UNIVERSITATEA Dunarea de Jos DIN GALATI FACULTATEA DE LITERE

PREZENTAREA CURSULUI
Capitolul I. Language as a Conceptual System. Linguistic Relativism and Semantic Universals Capitolul II. Semantic Relations and Lexical Categories A. Paradigmatic Relations 1. Incompatibility/ Opositeness of Meaning a. Complementarity b. Antonymy c. Reversibility d. Hierarchic oppositions. e. Inverse oppositions. 2. Synonymy 3. Hyponymy or inclusion B. Syntagmatic Relations. Capitolul III. Semantic Theory within the Framework of Generative Transformational Grammar 1. Semantics in the Standard Generative Theory of language. The Semantic Component of Generative -Transformational Grammar 2. Generative Semantics Versus Interpretive Semantics Capitolul IV. New Semantic Theories 1. Categorization. Necessary and Sufficient Conditions Model. The Theory of Prototype 2. Cognitive Semantics

Chapt er I LA NGU AGE A S A C ON C EPTU AL S YST EM

Language is not only an instrument of communication. It is far more than this - it is the means by which we interpret our environment, by which we classify or "conceptualize" our experiences, by which we are able to impose structure on reality, so as to use what we have observed for present and future learning and understanding. Leech considers language, in its semantic aspect, as a conceptual system. Not as a closed, rigid, conceptual system which tyrannizes over the thought processes of its users, but as an open-ended conceptual system, one which "leaks", in the sense that it allows us to transcend its limitations by various types of semantic creativity. The first question which arises in whether language is a single conceptual system, or whether there are as many conceptual systems as there are languages. Although much of present-day thinking has tended to hypothesize a universal conceptual framework which is common to all human language, common observation shows that languages differ in the way they classify experience. A classic instance of this is the semantics of colour words. English (according to Berlin and Kay, Basic Color Terms, 1969) has a range of eleven primary colour terms (black, white, red, green, yellow, blue, brown, purple, pink, orange and grey), whereas the Philipine language of Hanuno (according to Conklein, Hanuno Colour Categories, 1955) makes do with four. Conceptual boundaries often vary from language to language. Languages have a tendency to impose structure upon the real world by treating some distinctions as crucial, and ignoring others. The way a language classifies things is sometimes blatantly man-centred.

Linguis tic Rel ativis m and S emanti c Uni vers als Semantic relativism and semantic universals are two conflicting points of view in relation to meaning. Both theses concern the relation between the structure of language and the structure of the universe. They represent in fact two different ways of interpreting the relation between the universe, as experienced by man, and language as a tool of expressing that experience. Ever since ancient times it has been maintained that the structure of language reflects more or less directly the structure of the Universe as well as the universal structure of the human mind (Mounin, 1963: 41).
3

This was taken to be a precondition of interlingual communication as well as of the act of translation. In terms of Hjelmslevian distinction between substance and form of the content, it was agreed that there may be different ways of segmenting substance, and an even richer variety in its form but the content itself, the world of experience remains basically the same. Linguistic relativism. The axiomatic character of the statement which relates the structure of language to the structure of the universe as reflected in man's mind, ceases to be commonly agreed upon when one begins to consider the nature of this relationship. Wilhelm von Humboldt in the first half of the 19th century, and many philosophers and linguists after him, assigned language a much more active role, regarding it not as a passive carrier of thought, but, in a very direct way as a moulder of it. In their opinion, language imposes upon thought its own system of distinctions, its own analysis of objective reality. These ideas remained unheeded by linguists until the advent of European structuralism. The key idea in Saussurean linguistics namely that language signs have no meaning or "value" outside the system to which they belonged, fits perfectly the principle of linguistic relativism. Trier and particularly Hjelmslev consider that each language structures reality in its own way and by doing so, creates an image of reality which is not a direct copy of it. Language is the result of the imposition of same form upon an underlying substance. Quite independently, and emerging mainly from current observation in linguistic anthropological research on Amerindian languages, conducted by Fr. Boas, similar ideas were expressed by E. Sapir and B. L. Worf in America. Linguistic determinism has come to be often referred to as the Sapir-Worf hypothesis. For Sapir (1921) and Worf (1956) objective reality is an undifferentiated continuum which is segmented by each language in a different way. We obtain a vision of nature, of reality which is by and large pre-determined by our mother tongue. Each language is a vast system of structures, different from that of others in which are ordered culturally all forms and categories by means of which the individual not only communicates but also analyzes nature, grasps or neglects a given phenomenon or relation, in means of which he molds his manner of thinking and by means of which he builds up the entire edifice of his knowledge of the world. Worf provided ample evidence from Amerindian languages of how languages segment reality differently by neglecting
4

aspects which are emphasized in other languages. In Europe linguists as Benveniste (1958) and Martinet, in analyzing the relationship between categories of thought and categories of language, are unanimous not only in pointing out a basic parallelism between the two, but also in assigning to linguistic categories a primary role. The linguistic structure conditions, albeit in an unconscious way, man's knowledge of the world, his spiritual and philosophical experience. Linguistic relativism or determinism in its extreme variant, which maintains that people's knowledge of the world, the categorization of external experience is totally determined by the structure of language which imposes its particular form upon it, has been criticized. Various arguments can be advanced against the SapirWorf position. The idea that language systems have no points in common at all, and are completely untranslatable is refuted by empirical evidence. The fact that speakers of a given language are able to learn the vocabularies of other language, and, indeed, other languages as a whole, is the best proof of it. Also, a single language often has alternative conceptualizations of the same phenomenon: in English, for instance, human beings can be categorized by age into "children", "adolescents" and "adults" or alternatively, into "majors" and "minors". Furthermore, if we draw a distinction between meaning and reference, we can say that even though there is no corresponding concept in one's own language for a concept in another language, one can nevertheless provide a description of its referent (Leech 1990: 27). The differences in environment, climate, cultural development, etc., among various linguistic communities may be very great, but basically, human societies are linked by a common biological history. The objective reality in which they live is definitely not identical but it is by and large similar. Man's universe is basically a Universe made up of things and he is constantly confronted with them, obliged to communicate about them, to define himself in relation to them. This is basic to all human societies. Various language systems are not therefore untranslatable. The problem of translatability or rather degrees of translatability may be discussed appropriately with reference to the notion of cultural overlap. Cultures are not linguistically bound; in other words, languages and cultures are not co-terminous. Linguistic boundaries do not coincide with cultural ones. There is always a certain degree of cultural overlap between two language communities.

On the whole, similarities among languages are more important and more numerous than the differences among them. These differences can be explained in terms of cultural differences between the respective language communities. Second language learning too seems to support this point of view. Words denoting objects, structures and features situated in an area of cultural overlap are among the first to be learned, and with no apparent difficulty. Their acquisition seems to form the foundation on which the other words in the new language are acquired and integrated into a dynamic semantic system. Universal semantics. Interest in the study of language meaning shifted from what keeps languages apart to what all languages are said to have in common. The idea that the meanings of words in different languages can be analyzed, at least partially, in terms of a given number of conceptual atoms identificable in the analysis of the vocabularies of all languages has become once again a very popular one with linguistics. As for the "universality" of grammar, it lies at the foundation of all linguistic work produced before the advent of structuralism. Linguistic and philosophical speculation ever since the 17th century has currently dealt with such problems. The current renewal of interest in language universals is due mainly to generative grammar which has always laid emphasis on those features which are shared by all languages alike. The universalist point of view is based on the idea that language is basically an innate, or genetically inherited capability, which all human beings are "programmed" from birth to develop. This implies the adoption of the position that languages share the same basic conceptual framework. It can be argued that there is a universal set of semantic categories (i.e. categories concerned with time, place, causation, animacy, etc.) from which each language draws its own subset of categories, and it is only in the choice from this subset, and in the permitted combinations in which they are expressed, that languages differ.

The C hild's Acq uis ition of Conceptu al Categori es How do we acquire conceptual categories in childhood? There are widely divergent points of view, extending from the empiricism of those who would argue that the cognitive system is learned entirely through experience from one's environment (which includes cultural conditioning), and the extreme rationalism of

those who would claim that the cognitive framework does not have to be learned, as it is part of an inherited mental apparatus specific to the human species. This polarity of views is obviously the universalist-relativist controversy in a slightly different guise. Two prima facie arguments arising from modern linguistic research favour the universalist-rationalist point of view: as linguistics probes more deeply and precisely into the layers of linguistic structure, firstly it becomes more difficult to explain how a child learns so soon to manipulate the remarkable complexities of language, particularly on the semantic level, without having a "head-start" in the form of some fairly specific language-learning capacity; and secondly, it becomes easier to see how in a multi-layered analysis of language, widely different structures in phonology and syntax can be reconcided with identical, or al least similar, structures on the semantic level. On the other hand, that at least part of concept learning runs according to empiricist thinking is clear from the way we observe young children to acquire the conceptual categories of their language by a procedure of trial-and-error. It has long been noted that learning a concept such as "cat" involves two complementary processes: (1) extension, i.e. extending the name one has learned to apply to same referents (cat1, cat2, cat3, etc.) to all objects sharing certain attributes of those referents (cat4, .... catn); and (2) differentiation, i.e. restricting the reference of a word to objects sharing certain characteristics, but not others (e.g. not applying the term cat to dogs, tigers, etc.). These two processes go hand in hand in the learning of category boundaries, but a child cannot learn both aspects simultaneously, so he tends either to overextend (e.g. "identifying "daddy" with all men) or to underextend (e.g. identifying "man" with all strange men wearing hats).

Creativity in Language Discussion for and against semantic universals usually seems to assume that a language forms a static, closed conceptual system, and that once the fixed categories of the language have been acquired, our semantic equipment is complete. If this were true, it would cause us to take very seriously the sinister idea that our language is a mental strait -jacket, which determines our thought processes and our assumption about the universe. But fortunately for the human race, language is only a mental straitjacket if we allow it to become one: the semantic system, like any other system relating to human
7

society, is continually being extended and revised. In a language, new concepts are introduced in large numbers day by day and week by week, and in very little time, owing to modern mass communications, become familiar to many people. The technique by which the new concepts are introduced is lexical innovation, which may take the form of neologism and of transfer of meaning. Language has within itself anti-creative pressures, and the function of the literary writer, in T. S. Eliot's words, is to "purify the dialect of the tribe" - to restore the currency to its full value, and to resist the natural tendency to devaluation. Writers have always considered themselves the determined enemies of jargon and clich. Our linguistic competence (as Chomsky pointed out) is such that with a finite number of rules, we can generate and interpret an infinite number of sentences. Day by day we encounter and produce sentences we have never met in our whole life before. In its semantic aspect, this creativity of linguistic resource may be demonstrated by our ability to make up and make sense of configurations which have virtually a nil probability of occurring in day-to-day communication. But in performance, this creative or innovative power inherent in our language competence is eroded by our tendency to rely on well-worn paths through theoretically infinite array of possible English utterances. Thus not merely individual concepts, but configurations of concepts, become stereotyped; jargon invades syntax. The writer who resists this principle of least effort, by exploring new pathways and taking no meaning for granted, is in a real sense "creative". There is an important notion of linguistic creativity which applies preeminently to poetry: one which amounts to actually breaking through the conceptual bonds with which language constrains us. If one of the major roles of language is to reduce experience to order, to "prepackage" it for us, then the poet is the person who unties the string. It is in this context that the "irrational" or "counterlogical" character of poetry becomes explicable. A very simple example of poetic irrationality in the Latin poet Catullus famous paradox Odi et amo: "I hate and I love". The two-valued orientation of language makes us to see love and hate as mutually exclusive categories. But the poet, by presenting a seeming absurdity, shocks his reader into rearranging his categories; the stereotyped concept of love and hate as contrasting emotions is destroyed. A kind of conceptual fission and fusion takes place.

The quality just observed in poetic paradox is also present in metaphor - a more pervasive and important semantic feature of poetry. Again, the mechanism can be demonstrated by a very simple example. In an Anglo-Saxon poem, the expression mere-hengest ("sea-steed") is used as a metaphor for "ship". The connection between steed and ship lies in common connotations: both horses and ships convey men from one place to another; both are used (in the heroic context of the poem) for adventurous journeys and for warfare; both carry their riders with an up-and-down movement. By presenting the two concepts simultaneously, as superimposed images, the poet dissolves those linguistically crucial criteria which defines their separateness: the fact that a horse is animate whereas a ship is not; and the fact that a horse moves over land, whereas a ship moves over water. Metaphor is, actually, a conceptual reorganization. Through its power of realigning conceptual boundaries, metaphor can achieve a communicative effect which in a sense is "beyond language". It has a liberating effect. As a chief instrument of the poet's imagination, metaphor is the means by which he takes his revenge on language for the "stereotyped ideas" which have "prevailed over the truth". (G. Leech 1990: 38). It is not surprising that children's language produces many instances of semantic "mistakes" which strike the adult as poetic. G. Leech gave two of such instances: a child's description of a viaduct as a window-bridge and of the moon as that shilling in the sky, both based, significantly, on visual analogy. The window-bridge example is very similar to the mere-hengest of the Anglo-Saxon poet: the openings in a viaduct, when seen side on, are indeed very close in appearance and construction to the window openings of a house. Using this generalizing ability, the child hits on physical appearance as a crucial criterion, at the expense of the criterion of function, which the language regards as more important. The difference between the two cases, of course, is that while the poet is familiar with the institutional categories and is aware of his departure from them, the child is not.

Concl us ions "Except for the immediate satisfaction of biological needs, man lives in a world not of things but of symbols" (General Systems Theory, p. 245). This statement by Ludwig von Bertalanffy is close enough to the truth to justify the concentration on the way language both determines and reflects our understanding of the world we live in.

Thinking of a language as providing its users with a system of conceptual categories, we may conclude: 1. That the concepts vary from language to language, and are sometimes arbitrary in the sense that they impose a structure which is not necessarily inherent in the data of experience. 2. That it is a matter for debate how for concepts vary from language to language, and how far it is possible to postulate semantic universals common to all human language. 3. That although the conceptual system of a language predisposes its users towards certain distinctions rather than others, the extent to which more is "enslaved" by his language in this respect is mitigated by various forces of creativity inherent in the system itself.

Bibliography: 1. Chi oran, D. 1973. Elements of English Structural Semantics. Buc.: Ed. Didactic i Pedagogic . 2. Leech, G. 1990. Semantics. The Study of Meaning. London: Penguin Books.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION Comment on the two different conceptions in semantics relativism and universalism.

Chapt er II SEMANTIC RELATI ONS AND LEXIC AL CATEGORI ES F. de Saussure directed the linguists attention to the necessity of studying the multiple relationships among words in a systematic way. A particular lexeme may be simultaneously in a number of such relations, so the lexicon must be thought as a network rather than a listing of words. He suggested the existence of a network of
10

associative fields, covering the entire vocabulary, and this structuring the huge mass of words. So an important organizational principle in the lexicon is the lexical field. This represents a group of words which belong to a particular activity or area of specialized knowledge, such as terms in cooking, sailing; the vocabulary of doctors, coal miners or mountain climbers. The effects are the use of different senses for a word and also the use of specialized terms. In fact, each word is a center of a constellation or series of constellations, the point towards which other terms associated with it converge. Saussure established four major types of associations among lexical items: etymological- based on resemblances in form and meaning; derivational- based on identity of affixes; semantic- based on meaning relations; formal- based on accidental form resemblances. The types of associations listed above are illustrated by D. Chi oran considering the example of the French word enseignement. Enseignement

Enseigner

apprentisage

changement

clement

Enseignons justement

education

armement

Progress in semantics was due mainly to lexicographic practice, which continued to bring together facts about meaning. Particular attention was paid to changes in the meaning of words. Traditional lexicology deals with types of lexical relations established considering distinctions similar to those belonging to Saussures conception: semantic ties - based on the signification of words; such ties result in

synonymic and antonymic series of words; morpho-semantic ties obtaining among lexical items derived from a

common basic element; they result in word families; syntagmatic ties obtaining among lexical items as they occur in actual

utterance; syntagmatic ties may be divided into free - relations among sit and chair/

11

table/ down etc.- and stereotype relations among lexical items part of set idioms and phrases, as a matter of fact, as mad as a hatter, day and night, etc.-; phonetic ties based on similarities of phonic substance; the first two

examples represent minimal pairs, i. e. words which differ in just one phoneme, and the next two examples are words which present a common grammatical marker, in this case, that for the past participle might - night town - down flown- shown caught- taught.

These types of relations can be interpreted in terms of the distinction between expression- signifiant- and content- signifie-, as the interdependent planes of a linguistic sign. There are: - formal or phonological relations established between the signifiants, i. e. the expression planes of linguistic signs; they account for homonymy; - the relation of the type one signifiant- various signifies serves the designation of polysemy; - the relation one signifie- various signifiants expresses synonymy; - relations between various contents of linguistic signs. E. Co eriu pointed out that semantic relations should be signification relations, rather than relations between signs. Only in this way semantic structures can be distinguished from simple associative fields which are based on similarity relations between linguistic signs both on the expression and on the content level. The primary task of linguistics is to study the relational network encompassing the elements of language. The linguistic relational framework is structured along two axes, the syntagmatic and the paradigmatic axis. The linguistic elements situated on the syntagmatic axis find themselves in a bothand kind of relationship, i. e. they coexist within the same linguistic chain. They are in contrast position ( A. Martinet).The syntagmatic relations are directly observable in the spoken/ written chain. On the paradigmatic axis, the linguistic elements are mutually exclusive within one and the same linguistic sequence. They are in eitheror relationship, in opposition (A. Martinet). These relations are not observable within a linguistic chain.

A. Par adig matic Rel ations

12

1. The primary semantic relation on the paradigmatic axis is that of incompatibility, a relation which is characteristic of all lexical elements based on the substitution of items: e. g. I had tea at breakfast. I had coffee/cocoa/milk. Part of the meaning of a term belonging to a lexical set is its compatibility with all the other members of the same lexical set in a given context. The wider concept of meaning incompatibility includes distinct types of oppositeness of meaning, each of them being designated by a separate term (J. Lyons). a. Complementarity is a type of antonymic relation based on binary oppositions which do not allow for gradations between the extreme poles of a semantic axis; they are two- term sets of incompatible terms. Validity of one term implies denial of the other: e. g. single - married male - female alive - dead. b. Antonymy. The term is used to designate those meaning oppositions which admit certain gradations with regard to the meaning expressed: e. g. young- old; young.........childish/juvenil.............adolescent.............young.........mature.........middle. .......... aged...........old.......ancient......... small- large; ....microscopic....tiny....little....small.....big/large.....spacious.....immense.... beautiful - ugly; .....splendid.......wonderful....beautiful.....attractive.....handsome.....good-looking....... pretty.....nice....pleasant....acceptable......common.....ordinary.....plain... unattractive....ugly....horrible...awful....frightening....spooky....terrifying clever - stupid; interesting - boring; fast - slow. c. Reversibility refers to two terms which presuppose one another: give- take; borrow- lend; buy- sell; husband- wife; offer- accept/refuse; employeremployee. This type of binary opposition, a relation, involves a contrast of direction.

13

The relation can be realized by keeping the same lexical item and reversing the syntactic positions of the arguments: e. g. John is the parent of James. James is the parent of John. or by keeping the syntactic positions of the arguments constant and changing the lexical form: e. g. John is the parent of James. John is the child of James. Lexical pairs such as parent and child are called converses. Because of the alternative ways of expressing the same contrast, there arise cases of synonymy, John is the parent of James = James is the child of John. In case of parenthood relation, the directional contrast is mutually exclusive, so there is an asymmetric relation. Alf is parent of George. is incompatible with George is parent of Alf. An example of symmetric relation is John is married to Susan. which entails Susan is married to John. In this case we talk about reciprocal relation. d. Less common types of semantic opposition include hierarchic oppositions, which are multiple taxonomies, except that they include an element of ordering. Examples are sets of units of measurement- inch/ foot/ yard- , calendar unitsmonth of the year- or the hierarchy of numbers which is an open- ended, that is it has no highest term. The days of the week opposition is a cyclic type of hierarchy, because it has no first/ last member. e. Last but not least, there is an interesting type of binary semantic contrast, called inverse opposition: e. g. all - some possible - necessary allow - compel willing- insist still- already remain- become.

The main logical test for an inverse opposition is whether it obeys a special rule of synonymy which involves substituting one inverse term for another and changing the position of the a negative term in relation to the inverse term e. g. Some countries have no coastline. = Not all countries have a coastline. All of us are non- smokers. = Not any of us are smokers. We were compelled to be non- smokers. = We were not allowed to be smokers.
14

It is possibly true that Jack is a hippy. = It is not necessarily true that Jack is a hippy. 2. Another type of paradigmatic relation is synonymy. There are words which sound different, but have the same or nearly the same meaning. There is a tendency to limit synonymic status to those elements, which given the identity of their referential, can be used freely in a given context. There are no perfect synonyms, since no two elements can be used with the same statistic probability in absolutely all contexts in which any of them can appear. Synonymy is always related to context. Two lexical items are perfectly synonymous in a given context or in several contexts, but never in all contexts. The term used to describe this is relative synonymy. Context, that is the position on the syntagmatic axis, is essential for synonymy. e. g. deep water *deep idea profound idea *profound water deep / profound sleep; deep / profound thought. We can notice that the distinction concrete/ abstract is not relevant here, since words like idea and thought, both abstract, behave differently in relation to the pair of relative synonyms deep and profound. Talking about the terms used in describing synonymy, it is necessary at this point to present Lyons classification of synonyms into: absolute synonyms; partial synonyms; near synonyms.

Absolute synonyms should be fully, totally and completely synonymous. i. Synonyms are fully synonymous if, and only if, all their meanings are identical ; ii. synonyms are totally synonyms if and only if they are synonymous in all contexts; iii. synonyms are completely synonymous if and only if they are identical on all relevant dimensions of meaning. Absolute synonyms should satisfy all the three criteria above, whereas partial synonyms should satisfy at least one criterion (Lyons, 1981: 50-51). D. A. Cruse (1987: 292) comments on Lyons classification, arguing that identical and synonymous are to be understood as completely synonymous; secondly, nearsynonyms more or less similar, but not identical in meaning qualify as incomplete
15

synonyms, and therefore as partial synonyms, so the distinction between the two classes is not so clear as Lyons claims. Referring to absolute synonyms in language, Cruse states that there is no real motivation for their existence, and if they do exist, in time one of them would become obsolete, or would develop a difference in semantic function. For example, sofa and settee are absolute synonyms, but at a certain point in time sofa had the feature /elegant/, which now seems to have disappeared from the conscience of the speakers who use the two terms in free variation. But according to Cruse, this state of affairs would not persist, since it is against the tendency towards economy manifest in any language. Examples like sofa and couch refer to the same type of object, and share most of their semantic properties-/ piece of furniture/ / used for sitting/ /with arms/ / backed/ / upholstered/-, so they can be considered synonymous. There are words that are neither synonyms nor near synonyms, yet they have many semantic properties in common. For example, man and boy imply /+male/ /+human/ features, but boy includes the property /+youth/, so it differs in meaning from man. The question to be asked is how to determine all relevant dimensions of meaning in order to establish the type of synonymy we are dealing with. Cruse draws a distinction between subordinate semantic traits and capital traits. Subordinate traits are those which have a role within the meaning of a word analogous to that of a modifier in a syntactic construction (e. g. red in a red hat).For instance, /walk/ is the capital trait of stroll, /good looking/ of pretty and handsome. For nag , /worthless/ is a subordinate trait. Sometimes words that are ordinarily opposites can mean the same thing in a certain context, a good scare = a bad scare. The apparent synonymy of two utterances that contain a pair of antonyms hides opposite or at least different connotations. e.. g. How old are you? someones age How young are you? You shouldnt smoke. obvious you are too young to do that; I dont know how big his house is. - neutral I dont know how small his house is. -negative connotation; I know that it is too small Even when using synonyms this implies not only a high degree of semantic overlap, but also a low degree of implicit contrastiveness,
16

- neutral connotation; inquiry about

-negative connotation; its

e. g. He was murdered, or rather/ more exactly, executed. He was cashiered, that is to say, dismissed.- the synonym is used as an explanation for another word. Synonymy depends largely on other factors such as: register used, wife [neutral], spouse [formal, legal term], old lady [highly informal]; collocation, big trouble *large trouble; connotation, notorious [negative], famous [positive]; immature [negative], young [positive]. dialectal variations, which may be geographical ,- lift (British English), elevator (American English)-, temporal,- wireless became radio, -, and last but not least, social - toilet replaced lavatory, settee became sofa-,though the last two subtypes of variations cannot be always separated; (Cruse, 1987: 282-283) morpho- syntactic behavior, e. g. He began/ started his speech with a quotation. Tom tried to start/ *begin his car. At the beginning/ *start of the world All the examples above refer to lexical synonymy, but there are also grammatical synonyms, operating at the level of morphology, means of expressing futurity, possibility, etc. e. g. He will go / is going / is to go tomorrow. He can/ may visit us next week if the weather is fine. 3. Hyponymy. Another type of paradigmatic relation is hyponymy / inclusion. It implies as a rule multiple taxonomies, a series of hypo-ordinate / subordinate terms being included in the area of a hyper-ordinate/ super-ordinate term. This relationship exists between two meanings if one componential formula contains all the features present in the other formula. Woman contains the features /+human/, /+adult/, /male/.In different contexts, the emphasis is on one of the features included in the meaning of woman: e. g. Stop treating me like a child. Im a woman [= grown- up] She is a woman [= human being], not an object. She is a woman [ = female] , so she wouldnt know what a man feels like in such a situation.

17

One way to describe hyponymy is in terms of genus and differentia. We can discuss about meaning inclusion, that is all the features of adult are included in woman, and about reference inclusion, that is all the objects denoted by woman are included into the larger category denoted by adult. Sometimes we cant have a super-ordinate term expressed just by one word: musical instrument clarinet guitar piano trumpet violin drums

B. Syntag mati c Rel ations. Relations of the type bothand are fundamental in structuring our utterances. The connection between paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations appears obvious, since in choosing a certain term from a synonymic series, we must take into account selectional restrictions. A particular type of arbitrary co- occurrence restrictions are collocational restrictions: e. g. Ann/ The cat/ The plant died. Ann/ *The cat/ *The plant kicked the bucket. Collocational restrictions vary in the degree to which they can be specified in terms of required semantic traits. When fully specifiable, they may be described as systematic collocational restrictions: e. g. Pass away /animate/ and kick the bucket /human/ Grill /meat/ and toast /bread/ When there are exceptions to the general tendency in collocating, we may speak of semi- systematic collocational restrictions: e. g. Customer /acquiry of something material in exchange for money/ Client /acquiry of a certain type of service/, but a client of a bank is called customer, too. The collocational ranges of some lexical items can only be dscribed by listing permissible collocants. Such items will be described as having idiosyncratic collocational restrictions. (Cruse,1987: 281) performance argument complexion behavior kitchen unblemished ? spotless ? + flawless + + + immaculate + + impeccable + ? + -

18

The table above represents Cruses own intuitions. No semantic motivation can be discerned for the collocational patterns. It is debatable whether idiosyncratic restrictions are a matter of semantics at all.

Bibliography: 1. Chi oran, D.1973. Elements of English Structural Semantics, Bucure ti: E.D.P. 2. Cruse, D.1987. Lexical Semantics,Cambridge: CUP. 3. Leech, G.1990. Semantics, London: Penguin Books. 4. Lyons, J.1977. Semantics, Cambridge: CUP.

Questions and exercises 1. Discuss the types of opposition relation. 2. Illustrate how various linguistic and extra- linguistic factors influence synonymy. 3. Match the appropriate adjectives with the nouns to show how collocation works. calculated deliberate voluntary premeditated considered express wilful retirement risk judgement mistake murder ignorance wish.

4. Context is essential in choosing from a pair of synonyms. Think of contexts in which the following pairs of words cannot be interchanged: hurry/ hasten consider/ regard injure/ damage confess/ admit. 5. Synonymy and antonymy are associated when arranging words expressing different degrees of the same quality/ concept. The result is a cline/ scale. Try to arrange the following words according to their intensity: a. immense, big, enormous, large, gigantic, spacious, colossal, extensive; b. little, tiny, microscopic, small, minute, infinitesimal, diminutive; pavement/ sidewalk exit/ way out spud/ potato

19

c. distinguished, famous, well- known, illustrious, renowned; d. mansion, castle, cottage, hut, house, palace, cabin. 6. A word can have different opposites in different contexts; which are they in case of: Light bag/ wind/ colors; Rough sea/ texture/ area/ person/ calculation; High marks/ opinion/ building/ price/ temperature/ wind; Hard exam/ chair/ journey/ work/ person/ drugs. 7. Construct hyponymy trees for vehicle, tomato, bench. Then complete diagrams like the following: vehicle/ feature bus car powered + carries people + four- wheeled +

Chapt er III SEMANTIC THEORY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF GENERATI VE-TRANS FORMATIONAL GRAMMAR

The development of generative-transformational grammar beginning with the late fifties of the 20th century has brought about a strong revival of interest in semantics. Particular mention should be made of the distinction postulated by generative grammar between deep structure and surface structure which is in many ways responsible for the recent developments in the study of language meaning. Generative-transformational grammar resumes many of the concerns of traditional semantics. Thus, according to the theory, semantics should include an analysis of the way in which words and sentences are related to objects and processes in reality reintroducing into the discussion the problems of reference, denotation etc. Its second concern should be an analysis of the manner in which words and sentences

20

are related to one another. These include an account of synonymy, antonymy entailment, contradiction, paraphrase, implication, presupposition, etc.

1. Semantics in the Standard Generative Theory of Language

A grammar of language can be described as a system of rules that express the correspondence between sound and meaning in the respective language. Every speaker possesses a finite and relatively small set of simple rules, which enable the speaker to produce and the listener to understand an infinite number of sentences. The set of rules represents - in the Chomskyan terminology - the linguistic competence, while the utterances produced on their basis constitute the linguistic performance. Generative grammars are thus, synthetic models, able to generate all wellformed sentences in a language. By "synthetic" it is meant that starting from a set of rules arranged in a formalized construction, synthetic models lead finally to a set of utterances. G.T. is first of all, a model of competence, being-conceived as a model of language acquisition. The rules are mainly of two kinds: rewriting rules and transformational rules. These rules are applied to symbols which make up the vocabulary of grammar. Semantics will be concentrate on lexical categories and formatives (corresponding to words or full-lexical meaning or content words). The organization of a generative grammar. Generative transformational grammar is defined in terms of 3 components: syntactic, semantic and phonological. In the standard theory, the syntactic component in the most important one. It generates both the deep structure - which is semantically interpreted by the semantic component - and the surface structure which is further related to the sound aspect of language by means of the phonological component. While the semantic and the phonological components are purely interpretative, the syntactic component is basic to grammar since it represents the generative source of the grammar. The syntactic component consists of a base syntactic subcomponent and a set of transformations, i.e. it has two kinds of rules: writing rules or phrase-structure rules and transformational rules. The first specify the form of constituent structure trees, and the second convert one kind of tree-structure into another (e.g. an active structure into a passive one). Transformations are rules that act on the phrase markers

21

generated by the base, mapping deep structures onto the surface structures of sentences. In the earliest published version of transformational grammar - Chomsky's Syntactic Structures (1957) - meaning was in effect ignored. It was assumed that syntactic rules operated in complete independence from meaning: their function was to "generate" or specify by rule the grammatical sentences of a language, and to assign to these sentences their correct structure. In fact, many of the transformational rules, such as that which converted an active sentence structure into a passive sentence structure, happened in general to preserve the meaning of sentences unaltered (and therefore to be rules of paraphrase), but this was considered an irrelevant side-effect of such rules. However, after a pioneering article on semantics by Katz and Fodor ("The Structure of a Semantic Theory", 1963), transformational grammar went through a period of conceding to semantics a more and more important position in linguistic theory. (Leech 1990: 343) Scope and object of a semantic theory in generative-transformational grammar. A semantic theory describes and explains the interpretative competence of the speaker. This ability implies that a speaker can interpret sentences in the sense that he can relate them appropriately to "states, processes and objects in the universe" (Bierwisch 1971: 167). A speaker can understand an infinite number of sentences, some of which he has never heard before. This is because he knows a number of rules on whose basis he can generate an infinite number of sentences. The rules are said to project a finite set or rules on an infinite set of sentences (Katz and Fodor, 1966: 481). The problem of formulating such rules represent the projection problem. This problem requires for its solution rules which project the infinite set of sentences in a way which mirrors the way speakers understand novel sentences. In encountering a novel sentence, the speaker is not encountering new elements but only a novel combination of familiar elements. Since the set of sentences is infinite and each sentence is a different concatenation of morphems, the fact that a speaker can understand any sentence must mean that the way he understands sentences he has never previously encountered is compositional, i.e. it is based on his knowledge of the grammatical properties and the meaning of the morphems of the language. The rules the speaker knows enable him to determine the meaning of a novel sentence, by following the manner in which the parts of the sentence are composed to form wholes.
22

As any speaker is able to grasp the difference in meaning between any two syntactically similar strings, this ability falling under the scope of semantic theory, it follows that the projection problem is fully solved only in as much as the grammar is supplemented by a semantic theory. The aims and objectives of a semantic theory as part of the transformationalgenerative theory of language are: a) to establish the meaning and the degree of ambiguity of a sentence; b) to detect semantic anomalies; c) to state the paraphrase relation between sentences; d) to state other relevant semantic properties of sentences. These objectives are self-evident for the innovative character of this semantic theory as compared to more traditional ones. While semanticists in the past were mainly concerned with the analysis of meaning (usually of isolated elements), the change in the evolution of meaning etc., the interest is now switched to the analysis of the meaning of sentences, and of their semantic properties. (Chitoran, 1973: 172). The semantic component of generative-transformational grammar. The semantic component of a linguistic description is a projective device consisting of: 1) a dictionary that provides a meaning for each of the lexical items of the language; 2) a finite set of projection rules which assign a semantic interpretation to which string of formatives (or string of words) generated by the syntactic component. To arrive at a semantic interpretation it is necessary for each lexical item in a string of formatives to be assigned a meaning on the basis of the semantic information provided by the dictionary. The projection rules then combine these meanings in a manner dictated by the syntactic description of the string to arrive at a characterization of the meaning of the whole string and of each of its constituents. This process reconstructs the way in which a speaker is able to obtain the meaning of a sentence from the meaning of its lexical items and its syntactic structure. The dictionary part of the semantic component offers information on a lexical entry which is analyzed at four distinct levels. At the first level, each lexical entry is categorized grammatically by indicating its syntactic marker, i.e. the grammatical class to which it belongs (noun, adjective, transitive, etc.). The semantic information proper, i.e. the specification of the meaning
23

or meanings of the respective item is given under the form of semantic markers (as semantic categories of the type: s Animate, s Human, s Male, etc., which indicate the semantic relations obtaining among various lexical units and appearing therefore in the description of many of them) and distinguishers, which reflect the idiosyncretic elements in the meaning of lexical items. Semantic markers and distinguishers are the transformational analogues of semes in the structural semantics (the first are similar to classemes and the second to semantemes). The distinction between semantic markers and distinguishers consists in the fact that semantic markers are used in the semantic description of more formatives (words), while distinguishers occur only in the description of a certain formative, individualizing it. For example in the case of the formative mammal the semantic marker is (+Animate) and the distinguisher is [they feed the young with their own milk]. The first can appear in the description of many formatives: mammal, fish, bird and the second is applied only to mammal. (E. Ionescu 1992: 192). The fourth type of information provided by the dictionary refers to the combinatorial abilities of lexical items in a given syntactic construction to render a definite meaning. These rules of the combination of items in order to render a given meaning take the form of selectional restrictions in the dictionary suggested by Katz and Fodor. Thus, handy means clever with the hands when said of persons, and easy to use, convenient to handle when used of things and places. The syntactic marker of an item is indicated by the grammatical terms denoting it; semantic markers are enclosed between normal brackets (...), distinguishers are enclosed between square brackets [...] and selectional restrictions are given between angles ...". The second constituent of the theory is represented by the projection rules (amalgamation), whose object is to account for the semantic relations among morphems and the interraction between meaning and syntactic structure. Projection rules are ultimately responsible for assigning a semantic interpretation to a sentence. This they do in the first place by associating to the lexical items of a given sentence S, those readings which are compatible with their syntactic categorization as revealed by the phrase marker of the respective S (Katz and Postal 1964: 18). The next operation that projection rules perform is to combine the readings of inferior constituents into derived readings of successively higher constituents until the

24

readings for the whole sentence are arrived at. The process by means of which composite readings are arrived at by combining readings from each of the sets of readings dominated by a given node in a phrase marker, is called amalgamation. There is an interplay of syntactic and semantic relations in regulating the pairing of readings, since one condition for two items to be joined in syntactic relation, is that all selectional restrictions of one be included in the semantic markers of the other. A closer analysis of the dictionary component of Katz and Fodor semantic theory reveals many similarities with previous approaches to the science of meaning. In fact, what Katz and Fodor do in their dictionary component of the theory is to rediscover the Aristotlean reference to genres and species (semantic markers and distinguishers) (Mounin 1972: 168). As Co eriu indicated (1968) what Katz and Fodor essentially do, is to study meaning along the semasiological direction, that is starting from a given signifiant, proper signifis are assigned to it in a given context, following certain (syntactic) operations. In its original form the theory does not account for such well established facts as the existence of primary meanings and secondary ones, and in particular, it does not account for transferred meanings, and, in general, for the widespread use of metaphor in language. An obvious criticism that was raised against the theory regards, as in the case of componential analysis, the very hypothesis according to which linguistic signification and semantic structure in general can be reduced to a relatively small set of "atoms" of meaning, with no residue whatever because this hypothesis is far from having been accepted unanimously (Chitoran 1973: 177). 2. Generative Semantics Versus Interpretive Semantics The generative-interpretative controversy raged in the early seventies, but had no conclusive outcome. After a while the partisans of each side moved on the other topics of interest. The popular labels generative semantics and interpretive semantics refer not so much to ways of studying semantics per se, as to ways of relating semantics to syntax. Both developed out of the Standard Theory of 1965 (Aspects of the Theory of Syntax) in wich a sentence was seen as organized syntactically on two chief levels: that of deep structure and that of surface structure. The surface structure of a sentence was derived from the deep structure by means of transformational rules involving

25

such operations as the delition of constituents, the movement of constituents from one part of a sentence to another, etc. The rules which specified the DS were phrase structure rules, which spelt out the basic constituency of sentences in terms of categories like Noun Phrases, Verbs, etc. As it was previously mentioned, these rules made up the base component of syntax, and had as their output (after the insertion of lexical items) deep structures and the transformational rules made up the transformational component of syntax, and had as their output surface structures. Apart from syntax, which was the central part of the total grammar, these were two interpretive components: the phonological and the semantic. The phonetic interpretation of a sentence was derived from its surface structure by means of phonological rules, while the semantic interpretation of a sentence was derived from the deep structure through the operation of the so-called projection rules of semantics. The whole theory, therefore, through the interaction of its various components, provided a matching of phonetic outputs with semantic outputs (G. Leech 1990: 344). So, the theory provides an account of the pairing of meanings with sounds which any complete linguistic theory must attempt. The syntactic component has special status, being the point from which the derivation of both sounds and meaning originates. Among the special claims of Standard Theory are (1) that syntactic surface structure is the only level of syntax relevant to the specification of phonetic interpretation; and (2) that syntactic deep structure is the only level of syntax relevant to semantic interpretation. This second point brings with it the important principle that transformational rules are meaning-preserving; that is, they do not in any way alter the meaning of the structures that they operate on. This means, in effect, that all sentences that have the same deep structures have the same meanings. We can see, Standard Theory provides for an interpretative semantic component; that is the meaning of a sentence is specified by the application of semantic rules to a syntactic base. It may be diagrammed as follows: Standard Theory Transformational Grammar 1965 S ema ntic Int er pr etat ion (Projection Rules) (Base) DEEP STRUCTURE (Transformational Rules)
26

S URF ACE STRUCT URE (Phonological Rules) Phonetic Interpretation

Later, an important modification to the interpretivist position was proposed. Chomsky (1970), Jackendoff (1972), and others didn't claim any more that all sentences with the same deep structures have the same meaning. Within this revised theory, deep structure reverted to being a level to be justified very largely on syntactic grounds alone. Generative semantics like interpretative semantic, arose out of Standard Theory, but it developed along a quite different path. Lakoff, McCawley, Ross, and others, "deepened" the deep structure so as to make it closer to a representation of a sentence's meaning, and they also "lengthened" the transformational process of derivation from deep to surface structure. Leech considers that the logical terminus of this process was reached (Ross and Lakoff 1967 and McCawley 1968) when the deep structure of a sentence was declared to be so "deep" as to be identical with its semantic representation. This now meant that base component, in the sense of Chomsky (1965), was no longer syntactic, but semantic. And since the deep structure was the semantic interpretation, there was no longer any need for the projection rules to supply an interpretation of deep structure. Projection rules therefore disappeared, and the resulting diagram was: Generative Semantics Position SEMANTIC REPRESENTATION (or deep structure) (Transformational Rules) S URF ACE STRUCT URE

(Phonological Rules) Phonetic Interpretation Since it eliminates the projectional rule component, the generativist model has the advantage of overall simplicity of design. But, the simplification is necessarily at
27

the cost of expanding the transformational component, and making the chain of transformational derivation for each sentence considerably longer than was envisaged by Chomsky in 1965. (G. Leech 1990: 347). The generativists, in the main, stayed commited to the view that transformational rules do not change meaning. This proved the most vulnerable principle in their model, and was subject to the severest criticisms from interpretivists. Within the framework of generative-transformational grammar, a "battle" is being fought not only between two rival semantic theories - interpretive semantics and generative semantics - but also between two versions of grammar: one which is syntactically based (the "standard" theory as developed by Chomsky, Katz, Fodor, Postal, including interpretive semantics) and another one which is semantically based (generative semantics). In the standard theory, syntax is independent; it is the generative source of the grammar, which provides a deep and a surface syntactic structure. The deep structure provides all necessary information to the semantic component whose task is to assign semantic interpretations (readings) to the deep structures generated by the syntactic component. With the generative semantics models, the semantic component is the generative source of the grammar. The semantic representations which initiate the derivation of sentences are independently generated, and are then mapped onto surface (syntactic) structures by means of transformations. (Chitoran 1973: 181). Thus there have been two ways heading to generative semantics: 1. the revision of the standard model particularly of the notions of deep structure, selectional restrictions, etc. 2. a reappraisal of the semantic component, more specifically of semantic representation. Leech (1990) considers that a simple way of defining interpretive and generative semantics is to say that in the one case the semantic representation of a sentence is derived from a syntactic base, whereas in the other, the (surface) syntactic representation is derived from a semantic base. The same author proposes a three-component model of language (semanticssyntax-phonology) in which expression rules would have the function of translating (or "recoding") semantic representations as syntactic representations, or vice versa (no directional precedence was assumed). Thus we have two separate bases, with syntax
28

and semantics both having independent well-formedness conditions. In fact, various phonologists (Sampson 1970) have also argued for a phonological base. Hence, Leech's model differs from both the generative and interpretative models in containing more than one base component (Leech 1990: 349; 351). Bibliography: 1. Chi oran, D. 1973. Elements of English Structural Semantics, Bucure ti: E.D.P. 2. Leech, G. 1990. Semantics. The Study of Meaning. London: Penguin Books.

TO PI CS FOR DIS CUSSI ON 1. What is the difference between semantic markers and distinguishers? Give some examples.

29

Chapter IV NE W S EMANTI C THE ORI ES

1.

Cat egori zation

The process of categorization is essential because it represents "the main way we make sense of experience" (G. Lakoff 1987: XI). This mental operation, which consists in putting together different things, is present in all our activities: thinking, perception, speaking etc. Categorization and categories are fundamental for the organization of human experience. Without this capacity of surpassing individual entities in order to reach a conceptual structure, the environment would be chaotic and forever new. (E. Cauzinille-Marmche, D. Dubois, J. Mathieu, 1988). Most of the concepts or mental representations correspond to certain categories and not to individual entities. Therefore, it is fundamental to know the mechanisms of categorization, trying to give an answer to the question: What are the criteria which decide that an entity belongs to a category? The objectivist current gives a clear answer: categorization is made on the basis of common characteristics. The experiential realism imposes a different view, based on prototype theory. G. Lakoff considers that the theory of prototype changed our conception about categorization, reasoning and other human capacities (G. Lakoff 1987: 7). Necess ary and S ufficie nt Co nditio ns Model. One traditional approach to describing concepts is to define them by using sets of necessary and sufficient conditions. This approach comes from thinking about concepts as follows. If we have a concept like WOMAN, it must contain the information necessary to decide when something in the world is a woman or not. How can this information be organized? Perhaps as a set of categoristics or attributes, i.e.: X is a woman if and only if L where L is a list of attributes, like: X is human;

30

X is "adult"; X is female, etc. One can see these attributes as conditions: if something must have them to be a woman, then they can be called necessary conditions. In addition, if we can find the right set, so that just that set is enough to define a woman, then they can be called sufficient conditions; that means we have identified the right amount of information for the concept. This theory views concepts as lists of bits of knowledge: the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to be an example of that concept. The Aristotleian model of necessary and sufficient conditions, very largely used in philosophy, anthropology, psychology and linguistics is based on the following thesis: 1. Concepts and categories are entities with very clear borderlines. 2. The model is based on truth and false system: It is a dog provided that it fits the criterial conditions of the category "dog". 3. The members of the same category have an equal status since each member has the features required by the definition of the category. So, each member is a good as any other. One major problem with this approach has been that it seems to assume that if speakers share the same concept they will agree on the necessary and sufficient conditions: if something has them, it is an x; if not, not. But it has proved difficult to set these up even for nouns which identify concrete and natural kinds like dog or cat. Saeed (1997: 36) takes as an example the noun zebra. We might agree on some attributes: is an animal, has four legs; is striped, is a herbivore. The problem we face, though is: which of these is necessary? The first obviously, but the rest are more problematic. If we find in a herd of zebra, one that is pure white or black, we might still want to call it a zebra. Or if by some birth defect, a three-legged zebra comes into the world, it would still be a zebra. Similarly, if a single zebra got bored with a grass diet and started to include a few insects, would it cease to be a zebra? Of course, these seem rather whimsical or strange questions, perhaps problems for philosophers rather than linguists, and indeed this zebra example is just a version of Saul Kripke's example about tigers (Kripke 1980) or Putnam's fantasy about cats (Putnam 1962). Questions such as these have important consequences for our ideas about concepts: if we cannot establish a mutual definition of a concept, how can we use its linguistic label?
31

Another argument against necessary and sufficient conditions as the basis for linguistic concepts is Putnam's (1975) observations about ignorance. Speakers often use words to refer knowing very little, and sometimes nothing, about the identifying characteristics of the referent. Putnam's examples include the tree names beech and elm: like Putnam, many English speakers cannot distinguish between these two trees yet use the words regularly. Such a speaker would presumably be understood, and be speaking truthfully, if he said: In the 1970s Dutch elm disease killed a huge number of British elms. Perhaps as Putnam suggests, we rely on a belief that somewhere there are experts who do have such knowledge and can tell the difference between different species of trees. In any case it seems, as with other natural kind terms like gold or platinum, we can use the words without knowing very much about the referent. It seems unlikely then that a word is referring to a concept composed of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions, or what amounts to the same thing, a definition. The idea is that natural kind terms, like names are originally fixed by contact with examples of the kind. Thereafter, speakers may receive or borrow the word, without being exposed to the real thing, or knowing very much about its characteristics. As we have seen, philosophers like to use examples of metals like gold or silver. Any inability to identify correctly or define the substance silver does not prevent one from using the word silver. We assume that someone once had the ability or need to recognize the individual metal and that somewhere there are experts who can identify it empirically. Putnam speaks about a "division of labour" in a speech community: between "expert" and "folk" uses of a term. Only the expert or scientific uses of a word would ever be rigorous enough to support necessary and sufficient conditions, but speakers happily go on using the word. The Prototype Th eory. Because of problems with necessary and sufficient conditions, or definitions, several more sophisticated theories of concepts have been proposed. One influential proposal is due to Eleanor Rosch and her coworkers (Rosch 1973, 1975, Rosch and Mevis 1975, Rosch et al. 1976) who have suggested the notion of prototypes. This is a model of concepts which views them as structural so that there are central or typical members of a category, such as BIRD or FURNITURE, but then a shading off into less typical or peripheral members. So chair is a more central member of the category FURNITURE than lamp, for example. Or

32

sparrow a more typical member of the category BIRD than penguin or ostrich. This approach seems to have been supported by Rosch's experimental evidence: speakers tend to agree more readily on typical members than on less typical members; they come to mind more quickly, etc. Another result of this approach and similar work (e.g. Labov 1973) is that the boundaries between concepts can seem to speakers uncertain, or "fuzzy", rather than clearly defined. G. Kleiber (1999) speaks about two sciences of prototype theory: the standard theory and the extended theory. The standard theory corresponds to the period when E. Rosch and her team publish their work. According to prototype theory, the category is structured on two dimensions: the horizontal dimension (the internal structure) and the vertical dimension (intercategorial relations). The Horizontal Dimension. The prototype is the best exemplar, the central instance of a category. This new conception is based on the following principles (Kleiber 1997: 51). 1. The category has an internal prototypical structure. 2. The borderlines of the categories or concepts are not very clearly delimited, they are vague. 3. Not all the members of a category present common characteristics; they are grouped together on the basis of the family resemblance. 4. An entity is a member of a certain category if it presents similarities with the prototype. So, this approach allows for borderline uncertainty: an item in the world might bear some resemblance to two different prototypes. Here we might give examples of speakers being able to use the word whale, yet being unsure about whether a whale is a mammal or a fish. In the prototype theory of concepts, this might be explained by the fact that whales are not typical of the category MAMMAL, being far from the central prototype. At the same time, whales resemble prototypical fish in some characteristic features: they live underwater in the oceans, have fins, etc. There are a number of interpretations of these typicality effects in the psychology literature: some researchers for example have argued that the central prototype is an abstraction. This abstraction might be a set of characteristic features to which we compare real items. These characteristic features of BIRD might describe a kind of average bird, small, perhaps, with wings, feathers, the ability to fly, etc. but of no particular species. Other researchers have proposed that we organize our categories
33

by exemplars, memories of actual typical birds, say sparrows, pigeons and hawks, and we compute the likelihood of something we meet being a bird on the basis of comparison with these memories of real birds. There is another approach to typicality effects within linguistics, which is interesting because of the light it sheds on the relationship between linguistic knowledge and encyclopedic knowledge. Kleiber called this approach the extended version of the prototype theory. Charles Fillmore (1982) and G. Lakoff (1987) both make similar claims that speakers have folk theories about the world, based on their experience and rooted in their culture. These theories are called frames by Fillmore and idealized cognitive models (ICMD) by Lakoff. They are not scientific theories or logically consistent definitions, but collections of cultural views. Fillmore gives an example of how these folk theories might work by using the word bachelor. It is clear that that some bachelors are more prototypical than others, with the Pope, for example, being far from prototypical. Fillmore and Lakoff (1987) suggests that there is a division of our knowledge about the word bachelor: part is a dictionary-type definition ("an unmarried man") and part is an encyclopaedia-type entry of cultural knowledge about bachelorhood and marriage - the frame or ICM. The first we can call linguistic or semantic knowledge and the second real world or general knowledge. Their point is we only apply the word bachelor within a typical marriage ICM: a monogamous union between eligible people, typically involving romantic love, etc. It is this idealized model, a form of general knowledge, which governs our use of the word bachelor and restrains us from applying it to celibate priests, or people living in isolation like Tarzan living among apes in the jungle. In this view, when using a word involves combining semantic knowledge and encyclopaedia knowledge, and this interaction may result in typicality effects. G. Leech (1990) considers that one of the flaws of the prototype semantics is that it reduces the role of conceptual semantics, in explaining word meaning, to the minimum of matching a word to a category. But the nominal view appears to be too restricted, because it can only be easily applied to common nouns (rather than to adjectives, verbs, etc.). In addition to the category - recognizing ability, human beings also have a different order of cognitive ability - something which is much more closely tied to language - which is the ability to recognize structural relations between categories. (G. Leech 1990: 85).
34

Although the prototype theory was considered a veritable revolution, it is not a miraculous solution for all semantic problems and it cannot surpass all the difficulties which remain unsolved in the classical model of necessary and sufficient conditions. But, the theory brings three new elements of a great importance for lexical semantics. (i) This theory allows us to integrate in the meaning of a word, characteristics excluded by the classical model, being considered unnecessary, encyclopaedic features; (ii) It proves the existence of an internal organization of the category. (iii) It also explains the hierarchical conceptual structure and intercategorial relations. We also have to take into account that this theory is a theory of categorization, first intended for psychological goals. The Vertical Dimension. Relations between Concepts. The relational nature of conceptual knowledge is an important issue in semantics. Words are in a network of semantic links with other words and it is reasonable to assume that conceptual structures are similarly linked. Models of conceptual hierarchies are fundamental in the cognitive psychology literature. A model based on defining attributes was proposed by Collins and Quillian (1969). In this model, concepts are represented by nodes in a network, to which attributes can be attached and between which there are links. Proponents of prototype theory, (Rosch et al. 1976) have also investigated conceptual hierarchies and have proposed that such hierarchies contain three levels of generality: a superordinate level, a basic level, and a subordinate level. The idea is that the levels differ in their balance between informativeness and usefulness. If we take one of Rosch et al.'s (1976) examples, that of furniture, the superordinate level is FURNITURE, which has relatively few characteristic features; the basic level would include concepts like CHAIR, which has more features, and the subordinate level would include concepts like ARMCHAIR, DININGCHAIR, etc., which have still more features and are thus more specific again. The basic level is identified as cognitively important; it is the level that is most used in everyday life; it is acquired first by children; in experiments it is at which adults spontaneously name objects; such objects are recognized more quickly in tests, and so on.

35

This model has proved to be very robust in the psychological literature, though the simple picture we have presented here needs some modifications. It seems that the relationship between the classic level and the intermediate term might vary somewhat from domain to domain: man-made categories like FURNITURE differ somewhat from natural kind terms, and the relationship may vary depending on the person's experience of the categories. So a person's expert knowledge of a domain might influence the relationship between the basic and subordinate levels. Tancka and Taylor (1991) suggest that experts on dogs and birds might have a different, richer structure at subordinate levels for these categories from the average person. 2. Cognitive S e man tics Toward the end of the 20th century, there is both a dissatisfaction with existing formal semantic theories and a wish to preserve insights from other semantic traditions. Cognitive semantics, the latest of the major trends which have dominated the last decades, attempts to do this by focusing on meaning as a cognitive phenomenon. As is often the case with labels for theories, the term cognitive semantics might be objected to as being rather uninformative: in this instance because in many semantic approaches it is assumed that language is a mental faculty and that linguistic abilities are supported by special forms of knowledge. Hence, for many linguists semantics is necessarily a part of the inquiry into cognition. However, writers in the general approach called cognitive linguistics, and other scholars who are broadly in sympathy with them, share a particular view of linguistic knowledge. This view is that there is no separation of linguistic knowledge from general thinking or cognition. Contrary to the influential views of the philosopher Jerry Fodor or of Noam Chomsky, these scholars see linguistic behaviour as another part of the general cognitive abilities which allow learning, reasoning, etc. So perhaps we can take the label cognitive linguistics as representing the slogan "linguistic knowledge is part of general cognition". (Saeed 1997: 299). Cognitive linguists often point to a division between formal and functional approaches to language. Formal approaches, such as generative grammar are often associated with a certain view of language and cognition: that knowledge of linguistic structures and rules forms an antonomous module (faculty), independent of other mental processes of attention, memory and reasoning. This external view of an independent linguistic module is often combined with a view of internal modularity:
36

that different levels of linguistic analysis, such as phonology, syntax and semantics, form independent modules. Functionalism, with which cognitive linguists identify themselves, implies a quite different view of language: that externally, principles of language use embody more general cognitive principles; and internally, that explanation must cross boundaries between levels and analysis. Thus, it makes sense to look for principles shared across a range of cognitive domains. Similarly, it is argued that no adequate account of grammatical rules is possible without taking the meaning of elements into account. This general difference of approach underlies specific positions taken by cognitive linguists on a number of issues: in each case their approach seeks to break down the abstractions and specializations characteristic of formalism. Studies in cognitive semantics have tented to blur, if not ignore, the commonly made distinctions between linguistic knowledge and encyclopaedic, real world knowledge and between literal and figurative language. Cognitive linguists consider that syntax can never be antonomous from semantics or pragmatics. So, the explanation of grammmatical patterns cannot be given in terms of abstract syntactic principles but only in terms of the speaker's intended meaning in particular contexts of language use. A further distinction that is reassessed in this framework is the traditional structuralist division between, to use Ferdinand de Saussure's terms, diachronic (or historical) linguistics and synchronic linguistics. In his foundational lectures, de Saussure, attempting to free linguistics from etymological explanation, proposed his famous abstraction: a synchronic linguistics, where considerations of historical change might be ignored, as if in describing a language we could factor out or "freeze" time. This consideration has been accepted in many linguistic theories, but is currently questioned in functional approaches. Linguistic structures, in a functionalist perspective, have envolved through long periods of use and the processes of change are evident in and relevant to an understanding of the current use of language. If we turn to meaning, a defining characteristic of cognitive semantics is the rejection of what is termed objectivist semantics. G. Lakoff (1988) assigns to objectivism the basic metaphysical belief that categories exist in objective reality, together with their properties and relations, independently of consciousness. Associated with this in the view that the symbols of language are meaningful because they are associated with these objective categories. This gives rise to a particular
37

approach to semantics, Objectivist Semantics, which Lakoff characterizes under three "doctrines" (adapted from Lakoff 1988: 125-6): a. The doctrine of truth-conditional meaning: Meaning is based on reference and truth. b. The "correspondence theory" of truth: Truth consists in the

correspondence between symbols and states of affairs in the world. c. The doctrine of objective reference: There is an "objectively correct" way

to associate symbols with things in the world. In rejecting these views, cognitive semanticists place themselves in opposition to the formal semantics approach. For these writers, linguistic truth and falsity must be relative to the way an observer construes a situation, based on his or her conceptual framework. The real focus of investigation should, in this view, be these conceptual frameworks and how language use reflects them. In the cognitive semantics literature meaning is based on conventionalized conceptual structures. Thus semantic structure, along with other cognitive domains, reflects the mental categories which people have formed from their experience of growing up and acting in the world. A number of conceptual structures and processes are identified in this literature but special attention is often given to metaphor. Cognitive linguists agree with the proposal by G. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) that metaphor is an essential element in our categorization of the world and our thinking processes. Metaphor is seen as related to other fundamental structures such as image schemas, which provide a kind of basic conceptual framework derived from perception and bodily experience, and Fauconnier's notion of mental spaces, which are mental structures which speakers set up to manipulate reference to entities. Cognitive linguists also investigate the conceptual processes which reveal the importance of the speaker's construal of a scene. A consequence of this view of language is that the study of semantics and linguistics must be an interdisciplinary activity. One result is that scholars working within this and related frameworks tend to stray across intra- and inter-disciplinary boundaries more easily than most. The approach to metaphor has been applied not only to the study of grammar and semantics, but also to historical linguistics, categories of thought, poetic language, rhetoric and ethics amongst other areas. Bibliography:

38

1. Kleiber, G. 1990. La smantique du prototype. Paris. Presses Universitaires de France. 2. Leech, G. 1990. Semantics. The Study of Meaning. London. Penguin Books. 3. Saeed, J. 1997. Semantics. Blackwell Publishers.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION 1. What is a prototype? Give examples. 2. What are conceptual hierarchies? Provide examples. 3. State the main principles of Cognitive Semantics.

FINAL TESTS AND QUESTIONS

1. Linguistic Relativism versus Semantic Universals.

39

2. Two or more words may be close in meaning and yet not collocate with the same items. Which is correct: The baby began to cry/ started to cry as soon as they had left. I couldnt begin / start my car; the battery was flat. Before the world started, only God existed. 3. Words have distinct syntactic behaviour. Analyse the differences: The plane leaves/ departs from Gatwick, not Heathrow. We left the house at 6. We *departed the house at 6. 4. Mark the following words with positive[+], negative[-] or neutral [n] connotation. If possible, try to establish relations of synonymy or antonymy between pairs of them frugal, famous, extravagant, boast, generous, miserly, notorious, careful, brag, resolute, strict, advertise, obstinate, severe, praise. 5. What is the criterion that differenciates the following words belonging to the two series: a. partner, colleague, ally, accomplice, comrade; b. pal, mate, associate, companion, buddy, friend. 6. Correct the sentences if necessary: There was a high difference between the two teams. I am doing this exam because I want to achieve a step in my career. His books commanded criticism from many people. He had been found guilty of some slight crimes. She won many competitions, forming fame in the process. I was very grateful, because he had rescued my life. 7. What are the opposites of single, white, light, heavy. Provide contexts. 8. Identify the different types of oppositions: The more the haste, the less the speed. Marry in haste and repent in leisure. If you lie upon roses when young, youll lie upon thorns when old. Better to give than to take. Spare when you are young and spend when you are old. Faults are thick when love is thin. A saint abroad and a devil at home. Pride goes before and shame follows after. An idle youth, a needy age. This world is a comedy to those that think and a tragedy to those that feel. A good beginning makes a good ending. Unselfish parents have selfish children. Promise little but do much. A pair of lovers are like sunset and sunrise; there are such things every day, but we very seldom see them. 20. What are the elements of the semantic component of GenerativeTransformational Grammar? 21. The organization of a generative grammar. 22. Generative Semantics versus Interpretive Semantics. 23. Explain the importance of the process of categorization. 24. Discuss the main theses of the two opposite models: the model of necessary and sufficient conditions and the prototype theory. 25. The vertical dimension of categories. Give examples.

40

26. Discuss the main theses of Cognitive Semantics.

41