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Why did the Paris peace treaties fail to secure the long-term stability of the successor states?

The Paris peace treaties of 1919 looked to both end WWI and provide stability and autonomy to states within Europes empires. Delegates from the US, Britain, France, Italy and Japan sought to find a balance between post-war reparations and penalties for the loser states and allow them the ability to reform into democratic governments. Arguably it must be seen that they failed to provide any long-term stability with the rise of Hitler and WWII occurring twenty years later. In order to fully understand why these treaties failed to achieve long lasting peace it is necessary to examine Wilsons (the key thinker behind self-determination of European states) lack of perception of European politics. Moreover, the way in which ethnic nationalities mixed within the Balkan areas of Europe as well as the effect that the break up of the Habsburg Empire had both politically and economically. Finally one must analyze the rise of Fascism in Europe and the reasons why the liberal Paris treaties failed to stem the tide of authoritarianism in Europe. A key argument behind the failure of the Paris peace treaties in securing stability is that Wilson did not fully understand the Eastern European situation. Nicolson adds [Wilson had] unbusinesslike methods and a lack of program of coordination.1 His argument of self-determination and liberalism were simply not applicable to the entirety of Eastern Europe. Indeed observes that Wilson did not appreciate how difficult self-determination was in much of Eastern Europe2 This was due to the obvious mix of ethnic groups within the area. However, it is not just the mix, but the
1 2

Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, London, 1945, p197 P13

way they were mixed. Macmillan remarks the peacemakers had little to guide them in adjudicating all the claims3 Races were spread all around the area particularly in locations such as Macedonia with Slavs, Serbs, Jews and Greeks all living within a confined space. Wilson, with his views of self-determination did not take into account the numbers of ethnic nationals that would be left out of their newly formed state. Moreover, it can be argued that both Clemencau and Lloyd George were more concerned with making Germany and other losers pay than in ensuring stability. In support of this argues that most French people wanted revenge for the devastation of the war4 and goes on to add that like Clemenceau [Lloyd George] had to listen to public opinion at home5 Regardless, although the creation of states on ground of ancient ethnicity was the most acceptable way in which to do it, it still left many feeling disconnected from their own nation. Macmillan observes how Yugoslavia was an uneasy marriage, among people who had been divided by years of history, religion and cultural influences.6 In Hungary more than one third of all Hungarian nationals were now living outside of national borders. These people would face antagonism in whatever country they lived in even despite holding a reasonable minority. One could argue that Wilson was looking to invoke the Swiss model of national acceptance for all cultures. Switzerland, having been built from a combination of cultures has a strong tradition of accepting new races. However, this occurred not over the space of one government or even one generation. Critics argue that for Wilson to have such faith in and so heavily press the issue of selfdetermination in this manner showed a clear lack of understanding about the cultural

Margaret Macmillan, Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and its Attempt to end the War, John Murray, 2001, p130 4 p16 5 p17 6 Margaret Macmillan, Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and its Attempt to end the War, John Murray, 2001, p132

effects that it would have on the diaspora of peoples living in the Balkan area.

One can argue that the reason why the Paris peace treaties were less than effective was the actual makeup of the Balkan territories themselves. Each nation had different grievances following such a large-scale war and period of Imperial power. Lukacs argues that petty and furious nationalism remained the main political forces in Central Eastern Europe.7 As such this meant that it was almost impossible to effectively mesh people together due to the inherent differences in their demands. For example Romania was specifically looking to increase its lands by receiving Transylvania, which had been promised to them in the Treaty of London in 1916. Hungarys position was contrary to this: it very much saw Transylvania as a traditional part of the Hungarian nation. Despite the best efforts of the Paris peace treaty it can be argued that there was no way that the newly freed area was going to stay free of violence. The Balkan wars that followed highlight an almost perceived need for violence in order to reassert what leaders felt were traditional national borderlines. Arguably this potentially could have been avoided had the League of Nations been more able to step in to deter such confrontations. Indeed, It can be seen argued that the League of Nations, designed to be able to enforce these new treaties did not function as it should have done. Firstly the mish mash of powers within the league meant that many members did not have much power whilst Britain and France bickered between themselves. In support of this Lukacs observes British and French differences of attitude and policy in eastern

John a Lukacs, The Great Powers and Eastern Europe, American Book Company, 1953, p17

Europe.8 Moreover, Wilson, whos brainchild the League had been could not even get it ratified within the US Senate. As such no action or treaty with the League covenant in it was officially endorsed by the US. As such the league was nowhere near as powerful or unified as Wilson had intended. The consequence of this was that many of the treaties were not enforced strongly. Indeed the Treaty of Sevres, concerning the Turkish Empire was a complete failure. Mustapha Kemal led a revolt of Turkish nationalists against the terms after the sultan accepted them. This led to a segregation of the Armenian population within Turkish lands. Moreover, Turkey regained lands that had been gifted to Greece as part of post war self-determination. Within the League this was a typically divisive issue. The French supported Kemal with arms trade deals and the Italians supported the Greeks in the following GrecoTurkish wars. Clearly we can see here a lack of cooperation within the League as well as a real lack of respect for the treaties by other nations. Already the first post war years indicated the weakness of the League of Nations9 In essence this destabilization of the area through a lack of power within the league led to the increase in war within the Balkans. A key example of both the failings of the League and of Wilsons aims is the plight of Hungary following the peace conferences. Following Wilsonian agreements Hungary disbanded its entire army according to the peace conference in Paris. Either delegates had a clear disregard for Hungarian peace or had no idea of the power politics and ethnic tensions of the area. Whilst more likely the latter, the decision to force Hungarian disarmament made them open to attack on all sides from other successor states. This meant that following the conference, Hungary was attacked by Serbian (with French aid), Czech and Romanian armies. In all cases Hungary lost large tracts
8 9

John a Lukacs, The Great Powers and Eastern Europe, American Book Company, 1953, p34 p18

of land and was forced to illegally issue arms in order to defend itself in the most basic of ways. Due to this McDonough refers to the Treaty of Trianon as arguably even harsher than the Treaty of Versailles.10 The vulnerability of the Hungarian nation caused not only destabilization in the short term but also arguably created resentment in the long term. As such those in Hungary were largely supportive of ideas to reunify with Austria following these political and militarial embarrassments. This is something that following the Paris peace treaties the Allies could not allow. The destruction of two of the largest European empires almost concurrently meant the inevitable destabilization of the area. Arguably Britain particularly did not want to see the destruction of the Habsburg Empire. They had strong ideological similarities of the monarchical imperialism of the Empire as well as blood links with the royal families. However, by the end of WWI it was clear that Austria-Hungary had already dissolved with Emperor Wilheim abdicating the throne declaring the empire a federation. Understandably, nations within these empires felt the moment to voice their grievances had come through the mode of self-determination. However, it must be seen that the mere existence of these empires created a form of stability within the Balkan area. They provided a social structure based upon a powerful landmass empire. Imperial power during this period provided a great amount of trade and expertise. For example Hungary provided the majority of Europes grain. This agricultural production fell away following the cessation of territories from the Hungarian borders. This economic stability enabled Europe to operate efficiently in terms of trade and finance. As such one could feasibly argue that the Paris peace treaties heightened the effect of the Great Depression in Europe due to the destruction of previous economic structures in favor of the cessation of nation states. This can be clearly noted in cases
10

Frank McDonough, The Origins of the Second World War, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p51

such as Germany or Hungary, who experienced bouts of hyperinflation following the Treaty of Versailles and St Germain. At the highest point the value of one gold Mark was one trillion paper Marks. This is similar in the Hungarian Pengo, which experienced similar inflationary rises. John Maynard Keynes, who was present at the conference observes that this treaty ignores the economic solidarity of Europe.11 The destruction of economic aspects of imperial powers must be seen therefore to affect the stability of other successor states. Indeed, the lack of any real aid from the League or the US worsened the situation with Lamb observing that much of the European economic recovery in the 1920s was dependent on American loans.12 In support of this Lukacs argues that United states finance and credit could have made a major contribution to the stabilization of eastern and south eastern Europe.13 As such the economic depression created an impetus for revolutionary and reactionary parties within the successor states. Indeed Winks argues in connection with the success of the political right that it was due to the failure to solve grievous economic problems.14 This can be directly seen in Austria with the creation of the increasingly violent Heimwehr and Schutzbund groups emerging out of desperation in Austria following the collapse of the Vienna Kredit-Anstalt bank. It is clear that the economic stability provided by the Habsburg Empire collapsed after the Paris peace conference and as such reduced stability within the successor states due to a noticeable reduction in prosperity, security and quality of life. More than just providing an economic structure, the Ottoman and Habsburg empires were seen as a real block towards a transfer of Communist and reactionary ideals into
11 12

John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of Peace, London, 1920 Margaret Lamb and Nicholas Tarling, From Versailles to Peral Harbour, Palgrave, 2001, p71 13 John a Lukacs, The Great Powers and Eastern Europe, American Book Company, 1953, p37
14

Robin W.Winks and R.J.Q Adams, Europe 1800-1945, Oxford University Press, 2003, p155

Europe. Indeed Polonsky argues that France saw the creation of new states as a cordon sanitaire against Bolshevism.15 It must be seen that the European powers took seriously the threat of other authoritarian ideologies, especially Communism. However, through the actions of the Paris Peace treaties it can be argued that the Allies ironically allowed Communist as well as Fascist ideals to spread throughout the successor states. Almost every successor state experienced an authoritarian revolution almost as soon as new governments were put in place. Indeed, Winks observes that in addition to systematic racism, all but Czechoslovakia reverted to dictatorial systems.16 Whilst the League created liberalist federal structures within the new states this did not provide the stability that was desired. To quote Harold Nicolson one cannot build a house by starting with the roof.17 Simply creating western political structures in these new states did not create democracy but rather fostered corruption and fascism. Hungary experienced a short-lived period of Communist revolution followed by a dictatorial government in the space of one year. Bela Kun briefly took control of Hungary in a Communist coup in November 1918. However, his coup lasted less than a year and a counterrevolution by the Conservative Royalists overturned his rule and put in place the authoritarian king Alexander. This series of events is key to highlighting the instability created through the Paris peace treaties. Hungary was so destabilized by the treaties that its political structure crumbled twice in a single year. This had consequences for other successor states in the surrounding area as well with Polonsky asserting that this period saw the failure of liberal democracy in this area.18

15

Antony Polonsky , The Little Dictators: The History of Eastern Europe since 1918, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980, p23 16 Robin W.Winks and R.J.Q Adams, Europe 1800-1945, Oxford University Press, 2003, p160 17 Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, London, 1945, p201 18 Antony Polonsky , The Little Dictators: The History of Eastern Europe since 1918, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980, p24

Conversely, the Polish example contradicts this view. Many argue that the PolishSoviet war of 1919 to 1921 was the main reason for the halt of Communism in Europe. The crushing defeat of the Red Army here allowed Poland to regain many old territories and is now referred to as the Miracle of Vistula.19 The consequence of this was that many exiled Polish thinkers, such as Jan Paderewski (who would go on to be prime minister) were allowed to return and reform. This progression occurred until Marshal Pilsudskis coup in 1926, which preceded a switch to more authoritarian rule. Following this Poland moved towards a regime that mirrored other in the area with Hugh Seton Watson describing the Polish political system at the time as mainly concerned with which gang will rule the rest.20 Clearly we can see here that in some cases there was a real chance for stability in this region following the Paris peace treaties. However, this period was only achieved through war with Russia and in itself only last for five years. One can hardly extol the virtues of long lasting stability concerning a five year period. Whilst the Paris peace treaties may not have provided an immediate peace, they did provide a short-term stability in some areas. Indeed, Polonsky argues that the history of Eastern Europe between the wars is the story of the collapse of the political system established in 1918.21 Perhaps concerning a long term stability one needs to examine not only the treaties themselves but also the people that it concerned directly. The Paris peace treaties clearly enabled the possibility for stability but it can be seen that factors such as the actual nature of Balkan politics and the socioeconomic conditions at the period prevented this. Wilsons initial ideas of self-determination breathed fresh air into the politics of the Balkan nations so typically undervalued by
19 20 21

Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe 1914-1941, Cambridge University Press ,p166 Antony Polonsky , The Little Dictators: The History of Eastern Europe since 1918, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980, p24

the great powers of Europe. Moreover, there was a genuine attempt by the delegates to create borders based on true ethnic lines. However, these lines were so open to subjective view that this paved the way for heavy emphasis on revisionism at later dates. Moreover, the peace treaties failed to grasp the nature of European politics as well as the effect that the decline and destruction of both the Habsburg and Ottoman empires would have on a Europe in political turmoil. Alongside this, the meteoric rise in Fascism, whilst not intended, was aided by the rushed placement of western style democracy on new states as opposed to a genuine regime of progressive political change. Reactionary parties occurred due to a lack of real political investment by the great powers in Europes new states. As such although the peace treaties (and the League) had the best of intentions, they did not aid stability in any true practical manner.

Biblography Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, London, 1945 P13 Margaret Macmillan, Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and its Attempt to end the War, John Murray, 2001 John a Lukacs, The Great Powers and Eastern Europe, American Book Company, 1953 Frank McDonough, The Origins of the Second World War, Cambridge University Press, 1997 John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of Peace, London Margaret Lamb and Nicholas Tarling, From Versailles to Peral Harbour, Palgrave, 2001 Robin W.Winks and R.J.Q Adams, Europe 1800-1945, Oxford University Press, 2003 Antony Polonsky , The Little Dictators: The History of Eastern Europe since 1918, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980 Robin W.Winks and R.J.Q Adams, Europe 1800-1945, Oxford University Press, 2003 Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe 1914-1941, Cambridge University Press