Bundesministerium des Innern

Annual Report of the Office for Protection of the Constitution

1999

IV. Activities of Intelligence Services of Countries in the Near/Middle East

Also, the services of several Near/Middle East countries continue to pursue intelligence activities in, and against, Germany. Their intelligence interest covers the classical areas of espionage - politics, the military, industry, science and technology - and, to a particular extent, infiltration of, and spying on, organizations or persons in Germany which/who are in opposition to the government of their respective country of origin. In order to achieve these ends, they are also prepared to use force which may even include acts of (state-sponsored) terrorism. Also, they are interested in the subject of proliferation.

1.
Priority aim: spying on regime opponents

Iranian Intelligence Services

As before, the priority aim of the Iranian Intelligence Service VEVAK (Ministry for Intelligence and Security) is to combat Iranian dissidents living in Germany. In departure from the violent approach taken until the mid-1990s - inter alia, attempts on the lives of leading opposition politicians in Western foreign countries, including Germany 175) - VEVAK activities were, as in the previous years, focused on the political neutralization of opposition groups and their anti-regime activities. The "Peoples Mujahiddin of Iran" (MEK) and its political arm which is active worldwide, the "Nationaler Widerstandsrat Iran" (NWRI - "National Resistance Council of Iran"), continued to be the focus of the intelligence interest of the Iranian intelligence service. In its fight against the Iranian opposition-in-exile, VEVAK makes use of so-called "culture associations". These are cover organizations founded as directed by VEVAK and acting in accordance with Irans interests and wishes. In addition, the Iranian service initiates anti-MEK publications which in part are published by former MEK activists and have the aim of persuading the readers of these publications to turn their backs upon this organization. For spying on the MEK, the Iranian intelligence service also recruits supporters of that organization and other Iranian nationals. Recruitment mostly takes place during visits by exiled Iranians to Iran. When in that country, they will be approached by VEVAK and, in instances, under threat of massive harassment against themselves or their relatives in Iran, are compelled to co-operate with the intelligence service. On 24 November, the trial began in the Berlin Higher Regional Court of Appeal against a 36-year old Iranian national living in Germany for a number of years and arrested in Berlin in July. He was under strong suspicion to have spied, as a supposed MEK

"Culture Associations" and anti-MEK publications

Severe harassment as a lever

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supporter, on leading functionaries and activities of that organization in Germany on behalf of the Iranian intelligence service*).

2.

Syrian Intelligence Services

Also the Syrian intelligence services continued their intelligence collection activities in Germany.
Residencies control the source and informant network

For the development and control of the source and informant network set up to this end, they run undercover bases established at the official and quasi-official missions (legal residencies). The latter include the Syrian Embassy. The main tasks of the Syrian intelligence service officers operating from these missions under diplomatic cover are intelligence collection, and spying on and monitoring of compatriots living in Germany who are critical of the political system in their home country. The primary observation sites of Syrian secret services include the Islamic Centres and mosques whose frequenters are considered to be among the political opponents. With the help of sources and informants, the services attempt to gather information on the living conditions, contacts and political aims of these persons so as to induce them, by using the information thus obtained, to abandon their dissident stance. A case in point concerns a 43-year old Syrian who, after his asylum application had been turned down in August 1995, as a walkin volunteered co-operation with the Syrian intelligence service. Since then, he had maintained intensive intelligence contacts with the resident of the civilian Syrian intelligence service who held the cover post of attach in the Consular Division of the Syrian Embassy. In this context, he procured, and delivered to his handler, personal data on a large number of ethnic Syrians and Lebanese living in Germany. For this purpose, he increasingly made use of clandestine methods and means. This intelligence contact ended in May 1999 when he was arrested. In early October, he was sentenced by the Hamburg OLG (Higher Regional Court of Appeal) to two years' imprisonment (suspended on probation) on the charge of intelligence activity on behalf of Syria. At the instigation of the Foreign Office, the agent controller of the Syrian Embassy left the Federal Republic of Germany on 24 July.

___________________________________________ *)

On 19 January 2000, the Berlin Higher Regional Court of Appeal sentenced the accused to 18 months imprisonment (suspended on probation) and to a fine of 5,000 DM.

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