1964: Jack Kennedy, Barry Goldwater, and What Might Have Been

This thesis is presented by Eric Marshall (380467) to the School of Historical Studies in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts (Honours) in the field of History in the School of Historical Studies Faculty of Arts The University of Melbourne 10,525 Words Supervisor: Dr David Goodman October 2010

Table of Contents: List of Figures Introduction Chapter 1: The Debates Chapter 2: Civil Rights Chapter 3: Taxes, Spending, and Welfare Conclusion Bibliography 3 4 10 28 45 60 65

Acknowledgement: I would like to sincerely thank Dr David Goodman for assisting me in the writing of this paper. I truly value the input that he has given me over the past eight months, and Ive learned much from him about carefully crafting an original argument and a solid historiographical section.

Front Cover: Kennedy and Goldwater at the White House (See Goldwater, Mr. Conservative).

List of Figures:
Fig. 1 Kennedy and Goldwater during their days in the Senate together. (p. 14) Fig. 2 Another picture of Goldwater and Kennedy as Senators. (p. 14) Fig. 3 Goldwater and Kennedy at the White House. (p. 15) Fig. 4 Kennedy and Goldwater share a humorous moment together at the White House. (p. 15) Fig. 5 - Goldwater (top right), Robert Kennedy (center right), and Jack Kennedy (bottom right) during a hearing of the Senate Rackets Committee in 1957. (p. 18) Fig. 6 - A picture of Kennedy that Goldwater took one day while visiting at the White House which he later asked Kennedy to sign. The note at the bottom reads: "For Barry Goldwater Whom I urge to follow the career for which he has shown such talent - photography! - from his friend - John Kennedy." (p. 18) Fig. 7 Goldwater with President Johnson. (p. 18) Fig. 8 - Goldwater meets with Indians somewhere in the Arizona Desert. (p. 32) Fig. 9 - Goldwater is presented with a Kachina carving by some of his Hopi Indian friends in Washington. (p. 32) Fig. 10 - Senator Goldwater with President Johnson at the White House in 1964. (p. 41) Fig. 11 The controversial Choice film that was canceled after Goldwater previewed it. (p. 41) Fig. 12 Controversial commercial featuring the Ku Klux Klan released by the Johnson campaign in 1964. (p. 43) Fig. 13 Goldwaters Boy on Bicycle spot.. (p. 43) Fig. 14 Social Security, from the Lyndon Johnson campaign. (p. 57) Fig. 15 Republican Senator Margaret Chase Smith of Maine defends Goldwaters position on Social Security. (p. 57)

Introduction American politics has always been known for its negativity. During the bitterly fought presidential contest of 1800, foes of incumbent John Adams called the president everything from a fool to a criminal and claimed that he wanted to marry off his son to the daughter of George III, while Federalist campaigners called challenger Thomas Jefferson a cheat, fraud, coward, and robber.1 In 1828, supporters of Andrew Jackson alleged that First Lady Louisa Adams had been an illegitimate child who had indulged in sexual relations with her husband before the two had been married (a taboo in those days), while supporters of John Quincy Adams accused Jacksons wife Rachel of bigamy.2 And, in one of the last truly pejorative-laden campaigns (that of 1884)," Democratic nominee Grover Cleveland was accused of having an illegitimate child, and Republican nominee James Blaine was labeled as a prostitutor of public trusts by Democratic newspapers.3 Todays high levels of negativity in American politics are to be regarded with concern, however, given the inability of Democrats and Republicans to adequately address the state of the American economy, the size of the national debt, and continued American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. What explains such high levels of partisanship?

David Mark, Going Dirty: The Art of Negative Campaigning (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2009), 21. 2 Emmett H. Buell Jr. and Lee Sigelman, Attack Politics: Negativity in Presidential Campaigns Since 1960 (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 5. 3 Mark, Going Dirty, 21.

A number of scholars believe that a rise in social issue oriented politics is to blame for the astonishingly high levels of negativity in today's politics.4 Joel Olson, for example, argues that "polarization has resulted, in part, from the changing nature of white identity, or whiteness, and the strategic response to this change by political elites."5 According to Olson, the GOP has split the white vote along ideological lines, which has created an incentive for each party to bundle positions on racial issues with hot-button cultural issues such as welfare, abortion, and gay marriage.6 This vote-splitting has been achieved through the creation of a narrative that has portrayed the Democrats as the party of intellectual elites and undeserving rabble and Republicans as the party of the "virtuous

See for example Phil Neisser, United We Fall: Ending Americas Love Affair With The Political Center (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008); Emmett H. Buell Jr. and Lee Sigelman, Attack Politics: Negativity in Presidential Campaigns Since 1960 (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2008); Kerwin C. Swint, Political Consultants and Negative Campaigning: The Secrets of the Pros (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc, 1998); Nolan McCarty, The Policy Effects of Political Polarization, in The Transformation of American Politics, ed. Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Laura Stoker and M. Kent Jennings, Of Time and the Development of Partisan Polarization, American Journal of Political Science 52 (2008): 619-635; Steven Hill, "Divided We Stand: The Polarizing of American Politics," National Civic Review 4 (2005): 3-14; and Joseph A. Aistrup, The Southern Strategy Revisited: Republican Top-Down Advancement in the South (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1996). For a thorough analysis of the psychology of many of today's conservative "culture warriors" that consistently vote Republican, see John W. Dean, Conservatives Without Conscience (New York: Penguin Group, 2006). 5 Olson notes that during slavery and segregation, white identity functioned as a form of racialized standing that granted whites a superior social status to all those who were not white. This standing was lost due to the victories of the civil rights movement, leading to anger, anxiety, and resentment among many whites and a desire to restore that standing. This white ressentiment, as Olson refers to it, was initially mobilized by Nixon strategists so that Republican politicians could harvest formerly Democratic votes. See Joel Olson, Whiteness and the Polarization of American Politics. Political Research Quarterly 61 (2008), 704. 6 This in turn has made the base of both parties more ideologically consistent and more antagonistic to the other party's ideology, leading to an increasingly polarized electorate. See Olson, Whiteness and the Polarization of American Politics, 704.

6 middle," a concept that was originally voiced by former Vice President Spiro Agnew in the late sixties and early seventies. After carefully examining the former Vice President's speeches, Olson argues that Agnew divided white Americans and articulated the concept of the virtuous middle by referring to liberal intellectuals and student activists as "impudent snobs" and "campus radicals," while using racially coded words and references to make the virtuous middle into "forgotten Americans," "the new majority," and "the silent majority."7 A secret document written in 1971 by then Nixon aide Pat Buchanan provided a blueprint for the White House to exploit Olson's idea of white ressentiment and create a new, permanent Republican majority. Entitled "Dividing the Democrats," this controversial memorandum advocated that Republican political operatives divide the "Old Roosevelt Coalition" (Northern Catholic ethnic whites, Southern Protestants, and to a lesser extent, African Americans) through means such as nominating "a Southern Strict Constructionist" to the Supreme Court, highlighting "the elitism and quasi-anti Americanism of the national Democratic Party," elevating the issue of compulsory school and neighborhood integration in the media, and using President Nixon's strong stance on abortion to win over the Catholic vote.8

Other scholars believe that political consultants and partisan media outlets are responsible for today's high levels of negativity. Richard Skinner, for example, believes

7 8

Olson, Whiteness and the Polarization of American Politics, 711. See Pat Buchanan, "Dividing the Democrats," 5 October 1971, available from http://thenewyorker.typepad.com/online__georgepacker/files/dividing_the_democrats1.p df; [1 July 2010]. Buchanan's name does not appear on this document, but he claimed authorship of the memo in a piece called "The Fall of Conservatism" that George Packer wrote for the New Yorker in 2008. See George Packer, The Fall of Conservatism, The New Yorker, 26 May 2008.

7 that partisan presidents have polarized the American electorate in recent years by centering their political campaigns in the Oval Office.9 According to Skinner, the recent George W. Bush Administration called on political consultants and conservative think tanks rather than non-partisan third-party experts for policy advice, and bypassed conventional media in favor of partisan media such as Fox News and conservative talk radio in order to fire up its most ardent supporters.10 Under Bush, the concept of the partisan presidency, which was initially introduced by Ronald Reagan, was further radicalized.11 According to libertarian professor C. Bradley Thompson, evidence of Skinner's partisan presidency can be seen in the "conservative" domestic legislation passed under the last Republican Congress and signed by George W. Bush. 12 According to Thompson, much of the Bush administration's signature legislation was created not to advance the cause of Barry Goldwater and other "Goldwater conservatives" (whose limited government philosophy, according to Thompson, is in accordance with what

According to Skinner, the concept of the partisan presidency was first introduced by Ronald Reagan, and was taken to a new level by George W. Bush. See Richard M. Skinner, George W. Bush and the Partisan Presidency, Political Science Quarterly 123 (2008-9): 605-622. 10 Ibid., 616-618. In a partisan presidency, advice is only useful "if it promotes the party's platform and the president's political future." Many presidential decisions thus made in recent years have been entirely politically motivated. 11 Ibid., 616-618. 12 Thompsons must-read article offers an absolutely devastating critique of the domestic policies passed during the first five or so years of the George W. Bush administration. The article analyzes the two putatively conflicting philosophies of the modern conservative movement (compassionate conservatism and neoconservatism), and then provides an analysis of the legislation that todays conservative Republicans have passed since the GOP captured both houses of Congress in 1994 and the presidency in 2000. See C. Bradley Thompson, The Decline and Fall of American Conservatism, The Objective Standard, available online http://www.theobjectivestandard.com/issues/2006fall/decline-fall-american-conservatism.asp; [6 October 2010].

8 America's founding fathers advocated), but rather to appease influential voting blocs within the Republican Party.13 Has a positive, issue-oriented campaign ever been possible or happened in American history? In the early 1960s, Goldwater and Democratic President John F. Kennedy planned to participate in such a campaign were Goldwater to become the Republican nominee for President in 1964. After Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas on November 22, 1963, however, Goldwater lost interest in running for the Presidency. The Senator could not stand Kennedy's successor, Lyndon Johnson, and was compelled to re-enter the race only because so many conservatives, particularly Young Republicans on college campuses, urged him to run and expose Americans to his conservative ideas.14 After winning the Republican nomination by prevailing narrowly over New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller in the contested California primary, Goldwater addressed a very divided Republican National Convention in July of 1964, and ultimately lost the general election against Johnson by a landslide in November.15

13

The point of compassionate conservatism, according to Thompson, is that the federal government outsource the administration of welfare to private religious and civic institutions, thus promoting religion and shoring up votes from the Religious Right. Neoconservatives, on the other hand, are a group of influential intellectual right wingers that do not believe in Hayeks notion that continued growth of the state leads to serfdom, and are concerned with creating a conservative welfare state and urging Republicans to abandon their principles and develop rhetorical strategies for getting elected. See Thompson, The Decline and Fall of American Conservatism. 14 Barry M. Goldwater, Jr. and John W. Dean, Pure Goldwater (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 151. 15 After Kennedy's assassination, Rockefeller became the odds on favorite to win the Republican nomination until he divorced his wife and married a woman twenty years his junior. The news that his wife had borne a child, two days before the crucial California primary, is said to have given Goldwater the edge in the primary. See Barry Goldwater, With No Apologies: The Personal and Political Memoirs of United States Senator Barry M. Goldwater (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc, 1979), 178.

Barry Goldwater and John Kennedy are generally regarded as polar opposites by historians, and this judgment can be seen clearly in college-level American history texts. David M. Kennedy, for example, describes Kennedy as a "youthful, handsome millionaire from Massachusetts," and Goldwater as "a bronzed, box-jawed, bespectacled champion of rock-ribbed conservatism [from Arizona]" who opposed the Great Society and many New Deal programs.16 What this thesis shall argue, however, is that despite the ideological divide between the two men, Kennedy and Goldwater actually agreed on several fundamental aspects of the problems facing American society in the early 1960s. Then while Goldwater's plan to debate Kennedy is widely known in academic circles, these debates have never been critically examined. This thesis will not only describe how exactly the idea for these debates came about, but will more importantly show that Kennedy and Goldwater's mutual decision to debate in this format was not arranged solely for political purposes (as most political decisions are made today). Because Goldwater's plans to debate Kennedy never came to fruition, it is thus also important to analyze Goldwater's relationship with and actual campaign against Lyndon Johnson to argue that, regardless of who his opponent was, Goldwater would have stayed true to his pledge of running a positive, issue-oriented campaign that did not deliberately appeal to certain interest groups by channeling racial anxiety or promising federal aid.

16

David M. Kennedy, Thomas A. Bailey, and Mel Piehl, The Brief American Pageant: A History of the Republic (Toronto: D.C. Heath and Company, 1989), 492, 500.

10

Chapter 1: The Debates In this chapter, it will be argued that debates between John F. Kennedy and Barry Goldwater in 1964 would most likely have resulted in a positive, issue-oriented campaign that was not conceived for purely strategic political reasons. These debates most likely would have contrasted well with the political contests that preceded them and those that have occurred over the last forty years, given that many of the important decisions made by campaigns over this time period have been, and are currently made, by political consultants. To prove this point, it is necessary that we analyze the two mens' plans to debate. Why did Barry Goldwater, who had repeatedly voiced his opposition to running for the presidency when asked by his most fervent supporters, ultimately decide to forgo another run for the Senate and instead "grab the brass ring?"17 Why did John F. Kennedy, who had the benefits of incumbency and a booming economy, decide to put his presidency on the line and debate Goldwater? And how would the format of the planned debates have contrasted sharply with what occurs today in American politics? Before these questions are answered, it is important to note what was lacking in the debates that would have preceded ones between Kennedy and Goldwater - those of 1960. The televised presidential debates between incumbent Vice President Richard Nixon and Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts were a first in several respects.
17

Goldwater was first elected to the Senate in 1952, upsetting incumbent Democratic Senator and Majority Leader Ernest McFarland in a close race, and defeated McFarland in a rematch in 1958. Though the Senator was certainly able to run for re-election to Congress and the Presidency simultaneously (as Lyndon Johnson had done in 1960) in 1964, he found this contemptible, and ultimately chose not to run for another term in the Senate. See Bart Barnes, Barry Goldwater, GOP Hero, Dies, The Washington Post, 30 May 1998, 1, and Dean, Pure Goldwater, 151.

11 Never before had two major party candidates debated using television, and never had such debates influenced the voting public in an election.18 According to several critics of the debates, however, the events did not accomplish their desired purpose of generating an extensive, thoughtful discussion about the problems facing the country. Rather than providing a forum for issues, the debates made Americans decide which style and pattern of behavior under stress they preferred in their leader (as well as which candidate was more handsome or more personable), and only provided the candidates with enough time to exchange two and a half minute long answers.19 The televised format of the events was largely at fault here, and did not allow the candidates time to provide thoughtful and responsive answers to any difficult question that was asked.20 This opinion was reflected in newspaper reviews that appeared a day after the first debate, stating that television was

18

According to a CBS poll conducted after the election of 1960, 57% of voters said that the debates influenced their decision, and 6% (roughly four million voters at the time) ascribed their final decision to the debates alone. As three-fourths of these voters broke for Kennedy, and Kennedy won several states by razor thin margins (such as Illinois, by 8,858 votes out of over 4,657,000 cast), it is clear that the debates were a deciding factor in November. See Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1960 (New York: Atheneum House, 1960), 294 and Michael O'Brien, John F. Kennedy: A Biography (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2005), 496. 19 Of the 1960 presidential contest, White stated that "rarely has there been a political campaign that discussed issues less or clarified them less." According to historian Daniel Boorstin, the Kennedy-Nixon debates were remarkably successful in reducing great national issues to trivial dimensions, and were a clinical example of what Boorstin referred to as a "pseudo-event." See White, The Making of the President 1960, 292-3, Alan Schroeder, Presidential Debates: Fifty Years of High Risk TV (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 293; and Evron M. Kirkpatrick, "What Can We Learn From 1960?," in The Past and Future of Presidential Debates, ed. Austin Ranney (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1979), 17. 20 According to White, television and radio abhor silence and "dead time," and programs on these mediums are compelled to snap question and answers back and forth. Exceedingly difficult questions thus cannot be asked under these circumstances. See White, The Making of the President 1960, 292.

12 simply too superficial a medium for such a serious business as national politics.21 A real opportunity for issue discussion was thus missed during the debates between Kennedy and Nixon, yet would probably not have been missed in the debates that Kennedy and Barry Goldwater planned to hold. On April 15th, 1961, Republican Senator Barry Goldwater was at Andrews Air Force Base, eight miles away from Washington D.C., strapping himself into the cockpit of an F-86 fighter plane in preparation for a flight to Luke Air Force Base in Phoenix, Arizona.22 Goldwater had flown in the United States Army Air Corps for four years during World War II, and, as a Major General of the American Air Force Reserves, he was expected to fly a certain number of hours each month to maintain his flight proficiency rating.23 While Goldwater was going through his pre-flight checklist, an air force sergeant suddenly climbed up onto the wing of the F-86, and told the Senator that the President of the United States, John F. Kennedy, wished to see him at the White House immediately.24 Goldwater thus got out of the plane, proceeded to change into his civilian clothes, drove to the White House, and upon his arrival was immediately escorted into the Oval Office. Despite being opposed to many of Kennedy's policies, Goldwater had developed a

21

Newton N. Minow and Craig L. LaMay, Inside the Presidential Debates: Their Improbable Past and Promising Future (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 13. 22 Dean, Pure Goldwater, 118. 23 Barry M. Goldwater with Jack Casserly, Goldwater (New York: Doubleday, 1988), 57; and Frank R. Donovan, The Americanism of Barry Goldwater (New York: MacFadden Books, 1964), 69. 24 Goldwater, With No Apologies, 136.

13 warm, personal relationship with the President.25 The two men had come to the Senate in 1952, and, invariably on opposite sides during floor debates, would playfully send chiding messages back and forth: "Your father would have spanked you [for that vote], Jack"; "Barry, you're the greatest 19th century statesman in politics today."26 To Goldwater, Kennedy was "an antagonist" that he had always enjoyed and had been personally fond of, while Goldwater was an intellectually honest individual whom Kennedy admired.27 One day, during another White House visit, Goldwater, who had a knack for photography, had also taken a photo of Kennedy in the hopes of getting it autographed. Kennedy had written: "For Barry Goldwater, whom I urge to follow the career for which he has shown such talent - photography! - from his friend - John Kennedy."28 Kennedy and Goldwater were thus "political opponents with a friendly, mutual respect" who did not permit their political differences to develop into personal antagonisms."29

25

See Figures 1-4. Looking back at his Senate career in the 1980s, Goldwater remarked that his friendship with the Kennedys was one of the four relationships in Congress that meant a great deal to him. See Goldwater with Casserly, Goldwater, 29. 26 See William Prochnau, "Mr. Conservative's Gift," The Washington Post, 14 August 1988, 20, and Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1964 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1965), 94. In the first quote, Goldwater is making fun of Kennedy for being too beholden to his father's plans to make Kennedy more electable for the presidency. 27 See YouTube, Barry Goldwater after the assassination of John F. Kennedy, available from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PxnecmOWI-s; [7 February 2010]; Ted Sorensen, Counselor: A Life At the Edge of History (New York: Harper, 2008), 348; and John H. Kessel, The Goldwater Coalition: Republican Strategies in 1964 (New York: The Bobs-Merrill Company, Inc, 1968), 49. 28 See Figure 6. See also Dean, Pure Goldwater, 130, and Lloyd Grove, "Barry Goldwater's Left Turn: His Opinions Are Anything But Middle-Of-The-Road. Take Gay Rights, for Instance," The Washington Post, 28 July 1994, 1. 29 Donovan, The Americanism of Barry Goldwater, 66.

14

Fig. 1 Kennedy and Goldwater during their days in the Senate together. (See Goldwater, Mr. Conservative)

Fig. 2 Another picture of Goldwater and Kennedy as Senators. (See Goldwater, Mr. Conservative).

15

Fig. 3 Goldwater and Kennedy at the White House. (See Goldwater, Mr. Conservative).

Fig. 4 Kennedy and Goldwater share a humorous moment together at the White House. (See Goldwater, Mr. Conservative).

16 After confirming his arrival to a White House secretary, Goldwater went up to the Oval Office. Upon entering the Presidents study, Goldwater noted the presence of a rocking chair that Kennedys chiropractor, Dr. Janet Travell, had recommended as a therapeutic device to ease his ailing back. Goldwater also suffered from back problems, and decided to try the chair that Dr. Travell had prescribed for the President.30 Moments later, Kennedy entered the office, smoking a small Cheroot cigar.31 The two men looked at one another for a moment, until Kennedy said: So, you want this f---ing job, eh? Goldwater laughed. "Not in my right mind, no," he replied.32 The conversation then became more serious, and Kennedy asked for Goldwater's advice on the situation at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba. Goldwater was struck by Kennedys indecisiveness on the matter, and urged the President to follow up the CIAs proposed invasion of Cuba using Cuban exiles with American air strikes to make sure that the mission succeeded. 33 After the Senator made his case for the air strikes, Kennedy agreed to Goldwaters proposition and thanked him for coming, and Goldwater left the Oval Office feeling confident that the United States was going to stand firmly against communism and overthrow Fidel Castros regime.34

30

See Alan L. Otten, The Aching Back Bloc, Wall Street Journal, 18 October 1963, 14; Donovan, The Americanism of Barry Goldwater, 66; and Goldwater, With No Apologies, 136-7. 31 Dean, Pure Goldwater, 118. 32 CC Goldwater, 18 September 2006, Mr. Conservative: Goldwater on Goldwater, available from http://www.amazon.com/Mr-Conservative-Goldwater-JulianBond/dp/B000P7V6TW; [7 February 2010]. 33 See Goldwater with Casserly, Goldwater, 135; and White, The Making of the President 1964, 94. 34 Goldwater, With No Apologies, 138.

17 Goldwater was to be thoroughly disappointed following his meeting with Kennedy. Just before the invasion of the Cuban exiles, the President "lost his nerve" and decided not to commit the Air Force, which according to Goldwater made the Bay of Pigs into a fiasco.35 The Senator was disturbed with the President's vacillation on the Bay of Pigs and other related national defense issues, which also happened to include the situation in Vietnam. To Goldwater, Kennedys reaction to the incident appeared to reenforce his view that the young president was inexperienced and indecisive on matters of national security.36 For the first time, after continually refusing the requests of many of his fellow conservatives to seek the presidency, Goldwater felt compelled to seek the Republican presidential nomination to challenge Kennedy in 1964.37 Both Goldwater and Kennedy had their reasons for wanting to debate one another in such a format. The leading conservative politician of the day, Barry Goldwater had wanted to expose Americans to his conservative political philosophy, and stated that this alone would have been considerable compensation for a loss to Kennedy had they

35

Robert Alan Goldberg, Barry Goldwater (London: Yale University Press, 1995), 155. I am not trying to prove here that the fiasco at the Bay of Pigs was Kennedy's fault, but merely that Goldwater believed it was as a result of examining Goldwater's recollection of the incident to others as well as in his personal memoirs and autobiography. 36 See Dean, Pure Goldwater, 133, and Goldberg, Barry Goldwater, 152. 37 Another reason Goldwater decided to run against Kennedy was to debate the role of organized labor in American society. Both Kennedy and Goldwater had served on the Senate Rackets Committee during the late 1950s, and Kennedy had been reluctant to alienate labor unions (a powerful Democratic constituency) by going after Walter Reuther and the United Automobile Workers due to his (father's) plans to run for the presidency. See Figure 5, Goldberg, Barry Goldwater, 121-4; and Goldwater with Casserly, Goldwater, 102.

18

Fig. 5 - Goldwater (top right), Robert Kennedy (center right), and Jack Kennedy (bottom right) during a hearing of the Senate Rackets Committee in 1957. (See Goldberg, Barry Goldwater). Fig. 6 - A picture of Kennedy that Goldwater took one day while visiting at the White House which he later asked Kennedy to sign. The note at the bottom reads: "For Barry Goldwater Whom I urge to follow the career for which he has shown such talent - photography! - from his friend - John Kennedy." (See Dean, Pure Goldwater, 115).

Fig. 7 Goldwater with President Johnson. (See Dean, Pure Goldwater, 136).

19 debated in 1964.38 Goldwater perceived himself to be a man of high principle, and believed that he would be able to present himself as decisive on issues that he felt Kennedy had equivocated on, such as the Bay of Pigs and the war in Vietnam, to give the people "a choice, not an echo."39 Whereas Kennedy spouted the liberal line yet was cynical about most of it, Goldwater was a conservative by conviction, and thought he would be able to contrast his beliefs well with Kennedys weak pragmatism in potential debates.40 The Senator also thought the forums would be fun, as he had personally enjoyed engaging Kennedy on the Senate floor during the 1950s, and clearly looked forward to the coming debate.41 Kennedy, like Goldwater, also enjoyed debating, yet also believed that he would win easily in 1964 because Goldwater's beliefs would appear to be too conservative for most Americans.42 "Give me good old Barry as the GOP nominee, said the President. "I'd never have to leave this Oval Office."43 Nevertheless, Kennedy realized that Goldwater's characteristic bluntness and ability to speak his mind would be an advantage in a stump debate format, reportedly telling an aide that because "[Goldwater] was so damn quick on the trigger, he would quickly be able to answer questions, and then it would be all over."44

38

It was also Goldwaters belief in spreading the conservative message that ultimately led him to oppose Lyndon Johnson after Kennedys assassination. See John B. Judis, Barry Goldwaters Curious Campaign, available from http://aliciapatterson.org/APF0804/Judis/Judis.html; [20 September 2010]. 39 See Kessel, The Goldwater Coalition, 178, and Prochnau, "Mr. Conservative's Gift," 20. 40 Goldwater with Casserly, Goldwater, 139. 41 See Goldwater, Mr. Conservative, and William F. Buckley Jr., Flying High: Remembering Barry Goldwater (Philadelphia: Basic Books, 2008). 87. 42 See Sorenson, Counselor, 350, and Prochnau, "Mr. Conservative's Gift," 20. 43 O'Brien, John F. Kennedy: A Biography, 901. 44 Goldberg, Barry Goldwater, 178.

20 Kennedy was also clearly concerned about his re-election prospects, which Goldwater thought had made him unable to focus properly on governance during his first term.45 Sixty-one percent of the public thought that he spent money too freely, while a third thought him too weak in opposing Soviet challenges in Berlin and elsewhere in early 1962.46 In the summer of 1963, Kennedy had appeared so vulnerable that Goldwater, who had always been lukewarm in public about running for the presidency, had even asked several lawyers from Phoenix to come to Washington D.C. and organize a presidential primary campaign for him.47 Not only was Kennedy in trouble with Southern Democratic voters for his civil rights address in June 1963, but a Harris poll conducted in October of that year had even shown Goldwater ahead of Kennedy in a hypothetical presidential match-up by a 54 to 38 percent margin.48 Realizing his vulnerability, Kennedy had also reasoned that many Americans would find Goldwater's views to be somewhat extreme for the day's standards as opposed to the views of other leading Republicans of the day, and confided to someone that "if Goldwater is our opponent in '64, we're going to get to bed a lot earlier on election night than we did in 1960."49 It is worth noting that neither Barry Goldwater nor Jack Kennedy sought the Presidency out of long held ambition or hunger for power. Goldwater believed that Kennedy was a victim of his fathers ambition who believed that the White House was a
45 46

Goldwater, With No Apologies, 157. Buckley, Flying High, 68. 47 Judis, "Barry Goldwater's Curious Campaign." 48 See Sorensen, Counselor, 350, and O'Brien, John F. Kennedy: A Biography, 900. 49 Robert Dallek, 11 June 2006, "Robert Dallek on John F. Kennedy - In His Own Words," John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, available from http://www.jfklibrary.org/NR/rdonlyres/6147E958-9D63-410A-9557D708AC28671B/33492/RobertDallekonJFKinHisOwnWords.pdf; [1 July 2010].

21 trophy to be won, and was thus more concerned with being elected president than being the president.50 He also believed that Kennedy would have been quite a different president had he won a second term in 1964, and would have been more inclined to correct past mistakes and drastically alter public policies that both of them agreed required reform.51 Goldwater was also never really enthusiastic about being in charge of the executive branch, and chafed at the possibility of having to deal with a potentially hostile Democratic Congress. According to former United Nations Ambassador Charles Lichenstein, who served as Research Director for Goldwaters eventual run against Lyndon Johnson, Goldwater never really decided that he wanted to be president at any given moment. Asked by journalist Stewart Alsop in 1963 what it might feel like to wake up as president some day, Senator Goldwater remarked, "Frankly, it scares the hell out of me.52 Given both candidates' lack of interest in becoming president for power purposes, it is clear Kennedy and Goldwater would have been even less likely to take advice from campaign operatives who advocated win at any cost strategies. In later meetings with Kennedy at the White House following the botched Bay of Pigs invasion, Goldwater spoke to Kennedy about his plans for 1964 and what would happen if he won the Republican nomination. Goldwater wanted to debate the issues with Kennedy in every region of the country, and had even mentioned the two candidates traveling together in the same plane.53 Hed get out in one place and start to debate and

50

Kennedy became his father's favored presidential contender after his older brother Joe died in World War II. See Hugh Sidey, John F. Kennedy: Portrait of a President (London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1964), 10. 51 Goldwater with Casserly, Goldwater, 139. 52 Barnes, Barry Goldwater, GOP Hero, Dies, 1. 53 White, The Making of the President 1964, 343.

22 Id rebut him, said Goldwater. Then wed turn it around in the next place.54 Goldwater saw Kennedy as an honest individual, and wanted to debate Kennedy on a stage without a moderator in order to tell the President exactly how he felt about his proposals.55 Goldwater had gotten the idea for "a good old fashioned, stump debate" from his uncle, Morris Goldwater, who had been the mayor of Prescott, Arizona for twenty years.56 Uncle Morris, Barry recalled, "had an odd way of campaigning but a pretty good one. I drove for him a couple of times, and he and his opponent would climb into the same old car with a bottle of whisky. They'd get out of the car together, beat the hell out of each other at a debate, get back into the back seat and slug down some whisky, and I'd drive them on to the next debate. Seemed pretty civilized to me." To a young Barry Goldwater, the debates showed that people could disagree, but did not have to be disagreeable about it. Goldwater and Kennedy intended that a hypothetical campaign between the two men be issues oriented and offer Americans "a clear choice between liberalism and conservatism."57 The debates, Kennedy told his family in 1963, would be a series of forums modeled on the Lincoln-Douglas debates and would represent a clash of ideas,

54 55

Prochnau, "Mr. Conservative's Gift," 20. See White, The Making of the President 1964, 343, and Goldwater, Mr. Conservative. 56 See Goldwater, Mr. Conservative, and William Prochnau, "Mr. Conservative's Gift," 20. 57 This quote is attributed Kennedy, and was made during a conversation that the President had with Interior Secretary Stewart Udall. The source comes from Kennedy friend and Washington Post editor Ben Bradlee, who was also interviewed in CC Goldwater's documentary. See Goldberg, Barry Goldwater, 178, and Goldwater, Mr. Conservative.

23 rather than a clash of egos or personal attacks.58 According to Goldwater, the forums would also be old-fashioned, "without any Madison Avenue, makeup or phoniness."59 By engaging in a serious dialogue, directing the voters attention to the nations major problems, and then offering alternative solutions, Kennedy and Goldwater would be "making a constructive contribution to the public's understanding of the complexities of government."60 Although the two friends had sometimes gotten into heated arguments about policy, they never resorted to personal attacks, and had no plans to emphasize a fear of communism, racial difference, sexual preference, or other "irrelevancies" during their intended debates.61 Goldwater had even written an article on the subject of being a good opponent in a political contest that Kennedy had applauded. Among other things, the article had advocated positive opposition without hate and acknowledging when an opponent was right.62 In essence, the debates between Kennedy and Goldwater would have been "the political process at its best."63

58

Robert F. Kennedy Jr., Afterward, in The Conscience of a Conservative, ed. CC Goldwater (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 122. 59 "Madison Avenue" is a north-south avenue in Manhattan that has been identified with the advertising industry since the 1920s. The advertising firm Doyle Dane Bernbach, which produced the infamous "Daisy" commercial for Johnson's campaign against Goldwater, was and is still located on Madison Avenue. Clearly, Goldwater did not want his debates to be a repeat of the Kennedy-Nixon debates that focused more on the image and personality of the candidates than on the issues. See Dean, Pure Goldwater, 150. 60 Goldberg, Barry Goldwater, 178. 61 "First of all, it is fine to oppose but do not hate. Second, keep your sense of humor. Third, always oppose positively. Fourth, learn all the tricks of campaigning, and fifth, applaud your opponent if he is right." See Goldwater, With No Apologies, 156. 62 Ibid., 156. 63 CC Goldwater interviewed Kennedy's late brother Edward in her documentary about her grandfather around 2005 to 2006. Kennedy strongly endorsed the idea of a cross country debate, noting that it would have been "the political process at its best." See Goldwater, Mr. Conservative.

24 After President Kennedy was assassinated in 1963, Goldwater immediately lost interest in running for the presidency.64 Where JFK was honorable, thought Goldwater, his successor, Lyndon Johnson, was a ruthless opportunist.65 Johnson, Goldwater believed, was the epitome of the unprincipled politician whose only political dogma was expediency, a wheeler-dealer who never cleaned that crap off his boots, and a hypocrite who didnt believe half of what he said.66 Johnson was also a big faker on civil rights legislation - a counterfeit Confederate who said one thing in the North, and another down South.67 Goldwaters private opinion of Lyndon Johnson may have been unprintable, yet publicly he gave full, honorable respect to the commander in chief. The Senator did not mention the incumbent at all during his acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention in San Francisco, and refused to say to a crowd that LBJ was a vote-buyer, despite it being written on his teleprompter by campaign aides.68 During the last two weeks of the 1964 campaign, Goldwater visited Texas, and the crowd began to boo when the Senator mentioned Johnsons name. Goldwater scolded his

64

See Judis, "Barry Goldwater's Curious Campaign;" Dean, Pure Goldwater, 151; and Jerry Landauer, GOP and Goldwater Reassess Senators Presidential Chances, Wall Street Journal, 6 December 1963, 1, 8. 65 See Figure 7. See also Rick Perlstein, Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus (New York: Hill and Wang, 2001), 253. 66 See Goldwater with Casserly, Goldwater, 150-2; Goldberg, Barry Goldwater, 179; and YouTube, Barry Goldwaters opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, available [Online] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JJyWWM9OHKA; [1 July 2010]. 67 Johnson had long been ambivalent on civil rights during his tenure as Majority Leader. See Goldwater, Mr. Conservative, and Goldberg, Barry Goldwater, 146. 68 See Goldwaters 1964 Acceptance Speech, The Washington Post, 30 May 1998; Barnes, "Barry Goldwater, GOP Hero, Dies," 1; and Jerry Landauer, Goldwater Searches for a Winning Issue on Whistle-Stop Tour, Wall Street Journal, 2 October 1964, 1.

25 supporters: No, he is your president dont boo the office of the presidency.69 Although he disagreed with Johnsons politics, Goldwater noted that Johnson had been a very good majority leader: If he had a job to do, we didnt go home at five or six oclock we went home when we got the job done. When Lyndon Johnson said this is going to be legislation, you knew you werent going to leave until it was legislation.70 On January 3rd, 1964, after much prodding from close advisors and ardent supporters, Barry Goldwater declared his intention to seek the Republican presidential nomination in Phoenix, Arizona.71 "This campaign," said Goldwater, "will be a contest of principle, not personality."72 Instead of being the lofty, rational presentation of contending political beliefs that [Goldwater] had envisioned, however, the actual 1964 election degenerated into a campaign of epithets and gross falsehoods.73 "By the time the convention opened, I had been branded as a fascist, a racist, a trigger-happy warmonger, a nuclear madman and the candidate who couldn't win," Goldwater later recalled.74 One example of such vitriolic name-calling occurred when Goldwater referred to the President as "a big faker" for suddenly coming out in favor of civil rights

69

See Gil Troy, See How They Ran: The Changing Role of the Presidential Candidate (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 217, and White, The Making of the President 1964, 339. 70 Emphasis added. See Irwin and Debi Unger, LBJ: A Life (New York: Wiley, 1999), 239, and Goldwater with Casserly, Goldwater, 2. 71 Kennedy's assassination ended Goldwater's dream and desire of running for president, and initially, Goldwater announced that he would not run. The idea of running against Johnson, a "dirty fighter" and a "wheeler-dealer," was "abhorrent" to him. The Arizona Senator was compelled to change his mind by American young people, "particularly the Young Republicans who professed to be conservatives [on college campuses]." See Goldwater with Casserly, Goldwater, 151, and Dean, Pure Goldwater, 136. 72 Goldwater, With No Apologies, 170. 73 Ibid., 199. 74 Barnes, "Barry Goldwater, GOP Hero, Dies," 1.

26 legislation in order to win the African American vote after having long been ambivalent about such legislation while in the Senate.75 In reference to many of Goldwater's off-thecuff statements, Johnson called his opponent "a raving, ranting demagogue" who wanted "to tear down society" and "drop atomic bombs on everybody."76 Conclusion: From an analysis of Kennedy and Goldwater's plans to debate in 1964, it is clear that both men wished to participate in a positive, issue-oriented campaign for a variety of different reasons. Although the debates never occurred, Goldwater's actions during his eventual race with Johnson show that the Arizona Senator was not primarily motivated by politics, despite the fact that Kennedy was not his opponent. As Skinner's concept of the partisan presidency did not exist at this time and political consultants had only recently been introduced to national campaigns, it is clear that a Goldwater-Kennedy contest might well have been much less dominated by ad hominem attacks and

75 76

Ibid., 1. It is not clear exactly what Lyndon Johnson's personal opinion was of Barry Goldwater. In The Vantage Point, Johnson refers states that "Barry Goldwater and I, both coming from the Southwest, had been friends in the Senate." If Johnson thought of himself and Goldwater as friends, the feeling can hardly have been mutual given Goldwater's mostly negative statements about Johnson in his memoirs, autobiography, personal papers, and interviews. Johnson then describes many of the statements that Goldwater made before and during the campaign as "rash," and reiterates that "Goldwater wanted voters to give him a mandate to abolish social security... and for a strengthening of states' rights." See Randall Bennett Woods, LBJ: Architect of American Ambition (London: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 528, and Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency: 1963-1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 102-3.

27 irrelevancies than the eventual Goldwater-Johnson one.77 Given that the GoldwaterKennedy debates would have likely been issue and not attack-oriented, it is thus important to look at the candidates' stances on the major issues of the day to determine what voters would have seen in such an issue-oriented campaign.

77

The first political consultant used in a major political contest was Joseph Napolitan, who worked on Kennedy's campaign in 1960. Political consulting would blossom with the increasing use of television advertising for campaign communications in the 1960s. For further reading, see Joseph Napolitan, The Election Game and How to Win It (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1972).

28 Chapter 2: Civil Rights Despite the fact that Kennedy and Goldwater were on opposite sides of the aisle, a close analysis of their positions on civil rights will show that the two men did agree that segregation was both morally wrong and economically wasteful, and that some federal laws could help in combating discrimination. To more fully understand why a Cold War liberal and a Cold War conservative would agree to such an extent on such a controversial matter, it is also necessary to examine Kennedy and Goldwater's backgrounds. In explaining Barry Goldwater's complex views on civil rights, it is also important to distinguish between the campaign strategy advocated by Goldwater and his campaign aides to win the presidency by building a Southern-Western coalition, and the "Southern strategy" advocated by Republican politicians and political aides from 1968 onwards that was mentioned earlier. On July 2nd, 1964, President Lyndon Johnson signed the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 into law. The President had managed to get the historic legislation through Congress largely because of his expertise at making deals with and threatening reluctant supporters of the bill to support it, and because his predecessor's assassination had given Johnson a mandate to pass the remainder of Kennedy's "New Frontier" legislation. Senator Barry Goldwater, however, refused to vote "yes" on the measure, arguing that the sections dealing with segregation in places of public accommodation and employment discrimination were unconstitutional.78 Instead of having the federal government desegregate private businesses and schools, Goldwater argued that it was better that local

78

See Goldwater with Casserly, Goldwater, 193-4.

29 leadership take steps to solve what he deemed was primarily a moral problem.79 Given the fact that local and state leaderships in the South refused to end segregation and employment discrimination and that it was because of federal efforts that these practices were finally ended, it would appear that Goldwater's argument for local efforts to end such practices was unrealistic.80 But what if Kennedy had lived to debate Goldwater? It is doubtful that, without Johnson in command, the Civil Rights Act would have passed. If Kennedy had lived to debate Goldwater, he would have had to deal with angry Southern Democratic voters who were annoyed with him bringing up comprehensive civil rights legislation in the first place, as well as disgruntled and disillusioned African American supporters angry with Kennedy's inability to pass such legislation. In an issue-oriented, Kennedy-Goldwater campaign, Goldwater's views would have appeared much more viable to Democratic constituencies than in a Goldwater-Johnson race; thus, it is important that we analyze exactly what those views were. First, however, it is important to examine what both candidates had in common on the matter.

79 80

Where Barry Stands, Time Magazine, 2 August 1963, 1-2. According to civil rights historian Steven F. Lawson, the federal government played an indispensable role in shaping the civil rights revolution. To oppose federal action at this time was in practice to oppose civil rights. See Steven F. Lawson and Charles Payne, Debating the Civil Rights Movement, 1945-1968 (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), 3.

30 On the issue of civil rights, Jack Kennedy and Barry Goldwater were both quoted as saying that segregation was both morally wrong and economically bad.81 The candidates' backgrounds are useful in helping us understand why such consensus existed between the two men on this issue. Barry Goldwater understood what it meant to be persecuted due to one's racial background, as his grandfather, Michel Goldwasser, was a Polish Jew who had fled Poland as a teenager to escape persecution and conscription by Russians.82 Before becoming a Senator, Goldwater had run a successful chain of department stores that he had inherited from his uncle and father - stores that had been serving African Americans since before Arizona had achieved statehood in 1912.83 "As a merchant," said Goldwater, "I feel that a man in business who advertises for customers to come to his store or place of business and to make purchases from him cannot deny that customer, regardless of race, creed or color, the opportunity to purchase in any department of that store or business.84 For more evidence that Goldwater was

81

In a campaign speech, Senator Goldwater stated that it was not only morally wrong to practice segregation, but also economically bad. In his Special Message to Congress in February 1963, President Kennedy stated that racial discrimination in employment is especially injurious to both its victims and to the national economy. It results in a great waste of human resources and creates serious community problems. In his famous civil rights address of June 1963, Kennedy also acknowledged that segregation was primarily a moral issue, and that law alone could not solve the problem, a statement which Goldwater also reiterated in a civil rights speech during the campaign with Johnson. See Goldwater, Mr. Conservative; Kessel, The Goldwater Coalition, 210; Edmund S. Ions, The Politics of John F. Kennedy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd, 1967), 109; and American Rhetoric, John F. Kennedy Civil Rights Address Delivered 11 June 1963, available from http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jfkcivilrights.htm; [1 July 2010]. 82 Barnes, "Barry Goldwater, GOP Hero, Dies," 1, and Goldwater with Casserly, Goldwater, 42. 83 Barry Goldwater was also the first Phoenix businessman to hire African Americans as sales clerks in his department stores. See Barry Goldwater: Biography, available from http://www.answers.com/topic/barry-goldwater; [6 October 2010]. 84 Donovan, The Americanism of Barry Goldwater, 72.

31 sympathetic to improving race relations, one need look no further than the Senator's relations with the Native Americans of Arizona. Goldwater would often communicate with the Indians using his two-way radio set, was always ready to jump in his plane at a moment's notice to help out if someone needed medical attention, and had helped organize relief flights that dumped hay and feed to save stranded Navajo livestock during the harsh winter of 1936.85 As tokens of their friendship with the Arizona Senator, the Navajo Indians renamed an arch in the desert after Goldwater's wife, and the Hopi Indians presented him with Kachina carvings.86 Like Goldwater, Jack Kennedy had grown up amid stories of discrimination against his ancestors, who were Irish in his case.87 The President's Catholic faith gave him a sense of mercy for the weak and downtrodden, and he noted that such a regime of atrocious injustice in the South could not continue to prevail if America was to sustain its role as the banner of democracy and combat communism.88 Goldwater and Kennedy agreed that some federal intervention was necessary to combat segregation, especially in certain civil rights cases where constitutional rights were infringed upon, such as the right to vote.89 Both men also voted for the Civil Rights

85 86

See Figure 8, and Goldberg, Barry Goldwater, 41. See Figure 9, and Goldwater, Mr. Conservative. 87 O'Brien, John F. Kennedy: A Biography, 364. 88 See White, The Making of the President 1964, 21, and Hugh Brogan, Kennedy (London: Addison Wesley Longman Ltd, 1996), 152. 89 Goldwater noted that "the right to vote is in the Constitution (the 15th Amendment). There, the federal government should act even if it means with troops." He also criticized the Justice Department for not prosecuting more vigorously "cases where they can prove that a man is denied the right to vote by reason of race, creed, or color," and supported a constitutional amendment to abolish the poll tax which discriminated against blacks and the poor (which had kept the Southern aristocracy in power). See Goldberg, Barry Goldwater, 154, and Goldwater with Casserly, Goldwater, 172.

32

Fig. 8 - Goldwater meets with Indians somewhere in the Arizona Desert. (See Goldwater, Mr. Conservative).

Fig. 9 - Goldwater is presented with a Kachina carving by some of his Hopi Indian friends in Washington. (See Goldwater with Casserly, Goldwater).

33 Acts of 1957 and 1960, and favored a proposal to expand job training and vocational education programs to minorities.90 The main disagreement between Kennedy and Goldwater on the contentious issue of civil rights was a difference in opinion as to how much federal intervention could be used to settle civil rights matters in the areas of public accommodation and employment. The two men also disagreed with the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Brown vs. Board of Education (1954), despite agreeing with the objectives of the Court as stated in the decision.91 To address the problem of Southern segregation, Goldwater advocated more leadership at the local level, stating that "the problem of race relations, like all social and cultural problems, is best handled by the people directly concerned. Let us, through

90

Goldwater voted for the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts because they sought to end government discrimination against its citizens, offered four amendments to the Youth Employment Act of 1963 that forbade discrimination on the grounds of race, color, creed, or national origin, endorsed federal action (with troops if necessary) if state and local officials failed to maintain law and order in racial disputes, favored Kennedys proposal to expand job training and vocational education programs that would benefit minorities, and believed that the Commerce clause of the Constitution protected the rights of black citizens to use the facilities of bus companies, airlines, railroads, and other groups engaged in interstate commerce. See Where Barry Stands, Time Magazine, 1-2; Donovan, The Americanism of Barry Goldwater, 79; and Goldberg, Barry Goldwater, 154. 91 Emphasis added. Goldwater believed that the Brown decision was "not based on law," stating that the Fourteenth Amendment "was not intended to, and therefore did not outlaw racially separate schools... or authorize any federal intervention in the field of education." The Arizona Senator believed that the reasoning of the Court in Brown was at fault, as the Supreme Court justices "expressly acknowledged that they were not being guided by the intention's of the amendment's authors" in making their decision. He did, however, note that he was in agreement with the objectives of the Court, stating that he thought it was "both wise and just for negro children to attend the same schools as whites." Kennedy, on the other hand, stated that the Brown decision "was both morally and legally right." in his Special Message to Congress on February 29, 1963. See David Farber, The Rise and Fall of Modern American Conservatism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 88; Barry Goldwater, The Conscience of a Conservative (Washington: Regnery Gateway, Inc, 1990), 28-31; and Brogan, Kennedy, 155.

34 persuasion and education, seek to improve institutions we deem defective.92 When Kennedy's civil rights bill (later the Civil Rights Act of 1964) came up for a vote, Goldwater made a speech on the Senate floor in which he stated that The two portions of this bill to which I have constantly and consistently voiced objections, and which are of such overriding importance that they are determinative of my vote on the entire measure, are those which would embark the Federal Government on a regulatory course of action with regard to private enterprise in the area of so-called public accommodations and in the area of employment [and] I find no constitutional basis for the exercise of Federal regulatory authority in either of these areas. If it is the wish of the American people that the Federal Government should be granted the power to regulate in either of these areas and in the manner contemplated by this bill, then I say that the Constitution should be amended. I am unalterably opposed to discrimination of any sort, and believe that though the problem is fundamentally one of the heart, some law can help, but not law that embodies features like these, provisions which fly in the face of the Constitution, and which require for their effective execution the creation of a police state.93 Goldwater also objected to the public accommodations clauses because they "would force you to

92 93

Goldwater, The Conscience of a Conservative, 31. The "two portions of the bill" that Goldwater is referring to are Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act, which deal with public accommodation and employment discrimination. These two sections were the main reason why the bill was so vulnerable to filibusters by Southern Democrats. Goldwater later reiterated his opposition to these parts of the bill in a Firing Line interview with William F. Buckley, stating that were he still in the Senate, he would still vote against the bill if the bill had not changed. See Our Documents, Transcript of Civil Rights Act (1964), available from http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=old&doc=97&page=transcript; [6 October 2010]; Goldwater, With No Apologies, 180; Johnson, The Vantage Point, 157; and YouTube, Barry Goldwater explains his vote against the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Firing Line (1966), available online http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tacJtYPHKiE; [6 October 2010].

35 admit drunks, a known murderer or an insane person into your place of business," while the fair employment provisions would lead to the hiring of "incompetent" employees.94 The best thing that the president could do to solve these issues, according to the Arizonan, was to use the great moral influence of the Presidency to persuade and encourage localities to take up the task of leadership in the area, rather than simply shove civil rights legislation through Congress.95 Goldwater was thus opposed to the constitutionality of Kennedy's civil rights legislation, but not opposed to the legislation's objectives. Goldwater advocated more local and state leadership in addressing employment discrimination and segregation in public accommodations due to his extensive civil rights record in Arizona. In 1945, he founded the Arizona Air National Guard, and assumed command of the guards 197th Fighter Squadron a unit that was integrated at Goldwater's personal request - two years before President Truman desegregated the military.96 The Senator also ended racial segregation in his chain of family department stores, and proved instrumental in efforts to integrate Phoenix schools and lunch counters.97 A member of the NAACP in the early 1950s, Goldwater contributed $400 to the organization's efforts to desegregate the Phoenix school system, and later left the NAACP to join the Urban League.98 Given these successes, it is no wonder that Goldwater believed that "more could be accomplished for civil liberties at the local level

94 95

Goldberg, Barry Goldwater, 196-7. Kessel, The Goldwater Coalition, 210. 96 Goldwater with Casserly, Goldwater, 63. 97 Barnes, "Barry Goldwater, GOP Hero, Dies," 1. 98 Where Barry Stands, Time Magazine, 1-2.

36 than by faraway federal fiat."99 Nevertheless, the Senator sympathized with the civil rights movement that was advocating for rapid advances in the status of African Americans, and openly acknowledged that his approach to ending segregation and employment discrimination would be "time consuming."100 "If I were a Negro, I don't think I would be very patient either," he said.101 At the time of his assassination, President Kennedy had presented himself as a firm advocate for increased federal intervention in civil rights with his famous speech on the matter in June of 1963.102 However, it is also worth noting that Kennedys civil rights voting record while a Senator and Congressman was not very consistent with his actions as President; thus, Kennedy has largely been described as a moderate by many historians on the issue.103 As a senator, JFK had not been an active proponent of civil rights legislation, was reluctant to sponsor new legislation that addressed the matter, and certainly did not have a clear cut liberal voting record on civil rights issues when compared to other liberal members of Congress.104 In his unsuccessful quest for the Democratic Vice Presidential Nomination in 1956, Kennedy had wooed Southern delegations and stressed his moderation, and had publicly criticized President

99

Goldwater with Casserly, Goldwater, 172. See Goldwater, Mr. Conservative or YouTube, Barry Goldwaters opposition to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 101 Where Barry Stands, Time Magazine, 1-2. 102 See W.J. Rorabaugh, Kennedy and the Promise of the Sixties (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 112, and American Rhetoric, John F. Kennedy Civil Rights Address: Delivered 11 June 1963." For an interesting scale analysis of Goldwater, Kennedy, and Johnsons voting records on civil rights and other issues, see Charles H. Gray, A Scale Analysis of the Voting Records of Senators Kennedy, Johnson and Goldwater, 1957-60, The American Political Science Review, 59 (3), 615-21. 103 Brogan, Kennedy, 154. 104 See Goldberg, Barry Goldwater, 153, and Ions, The Politics of John F. Kennedy, 98.
100

37 Eisenhower for sending federal troops to Little Rock in 1957 and letting the situation get out of hand.105 When the Civil Rights Act of 1957 was being debated by the Senate, Kennedy had been one of the sponsors of the proposed OMahoney Amendment, which would have given trials to those held in criminal contempt of court and was emasculating to many civil rights militants of the day.106 Kennedys presidential ambitions also made him realize that winning the Democratic nomination for President in 1960 would be impossible without the support of the white South; thus, the Senator only became an aggressive fighter for African American rights when the fall campaign began, making several speeches in which his support for the civil rights cause appeared unequivocal.107 In an attempt to solidify his position with the black community during the last months of the presidential race, Kennedy made a highly publicized phone call to Coretta Scott King, after her husband had been arrested and jailed following his participation in civil rights demonstrations that had turned out to be crucial in winning the African American vote in such a highly contested and close election.108 In a further effort to gain black support for the young Democrat, the Kennedy campaign also ran a commercial that featured Harry Belafonte voicing his concerns about the future of the country.109 Kennedy's shifting stance on civil rights thus proves that he was the victim of his own, or his father's, ambition to run for
105 106

See Ions, The Politics of John F. Kennedy, 201, and Brogan, Kennedy, 155. Ions, The Politics of John F. Kennedy, 201. 107 See Brogan, Kennedy, 154, and Ions, The Politics of John F. Kennedy, 98, 201. 108 "Harris Wofford," John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, available from http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Biographies+and+Profiles/Profiles/Harri s+Wofford.htm; [1 July 2010]. 109 Verizon Foundation, "The Living Room Candidate - Commercials - 1960 - Harry Belafonte," available from http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1960/harrybelafonte; [1 July 2010].

38 the presidency and that he did not want to anger major Democratic constituencies. After winning the presidency, Kennedy made several moves to combat civil rights inequalities that were not only consistent with his liberal ideology, but also aimed at preserving his good standing with white Southerners. Due to his reluctance to lose Southern support for legislation and his small working margin in Congress, Kennedy initially decided not to seek civil rights legislation and instead decided to rely on his executive authority to combat injustice in the field of race relations.110 Under Kennedy, the federal government rapidly accelerated its hiring of African Americans, the Justice Department pressed litigation for school desegregation and voting rights, and the Interstate Commerce Commission banned segregation in bus facilities.111 Nevertheless, civil rights remained a political matter of low priority for Kennedy, and the young President took no pleasure in moving his party from the firm ground of economic liberalism to the politically treacherous terrain of racial liberalism.112 In order to prevent the Senate Judiciary Committee from blocking his nomination of Thurgood Marshall to the New York Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Kennedy had to agree to appoint segregationist Harold Cox to the federal bench in Mississippi.113 When Kennedy ordered the National Guard to supervise the attendance and enrollment of James Meredith at the University of Mississippi in 1962, he also made sure to refer to this episode as seldom as

110

Civil Rights Context in the Early 1960s, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, available from http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/JFK+in+History/Civil+Rights+Context+i n+the+Early+1960s+Page+3.htm; [6 October 2010]. 111 See Goldberg, Barry Goldwater, 153, and Civil Rights Context in the Early 1960s. 112 See Farber, The Rise and Fall of Modern American Conservatism, 102, and Goldberg, Barry Goldwater, 153. 113 Brogan, Kennedy, 158.

39 possible because of its potentially disastrous political consequences.114 During the 1964 campaign, many Southerners agreed with Barry Goldwater's stance that the federal government had no power to end segregation and employment discrimination in the South.115 Although Goldwater and his aides believed that the South, along with the West, were the keys to a Goldwater electoral victory (as these groups were believed to be most sympathetic to the rest of Goldwater's conservative agenda), Goldwater, unlike the Republicans who followed him, did not openly seek to gain Southern votes by exploiting racial tensions. The Senator refused to mention civil rights while campaigning down in Dixie, and sought a private meeting with President Johnson at the White House in which he agreed to eliminate any appeal to the passion of race in the fall campaign.116 Though Goldwater believed that a majority of Americans were conservative "in heart and mind," he did not seek to gain a majority of these (largely white) voters by referring to such people as "forgotten Americans" or "the silent majority" as Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew did in famous speeches.117

114 115

Ions, The Politics of John F. Kennedy, 99, and Brogan, Kennedy, 166. This agreement was reflected in the November general election results. Goldwater received 87% of the vote in Mississippi, 69% of the vote in Alabama, 57% of the vote in Louisiana, 54% of the vote in South Carolina, and 59% of the vote in South Carolina. All of these states had been Southern Democratic strongholds until 1964. See History Central, Presidential Election of 1964, available from http://www.historycentral.com/elections/1964state.html; [6 October 2010]. 116 See Figure 10, Robert Dallek, Flawed Giant: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 19611973 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 135; and White, The Making of the President 1964, 236. 117 See Olson, Whiteness and the Polarization of American Politics, 711; Goldberg, Barry Goldwater, 217; and YouTube, Richard Nixon 1969 Great Silent Majority, available from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v3K2N7FZSXc; [6 October 2010]. For an analysis of which groups Goldwater received the strongest support from in 1964, see Irving Crespi, The Structural Basis for Right-Wing Conservatism: The Goldwater Case, Public Opinion Quarterly, 29 (4): 523-543.

40 The only major speech that Goldwater made on civil rights occurred on October 16th in Chicago at a fundraising dinner, where the Arizona Senator attempted to approach the matter in a statesmanlike manner that no one would interpret as an appeal to white backlash.118 "Barriers infringe the freedom of everybody in society, not just minorities," said Goldwater. "The removal of such barriers enhances freedom... but it is equally clear that freedom is diminished when barriers are raised against the freedom not to associate. The idea that some predetermined bureaucratic schedule of equality must be imposed [by the Civil Rights Act in areas of public accommodation and employment]... will surely poison and embitter our relations with each other."119 Goldwater might have lost the black vote by an overwhelming margin to Johnson because of his position, but one could certainly argue that the Senator was correct that Americans relations with one another would be poisoned and embittered as a result of the Johnson's Civil Rights Act, given the outbreak of race-related violence that would occur in the United States over the next few years. Late in the campaign, the Republican presidential nominee was asked to preview a thirty-minute film that had been made by members of his campaign staff to criticize lawlessness and indecency in American society. The film, entitled "Choice," was intended to portray the Democrats as the party of pornographers, black rioters, and corrupt politicians, and featured footage of race riots, reveling beatniks, topless women, and a figure that was intended to be President Johnson throwing beer cans out of a

118 119

Kessel, The Goldwater Coalition, 209. See White, The Making of the President 1964, 332, and Goldberg, Barry Goldwater, 230.

41

Fig. 10 - Senator Goldwater with President Johnson at the White House in 1964. (See Goldwater with Casserly, Goldwater).

Fig. 11 The controversial Choice film that was canceled after Goldwater previewed it. (See YouTube, Barry Goldwater 1964 Campaign Film, Choice: Opening).

42 Cadillac.120 Goldwater was appalled by the ad, and killed the film before it was scheduled to air, claiming that it was "racist," "tasteless," "a cheap shot," and "portrayed the presidency in a bad light."121 Goldwater refused to appeal to racial tensions using advertising, yet Johnson refused to allow his Democratic base to become complacent in November. To ensure that black turnout remained high and that moderate Republicans and independents would consider voting for Johnson, the Democratic campaign made a controversial commercial that linked the Arizona Senator to the Ku Klux Klan, insinuating that Goldwater was a white supremacist due to his vote against the 1964 Civil Rights Act.122 Conclusion: Despite their differences on the use of the federal government to end the practices of segregation and employment discrimination in the South, Jack Kennedy and Barry Goldwater agreed that segregation was morally wrong and economically bad, while advocating that the federal government act in a number of other civil rights related areas. During his eventual campaign against Lyndon Johnson, Goldwater believed that his conservative ideas would appeal mostly to Westerners and Southerners, but unlike future Republican presidential nominees, the Senator did not use racially charged code words and phrases to appeal to the latter group in order to win Dixie's electoral votes. Goldwater
120

See Figure 11, YouTube, Barry Goldwater 1964 Campaign Film, Choice: Opening, available online http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YaL1lrGftqs; [6 October 2010]; Troy, See How They Ran, 218; and White, The Making of the President, 332-3. 121 See Joanne Morreale, The Presidential Campaign Film: A Critical History (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1993), 76, and Goldwater with Casserly, Goldwater, 204. 122 See Figure 12, and Verizon Foundation, The Living Room Candidate Commercials 1964 KKK, available online http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1964/kkk; [26 September 2010].

43

Fig. 12 Controversial commercial featuring the Ku Klux Klan released by the Johnson campaign in 1964. (See The Verizon Foundation, The Living Room Candidate Commercials 1964 KKK).

Fig. 13 Goldwaters Boy on Bicycle spot. (See Verizon Foundation, The Living Room Candidate Commercials 1964 Boy On Bicycle).

44 also refused to vote for the Civil Rights Act out of political expediency, instead advocating local and state solutions that had worked in Arizona but would probably not have appealed to civil rights campaigners. It is also worth noting that Goldwater, as a result of his occupation and Western upbringing, advocated local and state solutions to other domestic problems as well, and would thus agree with Kennedy on other issues, such as taxes and spending.

45 Chapter 3: Taxes, Spending, and Welfare In this chapter, a thorough analysis of Barry Goldwater and John F. Kennedy's views on various domestic spending measures will show that the two candidates were closer on such matters than is generally assumed. Like their stances on civil rights, several of Kennedy and Goldwater's views on domestic spending programs and tax cuts can be explained through an analysis of the candidates' backgrounds. It shall also be argued that Goldwater's choice to wage an issue-oriented campaign on taxes and spending related matters during his contest against Johnson is in direct contrast to many of the practices applied by today's advocates of Skinner's concept of a "partisan presidency." In his famous, best-selling manifesto, The Conscience of a Conservative, Barry Goldwater noted that "the root evil [of excessive government spending]" is that "the government is engaged in activities which it has no legitimate business. The only way to curtail spending substantially is to eliminate the programs on which excess spending is consumed; [thus], a staged withdrawal from government programs that are outside [the federal government's] mandate [is necessary]."123 Goldwater denounced Kennedy's initiative for raising and expanding coverage of the minimum wage for "tampering with the natural laws of the American free enterprise system," noting that a higher minimum wage would bring unemployment because American jobs would be lost to cheaper labor

123

Goldwater, The Conscience of a Conservative, 60.

46 markets overseas.124 He also opposed Kennedy's policy of rural electrification, and believed that the administration's plan to aid depressed areas would lead to vote buying and dependency and was "a long step toward the point where [Washington] would be able to control, by executive order not only prices, wages, working conditions, and hours, but even the places of employment."125 Goldwater was also opposed to what he deemed as "excessive taxation", as well as many federal programs that Kennedy supported, such as federal farm subsidies, federal education spending, the American welfare state, foreign aid, and other government programs such as the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). In his attack on federal farm subsides, Goldwater quoted Alexander Hamilton from the Federalist Papers, who noted that "supervision of agriculture and concerns of a similar nature... [could] never be desirable cares of a general jurisdiction," and that the attempt to exercise federal powers over agriculture "would be as troublesome as they were nugatory."126 The second Agricultural Adjustment Act, or AAA, which had been enacted by Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal Congress and upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of Wickard v. Filburn (1942), was to Goldwater not only unconstitutional, but

124

Under Kennedy's proposal, the minimum wage would be increased from one dollar an hour to $1.25 an hour. After a struggle with Congress, the minimum wage was increased to $1.15 an hour, and rose to $1.25 an hour two years later. See Goldberg, Barry Goldwater, 152; O'Brien, John F. Kennedy: A Biography, 564; and Kennedy, The Burden and the Glory, 37. 125 Donovan, The Americanism of Barry Goldwater, 76. 126 This quote is from Federalist Number 17. See The Conscience of a Conservative, 32.

47 more importantly, did not solve the problem of declining farm incomes.127 The "only way to persuade farmers to enter other fields of endeavor," in Goldwater's view, was to terminate farm subsidies and price support programs.128 In explaining Goldwater's position, Frank Donovan noted that if farmers were entitled to federal subsidies to help them cope with economic problems resulting from agricultural advances, cinema owners were entitled to subsidies to help them cope with television, and druggists and grocers were entitled to subsidies to help them compete with progressive distribution systems.129 Goldwater was not entirely opposed to federal help for farmers, however, and supported Kennedy's plan to give federal loans to farmers whose crops had been destroyed in an act of God and who could not receive assistance from local banks.130 On October 29th, 1960, during a campaign stop in Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, John F. Kennedy talked about the need for more federal education spending, and noted that in the near future, America would need to spend nearly twice as much on education

127

The second AAA was justified by the New Deal Congress as "a regulation of interstate commerce" after the first AAA, which had been justified under the "general welfare" clause of the Constitution, was found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in United States v. Butler (1936). In Wickard v. Filburn, a farmer was fined by the government for planting 23 acres of wheat, rather than the 11 acres the government had allotted him, despite the fact that the excess wheat was consumed by animals on his own farm. The Court reasoned that if Farmer Filburn had not used his own wheat for feed, he would have bought feed from someone else, and that this purchase would have effected the price of wheat that was transported in interstate commerce. Goldwater found this reasoning "bizarre." See Goldwater, The Conscience of a Conservative, 33-4, and Justia, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, available from http://supreme.justia.com/us/317/111/case.html; [6 October 2010]. 128 See Goldberg, Barry Goldwater, 139, and Goldwater, The Conscience of a Conservative, 36. 129 Donovan, The Americanism of Barry Goldwater, 129. 130 Ibid., 129.

48 as it was spending at the time in order to properly educate its youth.131 Like Kennedy, Barry Goldwater believed that education was one of the great problems of the 1960s, yet in Goldwater's view, federal education spending was not the answer to solving schooling deficiencies. The problem with the American school system was not a quantitative one, but rather a qualitative one in Goldwater's mind. The Arizona Senator believed in raising education standards substantially instead of spending more money, and objected to federal aid on the grounds that it was illegal, unnecessary, wasteful, and dangerous.132 The additional primary and secondary classrooms that Kennedy had proposed during his speech at Valley Forge were also unnecessary, in Goldwater's view, given that baby boomers had grown up and communities had responded adequately to the teacher shortage crisis of the 1950s.133 Despite disagreeing on the merits of federal education aid, both Kennedy and Goldwater believed that education was a matter of state and local control, and agreed that in some cases, state and local governments lacked the resources

131 132

Ions, The Politics of John F. Kennedy, 46. Goldwater's first objection to federal intervention in education was that it was unconstitutional. "Education is one of the powers reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment," he said. His second objection was that only one half of one percent of school districts in the country were in financial distress, and that it was up to the people who lived in such districts to remedy the problem through their local and state governments. The third objection was that federal aid for education came from funds extracted from the people who resided in the various states, and thus the federal government could force the people of the states to spend more money on education than they would ordinarily choose to spend by increasing federal taxes. Goldwater's final objection to federal aid to education was that it would inevitably lead to federal control of education, and noted that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was helping to determine the content of education through the National Defense Education Act of 1958. See Goldwater, The Conscience of a Conservative, 71-6. 133 Goldberg, Barry Goldwater, 152. It is worth noting that federal involvement in education was then not nearly as large as it is today, given that the Department of Education was not created until the late 1970s under President Jimmy Carter.

49 needed to tackle the problem.134 To address this dilemma, Kennedy advocated more federal assistance for building schools, an increased number of federal housing loans for state colleges, more government scholarships, and an expansion of student loan facilities.135 Goldwater, however, decided to work around the federal government in solving the education crisis, advocating that the federal government allow local property owners to take payments for school expenditures as a federal tax deduction in order to encourage leaders of local areas where schools were in trouble to raise taxes to fund education spending.136 Goldwater also objected to federal public works programs such as the Tennessee Valley Authority, stating that "Washington shouldn't intrude in the private sector and begin competing with companies and citizens who already support it through taxation.137 The TVA had a fertilizer production program and steam generating plants, thus Goldwater saw the Authority as a utility that could be sold, as he famously put it, "for a dollar," in late October 1963.138 Shortly after Goldwater made this remark, Kennedy laughed it off after being asked by reporters about it at a press conference. "He's had a busy week selling TVA, suggesting that military commanders overseas be permitted to
134

In The Conscience of a Conservative, Goldwater states that "responsibility for education "traditionally" rests with the local community. In a speech to Congress on federal education aid in February 1961, President Kennedy noted that "education must remain a matter of state and local control." See Ions, The Politics of John F. Kennedy, 57, and Goldwater, The Conscience of a Conservative, 71. 135 Ions, The Politics of John F. Kennedy, 58. 136 Donovan, The Americanism of Barry Goldwater, 75. By having local areas spend money as they see fit, the federal government avoids giving money to areas that do not need assistance, and thus resources are allocated more efficiently. 137 Goldwater with Casserly, Goldwater, 196. 138 Goldwater originally made this statement on the floor of the Senate in 1961, but repeated it later. See Richard H. Rovere, The Goldwater Caper (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc, 1964), 39.

50 use nuclear weapons, attacking the President of Bolivia, and involving himself in the Greek elections, said Kennedy. So, I thought that it really would not be fair for me this week to reply to him."139 Nevertheless, Kennedy was more serious on the matter two weeks later at an AFL-CIO convention speech, stating that he "did not believe that selling TVA [was] a program to put people to work."140 Barry Goldwater was also a strong opponent of the American welfare state that Kennedy had favored expanding. "Welfarism," stated Goldwater in The Conscience of a Conservative, "transforms the individual from a dignified, industrious, self-reliant spiritual being into a dependent animal creature without his knowing it. "[Given] the bankruptcy of doctrinaire Marxism [in the United States], [it is not surprising that] the currently favored instrument of collectivization is the Welfare State, [as collectivists have discovered] that private property can be confiscated as effectively by taxation as by expropriating it."141 "Let welfare [instead] be a private concern," said Goldwater. "Let it be promoted by individuals and families, by churches, private hospitals, religious service organizations, community charities and other institutions that have been established for this purpose. If we deem public intervention necessary, let the job be done by local and state authorities that are incapable of accumulating the vast political power that is so inimical to our liberties."142 Given Goldwater's hesitance to have the federal government promote the economic welfare of the American people, it is little wonder that the Senator
139

See Adam Clymer, "Barry Goldwater, Conservative and Individualist, Dies at 89," The New York Times, 29 May 1998; Goldberg, Barry Goldwater, 178; and Perlstein, Before the Storm, 237. 140 John F. Kennedy, The Burden and the Glory (London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1964), 39. 141 Goldwater, The Conscience of a Conservative, 63, 67. 142 Ibid., 68.

51 also opposed the government's attempt to give economic handouts to the people of other nations. "Foreign aid will not make communist leading nations America's allies," said Goldwater.143 "A man's politics are, primarily, the product of his mind. Material wealth can help him further his political goals, but will not change them."144 The foreign aid program was also inefficient in Goldwater's view, as the principle beneficiaries of the aid were international and multinational corporations, rather than impoverished foreigners.145 Goldwater's conservative views on many of the programs promoted by Kennedy and the Democrats of the 1960s are best explained by his Western upbringing and experience as a businessman.146 Goldwater's mother, Josephine, instilled a rugged sense of individualism and independence in her children, and taught them all how to shoot rifles and shotguns, as well as survive in the wilderness if they ever became stranded.147 "We didn't know the federal government," said Goldwater. During the Great Depression, no one that worked at Goldwater's stores was laid off, yet everyone took a pay cut, and the stores slashed inventory and reduced delivery services.148 If Goldwater's store could tighten its belts during hard times, why could not the federal government in good times? Given his experience as a business owner, it is certain that Goldwater must have been annoyed that some of the programs instituted by the Tennessee Valley Authority were competing with private business. As a private businessman, Goldwater must have thought, why would I want even more competition from a government that already
143

Barry M. Goldwater, Why Not Victory? A Fresh Look At American Foreign Policy (New York: MacFadden Books, 1963), 119. 144 Goldwater, The Conscience of a Conservative, 91. 145 Goldwater, With No Apologies, 84. 146 Farber, The Rise and Fall of Modern American Conservatism, 78. 147 Goldwater, Mr. Conservative. 148 Goldberg, Barry Goldwater, 31.

52 confiscates a third of my income each year? Goldwater's experience as a business owner was thus in direct contrast to his friend Jack Kennedy, who had sought a career in public service "because it beat following the dollar."149 Before other similarities between Goldwater and Kennedy on such matters are examined, it is worth noting that Goldwater was not opposed to all federal aid programs. Programs such as the Federal Housing Administration (a New Deal program that was an extension of consumer credit, not a handout), the Securities and Exchange Commission, Federal Deposit Insurance, and unemployment insurance were all fine in Goldwater's opinion, as they did not lead to centralized control or level a Washington brokerage fee that increased federal bureaucracy.150 Goldwater's acceptance of these programs on these grounds is thus also consistent with his Western upbringing and small government philosophy. Despite their differences on a variety of different programs that inevitably would have led to a debate on the role of the federal government in society, Goldwater and Kennedy did agree that the federal government was "overgrown, unwieldy, and almost unmanageable."151 Goldwater also admitted in his personal memoirs that Kennedy had been right about reducing taxes to stimulate the economy and strike at sluggish growth and unemployment, noting that "federal taxation increased even at the lower rate."152 The most important thing that the two men agreed on, however, was the matter of cutting taxes while controlling spending.

149 150

Sidey, John F. Kennedy: Portrait of a President, 366. Donovan. The Americanism of Barry Goldwater, 77. 151 Goldwater with Casserly, Goldwater, 156. 152 See Goldwater, With No Apologies, 157, and Sidey, John F. Kennedy: Portrait of a President, 365.

53 In the Conscience of a Conservative, despite his desire to abolish high taxes, Senator Goldwater noted "that as a practical measure, spending cuts must come before tax cuts."153 The Senator also stated that "the federal government cannot survive [in the long run] unless it balances its books," and that "continued unbalanced budgets will bring on more inflation and one day the sheer weight of the national debt will destroy the American economy."154 At a speech to the Economic Club of New York in 1962, President Kennedy noted that "the size of the deficit [should be] regarded with concern," and that "tax reduction must be accompanied by increased control of the rises in expenditures."155 The young Democrat believed that a country was only as strong as its currency, and agreed with Goldwater that high deficits would lead to inflation and weaken the dollar.156 Kennedy's stance on the deficit is perhaps best explained by the fact that despite being a millionaire, he was a notorious tightwad and conservative financier at heart who liked getting value for his money.157 In 1964, Kennedy was not Goldwater's opponent, yet Goldwater was still interested in running an issue-oriented campaign that addressed tax and spending related issues. Unlike many modern Republican campaigns that have been influenced by political

153

See Goldwater, The Conscience of a Conservative, 56-7, and Donovan, The Americanism of Barry Goldwater, 121. 154 See Goldwater, With No Apologies, 196, and Donovan, The Americanism of Barry Goldwater, 54. 155 Kennedy, The Burden and the Glory, 205. 156 O'Brien, John F. Kennedy: A Biography, 638. 157 Kennedy rarely carried any money on him, as the vast majority of his personal expenses were taken care of by his father's accountants in New York. Goldwater, like Kennedy, was also quite wealthy, but much less stingy than Kennedy. See O'Brien, John F. Kennedy: A Biography, 208; Brogan, Kennedy, 110; and Stephen Lemons, Goldwater Uncut, Phoenix New Times, available from http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2006-1019/news/goldwater-uncut/; [6 October 2010].

54 consultants and think tanks as a result of the new "partisan presidency" phenomenon, Goldwater's campaign did not turn to political consultants for advice on how to divide the opposition and buy votes.158 Unfortunately for the Arizona Senator, President Johnson did not share his predecessors view that presidential contests should be about substantive discourse between leading contenders on the major issues facing the country at the time. The Texan repeatedly refused Goldwater's requests to debate, citing national security reasons, and used his connections in the Senate to kill a congressional resolution suspending the "equal time" provision of the Communications Act requiring a part for minor, third-party candidates in debates.159 Johnson had been no stranger to close races in the past, and though his victory was all but assured given the country's grief over Kennedy's assassination, the President wanted his margin of victory over Goldwater to be as large as possible.160 Johnson was also haunted by the shadow of his fallen predecessor, and believed that a larger margin of victory would increase his party's margin in
158

Goldwater's campaign was influenced in some other respects, however, by some associates of William J. Baroody's American Enterprise Institute think tank. It is also worth noting that it was through Baroody's efforts that conservative intellectuals such as William F. Buckley were excluded from the Goldwater campaign. This occurred when Baroody leaked news of a meeting between Buckley and other Goldwater campaign members to discuss campaign strategy to the New York Times. According to Baroody, any association that Goldwater had with Buckley's magazine, National Review, would play into the hands of enemies who wished to associate the Arizona Senator with right wing fringe groups. See Perlstein, Before the Storm, 255, 471. 159 The "Equal Time Rule" was originally temporarily suspended by Congress in 1960 so that Kennedy could debate Richard Nixon. Kennedy had also intended to suspend this rule in 1964 in order to debate Goldwater. See Kessel, The Goldwater Coalition, 198; Troy, See How They Ran, 217; Minow, Inside the Presidential Debates, 2; and Dallek, Flawed Giant, 171. 160 In 1948, Johnson won a narrow victory in a Democratic Senate primary, edging out former Governor Coke Stevenson by the infamous margin of 87 votes. It is widely acknowledged that both sides committed voter fraud. Johnson was haunted by this victory for many years, and became known as "Landslide Lyndon" as a result. See Doris Kearns, LBJ and the American Dream (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1976), 206, and Mark, Going Dirty, 40.

55 Congress and allow him to "persuade" the federal legislature to approve more of his "Great Society" legislation.161 Though Americans gave Johnson credit for prosperity and for being an effective leader at the time, more than half of voters were unhappy or indifferent to the four and a half billion dollar increase in the federal budget, the administration's civil rights program and handling of medical care, and Johnson's war on poverty. "Beating up on Goldwater thus seemed the safest course," and thus Johnson was more receptive to advice from advisor Jack Valenti to treat the Arizona Senator "as a radical and preposterous candidate who would ruin the country."162 Goldwater's commitment to running an issue-oriented campaign on taxes and spending was reflected in his television spots and speeches. In spots such as "Boy on Bicycle," Goldwater criticized the federal government for taking a third of all earnings in the form of taxes and for "slowly but surely destroying individual initiative and responsibility."163 Out on the campaign trail, the Senator attacked Johnson's "war on poverty," stating that the effort was "as phony as a three dollar bill" and nothing more than "a Madison Avenue trick to win the election," while noting that the administrations record on foreign policy was one of "drift, deception, and defeat."164 In another speech, Goldwater stated that he was convinced that people were concerned with basic issues, and was thus not concerned with making certain areas of the country respond more

161

See Randall Bennett Woods, Fulbright: A Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 342. 162 Dallek, Flawed Giant, 168-9. 163 See Figure 13, and Verizon Foundation, The Living Room Candidate Commercials 1964 Boy On Bicycle, available from http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1964/boy-on-bicycle; [6 October 2010]. 164 Unger, LBJ: A Life, 304, and Kessel, The Goldwater Coalition, 197.

56 favorably to his message by trying to out-promise the Democrats.165 After the election, Goldwater was interviewed by the press and was asked whether he had any regrets about the campaign. We may not have spelled out all the issues as well as we could, he said. "That was the entire point of the campaign. If only Jack Kennedy were here, we would have had a good campaign.166 During the 1964 presidential race, Lyndon Johnson's campaign released a variety of different commercials that attacked and distorted Goldwater's stances on everything from national security ("Daisy," "Ice Cream") to public works programs such as the TVA ("Glen Canyon Dam") to civil rights ("KKK").167 Perhaps the most dishonest commercial on domestic spending related matters released by Johnson's campaign was the one that attacked Goldwater's plan to make Social Security voluntary. This particular ad exploited people's fears that Goldwater wanted to end the program (which had been created by a highly misleading headline in the Concord Monitor that stated: "Goldwater Sets Goals: End Social Security"), and featured a pair of disembodied hands ripping up a Social Security card.168 By releasing this commercial, Lyndon Johnson passed up an excellent opportunity to have an honest discussion with Senator Goldwater on strengthening and maintaining the Social Security system. Barry Goldwater believed that in its current state,
165 166

Kessel, The Goldwater Coalition, 205-6. Goldwater with Casserly, Goldwater, 220. 167 See Verizon Foundation, The Living Room Candidate Commercials 1964, available online http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1964/ [26 September 2010]. 168 See Figure 14, and Verizon Foundation, The Living Room Candidate Commercials 1964 Social Security, available online http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1964/social-security; [26 September 2010]. Theodore White noted that the headline was "a complete distortion of Goldwater's remarks. See Goldwater with Casserly, Goldwater, 160, and White, The Making of the President 1964, 302-3.

57

Fig. 14 Social Security, from the Lyndon Johnson campaign. (See Verizon Foundation, The Living Room Candidate Commercials 1964 Social Security).

Fig. 15 Republican Senator Margaret Chase Smith of Maine defends Goldwaters position on Social Security. (See Verizon Foundation, The Living Room Candidate Commercials -1964 Senator Margaret Chase).

58 Social Security was actuarially unsound, and was only designed "to prevent stark privation."169 He also criticized the Social Security Trust Fund as a "bookkeeping deception," as the money in the fund went straight into the U.S. Treasury and was spent outside the nation's budget.170 Despite these objections, Goldwater voted on numerous occasions to strengthen Social Security, and suggested making the program voluntary if someone who wanted to opt out was capable of providing for their own retirement.171 Because Lyndon Johnson refused to debate Barry Goldwater on Social Security and decided to make attack ads that distorted Goldwater's position on the matter instead, he thus missed out on an excellent opportunity to debate the Arizona Senator on how much of a role the government needed to play in helping individuals retire comfortably. Conclusion: Despite their disagreements on farm subsidies and the welfare state, Kennedy and Goldwater both believed that education should remain a matter of local and state control, and that tax reduction and deficit control were important to maintaining a healthy American economy. During his eventual race against Lyndon Johnson, Goldwater remained committed to running an issue oriented campaign on the issues of taxes and spending, and did not release commercials attacking the President's positions that would today be in line with what occurs under partisan presidents. Johnson, however, decided

169

See Goldwater, With No Apologies, 167, and Goldwater with Casserly, Goldwater, 160 170 Goldwater, With No Apologies, 195. 171 See Figure 15, and Verizon Foundation, The Living Room Candidate Commercials -1964 Senator Margaret Chase. Available [Online] http://www.livingroomcandidate.org/commercials/1964/senator-margaret-chase; [6 October 2010], and Goldwater with Casserly, Goldwater, 195.

59 not to run an issue oriented campaign on these matters, instead resorting to negative attack commercials and beginning the era of what Goldwater would later refer to as "electronic dirt."

60 Conclusion: 1964 was a pivotal year in American politics. In July, the Republican Party did the unthinkable at its convention in San Francisco by nominating a conservative for the presidency, which spelled the end of the domination of the party by its moderate, eastern establishment. During the fall campaign, the Democratic campaign would unleash a volley of negative advertisements, stunning the Republican opposition, and beginning the era of "electronic dirt." And in November, the incumbent President would win the presidential election in a landslide, sweeping over 61% of the vote and forty-four states.172 Our analysis of the relationship between Jack Kennedy and Barry Goldwater, however, shows that 1964 would likely have been a pivotal year in many other respects had Kennedy been the Democratic nominee for another term. Instead of hurling epithets, spreading rumors, and directing vitriol at one another, Kennedy and Goldwater would likely have campaigned together and debated policy and political philosophy in a pleasant and courteous manner. The focus of their debates probably would not have been Kennedy's good looks, or Goldwater's off-the-cuff comments, but the future of the country and how best to address America's problems. Would Kennedy and Goldwater's idea for stump debates work with any other two candidates? From our analysis of Goldwater's relationship with Lyndon Johnson, it is clear that neither man could stomach debating with the other for more than a few minutes. It is notable, however, that Barry Goldwater had relationships similar to the one he had with Jack Kennedy with other Democratic Senators, such as Hubert Humphrey

172

Perlstein, Before the Storm, 513.

61 and George McGovern. Goldwater and Humphrey, recalls former congressman Lee Hamilton, were "two of the great ideological warriors" of the late 1960s and early 1970s.173 After trying "to eviscerate each other rhetorically" during a heated debate, the two would joke together, leave the Senate floor, and head off for a drink or cup of coffee.174 Goldwater would often joke about Humphrey's fast and long-winded speeches, claiming that as a child, Humphrey "must have been vaccinated with a phonograph needle," or that when Humphrey spoke, "listening to him was like trying to read Playboy with your wife turning the pages" (Humphrey would reply that Goldwater would have been a great success in the movies working for Eighteenth Century-Fox").175 During the election, in which Humphrey ran as Johnson's running mate, Goldwater claimed that Humphrey was "a creature of the ADA," and Humphrey claimed that Goldwater was so extreme that he "had not even touched the shore" of his party, yet the two men got along great.176 Goldwater also had sharp disagreements, particularly on the issues of the Vietnam War and military spending, with Senator George McGovern. Despite their differences on these issues, McGovern praised Goldwater for always saying what he

173

Lee Hamilton, "Why Is Congress So Partisan?," available from www.centeroncongress.org/radio_commentaries/why_is_congress_so_partisan.php; [30 September 2010]. 174 In a speech at Notre Dame University, the late Tim Russert recalls watching Goldwater and Humphrey debate on the Senate floor (near the end of the clip). See YouTube, "Tim Russert on William F. Buckley, Jr. at Notre Dame," available from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eO7Mtv1SmfY; [30 September 2010]. 175 Goldwater disagreed "almost violently" with Humphrey's political philosophy, yet describes him as "warm," "wonderful," "direct" and "never vindictive." See Goldwater, With No Apologies, 58, and Lemons, Goldwater Uncut. 176 See Kessel, The Goldwater Coalition, 209 and 224. The ADA Goldwater is referring to is the "Americans for Democratic Action," a left wing political organization whom Goldwater referred to as having "abandoned the Marxist approach" in favor of using excessive taxation policies to achieve collectivization. See Goldwater, The Conscience of a Conservative, 63.

62 thought was right, and Goldwater continually praised McGovern for his service as a combat bomber pilot during World War II.177 Senate relationships such as those shared by Goldwater, Kennedy, Humphrey, and McGovern are rare or non-existent in today's upper chamber of Congress. According to George Packer of The New Yorker, the "world's greatest deliberative body" has increasingly become populated by "ideologues and charlatans," and is now bordering on dysfunctionality due to the unreasonableness of a few members.178 Since Democrats took control of the body in 2006 and expanded their majority in 2008, the number of Senate cloture votes to end debate has spiked as the result of a vast increase in the number of Republican filibuster threats.179 Such high levels of partisanship have arguably been made worse by partisan cable news networks and talk radio personalities. In 1964, the three major news networks were largely non-partisan, yet two of the three major networks (FOX News and MSNBC) today largely cater to audiences on opposite sides of the political spectrum in a quest for ratings. Also present in the 1960s was the so-called radio "Fairness Doctrine" that was instated in 1949 and upheld by the Supreme Court twenty years later, which required the holders of broadcast licenses to present controversial issues of public importance in a manner that the Federal Communications

177

Goldwater was no stranger to flying planes himself, as he had also served in the Air Force during the war, and flew over a hundred different planes throughout his lifetime. See Goldwater, Mr. Conservative, and George McGovern, "Goldwater: A Good Friend," The Washington Post, 4 June 1998, A23. 178 George Packer, "The Empty Chamber: Just how broken is the Senate?," The New Yorker, 9 August 2010. 179 See Ben Frumin and Jason Reif, "The Rise of Cloture: How GOP Filibuster Threats Have Changed the Senate," available online http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/01/the-rise-of-cloture-how-gop-filibusterthreats-have-changed-the-senate.php; [30 September 2010].

63 Commission (FCC) deemed "honest, equitable, and balanced."180 In August 1987, President Reagan abolished the doctrine via an executive order, and thus today talk radio is dominated by conservative radio hosts.181 If a positive, issue oriented debate is ever to occur in American politics between the two contenders for the presidency as Kennedy and Goldwater planned in 1964, leaders from both parties will have to resist the urge to polarize the electorate that began with Nixon and was mastered by Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush. In today's two party system, where the presidency is decided not by the will of the people but by fifty percent of the vote plus one in a handful of swing states, there is a high incentive to polarize, and a low incentive to show agreement with members of the other party.182 The last two presidential contests certainly reflect this trend in the content of the

180

The Supreme Court case that upheld the Fairness Doctrine (Red Lion Broadcasting Company vs. Federal Communications Commission) originated when Fred J. Cook, the author of Goldwater: Extremist of the Right, was personally attacked by religious radio host Billy James Hargis on Hargis' "Christian Crusade" radio broadcast on WGCB in Red Lion, Pennsylvania. Cook sued Hargis, and argued that he was entitled free airtime to respond to Hargis' accusations due to the Fairness Doctrine. In 1969, the Court ruled unanimously that the doctrine was constitutional. For the full text of the case, see Justia, "Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367: Volume 365, 1969," available from http://supreme.justia.com/us/395/367/case.html; [30 September 2010]. 181 "The Top Talk Radio Audiences," Talkers Magazine, available from http://talkers.com/online/?p=71; 30 September 2010]. 182 See Hill, "Divided We Stand: The Polarizing of American Politics," 3-14. Hill notes that partisan residential patterns have made it easier for partisans in control of redistricting to carve the electoral map into solid red or blue congressional districts, which in turn allows party strategists to target resources to the relatively few districts where close races are expected. The same strategy is arguably true of national politics, as neither Democrats nor Republicans tend to spend hundreds of millions of dollars in advertising in solid red or blue states.

64 advertisements released by both parties.183 If today's elections were truly issue-oriented, the U.S. National Debt would not be approaching $14 trillion, and partisans from both sides would not be squabbling over petty social issues such as abortion and gay marriage. Until such issues are resolved, and both parties lose the incentive to use partisan media to spread an oversimplified message crafted by political consultants, it is clear that Americans will never again have the chance to witness a completely positive, issueoriented presidential campaign.

183

An overwhelming majority of the advertisements released by the Bush campaign in 2004 were negative, as were a substantial amount of the commercials released by Barack Obama and John McCain in 2008. See Verizon Foundation, "The Living Room Candidate."

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