PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE OF INTENTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL TORT: Compelled to Choose Between Civil Liberty or Employment

For at least several weeks, if not two or three months, MV has made me and other drivers driving the vans listed in Exhibit 12 to choose between the chance for injury or death and employment; and the United States Supreme Court has ruled that a government may not require an individual to relinquish rights guaranteed him by the First Amendment as a condition of public employment, ABOOD v. DETROIT BD. of ED., 431 U.S. 209, 234, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 1799, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977) (Equally clear is the proposition that a government may not require an individual to relinquish rights guaranteed him by the First Amendment as a condition of public employment. E.g., ELROD v. BURNS, supra, 427 U.S. at 357-360, 96 S.Ct. at 2681-2683 and cases cited; PERRY v. SINDERMANN, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570; KEYISHIAN v. BOARD of REGENTS, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629. The appellants argue that they fall within the protection of these cases because they have been prohibited, not from actively associating, but rather from refusing to associate. They specifically argue that they may constitutionally prevent the Unions spending a part of their required service fees to contribute to political candidates and to express views unrelated to its duties as exclusive bargaining representative. We have concluded that this argument is a meritorious one.), and a government may not require an individual to waive his/her constitutional right against selfincrimination, UNIFORMED SANITATION MEN ASSO. v. COMMISSIONER of SANITATION, 392 U.S. 280, 283, 88 S.Ct. 1917, 20 L.Ed.2d 1089 (1968) (Relying upon the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in GARDNER v. BRODERICK, 20 N. Y. 2d 227, 229 N. E. 2d 184 (1967) (reversed this day, ante, p. 273), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the dismissal of petitioners did not offend the Federal Constitution. For the reasons which we elaborate in our opinion reversing the New York courts decision in GARDNER v. BRODERICK, supra, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred.

Petitioners were not discharged merely for refusal to account for their conduct as employees of the city. They were dismissed for invoking and refusing to waive their constitutional right against self-incrimination. They were discharged for refusal to expose themselves to criminal prosecution based on testimony which they would give under compulsion, despite their constitutional privilege.), and a government may not compel an individual to choose between any constitutional right and public employment where the individual has a property right in his employment, and though I and the other drivers similarly situated are at-will employees, Page 16 of Exhibit 5, with no property interest in our employment, and not government employees per-se, and we have no property interest in the money we receive from MV in compensation for operating a paratransit vehicle since its really a debt instrument belonging to the Federal Reserve Bank, still, by law, it pays the bills and allows me to acquire a home in that I pay rent with it, and it allows me to acquire sustenance, and a home and sustenance are surely property interests, so for the following reasons I maintain that an instrumentality of the State of Florida should come within the ambit of ABOOD and UNIFORMED SANITATION MEN ASSO., supra, as committing an intentional constitutional tort when they compel a choice between the chance for injury or death and employment: 1) Under the law of Master and Servant the relationship of employer and employee requires control and direction by the employer over the conduct of the employee. This exercise of control over the person as well as the performance of the work to the extent of prescribing the manner in which the work shall be executed is the ultimate test of the nature of the relationship between employer and employee. . . . Customarily, the employer determines both the method and manner in which the work is to be done as well as the time and tenure of the service. CITY of BOCA RATON v. MATTEF, 91 So.2d 644, 647 (Fla. 1956), and MV should be regarded as a government employer for the purpose of determining liability for the intentional constitutional tort of compelling me and those similarly situated to choose between the chance for injury or death and employment because LYNX wrote the Paratransit contract and exercise of control over the person as well as the performance of the work to the extent of prescribing the manner in which the work shall be executed is accomplished through LYNX supervision by and through their Road Supervisors in charge of Contract

Compliance and by and through them is determined both the method and manner in which the work is to be done and LYNX has the power to fire you on the spot which determines my tenure of service, and LYNX has the power to terminate the contract pursuant to perceived violations of 287.133(1)(g) Fla. Stat. or for other breach of contract issues which can determine the tenure of the service; 2) Under this view, while recognizing that it is an element characteristically associated with the employer-employee relationship and to be considered, the question of control is not the sole or determining factor. (Citation omitted) The ultimate criteria are to be found in the purposes of the act. (Citations omitted) FAHS v. TREE-GOLD CO-OP. GROWERS of FLORIDA, 166 F.2d 40, 44 (CA5, Fla. 1948), and in the instant case, the purposes of the Due Process Clause of the Florida Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment should be the ultimate criteria determining liability for the intentional constitutional tort of compelling me and those similarly situated to choose between the chance for injury or death and employment; 3) That which the Constitutionstate or federalprohibits directly shall not be done indirectly by subcontracting the State of Floridas federal obligation to a private company. HUNTINGTON v. WORTHEN, 120 U.S. 97, 101, 7 S.Ct. 469, 30 L.Ed. 588 (1887) (That cannot be accomplished indirectly which the organic law declares shall not be done directly.); CUMMINGS v. MISSOURI, 71 U. S. 277, 325, 18 L.Ed. 356 (1866) (The legal result must be the same, for what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. The Constitution deals with substance, not shadows. Its inhibition was leveled at the thing, not the name. It intended that the rights of the citizen should be secure against deprivation for past conduct by legislative enactment, under any form, however disguised. If the inhibition can be evaded by the form of the enactment, its insertion in the fundamental law was a vain and futile proceeding.); Ex parte GARLAND, 71 U.S. 333, 368, 380, 18 L.Ed. 366 (1866) ([I]t is a rule of construction especially applicable to a constitutional provision intended for the protection of the citizen, that what cannot be done directly, cannot complete, it

cannot be defeated by any evasion.) (Mr. Reverdy Johnson, in reply, for the petitioner) (That this result cannot be effected indirectly by a State under the form of creating qualifications we have held in the case of CUMMINGS v. THE STATE of MISSOURI, and the reasoning by which that conclusion was reached applies equally to similar action on the part of Congress.) (FIELD, J.). 4) It should be conclusive proofat a minimum for MV Vehicle 32159, the vehicle assigned to me to drivethat when the sun hits the mirror or the plexiglass window the right way, I have no functional side-view mirror protecting the blind side of my vehicle particularly when I am driving on an expressway needing to access an off-ramp as shown by Exhibits 9, and 10; and, Exhibit 11, in my opinion, best shows the haze or scratched surface of the plexiglass window caused by the car wash since I can see a sheltered area in the lower left cornersheltered by the mirror itselfand I can see a second sheltered area on the right, nearer the top than the bottomsheltered by an outside passenger door hinge; I dont believe I would see these sheltered areas except for the car wash explanation.