EvidenceProject Vol4

THE REVISED RULES
ON
EVIDENCE:
Codal Provisions, Special Laws & Jurisprudence
Class of 3-C 2003-2004 Atty. Francis Edralin Lim Ateneo De Manila School of Law
Volume 4
Evidence Project Volumes

Volume 1: I. Admissibility of Evidence II. What Need Not Be Proved III. Real Demonstrative Evidence IV. Best Evidence Rule V. Parole Evidence Rule VI. Interpretation of Documents VII. Qualifications of Witnesses VIII. Privileged Communications IX. Admissions & Confessions X. Conduct & Character XI. Hearsay Rule XII. Opinion Rule XIII. Burden of Proof & Presumptions XIV. Presentation of Evidence (Part. A., B. , C. 1. to 7.) XIV. Presentation of Evidence (Part C. 8. to 10., D., E.) XV. Weight & Sufficiency of Evidence
Volume 2:
Volume 3: Volume 4: Volume 5:
Volume 6:
3C 2003-2004 Evidence Project Vol. 4 - 1 -
Volume 4: Table of Contents

XI. Hearsay Rule A. Testimonial Knowledge 1. Rule 130, Sec. 36 2. People vs. Brioso 3. People vs. Cusi 4. People vs. Gaddi 5. Estrada vs. Desierto 6. US vs. Zenni B. Exceptions to Hearsay 1. Dying Declaration a. Rule 130, Sec. 37 b. People vs. Laquinon c. People vs. Sabio d. People vs. Salison 2. Declaration Against Interest a. Rule 130, Sec. 38 b. People vs. Majuri c. People vs. Toledo d. Fuentes vs. CA 3. Pedigree a. Rule 130, Sec.39 b. Gravador vs. Mamigo c. People vs. Alegado d. Tison vs. CA 4. Family Tradition a. Rule 130, Sec.40 b. Ferrer vs. De Inchausti 5. Common Reputation a. Rule 130, Sec.41 b. Ferrer vs. De Inchausti c. City of Manila vs. Del Rosario 6. Res Gestae a. Rule 130, Sec.42 b. People vs. Lungayan c. People vs. Putian d. People vs. Tolentino
7. Entries in the Course of Business a. Rule 130, Sec. 43 b. Palmer vs. Hoffman c. Philamlife vs. Capital Assurance Corp. 8. Official Records a. Rule 130, Sec.44 b. Africa vs. Caltex c. People vs. Leones d. Manalo vs. Robles Trans. Co. e. People vs. Cabuang f. People vs. Gabriel 9. Commercial Lists a. Rule 130, Sec.45 b. State vs. Lungsford c. PNOC Shipping vs. CA d. Estrada vs. Noble 10. Learned Treatises a. Rule 130, Sec. 46 11. Prior Testimony a. Rule 130, Sec.47 b. Tan vs. CA c. Ohio vs. Roberts XII. Opinion Rule A. Rule 130, Secs. 48-50 B. Cases: 1. Dilag vs. Merced 2. US vs. Trono 3. People vs. Adoviso 4. People vs. Ominta 5. People vs. Vallejo 6. State vs. Garver 7. US vs. Stiefel 8. Daubert vs. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 9. US vs. Bonds 10. People vs. Daniel
XI.
HEARSAY RULE
A. Testimonial Knowledge 1. Rule 130, Section 36 Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. Cases: People vs. Brioso 37 SRCA 336 (1971) Hearsay (Testimonial Knowledge) Facts: Appellants Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza are convicted of the crime of murder for the death of one Silvino Daria. The records of the case shows that on 23 December 1966, the spouses Silvino Daria and Susana Tumalip were in their house at barrio Tiker, Tayum Abra. Cecilia Bernal, a niece and neighbor of the spouses, was alarmed by the barking of the dogs and when she peeped through a crack in the wall of her house she saw appellants walking in the direction of the house of Silvino. Brioso was carrying a long gun. Bernal witnessed appellants point a gun at the bamboo wall of Darias house. Two detonations followed and Bernal heard Daria moaning and his wife crying for help. Bernal went to the house and found the victim prostrate, wounded, and unable to speak. The widow, however, right after being shot, rushed to her husbands side and told her that he was shot by Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza. Daria died one hour later. A few days later, Susana Tumalip and Cecilia Bernal executed affidavits pointing to the two accused as the killers. In this appeal, appellants assigns the following errors: (1) the lower court erred in relying on the uncorroborated and contradictory statement of prosecution witness Cecilia Bernal; and (2) the lower court erred in disregarding the affidavit of Antonio Daria, son of deceased, clearing the accused Mariano Taeza, which affidavit had been identified in court by the fiscal before whom the same was executed. Issues: 1. Whether or not the court erred in relying on the testimony of Cecilia Bernal. 2. Whether the affidavit executed by Antonio Daria is hearsay. Ruling: There is no discrepancy on the testimony of Bernal on the material points. Cecilia Bernal had no motive to impute falsely the crime against the accused. The alleged inconsistencies in her testimony do not detract from the positive and straightforward identification of the accused as the ones who were seen at the scene of the crime and who actually shot Daria. Moreover, the testimony of Bernal is corroborated by the declaration of the victim himself, who told his wife that it was Juan Brioso and Mariano Taeza who shot him. This statement satisfies the requirements of an ante-mortem statement. Judged by the nature and extent of his wounds, Silvino Daria must have realized the seriousness of his
condition, and it can be safely inferred that he made the same under the consciousness of an impending death, considering that he died only an hour after being shot. With respect to the affidavit of Antonio Daria, which was presented to corroborate the testimony of Mariano Taeza, the same is rejected as hearsay. The said affidavit was never identified by the supposed affiant and there was no opportunity for the prosecution to crossexamine him. As stated in People vs. Mariquina, affidavits are generally not prepared by affiants themselves but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. For this reason, and for further reason that the adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiants, affidavits are generally rejected in a judicial proceeding as hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are place on the witness stand to testify thereon. Antonio Darias affidavit, therefore, has no probative value. By: Christian H. Sorita People vs. Cusi 14 SCRA 944 (1965) Hearsay (Testimonial Knowledge) Facts: Respondents Arcadio Puesca, Walter Apa, Jose Gustilo, Filomeno Macalinao, Ricardo Dairo, and Magno Montano were all charged with robbery in band with homicide. During the trial, prosecution witness Sgt. Lucio Bao of the Police Force of Digos, Davao testified that an extrajudicial confession was made to him by accused Arcadio Puesca wherein the latter admitted his participation in the commission of the crime and revealed the name of other persons who conspired with him. Prosecuting officer asked the witness Bao to mention in court the name of Puescas alleged co-conspirators. Counsel for the accused Macalinao, Gustilo, and Dairo objected to this upon the ground that whatever the witness would say would be hearsay as far as his clients were concerned. Respondent Judge resolved the objection allowing the witness to answer the question but without mentioning the name of those persons who objected. Prosecuting officers motion for reconsideration having been denied, hence the present petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether the court erred in not allowing the witness to mention the names of Puecas co-conspirators on the ground of hearsay. Ruling: There is no question that hearsay evidence, if timely objected to may not be admitted. But while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement. In the present case, the purpose of the prosecuting officer as manifested by him in the discussions below, is nothing more than to establish the fact that the accused Puesca had mentioned to Sgt. Bao the names of those who conspired with him to commit the offense charged, without claiming that Puescas statement or the answer to be given by Sgt. Bano
would be competent and admissible evidence to show that the persons so named really and actually conspired with Puesca. For this limited purpose, we believe that the question propounded to the witness was proper and the latter should have been allowed to answer it in full, with the understanding, however, that his answer shall not to be taken as competent evidence to show that the persons really and actually conspired with Puesca and later took part in the commission of the offense. By: Christian H. Sorita People vs. Gaddi 170 SCRA 649 (1989) Hearsay (Testimonial Knowledge) Facts: Nerio Gaddi was charged with murder for the death of one Augusto Esguerra. The prosecutions version of the facts (which was the version believed by the court) show that in the afternoon of December 11, 1981, at San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City, Ernesto Guzman saw appellant Nerio Gaddi and the victim Augusto Esguerra drinking gin. In the morning of the following day, appellent told Ernesto Guzman that he killed Esguerra and dumped his body in a toilet located in the backyard of Guzman. Guzman advised appellant to surrender to the police. Guzman went to the police and reported what appellant told him. On December 12, 1981, the appellant was arrested. Appellant voluntarily surrendered and told the police that he killed the victim and that he buried the body. The appellant led the police to where the body is buried. Patrolman Patriarca noted the statements of Guzman and Gaddi and took down the confession of appeallant. In his defense, Gaddi points to Guzman as the perpetrator of the crime and that he was only forced by the latter to admit the crime. The court convicted the appellant of the crime charged. In this appeal, appellant disputes the trial courts reliance on the testimonies of the prosecution witness Guzman as a basis for his convition. He claims that Ernesto Guzmans testimony on Gaddis confession of the crime to him cannot be given credence for being hearsay. Issue: Whether or not Guzmans testimony is hearsay. Ruling: No. This tribunal had previously declared that a confession constitutes evidence of the high order since it is suported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience. Proof that a person confessed to the commission of a crime can be presented in evidence without violating the hearsay rule which only prohibits a witness from testifying as to those facts which he merely learned from other persons but not as to those facts which he knows of his own knowledge;that is, which are derived from his own perception. Hence, while the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the facts asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement.
Here, when Guzman testified that the appellant, who probably was bothered by his conscience, admitted the killing to him, there was no violation of the hearsay rule as Guzman was testifying to a fact which he knows of his own personal knowledge; that is, he was testifying to the fact that the appellant told him that he stabbed Augusto Esguerra and not to the truth of the appellants statement. (In this case, it should also be noted that the appellant was not convicted based only on the prosecution witness testimony but also on the presence of other circumstantial evidence proved.) By: Christian H. Sorita Estrada vs. Desierto 356 SCRA 108 (2001) Hearsay (Testimonial Knowledge) Facts: This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the Courts resolution in GR. No. 146710-15 and Omnibus Motion in GR. 146738 of the Courts Decision of March 2, 2001. In G.R. No. 146738, petitioner raises and argues the following issues: 1. Whether petitioner resigned or should be considered resigned as of Janury 20, 2001; 2. Whether the Anagara Diary is inadmissible for being violative of the following rules on evidence: hearsay, best evidence, authentication, admissions, and res inter alios acta; 3. Whether reliance on newspaper accounts is violative of the hearsay rule. It is urged that the use of the Angara Diary to determine the state of mind of the petitioner on the issue of his resignation violates the rule against the admission of hearsay rule. Ruling: We are unpersuaded. To begin with, the Angara Diary is not an out of court statement. The Angara Diary is part of the pleadings in the cases at bar. Even assuming arguendo that the Angara Diary was an out of court statement, still its use is not covered by the hearsay rule. Evidence is called hearsay when its probative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competency and reliability of some persons other than the witness by whom it is sought to produce it. There are three reasons for excluding hearsay evidence: (1) absence of cross-examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence, and (3) absence of oath. Not all hearsay evidence, however, is inadmissible as evidence. Over the years, a huge body of hearsay evidence has been admitted by courts due to their relevance, trustworthiness and necessity. A complete analysis of any hearsay problem requires that we further determine whether the hearsay evidence is one exempted from the rules of exclusion. A more circumspect examination of our rules of exclusion will show that they do not cover admissions of a party and the Angara Diary belongs to this class. Section 26 of Rule 130
provides that the act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. It has long been settled that these admissions are admissible even if they are hearsay. That Angara Diary contains direct statements of petitioners which can be categorized as admissions of a party: his proposal for a snap presidential election where he would not be a candidate; his statement that he only wanted the five-day period promised by chief of Staff Angelo Reyes; his statements that he would leave by Monday if the second envelope would be opened by Monday and pagod na Pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. It is however argued that the Angara Diary is not the Diary of petitioner, hence, nonbinding on him. The argument overlooks the doctrine of adoptive admission. An adoptive admission is a partys reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the partys reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by the other person. The basis for admissibility of admissions made vicariously is that arising from the ratification or adoption by the party of the statement which the other person had made. In the Angara Diary, the options of the petitioner started to dwindle when the armed forces withdrew its support from him as president and commander-in-chief. Thus, executive Secretary Angara had to ask Senate President Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of dignified exit or resignation. Petitioner did not object to the suggested option but simply said he could never leave the country. Petitioners silence on this and other related suggestions can be taken as an admission by him. Petitioner also contends that the use of Angara Diary against him violated the rule on res inter alios acta. The rule is expressed in section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, viz: The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided. Again, petition errs in his contention. The res inter alios acta rule has several exceptions. One of them is provided in Section 29 of Rule 130 with respect to admissions by a co-partner or agent. Executive Secretary Angara as such was an alter ego of the petitioner. Under our rules of evidence, admissions of an agent (Secretary Angara) are binding on the principal (petitioner). Moreover the ban on hearsay evidence does not cover independently relevant statements. These are statements which are relevant independently of whether they are true or not. They belong to two (2) classes: (1) those statements which are the very facts in issue, and (2) those statements which are circumstantial evidence of the facts in issue. The second class include the following: a. Statements of a person showing his state of mind, that is his mental condition, knowledge belief, intention, ill will and other emotions; x x x b. statements of a person from which an inference may be made as to the state of mind of another, that is, the knowledge, belief, motive, good or bad faith, etc. og the latter;
As afore discussed, the Angara Diary contains statements of the petitioner which reflects his state of mind and are circumstantial evidence of his intent to resign. It also contains statements of Secretary Angara from which we can reasonably deduce petitioners intent to resign. They are admissible and they are not covered by the rule on hearsay. By: Christian H. Sorita U.S. vs. Zenni 492 F. Supp. 464 (1980) Hearsay (Testimonial Knowledge) Facts: While conducting a search of the premises of the defendant, Ruby Humphrey, pursuant to a lawful search warrant, which authorized a search for evidence of bookmaking activity, government agents answered the telephone several times. The unknown callers stated directions for the placing of bets on various sporting events. The government proposes to introduce this evidence to show that the callers believed that the premises were used in betting operations. The existence of such belief tends to prove that they were. The defendants object on the ground of hearsay. Issue: Whether the statements overheard in the telephone call are inadmissible in evidence on the ground of hearsay. Ruling: The utterances of unknown callers were non-assertive verbal conducts offered as relevant to support inferences that bets could be placed at premises being telephoned, and thus, as implied assertions, utterances were not within the operation of the hearsay rule.The utterances of the absent declarants are not offered for the truth of the words, and the mere fact that the words were uttered has no relevance in itself. Rather they are offered to show the declarants belief in a fact sought to be proved. The evidence was not offered for any truth stated in it but for the truth of some other proposition inferred from it. Under the federal rules of evidence, implied assertions are not hearsay. Two principal arguments were usually expressed for removing implied assertions from the scope of the hearsay rule: First, when a person acts in a way consistent with a belief but without intending by his act to communicate that belief, one of the principal reasons for the hearsay rule to exclude declarations whose veracity cannot be tested by cross-examination does not apply; because the declarants sincerity is not then involved. In the second place, the underlying belief is in some cases self-verifying: There is frequently a guarantee of the trustworthiness of the inference to be drawn . . . because his actions on the correctness of his belief, i.e. his actions speak louder than words. By: Christian H. Sorita
B. Exceptions to Hearsay Rule

1. Dying Declaration (a) Rule 130, Section 37 Sec. 37. Dying declaration. The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.
Cases: People vs. Laquinon 135 SCRA 91 (1985) Dying Declaration Facts: Accused Gregorio Laquinon was charged with the crime of murder in the CFI of Davao del Sur for the killing of Pablo Remonde. The facts show that on the night of November 13, 1972, in Barrio Clib, Hagonoy, Davao Del Sur, Barrio Captain Samama Buat heard gunshots coming from the bank of a river near his house. Moments later, Leocario Buat, Samamas brother arrived and told the latter that a man was shouting for help at the bank of the river. Samama instructed Leocario to call the barrio councilman. Samama proceeded to the place where the unidentified man was. Leocario and the barrio councilman also arrived there. Samama found the man lying face down on the sand and with his two hands tied on his back. When asked who he was, the man answered that he is Pablo Remonde. Samama Buat took the ante-mortem statement of Pablo Remonde. Samama asked Remonde who shot him and the latter replied that it was Gregorio Laquinon. He also asked Pablo Remonde whether he would survive and to which the victim answered I dont know. Barrio captain Samama Buat also informed Vice Mayor Biran the shooting of Remonde. Biran went to the scene of the incident and asked Remonde who shot him to which the latter answered that he was shot by Gregorio Laquinon. Remonde was subsequently brought to the hospital but died on November 16, 1972 because of bullet wounds. The accused denied the killing and raised the defense that it was a certain Noli Cabardo who killed Remonde. As a member of the KM, he was only the one who brought Remonde to Cabardo. After trial, the court found the accused guilty of the crime charged. In this appeal, the appellant argues that the lower court erred in finding him guilty on the basis of the ante-mortem statement of Remonde since it was not made under the consciousness of an impending death. Issue: Whether the declaration of Remonde is admissible as an ante-mortem declaration. Ruling: The dying declaration of Remonde is not admissible as an ante-mortem declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not. (Remember that when the
deceased was asked when he would be able to survive, the deceased replied, I dont know.) The declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself in extremis, at the point of death when hope of recovery is extinct, which is the sole basis for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule. It may be admitted however, as part of the res gestae since the statement was made immediately after the incident and deceased Pablo Remonde had no sufficient time to concoct a story. The evidence presented however shows that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by treachery. By: Christian H. Sorita People vs. Sabio 102 SCRA 218 (1981) Dying Declaration (Exception to Hearsay) Facts: Catalino Espina, 80 years old and owner of a sari-sari store in Cebu, was found on the second floor of his home, wounded on the forehead, from which injury he died 3 days later. Prosecution witness Jesusa Birondo testified that around 5am that day, as she was preparing to go to the seashore, she heard cries for help coming from Espinas house. When she looked outside her window, she saw the accused, Rodulfo Sabio (nicknamed Papu) coming out of the door of the store of Espinas house. Another witness, Camilo Semilla, grandnephew of the victim, who lived at the latter since childhood, testified that he left the victims home at around 4am to go fishing. Sometime later, he observed Sabio from 6 meters away, running past him and towards his (Sabios) home. Semilla observed that Sabio had his hands tucked inside his shirt while running. Minutes later, a certain Enok Calledo arrived and told Semilla to go home because his grand-uncle was crying for help. When Semilla arrived, he saw Espina lying wounded upstairs and the latter was only able to speak when his head was raised. Semilla also observed that the tin can (called a barrio) containing the cash sales of the store amounting to around 8 pesos was lying empty on the floor. Espina asked Semilla to call for the police and Patrolmen Fuentes and Burgos responded. Upon arrival, Fuentes asked Espina questions about his wounding and wrote the answers on torn calendar page. According to Fuentes, in response to his questions, Espina identified Papu Sabio as his assailant, the latter having attacked him after demanding money. Fuentes then had Espina thumbmark this ante-mortem statement with his own blood, there being no ink available. Fuentes and Burgos signed as witnesses. Espina was then brought to the hospital where he died 3 days later due to his head wounds. In his defense, Sabio testified that at the time of the supposed robbery and homicide, he was asleep at home. Sabio also presented a certain Jacinto Mendez who testified that he slept at the home of the accused the night before and corroborated Sabios presence therein.
The RTC found Sabio guilty of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced him to death. Issues: 1. Whether or not the RTC correctly convicted Sabio of robbery with homicide. 2. Whether or not the Ante-mortem Statement of Espina is admissible as evidence against Sabio Ruling: 1. The Supreme Court ruled that only the crime of homicide had been committed and sentenced him to 12-20 years of imprisonment. The evidence in support of robbery is circumstantial at best and does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Sabio had carried away the money contained in the tin can. The consummation of robbery cannot be presumed from the circumstance that the accused was seen running with his hands inside his shirt or that the tin can allegedly contained 8 pesos or that the house was in disarray. Nor can the dying declaration be admitted to establish the robbery (part of which read: Q: Who slashed and robbed you? A: Rodulfo Sabio). The admission of dying declarations has always been strictly limited to criminal prosecutions for homicide or murder, as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of death. 2. The Ante-mortem Statement is admissible versus Sabio. The arguments of the defense are unavailing. That the victim was under the consciousness of impending death is strengthened by the following circumstances: the seriousness of injury to the victims forehead, the profuse bleeding, the inability to speak unless his head was raised, the spontaneous answers to Fuentes questions, his subsequent demise from the wounds. The fact that death did not ensue until 3 days later does not alter its probative force since it is not an indispensable requirement that the declarant expire immediately after. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact, that renders the dying declaration admissible. Further, the fact that the victim told his grandnephew to fetch the police does not negative the victims feeling of hopelessness of recovery. Rather, it emphasizes the realization that he had little time to disclose his assailant to the authorities. By: Jose C. Salvosa People vs. Salison, Jr. 253 SCRA 758 (1996) Dying Declaration (Exception to Hearsay) Facts: Appellant Rey Salison, Jr. was convicted by the RTC of Davao City for the murder of one Rolando Valmoria. Witness Maria Ayola saw Salison approach Valmoria, put his arm around his shoulder, bring him behind a neighbors house and boxed the latter in the abdomen. A fight then ensued, during which, 3 other accused (Andiente, Dignaran and
Fediles) appeared and joined the fight against Valmoria. Another witness Emilia Fernandez tried to separate the parties but to no avail. The 4 assailants then picked up pieces of wood and began to hit Valmoria with them at the back of his nape. Valmoria then ran towards his house which was a few meters away and hid inside. The 4 assailants began hitting the walls and windows of his house, shouting for him to come out but Valmoria refused. After Salison and his 3 cohorts left, Valmoria was accompanied by his parents to the home of the purok leader, Patricia Alcoseba. At this point, Valmoria began to feel dizzy and pain from his head, which was bleeding at the time. He asked Alcoseba to take down his declaration regarding the incident, explaining that if he should die and no witness would testify, his written declaration could be utilized as evidence. Valmoria then related to Alcoseba the details of the attack, identifying his assailants. The declaration was written in Cebuano. He signed the same at the end and gave it to his mother. Valmoria died of his wounds 3 days later. Issue: Whether or not the written declaration of Valmoria is admissible as evidence against Salison. Ruling: The declaration is admissible. The judgment of the RTC is affirmed. Although the declaration is in Cebuano dialect and is unaccompanied by an English or Filipino translation, the records do not disclose that the defense offered any objection to the admission of such declaration at trial. Thus, any such infirmity is waived. Although Sec. 33 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court now prohibits the admission of such document in an unofficial language, the Court believes that in the interest of justice, such injunction should not be literally applied here especially since no objection was made by the appellant. Also, it appears that the concerned parties and judicial authorities were sufficiently familiar with the dialect in which it was written. Furthermore, appellants contention that the declaration was not made under the consciousness of impending death holds no water. At the time of the declaration, Valmoria was under great pain and he expressed belief in his imminent death and the hope that his declaration could be used as evidence regarding the circumstances thereof. A person would not say so if he believes he would be able to testify against his assailants. At any event, assuming the declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration, it is still admissible as part of the res gestae, since it was made shortly after the startling occurrence and under the circumstances, the accused had no opportunity to contrive. By: Jose C. Salvosa
2. Declaration Against Interest (a) Rule 130, Section 38

Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact is asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third persons. Cases: People vs. Majuri 96 SCRA 472 (1980) Declaration Against Interest (Exception to Hearsay) Facts: Airol Aling y Majuri was a Muslim belonging to the Samal tribe of Siasi, Sulu. While serving sentence in prison for robbery with frustrated homicide, he received information from his relatives that his wife, Norija Mohamad, was fooling around with other men. Later on, when he was able to escape prison, he went to his house to reconcile with his wife. But upon seeing him, Norija just ran away. Infuriated, Aling chased after her and stabbed several times with a bolo. She died 2 days later due to her stab wounds. Under police investigation, Aling admitted to stabbing his wife and related to the police the details of his assault. He was charged with parricide and pleaded guilty to the same. On the witness stand, he readily admitted to the killing of his wife. As such, Aling was convicted of parricide and since he was an escaped convict, he was sentenced to death. On automatic review to the Supreme Court, the counsel of Aling contended that the marriage of Aling and Norija was not proven and so the accused could not be convicted for parricide. Issue: Whether or not the marriage between the accused (Aling) and the victim (Norija) was sufficiently proven to warrant conviction for parricide. Ruling: The contention of the appellants counsel is without merit. The testimony of the accused that he was married to the victim was an admission against penal interest. It was a confirmation of the maxim semper praesumitur matrimonio and the presumption that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Aling had 5 children with the deceased and he alluded in his testimony that Norijas father was his father-in-law. That implies that the victim was his lawful wife. The fact that he bitterly resented her infidelity, her failure to visit him in prison and her neglect of their children are other circumstances confirmatory of their married status. By: Jose C. Salvosa
People vs. Toledo 51 PHIL 825 (1928) Declaration Against Interest (Exception to Hearsay) Facts: Sisenado Holgado and Filomeno Morales had a dispute over parcels of land located in Pinamalayan, Mindoro. One morning, the 2 men happened to me and their argument was renewed. They agreed to engage in a bolo duel which resulted in the death of Morales. Holgado, however, was seriously wounded and fled to the neighboring house of Dalmacio Manlisic. He then proceeded to the municipal building where he made a sworn statement before the municipal president that only there were the only 2 persons who fought. A month later, Holgado died of his wounds. The querida of Morales, Justina Villanueva, testified however that appellant Eugenio Toledo, one of Holgados workers had intervened in the fight and dealt a mortal blow to Morales. Her testimony was partially corroborated by a certain Justina Llave. Toledo denied having participated in the fight and stated that his only involvement was having met Holgado after the fight and helping him get to the Manlisic residence. Toledos counsel presented Exhibit 1, the affidavit of Holgado made at the municipal building after the fight. This Exhibit however was ruled to be hearsay evidence and hence, inadmissible. Toledo was convicted of homicide by the trial court, which is the subject of this appeal. The counsel of Toledo contends that Exhibit 1 should have been admitted into evidence. Issue: Whether or not the affidavit of the deceased Holgado is admissible as evidence. Ruling: The conviction is reversed and Toledo acquitted. The trial court erred in not admitting Exhibit 1 as a statement of fact against penal interest and had it been received, its influence would have been felt by the trial court. Hearsay evidence is generally excluded by the courts. One of the recognized exceptions has been the declarations of third parties contrary to their pecuniary or proprietary interest. Traditionally, this exception has been made only to apply to admissions against a pecuniary or proprietary interest but not a penal interest. The Court however fails to see why a man will be presumed to tell the truth in the former instances and not the latter. To limit the exception to statements against pecuniary interests and not criminal liability cannot be justified on grounds of public policy. The purpose of evidence is to get the truth. The reason for the hearsay rule is that the extrajudicial statements of another are not the best way of serving this purpose. In other words, the great possibility of fabrication and falsehood and the inability to prove such untruths requires the doors to be closed to such evidence. So long therefore as the declarant is available, his extrajudicial statement should not be heard.
Where however, the declarant is dead or has disappeared, his previous out-of-court statements are the best evidence, if not inadmissible on other grounds. But they cannot be rendered inadmissible by the mere fact that the declarant is unavailable. One fact that will satisfy this necessity is that the declaration is or was against the declarants interest and this is because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment. By: Jose C. Salvosa Fuentes, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals 253 SCRA 430 (1996) Declaration Against Interest (Exception to Hearsay) Facts: Julieto Malaspina, together with his 3 friends, was attending a benefit dance in Agusan Del Sur. Appellant Alejandro Fuentes, Jr. called Malaspina, put his arm around his shoulder, saying: Before, I saw you with long hair but now you have short hair. He then stabbed Malaspina with a hunting knife and fled. Before Malaspina succumbed, he told his 3 companions that it was Alejandro Fuentes who stabbed him. Alejandro was charged with murder qualified by treachery. His defense was that of mistaken identity. He claimed that it was actually his cousin, Zoilo Fuentes, Jr., alias Jonie who was the killer. He presented as evidence the testimony of his uncle, Felicisimo Fuentes. Felicisimo testified that Zoilo had confessed to the killing of Malaspina and even sought help in finding a lawyer. He further stated that upon learning of Alejandros arrest, Zoilo immediately fled and could not be found. Alejandro also presented the testimony of one Station Commander P/Sgt. Benjamin Conde. The latter testified that after Alejandro was charged with murder, Felicisimo approached him and relayed the confession of Zoilo. Conde then personally went to the alleged home of Zoilo but he was informed that he had already fled. The trial court convicted Alejandro of murder which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Alejandro appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the lower courts erred in ruling that he was positively identified as the killer. Issue: Whether or not Alejandro Fuentes was indeed positively identified as the killer of Malaspina. Ruling: The conviction of Fuentes is affirmed. It is true that declarations against interest are an exception to the hearsay rule. There are 3 essential requisites for this exception: (a) that the declarant must not be able to testify; (b) that the declaration must concern a matter of fact cognizable by the declarant; (c) that the circumstances render it improbable that a motive to falsify existed.
In this case, the alleged declaration against interest attributed to Zoilo is inadmissible in evidence as an exception to hearsay. The holding of the Court in People vs. Toledo is inapplicable here. For all its attempts to demonstrate the arbitrariness behind the traditional rejection of declarations against penal interest, the Toledo case is remarkably different from the instant case. First, Zoilo is the cousin of the accused and Felicisimo is his uncle. The alleged confession is patently untrustworthy because these two have every motive to prevaricate. Second, the admission of such a statement would be shocking to the sense of justice. Assuming that Alejandro is acquitted and Zoilo subsequently captured and put to trial, there is nothing to prevent the latter from repudiating the statement. Legally, Zoilo cannot be bound to such a statement. Third and most importantly, it has not been demonstrated that Zoilo is unable to testify. There is no showing that he is either dead, mentally incapacitated or physically incompetent. His mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under this Rule. The records show that the defense did not exert any serious effort to produce Zoilo as a witness. Indeed, an innocent declaration by the real culprit should be admissible as evidence. But this can be open to abuse as when the extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated, thereby increasing the probability of its fabrication. For this case, at least, the prudent course is its exclusion. By: Jose C. Salvosa
3. Pedigree (a) Rule 130, Section 39 Sec. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these fast occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree. Cases: Gravador v. Mamigo 20 SCRA 742 (1967) Pedigree Facts: The petitioner Pedro Gravador was the principal of the Sta. Catalina Elementary School in Sta. Catalina, Negros Oriental on August 15, 1964 when he was advised by the Superintendent of Schools Angel Salazar, Jr., through Teodulfo Dayao, of his separation
from the service on the ground that he had reached the compulsory retirement age of 65. The latters findings were based on pre-war records which included Gravadors Employees Record Card that stated that he was born on November 26, 1897 (He was thus 66 years, 8 months and 22 days old on record). In a letter dated August 31, 1964, the petitioner protested his forced retirement on the ground that the date of his birth is not November 26, 1897 but December 11, 1901. Attached to this letter was the affidavit of Lazaro Bandoquillo and Pedro Sienes who were their neighbors even during the lifetime of the parents of Gravador. They stated that Gravadors true birth date is December 11, 1901. The Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental ruled that Gravador was born on December 11, 1901 and ordered his reinstatement, back salaries and damages amounting to P52,400. Respondent Eutiquio Mamigo, the District Supervisor, appealed directly to the Supreme Court. Mamigo contends that it was error on the part of the trial court to rely solely on post-war records to determine petitioners true date of birth. According to respondent, these records were only manufactured since it was believed that the original pre-war records had been lost or destroyed. Issue: Whether or not the trial court correctly relied on post-war records. Ruling: Yes. The trial court committed no error in relying on post-war records that reflected Gravadors birth date as December 11, 1901. Although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may testify as to his age as he learned it from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of a family tradition. In his application for back pay filed with the Department of Finance and when he asked the GSIS and the Civil Service Commission to correct the date of his birth, he repeatedly asserted that his birthday was on December 11, 1901. In the second place, the import of the declaration of petitioners brother, contained in a verified pleading in a cadastral survey way back in 1924, to the effect that the petitioner was then 23 years old, can not be ignored. Made ante litem motam by a deceased relative, this statement is at once a declaration regarding pedigree within the intendment and meaning of section 33 (now section 39) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Thus, December 11, 1901 is established as the date of birth of the petitioner not only by evidence of family tradition but also by the declaration ante litem motam of a deceased relative. By: Giancarlo M. Puyo People v. Alegado 201 SCRA 37 (1991) Pedigree
Facts: At about 6:00 p.m. on April 14, 1988 at the Freedom Square inside the public market of San Carlos City, Negros Occidental, the appellant Alfredo Alegado, a 170-pound, 53 year old market watchman took the victim Cristina Deang to the second floor of the public market building that was deserted. On the second floor, the appellant ordered Cristina to masturbate him then forcibly pushed her to the floor. He lay on top of her and inserted his penis but it did not penetrate fully before he ejaculated. The appellant gave her P2.00 and then left. Fearing that he might kill her, the victim told no one. On April 20, 1988, around 7:00 p.m., Alegado again asked Cristina to go to second floor of the same market place. When she refused, the appellant shoved her to the stairs into the upper floor near the civic center. When she resisted to take off her shorts and panty, the appellant threatened to kill her. He then inserted his penis into the girls vagina that eventually bled. The appellant gave her P2.00 and then left. Patrolwoman Evangeline Alfaro saw appellant coming down the stairs and then the victim followed a minute later. She was pale with blood flowing from her thigh and legs. The accused-appellant was charged and convicted of two counts of statutory rape by the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City and was sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua. One of the errors assigned by Alegado is that the trial court erred in convicting him of statutory rape as defined under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code despite the prosecution failure to prove with certainty the actual age of the offended party. Issue: Whether or not the age of the offended party was duly proven to be below twelve years old in order for the RPC provision on statutory rape to apply. Held: Yes. The fact that the victim was below twelve years old at the time of the rape was duly proved. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the offended party herself and her maternal grandfather, Cornelio Villarosa, as to the fact that the victim was born on September 5, 1976 do not constitute hearsay evidence as claimed by the accused-appellant but rather fall under the exceptions to the hearsay rule as provided under Section 39 and 40 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The word pedigree under Section 39 includes relationship. Family, genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and places where these facts occurred and the name of the relatives. The said provision contains three requisites for its admissibility, namely, (1) that there is controversy in respect to the pedigree of any member of the family; (2) that the reputation or tradition of the pedigree of the person concerned existed previous to the controversy; and (3) that the witness testifying to the reputation or tradition must be a member of the family of the said person. All these preconditions are obtaining in the case at bar considering that the date of birth of the rape victim is put in issue; that the declaration of the victims grandfather relating to tradition existed long before the rape case was filed; and that the witness testifying to the said tradition is the maternal grandfather of the rape victim.
Moreover, the offended party herself categorically stated in open court that she was born on September 5, 1976. Although a person can have no personal knowledge of the date of his birth, he may testify as to his age as he learned it from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of a family tradition. Inasmuch as the accused-appellant failed to present contrary evidence to dispute the prosecutions claim that the victim was below twelve years old at the time of the rapes under consideration, we affirm the trial courts finding that the victim in these rape cases was under twelve years old. By: Giancarlo M. Puyo Tison v. Court of Appeals 276 SCRA 582 (1997) Pedigree Facts: It appears that petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are the niece and nephew of the deceased Teodora Dezoller Guerrero. Teodora died on March 5, 1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Hence they seek to inherit from Teodora Guerrero by right of representation. Upon the death of his wife, Martin executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating to himself, allegedly as sole heir, a parcel of land with a house and apartment thereon located at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. On January 2, 1988, Martin sold the lot to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo. Martin Guerrero died on October 1988. Subsequently, petitioners filed for an action for reconveyance claiming that they have a right to inherit one half of the property. During the pre-trial hearing, Corazon Tison was presented as the lone witness and she offered the following evidence to prove their filiation to their father and their aunt: baptismal certificates, death certificates, and certificates of destroyed records of births of Teodora Dezoller and their father Hermogenes Dezoller, a family picture, affidavits of Pablo Verzosa and Meliton Sitjar, marriage certificates of Martin and Teodora, among other documents shown. Tison also testified as to her filiation Tedorora. Private respondents filed a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to prove their legitimate filiation under Article 172 of the Family Code. The Trial Court granted the demurrer and dismissed the complaint. The CA affirmed the TC ruling. Issue: Whether or not petitioners failed to prove to establish their legitimacy and filiation to the deceased Teodora Guerrero with evidence merely consisting of several documents and the testimony of Corazon Tison. Held: Yes. They have proved their filiation. TC and CA ruling are reversed and set aside. It is not debatable that the documentary evidence adduced by petitioners, taken separately and independently of each other, are not per se sufficient proof of legitimacy nor
even of pedigree. However, both courts failed to recognize the presumption of legitimacy. There is no presumption more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally as in an action for reconveyance. The presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of petitioners. The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodoras niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is subject to inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration be made ante litem moam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon. There is no dispute as the first, second and fourth requirements. As to the third requirement, where the party claiming seeks recovery against a relative common to both claimant and declarant not from the declarant himself or the declarants estate the relationship of the declarant to the common relative may not be proved by the declaration itself, but this requirement does not apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely to establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other member of the family. Where a party claims a right to the part of the estate of the declarant, the declaration of the latter that the former is her niece is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason that such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. By: Giancarlo M. Puyo
4. Family Tradition (a) Rule 130, Section 40 Sec. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree. Case:
Ferrer v. De Inchausti 38 Phil. 905 (1918) Family Tradition & Common Reputation Facts: Plaintiffs Rafael and Maria Angelina Ferrer filed a complaint praying for a declaration that Rosa Matilde Viademonte, mother of the plaintiffs herein, had the right to succeed to the inheritance left by Isabel Gonzales in the same proportion and capacity as the other four children of the latter namely, Ramon, Rafael, Joaquin, and Clotilde. The plaintiffs allege that they are the only legitimate heirs of Rosa Viademonte and are entitled to receive the latters share, that is, one-fifth of the estate left by Isabel Gonzales. They allege that Isabel was first married to Ramon Martinez Viademonte and that their mother Rosa was the fruit of their relationship. Isabel was then married Jose Joaquin de Inchausti, father of defendants herein. Counsel for the plaintiffs sought to establish that Rosa Matilde Viademonte has been treated and considered as a daughter of Isabel Gonzales and that on one occasion, the said Gonzales remarked that the father of Rosa Matilde was Ramon Martinez de Viademonte. Also, that Joaquin C. de Inchausti dedicated a picture to Rosa in the following manner: To my dear and unforgettable sister Rosa. College records of the latter at Collegio de Santa Isabel were shown to use establish filiation. The defendants presented an entry in the notebook of Ramon Viademonte Jr. which showed that true name of Rosa Matilde Viademonte was Rosa Matilde Robles, born of unknown parents in September 1, 1952. Notwithstanding the arguments of the plaintiff, Joaquin de Inchausti testified that one day he was assured by his half brother Ramon Martinez Viademonte that Rosa Matilde was not his sister but a mere protge and that her true name was Rosa Matilde Robles and that on occasion the said brother showed him the certificate of birth of which Exhibit 6 is a copy, which he took from the parochial church. Issue: Whether or not Joaquin de Inchaustis testimony and the diary accounts of Ramon Viademonte Jr. are admissible to prove the filiation of Rosa Matilde Viademonte to Isabel Gonzales Ruling: Yes. Evidence adduced at the trial to prove the origin of the cause of action shows, in a manner which leaves no room for doubt, that Rosa was not a legitimate daughter of Isabel Gonzales and it follows that her children have no right to a part of the hereditary property of Isabel Gonzales. In view of the fact that Ramon Martinez Viademonte is now dead, the testimony of Joaquin Jose de Inchausti referring to the said deceased is admissible as evidence of family tradition, for they are members of the same family and consequently the conclusion is that Rosa Matilde is the same Rosa Matilde Robles mentioned in Exhibit 6 and because she was born in 1952, in no manner could she be a legitimate daughter of Ramon Viademonte and Isabel Gonzales, whose marriage was dissolved 1n 1936 by the death of the husband. By: Giancarlo M. Puyo
5. Common Reputation (a) Rule 130, Section 41 Sec. 41. Common reputation. Common reputation existing previous to the controversy, respecting facts of public or general interest more than thirty years old, or respecting marriage or moral character, may be given in evidence. Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of common reputation. Cases: Ferrer v. De Inchausti 38 Phil. 905 (1918) Common Reputation Ruling: Counsel for the plaintiffs likewise objected to the admission in evidence of the daybook kept by Ramon Martinez Viademonte Jr. as hearsay. Their contention is untenable as the section 298, No, 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (now section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court) provides that evidence may be given upon trial of monuments and inscriptions in public places as evidence of common reputation; and entries in family Bibles or other family books or charts; engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, as evidence of pedigree. By: Giancarlo M. Puyo City of Manila v. Del Rosario 5 Phil. 227 (1905) Common Reputation Facts: This is action to recover possession of two parcels of land located in Calles Clavel and Barcelona, district of Tondo, filed by the City of Manila against its present occupant, Jacinto del Rosario. The plaintiff introduced both documentary and oral evidence. The latter consisted of the testimony John Wilson, Eduardo Timoteo, Juan Villegas, Sotera Roco, Lorenzo del Rosario, and Modesto Reyes, the city attorney. The third witness, Juan Villegas, testified that the land in question was formerly included in the Gran Divisoria, and that all the land included in it belonged to the city. This particular testimony is at variance with the testimonies of Wison and Timoteo who testified that the land belonged to the Central Government (not the city). His testimony was based on what he had learned from the oldest residents of that section of the city and was introduced by the City of Manila apparently for the purpose of proving that the city was generally considered the owner of the land drawing from this fact the presumption of actual ownership
under paragraph 11, section 334, of the Code of Civil Procedure (now Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court). Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Villegas is admissible as proof of common reputation. Ruling: No. Villegas testimony is merely hearsay. Since it consisted of what he had learned from some of the old residents of Manila, it was hearsay as to the court since those who said it were not produced. Such testimony does not constitute the common reputation referred to in the section mentioned. Common reputation as used in that section, is equivalent to universal reputation. The testimony of Villegas is not sufficient to establish the presumption referred to. Furthermore, this witness stated that the land in Calle Azcarraga had been partitioned between the municipality and the Central Government, share and share alike, and that the Central Government (not the city) retained Calles Gabriel de Rivera and Barcelona, which are precisely the streets on which the property abuts. By: Giancarlo M. Puyo
6. Res Gestae (a) Rule 130, Section 42 Sec. 42. Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a starting occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae. Cases: People vs. Lungayan 162 SCRA 100 (1988) Exception to the Hearsay Rule: Res Gestae Facts: This appeal from the decision of the RTC arose due to the complaint filed by Agripina Juan Vda. De Garzota, then 52 years old and widow, charging the accused of rape. At about 10 in the evening of January 20, 1980, the complainant was already asleep inside the room at their market stall when the accused, who was then the barangay captain, awakened her by entering her room after one of her children opened the door for him. He invited her to join him to observe the persons drinking wine in the market because they are in violation of a barangay ordinance prohibiting drinking after 10 pm. She consented. While they were
standing two meters away from the open door of the canteen, the accused suddenly grabbed both of her hands and allegedly pointed a gun at her after she shouted loudly (only once). The accused then pulled her and she fell hitting her head on the ground. When she regained consciousness, she was dragged to a banana grove where she was allegedly raped which lasted for less than an hour. She only reached home at about 12 midnight and one of her daughters asked her what happened. She revealed that the accused abused her and when pressed for details, she just said that she will just tell everything in the morning. She told her as such and they then reported the incident. She was also submitted for to a medical examination. Based on the evidence presented, the accused was convicted. By way of rebuttal during appeal, the accused emphasized the failure of the prosecution to establish involuntariness on the part of the victim. Issues: 1. Whether or not the prosecution failed to establish the involuntariness of the victim. 2. Whether or not the trial court erred in considering the revelation of the complainant to her daughter of what happened to her as part of the res gestae. Ruling: 1. Yes. The prosecution failed. The circumstances of the case militated against the claim of the complainant that force and intimidation was employed by the accused. She should have declined the invitation. Going out alone with a man late in the evening is not good taste nor safe. She was also not discreet because she did not even put any underwear. She also only shouted for help once when she could have done more and just ran. She also offered no resistance nor struggle making the consummation last for almost an hour. 2. Yes. The RTC erred in considering the revelation as part of the res gestae. The Court stressed that in order for the statement to be part of the res gestae, it must not only be spontaneous but also be made at a time when there was no opportunity to concoct or develop a story. As the Court observed, she did not go home immediately after the incident. She took a walk and spent sometime thinking of what to do. She had enough time to make a decision of what will be the nature of her story. By: Marie Angeli Uy
People vs. Putian 74 SCRA 133 (1976) Exception to the Hearsay Rule: Res Gestae Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of the CFI convicting the accused of murdering Teodulo Panimdim. On November 22, 1969, while the victim was attending a dance, he was stabbed in the left groin. As a result, he died five days later. Putian was charged and convicted of murder on the basis of the testimony of the doctor who treated the victim and of the policeman who arrested the accused and seized from him the dagger allegedly used in the stabbing and who took down the victims ante-mortem statement identifying the accused as
the assailant. The trial court regarded the victims ante-mortem statement as part of the res gestae and not as a dying declaration since it was not made under the consciousness of an impending death. The victim was even able to go home after the medical treatment without any assistance. The appellant challenges the trial courts ruling that the statement be made part of the res gestae because it was not spontaneous, being made several hours after the incident. He claims that the requisite that the declarant gave the statement before he had time to devise or contrive was not present in this case. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that the statement be made part of the res gestae. Ruling: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court did not err in characterizing Panimdims statement as part of the res gestae and as proving beyond reasonable doubt that Putian is guilty of stabbing the victim. The res gestae rule embraces (a) spontaneous declarations and (b) verbal acts. Panimdims statement was a spontaneous statement made after the commission of the felony. Although a declaration does not appear to have been made by the declarant under the expectation of a sure and impending death, and, for the reason, is not admissible as a dying declaration, yet if such declaration was made at the time of, or immediately thereafter, the commission of the crime, or at a time when the exciting influence of the startling occurrence still continued in the declarants mind, it is admissible as part of the res gestae. Panimdims staetement was given sometime after the stabbing while he was undergoing treatment at a medical clinic. He had no time to concoct a falsehood or fabricate a malicious charge again Putian. No motive has been shown as to why he would frame up Putian. Putian, however, was convicted only of homicide since treachery was not proven. By: Marie Angeli Uy People vs. Tolentino 218 SCRA 337 (1993) Exception to the Hearsay Rule: Res Gestae Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of the RTC convicting all the accused of Robbery with Multiple Homicide and Serious Physical Injuries. On or about November 8, 1983, all the accused entered into the house of Adelaida Lingad (who at the time is not at home) by forcibly breaking a wooden window grill of the comfort room and then demanded from her children the whereabouts of Adelaidas money. At that time, the children were accompanied by their cousin, Grace Paule, who was able to recognize all the accused except for whose face was covered because Tolentino is both her uncle and barriomate, Tala is a relative of her mother and Matawaran as a barkada of Tala. When John Doe threatened to stab the kids, one of the children, Geraldine, got so frightened that she revealed where her mother hid the
money. After Tolentino took the money, he stabbed Grace Paule using a scythe and thereafter, stabbed the three other children one after the other. After Grace regained her consciousness, she cried for help and was heard by her mother and grandmother. Adelaida was then informed of the incident and thus rushed to her house. She asked Geraldine who the responsible persons were and the latter answered Bong-Bong and also mentioning the names of Tala and Matawaran. All the children died. Grace Paule was the only surviving victim who later positively identified the three accused. Tala argued that no probative value should be given to the extrajudicial statement of Garace taken by the fiscal while she was staying in the hospital, since his name and that of Matawaran were not mentioned. The accused also assailed the admissibility of the statement of Geraldine as par of the res gestae. Issues: 1. Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting the statement of Grace Paule. 2. Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting the statement of Geraldine. Ruling: 1. No. The trial court did not err in admitting Graces extrajudicial statement. Failure to mention some of the names of the accused was due to the fact that at the time her statements were taken, she was then groggy and delirious but she was nevertheless able to identify all of them on the witness stand. There is no improper motive on her part to implicate Tala who is even her mothers relative. Her testimony was also corroborated by Adelaida when the latter testified that her daughter Geraldine mentioned the names of Tala and Matawaran. 2. No. The trial court was correct in admitting Geraldines statement as part of the res gestae. The TC had correctly applied the principle of the res gestae, namely: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) that the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) that the statements made must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. All are present in the case at bar as Geraldine had named the accused-appellants as the perpetrators in the commission of the crime immediately after the occurrence of the stabbing incident.
By: Marie Angeli Uy
7. Entries in the Course of Business (a) Rule 130, Section 42 Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time of transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the
performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty. Cases: Palmer vs. Hoffman 318 U.S. 109 (1943) Exception to the Hearsay Rule: Entries in the Course of Business Facts: This is a petition for certiorari filed by Palmer et al. based on the decision of the District Court in favor of Hoffman. Howard Hoffman, the administrator of the estate of Inez Hoffman, filed an action against Palmer et al., trustees of NYNHH Railroad Company. This action arose from a railroad accident, which caused the death of the administrators wife, Inez. The accident occurred on the night of December 25, 1940. After two days, the enginner of the train, who died before the trail, made a statement at the freight office of petitioners where he was interviewed. During trial, such written statement was offered in evidence. They further offered to prove its admissibility by saying that the statement was signed in the regular course of business, it being the regular course of such business to make such a statement. Hoffmans objection to this was sustained. Issue: Whether or not the report is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule being an entry in the course of business. Ruling: No. It is not an entry in the regular course of business. The Act which allows the admission of business entries refers only to records kept in the regular course of business and not those kept in the regular course of conduct related to business. The petitioners are in the railroad business. In this case, the reports were not for the systematic conduct of the enterprise as a railroad business. Unlike payrolls, account receivables, accounts payable, bills of lading and the like, the reports were calculated essentially for use in the court. Their primary utility is for litigating and not for railroading. By: Marie Angeli Uy
Philamlife vs. Capital Assurance Corporation [CA] 72 O.G. 3941 (1975) Exception to the Hearsay Rule: Entries in the Course of Business Facts: This is an appeal from the judgment of the CFI which ordered Capital to pay PhilAm a certain sum of money. On July 21, 1960, PhilAm entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with Capital and spouses Galang whereby the latter parties agreed to pay the former a sum of money with interest in consideration of PhilAm issuing a clearance in favor of the Galang spouses. The sum involved was paid in full by Capital. However, it was also stipulated in the MOA that Capital will also be liable to any obligation arising from unremitted premiun collection. On March 19, 1963, PhilAm wrote Capital a letter advising it
that the Galangs have incurred additional accounts by way of unreported premium collections and demanding payment thereof. The issue boils down to the question of whether Philam has proved such unreported collections. In the action of PhilAm for the collection of money, it presented Bacani, its chief of accounts to testify on a statement of account showing the indebtedness of the debtors. Bacani, however, did not have personal knowledge about how the account had arisen. His office merely computed the charges based on debit memos received from other departments. The PhilAm maintains that the statement is admissible because it was a matter of company routine that charges for unremitted premiums are covered through the Accountants Control Office as soon as they are discovered. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the statement of account. Ruling: Yes. The statement of account could not be legally received in evidence. Before entries in the course of business may be received, it must be shown that they were made by a person who was in a position to know the facts therein stated. The Court said that Bacani certainly did not have personal knowledge of the transactions to which such entries refer. The rule also requires that the entries must have been made by a person deceased, outside the Philippines, or unable to testify. In this case, Bacani is neither of those enumerated. To lend probative value to the entries would be to countenance reception of self-serving evidence made without the intervention of other parties involved. Dissenting Opinion: The rule says entriesby a personwho was in a position to know. It is not essential that the entrant should have personal knowledge of the facts entered by him. If he made the entry in the regular course of business, recording an oral on a written report made to him by other persons in the regular course of business lying in the personal knowledge of the latter, it may be received provided the inconvenience of producing the numerous persons thus concerned outweighs the probable utility of doing so. In this case, the statement substantially satisfies the element of trustworthiness and necessity that underlie the consideration of exceptions to the hearsay rule. By: Marie Angeli Uy
8. Entries in Official Records (a) Rule 130, Section 44 Sec. 44. Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. (38) Cases: Africa vs. Caltex
16 SCRA 448 (1966) Official Records Facts: On March 18, 1948, fire broke out at the Caltex service station in Manila. The fire spread to and burned several neighboring houses. Their owners among them petitioners in this case sued respondents Caltex phils and Mateo Boquiren, agent in charge of operation. The action filed by the petitioners is one for damages under Article 1902 and 1903 of the old civil code. The petitioners alleged negligence on the part of the respondents as the cause of the fire. They presented the police and fire department reports to substantiate their claim. POLICE REPORT The report stated the circumstances surrounding the cause of the fire. The report also stated that the quick action of Leandro Flores in pulling off the gasoline hose connecting the truch with the underground tank prevented a terrific explosion. FIRE DEPARTMENT REPORT In connection with their allegation that the premises was subleased for the installation of a coca-cola and cigarette stand, the complainants furnished this office a copy of a photograph taken during the fire and which is submitted herewith. It appears in this picture that there are in the premises a coca-cola cooler and a rack which according to information gathered in the neighborhood contained cigarettes and matches installed between the gasoline pumps and the underground tanks. CAPT. TINIO The report reproduced information given by a certain Benito Morlaes regarding the history of the gasoline station and what the chief of the fire department had told him on the same subject. RTC and Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners failed to prove negligence and that respondents had exercised due care in the premises and with respect to the supervision of their employees. The court held that the police and fire department reports were inadmissible as being double hearsay. Hence, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court arguing that the reports in themselves, without further testimonial evidence on their contents, fall within the scope of section 35, Rule 123, which provides that entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Issue/s: 1. Whether or not the reports prepared by the Manila police, fire departments and a certain Capt. Tinio of the AFP are admissible in evidence. Held: 1. The reports are inadmissible. There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned. a. that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so
b. that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law c. that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information. Of the three requisites just stated, only the last is material to the issue in this case. Obviously, the material facts recited in the reports as to the cause and circumstances of the fire were NOT WITHIN THE PERSONAL KNWOLEDGE of the officers who conducted the investigation. Neither was it acquired by them through OFFICIAL INFORMATION. To qualify the statements as official information, it must have been acquired by the officers who prepared the reports, from persons who had PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE AND DUTY TO GIVE SUCH STATEMENTS. The reports in question do not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule; the facts stated therein were not acquired by the reporting officers through official information, not having been given by the informants pursuant to any duty to do so. However, in the report submitted by Captain Mariano of the Manila Police Department, the negligence of the respondents were established. The court held that the foregoing report was an exception to the hearsay rule since Captain Mariano prepared it basing it from his personal knowledge. The Court held Caltex liable for the fire and imposed solidary liability. By: Arnaldo M. Cario People vs. Leones 117 SCRA 382 (1982) Official Records Facts: Complainant Irene Dulay was a salesgirl employed in the store of Spouses Leones in La Union where she also resided. The accused, Joseph Leones, was a member of the Leones family. One day, all the members of the Dulay family went for a picnic. When the accused and her sister went back to the house, they saw the condition of Irene, who was then feeling very dizzy. The accused tried to give Irene medicine but the later refused so he forced her to drink it. After drinking the medicine, Irene felt more dizzy. The accused took advantage of Irenes condition and succeeded in raping her. The stepmother of the accused found Irene without any panty and brought her to the hospital where she was examined by a doctor. The medical examination conducted by Dr. Cayao revealed the following 1. healing lacerations of the hyment at 2 oclock and 10 oclock 2. smear exam for sperm cell negative 3. easily admit one finger with pain
Thereafter, the case for rape was filed against the accused. The accused denied the charge imputed to him and set up the defense of alibi claiming that he was at the beach with his family at the time the alleged incident happened. RTC ruled that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of having committed the crime of rape and was sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua. Hence the direct appeal to the SC. Issue/s: Whether or not the evidentiary value of the medical record presented by the government is sufficient to warrant conviction Held: 1. No. Supreme Court ruled for the acquittal of the accused. The clinical case record of Irenes admission and confinement at the hospital contain entries which totally and completely belie the claim of the complainant that she was raped by the accused. The entry in the medical record of Irene stated VAGINAL BLEEDING HEALING LACERATED WIDE AT 2 oclock and 10 o clock hymen. Assuming that the victim was raped between 2 and 3 pm. Then the lacerations of the hymen at 2 oclock and 10 oclock would not have been described and indicated to be HEALING in the clinical case record. It would be described as LACERATION FLESH. The findings of healing laceration clearly indicates that the defloration occurred SEVERAL DAYS BEFORE, which may have happened when Irene took a week-long vacation to her hometown in Pugo La Union. The written entries in the clinical case record showing the date of her admission the hospital and her complaint of vaginal bleeding and the diagnosis of healing lacerated wide at 2 oclock and 10 oclock hymen are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, the said entries having been made in official records by public officer of the Philippines in the performance of his duty especially enjoined by law which is that of a physician in a government hospital. [ Rule 130 sec. 38, Rules of Court] The court also found that Irene never complained of being rape but that her vaginal bleeding was caused by her menstruation. The court also observed that it is quite abnormal and unheard of in human experience and behavior that a man would have sexual intercourse with a woman having her menstrual period. The court acquitted the accused after it concluded that the evidence produced by the prosecution were not persuasive to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the accused. By: Arnaldo M. Cario Manalo and Salvador vs. Robles Trans. Co., Inc. 99 Phil. 729 (1956)
Official Records Facts: A taxicab owned by Robles Transport(Robles) and driven by Edgardo Hernandez (Hernandez) collided with a passenger truck. As a result of the accident, taxicab ran over Armando Manalo. Armando died several days later from his injuries. Hernandez was charged and convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence and sentenced to one year in prison and to pay P3,000. Hernandez served out his sentence but failed to pay P3,000. The sheriff served 2 writs of execution to Hernandez but it returned unsatisfied because Hernandez did not have any real or personal properties to answer for the liability. This fact was certified by the sheriff. The parents of the victim, herein Plaintiffs, filed the present action against Robles to enforce its subsidiary liability pursuant to Art. 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Robles filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that Hernandez should have been included in the complaint because he was an indispensable party. The RTC denied the motion. Plaintiffs introduced as evidence a copy of the decision in the criminal case convicting Hernandez of homicide. The writs of execution and the returns of the sheriff showing that the two writs of execution were not satisfied because of the insolvency of Hernandez. The defendant, Robles, objected to the presentation of evidence but the RTC admitted it. Hence, this petition. Issue/s: 1. Whether or not the sheriff's return is admissible in evidence Held: 1. Yes. A sheriff's return is an official statement made by a public official in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law and forming part of official records, and is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein (Rule 123, sec. 35, Rules of Court.) Sheriff making the return need not testify in court as to the facts stated in his entry. The court cited 2 reasons why public records need not be proven the way a private record is proven. Firstly, litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed, the occasions in which the officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness are numberless. Without exceptions to official statements, officials would be found devoting greater part of their time to attending as witness in court or delivering their depositions before an officer. the work of administration of government and the interest of the public having business with officials would alike suffer in consequence. Secondly, the law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will discharge their several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts they do in discharge of their public duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as the nature and circumstances of each case may appear to require. Rbles should pay the plaintiffs for the amount of P3,000. By: Arnaldo M. Cario
People vs. Cabuang 217 SCRA 675 (1993) Entries in the Official Record Facts: On 14 October 1988, Evelyn De Vera and Maria Victoria Parana, were walking home along an uninhabited place in Bayambang, Pangasinan. Suddenly, from out of the rice paddies, Modesto Cabuang emerged with a flashlight and asked them where they were going. Evelyn became anxious and started walking faster. Upon the other hand, Maria Victoria started talking to Modesto. When Evelyn was about ten (10) feet ahead of the two, she looked back and saw Modesto turn and shift his flashlight to the rear, illuminating the figure of Nardo Matabang, who had also suddenly appeared behind them from the rice fields alongside the road. Modesto then put off and pocketed his flashlight, grabbed Maria Victoria and covered her mouth. Nardo Matabang in turn pursued Evelyn, who had started to run away. She ran and ran until she entered the yard of a house along the road and hid in the shadows of the plants and shrubs inside the yard where she could not be seen by Nardo, but from where she is she could see him. After some time, having lost sight of Evelyn, Nardo went back and rejoined Modesto. Sometime later, Evelyn from her hiding place saw a tricycle pass by with her cousin Maria Victoria, and Modesto Cabuang, Nardo Matabang, the tricycle driver and another person who was seated at the back of the tricycle. Evelyn heard her cousin pleading for help. After the tricycle had passed by, Evelyn emerged from her hiding place and proceeded to the house of her sister. There she was scolded by her sister for coming home late. Evelyn, confused by the scolding and frightened by what she had just seen and experienced, was not able to tell her sister what had just occurred. She stayed in the sala and there tried to go to sleep, without success. The following morning, Maria Victoria was found dead along the road, naked, with stab wounds in different parts of her body including the pubic area. Aside from the sworn statement made by Evelyn identifying the two suspects Modesto Cabuang and Nardo Matabang since they were her baranggay mates and she knew them well. She also positively pointed them out from a police line up. The police were also able to find a book and some articles of feminine underwear and other personal belongings of a woman some 50 meters from where they had found the body of Maria Victoria. Evelyn, viewed and identified such articles as being owned by her deceased cousin. Autopsy report by Dr. Garcia also showed the victim was raped and stabbed by a pointed object. The cash valued at P400 with Maria Victoria was likewise missing. Hence, on the basis of such evidence, suspects were convicted of the crime of robbery with rape and homicide. Issue/s: 1. Whether or not Evelyn de Vera had positively identified Modesto Cabuang and Nardo Matabang as the assailants of Maria Victoria, when the entry in the Bayambang police
blotter, stated that the assailants were "still unidentified", although such entry was made after prosecution witness Evelyn de Vera was questioned by the police. 2. Whether or not the defense of denial and alibi may be given weight. And in relation thereto, whether or not circumstantial evidence may be considered adequate to convict the appellants beyond reasonable doubt since Evelyn did not witness the actual sex assault and slaying of the victim. Held: 1. RTC decision was affirmed. The police investigator, Pfc. Elegio Lopez, who initially questioned witness De Vera that morning, noticed that she was in a state of shock. He accordingly chose to defer further questioning until the afternoon of the same day when Evelyn had calmed down sufficiently to be able to give a sworn statement to the police. Thus, there was the initial report prepared and recorded in the police blotter at around 11 o'clock in the morning, stating that the assailants were still unidentified; there was, upon the other hand, Evelyn de Vera's sworn statement made and completed in the afternoon of the same day, where she revealed the identities of the men she had seen the night before. 2. The failure of Evelyn to specify the accused-appellants as the doers of the crime, the first time she was questioned by the police, does not adversely affect her credibility. It is firmly settled case law that the delay of a witness in revealing to the police authority what he or she may know about a crime does not, by itself, render the witness' testimony unworthy of belief. 3. It remains only to note that entries in a police blotter though regularly done in the course of performance of official duty, are not conclusive proof of the truth of such entries, In People v. Santito, Jr., 12 the Court held that entries in official records like a police blotter are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein set out, since the entries in the police blotter could well be incomplete or inaccurate. Testimony given in open court during the trial is commonly much more lengthy and detailed than the brief entries made in the police blotter and the trial court cannot base its findings on a police report merely, but must necessarily consider all other evidence gathered in the course of the police investigation and presented in court. In the case at bar, Prosecution witness Evelyn de Vera did positively and clearly identify Modesto Cabuang and Nardo Matabang as among those who had raped and killed and robbed the victim. 4. Modesto Cabuangs alibi that he was supposedly attending the wake held in the same baranggay where Maria Victoria was killed, as well as Nardo Matabangs excuse that he was allegedly in a town more than an hour away by bus was not given weight. The firmly settled doctrine is that the defense of alibi cannot prosper, unless the accused is able to prove that he was at some other place during the commission of the crime and that it was impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 5. On the other hand, the following circumstantial evidence produced conviction of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. On 14 October 1988, accused Cabuang and Matabang suddenly appeared from the surrounding rice fields, Cabuang grabbed Maria Victoria and covered her mouth. Evelyn ran away because she became terribly frightened and Matabang followed in pursuit. From her hiding place in the front yard of a house along the road, Evelyn
saw Maria Victoria pass by in a tricycle with the accused Early the next morning, the body of Maria Victoria was found in the barangay traversed by the road on which Maria Victoria were walking the night before. Hence, Judgment was affirmed. By: Beverly L. Santiago People vs. San Gabriel 253 SCRA 84 (1996) Entries in the Official Record Facts: The evidence shows that on 26 November 1989, at the vicinity of the North Harbor, Manila, a fistfight ensued between Jaime Tonog on one hand and the accused Ricardo San Gabriel together with "Ramon Doe" on the other. The fight was eventually broken up when onlookers pacified the protagonists. Ricardo and Ramon then hastened towards Marcos Road but in no time were back with bladed weapons. They approached Tonog surreptitiously, surrounded him and simultaneously stabbed him, after which the assailants ran towards the highway leaving Tonog behind on the ground. He was then brought to Mary Johnson Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. The accused on the other hand has a different version. He testified that he saw Tonog drunk; Tonog attempted to box him but he parried his blow; Tonog continued walking but when he chanced upon Ramon he suddenly and without provocation boxed and kicked Ramon; Ramon fought back but was subdued by his bigger assailant so the former ran towards the highway; when Tonog met a certain "Mando" he boxed the latter who however fought back despite his (accused) warning not to; at this moment he saw Ramon return with a bolo on hand; he warned Ramon not to fight but his advice went unheeded; instead, with bolo on hand Ramon struck Tonog on the belly; when "Mando" saw what happened he ("Mando") pulled out his knife and also stabbed Tonog at the back; Ramon and "Mando" then fled towards the highway. The lower court did not believe the accuseds version and instead convicted him based on the testimony of two prosecution witnesses Brenda Gonzales and Pio Ochobillo. Issue/s: 1. Whether or not the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are incredible and conflicting. 2. Whether or not the Advance Information Sheet did not mention him at all and named only "Ramon Doe" as the principal suspect. In relation thereto, was the Advance Information Sheet an exception to hearsay rule, being entries made in the official records? Held: 1. No. RTC Decision was affirmed. Gonzales and Ochobillo testified in a direct and candid manner. The court was not convinced that Gonzales would testify against accused3C 2003-2004 Evidence Project Vol. 4 - 36 -
appellant for a crime so grave simply because he owed her a measly sum of P300.00. Furthermore, the accused did not offer any information regarding the person and circumstances of "Mando." Up to this date "Mando" remains a myth. Not a single witness was presented by the defense to prove who "Mando" was, nor even a hint of his personal circumstances. During the entire proceedings in the court below "Mando"was never mentioned by the prosecution witnesses. Nobody ever implicated him except the accused. 2. Yes. As regards the Advance information sheet, which did not mention San Gabriel at all and named only "Ramon Doe" as the principal suspect. Unfortunately this cannot defeat the positive and candid testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Entries in official records, as in the case of a police blotter, are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. They are not conclusive. The entry in the police blotter is not necessarily entitled to full credit for it could be incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from either partial suggestions or for want of suggestions or inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all that pertain to the subject. It is understandable that the testimony during the trial would be more lengthy and detailed than the matters stated in the police blotter. Significantly, the Advance Information Sheet was never formally offered by the defense during the proceedings in the court below. Hence any reliance by the accused on the document must fail since the court cannot consider any evidence, which has not been formally offered. Furthermore, the Advance Information Sheet was prepared by the police officer only after interviewing Camba, an alleged eyewitness. The accused then could have compelled the attendance of Camba as a witness. The failure to exert the slightest effort to present Camba on the part of the accused should militate against his cause. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. But to be admissible in evidence three (3) requisites must concur: (a) The entry was made by a police officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and, (c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information. The Advance Information Sheet does not constitute an exception to the hearsay rule, hence, inadmissible. The public officer who prepared the document had no sufficient and personal knowledge of the stabbing incident. Any information possessed by him was acquired from Camba which therefore could not be categorized as official information because in order to be classified as such the persons who made the statements not only must have personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to give such statements for the record. In the case of Camba, he was not legally so obliged to give such statements. Hence, conviction was affirmed. By: Beverly L. Santiago
9. Commercial Lists (a) Rule 130, Section 45. Sec. 45. Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of statements of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them therein. (39) Cases: State v. Lungsford 400 A.2d 843 Commercial Lists Facts: Lungsford was arrested for being found in possession of a 1968 Plymouth Road Runner. State claimed that the Road Runner was stolen from James Wilton. Criminal investigation report showed that Wilton reported his car stolen on Jan 8, 1975. The report contained an incorrect VIN. Sgt Barett testified that he contacted Wilton and obtained the correct VIN which was compatible with the one found in the Road Runner. Wilton was not presented during the trial. Defendant testified that he purchased the car from James Law. He had title and registration but he could not corroborate the purchase. Law was not located despite efforts from both sides. Automobiles have at least 2-3 distinguishing numbers placed during its production, any of which may be used to trace a car. The primary and most visible number is called the VIN (vehicle identification number) such indicates the type, year and make of the car. The 2nd number is a confidential serial number, found in a permanent component of the car, for the benefit of Auto Theft Investigation. Such is also called a factory order number and found underneath the hood in the radiator base. Finally, the third is a packing slip number, placed in the coils of the back seat. The VIN of the Road Runner located in the dashboard drivers side did not appear to have been factory installed. Defendant claimed that such condition was because his windshield broke, ignition stolen, bought new seats, replaced engine and placed a new radiator and brace. He did not say when he replaced such nor did he present any receipts. He had new front plates because he lost the old one. The color of the car was also different from registered color.
The Road Runner was factory traced through the factory order number. Factory trace permits identification of first owner and the proper VIN of the vehicle. Detective Walsh obtained confidential factory code # from the Road Runner and sought factory trace from the NATB. Information led him to Wiltons stolen vehicle. State relied on NATB factory trace information to establish that the car in Walshs possession was the same car stolen from Wilton. The entire tracing process was crucial in States attempt to link car of defendant and that which was stolen from Wilton. But no information about probable reliability of NATB was found in the record. The National Automobile Theft Bureau is a non-profit corporation, national in scope and financed by over 95% of automobile insurance companies. Its purpose was to prevent and reduce theft losses of automobiles. It assembles and disseminates information on stolen vehicles and assists law enforcement in their identification and recovery. NATB is sometimes called upon for information pertinent to investigations with regard identifying and retrieving stolen cars. TC convicted Walsh based on such information. Issue/s: 1. Whether or not the information obtained from NATB was admissible as evidence. 2. Whether or not police record is admissible as evidence under the Business Entries exception Held: 1. No. Information obtained from NATB is not admissible as evidence because Walsh failed to tell the jury the precise content of the information received from NATB. The process of tracing the identity of the Road Runner was dependent thereon. Thus, reliability of NATB procedures must be proven. In this case, no proof of reliability of NATB procedures were presented thus no proper evidential basis for admission of data derived therefrom. Such procedure would be considered evidential only if such complies with the rules on evidence which states: Evidence of a statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical or other published compilation is admissible to prove truth of any relevant matter so stated if the compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used and relied upon by them. Qualification of evidence offered must be first decided and must satisfy the following: 1. Judge must be convinced that the compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation 2. Generally considered useful and reliable If such conditions are met, statements from compilation are admissible to prove the truth of the relevant matter stated. The ratio of this rule is that the use of such materials is necessary because it is too difficult to call to the witness stand those who have participated on their preparation or compilation. Trustworthiness requirement is satisfied by the judge that the material is regularly published for use by persons in a given occupation who rely on it. There
is no motive to falsify on the contrary there is every reason to be accurate and precise since the success of a business depends on accuracy and reliability. The information before the trial court regarding the operations of NATB was inadequate to permit admissibility under rules of Evidence. 2. No. The trial court erred in admitting the report and the reference in the supplement as a Business Entries exception to the Hearsay Rule. Such contained information that Wilton allegedly gave to the police immediately after he realized his car was stolen. This was the only evidence in the case establishing that Wiltons car had been stolen. Since the report and reference in supplement were inadmissible, state had no case for receiving a stolen vehicle. Such report was filled out by Detective Vittelo who recorded in writing summary of statements taken from Wilton. Vitello was not presented as witness. Instead, it was Sgt Barett who testified. In his testimony he said that the Auto Theft reports are routinely filled out contemporaneously with the complaint and are kept in the departments files. He also claimed that when he read the report on Wiltons stolen car, he observed that VIN was not accurate so he called Wilton and obtained the correct VIN. Barett had known Wilton since his HS days. He was also familiar with Wiltons car. Barett personally recorded the corrected VIN. Business records exception is founded upon twin principles of reliability and necessity. Records made in the usual course of business normally possess a circumstantial probability of trustworthiness. Business records exception is predicated not only on the circumstance that record itself is kept in the usual course of business but also on the circumstance that the recorded information is obtained by the recorder from a declarant having a business duty to communicate truthfully. The following are criteria must be met: 1. Recording of info on the usual course of business and 2. Providing of info by the declarant whose duty it is to supply truthfully. These two must be met before the trial judge is free to exercise his discretion in admitting or excluding the business entry based upon his ultimate evaluation of reliability. In this case the trial court should not have admitted the police record for falling short of the second criteria. Police records are admissible to prove that a report of crime was made and secured. But such is not admissible to prove the truth of its contents since members of the public whether targets of investigation, witness or victims are not under duty to make an honest and truthful report. Thus, evidence inadmissible. Conviction must be reversed. By: Ma. Cristina P. Salvatierra PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs. Court of Appeals 297 SCRA 402 Commercial Lists
Facts: M/V Maria Efigenia XV owned by respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation (MEFC) collided with vessel Petroparcel owned by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC). The incident was investigated by the Board of Marine Inquiry, the decision of the Philippine Coast Guard Commandment Simeon N. Alejandro found Petroparcel at fault. Respondent sued LSC and the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo Doruelo and sought an award of P692,680 representing value of fishing nets, boat equipment and cargoes, interest and attorneys fees. Petitioner PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation sought to be substituted in place of LSC since it already acquired ownership of the vessel. Original complaint was amended to include recovery of the lost value of the hull of M/V Maria Efigenia XV in the amount of P600,000 (Actual value at P800,000 less insurance of P200,000). The amended complaint also alleged that inflation resulting from the devaluation of the Philippine peso had affected the replacement value of the hull, its equipment and its lost cargoes as well as unrealized profits. Trial court rendered a decision in favor of MEFC and ordered PNOC to pay the value of fishing boat with interest and P50,000 for attorneys fees plus cost of suit. The case against Edgardo Doruelo is dismissed. Evidence presented by the respondent was a testimony of its general manager and sole witness Edilberto Del Rosario who testified that M/V Maria Efigenia XV was owned by respondent. At the time of sinking, the vessel was carrying 1,060 tubs of fish the value of which was never recovered. Also lost were two Cummins engines, radar, pathometer and compass. Documentary evidence presented consisted of the following: Marine Protest executed by Delfin Villarosa Jr, quotation for the construction of 95-footer trawler issued by Isidro Magalong of LA Magalong Engineering and Construction showing cost of trawler, pro forma invoice showing cost of engine, quotation of prices issued by Scan Marine Inc showing cost or radar, a quotation by Saefgear Sales Inc, regarding cost of other equipments, and retainer agreement between Del Rosario and F. Sumulong Associates Law Offices. Lower court held that the prevailing replacement value of P6,438,048.00 of the fishing boat and all its equipment would regularly increase at 30% every year from date quotations were given. On the other hand, petitioner merely presented Lorenzo Lazaro senior estimator of the PNOC Dockyard & Engineering Corporation as sole witness and no other documentary evidence to support its position. Lazaro testified that price quotations submitted were excessive and that as an expert witness, he used the quotations of his suppliers in making his estimates. But he failed to present such saying that he could not produce a break down of the cost of his estimates as it was a sort of secret scheme. Thus the lower court admitted as sufficient evidence the quotations presented. The respondents merely relied on witness bare claim that the amount presented were bloated or
excessive. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the lower court decision which was denied. Not having received order denying motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed motion for leave to file a reply which became moot and academic. Petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals claiming the award was not proved by competent and admissible evidence. CA ruled that it was not necessary to qualify Del Rosario as an expert witness because as the owner of the lost vessel, it was within his knowledge and competency to identify and determine the equipment installed and cargoes loaded. With regard the admissibility of documentary evidence presented in the nature of market reports or quotations, trade journals, trade circulars and price lists, the CA held that reception of these documentary evidence rests on the discretion of the lower court until the SC rules on the admissibility or inadmissibility of this class of evidence. With regard evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy or incompetency or admissibility, it is the safest policy to be liberal not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the courts. If they are thereafter found relevant or competent can easily be remedied by completely discarding or ignoring them. CA ruled that the alleged inadmissible documentary exhibits were never satisfactorily rebutted by appellants sole witness in the person of Lorenzo Lazaro. Thus, the court found that petitioner ironically situated itself in an inconsistent posture by the fact that its own witness relied heavily on the same pieces of evidence appellant has so vigorously objected to as inadmissible evidence. CA affirmed decision of the trial court. With regard issue of lack of jurisdiction, additional docket fee may later be declared still owing court may enforce as a lien on judgment. Case was brought to the SC. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the quotations presented can be admitted as a Commercial List exception to the hearsay rule 2. Whether or not actual damages were proven 3. Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction HELD: 1. No. Price quotations are ordinary private writings which under the Revised Rules of Court should have been proffered along with the testimony of the authors thereof. Del Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of the contents of the writings because he was not the one who issued the price quotations. Section 36 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a witness can testify only to those facts that he knows of his personal knowledge. Thus, Del Rosarios claim that losses incurred were in the amount of P6,438,048.00 should have been admitted with extreme caution because it was merely a bare assertion. It should have been supported by independent evidence. Since was also the owner of the respondent corporation whatever testimony he would give with regard to the value of the lost vessel, its equipment and cargoes should be viewed in the light of his self-interest.
His testimony with regard equipment installed and cargoes loaded should be given credence. However, his testimony with regard valuation of equipment must not be accepted as the truth. Price quotations presented as evidence partake of the nature of the hearsay evidence considering that the persons who issued them were not presented as witnesses. Any evidence, whether oral or documentary is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent can show that the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule. The exhibits presented do not fall under any of the exceptions provided under Sections 37 to 47 of Rule 130. Under Section 45, a document is a commercial list if: 1. it is a statement of matters if interest to persons engaged in an occupation 2. such statement is contained in a list, register, periodical or other published compilation 3. said compilation is published for the use of persons engaged in that occupation; and 4. it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same occupation. Based on such requisites, the documentary evidence presented are not commercial lists for these do not belong to the category of other published compilations under Section 45. The exhibits are mere price quotations issued personally to Del Rosario who requested for them. These are not published in any list, register, periodical or other compilation on the relevant subject matter. Neither are these market reports or quotations within the purview of commercial lists as these are not standard handbooks or periodicals, containing data of everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of the occupation. These are simple letters responding to the queries of Del Rosario. Letters and telegrams are admissible in evidence but these are however subject to the general principles of evidence and to various rules relating to documentary evidence. There is a difference between admissibility and probative value. Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to be considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue. A letter may be offered in evidence and admitted as such but its evidentiary weight depends on the observance of the rules on evidence. Author of the letter should be presented as witness to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to question him on the contents of the letter. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the letter renders its contents suspect. 2. Yes. Although damages may not be awarded on the basis of hearsay evidence, such inadmissibility does not mean that it totally deprives a private respondent of any redress of the loss of the vessel. In the absence of competent proof on the actual damage suffered, private respondent is entitled to nominal damages which is adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff which has been violated may be vindicated and recognized and not for the purpose of indemnifying plaintiff for any loss suffered.
Nominal damages are damages in name only and not in fact. Where these are allowed, they are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong inflicted but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical injury. Amount to be awarded as nominal damages shall be equal or at least commensurate to the injury sustained by respondent considering the concept and purpose of such damages. The allegations in the original and amended complaints can be the basis for determination of a fair amount of nominal damages inasmuch as a complaint alleges the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action.Actual damages were proven by means of the testimony of private respondents general manager and certain pieces of documentary evidence although these documents were not authenticated and that the witness Del Rosario did not have personal knowledge on the contents of the writings nor was he an expert on the subjects. To enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory damages, he is required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence. The burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on either side. Damages cannot be presumed and courts must point out specific acts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne. 3. The lower court acquired jurisdiction over the case when private respondent paid the docket fee corresponding to its claim in its original complaint. Failure to pay the docket fee corresponding to its increased claim for damages under the amended complaint should not be considered as having curtailed the lower courts jurisdiction. Unpaid docket fee should be considered as a lien on the judgment. Petitioner did not likewise question the jurisdiction of the lower court on the ground of insufficient docket fees in its answers to both the amended complaint and the second amended complaint. It did so only in its motion for reconsideration of the decision of the lower court. Decision of the CA affirming decision of RTC is modified in so far as it awarded actual damages to private respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation in the amount of P6,438,048.00 for lack of evidentiary bases. Petitioner has sustained injury but which unfortunately was not adequately and properly proved and P2,000,000 award for damages as nominal damages was in order. By: Ma. Cristina P. Salvatierra Gregorio Estrada vs. Proculo Noble [C.A.] 49 O.G. 139 Commercial Lists Facts: Maximino Noble, father of Proculo Noble, defendant in this case conveyed to the latter a lot in Camarines Sur through a public deed after payment of P2,600, P180 of which was paid to Francisco Espiritu as repurchase price. The deed dated June 22, 1945. Such sale wais subject to the condition that the vendor preserves to himself, his heirs and assigns the
right to repurchase or redeem the parcel of land described. Failure to exercise such right within the time aforesaid, the sale shall be irrevocably consummated and the vendees ownership over the said land shall become irrevocable and unconditional without the need of executing any other instrument. Defendant claims that the transaction entered was an absolute sale although the deed was termed as a sale with right of repurchase because his father was afraid that he might dispose of the property. On February 28, 1948, Maximino Noble by means of another deed conveyed the same property by way of absolute sale to the plaintiff Gregorio Estrada for the sum of P3,000. Only P2,300 was paid to Maximino Noble, balance of P700 was retained by the plaintiff. Trial court ruled in favor of Estrada and ordered defendant to execute a deed of resale in favor of Estrada for the amount of P700 which plaintiff offered for repurchase and in case defendant refuses to execute a deed of resale, Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur is ordered to execute a deed of resale of the same property in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P700 in Philippine currency and the defendant is ordered to pay the cost of the suit. Defendant appealed and alleges that the trial court incurred error in their judgment. Issue/s: 1. Whether or not the transaction entered into by Maximo and Proculo was an absolute sale 2. Whether or not the court should take judicial notice of the Ballantine scale of values HELD: 1. No. The deed which evidenced the transaction between Maximino and Proculo is clearly a deed of sale with right to repurchase. Although Proculo testified that the understanding between him and his father was that the sale was absolute and that it was made such because his father was afraid that he might dispose of the property, his statement is not corroborated by any other evidence of record either direct or circumstantial. No memorandum of the alleged agreement has been presented. No instrumental witnesses were placed on the stand to corroborate it. Thus, plaintiff has acquired the right to redeem the property in question. While at the time of the deed was executed, Maximino could not have sold and conveyed ownership of the property since a sale with right to repurchase transfers legal title to the vendee nevertheless said deed validly conveyed all his rights and interests in the property, which obviously included the right to repurchase to the plaintiff. Estrada approached Proculo shortly after transaction was entered between Estrada and Maximino, offering to repurchase the property for the sum of P700 but Proculo refused the offer. Thus, Estrada made a bona fide offer to repurchase the property with tender of the redemption price, within the period of redemption agreed upon. Filing of this complaint was equivalent to an offer to redeem and had the effect of preserving the right of redemption.
2. Yes. Such conversion table was submitted by Dr. D. L. Ballantine to the President of the Philippines in his capacity as economic adviser of the Commonwealth Government. It contained a recommendation for the adoption of measure which were greatly needed to solve the problem created by transactions made during the Japanese occupation and to hasten the economic recovery of the country. The table was embodied in a bill which the President of the Philippines sent to the Philippine Congress for enactment on December 13, 1945. It is therefore, an official document whose publication constituted a leading event of general interest and whose provisions are widely known and have played an important part in the contemporary political history of the country of which courts of justice could take judicial cognizance. Computation made by the trial court was correct. Based on the evidence of the record the sum of P180 and P2,420 Japanese occupation currency were paid to Maximino, the former, in the month of July 1944, and the latter, subsequent to that date but prior to the liberation of the Province of Camarines Sur. The appellant is entitled to the equivalent in Philippine currency of the P180 Japanese occupation currency in the month of July 1944 and as to the amount of P2,420 Japanese occupation currency at least to its equivalent in the month of December 1944. Ballantine scale of values provides that the equivalent of every Philippine peso in July 1944 was P20 Japanese occupation currency and in December 1944, P90 Japanese occupation currency. Computed based on the scale, the value is around P538.88 thus the estimate made by the court which is P700 is sufficiently liberal and justly compensates the appellant. He is also entitled to reimbursement of the amount of P400 which he spent in the construction of the dam, such is considered as useful expense. Judgment affirmed. By: Ma. Cristina P. Salvatierra
10.
Learned Treatises (a) Rule 130, Section 46.
Sec. 46. Learned treatises. A published treatise, periodical or pamphlet on a subject of history, law, science, or art is admissible as tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies, that the writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the subject. (40a) 11. Prior Testimony (a) Rule 130, Section 47.
Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him. (41a) Cases: Tan vs. Court of Appeals 20 SCRA 54 (1967) Prior Testimony Facts: Petitioners Carmelita and Rodolfo Tan through their mother Celestina Daldo as guardian ad litem sued respondent Francisco Tan for acknowledgment and support. However, after petitioners have presented their evidence, Celestina moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the parties have come to an amicable settlement and prayed that the same be dismissed. She also subscribed to an affidavit stating that Tan is not the father of my said minor children named Carmelita and Rodolfo but another person whose name I cannot divulge and that she prepared said affidavit to record what is true and correct what misinterpretation may arise in the future. RTC issued an order stating that dismissal of action with prejudice based on the ground that the parties have already come to an amicable settlement with the conformity of counsel. One year and eight months after dismissal of the case, petitioners through their maternal grandfather Servillano Daldo as guardian ad litem filed action for acknowledgment and support involving the same parties, cause of action and subject matter. RTC dismissed the case based on res judicata. Petitioner moved to reconsider. RTC reconsidered previous decision and declared petitioners to be the illegitimate children of defendant and ordered the him to support minors in the amount of P200 a month, to be paid directly to Carmelita for herself and her younger brother, additional amount of P300 semi-annually for matriculation expenses, and reimburse Servillano P2,000 as his expenses in supporting petitioners as well as attorneys fees and costs of suit. Tan appealed to the CA, which reversed RTC decision and dismissed the complaint. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the testimonies made by petitioners witnesses in the former case may be admissible as evidence under Section 41 of Rule 130. HELD: 1. No. The witnesses are available. They are not dead nor are they outside the Philippines. They just refused to testify. Thus, they do not come within the legal purview of
those unable to testify. Petitioners also failed to avail court remedies to secure their attendance. Petitioners tried to prove that Daldo and Tan lived together as husband and wife for more than 8 years. Carmelita and Rodolfo were allegedly fruits of such cohabitation. Respondent denies such and alleges that he is very much a married man with several children. Daldo by her own admission, had been a nursemaid (yaya) in the respondents residence but for a short period of not less than one year. Carmelita was born on May 8, 1942 and Rodolfo on September 11, 1944. The validity of the testimony of petitioners witnesses was downgraded by the affidavit of Celestina. In such affidavit, Daldo deposed that petitioners were not fathered by Tan but by another person whose name she could not divulge. SC affirmed judgment of CA. By: Ma. Cristina P. Salvatierra Ohio vs. Roberts 448 U.S. 56 (1980) Prior Testimony Facts: Herschel Roberts was arrested and charged for forgery of a check in the name of Bernard Isaacs and with possession of stolen credit cards belonging to the Isaacs and his wife Amy. Witnesses were called during the preliminary hearing including Isaacs daughter Anita who was the defenses only witness. She testified that she knew the respondent and that she permitted him to use her apartment for several days while she was away. Defense attempted to elicit from her an admission that she had given respondent checks and the credit cards without informing him that she did not have permission to use them. But such was denied by Anita. Counsel of the respondent did not ask that she be declared hostile and Prosecutor did not question her. Before the trial, five subpoenas for four different trial dates were issued to Anita at her parents residence. The last 3 carried a written instruction that Anita should call before appearing. She was not at the residence when these were executed. She did not call nor appear at trial. Respondent took the stand and testified that Anita Isaacs had given him her parents checkbook and credit cards with the understanding that he could use them. The State on rebuttal offered the transcript of Anitas testimony invoking the use of preliminary examination testimony of a witness who cannot for any reason be produced at the trial. The defense objected. Trial court conducted a hearing regarding its admissibility and Amy Isaacs, sole witness was questioned by both prosecutor and defense counsel regarding her daughters whereabouts. She said that Anita left their home soon after the preliminary hearing. A year before trial, San Francisco social worker was in communication with the Isaacs about a welfare application Anita filed there. Anita in one of her few phone calls to her parents informed them that she was traveling outside Ohio but did not reveal the place. Nobody knew where she was. Thus, the TC admitted the transcript into evidence and respondent was convicted on all counts.
CA of Ohio reversed judgment of TC based on the fact that prosecution failed to make show good faith effort to secure the absent witness attendance. State had nothing to show that Anita would be absent because of unavailability and showed no effort to seek out her whereabouts. SC of Ohio affirmed such decision. Issue/s: 1. Whether or not the transcript is admissible as a prior testimony under Section 47 Rule 130. Held: 1. Yes. Anitas unavailability was established and her whereabouts were entirely unknown. Four months before the trial, the prosecutor was in touch with Amy Isaacs and discussed Anitas whereabouts. She told him, that the last time they heard from Anita was during the preceding summer, that she was not in San Francisco but was traveling outside Ohio and there was no way they could reach her even for emergency. Thus, Anitas parents undertook affirmative efforts to reach their daughter and such was not a case of abandonment. Prosecutor issued subpoena to Anita at her parents home not only once but on five separate occasions over a period of several months. Prosecutor did not breach its duty of good faith effort. The service and ineffectiveness of the five subpoenas and the conversation with Anitas mother were far more than mere reluctance to face the possibility of a refusal. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. Court has emphasized that the Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for a face-to-face confrontation at trial and that a primary interest secured by the provision is the right of cross-examination. Confrontation clause operates in two separate ways to restrict the range of admissible hearsay. First, the sixth amendment establishes a rule of necessity. In the usual case, the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant. The second aspect operates once a witness is shown to be unavailable. The purpose of which is to augment accuracy in the fact finding process by ensuring the defendant an effective means to test adverse evidence, the Clause countenances only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that there is no material departure from the reason of the general rule. It is clear from these statements, and from prior decisions that even though the witness be unavailable his prior testimony must bear some of these indicia of reliability. In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate indicia of reliability. Anitas unwillingness to shift the blame away from respondent because discernible early in her testimony. The questioning of Anita afforded substantial compliance with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement. There was an adequate opportunity to crossexamine the witness and counsel availed himself of that opportunity, the transcript bore sufficient indicia of reliability and afforded a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of prior statement.
Judgment of the SC of Ohio is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings. The prosecution carried its burden of demonstrating that Anita was constitutionally unavailable for purposes of respondents trial. By: Ma. Cristina P. Salvatierra
XII.
OPINION RULE
A. Rule 130, Sections 48-50. Sec. 48. General rule. The opinion of witness is not admissible, except as indicated in the following sections. (42) Sec. 49. Opinion of expert witness. The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he shown to posses, may be received in evidence. (43a) Sec. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. The opinion of a witness for which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding (a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge; (b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and (c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person. (44a)
Cases: Dilag & Co Inc vs Vicente Merced and Sixto Zandueta 45 O.G. 5523 (1949) Opinion Rule Facts: Dilag & Co. purchased from International Harvester Company for P2,400 an International truck model 1938 with motor No. HD-232-22265. The truck was entrusted to Pablo Dilag, secretary-treasurer of the corporation, for business purposes. Truck was stolen during the Japanese occupation. After liberation, it was seen parked in front of City Lunch in San Pablo Laguna. Dilag had it seized by the police and filed a complaint for theft against Vicente Merced who had in possession of such truck, and against Lim Ben, Sy Pua and Sixto Zandueta. The criminal complaint was dismissed. Plaintiff filed present action against the
same parties for the recovery of the truck in question and for damages as well as order of seizure upon filing of bond. Merced filed a counterbond and was able to retain possession. Respondent claims he purchased the truck from Lim Ben. The latter claimed they bought the truck in good faith from Zandueta. But Zandueta did not appear and was declared in default. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dilag & Co, declared such owner of the truck and absolved Lim Ben and Sy Pua from liability for damages as purchasers in good faith and ordered defendants Merced and Zandueta to pay plaintiff sum of P5,000 as damages and costs. Defendant knew the address of Zandueta but chose not to cite him as witness. He relied on his certified copy of the certificate of registration and claimed such is conclusive on the question of ownership. On the other hand, plaintiff was able to prove that the motor number of the truck has been tampered. Pablo Dilag could not say for certain what the original number was but he was able to give the first five numbers which coincide with the first five numbers of the motor number of the plaintiffs truck. He also testified regarding certain features of its stolen truck which were to be found on the truck found in possession of Merced. The most important distinguishing features are as follows: (1) general appearance of the truck (2) paint of the hood (3) wooden running board on the left side (4) two iron bars supporting the glass windshield (5) welded tie rod (6) welded propeller shaft (7) half inch screw on the cylinder head (8) hole in the radiator caused by a blow from the fan belt. Such features were found in the truck involved in the dispute. Defendant claimed that features were visible at a glance, suggesting that testimony rendered by Dilag may have weight if such was rendered before Dilag saw the truck. But it is apparent that some of the distinguishing features mentioned were not exposed to view but were hidden. Dilags testimony was corroborated by the mechanic who made such repairs. The most convincing detail presented was the fact that the key of the plaintiffs truck could be used to start the engine of the said truck. The key was original and had no alteration. The key in possession of the defendant had an appearance of a made up key with many scratches on it which indicates that it had been filed off to make it fit into a keyhole not intended for it. The key was originally one for a cabinet lock, later converted into a key for motor vehicle switch. Evidence clearly shows that the motor number was tampered for it is no longer the original. The substitution was obvious because the last three digits appearing were larger than the others. Jose Aguilar was presented as witness to testify on the alleged tampering. Trial Court ruled in favor of plaintiff, stating that such truck is the property of the plaintiff and ordered the defendant to return such. Defendant impugns the testimony of Aguilar on the ground that he is not qualified as expert on motor numbers. Issue/s: 1. Whether or not Aguilar is considered as an expert witness
2. Whether or not Lim Ben can be held liable under his implied warranty against eviction Held: 1. Yes. Witness Jose Aguilar was presented as witness to testify on the alleged tampering. It appears Aguilar has been with the Bureau of Public Works since 1930 having occupied the position of inspector in charge of weighing and measuring trucks and verifying their motor numbers, chief of the registration division for 8 years and is presently a chief investigator charged with investigating conflicting claims on motor vehicles. A person with these qualifications is amply qualified for the simple task of determining whether the number appearing on the motor of a particular vehicle is genuine or not. There is no precise requirement as to the mode in which skill or experience shall have been acquired. Scientific study and training are not always essential to the competency of a witness as an expert. A witness may be competent to testify as an expert although his knowledge his knowledge was acquired through the medium of practical experience rather than scientific study and research. The fact that the motor number has been altered destroys the value of the certificate of registration as evidence of ownership of truck. It is possible that the certificate was issued for another truck already out of commission and is not being made to apply to this stolen truck. This kind of fraud was rampant during the time this case arose. Appellant protests the award of damages premised on the fact that the plaintiff has not proven his ownership. Such is overruled by the conclusion reached by the court regarding ownership of the truck. Appellant may not question the amount of damages since he himself asked damages in the amount of P15,000. 2. Yes. Lim Ben liable is liable on his implied warranty against eviction thus, liable for damages. Under the CC, vendor is bound to deliver and warrant the thing sold and by his obligation he is answerable to the purchaser for its legal and peaceful possession and if by final judgment and by virtue of right previous to purchase, the vendee is deprived of the thing bought, the vendee shall have the right to demand of the vendor. Defendants crosscomplaint against Lim Ben for breach of implied warranty against eviction should have been upheld and the cross-defendant Lim Ben adjudged to return to Merced the value of the truck at the time he is actually deprived of its possession with proper damages under Article 1478 of the CC. The value of the truck cannot now be fixed for the actual eviction has not yet taken place. The lower court shall fix the sum on the basis of evidence. Judgment of lower court modified in so far as it absolves Lim Ben from damages and affirmed as to the rest. By: Ma. Cristina P. Salvatierra US vs Torno 3 Phil. 213 (1904) Opinion Rule Facts:
Perez, Bautista, and Guevara were arrested in their respective houses by Officer Torno with other policemen. They were suspected of the theft of the revolver of Angeles. Thereafter, they were taken to a place called Sapang Angelo and there beaten and ill-treated. Prior to his arrest, Perez was in good health, but after he was released from custody, he complained of sharp pains in the abdomen and needed assistance to walk. Soon after, Perez died. Officer Torno et. al. were accused with ill treatment of three persons arrested as a result of which one died. Defense admits the fact of arrest but denies ill treatment. It offered the testimony of Dr. Icasiano to the effect that the deceased had not died due to wounds but by hepatic colic, a disease suffered by the deceased for a long time. Issue/s: 1. Whether or not the testimony can be admitted? Held: 1. SC held that the expert testimony no doubt constitutes evidence worthy of meriting consideration, although not exclusive, on questions of professional character. The courts however, are not bound to submit to such testimony. They are free to weigh them. They can give or refuse to give them any value as proof or they can counterbalance such evidence with other elements of conviction which have been adduced during the trial. As such, the testimony of an expert witness is not conclusive upon the courts. In the present case there are to be found sufficient data which show in a conclusive manner the seriousness of the wounds inflicted upon the deceased, which from the very first moment prevented him from keeping on his feet, and caused him continuous and sharp pains in the abdomen. These symptoms continuously showed themselves until death came to Perez. In the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, the injury suffered by Perez were sufficient in themselves to bring about death of the deceased. By: Jose Miguel Fernandez People vs. Adoviso 309 SCRA 1 (1999) Opinion Rule Facts: At around 8:00 in the evening, Emeterio Vasquez was preparing coffee as his wife was about to retire for the night. Their grandson Rufino had already gone to sleep in the papag. The wife has just finished spreading the sleeping mats when she heard several gunshots. Emeterio uttered that he was shot. Bonifacio, the spouses son, upon hearing the shots rushed to his parents house. He hid himself at dark portion a few meters from the house and saw Rufino being shot. He recognized Pablo Adoviso as one of the assailants. After the assailants left, Bonifacio went to the municipal building to fetch a police inspector, brought the cop to the scene of the crime, and together, they took Emeterio and Rufino to the hospital. Unfortunately, both did not make it to the hospital alive.
Adoviso was charged with murder. He put up alibi as defense. He claimed that he was at another place drinking when the murder took place. He also offered in evidence the testimony a NBI polygraph examiner who conducted a polygraph test on him. The report of the examiner opined that Adovisos polygram revealed that there were no specific reactions indicative of deception to pertinent questions relevant to the investigation of the crime. The trial court found Adoviso guilty. Issue/s: 1. Whether or not the negative results of the polygraph test should be given weight to absolve the accused of the crime. Held: 1. The Supreme Court still found Adoviso guilty. A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that simultaneously measures and records certain physiological changes in the human body that are believed to be involuntarily caused by an examinees conscious attempt to deceive the questioner. The theory behind a polygraph or lie detector test is that a person who lies deliberately will have a rising blod pressure and subconscious block in breathing which will be recored on the graph. However, American Courts almost uniformly reject the results of polygraph tests when offered in evidence for the purpose of establishing the guilt or innocence of one accused of a crime, whther the accused or the prosecutor seeks its introduction, for the reason that polygraph has not as yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception. The rule is no different in this jurisdiction. Thus, in People vs. Daniel, stating that much faith and credit must not be vested upon the lie detector test as it is not conclusive. Appellant, in this case, has not advanced any reason why this rule should not apply to him. By: Jose Miguel Fernandez People vs. Ominta G.R. No. 129667 (July 31 2000) Opinion Rule Facts: Nieva Garcia, the complainant, is a 27 year old single woman diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia and confined at Holy Spirit Clinic in Cubao. Eric Baid, the accused, is a nurse-aide of said clinic. On December 22, 1996, at around 3:00 a.m., Baid sneaked into the patients room. He woke up Garcia and offered her a cigarette, at the same time touching her foot. Garcia took the cigarette, smoked it, while Baid caressed her. Appartently, she was aroused, because she afterward removed her pants. It turned out that she was not wearing any underwear. The accused also removed his pants and the two had sexual intercourse. Afterwards, they
transferred under the bed and continued their sexual intercourse. A female patient who had been awakened tried to separate the two, as she failed to do so, she went out to call the two nurses o duty. The nurses responded but when they arrived, the accused had left, while the complainant already put her pants on. Baid was charge with rape. Dr. Salangad, an expert witness for the complainant, testified that Garcia was in no position to give her consent to the sexual congress. As defense, the accused questions the qualifications of Dr. Salangad as an expert witness and he raises the issue that the doctor is biased because she was hired by the Garcia family as a psychiatrist of the complainant. The trial court found Baid guilty of rape. Issue/s: 1. Whether or not the qualifications of the expert witness can be assailed during appeal and whether the doctor is a biased witness, thus making her testimony unworthy of consideration. Held: 1. No. Notwithstanding her mental illness, complainant showed that she was qualified to be a witness. She could perceive and was capable of making known her perceptions to others. As regard the qualification of Dr. Salangad, the Supreme Court ruled that the accused cannot question the said qualification on appeal fro he did not raise any objection in the trial court. On the contrary, he even cross-examined her on the matters on which she testified. Objections not timely raised are deemed waived. The fact that an expert witness was hired by the family of the complainant to give expert testimony does not by that fact alone make her a biased witness and her testimony unworthy of consideration. Although courts are not ordinarily bound by expert testimonies, they may place whatever weight they choose upon such testimonies in accordance with the facts of the case. The relative weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is peculiarly within the province of the trial court to decide, considering the ability and character of the witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the weight and process of reasoning by which he has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor of the side fro whom he testifies, the fact that he is a paid witness, the relative opportunities for study and observation of the matter about which he testifies, and other matters which deserve to illuminate his statements. The opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of all the facts and circumstances of the case and when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effect. The problem of the credibility of the expert witness and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon is not reviewable in the absence of abuse of that discretion. By: Jose Miguel Fernandez
People vs. Vallejo 382 SCRA 192 (2002) Opinion Rule Facts: Daisy Diolola went to Aimee Vallejos house to be tutored with her lessons. An hour later, Daisy came back to her house to look for a book with Gerrico Vallejo, her tutors brother. After finding the book, Daisy and Gerrico went back to the latters house. After a few hours, Nida Diolola, Daisys mother, started get worried that it was already late in the afternoon and her daughter has not yet returned. She went to Aimees place to look for her daughter and was told that Daisy was not there. Aimee explained that she was not able to tutor because she was not feeling well. Nida looked for Daisy in her siblings houses but the child was not here. Nida decided to go back to Aimees house, and there, she met Gerrico, who told her that Daisy had gone to a classmates house to borrow a book. Nida went there but was told that Daisy had not been there. She asked other neighbors if they saw her daughter and was told that they saw her playing and watch television after, but she already left with Gerrico. Nida with her siblings searched for Daisy the whole evening until the following morning but their search proved fruitless. Later that day, Nida was informed that the dead body of her daughter was found tied to the tree of an aroma tree by the river. Witness claim that at the time when Daisy was missing, they saw Gerrico walking towards the compuerta with cloths wet, but his face and hair remained dry, looking uneasy and troubled. Vallejo was charged of rape with homicide. The accused executed a statement wherein he admitted his participation in the crime. The NBI took blood samples from the accused. The basketball shirt and short worn by the accused on the day the victim was missing were taken for testing. Later on Vallejo claimed that the statement was a product of torture and coercion. He set up the defense of alibi. The prosecution submitted DNA evidence gathered from the body of Daisy, a sample that matched the DNA profile of the accused, to prove Vallejos guilt. The trial court found Vallejo guilty. On appeal, Vallejo contends that the trial court erred in convicting him despite of the insufficient and weak circumstantial evidence against him. He claims that the DNA analysis conducted by the NBI forensic chemist failed to show that all the samples submitted for DNA testing were not contaminated, being soaked in smirchy waters before they were submitted to the laboratory. Issue/s: 1. Whether or not the DNA evidence gathered is insufficient to establish his participation in the crime. Held: 1. No. DNA is an organic substance found in a persons cell which contains his or her genetic code. Except for identical twins, each persons DNA profile is distinct and unique. When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the
victims body for the suspects DNA. This is evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched with the reference sample taken from the suspects and the victim. The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected are subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile. The test may yield three possible results: 1.) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources (exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or discussion; 2.) It is not possible to be sure, based on the result of the test, whether the samples have similar DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons including degradation, contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the analysis might then be repeated with the same or different sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; 3.) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion). In such a case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the statistical significance of the similarity. In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. In the case at bar, the bloodstains taken from the clothing of the victim and of the accused, the smears taken from the victim as well as the hair strands and nails taken from her tested negative for the presence of human DNA. As the NBI forensic chemist explains, the specimens were soaked in smirchy water before they were submitted to the laboratory. The state of the DNA analysis could have been hampered the preservation of any DNA that could have been there before. With regard the negative results of the hair and nail samples, the same can be attributed to the fact that the hair did not contain any root while the nails did not contain any subcutaneous cells that would be amenable for DNA analysis. Thus, it is the inadequacy of the specimen submitted for examination, and not the possibility that the samples had been contaminated, which accounted for the negative results of their examination. However, not all samples taken produced negative results. The vaginal swabs taken from the victim yielded positive for the presence of human DNA- a DNA profile of the accused. The Supreme Court ruled that result of the DNA evidence, together with other evidence, point to no other conclusion that the Vallejo is guilty of the crime charged. By: Jose Miguel Fernandez State vs. Garver 225 P.2d 771 (1950) Opinion Rule Facts:
Robert Garver met Norman Andrus and Leland Marshall in a tavern in downtown Portland and proposed to them that they rob Abbot who was a janitor in the Fred Meyer Store. Garver claimed to have information that Abbott would be leaving the store late in the evening carrying about $5,00 in a shopping bag. Acting upon Garvers suggestions, the other two stole an automobile, secured two guns, and rejoined Garver in the evening at the vicinity of the store. They waited until Abott appeared carrying the shopping bag and followed him several blocks in the stolen car. They parked the car, got out, and held up Abott with guns in hand. Garver shot Abott three times, and the three desperados fled in the automobile, taking with them the victims shopping bag, which turned out to contain no money, only clothes. Andrus and Marshall pleaded guilty, while Garver set up the defense of insanity. It was shown during the trial that the accused was suffering from insanity. He was committed to the mental hospital many times before hand and was acquitted from a previous charge of robbery on the ground of insanity.. Dr. Hanger was called to testify and gave a finding that the accused was suffering from psychosopathic inferiority. Defense also presented Ms. Mitchell, the accuseds mother, to testify as to her sons mental condition. She related to the jury the history of her son from infancy to the day of the alleged crime- including his illnesses, both physical and mental; his hospitalizations; his moral delinquencies; and his crimes- whatever might throw light on his mental conditions. The court struck the phrases such a terrible shape and physically ill used by Ms. Mitchell in her testimony on the theory that they were opinions or conclusions of the witness. The lower court convicted Garver of the crime of first degree murder. Issue/s: 1. Whether or not Ms. Mitchell can testify as to the mental condition of Garver? Held: The general rule is that a witness may testify only to facts and not to opinions or conclusions. But lay witnesses are frequently permitted to use the so-called short-hand descriptions, in reality opinions, in presenting to the court their impression of the general physical condition of a person. Previously, the court held it proper in a personal injury case to permit laymen, who were intimately acquainted with the plaintiff prior to her injury and observed her condition thereafter, to testify that her health and general physical condition had materially changed for the worse. The witness is free to speak his ordinary language, unbewildered by admonitions from the judge to testify to facts, when all the while the witness is sure in his own mind that he is testifying to the facts. The jury understands what the witness means, and the right to cross-examination removes the likelihood of harm to the other side. Too strict adherence to the opinion rule is undesirable. By: Jose Miguel Fernandez US vs. Stifel 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970) Opinion Rule
Facts: Orville Stifel used to be in a relationship with Cheryl Jones. Their tempestuous romance lasted for a year until Cheryl ended it. Later on, she met Daniel Ronec, a graduate school student, with whom she was engaged to be married. Stifel learned of the new relationship Cheryl had and started to threaten her. In 1968, Daniel Ronec was killed by an explosion when he opened a package addressed to him consisting of a mailing tube with a screw-on top. The prosecution suspected Stifel as the author of the crime, he had a motive to kill Ronec, he was capable of fashioning the bomb, and materials from which the bomb was made were accessable to him. Evidence was presented that he had experience in handling firearms, fireworks and small rockets. The certain materials from which the bomb package could have been fabricated were available to him at his place of employment in a laboratory of Proctor & Gamble. This background, together with access to Stifels fathers tools and machinery rendered him capable of building the bomb. The prosecution also introduced expert testimony of James Scott, a chemist and microanalyst. This expert testimony indicated that through the method of neutron activation analysis, the bomb package cylinder, its metal top, its mailing sticker and its tape were found to be microscopically identical to cylinders, tops, mailing stickers and tape which were in the Proctor & Gamble stock room to which appellant had access. The defense objected and averred that Scotts opinion was inadmissible on the ground that the test is too new and unreliable and has not yet been accepted by scientists in its particular field. The lower court admitted Scotts testimony and convicted Stifel of murdering Ronec. Issue/s: 1. Whether or not the lower court erred in admitting Scotts testimony. Held: 1. No. It was ruled that Scotts expert opinion is admissible. On questions of science, skill or trade or others of the like kind, persons of skill or experts may not only testify to facts, but are permitted to give their opinion in evidence. Whether a witness is shown to be qualified or not as an expert is a preliminary question to be determined in the first place by the court. If the court admits the testimony then it is for the jury to decide whether any or if any weight is to be given to the testimony. In the case of Frye vs. United States the court held Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from well-recognized scientific principle and discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. Employing this standard in this case, we do not believe that the lower court committed error in the admission of Scotts evidence. By: Jose Miguel Fernandez Daubert vs. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) Opinion Rule
Facts: The petitioners are Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller, minors, who are being represented by their parents. The respondent is Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Petitioners were born with serious birth defects. Petitioners alleged that the birth defects had been caused by the mothers ingestion of Bendectin, a prescription anti-nausea drug marketed by respondent. Hence, the petitioners sued the respondent. Respondent moved for summary judgment arguing that Bendectin does not cause birth defects. In support of its motion, respondent submitted an affidavit of DR. STEVEN LAMM, an epidemiologist, who is a well-credentialed expert on the risks from exposure to various chemical substances. DR. LAMM stated that he had reviewed all the literature on Bendectin and human birth defects-more than 30 published studies involving over 130,000 patients. On the basis of this review, DR. LAMM concluded that maternal use of Bendectin during the first trimester of pregnancy has not been shown to be a risk factor for human birth defects. In response and opposition to the motion, petitioners presented eight (8) expert witnesses who all testified that Bendectin can cause birth defects. Their conclusions were based upon in vitro(test tube) and in vivo(live) animal studies that found a link between Bendectin and Malformations; DISTRICT COURT OF CALIFORNIA RULING Granted the respondents motion for summary judgment. The court stated that scientific evidence is admissible only if the principle upon which it is based is SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED TO HAVE A GENERAL ACCEPTANCE IN THE FIELD TO WHICH IT BELONGS. The court concluded that petitioners evidence did not meet this standard since expert opinion that is not based on epidemiological evidence is inadmissible to establish causation. Petitioners epidemiological analyses, based as they were on recalculations of data in previously published studies that had found no causal link between the drug and birth defects, were ruled to be inadmissible because they had not been published or subjected to peer review. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS RULING The court stated that expert opinion based on a scientific technique is inadmissible unless the technique is GENERALLY ACCEPTED as reliable in the relevant scientific community. The court declared that expert opinion based on a methodology that diverges significantly from the procedures accepted by recognized authorities in the field.cannot be shown to be generally accepted as a reliable technique. Issue/s: 1. Whether or not the GENERAL ACCEPTANCE rule is the proper standard for the admission of expert testimony as relied upon by the district court and the USCA. Held:
1. No. After careful analyses of the origin and rational for the general acceptance standard established in the famous case of FRYE, the court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence, not the FRYE TEST, provides for the proper standard for admitting expert scientific testimony in a federal trial. Firstly, the general acceptance test established by the case of FRYE has been superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 702 governing expert testimony, provides: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. As held in the case of US vs. Abel, nothing in the Rules as a whole or in the text and drafting history of RULE 702, which specifically governs expert testimony, gives any indication that general acceptance is a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence. Moreover, such a rigid standard would be at odds with the Rules liberal thrust and their general approach of realizing the traditional barriers to opinion testimony. Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony under Rule 702, the trial judge must make a preliminary assessment of whether the testimonys underlying reasoning or methodology is scientifically valid and properly can be applied to the facts at issue. Many considerations will bear on the inquiry, including whether the theory technique in question can be and has been tested, whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication, its know or potential error rate and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling its operation, and whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific community. The inquiry is a flexible one and its focus must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate. The remedy of the party who is questioning the admissibility of the challenged evidence is to cross-examine it, present contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof, rather than wholesale exclusion under an uncompromising general acceptance standard. In conclusion, general acceptance is not a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence, but the Rules of Evidence especially Rule 702 do assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an experts testimony both rests on a RELIABLE foundation and is RELEVANT to the task at hand. Pertinent evidence based on a scientifically valid principles will satisfy those demands. WHEREFORE, case is hereby remanded for further proceedings. By: Arnaldo M. Cario
U.S. VS. Bonds 12 F. 3d 540 (1993) Opinion Rule Facts: On February 27, 1988, David Hartlaub was gunned down in his van as he stopped at a bank near the Sandusky Mall in Ohio, where he planned to make a night deposit of cash from the music store he helped manage. The killers did not intend to rob the victim. In fact, the police found the deposit bag containing some $4,000 on the seat of the van. Three individuals, including the defendant JOHN BONDS, were indicted in connection with the crime, tried, and convicted of conspiracy and federal firearms offenses. During the trial, the Governments theory for the shooting was that the gunmen, members of the Hells Angels motorcycle gang, had mistaken the victims yellow van for an identical van driven by a local member of a rival motorcycle gang, THE OUTLAWA, whom the gunmen had allegedly planned to hit in retaliation for the shooting of a Hells Angels member by an OUTLAW the previous year in Illinois. Police authorities were able to recover the gun used in the shooting, a MAC-11 9-mm semi-automatic pistol and the victims van that was abandoned behind a hotel. Both the gun and the vans carpet were spattered with blood. Serology tests showed that the blood was not the victims, but rare enzymes identified in the spattered blood, which only appear in about 1% of Caucasian males. The rare enzymes matched those found in BONDS blood. Most of the blood in the van had dripped between the front seats; it was established that after the murder, BONDS wore his right arm in a sling, and it was later established that he had a serious ricochet wound which evidently bled between the seats as he drover the van that night. The police authorities obtained a blood sample of BONDS pursuant to a court order. These samples, were the basis for evidence introduced at trial, including evidence that the DNA in BONDS blood matched the DNA from the blood found in the back seat of Yees car. All 3 defendants were eventually tried to a jury and convicted. The defendants now appeal the decision. Defendants rely on the FRYE test arguing that forensic DNA testimony and evidence is not admissible since it has not met the general acceptance standard established by FRYE case. Issue: 1. Whether or not the district court erred in admitting expert testimony concerning DNA evidence in the trial. Held: 1. No. The court affirmed the ruling of the district court convicting the defendants of the crime charged. The court held that the district court did not err in admitting Forensic DNA testimony and evidence.
The court cited the case of DAUBERT vs. MERRELL DOW PHARMACEUTICALS, INC wherein the US Supreme court rejected FYREs general acceptance test as the exclusive test and redefined the standard for the admission of expert scientific testimony. The court held that the proper standard is RELIABILITY AND RELEVANCY of the evidence being presented. While the Daubert court did not explicitly define scientific validity or apply its new teaching to the evidence at issue in that case, it did begin to draw the parameters of this inquiry by providing the following non-exclusive list of factors: (1) whether a theory or technique can be tested, (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication, (3) the known or potential rate of error in using a particular scientific technique and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the techniques operation an (4) whether the theory or technique has been generally accepted in the particular scientific field. The inquiry envisioned by RULE 702 is a flexible one. The court held that the findings of the magistrate judge, although based on the FRYE test, were not clearly erroneous and are conclusive. Firstly, the judge issued exhaustive findings on the DNA evidence. The magistrate then defined general acceptance by stating what general acceptance is not-it does not require unanimity or consensus or approval by other courts. The magistrate judge went on to make alternative findings on the merits of the disputes about the reliability of the results, in the event that a reviewing court disagreed with him. Although the magistrate judge and the district court in admitting the DNA testimony focused on the FRYE test that has now been superseded by the Daubert Case, the court still affirm the decision on other grounds. It is also clear from this record that the DNA evidence and testimony would have met the more liberal rule test of Daubert case. Firstly, as to the RELEVANCY TEST of Daubert, the court held that the expert testimony meets such requirement. The evidence that BONDS DNA matched at least to some extent the DNA found in the crime-scene sample clearly is relevant to whether defendant BONDS was present in the victims van on the night of the murder. Thus, the DNA evidence was helpful to the jury in determining whether defendants were guilty of the charges. As the RELIABILITY TEST of Daubert, the court held that the FBIs principles and methodology of matching DNA samples have in fact been tested. The FBIs procedures have also received at least some exposure within the scientific peerage to which they belong. As to the rate of error of the technique, the court held that since the technique has been accepted in the scientific community, it is implicit that the rate of error is acceptable to the scientific community as well. Lastly, the court found that the underlying methodology and reasoning are scientifically valid and it is undisputed that the general principle that individuals can be identified by DNA is scientifically valid.
WHEREFORE, the court holds that testimony proffered by the government about the DNA matching and probabilities easily met the Daubert standard and admissible under Rule 702. By: Arnaldo M. Cario People vs. Daniel 86 SCRA 511 (1978) Opinion Rule Facts: This is a case involving the crime of rape. The victim, a minor named Margarita Paleng, was a first year high school student as the Baguio Eastern High School. One afternoon, when the victim just arrived in Baguio from Tublay, the accused followed the victim while the latter was on her way home. The victim tried to avoid the accused but the latter was adamant in following her. When the victim reached her house, the accused tried to force his way inside and pulled a dagger and threatened to kill her. Thereafter, the accused succeeded in raping the victim. The victim confided to her father the terrible misfortune. She was immediately brought to the Baguio hospital where she was examined. The victim was again re-examined by Dr. Micu at a helath center in Baguio. The victim together with her parents filed a complaint in the Fiscal. During the trial, Dr. Micu was called to the witness stand he testified on the physical examination conducted on the person of Margarita Paleng, the victim. Dr. Micu concluded that the defloration was recent. He also concluded that the victim was a virgin prior to the incident. For his defense, the accused said that the incident inside the room of the victim was with the latters consent and in fact it was the second time he had carnal knowledge with her. RTC AND CA RULING Guilty Issue: 1. The counsel for the defense raised the point that the accused voluntarily submitted himself to a lie detector test with the NBI and the report of the lie detector examiner is in accuseds favor. This is to say that the accused was telling the truth on the questions propounded to him one of which was whether he forced the victim into having sexual intercourse. Whether or not this finding, as the defense argue, should have been taken into consideration by the trial court. Held: 1. No.As to the NBI lie detector test report, the court does not put much faith and credit on it. It is well known that the same is not conclusive. Its efficacy depends upon the time, place and circumstances when taken and the nature of the subject. If the subject is hard
and the circumstances ,as in this instant, were not conducive to affect the subject emotionally, the test will fail. 2. The subject had nothing more to fear because the trial was over. He was not confronted by the victim or other persons whom he had a reason to fear. Naturally, his reaction to the questions propounded was normal and unaffected and the apparatus could not detect it. By: Arnaldo M. Cario

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THE REVISED RULES

Codal Provisions, Special Laws & Jurisprudence

Evidence Project Volumes

Volume 3: Volume 4: Volume 5:

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Volume 4: Table of Contents

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B. Exceptions to Hearsay Rule

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2. Declaration Against Interest (a) Rule 130, Section 38

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By: Marie Angeli Uy

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Learned Treatises (a) Rule 130, Section 46.

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