Harvard Divinity School

Meaning and Reference in Maimonides' Negative Theology Author(s): Ehud Z. Benor Reviewed work(s): Source: The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 88, No. 3 (Jul., 1995), pp. 339-360 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Harvard Divinity School Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1510088 . Accessed: 20/03/2012 04:32
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Meaning Negative
Ehud Z. Benor
DartmouthCollege

and

Reference

in

Maimonides'

Theology

The theory of religious languageadvocatedby the twelfth-century phil losopherjurist Moses Maimonides(1135-1204) contains an apparent paradox.Maimonides' radical stance regardingthe absoluteunknowability of God leads him to an austeretheology of negation,which appearsto be incongruouswith his representation God as a moral agent or intellect. of Through analysisof the functionsof meaningandreferencein Maimonides' theory of language,as well as his explicit or implicit distinctionsbetween literal,metaphoric, symbolicuses of languagein theologicaldiscourse, and I argue that the purposeof the Maimonidean theology of negation is to establishthe referenceof the name "God,"therebymakingpossible a rationallydisciplined constructivist theology.This articleshowshow Maimonides sought to include a certain type of religious anthropomorphism a in theology that upholdsthe wholly other natureof God.l Maimonidespresents an extreme version of negative theology, going beyondboth his predecessor Alfarabiand his successorThomasAquinasin denyingeven a relationof analogybetween attributes that apply to human
lThephrase"whollyother"is borrowed fromRudolfOtto'sdescription the mysterious of object of the numinousexperiencein TheIdea of the Holy (trans.JohnW. Harvey;Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress, 1926). HTR 88:3 (1995) 339-60

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beings or the world and attributes that apply to God.2Maimonidesidentifies termsthat are "completely equivocal"3; they have nothingin common; they share only a name. Although Maimonidesadmits that scriptureapplies amphibolousand metaphorical terms to God, he does not allow them to be used in philosophical discussion.Maimonidesclaims that the word "existence"applies purely equivocallyto God and humanbeings:
Similarlythe terms "knowledge," "power,""will," and "life," as applied to Him, may He be exalted, and to all those possessing knowledge, power,will and life, are purelyequivocal,so that their meaning when they are predicatedof Him is in no way like their meaningin other application.Do not deem that they are used amphibolously. For when terms are used amphibolously they are predicated two things of betweenwhichthereis a likenessin respectof some notion.4

Maimonidesexplains repeatedlythat we do not understand what our familiarconceptsmeanwhen they are used as descriptions God. Even as of he labors in the lexicographical chaptersof the first part of the Guide to sort out the differentpossible meaningsof such Hebrewtermsas "high" (on), "rock" (X5:), "standing" (;l:bng), to explaintheirfigurativeuse in and
2See Alfarabi (Abu Na$r al-Farabi; ca. 870-950), Opinions of the Inhabitants of the Virtuous City 1.12; 2.5; translated in Al-Farabi on the Perfect State (trans. Richard Walzer; Oxford: Clarendon, 1985) 83, 99. In his introduction to the translation Walzer explains that "Al-Farabi does not share the uncompromising negative theology of the main trend of neoPlatonic teaching, that is, he does not describe God exclusively by what He is not" (p. 12). Alfarabi maintains (Commentaryon Aristotle 's "De Interpretatione " [trans. F. W. Zimmermann; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981] 120) that "One should, therefore, not say that God most high can be described negatively, but that he can be described by indefinite nouns. In many cases, their precise function is to signify a positive quality which is affirmed in such a way as to distinguish its subject totally from the things of which the corresponding definite noun is true, in which case they do not signify a privation." Although the relation between negation and positive attribution in the theology of Avicenna (Ibn-Sina; 979-1037) defies simple characterization, the mystical orientation of Avicennean negative theology suggests interpreting positive attributes as divine paradigms of absolute perfections. For discussion, see Ian Richard Netton, Allah Transcendent (London: Routledge, 1989) 153-62. Thomas Aquinas argues against the negative interpretation of attributes of perfection like goodness and wisdom and claims that they must be predicated analogically of God and of other beings: "the names said of God and creatures are predicated neither univocally nor equivocally but analogically, that is, according to an order or reference to something one" (Summa Contra Gentiles 1.34; ET On the Truth of the Catholic Faith [trans. Anton C. Pegis; New York: Doubleday, 1955] 147). 3See Moses Maimonides Milot ha-Higayon (Treatise on Logic) (ed. and trans. Israel Efros) PAAJR8[1938]59. 4Moses Maimonides The Guide of the Perplexed 1.56 (trans. Shlomo Pines; 2 vols.; Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1963). For a recent discussion, see ArthurHyman, "Maimonides on Religious Language," in Joel L. Kraemer, ed., Perspectives on Maimonides (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) 175-91.

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qualifications scripture,Maimonideswarns, "All the numerousattributive indicatingany exaltationof Him and of His greatworth,power,perfection, bounty, and various other things, refer to one and the same notion. That notion is His essence and nothing outside His essence.''SSince God's essence is deemed unknowable,the meanings of such terms must also be unknowable. theological austerityis informedby two majorprinciples: Maimonides' thesis that as a necessarybeing God is wholly otherfrom the metaphysical all dependentexistence and the religious thesis that whoever has a mistakennotion of God worshipsa nonexistentbeing a figmentof his or her The later thesis leads to an unforgivingrejectionof religious imagination. subjectivism:
As for someone who thinks and frequentlymentions God, without knowledge,following a mere imaginingor following a belief adopted of becauseof his relianceon the authority somebodyelse, he. . . does not in truerealitymentionor thinkaboutGod. For that thing which is and in his imagination which he mentionsin his speechdoes not correspondto any being at all andhas merelybeen inventedby his imaginathe tion, as we have explainedin our discourseconcerning attributes.6

seems to thinkthat it is possible to purifyour idea of God and Maimonides escape erroneousnotions by negating,in thoughtand speech, what God is not. His theory of attributeshas clear implicationsfor religious devotion and the languageof prayer:
become manifestto you that in every case in which It has accordingly that the demonstration a certainthing shouldbe negatedwith reference to Him becomes clear to you, you become more perfect, and that in every case in which you affirm of Him an additionalthing, you become one who likens Him to other things and you get furtheraway fromthe knowledgeof His truereality.7

Given these concerns, it is surprisingthat Maimonidespermits both attributesof action, which identify God as an agent withoutdescribingwhat God is, and attributesof charactersuch as "merciful,""gracious,"and which invoke an image of God as a moralpersonworthy "long-suffering," even directsthe Whatis more, in variousplaces Maimonides of imitation.8
Guide 1.20; ET 47. sMaimonides 6Ibid.,3.51; ET 620. 7Ibid.,1.59; ET 139. that clarification "themeaninghereis not thatHe possesses moralqualities, 8Maimonides' but that He performsactionsthat in us proceedfrommoralqualities"(Guide, 1.54; ET 124) of does not changethe fact thatGod is describedboth with attributes action andof character not of of thatareultimatelyreducibleto attributes action.Attributes character, action,invoke the idea of God as a moralperson.

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readerto understand God'sunity and incoxporeality thinkingof God as by an intellect.9 Given his metaphysical religiousprinciplesandrepeatedrecommenand dationof silence aboutGod,l it seems thatMaimonides eithercontradicted himself in allowing positive speech about God or failed to derive the semantic implicationsof his epistemologicalthesis, which maintainsthat, althoughit is possible to know that God is, we can only know what God is not.ll In orderto confrontthis paradox,I propose an interpretation of Maimonides' theology of negationthat liberatesreligiousthoughtfrom the austeredisciplineof tryingto remainas faithfulas possible to what a true descriptionof God might be. In this article, therefore,I wish to explain why Maimonides may have thoughtthe semanticthesis that "we can meaningfully say only what God is not" does not follow from the epistemic thesis that "we can only know what God is not," and why he thoughtthat in some circumstances positive descriptions God need not be idolatrous of projectionsof the imagination. intendto show that Maimonides' I uncompromisingdoctrine of absolute homonymybetween terms predicatedof absoluteor divine being andthese sametermswhen predicated mundane of or humanbeing led him to a daringconceptionof religious languageas constructing symbolicrepresentation idea of God. I call this represena or tation "symbolic"to contrastit to literal and metaphoricrepresentations. While descriptionsare literally or metaphorically true if the object they describe shares most characteristics denotedby the descriptionor at least one outstanding relevantcharacteristic, descriptions symbolicwhenthey are claim no shared characteristic. Symbolic ideas thus stand for the object withouttruly representing God could be describedliterally as a moral it. agent if God were to deliberate,decide, and be moved to act. God could be describedmetaphorically a moralagent if, for instance,God were to as share with humansa quality of mercy. Maimonidesemphaticallydenies both types of description.He justifies moral descriptionsas invoking a notion of perfectionthat God and humanbeings do not share. Symbolic descriptions this type are meantto be self-transcending point beyond of and the qualities they represent.
9See, for example, ibid., 1.1, 68; ET 22-23, 163. 10See, for example, ibid., 1.50; ET 112: "But men ought rather to belong to the category of those who represent the truth [God] to themselves and apprehend it, even if they do not utter it, as the virtuous are commanded to do." See also 1.59; ET 140: "Accordingly, silence and limiting oneself to the apprehensions of the intellects are more appropriate," and 2.5; ET 260 (quoted below). llI follow here Joseph A. Buijs's instructive distinction between three theses of negative theology ("The Negative Theology of Maimonides and Aquinas," Review of Metaphysics [1988] 723-38): a metaphysical thesis about the nature of God, an epistemological thesis about what knowledge of God is possible, and a semantic thesis concerning the language we should use to speak about God.

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This use of the term "symbolic"to designatethe way descriptionsthat perfectionmust termsstandfor God'sunknown use absolutelyhomonymous from the very differentsense in which the term is somebe distinguished the times used in the study of religion. In this regard,Julius Guttmann, of greathistorianof Jewishphilosophy,is exemplaryin his explanation the positive statementsabout God. Consistentwith his status of Maimonides' of Neoplatonic interpretation Maimonides'negative theology, Guttmann claimed that ethical attributes"expressthe fact that hidden within the diof vine essence there [necessarily]lie the presupposition such [moral]acnotion of symbolism Guttmann's tion; their value is merely symbolic.''l2 stressescontinuitybetweendomainsof meaningthattend towarda relation must of analogy. In order for such symbolismto be possible, Guttmann hold that God really does act morallywith regardto humanbeings, rather makes Neo-Kantianism to thanmerelyappearing act in this way. Guttmann's him predisposedtowardsuch a claim, whereasMaimonidesis more cauto approach the languageof being, or God-talk,makes tious.l3Maimonides' and background a potentiallyvaluableresourcefor his work an important The symbolicfunctionof God-talkis imporconstructivism. a postmodern philosopherswho realize that no conceptionof God tant for accomplished dictum that "Torahspeaks the is possible, accordingto the Maimonidean languageof humanbeings.''l4Intellectuallovers of God are thereforenot religious language. beyond the realm of human-bound theology of negation foundationof Maimonides' Since the metaphysical it has been studiedat length,lsI will only summarize briefly as background theoryof referenceandits relationto his for my discussionof Maimonides' of negation. Philosophicalargumentsto prove the existence of theology God, which are based on the natureof the world as we know it, are likely to influencethe way we think about God. This seems to be the case with beyond demonstrates Maimonides,who held that a cosmologicalargument existent.l6Fromthe meaning possible doubtthat God exists as a necessary
Philosophyof Judaism(trans.David W. Silverman;Northvale,fJ: l2JuliusGuttmann, Aronson,1988) 165. than view to l3Itis instructive notehowmuchcloserGuttmann's is to Thomas's to Maimonides'. Thomascommentson Exod 33:18, "I will makeall my goodnesspass beforethee,"that "the Contra that Lordgave Moses to understand the fullness of all goodnesswas in Him"(Summa explainsthatthe verse refersto "thedisplayto Gentiles 1.28.9; ET 137), while Maimonides him of all existing things"(Guide 1.54; ET 124). 4MaimonidesGuide 1.59. 15For systematicdiscussion of the medieval debate, see David B. Burrell,Knowingthe God (NotreDame,IN: Universityof Notre Dame Press, 1986) esp. chaps. 2-4. Unknowable "A Feldman, Scholastic and on See also Hyman,"Maimonides ReligiousLanguage"; Seymour JJS Doctrineof Divine Attributes," 19 (1968) 23-39 (reof Misinterpretation Maimonides' A printedin JosephA. Buijs, ed., Maimonides: Collectionof CriticalEssays [NotreDame,IN: Universityof Notre Dame Press, 1988] 267-83). Guide,2.1; ET 247-49. l6Maimonides

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simple concludesthatGod is absolutely existence" Maimonides of "necessary This in turn leads to the furtherconclusionthat "we and incomparable.l7 His the are only able to apprehend fact that He is and cannot apprehend thesis is radicaland its implicationsare This incomparability quiddity.''l8 as It far-reaching. implies that God cannotbe represented infinitelygreater wholly and more perfectthan we but only as absolutelyincommensurable, other.God'swholly othernatureas necessarybeing defines the contextfor negative theology to maintainthat since we have no knowledgeof what God is, we only know what God is not. What kind of knowledgeis this, and what does it imply about the languagewe should use to speak about God? What do we know about God when we only know what God is not? Either we apprehend,vaguely and momentarily,somethingof God that eludes conception in a way that does not amount to knowledge, or we nothing.The first option may lead to rationalistmysticismand apprehend preferencefor silence as the most adequateway to relate to God.l9 The second may lead to devout agnosticismintent on negatingpersistentilluto sions aboutwhat God is.20It is important examinethese optionsbriefly alternative. of priorto presentation the Maimonidean The mystical option relies on elementsof Neoplatonicmetaphysicsand Just as the epistemologythat penetratedmedieval Aristotelianthought.21
7Ibid., 1.57; ET 132-33; 2.1; ET 243-52. Ibid., 1.58; ET 135. l9Julius Guttmann and Alexander Altmann may be cited in support of a Plotinean interpretation of Maimonides' way of negation. Guttmann (Philosophyof Judaism,164) stressed the Neoplatonic context of Maimonides' theory of divine attributes and argued that theological negation is metaphysically oriented and involves much more than mere logical considerations. Guttmann ("Maimonides' Doctrine of God" in idem, Religion and Knowledge[Jerusalem: Magnes, 1955] 107-11 [Hebrew]) held that Maimonidean theological negation is intended to indicate the presence in God's hidden essence of something parallel to that which is known to us. Alexander Altmann ("Maimonides on the Intellect and the Scope of Metaphysics," in idem,

Von der mittelalterlichen zur modernen Aufklarung: Studien zur judischen Geistesgeschichte [Tubingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1987] 121-22) developed this interpretation further
when he drew attention to the similarity between Maimonides' advocacy of silence and that of Plotinus. Charles H. Manekin ("Belief, Certainty and Divine Attributes in the Guide," Studies 1 [1990] 117-42) suggests a nonmystical interpretation of this option Maimonidean claiming that Maimonides' doctrine of attributes suggests the possibility of possessing certain beliefs about God through the inditect device of "approaching an apprehension" by understanding what possible perfections there are and gaining demonstrative knowledge that they cannot apply to God. 20This is Isaac Franck's interpretation of negative theology ("Maimonides and Aquinas on Man's Knowledge of God: A Twentieth Century Perspective," Review of Metaphysics38 [1985] 591-615). 2lNeoplatonic ideas found their way into Arabic philosophy throughthe apocryphal Theologia Aristotelis, which summarizes books four through six of Plotinus' Enneads, and Liber de Causis,a synopsis of Proclus's Elementsof Theology,which was also attributed to Aristotle. For discussion of these books and their influence see Majid Fakhry, Historyof Islamic Phi-

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universe emanatesfrom the ineffable One in a process of differentiation and particularization increasinglyobscuresits sublimesourceand true that being, the human intellect approachesthe intellectualoverflow that pervades reality by overcomingveils of perceptionand conception,negating all that obscuresits vision until it can gaze, if only for a fleeting moment, upon absolutebeing. Maimonidesmay have had this type of illumination in mind when he likenedintellectualapprehension the flamingswordof to Gen 3:24, explainingthat "sometimestruth flashes out to us so that we think it is day, and then matterand habitin their variousforms conceal it so that we find ourselvesagain in an obscurenight, almost as we were at first."22 The mode of religious expressionthat seems most fitting for this type of apprehension silence, which limits the domainof linguistic aris ticulationto instructionfor oneself or for others:
For he who praises throughspeech only makes known what he has represented himself. Now this very representation the truepraise, to is whereaswords concerningit are meantto instructsomeoneelse or to make it clear concerningoneself that one has had the apprehension in question.Thus it says, "Commune with your heartupon your bed, and be still, Selah"(Ps 4:5).23

These suggestive statementsneed not necessarilymanifestthe attitudeof intellectual mysticism. The image of fleeting illuminationapplies to all difficultintellectualchallenges,not only to apprehension ineffabletruths. of Similarly, preferencefor silence need not have a mystical basis; it may simply reinforce awareness of the purely intellectual relation between worshipers God, a relationthat renderslinguisticarticulation and superfluous or misleading.It was not Maimonides' intention,however, to recommendmysticaldetachment from knowledgeof the world.24 the contrary, On in affirming absolutetranscendence God, Maimonides the of presentsknowledge of the world and contemplationof its teleological structureas the supremehuman achievement.25 Maimonidesreturnsto this theme in the most mystical chapterof the Guide:
Those who set theirthoughtto workafterhavingattained perfectionin the divine science, turnwholly towardGod, may He be cherishedand held sublime,renouncewhatis otherthanHe, and directall the acts of
losophy(2d ed., New York:Columbia UniversityPress, 1983) 19-31. See also AlfredL. Ivry, "Neoplatonic Currents Maimonides' in Thought," Kraemer, in Perspectiveson Maimonides, 115-40. 22Maimonides Guide 1. Introduction; 7. ET 23Maimonides Guide2.5; ET 260. 24This not to say that he did not recommend is detachment fromthe affairsof the world. 25SeeShlomoPines'scomparison betweenNeoplatonicandMaimonidean applications of negativetheology ("ThePhilosophicSources,"xcvi).

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their intellect toward an examinationof the beings with a view to drawingfrom them proof with regardto Him, so as to know His governanceof them in whateverway is possible.... This is the worship peculiarto those who have apprehended truerealities.26 the

Apprehensionof the "true realities"leads not to mystical absorptionin absolute being but to contemplationof the universe. It furtherleads to construction a moral idea of God as a perfect ruler, as can be seen in of the case of Moses and his proclamation the thirteenattributes.27 of These considerations also show that even if negative theology yields no special apprehension what God is, accordingto Maimonides,it does not follow of that all we ought to think or say about God is "whatGod is not." The emergingMaimonidean distinction betweenknowledgeandlanguage deserves closer and more detailed considerationthan is possible in the confines of this article;relationsbetween thinking,understanding, believing, knowing, and the use of languageare very complex. While we may sometimesbe temptedto believe that we think and understand more than we can express in words, it is at least as likely that we can think much more thanwe can know and can say even more thanwe can think.On the one hand, negativetheology can arguefor the inadequacy languageyet of allow the soul a superrational, mystical knowledgeof God. On the other hand, negative theology can claim that the soul is unable to have any knowledgeof God whatsoever and, accordingly, little or no concernfor has the inadequacy languageto expressthatwhich can neitherbe knownnor of thought. Negative theologians of the first and second persuasionwould have considerablydifferent approachesto religious language. Since, accordingto Maimonides,the semanticimplicationsof the way of negation
26Maimonides Guide 3.51; ET 620. 27Regarding attributes, Exod 34:6-7. It is important realize thatthe moralidea the see to of God cannotresult from metaphysical illuminationbut mustbe interpreted a construct as thatimposesa moralinterpretation nature. believe this is the only way to accountfor the on I ethical turnin Maimonides' presentation the life of intellectualperfection.This account of overcomes Shlomo Pines's argument("PhilosophicSources,"cxxii, and idem, "Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Maimonides, andKant,"Scripta Hierosolymitana 20 [1968] 27-28) that manyof God'sactions, includingearthquakes floods, and the qualitiesthey and may represent,do not conformto any recognizableconceptionof morality.A constructivist accountalso avoids Altmann'sresortto an un-Aristotelian notion of virtue to explain the Maimonidean froma theoretical anethicalconceptionof human shift to excellence(Alexander Altmann,"Maimonides's FourPerfections,"in idem, Essays in Jewish Intellectual History [Hanover: UniversityPressof New England,1981] 65-76). I discussthe issue at some length in my Worship of the Heart: A Study in Maimonides' Philosophy of Religion (New York: SUNY, forthcoming). argument the 'overflow of perfection" compelsprophets The that that to prophesyand philosophers teach, moves the solitaryMaimonidean to contemplative an to ethical imitatio dei, does not explainhow such an ideal is cognitively possible. For analysis of the final section of the Guide in which the ethical shift takes place, see Ralph Lerner, "Maimonides' Governance the Solitary"in Kraemer, of Perspectives on Maimonides, 33-46.

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requireneither mystical silence nor constantnegation, it is necessary to determinehow Maimonidesunderstood negative theology, what purposeit had for him, and why he thoughtit did not have austeresemanticimplications. I propose that Maimonidesfound in negative theology a method of uniquelyidentifyingthe groundof all being, and thus a methodof determining the referenceof the name '4God," withoutformingany conception of what God is.28The primarypurposeof negative theology is neitherto direct the mind towardsome notion of God nor to instructin the intelligible use of theological language,but to determinehow anythinghuman beings think or say, however erroneousor misguided,can be about God. Maimonidean negative theology is not an inquiryregardingwhat sort of theological thoughtsshould occupy one's mind or which theological language one might use to cultivate or express these thoughts.Accordingto my reconstruction, Maimonides'radical thesis of absolute divine incommensurability its epistemologicalimplicationsforced him to confront and the difficult philosophicalproblemof explaininghow thoughtsor words can be aboutGod if humanspossess neithera description an expenence nor of God. I believe he found the solution in negative theology. g

Representation God:Meaning Reference of and

To understand how Maimonidesthoughtnegative theology could direct the mind towardGod and solve the problemof how thoughtor speech can
28This proposalsuggeststhatMaimonides' religiousinterestsled him towarda theorythat modernphilosophyof languagerecognizesas an anti-Fregean view of the relationbetween meaningand reference.Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), who initiated the moderndistinction between the meaningof a term (what humanminds grasp when we understand and the it) relationof thattermto the objectit designates(its reference),held thatthe meaningof a term determinesits reference(ssOn Sense and Reference,"in Peter Geach and Max Black, eds. Translations from thePhilosophicalWritings GottlobFrege [Oxford: of Blackwell,1952l 5678). This is also a standard view of languagein medieval Arabicphilosophy,a view that Maimonidesgenerallytakes for granted.A dissentingmedievalview, which dissociatesreference from meaning, may be found in Ghazali'sargumentthat particularobjects can be identifiedonly by ostension (includingsuch indexical words as "this"and "that"), with no appealto meaningsapprehended the intellect.Ghazali's by argument quotedby Averroesin is Tahafutal-Tahafut(The Incoherenceof the Incoherence)(trans.Simon van den Bergh; 2 vols.; Oxford:OxfordUniversityPressandLondon: Luzac,1954) 1. 275-77. In claiIningthat the name"God" referto God withouta mediatingconcept,I believe Maimonides can moved towarda position similarto the anti-Fregean views of HilaryPutnamand Saul Kripke,who hold thatreferencecan be determined independently meaning.See HilaryPutnam, of "Meaning andReference,"Journalof Philosophy70 (1973) 699-711 and Saul A. Kripke,Naming andNecessity(Cambridge, MA:Harvard UniversityPress,1980). Onlyby movingawayfrom a representation theoryof referencecould Maimonides presentthe articulated name(YHWH) as indicativeof God'sessence (Maimonides Guide 1.61; ET 148). My commentshere are a partialresponseto Arthur Hyman's observation ('Maimonideson ReligiousLanguage," 190) that "Maimonides' theoryof how propernamessignify remainsto be workedout."

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be aboutGod, it is necessaryto examinehis notionof the relationsbetween words, thoughts,and objects. Accordingto the philosophicalconcept of languageacceptedby Maimonides,wordsrefer to objects by mediationof concepts.Threeelementsare involved;words,representations, conceptsor ideas in the mind; and objects, the essences of which are graspedby the intellect throughabstraction.29 Maimonides' basic notion of representation in the mind is similarto what modernphilosophyof languagecalls meaning. The technicalterm"representation"ta$awwur, in Arabic,suggesting somethingthatis "figured" was used in medievalphilosophyto denotean isolatedconceptin the mind.No truthvalue can be ascribedto the concept itself, but it can be affirmedor denied in relationto other concepts or in correspondence externalreality. In modernterminology,representation to is the idea an image, notion, or concept formed in our mind when we understand meaningof a word or a phrase. the Linguistic entities, such as words or phrases, are thought to refer to extralinguisticentities throughthe mediationof mental entities, such as notionsor propositions thatcorrespond essences of thingsor to relations to betweenessences. In this view of language,referenceis establishedthrough meaning. Consequently,Maimonidesheld that no theological doctrine a person professes can be about God. This view motivatesMaimonides' religious intellectualism implyingthat, withoutknowledge,piety and deby votion amountto worship of a figment of one's imagination.Yet, God's wholly othernatureand unknowability suggestthatthe required knowledge is necessarilybeyond our reach. I believe it is significantthat Maimonides' famous statementthat belief is not a matterof utterance proclamation, ratherof representation or but in the mind,opens his expositionof negativetheology.30 assertsthatbelief He requiresbothrepresentation affirmation whatis represented true. and that is Once the referenceof God is establishednegatively,as denotinga being so differentfromthe universethatthe being does not even partake its mode in of existence and hence is inconceivableto our mind, Maimonidesthinks thatthe necessitythatGod exists immediately follows. This is shownin his argument that "thereis an existent that is necessaryof existence in respect to its own essence.''3lIt is noteworthythat of his four speculativeproofs for the existence of God, Maimonidessingles out this third proof as "a demonstration concerningwhich there can be no doubt,no refutation,and no dispute."32 Maimonides' position would then be that with this determination of the referenceof the word "God"throughnegation comes not
29The distinction can be traced back to Aristotle's De Interpretatione 16a.3-9. 30Maimonides Guide 1.50. 3lIbid., 2.1; ET 247-48. 32Ibid., 2.1; ET 248.

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only affirmationthat the referentof the word "God"is real, but also certainty.33 Maimonidesseeks to show that negative theology alone can yield the required representation God thatdoes not violateGod'sunknowabilty. of By analyzinghow it does so and what the representation amountsto, one can see that Maimonides' delineationof indirectidentificationof an entity througha process of negation moves towarda position that resembles a moderndistinctionbetween meaningand reference. Maimonides'solution is based on the existence and the uniquenessof God as establishedby the cosmologicalproof.34 The majorpremiseof the solutionis simple and straightforward: uniqueentity can be isolated and a identifiedindirectlyby negative descriptionsthat rule out all that it is not. AlthoughMaimonidesasserts that an entity can be definitively identified throughnegation and that the reference of the term denoting it can be determined, stops shortof claimingthatnegativeidentification he amounts to proper representation. Regardinga person who comes to acquire the concept of "a ship" by means of negations,he circumspectlyaffirms that this "individual nearly achieved,by meansof these negativeattributes, has the representation the ship as it is," and goes on to say that"thenegative of attributesmake you come nearer in a similar way to the cognition and apprehension God."3s of If one can only "nearlyachieve"representation an object like a ship, of the essence of which is directly accessible to intellectualabstraction and the relationof which to otherentitiesallows us to constructan approximate idea of what it must be like, it is reasonableto think that the indirect negative identificationof God will achieve even less of a representation. This seems to be what Maimonideshas in mind when he proclaimsthat
As everyoneis awarethat it is not possible, except throughnegation, to achieve an apprehension that which is in our powerto apprehend of [of God] and that,on the otherhandnegationdoes not give knowledge in any respectof the true realityof the thing with regardto which the particular matterin questionis negatedall men, those of the past and those of the future,affirmclearlythat God, may he be exalted,cannot
33Foranalysis of Maimonidess statement on beliefs see Charles H. Manekins "Beliefs Certaintys and Divine Attributes in the Guideof the Perplexed, Maimonidean Studies 1 (1990) 117-41. I believe that Manekinss conclusions regarding "aboutness are too conservative. 34SeeMaimonides Guide2. 1; ET 247-49 on "the third philosophic speculation.ssFor analysis of Maimonidess arguments for the existence of Gods see William Lane Craigs TheCosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz(London: Macmillans 1980) 131-57. 35MaimonidesGuide1.6;ET 143-44 (my emphases). It is interesting to compare Maimonidess struggles with representation through negation to Thomas Aquinass categorical statement that "through negationss when we have a proper knowledge of a things we know that it is distinct from other thingss yet what it is remains unknown (see SummaContraGentiles3.49.1; ET 127).

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be apprehended the intellects, and that none but He Himself can by apprehend what He is, and that apprehension Him consists in the of inabilityto attainthe ultimatetermin apprehending Him.36

How shouldone understand Maimonides' evasive conclusionaboutnegative representation? suggest that it is best understood I when rephrased in moderntermsas a claim thatnegativepredication identifiesthe entity God by determining referenceof the word"God" leaves the worddevoid the but of meaning.37 If, as I suggest, Maimonidesheld that the way of negationis sufficient and necessaryto determinethe referenceof God-talk,then it follows that religious languageneed not, and indeed shouldnot, employ positive predicates to directthe humanmindto God. A conclusionsuch as this may have helped Maimonidesto uphold his uncompromising doctrine of absolute homonymybetweentermspredicated absoluteor divine being and these of same termswhen predicated mundane humanbeing. By denyingany of or analogy between these domains of meaning, Maimonidesausterely preferredthe objectivityof a truereferentfor humanthoughtsaboutGod over the satisfactionof providingcontent to these thoughtsthat would render their referentan object of intellectualillusion. Like otherphilosophically inclinedreligiousthinkers, Maimonides advocated an allegoricalapproachto religious language and applied it to the interpretation scripture.38 him, allegoryis a methodof graftingphiloof For sophical doctrines to mythic images. It is essential for Maimonidean
36Maimonides Guide 1.59; ET 139 (my emphasis). 37This suggestionrequirescarefulexamination. is not a claim thatthe word "God" It has no linguistic interpretation that the word cannotbe given a dictionarydefinition.Rather, or the claim is thathoweverthe wordis defined,it is not accompanied a corresponding by idea in the mind.Maimonides' understanding the term"necessary of existent"is entirelynegative. The questionof whetherany specifiablethoughtcan correspond a negationof all thatGod to is not is interesting.I believe the only Maimonidean candidatefor such a thoughtis Moses, to whomMaimonides attributes totalgraspof the structure the universeandthe relation the of of its parts.This type of scientia intuitivacan perhaps a corresponding be mentalcounterpart of "all thatGod is not,"andas such may be availablefor denial in thought.To Maimonides' idealizedMoses,then,"what Godis not"hastherequired meaning. reading Maimonides' My of discussionof representation through negationis diametrically opposedto Hyman's conclusion ("Maimonides Religious Language,"189) that "fromall this it follows that we can say on somethingsignificantaboutGod'sessential attributes withoutassigningto them affirmative signification." 38Maimonides devoteda majorpartof his introduction the first partof the Guideto a to methodof allegoricalinterpretation scripture prophecy(Guide 1. Introduction; 8of and ET 14). Forfurther referencesto Maimonides' defenseof allegoryandits application interpreto tation of rabbinicliterature,see IsadoreTwersky,Introduction the Code of Maimonides to (New Haven, CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1980) 366 n. 31. For a history of the allegorical methodfromPhilo to the churchfathers,see HarryAustrynWolfson, ThePhilosophyof the ChurchFathers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1970) 24-72.

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that both sides of an allegoricalequationbe availableto the hermeneutics human mind: one available to the imagination,the other to the trained intellect. As I suggest, however, negative theology uniquelyidentifies abthe solute or necessarybeing, and determines referenceof the name "God" without forming any conceptionof what God is. Insofar as Maimonides adheresto a theology of negation and is committedto deny the human intellect any contentfor its idea of God, he must also be committedto the of view that no allegoricalrepresentation God is possible. distinction,in the act suggest a strictMaimonidean These considerations of thinkingaboutGod, betweenforminga notion of God in one's mind and directingone's mind to God. The first is an exercise in positive theology involving a quest for the most adequatedescriptionof God, however imprecise its terminology,recognizingthat some notion must be apprehended The by the mind if it is to be thinkingabout anything.39 second involves use of concepts and words to direct the mind towardGod withoutgenerating false beliefs about God. When Maimonidesmust choose between them, he prefers the second. The determiningfactor in his unqualified is preference his concernfor referenceto truereality.This concernis stated strikingclaim thatpiety and devotionare nothingat boldly in Maimonides' all if they lack an objective intentionalrelationto God.40I carefullynote idea of God to be an invenconsidersan inadequate here that Maimonides tion of the imaginationonly if it is constructedwithoutprior knowledge. This leaves room for an inadequateidea of God to be constructed,with anthroMaimonides' knowledge,not as a mere productof the imagination. pology identifies two cognitive faculties that are capableof positing general conceptionsof the world:an intellectthatconformsto objectivereality, and an imaginationthat projects a view of the world in the service of humandesires. In the latter Maimonidesfinds the root cause of idolatry,
recognizesthis necessityin his discussionof the languageof prayer(Guide 39Maimonides 1.59; ET 140-41), where he quotes a Talmudicstory about Rabbi Hanina'scriticism of a forpersonwho openedhis prayerwith an invocationmuchlonger thanthe terse traditional mula, "God the great, the valiant, the terrible"(b. Ber. 33b). Even though the traditional epithets are logically permissibleattributesof action, Maimonidesarguesthat their use in were it not for the need to formsome notionof God in prayerwouldnot have been permitted also writes:"Consider thathe has statedclearlythatif mind.ThusMaimonides a worshiper's or these attributes stated we were left only to our intellectswe shouldneverhave mentioned to anythingappertaining them.Yet the necessityto addressmen in suchtermsas wouldmake them achieve some representation in accordancewith the dictumof the Sages: The Torah speaks in the language of humanbeings obliged resort to predicatingof God their own beingsbut to God, perfectionswhenspeakingto them."Since prayeris not directedto human use of these attributesin the invocation is permittedonly because it is ritually required. of Rabbinicdiscussionof these predicatesshows that they are meantto designateattributes action (see b. Yoma69b: "Whywere they called GreatAssembly?"). Guide3.51; ET 620 (quotedabove); see also Guide 1.50. 40Maimonides

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becauseimaginative projectionis uninterested correspondence reality. in to An inadequate idea of God constructed afterknowledgehas been achieved can no longer be consideredimaginativein this sense because it already assumes an objective orientationof the mind.41 The objectivityof referenceto God is indispensible genuineMaimoniin dean worship,and it can only be establishedthrougha strict theology of negation that yields no conception of God. Yet, for all its austerity, Maimonides' theology of negationhas a profoundliberatingeffect. Rather than stultify religious discourse,it gives Maimonidesthe freedomto experimentwith a variety of theological models which make the Guide so rich and multitextured. Once a relationof referenceis firmly established, leaving no place for doubt concerningwhich entity one uses the word "God"to designate,severalpossibilitiesemerge.First, it becomespossible to worship the real God. Second, it becomes possible to have mistaken beliefs that are still beliefs aboutGod. Such mistakeswould not otherwise be possible because mistakenbeliefs form in the mind a representation of anotherentity and thus are not, after all, mistakes about the real God. Third,and most important this article, it also becomes possible, selffor consciously,to entertain positive notionsof God in orderto affect a proper attitudetoward God, while knowing these notions to be untrueof God. This is a dialectical awarenessthat keeps such inadequatenotions from determining referenceof the word "God."Even thoughthe second and the third possibilities are important to religion, not to philosophy, it is Maimonidean philosopherswho need them most, for only these philosophers reach the stage where their concept of God is truly empty.42 g Philosophical Symbolsof Perfection: Intellect Moral and Excellence I believe the austerityof Maimonides' formaltheology of negation,and the certaintywith which he thoughtit establisheda genuine referenceto God, allowed him not to leave religiousthoughtin a state of unconceiving silence. This allowed him to resort insteadto symbolic ideas of God that providecontentfor religiousthoughtas they point beyondthemselvesand deny their literal or metaphorictruth. We underestimatethe problem
41I discuss Maimonides' view of the cognitive role of the imagination in "Models for Understanding Evil in the Guide for the Perplexed," Iyyun34 (1985) [Hebrew]. 42This Socratic attitude toward true wisdom as overcoming the illusion of knowledge is interesting when compared to the nonphilosophical view of R. Solomon ben Isaac (Rashi, 1040-1105). In his commentary to page 49b of b. Yebamot, Rashi writes: "all the prophets looked through an unclear glass imagining they were seeing but were not and Moses looked through a clear glass and knew that he did not see God's face" (U':5p9ORn ltD^O: C'R':U t: 1'D9 1n^C RtZ MN'l UN'RDUU'Cbp9ORn tDn:: nsnl lsm stl nlsmb C'ClODl :nN'RD 'RU). I am indebted to Yeshayahu Leibovitz for this reference.

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Maimonidesfaced if we locate it in the inability of languageto express difficult metaphysical ideas. The problemsof the limits and imprecisionof languagecan be easily overcomeby silence when speech is unnecessary. Maimonides recommends kind of silence throughout writings.More this his profoundis the difficulty facing those who reach the stage where their concept of God is truly empty and realize that they must either rid their minds of all thoughtabout God or allow their minds to entertainthoughts they know are inadequate. Given the choice betweenrelatingto God throughcontentlessthoughtor throughsome inadequate notion,Maimonides prefersthe latter.He was not attracted the self-enclosedinfinity of an empty self-contemplating to mind that Aristotle describes in book twelve of his Metaphysics.43 Ultimately, Maimonidesdoes not seem to accept Aristotle'sidea as a notion of what God'sthoughtmight be like, nor can he accept it as a mode of intellectual worship. Being self-enclosed and empty, such thought cannot be about anythingand cannotrelateto God. If the intellectis to relateto God at all, it must permititself to use inadequate ideas to providenecessarycontent for thoughtabout God. The most important notions Maimonidesuses for this purposeare those of intellect and ethicalperfection.It is these notions alone that providecontentfor his ideals of intellectuallove of God and of imitatiodei. Both are employedas self-transcending conceptions;invoking a notion of perfectionyet made transparent their ever-apparent by inadequacy,they pointbeyondthemselvestowardthe inconceivable divinebeing. While the idea of the wholly other nature of God described by the negative concept of necessary existent dominatesMaimonides'religious epistemology,the idea of divine perfectioninformshis attitude towardGod. Centralhere is the idea of an unmovedmover, the supremeteleological cause, whose perfectionmotivatesimitationin all inferiorbeings and sets the universein motion. For Maimonides,God as an epitome of perfection "is the ultimateend of everything;and the end of the universeis similarly a seeking to be like unto His perfectionas far as is in its capacity.... In
43Speculating on the nature of divine thought, Aristotle concluded that "it must be itself that thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking" (TheCompleteWorks Aristotle[trans. W. D. Ross; Princeton: Princeton Univerof sity Press, 1984] 1074bl5-35). Maimonides seems to suggest this view when he argues for the identity of life and knowledge in God, saying that "everyone who apprehends his own essence possesses both life and knowledge by virtue of the same thing" (Guide 1.55; ET 122). He distinguishes there between his allusion to divine self-knowledge and the focus on God's knowledge of the world by theologians who believe in positive attributes. While Maimonides ascribes self-knowledge to God, he is unwilling to limit God's knowledge to a self-knowledge that is not also omniscient. He deviates from the Aristotelian model and presents divine thought as knowing the world (1.68) and later defends the doctrine of divine omniscience against philosophical criticism (3.19-21).

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virtue of this it is said of Him that He is the end of the ends."44 Accordingly, when Maimonidesadaptsto his purposesthe rabbinicprinciplethat "Torahspeaks in human language"to save the Bible from materialistic anthropomorphism, tries to show that scripture he attributes God actions to and qualities that people tend to consider instances of perfection.45 is It not, however, anthropomorphism such that Maimonidesseeks to overas come, but the crude materialistic notions that sophisticated believers find embarrassing. moralidea of God can perhapsbe defendedas more spiriA tually refinedthanthe notion of a mightyheavenlywarrior, not as less but anthropomorphic. suggest that Maimonidesdevoted majorparts of the I Guide to extend this theoryand create a religious languageappropriate to the needs of those who use philosophyto overcomethe materialistic limitations of the imagination. lntellect as Symbolfor God's Unity and lmmateriality:In apparent contradiction negative theology, Maimonidespresentsas generally acto cepteda philosophical doctrinethatGod is an intellectfor whomthe knowing subject, the known object, and the activity of knowing are one. Maimonidesseems to have no reservationsin concludingthe discussion with a positive statementregarding God's essence, relatingit to a state of the humanintellect:"ThusHis essence is the intellectuallycognizing subject, the intellectuallycognized object, and the intellect, as is also necessarilythe case withregard everyintellectin actu."46 to HoweverMaimonides intendedhis special formulation this philosophicaldoctrineto be underof stood,47 clearly directshis readerto think of God as of an intellect, and it this notionwill not be totallyobliterated Maimonides' by argument another in partof the book that humanknowledgeand God'sknowledgehave only a name in common.48 This glaring inconsistencygives the readerreason to suspect that Maimonides'use of the term "intellect"in relation both to
44Maimonides Guide3.20. 45Maimonides'explanation for why angels are described as flying with wings is an instructive application of his theory. He claims that "through the admixture with their shape of something belonging to the shape of irrational animals. . . the mind is guided toward a knowledge of the fact that the rank of the existence of the angels is below the rank of the deity" (Guide 1.49; ET 109). He says that the motion of flying was chosen to point to the fact that the angels are living beings because flying "is the most perfect and the noblest of the motions of the irrational animals, and man believes it to be a great perfection; so that he wishes to fly in order that it might be easy for him to flee from all that harms him and that he might betake himself swiftly to whatever agrees with him." 46Maimonides Guide 1.68. 47Fordiscussion, see Shlomo Pines, "The Philosophic Sources," xcvii-xcviii; and idem, "The Limitations of Human Knowledge according to Al-Farabi, Ibn Bajja, and Maimonides," in Buijs, Maimonides: Collectionof CriticalEssays. See also Altmann, "Maimonides on the A Intellect and the Scope of Metaphysics." 48Maimonides Guide3.20.

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human beings and God representsa furthercase of homonymy.In his lectures on the Guide, Yeshayahu Leibovitch proposed that all of Maimonides'referencesto a conceptionof God as self-cognizing subject should be subsumedunderthe generalprincipleof negative theology. A1though I believe this is true, it cannot be the whole story. One still must explain why Maimonideschose to write as if he had a positive notion of what God is. Maimonides allows himself bold positive languageunmitigated warnby ings that the term can be used homonymously. part one of the Guide, In Maimonides presentsthe philosophicaldoctrinethatGod is an intellectthat differs from our intellect by being always in actu, never moving from potentialto actualintellection.49 partthree,Maimonidesuses predicates In of divinity in referenceto the intellect,describingit as "thegreatking who always accompanieshim [the man of God] and cleaves to him.''SMaimonides moderatesthis daring deification of the intellect with a typical Maimonidean ambiguity.In the final clause of the statement,he clarifies that "thisking who cleaves to him and accompanies is the intellectthat him overflows toward us and is the bond between us and Him, may He be exalted.''SlAlthough it seems here that Maimonideswithdrawsfrom an identificationof God and intellect, the readermust confrontan even more problematic possibility that Maimonidesis referringto the Agent Intellect as an intermediary objectof religiousexperience.S2 CouldMaimonides have wantedhis readersto think of God as an intellect and at the same time to be aware that the wholly other natureof God rendersthat notion absurd? Whatpurposecould such thoughtsserve? This is exactly what he does in the first chapterof the Guide. Maimonidesfirst introducesan oblique identificationof God and intellect in discussing the biblical idea that humanbeings were createdin the image of God: "Thatwhich was meantin the scriptural dictum,let us make man in our image, was the specific form, which is intellectualapprehension, not the shape and configuration.''S3 Maimonides' purposeis to overcome the materialisticimplicationthat since man was made in the image of God, God must have some sort of human-likeform. He claims that the image of God in man is not the humanshapebut the powerof intellection. Performingthis substitution,Maimonidespresents humanintellectualca49Ibid. 50Ibid., 3.52; ET 629. 5lIbid., 3.52; ET 629. 52Fora discussion of a possible parallel to mystical christology, see Ithamar Gruenwald, "Maimonides'Quest beyond Philosophy and Prophecy,"in Kraemer,Perspectives on Maimonides, 145. 53Maimonides Guide 1.1; ET 22.

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pacity as true humanessence and inevitably implies therebythat in this humansresemble God. The chapterends several sentences later with a qualifyingexplanation:
Now man possesses as his propriumsomethingin him that is very strangeas it is not found in anythingelse that exists underthe sphere of the moon, namelyintellectualapprehension. the exercise of this, In no sense, no part of the body, none of the extremitiesare used; and thereforethis apprehension was likened to the apprehension the of deity, which does not requirean instrument, althoughin reality it is not like the latterapprehension, only appears to the first stirrings but so of opinion. It was because of this something,I mean because of the divine intellect conjoinedwith man, that it is said of the latterthat he is in the image of God and in His likeness, not that God, may He be exalted,is a body andpossesses a shape.54

It is no simple task to sort out what the chapteraffirms and what it denies. At first, humanbeings are said to be God-like because of their intellect.This suggeststhatGod is also some sortof intellect.Subsequently, the suggestion is severely qualified and then reaffirmedwith no further denial. Informed negativetheology and the doctrineof the wholly other by natureof God, the readerwould not have been surprisedhad Maimonides chosen to end the chapterwith a statementof the opposite import. A1though he could have written that "God, may He be exalted, is not an intellect,"he chose not to do so. Maimonidesstates that the notion of the intellect is invoked to representGod because the human intellect is the only immaterial entity with which the readersare familiar,and he warns his readersnot to thinkthatGod apprehends humansdo. The notionthat as God is an immaterial,knowing subject, however, is not denied. Since Maimonides thoughtthatmost people were incapableof comprehending the notion of an intellect and that those who can are able to do so only after demanding philosophicalinstruction, could not have thoughtthat scriphe ture resortedto the languageof humanbeings and likened God to an intellect. The languagescripture descendsto is a languageof imagery,not of abstractconcepts. Throughout Guide, Maimonides the helps his intendedreaderunderstand what the humanintellectis, whatits perfectionrequires,how a personwho achieves it lives, and what such a personcan expect in life and in death. It is Maimonideswho resorts here to the languageof humanbeings and uses the concept of the intellect to representGod's immateriality. he As invokes the notion of the intellect,Maimonides remindsthe studentnot to believe that the comparisondenotes what God is. Maimonidesuses the
54Ibid., 1. 1; ET 23.

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notion of the humanintellect as a symbol for God'smode of being. Thinking of God as an intellectmakesit easier for our mindto acceptthe reality of God's immaterial mode of being, but thinkingabout God and knowing are separatethings.The distinctionbetweenthem is securedby the demand of negative theology that humanbeings deny of God everythingthat God is not, everythingthat does not share God's unique mode of necessary existence the intellect included. To those who understandhis view of the nature of the intellect, Maimonides suggeststhat the unity of the intellect can be a symbolfor the unity of God.55 The conceptof the unity of the humanintellect beyond its diverse applications helps the readerto accept the claim that attributing to God many diverseactionsneed not threatenGod'sunity. Thus Maimonides writes:
There need not be a diversity in the notions subsistingin an agent becauseof the diversityof his variousactions.... I shall illustratethis by the exampleof the rationalfaculty subsisting in man. It is one faculty with regardto which no multiplicityis posited. Throughit he acquiresthe sciences and the arts;throughthe same faculty he sews, carpenters, weaves, builds, has a knowledgeof geometry[architecture?], governsthe city.56 and

This illustration formsan important betweenMaimonides' major link two notions of God, intellect and moral agent. The intellect is presentedas an agent and its unity is invokedto represent unity of God. No reference the is yet made to the natureof that unity. The missing referenceto the essential unity of the intellect, whether human or divine, is supplied in the tripartiteidentificationof knower, known, and knowing in chaptersixtyeight of part one of the Guide. God as Moral Person: Maimonidespresents the notion of God as an ideal of practicalexcellence as a theological constructthat serves as an object of imitationfor those who have reachedintellectualperfection.S7 He
55Maimonides was able to use the intellect as a symbol for God due to the particularly strong view he held of the unity of the intellect. Unlike other Aristotelian thinkers, most notably Alfarabi, he refused to distinguish between a theoretical and a practical intellect. For discussion of the relevant sources and references to secondary works, see Howard Kreisel, "The Practical Intellect in the Philosophy of Maimonides," HUCA59 (1988) 189-215. 56Maimonides Guide 1.53; ET 120-21. 57IsadoreTwersky has shown ("On Law and Ethics in the MishneTorah:A Case Study of Hilkhot Megillah II-17," Tradition [1989] 143) that Maimonides made "a major and most 24 far-reaching innovation" in determining that the scriptural phrase "You shall walk in His ways" (Deut 28;9) should be considered a distinct commandment and not only a general call to obey God's laws. Maimonides' son, Abraham, justified this decision by explaining that the phrase should be understood as a command to mold, nurture, and sustain an ethical personality. He explained that this is a completely autonomous mitzvah.

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offers two versionsof the ideal: one embodiedin the Mosaic proclamation of God's ways, and the other in a verse from Jeremiah that describesGod as "the Lord who exercises loving-kindness, judgment,and righteousness, in the earth"(Jer 9:23). Both consist of virtues attributed God on the to basis of attributes action, and their status is accordinglyproblematic.S8 of Maimonidessays that they are "merelysomethingthat is in thought," that they "are indicativeof a perfectionlikened to our perfections,which are understood us''S9 by and that "the meaninghere is not that He possesses moralqualities,but thatHe performsactionsresemblingthe actionsthat in us proceed from moral qualities I mean from aptitudesof the soul; the meaning is not that He, may He be exalted, possesses aptitudesof the soul."60Again, both affirmationand denial direct humanbeings toward God'sunknowable perfection.Maimonides calls upon a philosophicalconception of humanexcellence to representthe perfectionof God's mode of action, with which it is known and attestedto have nothing in common. It is a centralclaim in Maimonides' psychologyof religionthatonce the humansoul turns to perfect its intellectualcapacitiesby embarking a on scientific quest to comprehend wisdom that is manifestin nature,the the soul finds itself inexorablyattracted securea knowledgeof God. Failing to to apprehend God, the perfectedintellect is strickenby a passionatelove of God that drives it to generatea speculativeidea of God out of the only elements which the theory of attributesallows-out of attributesof action.61 Humanbeings generatethis idea of God by contemplating structhe tureof nature interpreting as an expression God'swill, as proceeding and it of fromthatwhichin humans wouldbe virtues.Theresultis an acknowledgedly inadequate idea of God thathumansconstruct imposingan ethical interby pretation the structure nature.It is important Maimonides this on of for that idea of God is not merely an imaginativeprojectionbut a constructof the intellect that requirespracticalwisdom.62
58The theological status of attributes of action is itself problematic. Feldman succinctly explains this ("A Scholastic Misinterpretation of Maimonides' Doctrine of Divine Attributes," 271), noting that "the actions of God are coextensive with the course of nature, which men describe in anthropomorphic terms," that "all expressions, even of God's actions, are absolutely equivocal," and that "this level of religious language is inferior to negative attributes, which Maimonides maintains are the only true attributes of God." 59Maimonides Guide 1. 53; ET 123. 60Ibid., 1. 53; ET 124. 6lI defend this claim systematically in chapter one of my Worship of the Heart. 62This is the main thrust of Maimonides' argument in the first part of Guide 3.51. Describing the "regimen of the solitary," of those who "attained perfection in the divine science [metaphysics]," Maimonides says that they "direct all the acts of their intellect toward examination of the beings. . . so as to know His governance of them in whatever way it is possible." Several sentences later, Maimonides sets forth the necessary conditions for avoiding that which "has merely been invented by the imagination" (3.51; ET 620).

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The Aristotelian concept of practical wisdom, on which Maimonides' work is based, involves understanding the relations between ends according to their place in a teleologically ordered life. Such wisdom can include the best function of a craftsman in a household or the total scheme of civic activities. The wider the context in which a person can order the ends, deliberate, and justify a course of action, the greater the person's wisdom. Since, according to Maimonides, the highest theoretical achievement possible for a human being is a firm grasp of the totality of the teleological structure of nature, this achievement establishes the widest possible context within which human ends can be understood. Maimonides presents a portrait of Moses as the person who understood the ends of politics and strove to imitate the example set by an idea of God that personifies Maimonides' notion of the ideal ruler.63 The accomplished person of the end of the Guide,who is not a prophet-rulerbut a solitary religious intellectual, comes to exhibit the totality of the practical virtues by attributing to God and expressing in action the qualities of loving-kindness, justice, and righteousness. g

Remarks Maimonidean on Constructivism

Clearly, Maimonides did not think that we can meaningfully say only what God is not even though he did think that we can only know what God is not. Rather, knowing what God is not allows Maimonides relatively free use of language to effect what he considers a proper attitude toward God's unknowable perfection.64 His major theological models, which depict God as intellect and as paradigm of moral excellence, use the most highly respected notions of human perfection available in his philosophical culture. His principle that choice of symbols must be culturally sensitive means that no specific construct should ever be absolutized. Whoever would be guided by Maimonides' analysis of the nature of religious language should be aware, for instance, that under no circumstances may a description of God as a moral ideal determine how human beings ought to act; this would be an absurd reversal of logical order.65Consequently, a society that comes to
63Explaining Moses'requeststo know God, as describedin Exod 33:12-23, Maimonides writes: "This was [Moses'] ultimateobject in his demand,the conclusion of what he says being:'ThatI may knowThee, to the end thatI mayfind gracein Thy sight andconsiderthat this nationis Thy people' that is, a people for the government which I need to perform of actionsthatI must seek to makesimilarto Thy actionsin governingthem"(Guide 1.54; ET 125). 64Another purposeof Maimonidean theologicalconstruction, whichI cannotdiscuss here, is to protectthe unknowing human mindfromdangerous speculativeerrors. This, for example, is the purposeof his discussionof God'sknowledgein partthree of the Guide. 65In chapter of Maimonides' one "LawsConcerning Character Traits"-the partof his code of Jewish law devoted solely to ethical instruction he applies the logical orderjust de-

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doubt and reevaluate its moral ideals will not be saved by imitation of God. From a Maimonidean perspective, moral and theological confusion would seem to be intimately related. His analysis suggests that doubts now common in contemporary society regarding whether religion should present the same image of God to women and men will only be resolved if society is able to achieve a unified concept of the best life for a human being a concept that can apply both to women and men. These brief remarks suffice to show that freedom from the constraints of true representation does not lead Maimonidean constructivism to theological anarchy. Freed from speculating on what God might truly be like, this constructivism demands that human beings attend to what we can know and that we use this knowledge symbolically to shape our thoughts about what we want to know but cannot.

scribed. First, he presents the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean (without revealing its philosophical origins). Later, imitating the language of scripture, Maimonides says that "we are commanded to walk in these middle ways, which are good and right ways." Then he states that the prophets and sages applied terms to God that denote median virtues. This allows Maimonides to conclude: "Since these are names by which the Maker is called, and they are the middle way that we are obliged to walk, this way is called the way of God." Theology does not precede ethics but follows it. For the full text, see Raymond L. Weiss and Charles L. Butterworth, eds., Ethical Writings of Maimonides (New York: Dover, 1983) 28-30. My translation is significantly different in some places.