qaeda:
m 2008
ATTITUDE

09 REPORT
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001

m 2008

m 2009
RESULTS

m 2009
RESULTS

Very favorable

% %

Very favorable Somewhat favorable Somewhat Unfavorable

% 7% % %

%

3% Somewhat favorable
8% % % % %

1%
% 8% % 0% 0% % % 0%

Somewhat Unfavorable

Very Unfavorable Dk / Refused

Very Unfavorable

SUPPORT FOR ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS Percentage of respondants who believe attacks on civilian targets are often/sometimes justified in order to defend islam from its enemies.
m TURkEY
PerceNtage of resPoNdeNts 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 SUM-02 SPR-04

U.S.-LED EFFORTS TO FIGHT TERRORISM Which comes closest to describing your view of u.s.-led efforts to fight terrorism: in favor or oppose?
m fAVOR
PerceNtage of resPoNdeNts 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

m jORDAN

m INDONESIA

m PAkISTAN

m OPPOSE

Muslim World
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 SPR-06 SPR-07 SPR-08 SPR-09 date date

SPR-05

Source: Data collected for the charts comes from the Pew Global Attitudes Project Muslim attitudes of the U.S. were gauged using surveys conducted in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

NO

UNCERTAIN

YES

2 0 0 9

R E P O R T

2009



Public opinion has remained relatively stable for two years, despite the change in administration. Americans remain fearful of terrorism, but no longer see the issue as paramount.

IX. Public Attitudes in the United

A terrorist organizations goal is to cause fear and anxiety in a population in order to increase the likelihood of attaining its objectives. Without that fear and anxiety, terrorism fails at its purpose. Public opinion in the United States is thus an important measure in assessing the war on terror, because it reflects the job performance of terrorists. The current debate on Afghanistan has brought attention back to the war on terror, but only 5% of the American population surveyed in August 2009 believes terrorism is the most important issue facing the country. An additional 8% of the population thinks the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, often associated with terrorism, are the most important. Domestic concerns such as the economy and health care make up more than 75% of the responses. American opinion on who is winning the war on terror has remained fairly stable, with nearly 50% believing the United States has been winning the war for the past 24 months (those that believe terrorists are winning make up around 20-25%). Public opinion has remained constant despite major terrorist threats in Europe and attacks on Western targets overseas. The only major exception to this stability was February 2009, the first month of President Obamas administration, when 62% of surveyed Americans felt we were winning (a 15% difference from the months before and after). American opinion on terrorism is strongly influenced by political developments and media attention.

States

Thirty-five percent of Americans have a continued fear of an imminent terrorist attackbelieving it likely that there will be an act of terrorism in the United States in the next several weeks. This is a significant decrease from three years ago, when 54% feared an impending attack. Despite the decrease, the topic remains pertinent and continues to have significant political potential. In theory, the more threatened a society feels, the more willing it is to sacrifice individual rights to protect national security. This tradeoff is thus another terrorist job performance indicator. Interestingly, while the numbers for winning the war on terror and the likelihood of an imminent terrorist attack have remained largely the same between administrations, concerns over the balance between individual rights and national security have changed. Following President Obamas announcement of plans to end the practice of holding detainees at Guantanamo Bay and the disclosure of CIA memos on controversial interrogation techniques, polls show that the American public is increasingly concerned that the legal system is protecting individual rights at the expense of national security. This demonstrates a deep reservoir of fear and concern in the United States. Overall, the population does not find terrorism to be a significant issue, and while the discussion of enhanced interrogation techniques and civil liberties can be polarizing, they remain at the margins of public debate.


Do trends in this indicator demonstrate progress in the struggle against al Qaeda and associated movements?

HOW LIKELY IS IT THAT THERE WILL BE FURTHER ACTS OF TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS?
m VERY LIkELY/SOMEWhAT LIkELY
80 PerceNtage of resPoNdeNts 70 60 50 40 30 20 10

m NOT TOO LIkELY/NOT AT ALL LIkELY

09 REPORT
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001
jUN 09 AUg 09 jUN 09 AUg 09 APR 09

Source: CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll

jUN 07 AUg 07 jUN 08 AUg 08 APR 07 APR 08 OCT 06 DEC 06 fEb 07 OCT 07 DEC 07 fEb 08 OCT 08 DEC 08 AUg 06 fEb 09 0

date

WHO IS WINNING THE WAR ON TERROR?

m U.S. & ALLIES
70 PerceNtage of resPoNdeNts 60 50 40 30 20 10

m TERRORISTS

Source: Rasmussen Reports

0 jUN 05 AUg 05 jUN 06 AUg 06 jUN 07 AUg 07 jUN 08 AUg 08 APR 05 APR 06 APR 08 APR 08 APR 09 OCT 05 DEC 05 fEb 06 OCT 06 DEC 06 fEb 07 OCT 07 DEC 07 fEb 08 OCT 08 DEC 08 fEb 05 fEb 09

date

Which of the following is the most important issue facing the country?
% 8% 8% % 0% %

does our legal system worry too much about protecting individual rights or worry too much about protecting national security?
% 7% %

%

ThE ECONOMY hEALTh CARE ThE fEDERAL bUDgET ThE WARS IN IRAQ AND AfghANISTAN m EDUCATION m TERRORISM m ENERgY POLICY m m m m

m m m m

INDIVIDUAL RIghTS NATIONAL SECURITY bALANCE IS AbOUT RIghT NOT SURE

Source: Rasmussen Reports Survey, April 21-22, 2009

United States
Source: CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll, August 28-31, 2009

%



NO

UNCERTAIN

YES

2 0 0 9

R E P O R T

Although poverty and political oppression persist at high levels throughout the Muslim world, trends in both sets of indicators continue to improve. The Muslim world also weathered the international financial crisis noticeably better than many other regions.

X. Economic Prosperity & Political Freedom

Political Freedom
There is no direct link between political freedom and terrorism. However, frustration over the political systems in authoritarian countries likely contributes to the radicalization process. Unfortunately, authoritarian regimes dominate the Muslim world. Out of the 48 majority-Muslim countries rated by Freedom House, only two ranked as free (Mali and Indonesia)one less than last year. Twenty-three were ranked not free (with virtually no change from last year). There are, however, encouraging trends.68 Twenty countries showed improvement in political freedom and civil liberties over the past five yearswith most gains occurring in recent years. Only eight countries have had any decline in political freedom, with only four of those seeing a significant decline. These numbers seem to remain steady from last year, suggesting some movement back and forth between categories, but no overall regression. These countries lack stability, however, and countries that become wracked with internal turmoil are certain to see a decrease in political freedom. Pakistan moved from a rating of not free to partially free, but domestic terrorism and political volatility create dynamics that will need to be assessed closely over the coming year. The story is similar for countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Egypt.

FREE
m SIgNIfICANT IMPROVEMENT

PARTIALLY FREE
m NO ChANgE

NOT FREE
m SOME REgRESSION m SIgNIfICANT REgRESSION

m SOME IMPROVEMENT

Source: Freedom House


Do trends in this indicator demonstrate progress in the struggle against al Qaeda and associated movements?

Economic Progress
Poverty remains endemic in the Muslim world, though economic growth is slowly alleviating this problem. The number of Muslim-majority countries with a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of less than $2,000 declined from 28 to 14 over the past year as several poor nations crossed that threshold.69 Economic growth in the Muslim world remained robust and largely untouched by the financial meltdown that hammered

the developed world. Eighteen Muslim-majority countries saw their GDP increase by more than 6% in 2008a decline from the 23 that saw such growth in 2007but nonetheless a strong showing in a year where economic decline was the norm in the industrialized world. There also remains a small number of countries and territories with economic situations that look increasingly hopeless Somalia, Chad, and the Palestinian territorieswith tremendous poverty, little economic growth, and few prospects for the future. $,00-$0,000 GDP PER CAPITA

09 REPORT
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001

LESS THAN $,000 GDP PER CAPITA

m LESS ThAN 0% gDP gROWTh m 0-2% gDP gROWTh

$,000-$,000 GDP PER CAPITA

m 2-4% gDP gROWTh

$0,00-$0,000 GDP PER CAPITA

GREATER THAN $0,000 GDP PER CAPITA

m 4-6% gDP gROWTh

m gREATER ThAN 6% gDP gROWTh

Source: CIA World Factbook

Prosperity & Freedom


NO UNCERTAIN YES

2 0 0 9

R E P O R T

Conclusions & Recommendations

CONCLUSIONS
For the first time in three years, we conclude this report on a cautiously hopeful note. While Islamist movements around the world remain vibrant, and the level of Islamist violence rose to new heights, we believe that trends on the whole suggest a positive turn in what was once called the war on terror. Three developments, in particular, are worth highlighting: First, al Qaeda seems to have been significantly weakened. The counter-productive actions of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) notably attacks on Muslim civiliansreduced the standing of the organization in the Muslim world. As long as al Qaeda could credibly claim to be a defender of Muslim rights, it could benefit from deep-seated anti-Americanism in the Muslim world. But AQIs tactics seem to have spawned a durable backlash. In addition, effective counterterrorism measures, including drone strikes in Pakistan, have killed many senior leaders and apparently disrupted media operations. Al Qaeda may certainly rebound in the future, but at the close of 2009 it seems to be at a low ebb. Second, with the exception of Al Shabaabs increasing affiliation with al Qaeda, there seems to be some movement toward a rejection of al Qaedas concept of a global struggle in favor of a more local focus for Islamist groups. The rejection of al Qaeda by the Libyan Islamic Fighting Groupreversing a public embrace in


A r e W e W i n n i n g ?

09 REPORT
2007is a significant development. The most significant increases in violence can all be attributed to groups with a local or regional agenda. The era of far enemy jihadism70 may be waning. Third, the continued lack of attacks on the United States suggests that American counterterrorism effortsas imperfect and, in some cases, counter-productive as they arehave been effective in reducing the threat to the United States. Better surveillance capabilities and authorities seemed to play a key role in thwarting terrorist plotter Najibullah Zazi.71 And as detailed earlier, American special operations forces and air strikes have likely disrupted al Qaeda activities. There is little evidence to suggest that Bush-era enhanced interrogation techniques contributed to American security, but the broader apparatus of counterterrorism activities, largely retained by President Obama, seems to provide a solid foundation to protect the nation from transnational plots. First, the most effective way to discredit AQAM is to directly challenge their claim to be defenders of the Muslim world. Highlighting as much as possible the human suffering inflicted by these groups on fellow Muslims seems a much more productive avenue than seeking to engage in esoteric debates over the meaning of jihad. Second, President Obamas personal popularity abroad is a potentially valuable resource that should be exploited carefully through measures that allow him to claim credit for specific achievements. While solving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute seems to many a panacea for our problems, a durable solution is unlikely to occur. Therefore, the administration should seek other, more achievable, accomplishments to bolster the presidents claim to be transforming American foreign policy. Explicitly linking the plight of the Bangladeshis to American commitments in regards to climate change could be one avenue for making inroads into anti-American attitudes in the Muslim world.

2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001

RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States may be facing unique opportunities to turn the corner and institutionalize some of the gains of the past year through three initiatives.

Third, the United States should continue to use carefully calibrated direct military action to maintain pressure on the AQAM leadership. These attacks have been successful, and the United States should take care before abandoning this policy in order to pursue more ambitiousand perhaps unattainablenationbuilding goals.

Conclusions & Recommendations

7
2 0 0 9 R E P O R T

Endnotes
1

national counterterrorism center, Worldwide Incidents Tracking System, January 1, 2006 - June 30, 2009. http://wits.nctc.gov/ (accessed October 10, 2009). daud Khattak, taliban terror holds 2,000 villagers as human shields, TimesOnline, May 3, 2009. http:// www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/ article.ece (accessed October 13, 2009). reuters, hundreds gather as Malaysia Buries noordin top, New York Times, October 2, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/00/0/0/ world/international-uk-indonesia-militantmalaysia.html (accessed October 13, 2009). federal Bureau of investigation, fBi seeking information: noordin Mohammad top. http://www. fbi.gov/terrorinfo/top.htm (accessed september 30, 2009). Bali bombers buried after execution, CNN, november 9, 2009. http://www.cnn.com/008/ WORLD/asiapcf//0/bali.bombings/index.html (accessed september 27, 2009). steven c. Welsh, terrorism Prosecution: indonesian court convicts islamic cleric Bashir, center for defense information, May 27, 2009. http://www. cdi.org/news/law/bali-bashir.cfm (accessed september 22, 2009). council on foreign relations, abu sayyaf group, May 27, 2009. http://www.cfr.org/ publication// (accessed september 29, 2009). Matthew rosenberg and siobah gorman, al qaedas diminished role stirs afghan troop debate, Wall Street Journal, October 5, 2009. http://online. wsj.com/article/SB88. html?mod=loomia&loomia_si=t0:a:g:r: c0.07:b80#articleTabs%Darticle (accessed October 13, 2009). ibid (accessed October 13, 2009). neal Krawetz, a Pictures Worth... Digital Image Analysis and Forensics, 2007, pp. 25-30. http:// www.hackerfactor.com/papers/bh-usa-07krawetz-wp.pdf. B. Venske, intelcenter, september 15, 2009. fake communiqu roils Jihadi Online Media, The Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor, June 25, 2009. http://www.memrijttm.org/content/en/blog_ personal.htm?id=8&param=JT (accessed september 27, 2009).

13

the Middle East Media research institute, 9/11 Brings Mayhem to Jihadi internet, september 11, 2009. http://www.memri.org/bin/articles.cgi? Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP00 (accessed september 29, 2009). PBs frontline, a Biography of Osama bin laden, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ shows/binladen/who/bio.html (accessed October 23, 2009). global security, ayman al-Zawahiri, http://www. globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/ zawahiri.htm (accessed October 23, 2009). hundreds gather as Malaysia Buries noordin top. Jeffrey gettleman Eric schmitt, u.s. Kills top qaeda Militant in southern somalia, New York Times, september 14, 2009. http://www.nytimes. com/00/0//world/africa/raid.html (accessed October 12, 2009). Zahid hussain, usama al-Kini, head of al-qaeda in Pakistan, killed by us military, Times Online. January 9, 2009. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/ world/asia/article7.ece (accessed October 12, 2009). declan Walsh, air strike kills taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, guardian, august 7, 2009. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/00/aug/07/ baitullah-mehsud-dead-taliban-pakistan (accessed august 7, 2009). Bill roggio, senior al qaeda leader thought killed in north Waziristan strike, The Long War Journal. november 1, 2008. http://www.longwarjournal. org/archives/008//senior_al_qaeda_lead_ .php (accessed October 8, 2009). Joshua Prober, accounting for terror: debunking the Paradigm of inexpensive terrorism, The Washington Institute of Near East Policy, november 1, 2005. http://www.apgml.org/frameworks/docs/7/ Costs%0of%0TF_J%0Prober%0Dec0.pdf (accessed October 22, 2009). ibid. national commission on terrorist attacks, The 9/11 Commission Report, Washington dc: W.W. norton & co., 2004. Eben Kaplan, tracking down terrorist financing, Council on Foreign Relations. april 4, 2006. http:// www.cfr.org/publication/0/#p (accessed October 15, 2009).

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ibid.; Joshua Prober, accounting for terror: debunking the Paradigm of inexpensive terrorism, The Washington Institute of Near East Policy, november 1, 2005. http://www.apgml.org/ frameworks/docs/7/Costs%0of%0TF_J%0 Prober%0Dec0.pdf (accessed October 22, 2009). Eben Kaplan, tracking down terrorist financing, Council on Foreign Relations, april 4, 2006. http:// www.cfr.org/publication/0/#p (accessed October 15, 2009). tom Vanden Brook, Best afghanistan defense: MraPs+ locals, USA Today. august 13, 2009. http:// www.usatoday.com/news/military/00-08-ied_N.htm (accessed October 20, 2009). Vickey nanjappa, Mumbai attacks cost lashkar rs 4 crore, Rediff India Abroad, december 26, 2008. http://www.rediff.com/news/008/dec/ mumterror-mumbai-attacks-cost-lashkar-rsfour-crore.htm (accessed October 1, 2009). adianto P. simamora, hotels bombing cost terrorists rP 1 billion, The Jakarta Post, august 19, 2009. http://www.thejakartapost.com/ news/00/08//hotels-bombing-cost-terroristsrp--billion.html (accessed september 30, 2009). david s. cohen, remarks to the aBa/aBa Money laundering Enforcement conference, October 12, 2009. http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/ tg7.htm (accessed October 14, 2009). afghanistans narco War: Breaking the link Between drug traffickers and insurgents, A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, august 10, 2009. united nations Office on drugs and crime, afghanistan Opium survey 2009, summary findings, 2009. afghanistans narco War: Breaking the link Between drug traffickers and insurgents. Eric schmitt, Many sources feed taliban War chest, New York Times, October 18, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/00/0//world/ asia/taliban.html?_r=&hp (accessed October 7, 2009). david Blair, Extremist group announces split from al qaeda, Telegraph, July 9, 2009. http://www. telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/7880/ Extremist-group-announces-split-from-al-Qaeda. html (accessed October 7, 2009).

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Andrew Hansen and Lauren Vriens, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Council on Foreign Relations, July 21, 2009. http://www.cfr.org/ publication/12717/ (accessed September 25, 2009). Eric Schmitt and Squad Mekhennet, Qaeda Branch Steps Up Raids in North Africa, New York Times, July 9, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/10/ world/africa/10terror.html?_r=3&scp=1&sq=al %20qaeda%20north%20africa&st=cse (accessed October 7, 2009). Mumbai Attacks, BBC News, October 12, 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/south_ asia/2008/mumbai_attacks/default.stm (accessed October 7, 2009). Nick Grace, Shabaab Leader Sanctioned as Zawahiri Responds to Groups Oath of Loyalty, Long War Journal, November 21, 2008. http://www. longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/11/shabaab_ leader_sanct.php (accessed September 22, 2009). Stephanie McCrummen, Rebels Threaten Somali Government, Washington Post, May 18, 2009. http:// www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2009/05/17/AR2009051701296.html. Jonathan Adams, After deadly US raid, Somalia radicals call for backup, Christian Science Monitor, September 16, 2009. http://www.csmonitor. com/2009/0916/p99s01-duts.html (accessed October 7, 2009). Associated Press, Seattle FBI investigating Somali suicide bombing, NPR, September 25, 2009. http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story. php?storyId=112914209 (accessed October 7, 2009). Andrew Liepman, Violent Islamist Extremism: AlShabaab Recruitment in America, Hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, March 11, 2009. Berni Moestafa and Bambang Djanuato, Jakarta Hotel Bombers Linked to Jemaah Islamiyah, Police Say, Bloomberg, July 19, 2009. http://www.bloomberg. com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aRi. LFPckR88 (accessed September 21, 2009). VOA News, DNA Confirms Death of Terrorist Leader Noordin Top, September 19, 2009. http://www. voanews.com/english/2009-09-19-voa7.cfm (accessed September 20, 2009); Yormick and Associates, Personal data exchange between the EU and the U.S., April 2009. http://www.yormicklaw.com/cms/index. php?id=211 (accessed October 15, 2009). Edd K. Usman, MILF launches Mindanao-wide consultations on peace process, Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation, August 11, 2009. http://www. mb.com.ph/articles/215400/milf-launchesmindanaowide-consultations-peace-process (accessed October 3, 2009). The World Bank, The Worldwide Governance Indicators Project, Governance Matters 2009. http:// info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (accessed October 2, 2009).

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General Stanley McChrystal, COMISAFs Initial Assessment, August 30, 2009. http://media. washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/ documents/Assessment_Redacted_092109. pdf?hpid=topnews (accessed September 30, 2009). Sabrina Tavernise and Irfan Ashraf, Racing Time and Taliban to Rebuild in Pakistan, New York Times, October 10, 2009. http://www.nytimes. com/2009/10/11/world/asia/11swat.html?_ r=1&scp=4&sq=swat%20valley&st=cse (accessed October 7, 2009). Sabrina Tavernise, Organized Crime in Pakistan Feeds Taliban, New York Times, August 28, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/29/world/asia/ 29karachi.html (accessed October 7, 2009). Lydia Polgreen and Squad Mekhennet, Militant Network Is Intact Long After Mumbai Siege, New York Times, September 29, 2009. http://www.nytimes. com/2009/09/30/world/asia/30mumbai.html (accessed October 10, 2009). United Nations Security Council, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1456, January 20, 2003. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Factsheet: Action Against Terrorism Unit. http://www. osce.org/publications/atu/2008/09/13544_47_ en.pdf (accessed October 12, 2009). Yormick and Associates 2009; THE U.S.-EU SAFE HARBOR Framework: Data Protection & Cross Border Personal Data Transfers. Damon C. Greer. http://74.125.113.132/search?q=cache: ZwdDTG7XxRQJ:ec.europa.eu/justice_home/ news/information_dossiers/conference_ personal_data/doc/greer.ppt+THE+U.S.-EU+SAFE+ HARBOR+Framework:+Data+Protection+ %26+Cro ss+Border+Personal+Data+Transfers&cd=2&hl=e n&ct=clnk&gl=us (accessed October 12, 2009). Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). http://www. globalct.org/resources_factSheets_arf.php (accessed October 10, 2009). Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism (SEARCCT), About SEARCCT. http://www.searcct. gov.my/index.php?option=com_content&task=v iew&id=30&Itemid=272&lang=english (accessed October 13, 2009). United States Africa Command, The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. http://www.africom. mil/tsctp.asp (accessed October 13, 2009). U.S. Department of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism. http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151. htm; U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, April 30, 2009. http://www.state. gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2008/index.htm (accessed October 10, 2009).

60 61 62

Polgreen and Mekhennet.

Country Reports on Terrorism 2008.

49

President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on a New Beginning, Cairo, June 4, 2009. http://www. whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-bythe-President-at-Cairo-University-6-04-09/. Confidence in Obama lifts U.S. image around the world, most Muslim publics not so easily moved, The Pew Global Attitudes Project, July 23, 2009. http:// pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=264 (accessed September 15, 2009). Ibid. Growing concerns about extremism, continuing discontent with U.S., The Pew Global Attitudes Project, August 13, 2009. http://pewglobal.org/ reports/pdf/265.pdf (accessed September 15, 2009). Ibid.

09 REPORT
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001

63

38

50

64 65

39

51

66 67 68

Confidence in Obama lifts U.S. image around the world. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2009. http://www.freedomhouse.org/template. cfm?page=351&ana_page=352&year=2009 (accessed October 10, 2009).

40

52 53

41

69

54

Central intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, October 2, 2009. https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/ (accessed October 5, 2009).

42

70 71

Fawaz Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). DeeDee Correll, Suspected terrorist may have planned 9/11 anniversary attack, Los Angeles Times, September 26, 2009. http://www.latimes.com/ news/nationworld/nation/la-na-terror-zazi262009sep26,0,1853602.story (accessed October 10, 2009).

43

44

55

56

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57

46

58

47

59

Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, Iranian Strategy in Iraq - Politics and Other Means, Occasional Paper Series, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, October 13, 2008.

Endnotes
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w ww. Americ a n S e c u r i t y P r oj e c t . o r g

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