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Numquid Voluntatis Meæ est Mors Impii

et non ut Convertatur a Viis Suis et Vivat?


An Examination of the Universal Salvific Will of God
in Light of Predestination

A Thesis Submitted to
The Faculty of Thomas Aquinas College
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Bachelor of Arts

By
Joshua Stephen Kenz

Advisor: Dr. John F. Nieto

March 9th, 2008


Benedictus Deus et Pater Domini nostri Iesu Christi, qui benedixit nos in omni benedictione
spirituali in cælestibus in Christo, sicut elegit nos in ipso ante mundi constitutionem, ut essemus
sancti et immaculati in conspectu eius in caritate. Qui prædestinavit nos in adoptionem filiorum
per Iesum Christum in ipsum: secundum propositum voluntatis suæ, in laudem gloriæ gratiæ
suæ, in qua gratificavit nos in dilecto Filio suo. (Ephesians 1: 3-6)

Non tardat Dominus promissionem suam, sicut quidam existimant: sed patienter agit propter
vos, nolens aliquos perire, sed omnes ad pænitentiam reverti. (II Peter 3:9)
Introduction

St. Paul, exhorting Timothy to pray for all men, tells him that such “is good and

acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour, Who wills all men to be saved and to come to the

recognition of the truth.”1 This will to save all men presents a difficulty. How can God be said to

will that all men be saved if that will is not accomplished, that is, if some men are not saved?

Does one, then, construe it to be only a signified will, i.e. metaphorical? Can one speak of it as a

wishfulness, as if God could be impeded in His desires? One must see that, although not all men

are saved, God truly wills that all be saved and that these two statements are not contradictory.

To see how the perdition of some can be reconciled with God's will to save all, one first has to

see wherein the difficulty lies exactly, viz. the issues of predestination and reprobation. Then, one

must proceed to see how these two aspects of God's will, i.e. His will to save all and His actually

predestining only some, relate to one another. In order to find the right solution we will look first

to St. Augustine, and then to St. Thomas, judging the positions of both by Scripture and the

Magisterium and, using the principles which they give, reconcile the teaching that God wills all

men to be saved with the doctrine of predestination as far as possible.

The Difficulty

The Catholic Faith teaches that God's Providence directs even the free actions of

creatures. As Vatican I teaches, God's Providence governs all things He has created, “even those

which will be brought about by the free action of creatures.”2 That God does choose certain

persons for salvation is clear from numerous passages of Scripture, particularly in the beginning

1 I Timothy 2:3-4
2 Universa vero quæ condidit, Deus providentia sua tuetur atque gubernat, attingens a fine usque ad finem fortiter,
et disponens suaviter (Sap. 8:1). Omnia enim nuda et aperta sunt oculis eius (Heb. 4:13), ea etiam, quæ libera
creaturarum actione futura sunt. (Constitutio dogmatica de fide catholica, Cap. I) [But all the things which He
founded, God protects and governs by His Providence, reaching from end even unto end strongly, and disposing
sweetly (Wis. 8:1) For all things are nude and open to His eyes (Heb. 4:13), those things also, which will be
brought about by the free action of creatures.]

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of the Apostle's Epistle to the Ephesians:

Just as He chose us in Himself before the foundation of the world that we might be holy and
immaculate in His sight in charity, Who has predestined us unto the adoption of sons through
Jesus Christ unto Himself according to the proposition of His will.3

Again, this choice of God is infallible; i.e. those He has chosen will certainly get to heaven, as is

clear from the words of our Lord, “[my sheep] shall not perish forever and neither shall any man

snatch them from my hand.”4 Therefore predestination includes the necessary means and helps

for salvation. Thus, while one might be predestined to the grace of faith but at last fall away and

be damned, still the one predestined to glory will also be predestined to grace. Complete

predestination (prædestinatio adæquata) can thus be defined as “the preparation of grace in the

present and of glory in the future.”5 Lastly, this choice of God is utterly gratuitous. “For who

distinguisheth thee? But what hast thou which thou hast not received?” asks the Apostle.6 St.

Augustine, therefore, defines predestination as “nothing other than the foreknowledge and

preparation of benefits by which whosoever is liberated is most certainly liberated.”7 It is true

that every resolve of the Divine Will may be broadly called predestination, but that part of

Providence by which rational creatures are directed to their final destination is more properly

called predestination. Still more properly, predestination, and it is in this sense that the term will

be used in this thesis, “is a certain account of the order of some to eternal salvation, existing in

the divine mind.”8 The part of Providence which deals with the final end of those lost will be

called reprobation and will be examined more specifically later.

Scripture also teaches that God is “He Who wills all men to be saved and to come to the

3 cf. Matt. 20:16, Rom. 8:33


4 John 10:27, 28. cf. John 6:39
5 S. Th. Ia q. 23 a. 2 arg. 4
6 Cor. 4:7. cf. Eph 2:9-10
7 De dono perseverantiæ., cap. 35
8 S. Th. Ia q. 23 a.2 c.

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recognition of the truth.”9 If God were to predestine all men to salvation, this passage would be

readily understood. But if that were to happen then all men would infallibly be saved; there

would be no lost souls. Even if it were possible that all be saved, Scripture insists on the real

possibility of some being damned. This will of God to save all men must therefore be consonant

with some being lost. This is even more evident when one takes the Scripture in its obvious

meaning, that is that some are indeed lost. Our Lord states that Judas, the son of perdition, is

lost10 and that many are lost and few saved.11 While one might still reconcile with this the idea

that most are saved by calling it hyperbolic, it cannot be reconciled with the idea that none are

lost. One sheep out of a hundred might be many to the Good Shepherd, and the ninety-nine

remaining ones few, but how could none be many and all be few? Still, it suffices to see that

God's will to save all must be compatible with His not predestining all men.

At first the two propositions seems to exclude one another. It seems that God's will that

man be saved is the same as His will to predestine him. How can He will a man to be saved but

not will to confer grace and glory on him?

St. Augustine's Interpretation of I Timothy 2:4

This problem seems to have given trouble to St. Augustine, for he gives at least four

different accounts12 of the passage in I Timothy. His first account is in De Spiritu et littera (cap.

33). There he asks whether the will to believe is a gift from God or whether it arises from the

natural free will implanted in us:

If by nature, why not to all, since the same God is creator of all? If by the gift of God, this
yet again, why not to all, since He wills all men to be saved and to come to the recognition of
the truth?... But God wills all men to be saved and to come to the recognition of the truth,
still not thus, that He takes away from them free choice, using which they might be judged

9 I Tim. 2:4
10 John 17:12
11 Matt. 7:13-14
12 He held that the passage may be understood in many ways (chapter 14, or 44 of De Correptione et Gratia)

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either well or badly. This being the case, infidels certainly act against the will of God, when
they do not believe His Gospel, nor still do they therefore conquer it [the will], but they
defraud themselves of the great and highest good by evils which involve those worthy of
punishment in the experience of His power in sufferings, Whose mercy in gifts they
contemned. 13

St. Augustine adds below that the will to believe is from God both in the sense that man is

naturally created with free will and that God excites that will externally and internally: externally

by preaching and by the law, by which man can realise he needs grace, and internally by suasion

and calling. This latter is important; man does not necessarily choose what thoughts occur to

him; God's calling and suasions can be given to him with or without consent. But man must, by

his free choice, either consent or dissent from such cogitationes piæ. Hence, St. Augustine could

say that the will to believe was received as a gift because the calling that preceded free consent

was necessary for that belief. Yet he cannot, nor does he attempt here, to answer why one man

yields to the cogitationes piæ and another resists.

This first answer by St. Augustine, as illuminating as it might be, is insufficient. As St.

Augustine explains in the first book of De Gratia Christi, it is not sufficient to posit suasions and

holy thoughts from God, which Pelagius too admits, because many hear the words of our Lord,

are presented such holy thoughts and yet do not believe. God states, however, that His “grace is

sufficient for thee”14 and again our Lord states specifically of those who did not believe in Him

“that no one is able to come to Me unless it has been given to him by My Father.”15 This gift of

God, St. Augustine explains, is the grace which Pelagius denies, viz., what later theologians term

efficacious grace.16 Moreover, it still remains that predestination is infallible and that it is prior to

any foreseen merit, as is demanded by its very gratuitousness.17 If it were after foreseen merits,

13 My translation. This is chapter 58 in the translation edited by Schaff.


14 2 Cor. 12:9
15 John 6:65
16 A grace which infallibly attains its effect. This is also taught by the popes. Cf. Denzinger-Rahner (DR) para. 135.
17 One may hold predestination post prævisa merita, but he still must hold that grace precedes merit. DR. 176

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God's bestowal of the means of salvation would be prior to His willing glory, which does not fit

with the truth that, in glorifying man in heaven, God crowns His own merits. Thus, it must be

said that the predestined will in fact consent to God's grace, while the non-predestined will

ultimately reject it.

Perhaps on account of the difficulties involved, St. Augustine gives several other

interpretations. He states that it is clear, from our Lord not performing miracles that He knew

would convert unbelievers, that God does not will every man to be saved.18 He explains that one

is to understand by “wills all men to be saved ... as if it were said that no man is saved except

whom He has willed to be saved.”19 In support he cites the Gospel of John, chapter one, where it

states that Christ is “the true light that enlighteneth every man,” since it is clear that not every

man is in fact enlightened, but that every man who is enlightened is enlightened by Christ. St.

Augustine also states that the passage can be understood as meaning that God wills men of every

sort, whether of different race or class, to be saved. This explanation he gives repeatedly.20 It can

also be taken, he states, to mean that God gives us a desire that all be saved or that we should

pray for all, since we do not know who is predestined.21

These answers of St. Augustine cannot be taken as the answer by itself, for it would then

be contrary to various other passages in Scripture and the teaching of the Church.22 “I do not will

the death of the impious man but that the impious return from his way and live”23 declares God,

18 Enchiridion 103
19 tanquam diceretur nullum hominem fieri saluum nisi quem fieri ipse uoluerit; non quod nullus sit hominum nisi
quem saluum fieri uelit, sed quod nullus fiat nisi quem uelit, et ideo sit rogandus ut uelit, quia necesse est fieri si
uoluerit (Enchir. 103) [as if it were said that no man is saved except whom He has willed to be saved; not that
there is no one of men save whom He wills to be saved, but that no one is made {saved} except whom He wills,
and therefore it is to be asked that He will, since it is necessary that he be saved if He should will it.]
20 Contra Julianum IV 8,44 De correptione et gratia cap. 15, Enchir. 103.
21 ibid.
22 Pope Innocent X states that it is false, rash and scandalous to state that it is Semipelagian to hold that Christ died
for all men. He then states that it is also impious, blasphemous, contumelious, dishonouring to divine piety and
heretical to state that He died for only the predestined. (DR. 1096).
23 Ezekiel 33:11. cf. 2 Peter 3:9

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and again “Convert yourselves to me and you shall be saved”24 promises the Lord. There must be

more to God’s will as described in Timothy. Indeed, in his example taken from the Gospel of St.

John, where he states that not every man is enlightened by Christ, numerous other Fathers offer

other interpretations. One passage from St. John Chrysostom is of particular note:

If He "lights every man that comes into the world," how is it that so many continue
unenlightened? for not all have known the majesty of Christ. How then does He "light every
man"? He lights all as far as in Him lies. But if some, wilfully [sic] closing the eyes of their
mind, would not receive the rays of that Light, their darkness arises not from the nature of
the Light, but from their own wickedness, who willfully deprive themselves of the gift. For
the grace is shed forth upon all, turning itself back neither from Jew, nor Greek, nor
Barbarian, nor Scythian, nor free, nor bond, nor male, nor female, nor old, nor young, but
admitting all alike, and inviting with an equal regard. And those who are not willing to enjoy
this gift, ought in justice to impute their blindness to themselves; for if when the gate is
opened to all, and there is none to hinder, any being willfully evil remain without, they perish
through none other, but only through their own wickedness.25 (Emphasis added)

In judging St. Augustine's doctrine on this matter, one heeds his own words, “I would wish no

one thus to embrace all my [teachings] that he should follow me except in those things in which

he has perceived me not to err.”26

The Interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas

St. Thomas addresses this passage in the Summa Theologiæ only obliquely, as a response

to an objection. He also addresses it directly in the Super Sententias Petri Lombardi. We shall

look first to the answer in the Summa Theologiæ, then build upon that first with the text from the

Super Sententias, and then with other passages from St. Thomas and others that more fully

expound on certain points.

In question nineteen of the Prima Pars, St. Thomas addresses whether God's will is

always fulfilled. An objection is raised that God wills all men to be saved, but not all are saved.

Therefore, God's will is not fulfilled always. St. Thomas gives three different answers to this
24 Isaias 45:22
25 Homily on the Gospel of St. John. No. 8, chapter 1. Taken from the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers edited by
Schaff.
26 De dono perseverantiæ, cap. 21

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objection, based on three different interpretations of I Timothy 2:4.27 The first way is “according

to this sense, God wills all men to be saved who are saved, not that there is no man whom He

does not will to be saved, but that no man is saved whom He does not will to be saved.” This

interpretation he attributes to St. Augustine. The second is “according to this sense, God wills

from whatever condition of men, males and females, Jews and gentiles, small ones and great, to

be saved; still not all of each condition.” This too is an interpretation of St. Augustine. St.

Thomas does not reject these interpretations as false, rather he adds more to them. Indeed, as will

be clear from the passage in the Super Sententias, St. Thomas can include St. Augustine's

interpretations under the third interpretation.28

The third interpretation is from St. John Damascene.29 This is the interpretation which he

elaborates most on, from which it may be presumed that he sees it as the fullest answer. This

passage, that God wills all to be saved, “is understood of the antecedent will, not the consequent

will.” St. Thomas illustrates what is meant by these terms by the example of a just judge. The

just judge holds that life is a good of man. If one were to ask him, “is it good for man to live and

is it evil to kill him?,” his response would be, “yes.” In so answering, the judge is not considering

any particular circumstances nor is he looking at any one man, but just towards man, as man.

Hence he is said to will antecedently all men to live, insofar as, before considering any other

particulars, his will is that they live. Yet, if a man were a murderer or dangerous to the multitude,

the judge would not hold that it is a good for him to live and an evil for him to die; rather, the

judge would will him to be hanged precisely because the added condition makes it evil for him to

live and good that he die. This is called the consequent will because it follows upon the

27 St. Th. Iª q. 19 a. 6 ad 1
28 Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 46 q. 1 a. 1 ad 1 St. Thomas says that St. Augustine understood the passage to refer to the
consequent will, concerning which his interpretations would be true, namely that God saves all who are saved,
and He does so from all sections of humanity.
29 De Fide Orthodoxa, lib. 2 cap. 29

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consideration of particulars. Since the will is in respect to things as they are in themselves, and

that is as particulars, the consequent will can be called will simply, since we only will something

having considered the particular circumstances. Hence, the antecedent will is only a will in a

certain respect; e.g. the judge only wills the murderer to live inasmuch as he is man, but the

judge simply wills that he be hanged. St. Thomas adds that, on account of it being only in a

certain respect, the antecedent will can be called a willingness {velleitas} more than an absolute

will. He also adds that this distinction between antecedent and consequent arises not in God's

will itself, because there is no prior or posterior in God, but in the things willed, just as the

conditions that make it good or evil for this man to live are not from the judge but from the man

himself.

St. Thomas takes up this same question in the Super Sententias.30 Here he elaborates on

the effect of these two wills. Considering men insofar as they participate in humanity, there is no

reason why it would be better that one be saved and not the other. Indeed, it is a good for either

to be saved; for man was created with God for his final end.31 Since every good is willed by God,

this too is willed by God. This is the antecedent will, since it is prior to the consideration of the

diverse conditions of man. St. Thomas states in the body of the article, “the effect of this will is

the very order of nature to the end of salvation, and things offered to all in common moving them

forward towards salvation, as much natural things as gratuitous things.”32 When in a man his

peculiar circumstances are considered, then it is found that it is not equally good that all be

saved. For, it would be unjust if a man who resists God and rejects Him were saved. In this will

God wills to be saved only those who cooperate with Him and prepare themselves.

30 Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 46 q. 1 a. 1


31 Deus ex infinita bonitate sua ordinavit hominem ad finem supernaturalem, ad participanda scilicet bona divina.
Vatican I, Constitutio dogmatica de fide catholica, Cap. 2 [God from His infinite goodness ordered man to a
supernatural end, namely towards participating in the divine good]
32 Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 46 q. 1 a. 1

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The objections contained in this article and the responses to them help to answer the

question further. A common answer given to explain God's will in saving man is stating that His

will to save all is conditional on a person dying having accepted grace. The objector anticipates

this answer and takes I Timothy 2:4 to refer to God's will absolutely. He will not admit the will to

be conditioned because a conditioned will is an imperfect one since it depends on something else

for completion. The antecedent will that St. Thomas poses seems to be conditioned since not all

men are saved.

In response to this, St. Thomas answers that it is conditioned, not on the part of God, but

on the part of the thing willed since there is no priority in God's will. 33 Moreover it can be said

that God's will is absolute in itself, and the helps and order to salvation that He grants are indeed

granted by His antecedent will. Nevertheless, their consequent effects depend on how they are

received by men. An example of an effect of this will that St. Thomas gives are the precepts of

law. A law can be given equally to two men, but both might receive it in very different fashion-

one cooperating with it and the other rejecting it. Still, God's will is accomplished, viz., He gave

the precepts of the law to the men, which precepts are truly ordered to their salvation. His

consequent will to save this man is also saved from this difficulty. For this will is nothing other

than the will that this man be saved, i.e. the predestinating will. As stated above, predestination

includes not only glory in the future, but grace in the present. As will be shown below, the very

cooperation of man is a grace from God. St. Thomas teaches in the Summa Theologiæ34 that

grace is placed in the definition of predestination, “insofar as predestination imports something

in respect to grace, as of a cause to its effect and an act to its object.” Therefore, instead of man's

cooperation being a condition for God's consequent will, it is the very effect of it.

33 ibid. cf. St. Th. Iª q. 19 a. 6 ad 1


34 S. Th. Ia q.23 a.2 ad. 4

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The objector then raises this challenge, “the will of one having charity imitates the divine

will. But the one having charity wishes the salvation of any person whatsoever.” It seems right,

moreover, that someone with charity should pray for any person to be predestined, to have grace

to cooperate, namely to be included in God's consequent will. On the other hand, should not the

will of man be conformed to God's will with respect to the reprobate? Would it not be the height

of temerity to will goods to someone that God did not wish that person to have? Therefore, one

should conclude that God does indeed will all these goods to all, and that any difference in the lot

of any man arises from that man's will.

St. Thomas' response is brief. One with charity, he states, does wish all men to be saved

absolutely because the conditions by which someone is disordered from salvation are not subject

to his knowledge; they are subject to God's knowledge. Hence, as St. Augustine taught above, the

salvation of all is willed by us because we do not know who is or is not predestined.

St. Thomas explains in the Summa Theologiæ35 that man's will conforms to God's not by

being made equal to it but by imitating it, in a way proportionate to human nature. The will

follows upon the apprehension of the intellect, and the more common the good apprehended by

reason, the more common is the good willed by reason. Hence, a judge will order the death of a

thief, but the thief's wife wills that her husband be spared. The judge, having charge over the

common good, will act for that good. The wife, however, only apprehends the more particular

good of her family, since that is the good proportionate to her, and thus wills that her husband be

spared. Neither has a bad will, as long as the wife submits to the judge's decision. God

apprehends the good of the whole universe, namely His own Goodness, and orders things to It.

Men, however, can only apprehend a much more particular good. What matters is that man

35 S. Th. Ia IIæ q.19 art. 8, 9.

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apprehends something as good because he sees it in reference to the common good as to an end.

That is, it is the account of the thing willed and not the thing itself that matters more. Hence, one

prays that a sinner be converted before he causes any damage, because he sees this as ordered

towards God. Yet, God might order things such that the sinner be converted later. What is

essential is the “voluntas tua” that Christ gave us as an example at Gethsemane. As St. Thomas

explains, “he wills more what God wills who conforms his will to the divine will as much as to

the account of the thing willed, than he who conforms as much as to the very thing willed.”36 In

other words, it is more important in order to will what God wills that we resign ourselves to His

will than to actually will this particular object precisely as God, in fact, wills it. Hence, we can

and should pray for people to be predestined, even though God might not predestine them.

The next objection is that an artificer always wills that his work attain its end, but God

created man for eternal glory. Therefore He would will all to be saved, simply. St. Thomas' reply

is that a wise artificer does not, in fact, will that his work attain its end unless that would be in

accordance with the reason of the end. If something has a disposition contrary to the form the

artificer wants to shape it to, he does not shape the thing, except perhaps by removing the

indisposition. A builder does not will that stones should come into the construction of a house if

they remain rough. Neither does God will that man to be saved should that man remain opposed

to God.

Again, the objector argues that man cannot be saved without God willing it. Therefore, if

some man is not willed to be saved by God, then it is not in that man's power to be saved. If it is

not in his power, then he cannot be blamed for not being saved. But this is false, for otherwise

the damned would not be punished. Therefore, God wills every man's salvation.

36 ibid. art. 9 ad. 4

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Here, St. Thomas merely replies that what turns man away from his end, sin, arises from

man alone and it is under that condition that God does not will him to be saved. Therefore, man

can truly be held to account for failing to attain his end.

Further Exposition on the Antecedent Will

St. Thomas states that the effect of the antecedent will “is the very order of nature to the

end of salvation, and things offered to all in common moving them forward towards salvation, as

much natural things as gratuitous things.”37 One might argue that, since St. Thomas only gives

“natural things” as examples, such as the precepts of the law, he does not mean to include grace

here. Even if this were true, and St. Thomas did not have in mind grace, yet we can see that his

statement is true of grace as well, if it is given or at least proposed to all. Hence, we will consider

both natural helps and helps of grace that God would offer all men in His antecedent will.

As St. Thomas states, “the very order of nature” is an effect of the antecedent will. This

must first include the fact that man was constituted with eternal glory as his end. It was wholly

possible for God to create man with only a natural end in view, in a state of pure nature or a state

of unimpeded nature as the Scholastics speak. This follows directly from St. Pius V's

condemnation of this statement of Baius, “God was not able from the beginning to create man

such as he is now born.”38 In other words, God could have created man without the preternatural

gifts39 given to Adam, including original justice and integrity,40 such that man would have been

only able to attain a natural end, and this is the state of pure nature. St. Thomas explains that:

“God was able from the beginning...to form also another man from the slime of the earth,
whom He would leave in the condition of his own nature, namely so that he would be mortal

37 Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 46 q. 1 a. 1


38 DR 1055 (DS 1955) Deus non potuisset ab initio talem creare hominem, qualis nunc nascitur. cf. DR 1026 (DS
1926)
39 Those graces which our first parents were endowed with that was beyond mere human nature, such as the ability
not to die, original justice, etc.
40 The gift by which man's reason had an easy dominion over his passions.

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and passable, and one feeling the fight of concupiscence against reason; in which nothing is
derogated from human nature, since this follows from the principles of his nature41. Still this
defect would not have in him the account of blame and punishment, since the defect would
not be caused by the will.”42

God may also have endowed man with these preternatural gifts to help him attain a purely

natural end, and this would be unimpeded nature. What is important is that if such a nature were

to exist, it would not take away anything from human nature. Therefore, not only do we see that

human nature could have been created with an end that did not include an order to grace, but that

human nature, in itself, would not be lowered by such an act. Hence, that God did ordain man

from the first to an end beyond human nature in the pure state is itself a gratuitous act and one

belonging to all men, for He did not create this other man that St. Thomas speaks of, but created

all with the same end.

To help man attain this end, God granted to our first parents, not only original justice, that

is sanctifying grace, by which they could enjoy union with God, but also other gifts that, strictly

speaking, went beyond their nature. These were freedom from dying, the complete dominion of

reason over the passions, probably freedom from suffering, and knowledge of natural and

supernatural truths infused by God. Under that condition it was clear how man had been ordered

to his end and given aids to attain it. By sinning Adam lost for himself and posterity not only

original justice but also the preternatural gifts. Man was left to his fallen nature, unable to attain

the end for which he was created. Now God, in willing to save man, thereby established an order

in which man may be saved. We will look first to things that are natural, at least in the sense that

41 cf. De malo, q. 5 a. 5 co. Sic ergo mors et corruptio naturalis est homini secundum necessitatem materiæ; sed
secundum rationem formæ esset ei conveniens immortalitas; ad quam tamen præstandam naturæ principia non
sufficiunt; sed aptitudo quædam naturalis ad eam convenit homini secundum animam; complementum autem
eius est ex supernaturali virtute. [Thus, therefore, death and natural corruption belongs to man according to the
necessity of matter; but immortality would be fitting to him according to the account of form; for the furnishing
of which, still, the principles of nature do not suffice; but a certain natural aptitude for it belongs to man
according to the soul; but its completion is from supernatural power]
42 Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 31 q. 1 a. 2 ad 3.

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they are not anything supernatural in the soul. But first we should see what is necessary for man

to be saved.

The Things Necessary for Salvation.

For man to be saved he must be elevated by grace. The means established for this is first

and foremost baptism, as Our Lord teaches, “He that believeth and is baptised, shall be saved.”43

Again, we can take from that passage the necessity of faith in God, which according to the

Church must be explicit, not only in the existence of God and that He is a rewarder,44 but also in

the Incarnation and the Trinity.45 Man must also die in charity to be saved, and therefore needs

graces to restore that state and to persevere in it. Now for man to do all these things to be saved,

he must first be influenced morally by law, counsel, suasion and the like. This follows from the

necessity of apprehending the good in the mind which is to be chosen. Man cannot choose to be

baptised, or to assent in faith to certain propositions if he is ignorant of them, and he will not

choose to unless he sees them as good. Also, man must be physically able to choose- for instance

he must have certain necessary habits- and he must indeed choose. If the action is of a

supernatural character, this must involve not only God as first mover but also His grace. It can

readily be seen, therefore, that for a man to be saved the Gospel must be preached to him and he

must have grace to act.

The Church as Ordered to All and All Ordered to Her.

As the Catechism of the Catholic Church puts it, “No one can have God as Father who

does not have the Church as Mother.”46 The Church is the instrument of salvation on earth; no

43 Mark 16:16, cf. John 3:5


44 Heb. 11:6, DR 1172, and CCC 848
45 These two are “especially” necessary by a necessity of means for salvation. Cf. DR 1349a. Leaving aside
whatever distinction could still be made, the Church forbids, even when there is a danger of death and the person
is stupid, baptising any adult without explicit faith in the Trinity and Incarnation.
46 CCC 181, quoting St. Cyprian

14
one is saved who does not die in her bosom.47 Now because of the impossibility of pleasing God

without faith, the Catechism teaches that there is a missionary imperative of the Church. This

missionary imperative must be universal, aimed at every individual, as it is founded on the will

to save all men, as Vatican II teaches, “The reason for this missionary activity is taken from the

will of God, 'who wills all men to be saved...'... For Christ himself 'by stressing the necessity of

faith and baptism in explicit words, confirms at the same time the necessity of the Church, into

which men enter by baptism just as through a door.'”48 It is thus manifest that the Church is

directed to evangelise all peoples; it is ordered to their salvation and every individual is called to

join her.49 It can therefore be said that the Church, with her universal scope, is not only part of

God's will to save all, but fundamental to it. That not all hear the Gospel, in fact, is a weighty

objection. It can be said that, although God permits impediments, He does still will the Church to

evangelise all. Just so a seed has an order to germination and maturity, although it might not

actually attain its end because there might be a rock over it. There is some reason for the ordering

of things in Providence, even when it is not readily intelligible. Again, as St. Thomas replied in

the article from the Super Sententias, a good artificer does not will his work to attain its end if it

is unsuitable to that end. It might well be, for example, that in a particular case, this man would

be led to worse sins by learning the contents of the Gospel, and therefore it is merciful to leave

him in his blindness, rather than without excuse. This is just speculation, of course, but it does

illustrate that there can be a higher end in God permitting what would be considered good

normally, the preaching of the Gospel, to be impeded.

47 Credit firmiter... neminemque quantascunque elemosinas fecerit, et si pro Christi nomine sanguinem effuderit,
posse salvari, nisi in catholice ecclesie gremio et unitate permanserit. (Bulla unionis Coptorum, Sessio XI
Concilium Florentinum) [She {the Church} firmly believes...that no one can be saved however so much he has
made alms, and even if he has shed blood for the name of Christ, unless he has persevered in the bosom and
unity of the Catholic Church]
48 Concilium Vaticanum II, Decretum de activitate missionali ecclesiæ, Ad gentes para. 7
49 CCC 804, Lumen Gentium 13

15
The Role of Grace and Free-Will

Earlier the claim was made that the very cooperation of man was a grace from God. That

this is true is readily apparent upon consideration. For otherwise man would be distinguished

from fellow man, as saved and reprobate, not by God's election, but purely by human effort. Man

would merit without grace against what the Apostle declares in I Corinthians 4:7, “For who

distinguisheth thee? But what hast thou which thou hast not received?” The question then arises,

if the man who cooperates does so because of grace, then why are not all given this grace if God

wills them to be saved? If therefore a man lacks that cooperation, how could it be imputed as a

fault to him? And if we say that a prior sin which man commits disqualifies him from the grace

of cooperation, would we not be saying that salvation depends on actions of men, apart from

God, as prerequisites to be predestined?

As said above, it was going to be argued that God's antecedent will includes not only

natural and external things, but grace as well. If man is truly going to be offered salvation, then it

must in some way be available to him. And if fault is going to be imputed to him for his

blindness, for his rejecting grace, then he must be able to make acts of faith, hope and charity,

which are not natural acts and therefore require grace. What this grace is must first be seen and

then whether it is given to all or not. It is clear that this grace cannot be that which distinguishes

the predestined from the non-predestined, namely efficacious grace to borrow a term that came

into usage after St. Thomas. It must be something common to both. If we take as given, a point

commonly admitted in Catholic teaching,50 that there are distinctions in grace, and further, that

there is a difference between habitual grace and the graces which aid us to attain and remain in

habitual grace,51 then we must look to this aiding or assisting grace for the difference, since to

50 Cap. V, VI, session VI Decretum de iustificatione, Concilium Tridentinum


51 Namely, actual grace.

16
have habitual grace is to be justified and to die with it is to be saved.

St. Augustine already provided us with a starting point for this investigation. He stated

that God gives us suasions and callings,52 and that these are necessary to act towards salvation,

but they are yet distinct from the voluntary act of the will by which we consent or dissent. St.

Augustine, in the 2nd Book of De correptione et gratia,53 makes a division among the assistances

(adjutoria54) that God gives us:

Again the very assistances are distinguished. One is the assistance without which something
is not done, and the other is the assistance by which something is done. ... But to be sure, the
happiness which man does not have, when it is given, makes him continuously happy. For it
is not only the assistance without which it does not happen, but also that by which it happens
on account of what is given. Why is this assistance both that by which it happens and that
without which it does not happen? Since both if happiness were given to man, he would be
made continuously happy; and if it were never given, he will never be happy. But
nourishments do not consequently make it that a man should live: but still without them he is
not able to live. Therefore, to the first man, who, in that good by which he was made upright,
received the ability {posse} not to sin, the ability not to die, the ability not to desert the good
itself, was given the assistance of perseverance, not that by which it would be made that he
would persevere, but that without which he would not be able to persevere by his free choice.
But now to the saints predestined to the kingdom of God by the grace of God such an
assistance of perseverance is not given, but such that perseverance itself should be given to
them; not only that they would be unable without this gift to persevere, but also that through
this gift they would not be able to be except persevering.

The assistances that St. Augustine speaks of must be really distinct, for the former merely gives

the ability to do an action and the latter gives the doing {agere}. As St. Augustine says, those

who receive the latter, e.g. perseverance, cannot be but performing that action, e.g. persevering.55

Yet those who receive the former need not actually do the action that it is ordered towards. For

52 De spiritu et littera cap. 33 (vide supra)


53 Chapter XII. John of St. Thomas quotes this when discussing sufficient grace. Translation mine, made from the
Migne. (P.L 44, 396)
54 From hence adjutoria and adjuvans will be translated assistances and assisting, as opposed to auxilium and
auxiliarium which will be rendered help and helping. The former is usually used for the grace that accompanies
an act, while the latter is used broadly for any actual grace, prevenient or subsequent. It is not claimed here that
that distinction is found in St. Augustine, but merely that it is the usage of most theologians (cf. Fundamentals of
Catholic Dogma Book IV, Part I, Introduction § 3).
55 The Church has dogmatically defined that the will is still free to reject efficacious grace, though it in fact does
not. St. Augustine too affirms this dogma; it will suffice to say that by definition efficacious grace entails
infallibly doing the action it is ordered to, though explanation of this vary greatly. (cf. Can 4, Sessio VI,
Concilium Tridentinum)

17
the sake of brevity, and because it is common usage, the posse for an action will be called a

sufficient help, and sufficient grace when it of a supernatural character. The agere will be termed

efficacious.

St. Thomas does not explicitly treat of sufficient or efficacious grace. He does, however,

divide grace, and his division should help us here. There are two divisions he makes of actual

grace,56 viz. he divides it on the one hand into operating and cooperating grace, and on the other

hand into prevenient and subsequent graces.

St. Thomas, in the Summa Theologiæ57 states that both habitual grace and that grace

which given to us “for willing and doing well” can be divided by its effects into operating and

cooperating grace. Concerning the latter case he states, “and therefore insofar as God moves the

human mind to this act, it is called operating grace...and since God also aids us for this act both

by interiorly strengthening the will so that it should arrive at the act and exteriorly by supplying

the faculty of operating; in respect to this act it is called cooperating grace.” This division is

much like the one that St. Augustine made between the different types of assistances, and the

distinction he made earlier in De Spiritu et littera about callings and suasions, but it is different.

This first involuntary act to think about the good, to be morally influenced to perform the good,

is operating grace. Whereas the consent of the will, since it involves the will and God's grace in

one and the same action, is cooperating grace. It is also clear that this division is like the division

of sufficient and efficacious grace since every cooperating grace will be efficacious (since it

involves the consent of the will), and every operating grace will be a precondition to such a

consent.

56 To be precise he presents it as a division of “gratia gratum facientis” which would include both actual and
habitual grace. This is important because the habit of grace is a principle of actions done by grace, so that the
distinction between actual and habitual grace is not so sharply defined by St. Thomas as by later theologians.
57 S. Th. Iª-IIæ q. 111 a. 2 co.

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However, whereas operating and cooperating grace divide grace by its effects, we can say

that merely sufficient grace and efficacious grace divide grace by its fruitfulness. It needs to be

noted that St. Thomas is not saying that operating and cooperating grace are necessarily

numerically distinct; it is merely a division based on effects. Hence he says of habitual grace that

it is operating grace insofar as it heals the soul, but cooperating grace insofar as it is the principle

of meritorious actions. But efficacious and merely sufficient grace must be not only extrinsically

but also intrinsically distinguished. For sufficient grace can be given without the effect being

produced, so that in its character it cannot include the motion of the will. The existence of an

inefficacious grace is shown numerous times in Scripture. St. Stephen said to the Jews, “With a

stiff neck, and being uncircumcised in your hearts and ears, you always resist the Holy Ghost.”58

But the consent, this cooperation, we have already said, is a grace from God and does not arise

from man as something added to the sufficient grace God gives us, but as an action that is truly

God's and man's. That such cooperation is from God can be seen in Scripture. St. Paul states,

“For God is He Who works in you both to will and to work according to His good will.”59 And it

is said in Proverbs, “Just as the divisions of the water, so the heart of a king in the hand of the

Lord, whithersoever he shall will, he shall incline it.”60

The other division St. Thomas makes is one of priority, though not in the temporal

order.61 He first explains that there are five effects of grace. This division starts with the healing

of the soul, that is with the justification that comes with habitual grace, and ends with the gift of

glory. Here we can see that St. Thomas sees in grace truly the beginning, the germ, of eternal life.

This is important to note for later on, because we will need to see grace in its order to glory to

58 Acts of the Apostles 7:51


59 Phillipians 2:3
60 Proverbs 21:1
61 This he does in S. Th. Iª-IIæ q. 111 a. 3 co.

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understand sufficient grace. St. Thomas states that grace heals the soul, causes it to will the good,

then to efficaciously act for the good, to persevere in the good and finally to attain glory. The one

and same grace is called both prevenient insofar as it is seen in its reference to a further effect,

and subsequent insofar as it is seen as following a previous effect. Hence, the first effect of

healing the soul is considered prevenient to the second, to which it is ordered, while the second is

seen as subsequent in respect to the first. What is important here to note, for our purposes, is that

by styling the same effect as both prevenient and subsequent, one is setting it in its proper and

inherent order to the other effects of grace. It is not as if God heals the soul in such a way that the

healing is not ordered towards willing the good and ultimately attaining glory, nor is glory

bestowed unless first the soul be healed and will the good.

It is important to note that sufficient grace is ordered towards the action that happens with

efficacious grace. It can be crudely compared to sharpening a pencil; one must sharpen the pencil

to write with it. Yet having sharpened it, one need not write with it; still it was sharpened in order

to be used in writing. The fact that the writing need not take place does not mean that the

sharpening was not ordered to writing, it just means that it is a conditio sine qua non, a condition

without which the writing could not happen, but it is not the writing itself; it creates the

disposition necessary for action. Further, since sufficient grace in itself is prevenient grace with

respect to efficacious grace, then it is never given except in anticipation of efficacious grace; the

having of which actually secures the salutary act of the will. The only defect in this causing one

to remain with only sufficient grace must be the resistance of the man, since God would not

frustrate His own designs.

It may be noted that these terms and concepts were only sharply defined in reaction to the

Calvinists and Jansenists who both denied a merely sufficient grace, holding that any grace

20
which was sufficient was infallibly efficacious, and that any grace that was efficacious could not

be resisted. Blaise Pascal formulates the principal objection in his Provincial Letters:

“But tell me, Father, is this grace given to all men sufficient?” “Yes,” he said. “And yet it is
of no effect without efficacious grace?” “That is true,” he said. “That means,” I said, “that all
have enough grace, and all do not have enough; that this grace suffices, although it does not
suffice; that it is sufficient in name and insufficient in fact.”62

Indeed, we normally mean by calling something sufficient that it is adequate or enough. If

sufficient grace were adequate for an action, then it seems one would not need a further grace. If

we were to dismiss the name as badly used, and say that St. Augustine's division still holds, we

still have a problem. Let the pencil be sharpened. If there were no intention to go ahead and use

that pencil, as true as it may be that sharpening it is necessary to write with it, the sharpening

could not be said to be part of a will to write. Likewise, if sufficient grace were given without

any intention to bestow efficacious grace then how could it be part of God's will to save all men?

We must first get down what is meant by sufficient and why that term is used. The word

is derived from sufficio which is a compound of sub and facio. Literally it means, “to make

under.” According to Lewis and Short one of its first meanings is to lay a foundation. In this way

we can speak of a grace being sufficient which merely lays a “foundation” for further grace. We

can make further distinctions within sufficient grace that might aid us here. John of St. Thomas

divides sufficient helps into two categories.63 The first he calls intergra et totalis and the other

partialis et inædequata. The former is said to be simply sufficient and is present when all that is

prerequisite for action is present. The example given is that of the knowing power. That power is

sufficient simply when there is the potency, form and light, since those three things are necessary

to have an act of knowledge. But any one of them is said to be a sufficient help in its own genus,

but inadequately. Hence, one says there is sufficient light to take a picture, though there is not
62 The Provincial Letters, Blaise Pascal. Letter II. Translation for Penguin Books. ©1967
63 Cursus Theologicus, In Iam-Iæ, Tractum de Gratia. Disp. XXIV, art. I. para. 1034. Collectio Lavallensis

21
sufficient film to do so. It is important to note that John of St. Thomas is not speaking merely of

sufficient grace here in the sense of only interior grace, but help in general. Hence, he states that

for a supernatural act there is required “the principle which is a habit or in the manner of a habit,

then a sufficient proposition of the object [of action], then the law, whether precept or counsel or

suasion, then some affection which is like a striking or excitation of the will.” Some of these

things he states are moral, such as the law, others are physical, such as the habit or inspiration.

Again, some are extrinsic, like man preaching and some are intrinsic such as the action of God.

Hence, the preaching of the Gospel and the missionary activity of the Church form a partial

sufficiency for salvation by themselves. One can see that sufficiency does not always mean

everything that is necessary for an action, but can refer to things of a certain kind and that we

speak of them as sufficient for a certain action, and in that way ordered to that action, even when

the other conditions are lacking that are necessary. In this way, a man can truly participate in the

order God has established to salvation, and yet not have true sufficiency to attain the end of

glory, because, while he might share in some sufficient help, he can impede himself with regards

to another. Hence a man might learn the Gospel and even have faith, but disorders himself from

salvation because he sets up impediments to the supernatural habit of charity.

We can also note that it is not necessary that God, in fact, grant to all grace sufficient to

act. But it is necessary that He be prepared to give all grace, since all are ordered to salvation and

grace is necessary for that end, just as it is necessary that He give efficacious grace to one who

does not resist sufficient grace, and glory to one who dies in grace; not because He owes it,

strictly, but because He has pledged it in Christ who died for all. Answering why it is not the case

that man is free from fault for not converting, even though that needs grace, St. Thomas answers:

Although someone through the motion of his free choice is neither able to merit nor call
upon divine grace, still he is able to impede himself lest he should receive it...And since this

22
is in the power of free choice, to impede or not impede the reception of divine grace, it is not
unjustly imputed to him as fault who presents an impediment to the reception of grace. For
God, as much as He is in Himself, is prepared to give grace to all, for he wills all men to be
saved... but those only are deprived of grace who present in themselves an impediment to
grace.64

Hence, it is not that God makes it absolutely impossible for man to do salutary actions. If a man

had not set up impediments, then God would have granted him grace. Hence a man with actual

grace, who does not receive habitual grace, lacks habitual grace because he resisted actual grace.

Again, the man that does not even receive actual grace lacks it, not because God would never

have given it, but because he has already resisted God in the natural order, such as through an act

of positive infidelity, e.g. false worship. While God could give graces even then to turn him back

to Him, and might often give such graces, yet the natural helps and powers of man were

sufficient not to sin in the first place. Grace is necessary to perform acts of faith, hope and

charity, but no grace is necessary to avoid murder, idolatry or theft. It can be added that even

though man without grace cannot make an act of faith, for example, yet he can still be culpable

for failing to do so, because he placed an impediment to receiving the means to faith. Man is

responsible for not doing actions that he is unable to do when the fact that he cannot do them is

his own fault. It is true, of course, that God could have upheld a will in the good, rather than

permitting it to resist. Yet it is equally true that God need not permit any sin. That there could be

free creatures without God permitting any sin is certainly true, but sin exists and it must then

exist for a higher good and the same answer must suffice for why God permits some to offer

resistance.

Synthesis of an Answer

St. Thomas stated that the effect of the will to save all men was the very order of nature

and the things impelling to that end. We have seen that the Church is ordered to work for the
64 Summa Contra Gentiles lib. 3 cap. 159

23
salvation of all, that God is prepared to give all grace and that the sufficient graces He does give

many men are ordered to efficacious grace. We can then state that God's will to save all men

consists in this, that they are ordered to eternal glory as an end and that, consequently, the

sufficient means to attain that end are available to all, and actually dispose to that end when not

impeded. Hence, external preaching, the witness of the Church, the law, both natural and Divine

positive law, serve to prepare men for the reception of grace. A priest does not preach against sin,

except so as to lead people to quit that sin. Barring any positive infidelity that would preclude it,

God grants sufficient grace to adults so that they may, in fact, act on the Gospel, convert, have

faith, seek baptism. They are thus given the possibility of attaining salvation. This sufficient

grace, being prevenient to efficacious grace, is ordered to the act for which it gives the ability.

Barring resistance, God gives efficacious grace by which man actually does those things

necessary to attain sanctifying grace and remain in it. God does not in fact predestine all men, for

He permits some to fall from that order He established; but that order is truly there for them, and

it is truly sufficient for their salvation.

Some Further Objections

This answer may seem satisfactory for many cases, where we are speaking of men who

may freely reject God's grace, but two instances seem to be unanswered. The first is the case of

unevangelised peoples. The second is the case of those who die before the age of reason, but

without baptism. In the first case, there was no hearing of the Gospel to prepare them for grace,

no sacraments of the Church or availability of the Church to provide the sacraments. How can

the order be sufficient for them? In the latter case, how can an infant have been ordered to

salvation, when he does not even exist in the realm of action wherein we speak of sufficient and

efficacious grace. His salvation is passive, through baptism, and there can be no impediment or

24
resistance on his part that explains the failure for him to attain his end of eternal glory.

The first case was treated earlier. It was said then that the Church was still ordered to their

salvation, even though geographically, or otherwise, impeded from reaching them. The

impediment does not exist in the men, it is true, but in the exterior course of things. The example

of a seed failing to grow to maturity seems unsatisfactory, insofar as the eternal salvation of a

man seems such a higher good as so not to allow such external impediments sufficient reason for

being. We must remember what God told Isaiah, “For my thoughts are not your thoughts: nor

your ways my ways, saith the Lord.”65 It must be affirmed that His Providence is for a greater

purpose; it is true that the salvation of a human soul is of great value and that God's glory is the

glorification of His creatures, but if He truly allows the Church to be impeded from reaching

certain men it must be for a greater good. It is sufficient, since it is all that we can say with what

we know, that God is prepared to give them all grace, and as master of history, He makes the

Church present and available as it suits His Providence.66

The second example is thornier, even if the answer is in large part the same. We know

that to die in original sin only means to descend directly into hell.67 We know that any way in

which an infant can be saved from original sin apart from water baptism is unknown to

revelation,68 and therefore would be outside the order God established. This follows, in part,

65 Isaias 55:8
66 If God did save a man in an unevangelised area, it would be outside the normal order, but still through the
Church. It might be possible for some to be saved outside the visible Church, but not apart from her.
67 Concilium Florentinum, Sessio 6- Illorum autem animas, qui in actuali mortali peccato vel solo originali
decedunt, mox in infernum descendere, penis tamen disparibus puniendas. [The souls of those who depart in
actual mortal sin or original sin alone, immediately descend into hell, nevertheless to be punished by disparate
penalties.]
68 Cap. 4 et Can. V sessio VI Decretum de iustificatione, Concilium Tridentinum. Also, Bulla unionis Coptorum,
Sessio XI Concilium Florentinum.: cum ipsis non possit alio remedio subvenire nisi per sacramentum
baptismi...admonet ...quamprimum commode fieri potest debere conferri. [Since it is not possible for them to
come under another remedy except baptism...{the Church} admonishes ...that as soon as it can conveniently be
done it {baptism} ought to be conferred].

25
because of the impossibility of baptism of desire for infant.69 Even if God did save all infants,

then miracles would be multiplied exceedingly and the extraordinary would actually be quite

ordinary. It would also be extremely difficult to see how that would not point to a fundamental

flaw in the order established. Certainly this, even a sincere will to save all that includes infants

does not demand that the extraordinary be made ordinary.

Nevertheless, there must be good reason that such infants are permitted to die. St.

Gregory of Nyssa wrote:

It is a sign of the perfection of God's Providence, that He not only heals maladies that have
come into existence, but also provides that some should be never mixed up at all in the things
which He has forbidden; it is reasonable, that is, to expect that He Who knows the future
equally with the past should check the advance of an infant to complete maturity, in order
that the evil may not be developed which His foreknowledge has detected in his future life,
and in order that a lifetime granted to one whose evil dispositions will be lifelong may not
become the actual material for his vice.70

Here it is suggested that God's order, which could have excluded any such premature deaths, is a

function of His mercy, since they would at least obtain natural happiness. There might be a

myriad of other reasons; it is not claimed here that this is the sole reason for permitting such

deaths. The fact is that the order God established includes this, that some die before attaining

reason. If we are to admit with Scripture that God “disposes all things sweetly”71 then we must

simply admit that the order of Providence is superior to our understanding of it. It remains that

such an unbaptised infant was ordered to salvation. In the case of the infant of Catholic parents,

the infant is clearly ordered to the parents and the parents in turn order the infant to God, though

the infant is impeded through death. In the case of parents who would not baptise the infant, then

there already existed an impediment in the order of things for the infant, since the normal order is

69 Pius XII stated: An act of love is sufficient for the adult to obtain sanctifying grace and to supply the lack of
baptism; to the still unborn or newly born this way is not open. Address to Midwives (Acta Apostolicæ Sedis,
XLIII, 84). cf. the Bulla of Sixtus V, Effrænatam. (29 October 1588)
70 De infantibus qui præmature abripiuntur.
71 Wisdom 8:1

26
that an infant be baptised and raised in the faith by his parents. Yet the order to salvation still

exists for such an infant, because the parents themselves are still ordered to the Church and the

Church to them. Further, the Church would baptise such an infant, in danger of death, even

against the wishes of the parents;72 the Church does not exclude such from those whom she

seeks. It is a sad fact that so early on such life is lost, but the order to salvation still existed for

the infant.73

The last objection is this: that God could have not only arranged His Providence such that

all infants should survive, and all be reached by the Gospel, but He could have predestined all to

heaven and not permitted anyone to fall away from the order to eternal glory. It might well be

clear that by permitting some to fall, God does not cause them to sin, but it is clear that He need

not permit them to fall. It can only be answered thus, that just as it pertains to a part of

Providence to predestine certain ones to salvation, so it pertains to a part of Providence to permit

some to fall; for it pertains to Providence not only to will the good but also to permit defects. We

can say that God predestines some and reprobates others so that His mercy and justice might

both shine forth, but we could never answer why this man and not that one. God does not will the

damnation for itself, for if He did that would be contrary to His will to save all. But as St.

Thomas explains, He wills the punishment of the sinner under the account of justice, not

damnation74 and He permits some to fall from the order He has established so that His justice

might be shown in that order. This is called reprobation, and as St. Thomas explains it is the

counterpart to predestination within Providence, for it is not only prescience that some should

fall from their end, but it includes the permission for them to sin and the punishment for those

72 Can. 868 § 2 Infans parentum catholicorum, immo et non catholicorum, in periculo mortis licite baptizatur, etiam
invitis parentibus. Codex Iuris Canonici. [An infant of Catholic parents, nay also of non Catholics, in danger of
death is licitly baptised, even if the parents are unwilling]
73 God could save this or that infant apart from baptismal graces, but that is not the subject here.
74 S. Th. Ia-IIæ q. 19 art. 10 ad 2

27
sins. If we are to see that reprobation does not mean that God's antecedent will to save all men

does not apply, we need to remind ourselves what is included in the will to save all men. That

will does not include eternal life itself, nor even efficacious graces, it includes an order to such

graces and glory. The reprobate are not willed the actual goods of glory or predestinating graces,

but they nevertheless are ordered to them and are given gifts that are thus ordered. If there were

an absolute impossibility of grace or glory for them, then perhaps the reality of reprobation

would negate the divine will to save all men, but the impossibility of the reprobate securing

grace is not absolute, but conditioned. Man's free choice remains, he was not determined to sin

because he is reprobate, but he freely chooses to labour under this or that sin.75

Conclusion

God wills all men to be saved. The will to save all men does not include bestowing

efficacious grace on all, let alone the good of eternal life itself. It includes only this, that all men

are ordered to eternal glory as their proper end, and that they share in an order in this world

which conduces to that end. Further, the order established by God includes a true sufficiency, in

His Church, for the salvation of all and the gifts that God gives within this order truly do order

those who receive them to salvation, even though they, in fact, fall away from that end. We can,

therefore, truly affirm the reality of God's will to save all men, and still uphold the truth of

predestination, that God wills the actual good of eternal life to an elect.

75 S. Th. Ia q. 23 art. 3 ad 3

28
Bibliography

1. Biblia Sacra Iuxta Vulgatam Clementinam. Martriti, Hispania


Bibiliotheca Auctorum Christianorum, 2002

2. S. Thomæ Aquinatis, Summa Theologiæ. Martriti, Hispania


Bibiliotheca Auctorum Christianorum, 1994

3. Blaise Pascal, The Provincial Letters. Trans. A.J. Krailsheimer. Baltimore, Maryland.
Penguin Books Inc. 1967

4. Joannes a Sancto Thoma, Cursus Theologicus: De Gratia In Iam-IIæ. Québec, Canada.


Les Presses Universitaires Laval, 1954.

5. Norman P. Tanner, S.J, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils. London, England & Washington D.C.
Sheed & Ward, and Georgetown University Press, 1990

6. Catechism of the Catholic Church, New York, New York


Doubleday, 1997

7. Henry Denzinger, revised Karl Rahner, S.J, The Sources of Catholic Dogma. Trans. Roy J. Deferrari.
Fitzwilliam, New Hampshire: Loreto Publications. 2004.

8. Passages from SS. John Chrysostom and Gregory of Nyssa taken from http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/
They are taken from the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers edited by Schaff.

9. Passages of St. Thomas Aquinas, other than the Summa Theologiæ taken from
http://www.corpusthomisticum.org All are taken from critical editions of the Latin, and all translations are my
own. Besides the Summa the following works were used:
i. Quaestiones disputatæ De malo
ii. Super Sententias Petri Lombardi
iii. Summa Contra Gentiles

10. All passages of St. Augustine are translated by the author. They are taken from the Migne Patrologia
Latinorum, as found online at Google Books® The following works are used:
i. De Spiritu et littera
ii. De correptione et gratia
iii. De Gratia Christi
iv. De dono perseverantiæ
v. Contra Julianum
vi. Enchidirion de fide, spe et caritate

11. Ludwig Ott, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, Trans. James Canon Bastible. Rockford, Illinois.
Tan Books and Publishers. 1974

12. Codex Iuris Canonici, 1983. http://vatican.va

13. Lewis and Short, A Latin Dictionary, Oxford, England


Oxford Clarendon Press, orig. 1879.

14. A few citations from popes (namely Pius XII and Sixtus V) were taken from http://www.papalencyclicals.net

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