The State and the Nation: Changing Norms and the Rules of Sovereignty in International Relations Author(s): J.

Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cronin Reviewed work(s): Source: International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Winter, 1994), pp. 107-130 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706916 . Accessed: 25/04/2012 02:21
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J.SamuelBarkin BruceCronin and

The stateand thenation:changing normsand therulesofsovereignty in international relations

The international relationsliterature as regularly embraces sovereignty the rule primary constitutive of international organization.' Theoreticaltraditions that agree on littleelse all seem to concur that the defining featureof the moderninternational system the division theworldintosovereign is of states. Despite differences over the role of the state in international affairs, most scholars wouldacceptJohn of as Ruggie'sdefinition sovereignty "theinstitutionalizationofpublicauthority within exclusive mutually jurisdictional domains."2 Regardless of the theoreticalapproach however,the concept tends to be viewed as a static,fixedconcept: a set of ideas that underliesinternational relations but is not changed along with them. Moreover, the essence of is and territoriality sovereignty rarelydefined;while legitimate are authority thekeyconceptsin understanding international relations scholars sovereignty, rarely examinehow definitions populationsand territories of changethroughout history howthischangealtersthenotionoflegitimate and authority.3 of Definitions sovereignty tend to focus on its legal content;this content therefore is The changeslittle, of sovereignty seen as fixed.4 institutionalization
We thankMlada Bukovansky, JamesMcAllister, KathleenMcNamara,PatriciaMoynagh, John Odell, Jack Snyder,Hendrik Spruyt,Tami Stukey,and two anonymousreviewersfor their comments. earlierversionof thisarticlewas presentedat the annual meeting the Northeast An of International StudiesAssociation, Providence, RI., 5-7 November1992. 1. Constitutive rulescan be defined conceptsthatcreateand definenew forms behavior(x as of countsas y in context They are standardized, c). relatively unchanging practicesthatconstitute a for vocabulary international communication. p. 455 of David Dessler, "What's at Stake in the See Agent-Structure Debate?" Intemational Organization (Summer1989),pp. 441-73. 43 2. See p. 143 of JohnRuggie,"Continuity and Transformation the World Polity:Toward a in NeorealistSynthesis," Robert0. Keohane, ed.,Neorealism Its Critics in and (New York: Columbia University Press,1986),pp. 131-57. 3. Lipset defineslegitimacy the capacityof the system engenderand maintainthe belief as to thatthe existing politicalinstitutions ones for (and institutional forms)are the mostappropriate See MartinLipset,Political Man (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960),p. 77. society. Seymour 4. Even legal conceptsof sovereignty changeovertime.For example,theconceptof human do as in rights defined theUnitedNationsCharterand thevariousHelsinkiaccordsdoes diminish the legal rights sovereign of stateswithrespectto their thisis a separateissue from the citizens, though one beingaddressedhere. Intemational Organization 1,Winter1994,pp. 107-30 48, ? 1994byThe 10 Foundationand theMassachusetts Institute Technology of

Organization 108 International as of within exclusive domainsis, however, mucha function mutually authority as as its legitimacy of its legal content.Thus an institutional, opposed to a of of mustaddress the legitimization purelylegal, understanding sovereignty As as system well as its formaldefinition. we argue below, the nation-state tend to change fromera to era. This study of understandings legitimacy as some of the examinesthe concept of sovereignty a variable by exploring circumstancesunder which the political legitimationof the nation-state are changesover time.In doingso we will argue thatthe rules of sovereignty interpretations.5 nor constant, ratherare subjectto changing but neither fixed Specificallywe hold there has been a historical tension between state and authority a defined whichstressesthe linkbetweensovereign sovereignty, whichemphasizesa linkbetweensovereign and territory, nationalsovereignty, in differ the and authority a definedpopulation.The twotypesfundamentally as source of their legitimation independententities,therebyalteringthe whichstatesrelateto each other. environment through During periods when internationalnorms legitimizestate rather than will and the community itsinstitutions tend nationalsovereignty, international claimsof domestic of statesagainstnationalist to defendtherights established order ethnicgroups.On the otherhand,when the normsof the international will the community be more favor nationaloverstatesovereignty, international oftenat the expense of to sympathetic pleas fornationalself-determination, are establishedstates.The legitimizing principles called into questionduring crises,such as worldwars or widespreadpoliticalupheavals, major systemic coalitionoftensees the previousemphasison one because the new dominant as formof sovereignty the cause of the crisis.The coalition then creates a postwar order that reflectsthis belief. This dynamicoccurs because it is simultathe principles satisfy statistand nationalist impossibleto completely leadingto a the tendsto generateitsowncrisis, Therefore, newsystem neously. reevaluation thenormative of principle. in in will probes,ranging plausibility This argument be highlighted fourbrief to time fromthe post-Napoleonicsettlement the present.We argue conseshould be viewed as a variable ratherthan as a quentlythat sovereignty constant and thereforethat the state as a basic analyticunit should be scrutinized international in relations theory.6 Sovereigntyas a variable is For realism, sovereignty a necessary constant; it is the fundamental is Institutional whichthe realistnotionof anarchy derived.7 from assumption
are 5. The "rules of sovereignty" definedas a set of principlesby which the international of controlover a specifiedpopulation and community recognizesthe legitimacy authoritative territory. distinction the only or even the most is that the state/national 6. We are not suggesting of We important elementof change in the legitimation sovereignty. suggestonly that it is an can of one important thatcan illustrate wayin whichunderstandings sovereignty change. one in of and reference to sees sovereignty primarily terms itslegal definition without 7. Morgenthau

Stateversusnation 109 as to approachessimilarly sovereignty a given. take According StephenKrasner of has forexample,the "historical legacyof the development the statesystem left a powerfulinstitutional structure(sovereignty), one that will not be dislodged easily, regardless of changed circumstances in the material is environment."8 JaniceThomsonand Krasnerfurther argue thatsovereignty Even not onlya constantbut is unlikely change at all in the near future.9 to those theoreticaltraditionsthat focus on the role of rules and norms in in providing orderto the international system tend to approach sovereignty a staticway. Hedley Bull, for example,argues that "an independentpolitical whichmerely claimsa right sovereignty is judged byothers to to community (or in have sucha right), cannotassertthisright practice, nota stateproperly but is The questionsof the basis upon whichsuch a rightis asserted, so-called."10 what constitutes legitimate a claim, and how thisstandardhas been applied are throughout history all leftunexplored. From this briefoverviewit is apparentthat the bulk of the international relations literaturegenerally does not account for any variation in the It not legitimation sovereignty of through courseofmodernhistory. is often the appreciated fullythat sovereignty a social construct, is and like all social institutions locationis subjectto changing its interpretations. otherwords, In whilethe specific thatwhichis expression sovereignty remainconstant, of may in of considered be sovereign to changes.This inflexibilitythestudy sovereignty has undulyconstrained usefulness the conceptfortheoriesof internathe of tionalorganization. The way in whichpoliticalactorsdefinethe politicaland and over territory populations geographicboundariesof legitimate authority will the on strongly affects principles whichthe international system function. At a minimum stipulateshow sovereignty it may be created or transferred, the issue following worldwar or othermajorupheavalin a historically primary thesystem. particular defines In such it howstatesuccessionis to be regulated,

is to its legitimation. Sovereignty supreme authority create and enforcelaws withina given is fixedand indivisible. Hans J. See sovereignty conceptually territory. Therefore Morgenthau for for Morgenthau, Politics AmongNations:TheStruggle Powerand Peace, 6thed. (New York: Alfred sovereignty whetherstates remain is A. Knopf,1985). For Waltz the relevantissue concerning is are See on independent; principles whichstateauthority legitimized notimportant. Kenneth the 1979), especially chap. 5. Politics(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, Waltz,Theory Intemational of within to is one's ability maintainorderand control For Gilpin sovereign authority derivedfrom it stable borders. "Within the territory encompasses," Gilpin argues, "the state exercises a is in use monopoly the legitimate of forcesand embodiesthe idea thateveryone the territory of subject to the same law or set of rules." Robert Gilpin, War and Change in WorldPolitics University Press,1981),p. 17. (Cambridge, England:Cambridge Perspective," Comparative 8. See p. 90 of StephenD. Krasner,"Sovereignty: Institutional An 2 Political Studies (April 1988),pp. 66-94. 9. JaniceE. Thomson and Stephen Krasner,"Global Transactionsand the Consolidationof and Theoretical in Czempieland JamesN. Rosenau, eds., Global Changes Sovereignty," Ernst-Otto to Politics the1990s (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), for Challenges: Approaches World pp. 195-219. in Politics (New York: Columbia 10. Hedley Bull, TheAnarchical Society:A Study Order World of University Press,1977),p. 9.

110

International Organization

as when large statesbreak apart into smallerunitsor when severalsovereign unitscombineintoone. in and maintaining orderin How important rulesof sovereignty creating are is A theinternational system? realist mayarguethatsovereignty based less on a than on the ability a politicalgroupto establishdomestic of set of principles and external attack.As RobertArtand control overitsterritory defenditfrom of politicsnot RobertJervis pointout,the anarchicenvironment international but onlyallowsevery stateto be thefinal judge ofitsowninterests also requires Yet the veryfoundation the thateach providethe means to attainthem.1" of laws, nation-state system-its diplomaticprocedures,treaties,international and that wars,and all otherinstitutions provideforcommunication interaction leadersthat amonggovernment amongstates-rests on themutualrecognition a an within exclusive domain. each represent specific jurisdictional they society and legitimation prerequisites participation are for in Diplomaticrecognition Inis Claude argues,is the systemas a fullmember.The typeof legitimacy, a thana legal or moralfunction.12 Thus a nationalist essentially politicalrather that takes military group claimingto representa population and territory as action in supportof its claim is consideredterrorist; such, it is generally At condemnedand opposed (oftenmilitarily) the world community. the by is muchit is disliked, recognized having right as the same timea state,however force. to defenditsclaimswithmilitary of affect can Changes in the contentand understanding sovereignty greatly thewaysinwhichstatesare constrained enabled to act in theirinternational or of relations. Anthony As Giddens pointsout,the sovereignty the nation-state of State authorities were does not precede the development the state system. not originally destined to become empoweredwith an absolute sovereignty confinedby a growingnetworkof international connections.Rather, the of development statesovereignty depended (and stilldepends) on a monitored relations'are not connections set of relationsbetweenstates." 'International set up betweenpreestablished states,"Giddens argues,"whichcould maintain theirsovereignty withoutthem:theyare the basis upon whichnation-states existat all."'13

the Sovereignty: stateand thenation

in relationshas been ascribedto twodifferent types Sovereignty international of entities:states,definedin termsof the territories over whichinstitutional
in 11. See p. 3 of RobertArt and RobertJervis, "The Meaning of Anarchy," RobertArt and Politics: and DecisionMaking, RobertJervis, eds., Intemational Anarchy, Force,PoliticalEconomy, 2d ed. (Boston: Little,Brown, and Company, 1985). as 12. See p. 370 of Inis L. Claude, Jr.,"CollectiveLegitimization a PoliticalFunctionof the 20 UnitedNations,"Intemational Organization (September1966),pp. 367-79. of Press, 13. Anthony Giddens, TheNation-State Violence and (Berkeley:University California 1987),p. 263.

Stateversusnation 111 authoritiesexercise legitimatecontrol, and nations, defined in terms of "communitiesof sentiment"that form the political basis on which state rests.14 and authority Whiletheyare institutionally structurally alike,thesetwo in as ideal types differ fundamentally thesourceoftheir legitimation sovereign In entities. thisarticle present conceptsof "state" and "nation" as ideal we the of of typesto examinethe ramifications differing interpretations the sourceof In legitimate authority within definedpoliticalboundary. practicethereis a a and continuumfromstatistto national legitimation sovereignty, nationof statesalwaysshowsome characteristics both. of Since the seventeenth the century statehas been recognizedas the supreme This ended both the Church's power withina definedjuridical border.15 claimsto politicalauthority the overlapping and of transnational jurisdictions nobles, kings,and clerics that characterizedthe late medieval system.As Ruggie points out, the distinction between internaland externalpolitical realms, separatedbyclearly demarcated boundaries, a modernphenomenon; is it is the constitutive basis of the nation-state system.16 State sovereigntyinstitutional authority within a set of clearly demarcated boundaries-is self-justifying; historical possessionlegitimates continued jurisdiction. much In of Europe, its originscan be traced to the legal titlesand dynastic ties that that providedmonarchs witha claim to the territory eventually providedthe basis for the modern state. In this way state legitimation similarto the is in legitimation property manysystems law; possession,in the absence of of of claimsbyothers, leads to ownership. after juridical this Modernconceptsofthenationbegan to developa century of of The feature modernnationalism understanding the state.17 distinguishing and is the claim thatnationsshouldbe politically self-determining thatgroup in the sentiment shouldserveas thesole criterion defining (nationalsolidarity) nation.18 The nation-stateis accordingly legitimatedto the extent that it the of stems nation.Legitimation represents politicalaspirations a particular notfrom boundariesbutfrom community sentiment. the the of

14. The quotationis fromWeber,who definesa nationas "a community sentiment of which would adequately manifestitselfin a state of its own; hence, a nation is a community which normally tends to produce a state of its own." See Max Weber, From Max Weber:Essays in Sociology, Hans H. Gerthand C. Wright Mills,eds. (New York: Oxford University Press,1981),p. 176. 15. The term"juridical"is beingused here to refer a formally to statedand definedterritorial boundary sanctioned international by law. 16. Ruggie,"Continuity Transformation theWorldPolity," 142-43. and in pp. 17. There is some historiographic debate as to whether territorial statesas currently understood preceded the communities sentiment which nations are based. See, for example, M. S. of on Anderson,TheAscendency Europe(Totowa,N.J.:Rowmanand Littlefield, of 1972),p. 161. 18. For further discussions nationalism itsdevelopment, ErnestGellner, of and see Nationsand Nationalism(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and NationalismSince 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: on and (London: Verso, 1983); Reflections theOrigins SpreadofNationalism and Anthony Smith, Theories Nationalism of (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1983).

Organization 112 International therehas been a tension between of Since theevolution modernnationalism, which stressesthe link between two opposing principles:state sovereignty, and and a definedset of exclusivepoliticalinstitutions, sovereignauthority and authority whichemphasizesa linkbetweensovereign nationalsovereignty, of State sovereignty emphasizesthe integrity borders a definedpopulation.19 If and based on historical possession,nationalfrontiers, viability.20 we follow of institutions of thislogic,theviability a stateis based on theability established is over to exerciseauthority thepopulation.This control bestassuredbystable, stateswithstronginstitutions ratherthan by newlydefinednations effective Thus fromthe that may lack administrative competenceand social stability. norms of international system, perspectiveof the stability the international of of should favor the stability sovereignstates over the unpredictability sovereign nations. Since most countries contain some type of minority based on nationalclaimscan be seen as potentially population,a sovereignty authority sincethereis no international destabilizing all states.In addition, for treatiesand agreements, statesbased on long-standing capable of enforcing of can ensurecompliance stableinstitutions historic and control territory better of This is reinforced thefactthat by thanthosebased on principles nationality. whereasnationalidentification, being objectively, juridicalborderscan be fixed in cannotbe fixed thesame way. inherently subjective, to The resistanceof stateswithinan anarchicalsystem changesof borders considerationsas well. withinit can be derived throughbalance-of-power as inasmuch itbenefits According such an approach,anychangeofborders, to and therefore the should lead to one state over another,affects equilibrium thereis a systemic tendency balancingbehaviorbyotherstates.Consequently, foranyputative changeofbordersto be balanced againstbysome coalitionof we the thosewho standto lose from change.21 Thus,in a stateofanarchy should made to conform withnationalities.22 expectstatesto oppose borderalterations
as 19. The idea of "national" sovereignty it is used here should not be confusedwithideas of it National sovereignty in fact a subset of popular sovereignty; is a is "popular" sovereignty. ways of particulardefinition who the people in "popular" are. There are two predominant of be understanding popular sovereignty. One is that it means that the state should ultimately responsibleto the people as individualpoliticalbeings. This has its roots in Lockean political The other and of as and civilrights. theory can resultin such requirements government democracy to of group wayof understanding conceptis thatit refers the rights a self-identifying to govern the ways itself a separatepoliticalentity. as This idea has itsrootsin different in bothRousseauian and It and oriented thefirst as understanding. is Hegelianpoliticaltheory need notbe as democratically withnationalsovereignty itis used here. thisapproachto popularsovereignty is compatible that as and external self-determination discussed This distinction follows distinction the betweeninternal of (New Haven, Conn.: Yale by Lee Buchheit in Secession: The Legitimacy Self-Determination University Press,1978),pp. 13-16. 20. See Hobsbawm, Nationsand Nationalism, 31-32. pp. see Politics, chap. 6; 21. For the logicofbalance-of-power theory, Waltz,Theory Intemational of A and of EdwardV. Gullick, of Europe's ClassicalBalance ofPower: CastHistory theTheory Practice One of theGreatConcepts EuropeanStatecraft (Westport, Conn.: GreenwoodPress,1982); and of Politics(Baltimore: Johns Essays on Intemational Arnold Wolfers,Discord and Collaboration: HopkinsUniversity Press,1962),chap. 12. 22. This does not necessarilyimplythat state borderswill be fixedand impermeable.For

Stateversusnation 113 On the other hand, states also relate to each other in termsof common practices,norms,and rules where such rules provide the basis for making conduct,for advancingclaims of judgmentsof just and unjustinternational States are concerned rights, forseekingredresswhenrules are violated.23 and with their social as well as their physical well-being,in particular the as and of legitimation theirown authority of the system a whole. As Claude intoauthority, comperequiresthat"powerbe converted argues,legitimation "24 and by tencebe supported jurisdiction, possessionbe validatedas ownership. withthe internaof requiresthatstatesconform The maintenance legitimacy era changesfrom to tionalcommunity's conceptionofjustice.This conception whichto judge whatis just. era, and thustherecan be no singlestandardfrom Accordingto Claude, however,there is a tendencyfor a single concept of era. Statistprinciples, in dominant a particular legitimacy become generally to from balance of the a thatis foundedon bases ranging reflecting legitimation have dominated at times. However, "the power to dynasticconservatism, as of modernera has also seen the establishment nationalself-determination of the basis of legitimate statehood,and the global extension the reach of this of developments legitimizing principlehas been one of the most significant To recent decades."25 the extentthat this is true,modern states should be borders based on to expected to be sympathetic the idea of international their and by extension the nationality, thishelps to legitimize state system as whendisjunctures become apparentbetween ownrolewithin Consequently, it. in a juridicalboundaries and nationalistsentiments, societyof nation-states from shouldsupport derivesprimarily nationalist principles whichlegitimation altering those borders to better reflect the principle of national selfdetermination. in fulfilled all circumThese two ideals clearlycannot be simultaneously on recognized whennationalclaimsinfringe the currently stances,particularly in states.Should the stateemphasispredominate bordersof existing sovereign over the national emphasis,then internathe understanding sovereignty of and the international determined, tional borderswill be seen as territorially of can community be expectedto defendthe interests establishedstatesover nationalistaspirations.On the other hand, should the national emphasis defined populations thenstateswillbe seen as tiedto specifically predominate, malleable to suit the evolutionof nations.The international and territorially will to claims,oftenat the community then be more sympathetic nationalist
practiceforsovereigns it and centuries was notuncommon example,in the seventeenth eighteenth the in of often theinterest preserving balance ofpower. territory amongthemselves, to redistribute being rarelyregarded the wishes of the populations of the territories These redistributions, theywere undertakenpurelyforraisonsd'etat. As such, theycan be seen as a redistributed; perspective. from balance-of-power a stabilizing mechanism and the Relations of States (Princeton,N.J.: Princeton 23. Terry Nardin, Law, Morality, Press,1983),p. 34. University as 24. Claude, "CollectiveLegitimization a PoliticalFunctionof theUnitedNations,"p. 367. 25. Ibid.,p. 369.

114 International Organization expense of established states. This tension is always present within the acute during periodswhenthe international system, itbecomesparticularly but international orderundergoesrapidchange.26 during and Historically, understandings sovereignty of tend to be redefined the conclusion of major wars or in the aftermath widespread of following are of political upheavals. Such understandings a reflection the normsand principles that underlay the legitimationof the nation-statefollowinga particularera. Accordingto Robert Gilpin, a necessary"componentof the and of is or governance an international system a set of rights rulesthatgovern These rules,Gilpinargues, the at least influence interactions amongstates."27 are negotiatedat the conclusionof greatwars,where the negotiatedtreaties of serveas theconstitution thestatesystem.28 in It is our contention thatthe legitimation the nation-state a particular of aroundwhichthewinning coalition era is determined largely the principles by unites duringthe course of a great war, as well as in its aftermath, the as a order. These principles dominantcoalition constructs new international deduced solely fromthe nature of the states and the cannot be objectively distribution capabilities,29 must also be induced fromthe process of of but the consensusamongthemembers of building coalitionand theintersubjective We base this propositionon the the coalition as to the cause of the war.30 premise that norms and principlesare at least partiallyderived through ratherthan froman objectivenotion of self-interest.31 political interaction, Since the verynature of the nation-state systemcontainselementsof both nationalismand statism,one cannot know a prioriwhich principlewill be coalition. adoptedbya particular
26. As Kissingerargues, a stable social order lives with an intuitionof permanence,and to whilea revolutionary by opposition it is eitherignoredor assimilated, periodis characterized its self-consciousness, because political life loses its spontaneityonce the existingpattern of A Restored: obligations has been challenged.See HenryKissinger, World Mettemich, Castlereagh and theProblems Peace, 1812-1822(Boston: HoughtonMifflin, of 1958),p. 192. 27. Gilpin,Warand Changein World Politics, 34. p. 28. Ibid.,p. 36. to See 29. This runscontrary Waltz'sargument. his Theory Intemational of Politics. 30. There is a growing literature the effects intersubjective on of understandings agencyin on these international relations.The school of thought that stressesthe importance examining of to understandings sometimes is referred as "constructivist" "reflectivist." an introduction to or For thisliterature, interalia, AlexanderWendt,"AnarchyIs What States Make of It: The Social see, of 46 Construction PowerPolitics,"Intemational Organization (Spring1992), pp. 391-426; Robert Institutions: Approaches," Two Studies 32 Keohane,"International Quarterly (DecemIntemational of ber 1988), pp. 379-96; Nicholas Onuf, Worldof Our Making (Columbia: University South Problem in International Carolina Press, 1989); Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure 41 RelationsTheory," International Organization (Summer1987), pp. 335-71; Dessler, "What's at and JohnRuggie,"International Stake in the Agent-Structure Debate?"; FriedrichKratochwil 40 A Organization: State of the Art on the Art of the State," Intemational Organization (Autumn 1986), pp. 753-75; and FriedrichKratochwil, Rules, Norms,Decisions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1989). 31. There is a growing literature the relationship on between politicalprocess and political Is outcomes.See, forexample,Wendt,"Anarchy WhatStatesMake of It."

Stateversusnation 115 created as a we Furthermore, argue that this consensus is itselfpartially on reactionto a perceivedoveremphasis eitherthe state or the nationduring and national the previous period. The tension between state legitimation resolved;as discussedabove,theideals of legitimation neverbe completely can and stateand nationare oftencontradictory, the realizationofbothcan rarely on orderfocuseslegitimacy be simultaneously achieved.When an international will one, tensionsoftenarise in the other.Thus, postwarsettlements tend to favorone over the other,and the emphasis is oftenreevaluatedduringthe order. Consequently,we suggestthat the creation of a new international tensiondepends on whichemphasisis seen as resolution the state/nation of order. The of more destabilizingduringthe construction an international through general cannotbe determined precisecontentof postwarsettlements unique. Rather, we argue that the general theory;they are historically oscillatesbetweenstateand nation.Statedin dialectical emphasisoflegitimacy is of and nationalist the of terms, legitimacy the nation-state a synthesis statist drivea The of forms legitimation. potentialcontradictions these twoforms of developsin a crisisand changesto processin whichthe contentof legitimacy favor one form overthe other. examinefourhistorical cases as a plausibility We will now briefly probe for of this approach. The four eras examined are ones in which definitions were on sovereignty focusedalternately thestateand thenation.In doingso we will highlight how the relevantactorsviewed the natureof the international systemat the time, their concept of a legitimatenation-state,and the of determination state borders.The periods thatwill be studiedinclude the of wars: the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, World aftermath the following War II, and thecold war.

order Statesovereignty thepost-Napoleonic and

came One ofthe earliestchallengesto theWestphalian conceptof sovereignty From 1792 to 1815,France about in theyearsfollowing Frenchrevolution. the Europe, its control)throughout to (and territorial attempted export revolution and with each conquest the ideas of nationhood,republicanism, bringing the on These ideas directly threatened principles whichmostEuropean liberty. from the monarchies the werebased. In addition, following Frenchwithdrawal the territories conquered during Napoleonic Wars,morethan halfof Europe that had ruled much of the was without The Hapsburgdynasty government. the intoa modernstate.Consequently, old continental regionwas reorganized and of dynasties, stateswas replacedbya morerationalsystem principalities, on thisnewsystem wouldbe ized system modernstates.The principles which of of importance. legitimized weretherefore utmost order Followingthe defeatsof Napoleon in 1814 and 1815,an international was constructed thevictorious coalitionthatlastedat least until1848and to by

Organization 116 International a lesser extentthrough1856. This order was based in large part on the principlesthat united a rather diverse group of states in opposition to of monarchy Britainand theabsolutemonarchies Napoleon: theparliamentary the of of Austria,Prussia,and Russia. Although members the Grand Alliance agreed they interests, bothgeopoliticaland military, eventually had conflicting war againstNapoleon.32 thatdefined and legitimized their to a set ofprinciples afterthe war. would be interpreted definedhow sovereignty These principles interaction among the as Furthermore, will be shownbelow, it was through principlewas developed, victoriousstates and France that the "legitimist" over national claims by newlyliberated claims of territory favoring dynastic Europe. peoples throughout British Foreign SecretaryLord Castlereagh's stated objective was the balance and a return a continental to of Frenchcontrol liberation Europe from He of power.33 believedthatthe cause of the Napoleonic Warswas a coupling of thatadvocatedthe withJacobinism form Frenchradicalism ofnationalism (a equality,and nationhood by force of arms and internal spread of liberty, also saw republicanKlemensvon Metternich Austrianminister repression).34 he as ismand nationalism the causes of thewar. Unlike Castlereaghhowever, coalitionbased on two key soughtto definethe war aims of the anti-French of of conservative principles:the sanctity treatiesand the legitimacy soverthese Frenchnationalism containedseveralelementsthatthreatened eigns.35 and aims. First,the Jacobinconceptof nationincludedthe idea of citizenship peoplehood. Accordingto the Declaration of the Rightsof Man and Citizen, in This was resides essentially the nation."36 "the source of all sovereignty partiallyreflectedin Napoleon's use of a conscriptarmy,rather than a thatwas unheardof in even the aristocratic something military, professional the was mostautocratic states.Second, Jacobinism militantly patriotic; French wereincorporated a seriesofdomestic into and nationalanthem language, flag, Carlton the ritualsdesignedto rally nationaroundJacobinideals. As historian Hayes explains,"To the Jacobins'the people' has become 'the nation,' a an mystical entity, absolutesovereign."37 While the nationalism the FrenchRevolution of was based moreon historic the solidarity, French Revolution ties than on a sense of ethnicor linguistic definition thenationtherequirement citizenship of of added to the traditional did Thus whileFrenchnationalism not requirea commonlanguage,it rights.38
"The Collapse of the Second Coalition,"JoumalofModemHistory 32. See Paul W. Schroeder, 59 (June1987),pp. 244-90. L. 33. See Franklin Ford,Europe,1780-1830(London: Longman,1970),chap. 30. Order1648-1989 (Camand Intemational 34. Kalevi Holsti,Peace and War:ArmedConflicts Press,1991),p. 117. University bridge:Cambridge p. A Restored, 82. 35. Kissinger, World 1789-1848 (New 36. The declarationis quoted in Eric J. Hobsbawm,TheAge of Revolution: York: Mentor,1962),p. 81. Evolution Modem Nationalism (New York: Russell and of 37. CarltonJ. Hayes, The Historical Russell,1968),p. 69. p. Nationsand Nationalism, 86. 38. Hobsbawm,

Stateversusnation 117 did instill a conception of Frenchness throughoutthe population. This rather thanto thestate, was nowloyalto "France" as an abstraction population Consequently notion the with synonymous themonarchy. which was previously if was It of of nationality, not specifically ethnicity, introduced. is tellingthat in members the of even the loyalists; 1789,twelvehundred thisnotionaffected French National Guard took an oath declaringthat theywere no longer but or Dauphinois,Provencaux, Languedociens, onlyFrenchmen.39 for Both Austriaand Russia agreedthatthewarwas a struggle equilibrium, of would be based on a European society states,and thatsuch an equilibrium in In the be thattheorderwouldessentially conservative character.40 short, war aims:to restore balance ofpower,to stop a againstNapoleon had threespecific the spread of French radical ideas, and to preventliberal revolutionsin Europe.41 to Czar Alexanderwas moresympathetic theideas ofconstitutionAlthough principle in legitimizing alism and self-determination, the end Metternich's It was accepted by all as the raisond'etre of the coalition.42 favoredthe state of European society states,not overthenation.There wouldbe a conservative nations,in whichall postwarborderswould be defendedby collectiveforce. period of Unlikethe aftermath WorldWar I (see below), thepost-Napoleonic about through the saw a decrease in the numberof statesin Europe, brought into existingstates. Even France was of incorporation smaller territories the it territories had acquiredduring allowedto retainsome ofthenon-French war.43 The views of AustrianEmperor Francis II on how a new legitimate to nation-state could be createdis containedin his statement Czar Alexander: and "A Princecan, ifhe wishes,cede a partof his country all of hispeople" to create such a state. "If he abdicates then his rightsare passed on to his heirs."44 legitimate Peace of Paris (1814) and the concludedat the first The peace settlements the reflected value ofthestateoverthenation. TreatyofVienna (1815) clearly The claims of ancient nations,such as Poland, were all but ignored.The rule; Belgiumwas and Poles were placed underforeign Belgians,Norwegians, incorporatedinto Holland and Norway,into Sweden. Germanyand Italy a Britain preferred even though by fragmented disunited design, and remained In unitedGermany help maintaina balance of power in CentralEurope.45 to resolvingthe Polish question, Austria retained Galicia and Tarnopol and
39. Ibid. A Restored, 56. p. 40. Kissinger, World stated,"There is onlyone real problemin Europe, the Revolution."See 41. As Metternich of The Congress Viennaand Europe (New for Commission the Teachingof History, International York: PergamonPress,1964),p. 29. Restored, 56. p. A 42. See Kissinger, World 43. Ford,Europe,1780-1830,p. 298. and of of 44. See GuglielmoFerrero,TheReconstruction Europe:Talleyrand theCongress Vienna, 1814-1815(New York: G. P. Putnamand Sons, 1941),p. 261. and 1812-1815:Britain theReconstrucThe Policy Castlereagh, of 45. Sir CharlesWebster, Foreign tionofEurope(London: G. Bell and Sons, 1931),p. 393.

Organization 118 International of Prussiawas givenPosen and Thorn.The remainder the Duchy of Warsaw of came underthe authority the czar of Russia. In addition,Prussiaobtained were During the Congress of Vienna, territories of two-thirds Saxony.46 territory, lost a contested When one sovereign barteredamongthe sovereigns. he was "compensated"withanother.The use of the term"souls" ratherthan would receivein compensa"citizens"to describethepopulationsa sovereign their people.47 the tionsymbolized viewthatstatesexistedapartfrom as have come to view this simply balancing While manypoliticalscientists balance ofpowerwas in fact it at dynamics work, is apparentthattheterritorial The for onlyone of the principles whichthe war was fought.48 creationof the articulated by principles HolyAlliancein 1815and theadoptionof "legitimist" thatthe demonstrated and French MinisterTalleyrand-Perigord Metternich principle of the "legitimatestate" was as importantas the principle of association of a maintaining balance. Czar Alexander proposed a fraternal rather and solidarity sovereigns guidedbythepreceptsof Christianity dynastic The important forour purposeshere is point thanby traditional diplomacy.49 not thefactthattheassociationwas a compactamongrulers, amongnationsor peoples. of the principles the war at The Britishpositionalso reflected legitimizing on interests If interests. one evaluatedBritish least as muchas itsown security alone, therewould be littlereason forthemto supporta the basis of security that denied nationhoodto the dispossessedpeoples of settlement territorial ambitionson the Continent;in Europe, Europe. Britainhad no territorial British interestsmerely required that no single power be too strong.50 of thatEurope was a society stateswas thebasis forhis assertion Metternich's less than interestsmade the notion of sovereignty belief that community when domestic social unrest makes it absolute. Accordingto Metternich, thatbind it to other obligations to for impossible a government meet itstreaty to "the right intervene to belongsas clearlyand indisputably every countries, in itself dangerof beingdrawnintothe revolutionary whichfinds government in who mustputout a fire hisneighbor's as maelstrom, itdoes to anyindividual This principlewas put into forcea house if it is not to spread to its own."51 to intervened prevent numberof times,as the Holy Alliance subsequently Europe. liberalrevolution throughout
of 46. Sir Charles Webster,The Congress Vienna,1814-1815 (London: Thames and Hudson, 1934),p. 140. 47. For an excellentaccount of the discourseduringthe congress,see Webster,The Foreign Policy Castlereagh. of Europe'sClassicalBalance ofPower. 48. See, forexample,Gullick, 1789-1850 (New York: W. W. Norton and 49. CharlesBreunig,TheAge ofRevolution Reaction, 1977),p. 17. and Company, pp. 50. Hobsbawm,TheAgeofRevolution, 128-29. in Polyarchy is 51. Metternich quoted in Kalevi Holsti, "Governance WithoutGovernment: European InternationalPolitics," in James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Nineteenth-century and Changein World Politics(Cambridge, Order Without Government: Czempiel,eds., Governance Press,1992),p. 28. University England:Cambridge

Stateversusnation 119 warsbetween1815 therewere fewinterstate As a resultof thissettlement, morethanone greatpower.On the otherhand, and 1856 and none involving rebellions, mostlynationalistin character,occurred regularlywithin the the German principalities, Netherlands,the Italian states,Greece, Poland, At the within AustrianEmpire itself. the same France,Spain, and ultimately time,untilafterthe CrimeanWar the greatpowers allowed onlytwo border changes in the European state system:the independence of Belgium and sanctioned force. wereputdownbycollectively Greece. All otherrebellions

of WorldWar I and thetriumph thenation

conditionsof the international duringand after system While the structural the century, World War I were quite similarto those of the earlynineteenth at order constructed the end of the Napoleonic Wars differed international period. In both cases empires fromthat of the post-Versailles considerably and stateswerecommitwereredistributed, thevictorious collapsed,territories the by ted to restoring balance of poweron the Continent reducing strength a by In the was of the enemy.52 addition, end ofbothconflicts followed domestic unrest that spread throughoutthe Continent. Rioting and revolutionary regimesin Europe during agitationthreateneda numberof well-established was both eras. While the feared ideologyof the early nineteenthcentury after World War I socialism, in particular French liberalism/Jacobinism, playedthisrole. Bolshevism, at boththe Congressof Vienna and the conference Versailles Yet although a large degree with the question of a European balance, the dealt to settlementresulted in a reductionof countries and a nineteenth-century great power borders,while the post-WorldWar I restoration traditional of in and a breakupof traditional empires.The orderled to an increase countries conquered by France a century question of what to do withthe territories yet to authorities, the earlierwas resolvedbyrestoring sovereignty traditional of collapse of the post-WorldWar I empiresled to a proliferation new state One factorthatcan based largely the principleof nationality. on formations of and is conceptions sovereignty nationhood explainthisdifference thevarying beliefsover the causes of war and the basis of broughtabout by competing orderin theinternational system. enteredthewarwitha setofpolitical none ofthemainantagonists Although principlesin mind, the analysis and programof U.S. PresidentWoodrow Wilsonpredominated theend ofthewar.DuringthecourseofWorldWar I, by there was little discussion about goals and principlesother than military questions,therewas littleto distinobjectives.In fact,apart fromterritorial
52. The conclusion of World War I saw the collapse of four empires: German, Austroand Russian. Hungarian(Hapsburg),Ottoman,

120 International Organization if guishthe twosides,particularly one considerstheir viewsof whata postwar international orderwouldlook like.Within allied coalition, the agreement was restricted primarily military to questions. Animositiesbetween Britain and France,whichdated back to the era of Louis XIV, remainedstrong.53 Italy's Britainand France in membership the alliance was primarily opportunistic; simply offered Italya betterdeal. FrenchPrimeMinisterClemenceau clearly renderedincapableoffighting anotherlarge-scale wantedGermany war,much a as the Grand Alliance wishedto stripFrance of thatability century earlier. Clemenceau arguedthatthe cause of thewarwas Germanpowerand thatthe of after warwas France's chiefgoal.54 the British Prime containment Germany MinisterLloyd George's primary interest was in dividing the remnants of up that neitherGermanynor the German and Hapsburg empiresand ensuring France dominated Continent. the It was not untilthe intervention WoodrowWilson thatthe Allied cause of of became necessary developed a unified purpose.A statement principles for the Allies to differentiate themselves fromthe Central Powers,particularly since the rationalebehind the war was not immediately clear to eitherthe Russian or U.S. populations.Accordingto Wilson,thiswas a war to end all the wars.The purposeof fighting war was to eliminatetheverycauses of war itself: the balance of power, the systemof alliances, and the denial of and the world.55 He self-determination democracyto peoples throughout between diagnosed as a major cause of World War I the lack of congruence For nationsand statesand the existenceof autocratic governments. Wilson a was a nationalpopulation nation-state one thatrepresented defined legitimate and whosegovernment accountableto itspeople. was In hiswell-known Wilsonarticulated a FourteenPointsaddressto Congress, raisond'etreforthe Allied coalition.While the first pointsdealt primarily five thirteen were addressed withgeneraldiplomatic principles, pointssix through to specific territorial questions,all of whichwere applicationsof the principle In additionto thesefourteen Wilsonadded four ofself-determination.56 points, whichincludedthe tenetsthat"people and provincesmustnot be principles to as werechattels pawns or bartered aboutfrom sovereignty sovereignty ifthey in a game" and thatall territorial of questionshad to be settled"in theinterests These statementscan be seen as a direct the populations concerned."57 referenceto how the Congress of Vienna bartered the newly liberated the stateswithouttakinginto consideration territories among the victorious

and WorldWarOne: 1917-1921 (New York: Harper & 53. RobertH. Ferrell,Woodrow Wilson Row, 1985),p. 118. 1914-1924: TheLast Bidfora Balance of Diplomacy, 54. WalterMcDougall, France'sRhineland University Press,1978),p. 16. PowerinEurope(Princeton, N.J.:Princeton (New York: E. P. Dutton,1980),p. 11. 55. CharlesMee, TheEnd ofOrder 56. Ferrell,Woodrow Wilson and World WarOne, pp. 125-26. and World Wilson Settlement, 1 (New York: Doubleday, vol. 57. Ray StannardBaker, Woodrow Page and Co., 1922),p. 12.

Stateversusnation 121 of principleof nationality.58 One could argue that the intensity nationalist that developed in the latterpart of the nineteenth century could be feelings a following to on equilibrium traceddirectly theoveremphasis creating perfect sharedby the defeatofNapoleon. WhileWilson'sidealismwas notnecessarily as agreed to accept his principles the eitherBritainor France,theyeventually order following end of the war. the basis on whichto build an international attackedWilsonas hopelessly naive,holdingto hisbelief Clemenceau initially in the balance of power.Howeverin 1918 the Frenchpositionchangedwhen the foreign agreeingthat ministry issued a proposal fora postwarsettlement nationalself-determination and including peace mustreston threeprinciples, theprotection minority of rights.59 during course the LloydGeorgealso came to acceptWilson'sbasic principles of the war. In 1918 he spoke at a London tradeunion conference and argued of of that a just and lastingpeace would require the restoration sanctity treaties, the settlementof territorialdisputes on the basis of national to and organization limit self-determination, the creationof an international armaments diminish probability war.60 and of Even Germany, theverge on the of defeat, turned to the United States rather than Britain or France to In negotiatepeace based on Wilsonianprinciples. a note sent to the United Stateson 7 October 1918,Germany acceptsas said, "The Germangovernment the basis forits negotiations, programlaid down by the Presidentof the the UnitedStates."'61 elimifiveof Wilson's fourteenpointswere essentially Althoughthe first nated in secrettalksbetweenWilson,Clemenceau,and Lloyd George priorto withthe principleof the conference Versailles,those that dealt primarily at Like the were left intact.62 nationalism, includingWilson's four principles, at earlier,the conference Versaillesdividedup Congressof Vienna a century Francewas given Alsace and amongthevictors: historically disputedterritories Lorraine,Britainand France were granted"mandates"overGermancolonies and the territories the former of OttomanEmpire, and Italy receivedsome islands offthe Dalmatian coast. Yet unlike at Vienna, the conferenceat from dozensofdispossessednations Versailleswas attended representatives by and peoples who were allowed to press theirclaims before the assembled in of the powers.63 Additionally, resolving disposition the Austrian,German,
pointsof contention of 58. This was ofcoursetrueonlyto a matter degree.One of theprincipal was not over at the Congress was the dispositionof Poland and Saxony. While the conflict principle, which recognizedthat sovereigns it nationalistsentiments, did involvethe legitimist de of See of rights. Le Duc de Broglie,ed.,Memoirs thePrince could notbe deprived theirdynastic Talleyrand, 2 (New York: AMS Press,1973),part8. vol. 59. Holsti,Peace and War,p. 192. During of Theory Practice LiberalInternationalism and Wilsonian Statecraft: 60. LloydAmbrosius, Resources,1991),p. 110. World Del.: Scholarly WarI (Wilmington, 61. Ibid.,p. 12. 62. Ibid.,p. 52. WarOne, p. 140. 63. Ferrell,Woodrow Wilson and World

Organization 122 International was clearlythe and Russian empires,the principleof national sovereignty guide. The various Balkan Slavic groups were united to forma new state, Romania was expanded to include those parts of the Austrian Yugoslavia.64 Empire where a majorityof Romanians lived, and Hungary became an state.The Czechs and Slovakswere unitedintothenew nationof independent Czechoslovakia, and what was left of the old Hapsburg Empire became independentAustria.Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuaniawere grantedindepenintoItaly. bothItalian-speaking areas,werebrought dence. Istriaand Trentino, Schleswigof including wereheldin a number smallregions, plebiscites Finally, could decide for Holstein,Upper Silesia, and Saarland,so thatthe inhabitants whatcountry wantedtojoin. they themselves was The principleof self-determination put to its greatesttest over the former colonies and Turkey'sformer questionof how to deal withGermany's a were leeryabout setting precedentthatcould territories. While the British Wilsonstood by his colonial independence, theirempireby granting threaten aboutfrom to sovereignty thatpeople shouldnotbe bartered wartime principle a solutionin theTreaty The powersstruck compromise sovereignty. victorious colonialcontrol thegreatpowers by ofSevres:thecolonieswouldbe freedfrom wing of the League of Nations. The by placing them under the protective would appointvariousnationsas guardians. League ofNationsin turn

WorldWar II and its aftermath

of The accepted interpretation the main cause of World War II was very from thatof WorldWar I. Whereas WorldWar I was seen afterthe different WorldWar II was viewedboth factas old alliance politicsgone out of control, during its course and after as a fightagainst fascism.There are several componentsof fascistideology,but one crucial componentthat serves to strain from othertotalitarianisms a particularly is virulent fascism differentiate of nationalism.Opposition to such expansionistnationalismserved as an banner under which to unite the Allies for two reasons. First,it effective of matchedthe popular impression the primecause of thewar. Second, itwas and acceptable to all of the Allies, a group of stateswhose politicalsystems ideologieshad littleelse in common. the cause ofthewar; ithad provided Nationalism was perceivedas a primary forthe German occupationsof Austria,Czechoslovakia,and Poland pretext thatled to the outbreakof war. It was seen as one of the mostobjectionable remained a legitimate aspects of fascistideology.While self-determination came to be thatwere xenophobicand expansionist politicalgoal, nationalisms seen as an unacceptable threat to internationalpeace. Nationalism had
forceas the self-identification was as potenta nationalist 64. At thatpointin timepan-Slavism of suchgroupsas the Serbs,Croats,and Slovenes.

Stateversusnation 123 previously been associated with the desire of people to be free. Fascism associatednationalism withthedesireof some people to dominateor dislocate of others. This led to a conceptual separation of "the self-determination basis forthe state.65 nationalism thelegitimate as peoples" from as has The self-determination peoples impliesthateveryone an individual of in The a right hisor herowngovernment to participate thatgovernment. to and term"peoples" does not, however,implyany specificbasis for delineating the nationalboundaries.66 long as all of the people within boundarieshave As to does nottry control any and equal access to thegovernment thegovernment of peoples outside of those boundaries,the requirements self-determination a basis on have been fulfilled. Nationalism, the otherhand,does imply specific state boundaries.The state should matchthe nation.Should fordelineating nationalism membersof the nation live outside of the state,an expansionist those nationalslive. In areas where would have the state expand to wherever becomes both conflict membersof more than one nationality live, interstate acceptance by the winningcoalition,the likelyand virulent. The normative basis forthe state of Allies,of the self-determination peoples as thelegitimate thatitwas nationalism thathad caused thewarin the reflected their perception first place. in This normative acceptance is reflected the documentintendedto be the relations,the Charterof the United primary basis forpostwarinternational as Nations (UN). The charter affirms the firstpurpose of the UN the It maintenanceof international peace and security.67 defines this as the of prevention the violationof establishedstatebordersby the forcesof other of of state This clearly establishes priority theintegrity established the states.68 of bordersover the integrity nationalor nationalist groups.The charteralso of affirms principleof the self-determination peoples, but not of nations, the and the principleof noninterference the domesticaffairs otherstates.69 in of not the "nation" as a This suggeststhat it is their people as individuals, As thatstatesrepresent. long as a stateadequatelyrepresents separateentity, its people as individuals, otherstates cannot legitimately claim to represent some ofthesepeople as members its"nation."70 of in The emphasisin the UN Charteron noninterference the domesticaffairs ofotherstatesis markedly different from emphasison international the justice
the of 65. The quoted termis used throughout Charter theUnitedNations(UN). said, "On the surfaceit seems reasonable:let the people 66. Of thisdilemmaSir IvorJennings decide. It was in factridiculous because the people cannotdecide untilsomeone decideswho are Secession, 9. p. thepeople." Jennings quoted in Buchheit, is articleof the charter.See United Nations 67. This is statedin the first paragraphof the first Charter theUnited Nationsand Statute theInternational Courtof of of Office Public Information, of Justice (New York: UnitedNations,1974),p. 3. 68. Ibid.,article2, paragraph and article51. 4, 7. 69. Ibid.,article1, paragraph and article2, paragraph 2, 70. There is of course a tensionhere inasmuchas self-determination servein cases as an may sentiment. This tensionis recognizedin practiceby the UN but is often expression nationalist of states.See Buchheit, Secession, 14-20. pp. resolvedin favor thecohesionof existing of

Organization 124 International This is reflectedin the to be found in the League of Nations Charter.71 relations to be found in the periods academic response to international following World Wars I and II. The dominanttrendin the studyof internathe after stressed value of international WorldWar I, idealism, tionalrelations and overthevalue ofstability raisond'etatin equityand justicein thelongterm of was seen as the source of the legitimacy states, the shortterm.Nationalism the ideal of state as be and therefore states might changed to betterreflect WorldWar II, following nation.The dominant trendin the same fieldof study of realism, was in some waystheopposite.It arguedforthereturn Realpolitik. of States were seen as legitimized the representation theirpopulations, by was made up thatpopulation.It therefore theroleofthestateto act in whoever the interestof itselfand its population, rather than to act toward some ideal in a manner that might rebound to the long-term internationalist nationalinterest.72 detriment theimmediate of of coalitionthatstateborders The intersubjective understanding thewinning nationalgroupshad a markedeffect thepattern on had a legitimacy apartfrom the shown many by ofbordersin Europe following war.Despite theanimosities the to Sovietnationalities Russian domination during war,theSovietstatewas allowed to grow.At the same time,the German nationwas dividedinto two a thatwas soon to be repeated statesin orderto ease interstate conflict, pattern in Korea and Vietnam.73 Many borders in Eastern Europe, such as those between the Soviet Union and Poland, Czechoslovakia,and Romania, were nonrepresentaconvenient ethnically but alteredin waysthatwere politically commuThese changes were officially recognizedby the international tive. nity.74 Finally,the emphasison juridicalbordersratherthan the populations within themis strongly suggested thesolutionto theproblemthathad led to by the war in the firstplace: German ethnicallymotivatedexpansionismin Eastern Europe. Instead of expandingthe bordersof the German state to encompass ethnicGermans in Eastern Europe, millionsof ethnicGermans were evicteden masse fromPoland and Czechoslovakiaso thattheirborders withGermany wouldno longerbe threatened. basis of The understanding the winningcoalition as to the legitimate of had effect postwar on international relations well. One as sovereignty a distinct
71. For example,the Covenantof the League of Nations stipulatesthat"the Membersof the for to League reserveto themselves right take such actionas theyshallconsidernecessary the the to and maintenance right justice" (article15,paragraph7). This reference right justiceas a of and peace and to legitimate basis forstateactionis in markedcontrast the emphasison international security the Charter theUN. in of Years Crisis,1919-1939 (London: 72. See, for example, Edward Hallet Carr, The Twenty Macmillan,1946),chap. 5. 73. In all threeof theseexamples,"nations"were dividedintotwostates,each in the sphereof nationalunity superpower to This willingness subordinate to influence a different of superpower. of conflicts consideredmore was indicatesthatthe termination international spheresof influence in important thannationalself-determinationthesecases. 74. See, for example,Gordon Craig,Europe Since 1815, alternateedition (New York: Holt, Rinehartand Winston, 1974),pp. 506-10.

Stateversusnation 125 can area in whichthiseffect be seen is theprocessof decolonization. particular of The normof the self-determination peoples clearlyspeaks againstcolonial illegitimate unacceptand and these came to be seen as increasingly empires, decolonizathe able through late 1940s and 1950s.For the mostparthowever, lines. Rather,the bordersof new states tiondid not proceed along nationalist This is chosen bordersof colonial territories. tended to matchthe arbitrarily clear with respectto the decolonizationof Africa.By retaining particularly bordersas the basis forthe creationof new colonial ratherthan traditional of the states,the colonialpowersand the UN soughtto maximize viability the the ties.In so doingitreflected accepted or thanethnic tribal rather newstates, not of norm that the legitimacy states was based on good government,75 nationalself-determination.76 of Once again,the reification statebordersin Europe and the ThirdWorld provideda basis forthe "rules of the game" thathelped to stabilizerelations in Despite greatdifferences betweenthetwoblocs.77 particularly amongstates, the ideologyand domesticinstitutions, United States,the Soviet Union, and eitherin Europe movements secessionist supported theEuropean statesrarely or in theThirdWorld.78

the after cold war Sovereignty

responseto theexcessesof WorldWar II, realismseemed an appropriate After and and nationalism. However,as thecold warprogressed thebalance ofterror the concept of mutuallyassured destructiondeveloped, the dangers of nationalismreceded in both popular perceptionsand the perceptionsof political and decision makers.The cold war was a war about legitimating the economicideologies,not one about legitimating state.The end of the cold in and againstnoninterference the war has seen a reactionagainstrealpolitik its of domesticaffairs otherstates,and forthe role of the West in promoting This politicaland economicideals internationally. has led to a changein both in the discourse concerninglegitimacy foreignaffairsand the conduct of affairs. foreign
"good thattherewas anysortof consensuson whatconstituted 75. This is not meantto imply welfareand political was viewofgood government based on individual The government." Western The and economicrights. keypointhere socialwelfare viewstressed whereasthecommunist rights, view, from nationalist a different viewand theclass vieware markedly is thatboththe individualist in sense. understood thefascist apart fromthe 76. Once again this refersto the view that sees the "nation" as something in of aggregate thepeople thatrequiresrepresentation itsown right. (Washington,D.C.: Brookings Detente and Confrontation 77. See Raymond L. Garthoff, 1985),chap. 1. Institution, 78. For the Sovietview on secession,see Bruce Porter,The U.S.S.R. in ThirdWorldConflicts: Press, SovietArmsand Diplomacyin Local Wars,1945-1980 (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity 1984),p. 220.

126 International Organization The international normfollowing World War II as discussedabove was to reifythe state in its existingborders. This allowed for gross abuses by of governments theirpopulations,includingin extremeinstancesa country a ethnicgenocidewithout substantive responsefromthe internacommitting tionalcommunity.79 Internalimperialism-thedomination one ethnic of group over otherswithinan establishedstate-was also tacitlyaccepted by other of statesdue to theemphasison theintegrity juridicalbordersand thenormof Whilethe international community not have condoned may nonintervention.80 these actions,neitherdid it advocate restructuring bordersto preventit. The from reification to a popular this led predominance raisond'etatthatresulted of milieuthatwas within "winning the coalition"withan international discontent of unable to cope withthethreats nuclearweaponson perceivedas increasingly environmental disaster theother.81 on These factors theone hand and looming of understood the inviolaas increasingly weakenedthe legitimacy sovereignty of relations increasingly bility states.As thepoliticaldiscoursein international to it reflects change,foreign this policiesare beginning reflect as well. The end of the cold war has not to date resultedin the sort of official documentation the winningcoalition that marked the end of previous by thatexpresses the document hegemonic conflicts. There is therefore formal no of of understanding thiscoalitionas to thenatureofthelegitimacy sovereignty. However,there have been substantialchanges in the formsof discoursein whichdiscussions international of relationshave takenplace. As littleas four in or five yearsago, alterations thebordersof EasternEurope wereperceived, as both popularlyand officially, potential threatsto the peace. Now such as changes are consideredeitherneutrally, in the case of Czechoslovakia,or as SovietUnion or Yugoslavia.The recent positively, in the case of theformer that twenty action of the UN in excommunicating Yugoslavia forsomething this yearsago mayhave been consideredpurelydomesticactionsexemplifies change. The increasing such as Belgium, degree to whichsome Westerncountries, Canada, and Spain, feel thattheymustmake concessionsto domesticethnic minoritiesalso reinforcesthe contentionthat the understanding the of basis of the state is changing. these concessionsare to be found If legitimate within winning well as the losingcoalitions, the as theycannotbe explainedby to reference powerpolitics.Some ofthesealterations, suchas thereunification of Germanyand the breakup of the Soviet Union, may reflect the changed afterthe end of the Soviet military threatto Western environment security
motivated 79. Examplesof thisincludeethnically genocidesin Ethiopiaand East Timor. 80. Internalimperialism refersto such obvious cases as the Soviet Union, South Africa,and suchas Spain. Yugoslaviabutalso includessome Westerncountries 81. For the purposesof thisarticle,it is reasonable to definethe winning coalitionof the cold warin thesamewayas was done forthecases discussedabove: themembers themilitary of alliance In thattriumphed. thiscase, thecoalitionwould includethe members suchgroupsas theNorth of Atlanticand SouthEast Asia TreatyOrganizations.

Stateversusnation 127 of Europe. Others,however,do not. The unification Yemen and the recent suggestthat afterdecades of ideological talks by the Korean governments priority over come to viewthe "nation"as having animosity, have abruptly they owes as much to a relatively the "state." The demise of Yugoslavia certainly both in the eyes of the international sudden loss of perceived legitimacy, populations,as to the community in the eyes of Yugoslavia's constituent and environment. changedsecurity The reactionin theUnitedStatesand Western Europe to thebreakupofthe to considerSoviet Union also cannotconvincingly tracedstrictly security be ations.Americanand Allied policytowardthe SovietUnion until1989was to for both securityand ideological firmly support the central government would be centralgovernment reasons.82 The security reasonwas thata strong effectively, and arms reductions necessaryto preside over troopwithdrawals and the ideological reason was support for President Gorbachev and his abruptly support thebreakupof the to for reforms. This policychangedrather the of SovietUnion intoitsconstituent republics; international perception the of thatof a forceforthemaintenance order central government devolvedfrom This perceptualshift be explained can to an institution ethnicimperialism. of of of betterthrough examination changesin understandings statelegitimaan environment. tionthanchangesin thesecurity in of Two There are exceptions theresurgence thelegitimacy nationalism. to in particular purposes,South Africaand Iraq. The are usefulforillustrative to rule in a united committed majority international community explicitly is There are tworeasonsforthis.The first thatthiscommitment is SouthAfrica.83 the predatesby decades the end of the cold war, and therefore international in of fixed thenorms thecold war.84 discourseon SouthAfricais to some extent In otherwords,because this discoursehas been strongly institutionalized, it and continuity characteristic formal of institudisplayssome of the stickiness The second reason is the perceptionthat a breakupof South Africa tions.85 so would not servethe purposeof nationalself-government generally muchas thepurposesofthewhiteminority specifically. The current policyof the United States and its allies towardIraq displaysa the of even thoughthereare commitment maintaining integrity the country to from This policyresultsexplicitly active secessionistmovements withinit.86
in Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: ElementsofStability thePostwarInternational 82. See John Prospects Peace (Cambridge, for ed., System,"in Sean M. Lynn-Jones, The Cold Warand After. Mass.: MIT Press,1991),pp. 1-44 and pp. 33-34 in particular. Nations,1986, vol. 40 (Dordrecht,Netherlands: 83. See, forexample,Yearbookof the United 1990),pp. 124-25. Martinus Nijhoff, in 84. Ibid. The continuity the textsof these resolutionssupportsthe suggestionthat the goal. aroundtheestablished discoursehas become fixed see in relations, Krasner, of institutions international 85. On thesubjectofthecontinuity formal pp. Perspective," 67 and 74. "Sovereignty: Institutional An in French,and U.S. Agree to Hit Iraqi Aircraft the South," The 86. Michael Gordon,"British, 12 New YorkTimes, August1992,p. Al.

Organization 128 International an thatwhilerecentchangesin the considerations, indication balance-of-power of have alteredthe realpolitik the cold war,they of interpretation sovereignty It have not eliminatedit entirely.87 is worthnoting,however,that the U.S. of During addressedthe issue of the integrity Iraq.88 has government explicitly would have been simply assumedthatthisintegrity thecold war itwould likely has felt it necessaryto be maintained.The fact that the U.S. government to thatmostIraqis do not addressthe issue at all, and its efforts demonstrate of thatthechangein theunderstanding brokenup, indicates wanttheir country relationshas indeed taken discoursein international underlying sovereignty root.

Conclusion
of authority A briefexamination how politicalactorshave definedsovereign demonstrates that the rules of soverthe course of modernhistory through vary,and thus the concept is neitherfixednor constant.Rather it is eignty in that interpretations alterthe environment whichstates subjectto changing the relateto each other.These changesin turnaffect waysin whichstatesare international relations. The case studies and constrained enabled to act in their orders emphasize the state, indicate that while some international strongly othersemphasizethe nationand thatthisemphasistendsto oscillatebetween variables alone cannot account for these the two. We findthat structural environment an The differences. GrandAllianceoperatedwithin international in 1815 similarto thatfaced by the Allies in 1919. Yet theirsolutionsto the wartime Twenty-five yearslater,the winning considerably. dilemmasdiffered coalitionadopted territorial policies similarto those embracedby the Grand thatthe emphasis indications Alliance a century earlier.Now thereare strong of and the has swungtowardthe nationallegitimation sovereignty awayfrom of sovereignty the state. We have triedto show thatthisoccursbecause our is largelybased on the of understanding sovereignauthority intersubjective, coalitioncomes to adopt in the process and beliefsthata dominant principles order. ofconstructing international an One of the problemsfaced by political leaders is that state and national can be internally The stabilityof a systemof contradictory. sovereignty statesrestson the adherencebymoststatesmostof thetimeto a set sovereign It that of rules and commonpractices.89 also relies on a formof legitimacy is fixed, allows formutualexpectations. While stability best assured through reinstitutions, legitimacy competentstates with entrenchedauthoritative
20 87. Michael Gordon,"A ShieldforIraq," TheNew YorkTimes, August1992,pp. Al. 88. Ibid. of but does not refer here to the absence of conflict to the maintenance the system 89. Stability of thatofWaltzin Theory International This usage follows without drastic changesin itsform. intact Politics, 161-63. pp.

Stateversusnation 129 in are and right; short, forms appropriate quires a beliefthatthe institutional is that theyare just. Legitimacy eroded when people no longer accept the authorities. why they oughtto obeytheexisting thatsuggest principles The dilemma arises when political leaders considerhow the principleof wouldbe putintopractice:at whatpointis a people capable self-determination that can ensure domestic a of organizingand administering government rules? As Kalevi Holsti welfareand guaranteecompliancewithinternational could resultin the proliferation applied universally argues,self-determination and It states.90 could also ignitedomestic ofconditionally viable and ineffective in regional confrontations cases where conflictsof state interestsdo not basis of role as a legitimate norms expandtheir exist.As nationalist necessarily confrontations suchconditionally viable statesand regional conflict resolution, policy This can raise some important are appearingwithincreasing frequency. whereto thatare currently beingdiscussedonlyin an ad hoc fashion: questions and motivated and drawthe line betweenlegitimacy viability whennationally elsean constitutes unacceptable threat to stability regional confrontation where. one Fromthispliableunderstanding sovereignty, can arguethat"objective" of insufficient understand to materialfactors, such as polarity, bythemselves are of Understandings to whatconstitutes as the stability theinternational system. of have a significant impacton the patterns the legitimate basis of sovereignty is thatsovereignty based predominates When an understanding globalconflict. to efforts alter state boundaries to reflect on the principleof nationality, efforts Wars mayresultfrom have a certainlegitimacy. nationalist sentiments to coordinatestateboundarieswithnationalgroupswhensuch a coordination state.For example,theGermaninvasion wouldcome at theexpenseof another of Czechoslovakia in 1938 was seen as having some legitimacyby the but international community, that was seen by the losing state,in this case as predominates Czechoslovakia, beingat itsexpense.When an understanding is that sovereignty of a more juridical nature,then states are less likelyto to attempt alter nationalbordersin response to national or ethnicconflicts. do disappear,but theyare more likelyto be These conflicts not necessarily countriesthanbetweenthem.Since juridicalstatescannot played out within will of conflicts in affairs otherstates,ethnic interfere thedomestic legitimately more oftenbe decided by internalviolence-the use of violence by states of Bosnia is a good example.As longas ownpopulations. againstelements their the international community recognized an intact Yugoslavia, any ethnic in of betweenSerbs and members otherethnicities Bosnia was a purely conflict recognized Bosnia community Once theinternational Yugoslav affair. internal the as a separate stateunderthe bannerof nationalself-determination, same war. conflict became an interstate

90. Holsti,Peace and War,p. 352.

Organization 130 International The degree of violence-defined as the total physicalharmthatcomes to of withanygivenunderstanding sovereignty. greater people-is notnecessarily the this is to However, whensovereignty understood stemfrom nation, violence is is more likelyto occur between and among states than when sovereignty to in to understood be morejuridical, whichcase stateviolenceis morelikely be This affects legitimation thusthe practiceof the and thaninterstate. internal the intervention, whichcan in turnaffect outcome.This can be clearly external to community Iraq's seen when comparingthe actions of the international in of of violentsuppression Kurdishnationalism the 1980swithits declaration so-calledsafezones in 1991. worldshifts from neorealists wouldsuggest As thecontemporary bipolarity,91 that some change should be expected in the degree of stabilityof the suggestedhere indicates The analysisof sovereignty international system.92 in of understanding sovershift the predominant that the contemporaneous This does not mean that the will also serve to destabilizethe system. eignty overalllevel of violence to whichthe people of the world are subjectedwill of thata new category causes of necessarily increase.It does mean, however, has interstate conflict been legitimated. should not be understoodas a strictly Finally,in arguingthat sovereignty unitshould thatthe stateas a basic analytic staticconcept,thisarticlesuggests relations morethanhas often been thecase in theinternational be scrutinized bothfrom entity, The sovereign statehas oftenbeen seen as a fixed literature. Fromwithout, and neoliberalinstitutionand from neorealists within. without theoriesof the alists alike take the sovereignstate as a given.From within, as domesticsources of foreignpolicy often assume a fixedsovereignty the theoriesand However,bothstructural politicalactivity. backdropfordomestic thatsovereignty as itself, of sourcesmight benefit allowing by theories domestic a basic unit of international relationstheory,changes over time and that of can and do affectinternational changing understandings sovereignty relations.

more toward 91. It is beyond the scope of this article to suggestwhetherit is shifting multipolarity unipolarity. or Politics, 204-10. pp. 92. Waltz,Theory International of