Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A Thesis Submitted to
The Faculty of Thomas Aquinas College
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Bachelor of Arts
By
Joshua Stephen Kenz
Non tardat Dominus promissionem suam, sicut quidam existimant: sed patienter agit propter
vos, nolens aliquos perire, sed omnes ad pænitentiam reverti. (II Peter 3:9)
Introduction
St. Paul, exhorting Timothy to pray for all men, tells him that such “is good and
acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour, Who wills all men to be saved and to come to the
recognition of the truth.”1 This will to save all men presents a difficulty. How can God be said to
will that all men be saved if that will is not accomplished, that is, if some men are not saved?
Does one, then, construe it to be only a signified will, i.e. metaphorical? Can one speak of it as a
wishfulness, as if God could be impeded in His desires? One must see that, although not all men
are saved, God truly wills that all be saved and that these two statements are not contradictory.
To see how the perdition of some can be reconciled with God's will to save all, one first has to
see wherein the difficulty lies exactly, viz. the issues of predestination and reprobation. Then, one
must proceed to see how these two aspects of God's will, i.e. His will to save all and His actually
predestining only some, relate to one another. In order to find the right solution we will look first
to St. Augustine, and then to St. Thomas, judging the positions of both by Scripture and the
Magisterium and, using the principles which they give, reconcile the teaching that God wills all
The Difficulty
The Catholic Faith teaches that God's Providence directs even the free actions of
creatures. As Vatican I teaches, God's Providence governs all things He has created, “even those
which will be brought about by the free action of creatures.”2 That God does choose certain
persons for salvation is clear from numerous passages of Scripture, particularly in the beginning
1 I Timothy 2:3-4
2 Universa vero quæ condidit, Deus providentia sua tuetur atque gubernat, attingens a fine usque ad finem fortiter,
et disponens suaviter (Sap. 8:1). Omnia enim nuda et aperta sunt oculis eius (Heb. 4:13), ea etiam, quæ libera
creaturarum actione futura sunt. (Constitutio dogmatica de fide catholica, Cap. I) [But all the things which He
founded, God protects and governs by His Providence, reaching from end even unto end strongly, and disposing
sweetly (Wis. 8:1) For all things are nude and open to His eyes (Heb. 4:13), those things also, which will be
brought about by the free action of creatures.]
1
of the Apostle's Epistle to the Ephesians:
Just as He chose us in Himself before the foundation of the world that we might be holy and
immaculate in His sight in charity, Who has predestined us unto the adoption of sons through
Jesus Christ unto Himself according to the proposition of His will.3
Again, this choice of God is infallible; i.e. those He has chosen will certainly get to heaven, as is
clear from the words of our Lord, “[my sheep] shall not perish forever and neither shall any man
snatch them from my hand.”4 Therefore predestination includes the necessary means and helps
for salvation. Thus, while one might be predestined to the grace of faith but at last fall away and
be damned, still the one predestined to glory will also be predestined to grace. Complete
predestination (prædestinatio adæquata) can thus be defined as “the preparation of grace in the
present and of glory in the future.”5 Lastly, this choice of God is utterly gratuitous. “For who
distinguisheth thee? But what hast thou which thou hast not received?” asks the Apostle.6 St.
Augustine, therefore, defines predestination as “nothing other than the foreknowledge and
that every resolve of the Divine Will may be broadly called predestination, but that part of
Providence by which rational creatures are directed to their final destination is more properly
called predestination. Still more properly, predestination, and it is in this sense that the term will
be used in this thesis, “is a certain account of the order of some to eternal salvation, existing in
the divine mind.”8 The part of Providence which deals with the final end of those lost will be
Scripture also teaches that God is “He Who wills all men to be saved and to come to the
2
recognition of the truth.”9 If God were to predestine all men to salvation, this passage would be
readily understood. But if that were to happen then all men would infallibly be saved; there
would be no lost souls. Even if it were possible that all be saved, Scripture insists on the real
possibility of some being damned. This will of God to save all men must therefore be consonant
with some being lost. This is even more evident when one takes the Scripture in its obvious
meaning, that is that some are indeed lost. Our Lord states that Judas, the son of perdition, is
lost10 and that many are lost and few saved.11 While one might still reconcile with this the idea
that most are saved by calling it hyperbolic, it cannot be reconciled with the idea that none are
lost. One sheep out of a hundred might be many to the Good Shepherd, and the ninety-nine
remaining ones few, but how could none be many and all be few? Still, it suffices to see that
God's will to save all must be compatible with His not predestining all men.
At first the two propositions seems to exclude one another. It seems that God's will that
man be saved is the same as His will to predestine him. How can He will a man to be saved but
This problem seems to have given trouble to St. Augustine, for he gives at least four
different accounts12 of the passage in I Timothy. His first account is in De Spiritu et littera (cap.
33). There he asks whether the will to believe is a gift from God or whether it arises from the
If by nature, why not to all, since the same God is creator of all? If by the gift of God, this
yet again, why not to all, since He wills all men to be saved and to come to the recognition of
the truth?... But God wills all men to be saved and to come to the recognition of the truth,
still not thus, that He takes away from them free choice, using which they might be judged
9 I Tim. 2:4
10 John 17:12
11 Matt. 7:13-14
12 He held that the passage may be understood in many ways (chapter 14, or 44 of De Correptione et Gratia)
3
either well or badly. This being the case, infidels certainly act against the will of God, when
they do not believe His Gospel, nor still do they therefore conquer it [the will], but they
defraud themselves of the great and highest good by evils which involve those worthy of
punishment in the experience of His power in sufferings, Whose mercy in gifts they
contemned. 13
St. Augustine adds below that the will to believe is from God both in the sense that man is
naturally created with free will and that God excites that will externally and internally: externally
by preaching and by the law, by which man can realise he needs grace, and internally by suasion
and calling. This latter is important; man does not necessarily choose what thoughts occur to
him; God's calling and suasions can be given to him with or without consent. But man must, by
his free choice, either consent or dissent from such cogitationes piæ. Hence, St. Augustine could
say that the will to believe was received as a gift because the calling that preceded free consent
was necessary for that belief. Yet he cannot, nor does he attempt here, to answer why one man
This first answer by St. Augustine, as illuminating as it might be, is insufficient. As St.
Augustine explains in the first book of De Gratia Christi, it is not sufficient to posit suasions and
holy thoughts from God, which Pelagius too admits, because many hear the words of our Lord,
are presented such holy thoughts and yet do not believe. God states, however, that His “grace is
sufficient for thee”14 and again our Lord states specifically of those who did not believe in Him
“that no one is able to come to Me unless it has been given to him by My Father.”15 This gift of
God, St. Augustine explains, is the grace which Pelagius denies, viz., what later theologians term
efficacious grace.16 Moreover, it still remains that predestination is infallible and that it is prior to
any foreseen merit, as is demanded by its very gratuitousness.17 If it were after foreseen merits,
4
God's bestowal of the means of salvation would be prior to His willing glory, which does not fit
with the truth that, in glorifying man in heaven, God crowns His own merits. Thus, it must be
said that the predestined will in fact consent to God's grace, while the non-predestined will
Perhaps on account of the difficulties involved, St. Augustine gives several other
interpretations. He states that it is clear, from our Lord not performing miracles that He knew
would convert unbelievers, that God does not will every man to be saved.18 He explains that one
is to understand by “wills all men to be saved ... as if it were said that no man is saved except
whom He has willed to be saved.”19 In support he cites the Gospel of John, chapter one, where it
states that Christ is “the true light that enlighteneth every man,” since it is clear that not every
man is in fact enlightened, but that every man who is enlightened is enlightened by Christ. St.
Augustine also states that the passage can be understood as meaning that God wills men of every
sort, whether of different race or class, to be saved. This explanation he gives repeatedly.20 It can
also be taken, he states, to mean that God gives us a desire that all be saved or that we should
These answers of St. Augustine cannot be taken as the answer by itself, for it would then
be contrary to various other passages in Scripture and the teaching of the Church.22 “I do not will
the death of the impious man but that the impious return from his way and live”23 declares God,
18 Enchiridion 103
19 tanquam diceretur nullum hominem fieri saluum nisi quem fieri ipse uoluerit; non quod nullus sit hominum nisi
quem saluum fieri uelit, sed quod nullus fiat nisi quem uelit, et ideo sit rogandus ut uelit, quia necesse est fieri si
uoluerit (Enchir. 103) [as if it were said that no man is saved except whom He has willed to be saved; not that
there is no one of men save whom He wills to be saved, but that no one is made {saved} except whom He wills,
and therefore it is to be asked that He will, since it is necessary that he be saved if He should will it.]
20 Contra Julianum IV 8,44 De correptione et gratia cap. 15, Enchir. 103.
21 ibid.
22 Pope Innocent X states that it is false, rash and scandalous to state that it is Semipelagian to hold that Christ died
for all men. He then states that it is also impious, blasphemous, contumelious, dishonouring to divine piety and
heretical to state that He died for only the predestined. (DR. 1096).
23 Ezekiel 33:11. cf. 2 Peter 3:9
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and again “Convert yourselves to me and you shall be saved”24 promises the Lord. There must be
more to God’s will as described in Timothy. Indeed, in his example taken from the Gospel of St.
John, where he states that not every man is enlightened by Christ, numerous other Fathers offer
other interpretations. One passage from St. John Chrysostom is of particular note:
If He "lights every man that comes into the world," how is it that so many continue
unenlightened? for not all have known the majesty of Christ. How then does He "light every
man"? He lights all as far as in Him lies. But if some, wilfully [sic] closing the eyes of their
mind, would not receive the rays of that Light, their darkness arises not from the nature of
the Light, but from their own wickedness, who willfully deprive themselves of the gift. For
the grace is shed forth upon all, turning itself back neither from Jew, nor Greek, nor
Barbarian, nor Scythian, nor free, nor bond, nor male, nor female, nor old, nor young, but
admitting all alike, and inviting with an equal regard. And those who are not willing to enjoy
this gift, ought in justice to impute their blindness to themselves; for if when the gate is
opened to all, and there is none to hinder, any being willfully evil remain without, they perish
through none other, but only through their own wickedness.25 (Emphasis added)
In judging St. Augustine's doctrine on this matter, one heeds his own words, “I would wish no
one thus to embrace all my [teachings] that he should follow me except in those things in which
St. Thomas addresses this passage in the Summa Theologiæ only obliquely, as a response
to an objection. He also addresses it directly in the Super Sententias Petri Lombardi. We shall
look first to the answer in the Summa Theologiæ, then build upon that first with the text from the
Super Sententias, and then with other passages from St. Thomas and others that more fully
In question nineteen of the Prima Pars, St. Thomas addresses whether God's will is
always fulfilled. An objection is raised that God wills all men to be saved, but not all are saved.
Therefore, God's will is not fulfilled always. St. Thomas gives three different answers to this
24 Isaias 45:22
25 Homily on the Gospel of St. John. No. 8, chapter 1. Taken from the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers edited by
Schaff.
26 De dono perseverantiæ, cap. 21
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objection, based on three different interpretations of I Timothy 2:4.27 The first way is “according
to this sense, God wills all men to be saved who are saved, not that there is no man whom He
does not will to be saved, but that no man is saved whom He does not will to be saved.” This
interpretation he attributes to St. Augustine. The second is “according to this sense, God wills
from whatever condition of men, males and females, Jews and gentiles, small ones and great, to
be saved; still not all of each condition.” This too is an interpretation of St. Augustine. St.
Thomas does not reject these interpretations as false, rather he adds more to them. Indeed, as will
be clear from the passage in the Super Sententias, St. Thomas can include St. Augustine's
The third interpretation is from St. John Damascene.29 This is the interpretation which he
elaborates most on, from which it may be presumed that he sees it as the fullest answer. This
passage, that God wills all to be saved, “is understood of the antecedent will, not the consequent
will.” St. Thomas illustrates what is meant by these terms by the example of a just judge. The
just judge holds that life is a good of man. If one were to ask him, “is it good for man to live and
is it evil to kill him?,” his response would be, “yes.” In so answering, the judge is not considering
any particular circumstances nor is he looking at any one man, but just towards man, as man.
Hence he is said to will antecedently all men to live, insofar as, before considering any other
particulars, his will is that they live. Yet, if a man were a murderer or dangerous to the multitude,
the judge would not hold that it is a good for him to live and an evil for him to die; rather, the
judge would will him to be hanged precisely because the added condition makes it evil for him to
live and good that he die. This is called the consequent will because it follows upon the
27 St. Th. Iª q. 19 a. 6 ad 1
28 Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 46 q. 1 a. 1 ad 1 St. Thomas says that St. Augustine understood the passage to refer to the
consequent will, concerning which his interpretations would be true, namely that God saves all who are saved,
and He does so from all sections of humanity.
29 De Fide Orthodoxa, lib. 2 cap. 29
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consideration of particulars. Since the will is in respect to things as they are in themselves, and
that is as particulars, the consequent will can be called will simply, since we only will something
having considered the particular circumstances. Hence, the antecedent will is only a will in a
certain respect; e.g. the judge only wills the murderer to live inasmuch as he is man, but the
judge simply wills that he be hanged. St. Thomas adds that, on account of it being only in a
certain respect, the antecedent will can be called a willingness {velleitas} more than an absolute
will. He also adds that this distinction between antecedent and consequent arises not in God's
will itself, because there is no prior or posterior in God, but in the things willed, just as the
conditions that make it good or evil for this man to live are not from the judge but from the man
himself.
St. Thomas takes up this same question in the Super Sententias.30 Here he elaborates on
the effect of these two wills. Considering men insofar as they participate in humanity, there is no
reason why it would be better that one be saved and not the other. Indeed, it is a good for either
to be saved; for man was created with God for his final end.31 Since every good is willed by God,
this too is willed by God. This is the antecedent will, since it is prior to the consideration of the
diverse conditions of man. St. Thomas states in the body of the article, “the effect of this will is
the very order of nature to the end of salvation, and things offered to all in common moving them
forward towards salvation, as much natural things as gratuitous things.”32 When in a man his
peculiar circumstances are considered, then it is found that it is not equally good that all be
saved. For, it would be unjust if a man who resists God and rejects Him were saved. In this will
God wills to be saved only those who cooperate with Him and prepare themselves.
8
The objections contained in this article and the responses to them help to answer the
question further. A common answer given to explain God's will in saving man is stating that His
will to save all is conditional on a person dying having accepted grace. The objector anticipates
this answer and takes I Timothy 2:4 to refer to God's will absolutely. He will not admit the will to
be conditioned because a conditioned will is an imperfect one since it depends on something else
for completion. The antecedent will that St. Thomas poses seems to be conditioned since not all
In response to this, St. Thomas answers that it is conditioned, not on the part of God, but
on the part of the thing willed since there is no priority in God's will. 33 Moreover it can be said
that God's will is absolute in itself, and the helps and order to salvation that He grants are indeed
granted by His antecedent will. Nevertheless, their consequent effects depend on how they are
received by men. An example of an effect of this will that St. Thomas gives are the precepts of
law. A law can be given equally to two men, but both might receive it in very different fashion-
one cooperating with it and the other rejecting it. Still, God's will is accomplished, viz., He gave
the precepts of the law to the men, which precepts are truly ordered to their salvation. His
consequent will to save this man is also saved from this difficulty. For this will is nothing other
than the will that this man be saved, i.e. the predestinating will. As stated above, predestination
includes not only glory in the future, but grace in the present. As will be shown below, the very
cooperation of man is a grace from God. St. Thomas teaches in the Summa Theologiæ34 that
in respect to grace, as of a cause to its effect and an act to its object.” Therefore, instead of man's
cooperation being a condition for God's consequent will, it is the very effect of it.
9
The objector then raises this challenge, “the will of one having charity imitates the divine
will. But the one having charity wishes the salvation of any person whatsoever.” It seems right,
moreover, that someone with charity should pray for any person to be predestined, to have grace
to cooperate, namely to be included in God's consequent will. On the other hand, should not the
will of man be conformed to God's will with respect to the reprobate? Would it not be the height
of temerity to will goods to someone that God did not wish that person to have? Therefore, one
should conclude that God does indeed will all these goods to all, and that any difference in the lot
St. Thomas' response is brief. One with charity, he states, does wish all men to be saved
absolutely because the conditions by which someone is disordered from salvation are not subject
to his knowledge; they are subject to God's knowledge. Hence, as St. Augustine taught above, the
St. Thomas explains in the Summa Theologiæ35 that man's will conforms to God's not by
being made equal to it but by imitating it, in a way proportionate to human nature. The will
follows upon the apprehension of the intellect, and the more common the good apprehended by
reason, the more common is the good willed by reason. Hence, a judge will order the death of a
thief, but the thief's wife wills that her husband be spared. The judge, having charge over the
common good, will act for that good. The wife, however, only apprehends the more particular
good of her family, since that is the good proportionate to her, and thus wills that her husband be
spared. Neither has a bad will, as long as the wife submits to the judge's decision. God
apprehends the good of the whole universe, namely His own Goodness, and orders things to It.
Men, however, can only apprehend a much more particular good. What matters is that man
10
apprehends something as good because he sees it in reference to the common good as to an end.
That is, it is the account of the thing willed and not the thing itself that matters more. Hence, one
prays that a sinner be converted before he causes any damage, because he sees this as ordered
towards God. Yet, God might order things such that the sinner be converted later. What is
essential is the “voluntas tua” that Christ gave us as an example at Gethsemane. As St. Thomas
explains, “he wills more what God wills who conforms his will to the divine will as much as to
the account of the thing willed, than he who conforms as much as to the very thing willed.”36 In
other words, it is more important in order to will what God wills that we resign ourselves to His
will than to actually will this particular object precisely as God, in fact, wills it. Hence, we can
and should pray for people to be predestined, even though God might not predestine them.
The next objection is that an artificer always wills that his work attain its end, but God
created man for eternal glory. Therefore He would will all to be saved, simply. St. Thomas' reply
is that a wise artificer does not, in fact, will that his work attain its end unless that would be in
accordance with the reason of the end. If something has a disposition contrary to the form the
artificer wants to shape it to, he does not shape the thing, except perhaps by removing the
indisposition. A builder does not will that stones should come into the construction of a house if
they remain rough. Neither does God will that man to be saved should that man remain opposed
to God.
Again, the objector argues that man cannot be saved without God willing it. Therefore, if
some man is not willed to be saved by God, then it is not in that man's power to be saved. If it is
not in his power, then he cannot be blamed for not being saved. But this is false, for otherwise
the damned would not be punished. Therefore, God wills every man's salvation.
11
Here, St. Thomas merely replies that what turns man away from his end, sin, arises from
man alone and it is under that condition that God does not will him to be saved. Therefore, man
St. Thomas states that the effect of the antecedent will “is the very order of nature to the
end of salvation, and things offered to all in common moving them forward towards salvation, as
much natural things as gratuitous things.”37 One might argue that, since St. Thomas only gives
“natural things” as examples, such as the precepts of the law, he does not mean to include grace
here. Even if this were true, and St. Thomas did not have in mind grace, yet we can see that his
statement is true of grace as well, if it is given or at least proposed to all. Hence, we will consider
both natural helps and helps of grace that God would offer all men in His antecedent will.
As St. Thomas states, “the very order of nature” is an effect of the antecedent will. This
must first include the fact that man was constituted with eternal glory as his end. It was wholly
possible for God to create man with only a natural end in view, in a state of pure nature or a state
of unimpeded nature as the Scholastics speak. This follows directly from St. Pius V's
condemnation of this statement of Baius, “God was not able from the beginning to create man
such as he is now born.”38 In other words, God could have created man without the preternatural
gifts39 given to Adam, including original justice and integrity,40 such that man would have been
only able to attain a natural end, and this is the state of pure nature. St. Thomas explains that:
“God was able from the beginning...to form also another man from the slime of the earth,
whom He would leave in the condition of his own nature, namely so that he would be mortal
12
and passable, and one feeling the fight of concupiscence against reason; in which nothing is
derogated from human nature, since this follows from the principles of his nature41. Still this
defect would not have in him the account of blame and punishment, since the defect would
not be caused by the will.”42
God may also have endowed man with these preternatural gifts to help him attain a purely
natural end, and this would be unimpeded nature. What is important is that if such a nature were
to exist, it would not take away anything from human nature. Therefore, not only do we see that
human nature could have been created with an end that did not include an order to grace, but that
human nature, in itself, would not be lowered by such an act. Hence, that God did ordain man
from the first to an end beyond human nature in the pure state is itself a gratuitous act and one
belonging to all men, for He did not create this other man that St. Thomas speaks of, but created
To help man attain this end, God granted to our first parents, not only original justice, that
is sanctifying grace, by which they could enjoy union with God, but also other gifts that, strictly
speaking, went beyond their nature. These were freedom from dying, the complete dominion of
reason over the passions, probably freedom from suffering, and knowledge of natural and
supernatural truths infused by God. Under that condition it was clear how man had been ordered
to his end and given aids to attain it. By sinning Adam lost for himself and posterity not only
original justice but also the preternatural gifts. Man was left to his fallen nature, unable to attain
the end for which he was created. Now God, in willing to save man, thereby established an order
in which man may be saved. We will look first to things that are natural, at least in the sense that
41 cf. De malo, q. 5 a. 5 co. Sic ergo mors et corruptio naturalis est homini secundum necessitatem materiæ; sed
secundum rationem formæ esset ei conveniens immortalitas; ad quam tamen præstandam naturæ principia non
sufficiunt; sed aptitudo quædam naturalis ad eam convenit homini secundum animam; complementum autem
eius est ex supernaturali virtute. [Thus, therefore, death and natural corruption belongs to man according to the
necessity of matter; but immortality would be fitting to him according to the account of form; for the furnishing
of which, still, the principles of nature do not suffice; but a certain natural aptitude for it belongs to man
according to the soul; but its completion is from supernatural power]
42 Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 31 q. 1 a. 2 ad 3.
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they are not anything supernatural in the soul. But first we should see what is necessary for man
to be saved.
For man to be saved he must be elevated by grace. The means established for this is first
and foremost baptism, as Our Lord teaches, “He that believeth and is baptised, shall be saved.”43
Again, we can take from that passage the necessity of faith in God, which according to the
Church must be explicit, not only in the existence of God and that He is a rewarder,44 but also in
the Incarnation and the Trinity.45 Man must also die in charity to be saved, and therefore needs
graces to restore that state and to persevere in it. Now for man to do all these things to be saved,
he must first be influenced morally by law, counsel, suasion and the like. This follows from the
necessity of apprehending the good in the mind which is to be chosen. Man cannot choose to be
baptised, or to assent in faith to certain propositions if he is ignorant of them, and he will not
choose to unless he sees them as good. Also, man must be physically able to choose- for instance
he must have certain necessary habits- and he must indeed choose. If the action is of a
supernatural character, this must involve not only God as first mover but also His grace. It can
readily be seen, therefore, that for a man to be saved the Gospel must be preached to him and he
As the Catechism of the Catholic Church puts it, “No one can have God as Father who
does not have the Church as Mother.”46 The Church is the instrument of salvation on earth; no
14
one is saved who does not die in her bosom.47 Now because of the impossibility of pleasing God
without faith, the Catechism teaches that there is a missionary imperative of the Church. This
missionary imperative must be universal, aimed at every individual, as it is founded on the will
to save all men, as Vatican II teaches, “The reason for this missionary activity is taken from the
will of God, 'who wills all men to be saved...'... For Christ himself 'by stressing the necessity of
faith and baptism in explicit words, confirms at the same time the necessity of the Church, into
which men enter by baptism just as through a door.'”48 It is thus manifest that the Church is
directed to evangelise all peoples; it is ordered to their salvation and every individual is called to
join her.49 It can therefore be said that the Church, with her universal scope, is not only part of
God's will to save all, but fundamental to it. That not all hear the Gospel, in fact, is a weighty
objection. It can be said that, although God permits impediments, He does still will the Church to
evangelise all. Just so a seed has an order to germination and maturity, although it might not
actually attain its end because there might be a rock over it. There is some reason for the ordering
of things in Providence, even when it is not readily intelligible. Again, as St. Thomas replied in
the article from the Super Sententias, a good artificer does not will his work to attain its end if it
is unsuitable to that end. It might well be, for example, that in a particular case, this man would
be led to worse sins by learning the contents of the Gospel, and therefore it is merciful to leave
him in his blindness, rather than without excuse. This is just speculation, of course, but it does
illustrate that there can be a higher end in God permitting what would be considered good
47 Credit firmiter... neminemque quantascunque elemosinas fecerit, et si pro Christi nomine sanguinem effuderit,
posse salvari, nisi in catholice ecclesie gremio et unitate permanserit. (Bulla unionis Coptorum, Sessio XI
Concilium Florentinum) [She {the Church} firmly believes...that no one can be saved however so much he has
made alms, and even if he has shed blood for the name of Christ, unless he has persevered in the bosom and
unity of the Catholic Church]
48 Concilium Vaticanum II, Decretum de activitate missionali ecclesiæ, Ad gentes para. 7
49 CCC 804, Lumen Gentium 13
15
The Role of Grace and Free-Will
Earlier the claim was made that the very cooperation of man was a grace from God. That
this is true is readily apparent upon consideration. For otherwise man would be distinguished
from fellow man, as saved and reprobate, not by God's election, but purely by human effort. Man
would merit without grace against what the Apostle declares in I Corinthians 4:7, “For who
distinguisheth thee? But what hast thou which thou hast not received?” The question then arises,
if the man who cooperates does so because of grace, then why are not all given this grace if God
wills them to be saved? If therefore a man lacks that cooperation, how could it be imputed as a
fault to him? And if we say that a prior sin which man commits disqualifies him from the grace
of cooperation, would we not be saying that salvation depends on actions of men, apart from
As said above, it was going to be argued that God's antecedent will includes not only
natural and external things, but grace as well. If man is truly going to be offered salvation, then it
must in some way be available to him. And if fault is going to be imputed to him for his
blindness, for his rejecting grace, then he must be able to make acts of faith, hope and charity,
which are not natural acts and therefore require grace. What this grace is must first be seen and
then whether it is given to all or not. It is clear that this grace cannot be that which distinguishes
the predestined from the non-predestined, namely efficacious grace to borrow a term that came
into usage after St. Thomas. It must be something common to both. If we take as given, a point
commonly admitted in Catholic teaching,50 that there are distinctions in grace, and further, that
there is a difference between habitual grace and the graces which aid us to attain and remain in
habitual grace,51 then we must look to this aiding or assisting grace for the difference, since to
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have habitual grace is to be justified and to die with it is to be saved.
St. Augustine already provided us with a starting point for this investigation. He stated
that God gives us suasions and callings,52 and that these are necessary to act towards salvation,
but they are yet distinct from the voluntary act of the will by which we consent or dissent. St.
Augustine, in the 2nd Book of De correptione et gratia,53 makes a division among the assistances
Again the very assistances are distinguished. One is the assistance without which something
is not done, and the other is the assistance by which something is done. ... But to be sure, the
happiness which man does not have, when it is given, makes him continuously happy. For it
is not only the assistance without which it does not happen, but also that by which it happens
on account of what is given. Why is this assistance both that by which it happens and that
without which it does not happen? Since both if happiness were given to man, he would be
made continuously happy; and if it were never given, he will never be happy. But
nourishments do not consequently make it that a man should live: but still without them he is
not able to live. Therefore, to the first man, who, in that good by which he was made upright,
received the ability {posse} not to sin, the ability not to die, the ability not to desert the good
itself, was given the assistance of perseverance, not that by which it would be made that he
would persevere, but that without which he would not be able to persevere by his free choice.
But now to the saints predestined to the kingdom of God by the grace of God such an
assistance of perseverance is not given, but such that perseverance itself should be given to
them; not only that they would be unable without this gift to persevere, but also that through
this gift they would not be able to be except persevering.
The assistances that St. Augustine speaks of must be really distinct, for the former merely gives
the ability to do an action and the latter gives the doing {agere}. As St. Augustine says, those
who receive the latter, e.g. perseverance, cannot be but performing that action, e.g. persevering.55
Yet those who receive the former need not actually do the action that it is ordered towards. For
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the sake of brevity, and because it is common usage, the posse for an action will be called a
sufficient help, and sufficient grace when it of a supernatural character. The agere will be termed
efficacious.
St. Thomas does not explicitly treat of sufficient or efficacious grace. He does, however,
divide grace, and his division should help us here. There are two divisions he makes of actual
grace,56 viz. he divides it on the one hand into operating and cooperating grace, and on the other
St. Thomas, in the Summa Theologiæ57 states that both habitual grace and that grace
which given to us “for willing and doing well” can be divided by its effects into operating and
cooperating grace. Concerning the latter case he states, “and therefore insofar as God moves the
human mind to this act, it is called operating grace...and since God also aids us for this act both
by interiorly strengthening the will so that it should arrive at the act and exteriorly by supplying
the faculty of operating; in respect to this act it is called cooperating grace.” This division is
much like the one that St. Augustine made between the different types of assistances, and the
distinction he made earlier in De Spiritu et littera about callings and suasions, but it is different.
This first involuntary act to think about the good, to be morally influenced to perform the good,
is operating grace. Whereas the consent of the will, since it involves the will and God's grace in
one and the same action, is cooperating grace. It is also clear that this division is like the division
of sufficient and efficacious grace since every cooperating grace will be efficacious (since it
involves the consent of the will), and every operating grace will be a precondition to such a
consent.
56 To be precise he presents it as a division of “gratia gratum facientis” which would include both actual and
habitual grace. This is important because the habit of grace is a principle of actions done by grace, so that the
distinction between actual and habitual grace is not so sharply defined by St. Thomas as by later theologians.
57 S. Th. Iª-IIæ q. 111 a. 2 co.
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However, whereas operating and cooperating grace divide grace by its effects, we can say
that merely sufficient grace and efficacious grace divide grace by its fruitfulness. It needs to be
noted that St. Thomas is not saying that operating and cooperating grace are necessarily
numerically distinct; it is merely a division based on effects. Hence he says of habitual grace that
it is operating grace insofar as it heals the soul, but cooperating grace insofar as it is the principle
of meritorious actions. But efficacious and merely sufficient grace must be not only extrinsically
but also intrinsically distinguished. For sufficient grace can be given without the effect being
produced, so that in its character it cannot include the motion of the will. The existence of an
inefficacious grace is shown numerous times in Scripture. St. Stephen said to the Jews, “With a
stiff neck, and being uncircumcised in your hearts and ears, you always resist the Holy Ghost.”58
But the consent, this cooperation, we have already said, is a grace from God and does not arise
from man as something added to the sufficient grace God gives us, but as an action that is truly
God's and man's. That such cooperation is from God can be seen in Scripture. St. Paul states,
“For God is He Who works in you both to will and to work according to His good will.”59 And it
is said in Proverbs, “Just as the divisions of the water, so the heart of a king in the hand of the
The other division St. Thomas makes is one of priority, though not in the temporal
order.61 He first explains that there are five effects of grace. This division starts with the healing
of the soul, that is with the justification that comes with habitual grace, and ends with the gift of
glory. Here we can see that St. Thomas sees in grace truly the beginning, the germ, of eternal life.
This is important to note for later on, because we will need to see grace in its order to glory to
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understand sufficient grace. St. Thomas states that grace heals the soul, causes it to will the good,
then to efficaciously act for the good, to persevere in the good and finally to attain glory. The one
and same grace is called both prevenient insofar as it is seen in its reference to a further effect,
and subsequent insofar as it is seen as following a previous effect. Hence, the first effect of
healing the soul is considered prevenient to the second, to which it is ordered, while the second is
seen as subsequent in respect to the first. What is important here to note, for our purposes, is that
by styling the same effect as both prevenient and subsequent, one is setting it in its proper and
inherent order to the other effects of grace. It is not as if God heals the soul in such a way that the
healing is not ordered towards willing the good and ultimately attaining glory, nor is glory
bestowed unless first the soul be healed and will the good.
It is important to note that sufficient grace is ordered towards the action that happens with
efficacious grace. It can be crudely compared to sharpening a pencil; one must sharpen the pencil
to write with it. Yet having sharpened it, one need not write with it; still it was sharpened in order
to be used in writing. The fact that the writing need not take place does not mean that the
sharpening was not ordered to writing, it just means that it is a conditio sine qua non, a condition
without which the writing could not happen, but it is not the writing itself; it creates the
disposition necessary for action. Further, since sufficient grace in itself is prevenient grace with
respect to efficacious grace, then it is never given except in anticipation of efficacious grace; the
having of which actually secures the salutary act of the will. The only defect in this causing one
to remain with only sufficient grace must be the resistance of the man, since God would not
It may be noted that these terms and concepts were only sharply defined in reaction to the
Calvinists and Jansenists who both denied a merely sufficient grace, holding that any grace
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which was sufficient was infallibly efficacious, and that any grace that was efficacious could not
be resisted. Blaise Pascal formulates the principal objection in his Provincial Letters:
“But tell me, Father, is this grace given to all men sufficient?” “Yes,” he said. “And yet it is
of no effect without efficacious grace?” “That is true,” he said. “That means,” I said, “that all
have enough grace, and all do not have enough; that this grace suffices, although it does not
suffice; that it is sufficient in name and insufficient in fact.”62
sufficient grace were adequate for an action, then it seems one would not need a further grace. If
we were to dismiss the name as badly used, and say that St. Augustine's division still holds, we
still have a problem. Let the pencil be sharpened. If there were no intention to go ahead and use
that pencil, as true as it may be that sharpening it is necessary to write with it, the sharpening
could not be said to be part of a will to write. Likewise, if sufficient grace were given without
any intention to bestow efficacious grace then how could it be part of God's will to save all men?
We must first get down what is meant by sufficient and why that term is used. The word
is derived from sufficio which is a compound of sub and facio. Literally it means, “to make
under.” According to Lewis and Short one of its first meanings is to lay a foundation. In this way
we can speak of a grace being sufficient which merely lays a “foundation” for further grace. We
can make further distinctions within sufficient grace that might aid us here. John of St. Thomas
divides sufficient helps into two categories.63 The first he calls intergra et totalis and the other
partialis et inædequata. The former is said to be simply sufficient and is present when all that is
prerequisite for action is present. The example given is that of the knowing power. That power is
sufficient simply when there is the potency, form and light, since those three things are necessary
to have an act of knowledge. But any one of them is said to be a sufficient help in its own genus,
but inadequately. Hence, one says there is sufficient light to take a picture, though there is not
62 The Provincial Letters, Blaise Pascal. Letter II. Translation for Penguin Books. ©1967
63 Cursus Theologicus, In Iam-Iæ, Tractum de Gratia. Disp. XXIV, art. I. para. 1034. Collectio Lavallensis
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sufficient film to do so. It is important to note that John of St. Thomas is not speaking merely of
sufficient grace here in the sense of only interior grace, but help in general. Hence, he states that
for a supernatural act there is required “the principle which is a habit or in the manner of a habit,
then a sufficient proposition of the object [of action], then the law, whether precept or counsel or
suasion, then some affection which is like a striking or excitation of the will.” Some of these
things he states are moral, such as the law, others are physical, such as the habit or inspiration.
Again, some are extrinsic, like man preaching and some are intrinsic such as the action of God.
Hence, the preaching of the Gospel and the missionary activity of the Church form a partial
sufficiency for salvation by themselves. One can see that sufficiency does not always mean
everything that is necessary for an action, but can refer to things of a certain kind and that we
speak of them as sufficient for a certain action, and in that way ordered to that action, even when
the other conditions are lacking that are necessary. In this way, a man can truly participate in the
order God has established to salvation, and yet not have true sufficiency to attain the end of
glory, because, while he might share in some sufficient help, he can impede himself with regards
to another. Hence a man might learn the Gospel and even have faith, but disorders himself from
We can also note that it is not necessary that God, in fact, grant to all grace sufficient to
act. But it is necessary that He be prepared to give all grace, since all are ordered to salvation and
grace is necessary for that end, just as it is necessary that He give efficacious grace to one who
does not resist sufficient grace, and glory to one who dies in grace; not because He owes it,
strictly, but because He has pledged it in Christ who died for all. Answering why it is not the case
that man is free from fault for not converting, even though that needs grace, St. Thomas answers:
Although someone through the motion of his free choice is neither able to merit nor call
upon divine grace, still he is able to impede himself lest he should receive it...And since this
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is in the power of free choice, to impede or not impede the reception of divine grace, it is not
unjustly imputed to him as fault who presents an impediment to the reception of grace. For
God, as much as He is in Himself, is prepared to give grace to all, for he wills all men to be
saved... but those only are deprived of grace who present in themselves an impediment to
grace.64
Hence, it is not that God makes it absolutely impossible for man to do salutary actions. If a man
had not set up impediments, then God would have granted him grace. Hence a man with actual
grace, who does not receive habitual grace, lacks habitual grace because he resisted actual grace.
Again, the man that does not even receive actual grace lacks it, not because God would never
have given it, but because he has already resisted God in the natural order, such as through an act
of positive infidelity, e.g. false worship. While God could give graces even then to turn him back
to Him, and might often give such graces, yet the natural helps and powers of man were
sufficient not to sin in the first place. Grace is necessary to perform acts of faith, hope and
charity, but no grace is necessary to avoid murder, idolatry or theft. It can be added that even
though man without grace cannot make an act of faith, for example, yet he can still be culpable
for failing to do so, because he placed an impediment to receiving the means to faith. Man is
responsible for not doing actions that he is unable to do when the fact that he cannot do them is
his own fault. It is true, of course, that God could have upheld a will in the good, rather than
permitting it to resist. Yet it is equally true that God need not permit any sin. That there could be
free creatures without God permitting any sin is certainly true, but sin exists and it must then
exist for a higher good and the same answer must suffice for why God permits some to offer
resistance.
Synthesis of an Answer
St. Thomas stated that the effect of the will to save all men was the very order of nature
and the things impelling to that end. We have seen that the Church is ordered to work for the
64 Summa Contra Gentiles lib. 3 cap. 159
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salvation of all, that God is prepared to give all grace and that the sufficient graces He does give
many men are ordered to efficacious grace. We can then state that God's will to save all men
consists in this, that they are ordered to eternal glory as an end and that, consequently, the
sufficient means to attain that end are available to all, and actually dispose to that end when not
impeded. Hence, external preaching, the witness of the Church, the law, both natural and Divine
positive law, serve to prepare men for the reception of grace. A priest does not preach against sin,
except so as to lead people to quit that sin. Barring any positive infidelity that would preclude it,
God grants sufficient grace to adults so that they may, in fact, act on the Gospel, convert, have
faith, seek baptism. They are thus given the possibility of attaining salvation. This sufficient
grace, being prevenient to efficacious grace, is ordered to the act for which it gives the ability.
Barring resistance, God gives efficacious grace by which man actually does those things
necessary to attain sanctifying grace and remain in it. God does not in fact predestine all men, for
He permits some to fall from that order He established; but that order is truly there for them, and
This answer may seem satisfactory for many cases, where we are speaking of men who
may freely reject God's grace, but two instances seem to be unanswered. The first is the case of
unevangelised peoples. The second is the case of those who die before the age of reason, but
without baptism. In the first case, there was no hearing of the Gospel to prepare them for grace,
no sacraments of the Church or availability of the Church to provide the sacraments. How can
the order be sufficient for them? In the latter case, how can an infant have been ordered to
salvation, when he does not even exist in the realm of action wherein we speak of sufficient and
efficacious grace. His salvation is passive, through baptism, and there can be no impediment or
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resistance on his part that explains the failure for him to attain his end of eternal glory.
The first case was treated earlier. It was said then that the Church was still ordered to their
salvation, even though geographically, or otherwise, impeded from reaching them. The
impediment does not exist in the men, it is true, but in the exterior course of things. The example
of a seed failing to grow to maturity seems unsatisfactory, insofar as the eternal salvation of a
man seems such a higher good as so not to allow such external impediments sufficient reason for
being. We must remember what God told Isaiah, “For my thoughts are not your thoughts: nor
your ways my ways, saith the Lord.”65 It must be affirmed that His Providence is for a greater
purpose; it is true that the salvation of a human soul is of great value and that God's glory is the
glorification of His creatures, but if He truly allows the Church to be impeded from reaching
certain men it must be for a greater good. It is sufficient, since it is all that we can say with what
we know, that God is prepared to give them all grace, and as master of history, He makes the
The second example is thornier, even if the answer is in large part the same. We know
that to die in original sin only means to descend directly into hell.67 We know that any way in
which an infant can be saved from original sin apart from water baptism is unknown to
revelation,68 and therefore would be outside the order God established. This follows, in part,
65 Isaias 55:8
66 If God did save a man in an unevangelised area, it would be outside the normal order, but still through the
Church. It might be possible for some to be saved outside the visible Church, but not apart from her.
67 Concilium Florentinum, Sessio 6- Illorum autem animas, qui in actuali mortali peccato vel solo originali
decedunt, mox in infernum descendere, penis tamen disparibus puniendas. [The souls of those who depart in
actual mortal sin or original sin alone, immediately descend into hell, nevertheless to be punished by disparate
penalties.]
68 Cap. 4 et Can. V sessio VI Decretum de iustificatione, Concilium Tridentinum. Also, Bulla unionis Coptorum,
Sessio XI Concilium Florentinum.: cum ipsis non possit alio remedio subvenire nisi per sacramentum
baptismi...admonet ...quamprimum commode fieri potest debere conferri. [Since it is not possible for them to
come under another remedy except baptism...{the Church} admonishes ...that as soon as it can conveniently be
done it {baptism} ought to be conferred].
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because of the impossibility of baptism of desire for infant.69 Even if God did save all infants,
then miracles would be multiplied exceedingly and the extraordinary would actually be quite
ordinary. It would also be extremely difficult to see how that would not point to a fundamental
flaw in the order established. Certainly this, even a sincere will to save all that includes infants
Nevertheless, there must be good reason that such infants are permitted to die. St.
It is a sign of the perfection of God's Providence, that He not only heals maladies that have
come into existence, but also provides that some should be never mixed up at all in the things
which He has forbidden; it is reasonable, that is, to expect that He Who knows the future
equally with the past should check the advance of an infant to complete maturity, in order
that the evil may not be developed which His foreknowledge has detected in his future life,
and in order that a lifetime granted to one whose evil dispositions will be lifelong may not
become the actual material for his vice.70
Here it is suggested that God's order, which could have excluded any such premature deaths, is a
function of His mercy, since they would at least obtain natural happiness. There might be a
myriad of other reasons; it is not claimed here that this is the sole reason for permitting such
deaths. The fact is that the order God established includes this, that some die before attaining
reason. If we are to admit with Scripture that God “disposes all things sweetly”71 then we must
simply admit that the order of Providence is superior to our understanding of it. It remains that
such an unbaptised infant was ordered to salvation. In the case of the infant of Catholic parents,
the infant is clearly ordered to the parents and the parents in turn order the infant to God, though
the infant is impeded through death. In the case of parents who would not baptise the infant, then
there already existed an impediment in the order of things for the infant, since the normal order is
69 Pius XII stated: An act of love is sufficient for the adult to obtain sanctifying grace and to supply the lack of
baptism; to the still unborn or newly born this way is not open. Address to Midwives (Acta Apostolicæ Sedis,
XLIII, 84). cf. the Bulla of Sixtus V, Effrænatam. (29 October 1588)
70 De infantibus qui præmature abripiuntur.
71 Wisdom 8:1
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that an infant be baptised and raised in the faith by his parents. Yet the order to salvation still
exists for such an infant, because the parents themselves are still ordered to the Church and the
Church to them. Further, the Church would baptise such an infant, in danger of death, even
against the wishes of the parents;72 the Church does not exclude such from those whom she
seeks. It is a sad fact that so early on such life is lost, but the order to salvation still existed for
the infant.73
The last objection is this: that God could have not only arranged His Providence such that
all infants should survive, and all be reached by the Gospel, but He could have predestined all to
heaven and not permitted anyone to fall away from the order to eternal glory. It might well be
clear that by permitting some to fall, God does not cause them to sin, but it is clear that He need
not permit them to fall. It can only be answered thus, that just as it pertains to a part of
some to fall; for it pertains to Providence not only to will the good but also to permit defects. We
can say that God predestines some and reprobates others so that His mercy and justice might
both shine forth, but we could never answer why this man and not that one. God does not will the
damnation for itself, for if He did that would be contrary to His will to save all. But as St.
Thomas explains, He wills the punishment of the sinner under the account of justice, not
damnation74 and He permits some to fall from the order He has established so that His justice
might be shown in that order. This is called reprobation, and as St. Thomas explains it is the
counterpart to predestination within Providence, for it is not only prescience that some should
fall from their end, but it includes the permission for them to sin and the punishment for those
72 Can. 868 § 2 Infans parentum catholicorum, immo et non catholicorum, in periculo mortis licite baptizatur, etiam
invitis parentibus. Codex Iuris Canonici. [An infant of Catholic parents, nay also of non Catholics, in danger of
death is licitly baptised, even if the parents are unwilling]
73 God could save this or that infant apart from baptismal graces, but that is not the subject here.
74 S. Th. Ia-IIæ q. 19 art. 10 ad 2
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sins. If we are to see that reprobation does not mean that God's antecedent will to save all men
does not apply, we need to remind ourselves what is included in the will to save all men. That
will does not include eternal life itself, nor even efficacious graces, it includes an order to such
graces and glory. The reprobate are not willed the actual goods of glory or predestinating graces,
but they nevertheless are ordered to them and are given gifts that are thus ordered. If there were
an absolute impossibility of grace or glory for them, then perhaps the reality of reprobation
would negate the divine will to save all men, but the impossibility of the reprobate securing
grace is not absolute, but conditioned. Man's free choice remains, he was not determined to sin
because he is reprobate, but he freely chooses to labour under this or that sin.75
Conclusion
God wills all men to be saved. The will to save all men does not include bestowing
efficacious grace on all, let alone the good of eternal life itself. It includes only this, that all men
are ordered to eternal glory as their proper end, and that they share in an order in this world
which conduces to that end. Further, the order established by God includes a true sufficiency, in
His Church, for the salvation of all and the gifts that God gives within this order truly do order
those who receive them to salvation, even though they, in fact, fall away from that end. We can,
therefore, truly affirm the reality of God's will to save all men, and still uphold the truth of
predestination, that God wills the actual good of eternal life to an elect.
75 S. Th. Ia q. 23 art. 3 ad 3
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Bibliography
3. Blaise Pascal, The Provincial Letters. Trans. A.J. Krailsheimer. Baltimore, Maryland.
Penguin Books Inc. 1967
5. Norman P. Tanner, S.J, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils. London, England & Washington D.C.
Sheed & Ward, and Georgetown University Press, 1990
7. Henry Denzinger, revised Karl Rahner, S.J, The Sources of Catholic Dogma. Trans. Roy J. Deferrari.
Fitzwilliam, New Hampshire: Loreto Publications. 2004.
8. Passages from SS. John Chrysostom and Gregory of Nyssa taken from http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/
They are taken from the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers edited by Schaff.
9. Passages of St. Thomas Aquinas, other than the Summa Theologiæ taken from
http://www.corpusthomisticum.org All are taken from critical editions of the Latin, and all translations are my
own. Besides the Summa the following works were used:
i. Quaestiones disputatæ De malo
ii. Super Sententias Petri Lombardi
iii. Summa Contra Gentiles
10. All passages of St. Augustine are translated by the author. They are taken from the Migne Patrologia
Latinorum, as found online at Google Books® The following works are used:
i. De Spiritu et littera
ii. De correptione et gratia
iii. De Gratia Christi
iv. De dono perseverantiæ
v. Contra Julianum
vi. Enchidirion de fide, spe et caritate
11. Ludwig Ott, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, Trans. James Canon Bastible. Rockford, Illinois.
Tan Books and Publishers. 1974
14. A few citations from popes (namely Pius XII and Sixtus V) were taken from http://www.papalencyclicals.net