Peter J.

Bresko c/o 25 Chilhowie Drive Kinnelon, New Jersey 07405 (973) 291-8430 In Propria Persona

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Peter Bresko,

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW IERSEY MORzuS COUNTY

CIIANCERY DIVI SION/FAMILY PART DOCKET NO. FM- l4-g7g- 1 1

Petitioner, Vs.
Renate Bresko, Christian Van Pelt, Erq., Unknown Entities 1-5, Jane Does 1-5, John Does 1-5 Respondents.

Civil Action

PETITION FOR WRIT OFHABBAS CORPUS

N.J.S.A. 2L267-15 Power and authority to issue

writ;

'6The power and authority to issue writs of habeas corpus shall be and reside in: a. The superior court and each judge thereof.tt

N.J.S.A. 2L:67-17; Issuance of

writ

grant such writ without delay or issue an order directing the defendant named in the complaint to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the complaint or otherwise that the applicant or person confined or restrained is not entitled thereto. The writ or order to show cause shall be directed to the person by whom such party
is conlined or restrained in his tiberty.It shalt be returneAWithin for good cause additional time, not exceeding 20 days, is allowed."

6'The judge to whom the application is made shall

3 dWS

unless

This is the Great writ of Habeas corpus,IIEREBY LAWFULLY SERVED UPON THE ABOVE MENTIONED TRIBUNAL IN T}IE JUDICIAL.BRANCH OF

GOVERNMENT. The nature of this action is thereby lawfutly stated by this document

which is brought in the common law UNDER THE CONSTITUTION FOR THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY and THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. Petitioner is a New Jersey father who has not surrendered his children or has been found to be unfit. Petitioner is the legal custodian of the minor children Katerina Bresko and Peter Bresko, Jr. Respondent is detaining and withholding the minor children from the Petitioner. Respondent has no cause or justification for the detention or withholding the minor children from the custody and control of the Petitioner. It is well-established that "parents have a fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of their children. Petitioner demands protection of his fundamental right to the interest, care, custody and management of his children under the Constitution and the Laws of the State of New Jersey. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. The New Jersey Supreme Court has emphasized the inviolability of the family unit, noting that "[t]he rights to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed `essential,' * * * `basic civil rights of man,' * * * and `[r]ights far more precious * * * than property rights' * * *." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L.Ed.2d 551, 558 (1972) (citations omitted). Petitioners natural children are being detained and held against their will in unknown locations. They have been deprived of their constitutionally protected guarantee to life, liberty and freedom from false restraint.

N.J.S.A. 9:2-7, unequivocally states; When any husband and wife shall live in a state of separation without being divorced, and shall have any minor child of the marriage, the Superior Court, upon such child being brought before it upon habeas corpus, shall award the custody of such child and make such order or judgment relating thereto for the access of either parent to such child, at such times and under such circumstances, as it may deem proper. And pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:67-13; Except as provided in section 2A:67-14 of this title, any person hereinafter specified may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus, according to the provisions of this chapter, to inquire into the cause of his imprisonment or restraint: c. Any person committed, detained, confined or restrained of his liberty, within this state, under any pretense whatsoever; And pursuant N.J.S.A. 2A:67-15; The power and authority to issue writs of habeas corpus shall be and reside in: a. The superior court and each judge thereof. And furthermore under N.J.S.A. 2A:67-17; The judge to whom the application is made shall grant such writ without delay or issue an order directing the defendant named in the complaint to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the complaint or otherwise that the applicant or person confined or restrained is not entitled thereto. The writ or order to show cause shall be directed to the person by whom such party is confined or restrained in his liberty. It shall be returned within 3 days unless for good cause additional time, not exceeding 20 days, is allowed. And finally under N.J.S.A. 2A:67-18; Writs of habeas corpus shall not be disobeyed for any defect of form. Petitioner demands a writ of habeas corpus require the Respondents to appear and produce the minor children before this court and to show cause why custody should not be restored to Petitioner. Respectfully, Dated: August 29, 2011 _______________________________ Peter J. Bresko, In Propria Persona

Peter J. Bresko c/o 25 Chilhowie Drive Kinnelon, New Jersey 07405 (973) 291-8430 In Propria Persona _________________________________

: Peter Bresko, : : : Petitioner, : : Vs. : : Renate Bresko, Christian Van Pelt, Esq., : Unknown Entities 1-5, : Jane Does 1-5, John Does 1-5, : : Respondents. : _________________________________:

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY MORRIS COUNTY CHANCERY DIVISION/FAMILY PART DOCKET NO. FM-14-979-11 Civil Action BRIEF FOR PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petition of Peter Bresko will rely upon his attached certification herein and incorporate herewith as a factual background for this petition. LEGAL ARGUMENT The following constitutional provisions are relevant to adjudication of the instant action for habeas corpus relief.
Constitution for the United States of America: WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America. (Preamble) To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States; (Article I, Section 8, Clause 4) To constitution Tribunals Inferior to the supreme Court; (Article I, Section 8, Clause 9) To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the 4

Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which same shall be, for the Election of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;-- And (Article I, Section 8, Clause 17) To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof. (Article I, Section 8, Clause 18) The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it. (Article I, Section 9, Clause 2) The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; --to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;--to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;--to Controversies between two or more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different States,-- Between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. (Article III, Section 2, Clause 1) AMENDMENT THE FIRST: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances. AMENDMENT THE FOURTH: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. AMENDMENT THE FIFTH: No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.

AMENDMENT THE SIXTH: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation ; to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. AMENDMENT THE SEVENTH: In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States than according to the rules of common law. AMENDMENT THE EIGHTH: Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. AMENDMENT THE NINTH: The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. AMENDMENT THE TENTH: The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. Constitution for the state of New Jersey (1776): IN PROVINCIAL CONGRESS: New Jersey, Burlington, July 2, 1776. By order of Congress:
XXII.

XV.

That the common law of England, as well as so much of the statute law, as have been heretofore practiced in this Colony, shall still remain in force, until they shall be altered by a future law of the Legislature; such parts only excepted, as are repugnant to the rights and privileges contained in this Charter; and that the inestimable right of trial by jury shall remain confirmed as a part of the law of this Colony, without repeal, forever. That the laws of the Colony shall begin in the following style, viz. "Be it enacted by the Council and General Assembly of this Colony, and it is hereby enacted by authority of the same: " that all commissions, granted by the Governor or Vice-President, shall run thus-" The Colony of NewJersey to A. B. &c. greeting: " and that all writs shall likewise run in the name of the Colony: and that all indictments shall conclude in the following manner, viz. "Against the peace of this Colony, the government and dignity of the same. That all criminals shall be admitted to the same privileges of witnesses and counsel, as their prosecutors are or shall be entitled to.

XVI.

Updated Through Amendments Adopted in November, 2000 ARTICLE I RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness. Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all prosecutions or indictments for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous is true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the papers and things to be seized. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless on the presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases of impeachment, or in cases now prosecuted without indictment, or arising in the army or navy or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger. In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury; to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the assistance of counsel in his defense. No person shall, after acquittal, be tried for the same offense. All persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or presumption great. Excessive bail shall not be required, excessive fines shall not be imposed, and cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. It shall not be cruel and unusual punishment to impose the death penalty on a person convicted of purposely or knowingly causing death or purposely or knowingly causing serious bodily injury resulting in death who committed the homicidal act by his own conduct or who as an accomplice procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value. 7

No person shall be imprisoned for debt in any action, or on any judgment found upon contract, unless in cases of fraud; nor shall any person be imprisoned for a militia fine in time of peace. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless in case of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it. The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power. Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Individuals or private corporations shall not be authorized to take private property for public use without just compensation first made to the owners. This enumeration of rights and privileges shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people. A victim of a crime shall be treated with fairness, compassion and respect by the criminal justice system. A victim of a crime shall not be denied the right to be present at public judicial proceedings except when, prior to completing testimony as a witness, the victim is properly sequestered in accordance with law or the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey. A victim of a crime shall be entitled to those rights and remedies as may be provided by the Legislature. For the purposes of this paragraph, "victim of a crime" means: a) a person who has suffered physical or psychological injury or has incurred loss of or damage to personal or real property as a result of a crime or an incident involving another person operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and b) the spouse, parent, legal guardian, grandparent, child or sibling of the decedent in the case of a criminal homicide. Article I, paragraph 2 amended effective January 1, 1994; paragraph 9 amended effective December 4, 1973; paragraph 12 amended effective December 3, 1992; paragraph 22 added effective December 5, 1991. ARTICLE III DISTRIBUTION OF THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT The powers of the government shall be divided among three distinct branches, the legislative, executive, and judicial. No person or persons belonging to or constituting one branch shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as expressly provided in this Constitution. ARTICLE IV LEGISLATIVE SECTION I The legislative power shall be vested in a Senate and General Assembly.

SECTION V No member of Congress, no person holding any Federal or State office or position, of profit, and no judge of any court shall be entitled to a seat in the Legislature. Neither the Legislature nor either house thereof shall elect or appoint any executive, administrative or judicial officer except the State Auditor. SECTION VI Any agency or political subdivision of the State or any agency of a political subdivision thereof, which may be empowered to take or otherwise acquire private property for any public highway, parkway, airport, place, improvement, or use, may be authorized by law to take or otherwise acquire a fee simple absolute or any lesser interest, and may be authorized by law to take or otherwise acquire a fee simple absolute in, easements upon, or the benefit of restrictions upon, abutting property to preserve and protect the public highway, parkway, airport, place, improvement, or use; but such taking shall be with just compensation. SECTION VII No divorce shall be granted by the Legislature. Article IV, Section VII, paragraph 2 amended effective December 2, 1999. The Legislature shall not pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or depriving a party of any remedy for enforcing a contract which existed when the contract was made. To avoid improper influences which may result from intermixing in one and the same act such things as have no proper relation to each other, every law shall embrace but one object, and that shall be expressed in the title. SECTION VII The Legislature shall not pass any private, special or local laws: (2) Changing the law of descent. (3) Providing for change of venue in civil or criminal causes. (4) Selecting, drawing, summoning or empaneling grand or petit jurors. (12) Appointing local officers or commissions to regulate municipal affairs. SECTION VIII Members of the Legislature shall, before they enter on the duties of their respective offices, take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of New Jersey, and that I will faithfully

discharge the duties of Senator (or member of the General Assembly) according to the best of my ability." Members-elect of the Senate or General Assembly are empowered to administer said oath or affirmation to each other. Every officer of the Legislature shall, before he enters upon his duties, take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation: "I do solemnly promise and swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully, impartially and justly perform all the duties of the office of ________________, to the best of my ability and understanding; that I will carefully preserve all records, papers, writings, or property entrusted to me for safekeeping by virtue of my office, and make such disposition of the same as may be required by law." ARTICLE V EXECUTIVE SECTION I The executive power shall be vested in a Governor. The Governor shall not be less than thirty years of age, and shall have been for at least twenty years a citizen of the United States, and a resident of this State seven years next before his election, unless he shall have been absent during that time on the public business of the United States or of this State. No member of Congress or person holding any office or position, of profit, under this State or the United States shall be Governor. ARTICLE VI JUDICIAL SECTION I The judicial power shall be vested in a Supreme Court, a Superior Court, and other courts of limited jurisdiction. The other courts and their jurisdiction may from time to time be established, altered or abolished by law. Article VI, Section I, paragraph 1 amended effective December 7, 1978. SECTION II The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and six Associate Justices. Five members of the court shall constitute a quorum. When necessary, the Chief Justice shall assign the Judge or Judges of the Superior Court, senior in service, as provided by rules of the Supreme Court, to serve temporarily in the Supreme Court. In case the Chief Justice is absent or unable to serve, a presiding Justice designated in accordance with rules of the Supreme Court shall serve temporarily in his stead.

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The Supreme Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction in the last resort in all causes provided in this Constitution. The Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of all courts in the State and, subject to the law, the practice and procedure in all such courts. The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over the admission to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted. SECTION III The Superior Court shall consist of such number of judges as may be authorized by law, each of whom shall exercise the powers of the court subject to rules of the Supreme Court. The Superior Court shall at all times consist of at least two judges who shall be assigned to sit in each of the counties of this State, and who are resident therein at the time of appointment and reappointment. Article VI, Section III, paragraph 1 amended effective December 7, 1978. The Superior Court shall have original general jurisdiction throughout the State in all causes. The Superior Court shall be divided into an Appellate Division, a Law Division and a Chancery Division, which shall include a family part. Each division shall have such other parts, consist of such number of judges, and hear such causes, as may be provided by rules of the Supreme Court. At least two judges of the Superior Court shall at all times be assigned to sit in each of the counties of the State, who at the time of their appointment and reappointment were residents of that county provided, however, that the number of judges required to reside in the county wherein they sit shall be at least equal in number to the number of judges of the county court sitting in each of the counties at the adoption of this amendment. Article VI, Section III, paragraph 3 amended effective December 8, 1983. Subject to rules of the Supreme Court, the Law Division and the Chancery Division shall each exercise the powers and functions of the other division when the ends of justice so require, and legal and equitable relief shall be granted in any cause so that all matters in controversy between the parties may be completely determined. Article VI, Section IV, repealed effective December 7, 1978. SECTION VI The Justices of the Supreme Court and the Judges of the Superior Court shall be subject to impeachment, and any judicial officer impeached shall not exercise his office until acquitted. The Judges of the Superior Court shall also be subject to removal from office by the Supreme Court for such causes and in such manner as shall be provided by law.

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The Justices of the Supreme Court and the Judges of the Superior Court shall receive for their services such salaries as may be provided by law, which shall not be diminished during the term of their appointment. They shall not, while in office, engage in the practice of law or other gainful pursuit. The Justices of the Supreme Court and the Judges of the Superior Court shall hold no other office or position, of profit, under this State or the United States. Any such justice or judge who shall become a candidate for an elective public office shall thereby forfeit his judicial office. ARTICLE VII PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES SECTION I Every State officer, before entering upon the duties of his office, shall take and subscribe an oath or affirmation to support the Constitution of this State and of the United States and to perform the duties of his office faithfully, impartially and justly to the best of his ability. SECTION II County prosecutors shall be nominated and appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. Their term of office shall be five years, and they shall serve until the appointment and qualification of their respective successors. County clerks, surrogates and sheriffs shall be elected by the people of their respective counties at general elections. The term of office of county clerks and surrogates shall be five years, and of sheriffs three years. Whenever a vacancy shall occur in any such office it shall be filled in the manner to be provided by law. SECTION III The Governor and all other State officers, while in office and for two years thereafter, shall be liable to impeachment for misdemeanor committed during their respective continuance in office. SECTION II The credit of the State shall not be directly or indirectly loaned in any case. No money shall be drawn from the State treasury but for appropriations made by law. ARTICLE X GENERAL PROVISIONS

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The seal of the State shall be kept by the Governor, or person administering the office of Governor, and used by him officially, and shall be called the Great Seal of the State of New Jersey. All grants and commissions shall be in the name and by the authority of the State of New Jersey, sealed with the Great Seal, signed by the Governor, or person administering the office of Governor, and countersigned by the Secretary of State, and shall run thus: "The State of New Jersey, to ___________________, Greeting". All writs shall be in the name of the State. All indictments shall conclude: "against the peace of this State, the government and dignity of the same".

I PETITIONER IS IMBUED AT LAW WITH SUPERIOR RIGHT OVER RESPONDENTS AS THE FATHER TO HIS CHILDREN. 1. Respondents are in fact, involved in an unlawful scheme to disenfranchise Peter Bresko rights as a fatherand subordinate his lawful authority, custody, and control and care of his own children, and/or property, to that of a rogue respondents district attorney and court who fraudulently pretends to act in the best interest of the children in order that they may obtain direct and/or indirect remuneration and/or benefits from their unlawful usurpations. 2. As the lawful father to said children, and owner over all his property do in fact have title over his own children, and under law, and in accordance with the morality and teaching of our Christian religion under Almighty God, as invoked by the Constitution for the state of New Jersey (1776) am entitled to the custody so demanded by this lawful instrument. [see Ammon v. Johnson, 3 Ohio Cir. Ct. Rep. 263, 2 Ohio Cir. Dec. 149.]

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The American Digest 99 Custody of Infants (1) In General [a] The father is the natural guardian of his child, and will be awarded possession of his person, unless he is unworthy, and incompetent to discharge the trust imposed upon him. (OhioC.C. 1899) In re Coons, 20 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 47 11 O.C.D. 208; (Tex. Civ. App. 1905) Parker v. Wiggins, 86 SW 786 (W.Va. 1891)Green v. Campbell 35 W.Va. 698 14 S.E. 212, 29 Am. St. Rep. 843 [c] (Ga. 1893) The father is entitled to the custody of his child during minority, unless such right has been relinquished or forfeited. Franklin v. Carswell, 29, S.E. 476, 103 Ga. 553. [d] (Ga. 1902) On the hearing of a writ of Habeas Corpus to determine the custody of a minor child, it is an improper exercise of discretion to render Judgment depriving one of the custody and awarding it to another, where there is undisputed evidence of the right and fitness of the former to have such custody, and there is no evidence to the contrary. Carter v. Brett, 42 S.E. 348, 116 Ga. 114. Determinations of Particular issues or question Custody of Infants. [j] (Mass. 1834) In general, as the Father is by law clearly entitled to the custody of his child, the court will so far interfere as to issue the writ of Habeas Corpus and inquire into the circumstances of the case, in order to prevent a party entitled to the custody of a child from seeking it by force or stratagem. And the court will feel bound to restore the custody to the father, where the law has placed it, unless in a clear and strong case of unfitness on his part to have such custody. -- Commonwealth v. Briggs, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 203 [k] (Mo. 1865) Upon a petition for Habeas Corpus to determine to whom the custody of certain minor children shall be given, the court has no authority to order the Father to pay any certain sums of money to a trustee for their Support. Ferguson v. Ferguson 36 Mo. 197. [American Digest, 1897 1906] 1897 1906

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The father owns the children against the mother, as well as against everyone else State v. Richardson, 40 NH 272. 3. Clearly, the state has no lawful interest nor jurisdiction over Peter Breskos children. Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary [68 US 510 (1925)] solidly established the precept that a child is not the mere creature of the state. Thereby, under the laws to which this state is established, under the Constitution for the State of New Jersey (1776), Article I, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS:
Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Individuals or private corporations shall not be authorized to take private property for public use without just compensation first made to the owners. This enumeration of rights and privileges shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people. ARTICLE I, RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES; Constitution for the Commonwealth of New Jersey. That the right of a parent to the use of a minor child is a right of property of which a parent cannot be deprived unless the court finds that he or she is "unfit." Booth v. Booth, 69 Cal. App. 2d 496, 159 P.2d 93 (Cal.App.Dist.1 06/08/1945)

4. Self Government thereby established by a free peoples dictates that parents have a fundamental right to the education and rearing of our children [See Pierce v Society noted above at p. 535 and Meyer v. Nebraska 262 US 390 (1923)] In Loving v. Virginia [388 U.S. 1 (1967)] the Supreme Court of the United States held that the right of family was one of the fundamental rights possessed by free men essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness. Factually, the father is the superior lawful entity that has superior claim and controls over his own children, above all others, especially including this court and governments. Continuing this idea further, Supreme Court Justice Power wrote for that court in Moore, Our
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decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nations history and tradition. [Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). The father, is in fact, the leader of that tradition, and any subornation of my rights is in fact, a unlawful usurpation of our form of government and those protections secured under the Constitution for the state of New Jersey (1776). In Loving v. Virginia, 388 US 1 (1967) the Court held that this right of family as one that had long been established as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.

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II SAID RESPONDENTS HAVE NO LAWFUL AUTHORITY USING ANY DOCTRINE SUCH AS THE PARENS PATRIAE DOCTRINE, OVER HIS LAWFUL AND SUPERIOR NATURAL BORN, COMMON LAW, AND/OR CIVIL LIBERTY RIGHTS TO THE CARE, CONTROL, AUTHORITY, AND EDUCATION OF MY CHILDREN 5. The first use of the inferior doctrine of parens patriae was first used by the King in his protection of lunatics [See e.g. Note, The Parens Patriae Theory and its Effect on the Constitutional Limits of Juvenile Court Powers, 27 U. Pitt. L. Rev., m 894 (1966)]. Between the fourteenth and the sixteenth centuries, the court devolved into a condition to where the Lords were committing a number of abuses under this doctrine, and used this power to not only disinherit said wards, but also in which to drain freemen of their fortunes. [See e.g. Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the States Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 Geo. L. J. 887 (1975)]. The abuses which clearly are adumbrated throughout our founding fathers warnings of the errant power and control of governments were ingrained throughout the formation of this government, and in fact were given voice within each and every state constitutions in which to establish a nation of free men in which to create and sustain a free nation. This in fact led to the formative Article I, Section 1 secured liberties (cited above) within the Constitution for the state of New Jersey (1776), as these perversions under the doctrine of parens patriae conflagrated themselves throughout not only England, but this nations laws to wit:
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However, by the end of the sixteenth century and beginning of the seventeenth century, there was increasing criticism of the system of wardship. As part of fiscal feudalism, wardship had become one of the major rackets of Tudor England. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, classes from the peerage through he yeomandry were liable to discover they were sleepingtenants-in-chief of the crown. Wardship endangered family fortunes and undermined the authority of the parents. Abuses of the system were a frequent cause of complaint in the commons. In the early seventeenth century emphasis shifted from abuses, to the system itself. In 1646 the court of wards was abolished along with feudal tenures, according to Lawrence Stone, as the crown monopolized more of the profits for itself (rather than allow peers and courtiers to prey upon and patronize the gentry), and at a respect for individual freedom of choice began to be accepted, the overthrow of the court was inevitable. [The Law of the Father? Patriarchy in Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism, by Mary Murray, 1995, Routledge, London and New York, 11 New Fetter Lane, London, EC4P 4EE, p. 109]

Chief Justice Blackman iterated in 410 US 113, 152 (1973) that the fathers freedoms within the family were Fundamental and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 6. Law clearly mandates under the maxims of law and our historical common law and statutory provisions that the father has the superior right over government as well as the mother in which to provide control, custody and care of his children.
The child knows his fathers bed the best. Nemo Cogitur rem suam vendere, etiam justo pretio. No one is bound to sell his property, even for a just price. Sed vide Eminent Domain. 2 Inst. 66. "the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce." (See: Clayton Act; 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. Sect. 17, 15 U.S.C.A. Sect. 17) Partus seqitur ventrem. The offspring follow the condition of the mother. This is the law in the case of slaves and animals; 1 Bouviers Institutes n. 167, 502; But with regard to freemen, children follow the condition of the father. Bouviers Law Dictionary Nulli enim res sua servit jure servitutis. No one can have a servitude over his own property. Dig 8, 2, 26; 17 Mass. 443; 2 Bov. Inst. n. 1600.

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7. The fathers predominance is also seen historically throughout the statuary laws within this state, as former Civil Code section 230 clearly pointed to the father as the determinant and controlling factor in his childrens life: The father of an illegitimate child, by publicly acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as such, with the consent of his wife, if he is married, into his family, and otherwise treating it as if it were a legitimate child, thereby adopts it as such; and such child is thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of birth. (See Lavell v. Adoption Institute, (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 557, at page 561). As your maxims of law denotes above, the mother with the help of the state is being unlawfully imbued with custody, as she need support from the state, via judicial activist courts; and that symbiotic relationship between respondents in this matter empowers and financially remunerates them all, by their overt usurpation of the natural, common law and civil liberties of the father established both by law and precedent throughout this nation, to the distain of both fatherhood, the destruction of children and the denigration of society at large, whom are factually paying for this miscegenation of law through both taxes and other plenary social burdens conspired by said courts and respondents under color of authority, and under color of law.
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the crown. It may be a frail [home]its roof may shakethe wind may blow through it the storm may enterthe rain may enterbut the King of England cannot enterall his force dares not cross the threshold of that ruined tenement! [William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, 1708-1778, Speech in the House of Commons 1763, p. 312]

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Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse; disregard the character of its own existence. -Supreme Court Justice, Tom C. Clark [Quoted in Foundations of Freedom: A Living History of our Bill of Rights, by John H. Rodehamel, The Constitutional Rights Foundation, Los Angeles, 1991, p. 97]

8. It is clear, that the predominant guardian of the child, by our law, our history, and by demographic example; is in fact, the father, of which I am to my own children of which I have lawful title and have never given them up, abandoned them, nor inflicted any egregious act upon. Thereby, the ultimate jurisdiction of my children fall to me, and not of that to the state, as Lord Coke exemplified by maxim:
Trying to Split Children: Here be two maxims of the common law. First, that no man can hold one and the same land immediately of two several lords. Secondly, that one man cannot of the same land be both lord and tenant. And it is to be observed, that it is holden for an inconvenience, that any of the maxims of the law should be broken, through a private man suffer losse; for that by infringing of a maxime, not onely a generall prejudice to many, but in the end a publike incertainty and confusion to all would follow. (Section 152b) [Maxims of Lord Coke] Duo non possunt in solido unam rem possidere. "Two cannot possess one thing in its entirety." Blacks Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, pg. 502

9. Thereby, someone under law has ultimate control and authority over my children, and it is not in fact the state, nor the mother, which needs the state to gain control over the children, but rather, it is naturally vested and imbued within Peter Bresko, by right and perfect right under law. As the law is clear, that I must do an egregious unlawful act in which to dispose of my right and authority, which is in fact, not an instance of this matter. The fraud of Joint Custody is factually,

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an impossibility under law as Coke notes above, as factually, it is an impossibility for two people to equally own fifty percent of anything. More importantly, the access and rights to Liberty and self-government are a concomitant cornerstone of the foundational essence of the New Jersey Republic and the union of the several States of which the State of New Jersey, is incorporated to, both by statute, law, and by treaty. With regards to my home and family, there must be some ultimate Lord over the property of Mr. Breskos children, and under, by and through law, factually, he has been endowed with the lawful responsibility (and concomitant rights) of assuming that natural station. 10. Mr. Breskos childrens interests are factually being abrogated by this courtand by said respondents[an overt violation of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution for the United States (1787-1791 impairing Obligation of Contracts] which is to deny the care, custody and control of Mr. Breskos own children, as their father, which said rogue courts have clearly established enmity against fatherhood, in overt violation of law. Thereby, as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted under Endo Laboratories, Inc., v. Hartford Ins. Group (9th Cir. 1984) 747 F.2d 1264, 1267) that California Civil Code section [43.1] was enactedto create a cause of action for the benefit of the child, and to protect its interests in the even of its subsequent birthThe word interests as used in section [43.1] means anything that his profitable or beneficial to the child,including the right to compensation for personal injuries wrongfully

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inflicted by the willful or negligent acts of another person. Clearly, denying my children the care, custody and control of their father whom has superior lawful title than that of said respondents whom act upon their own selfish pecuniary interests under the guise and overt fraud of: Being in the Best Interests of the Child. Thereby by keeping his children with him and protecting their (my) property in a viable relationship with no financial burden to either party, is factually a superior model and in their best interests in which to place the interests of the children with Mr. Bresko, their working and honorable father into custody and which factually burdens no one. Disenfranchising Bresko under color of law and under color of authority is in fact in nobodys (and all) childrens worst interests as it assures them to inherit this feminized madness under the fraud of Being in the Best Interests of the Child. [sic.] 11. By historical mandate, when either mother or father differ in who retains control or custody, that custody clearly in law defaults to the father, and not the mother the father is by law, clearly entitled to the custody of the child. (See Commonwealth v. Briggs, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 203, 205 (1834), as quoted in Zainaldin, supra note 208, at 1062; see also People ex rel. Ordronaux v. Chegaray, 18 Wend. 637, 642 [N.Y. 1836] (which established that when differences arise between parents, it is the right of the father which is superior under law). Clearly, my and the rights of my own children, which attach to me, hold that we have the fundamental right to privacy, to not have state interference under the subordinate Parens Patriae doctrine:
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"The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the State or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend to incriminate him. He owes no duty to the State, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property. "His rights are such as existed by the Law of the Land (Common Law) long antecedent to the organization of the State, and can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. "He owes nothing to the public so long as he does not trespass upon their rights." Hale v. Hinkle 201 U.S. 43 at 89

12. Finally, it is a well settled doctrine that individuals are superior over government and the instigations of state compliance against unjust, perfidy, and capricious acts of government in which to extort money from Fathers In the Best Interests of the child.
"The statist notion that government may supercede parental authority in order to ensure bureaucratically or judicially determined "best interests" of children has been rejected as repugnant to American traditions. Judges and state officials are ill-equipped to second guess parents and are precluded from intervening in absence of powerful countervailing interests". Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1138 (Pa. 1990), citing, Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257-61, 77 L.Ed.2d 614, 623-29, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2991-93 (1982).

III THE DOCTRINE OF PARENS PATRIAE IS UNDER LAW, SUBORDINATE TO MY LAWFUL AUTHORITY AS MY CHILDRENS NATURAL FATHER; MY CONSENT, WILL, CONTROL, CUSTODY AND CARE OF MY OWN CHILDREN IS ORDINATE AND PROTECTED BY LAW AS I HAVE A RIGHT TO PROTECT MY LIFE, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY.

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The maxim of law clearly controls and elucidates this point of law: Remisus imperanti melius paretur. A [father] commanding not too strictly is best obeyed. 3 Co. Inst. 233.

13. Clearly, it has been established that: No court may, except for the gravest of reasons, transfer a child from its natural parent to any other person. People ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser, 303 N.Y. 539, 104 N.E.2d 895 (1952). The natural parents of a child have a right to the care and custody of their child that is superior to all others unless the right has been abandoned or the natural parents proved to be unfit. People ex Rel. Kropp v. Shepsky, 305 N.Y. 465, 113 N.E.2d 801 (1953). Parental custody may not be displaced in the absence of grievous necessity or cause. Matter of Dickson v. Lascaris, 53 N.Y.2d 204, 440 N.Y.S.2d 884, 423 N.E.2d 361 (1981). Thus, in a custody contest between a parent and a non-parent, the issue of the childs best interest is not reached unless first it is established that the natural parent surrendered the child, abandoned the child, was unfit, had persistently neglected the child, or that other extraordinary circumstances exist. Matter of Merrit v. Way, 58 N.Y.2d 850, 460 N.Y.S.2d 20, 446 N.E.2d 776 (1983). This is because neither law, nor policy, nor the tenets of our society allow a child to be separated from its parent unless the circumstances are compelling. Neither the lawyers nor judges nor experts in psychology or social welfare may displace the primary responsibility of child raising that naturally and legally fall to those who conceive and bear children. Matter of Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 387 40 N.Y.2d 821, 356 N.E.2d 277 (1976);

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Matter of Gomez v. Lozado, 40 N.Y.2d 839, 387 N.Y.X.2d 834, 356 N.E.2d 287 (1976). 14. As unemancipated minors, my children come under the Fathers lawful authority and dominion, and the doctrine of parens patriae which this court unlawfully operates, bows subordinate to Mr. Breskos lawful command and lawful authority, as my children are not incompetents, have not been abandoned by me, nor have committed criminal acts and/or omissions.
"the role of the state as the sovereign or quasi-sovereign guardian of persons under some form of legal disability. It authorizes the state to substitute and enforce decisions about what is believed to be in the best interests of persons who presumably cannot or will not take proper care of themselves." [Bartol, "Parens Patriae: Poltergeist of Mental Health Law" (1981) 3 L. & Pol. Quart. 191 at 193]

15. As neither my children, nor I are Fourteenth Amendment citizens, that amendment nor classification does not attach to either me nor my children, whom are my lawful posterity. As they are factually not incompetents, nor as they or I have committed any crime; nor are they under any physical or mental jeopardy by me; therefore, their custodial status falls to me as their father, as a matter of right, and perfect right, protected under law. [See Parham v. J.R., 142 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (finding that while parental rights are substantial, they are not absolute when a child's physical or mental well-being are at stake and stating that the Supreme Court has "recognized that a state is not without constitutional control over parental discretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental health is jeopardized" Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 801

25

(1944). See also Bothman v. Warren, 156 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51-52 (Ct. App. 1979) (adopting a clear and convincing evidence standard)]. No court within the State of New Jersey can lawfully invoke either jurisdiction, nor the doctrine of parens patriae in which to usurp or abuse Mr. Breskos natural born rights in this matter.
FATHER-. But he is not bound, without some agreement, to pay another for maintaining them; 9 C. & P. 497; nor is he bound to pay their debts, unless he has authorized them to be contracted. 38 E. C. L. R. 195, n. See 8 Watts, R. 366, 1 Craig. & Phil. 317; Bind; Nother; Parent. This obligation ceases as soon as the child becomes of age, unless he becomes chargeable to the public. 1 Ld. Ray. 699. The rights of the father are authority over his children, to enforce all his lawful commands, and to correct with moderation his children for disobedience. A father may delegate his power over the person of his child to a tutor or instructor, the better to accomplish the purposes of his education. This power ceases on the arrival of the child at the age of twenty-one years. Generally, the father is entitled to the services of his children during their minority. 4 S. & R. 207; Bouv. Inst. Index, h. t. --Bouvier's Law Dictionary 1856

16. It is a fact, that we have no agreement upon this matter, and thereby; you cannot invoke any doctrine or jurisdiction to abrogate my rights by law.
17. The most dramatic admission of said abuse of state power of courts invoking

Parens Patriae over that of a father came in a case involving Daniel O'Connell, age 14, who was committed to the Chicago Reform School in 1870. His father subsequently demanded Daniel's release on the ground that his son had committed no crime. The Illinois Supreme Court so ordered, arguing that the boy's Constitutional rights had been violated. The parens patriae doctrine, the court opined, was subject to the restraints of divine law.
"The parent has the right to the care custody and assistance of his child," the court reasoned. "The duty to maintain and protect it is a principle of natural

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lawBefore any abridgement of the right, gross misconduct or almost total unfitness on the part of the parent, should be clearly proved. " The State as parens patriae, has determined the imprisonment beyond recall. Such a restraint upon natural liberty is tyranny and oppression. If, without crime, without the conviction of any offense, the children of the State are to be thus confined for the `good of society,' then society had better be reduced to its original elements, and free government acknowledged a failure. [People ex.rel. O'Connell v. Turner, 55 Ill. at 280-87 (1870)]

18. It is irrefutable, that no such unfitness has been charged against Mr. Bresko, nor has anything been proved.
19. Moreover, several recent state court decisions have reinvigorated "the natural

law defense" of family rights as a viable element of the American legal tradition. For example, in a stunning 1982 decision, the Utah Supreme Court struck down a provision of that state's Children's Rights Act which allowed for the complete termination of parental rights upon a decision by welfare authorities that "such termination will be in the child's best interest." Writing for the majority, Justice Dallin Oaks stated:
"This parental right [to rear one's children] transcends all property and economic rights, It is rooted not in state or federal statutory or constitutional law, to which it is logically and chronologically prior, but in nature and human instinct." He noted that much of the rich variety in American culture had been transmitted to children by parents "who were acting against the best interest of their children, as defined by official dogma." [In Re J.P., document no 17386, filed June 9, 1982, The Supreme Court of the State of Utah, pp. 13, 17.]

There was no surer way to destroy authentic pluralism, Justice Oaks added, than by terminating the rights of parents who violated the "trendy" definitions and "officially approved values imposed by reformers empowered to determine
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what is in the `best interest' of someone else's child." While not impugning evil motives, he did quote James Madison: "It is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties." I make the point that Madison impressed upon a nation as President of the United States, when he said:
James MadisonAddress to the States, April 25, 1783

Let it be remembered finally, that it has ever been the pride and boast of America, that the rights for which she contended, were the rights of human nature. By the blessing of the Author of these rights on the means exerted for their defense, they have prevailed against all opposition and form the basis of Thirteen Independent States. No instance has heretofore occurred, nor can any instance be expected hereafter to occur, in which the unadulterated forms of Republican government can pretend to so fair an opportunity of justifying themselves by their fruits. In this view, the citizens of the U.S. are responsible for the greatest trusts ever confided in a political society. If justice, good faith, honor, gratitude & all the other Qualities which enoble the character of a nation, and fulfill the ends of Government, the fruits of establishments, the cause of our liberty will acquire a dignity and luster, which it never yet enjoyed; and an example will be set which can no but have most favorable influence on the rights of mankind. If on the other side, our governments should be unfortunately blotted with the reverse of the Cardinal and essential Virtues, the great cause which we have negated to vindicate, will be dishonored & betrayed; the last & fairest experiment in favor of the rights of human nature will be turned against them; and their patrons & friends exposed will be insulted and silenced by the votaries of Tyranny and Usurpation. [Our Sacred Honor, Words of Advice from the Founders in Stories, Letters, Poems and Speeches, by William J. Bennet 1997, Simon and Schuster, Rockefeller Center, 1230 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10020, ISBN 0-684-84138-X p. 322]

20. Factually, all agents of the County of Morris, as well as the State of New Jersey are using a fraud, of either Parens Patriae, or: Being in the Best Interests of the Child doctrine, and are in fact, strangers to Mr. Breskos childrens secured liberties, rights, wants and needs. Respondents have no station at law in which

28

to intrude upon Peter Breskos care, custody and control over his own family and children:
A stranger however, has no general privilege of interference for the protection of what he believes to be anyone's welfare...in general, the stranger interferes at his peril, regardless of worthy motives. [Grinberger v. Brotherton, 1933, 173 Wash. 292, 22 p.2D 983; Warren v. Graham, 1916, 174 Iowa 162, 156 N.W. 323.]

21. Thereby, any trespass of Mr. Bresko or his childrens secured liberties, is actionable as a matter of law, and said respondents will have no immunity, nor remedy at law, and will be liable in the first instance for monetary damages which must be paid to me in reparation for said contempt and insolence to aforesaid freedoms and liberties, and the concise rule of law. 22. Finally, the Doctrine of Parens Patriae embraces societies fundamental values, and not those of radical feminism, of which these courts through said respondents, religiously attend to in direct violation of the foundations of our law and our society:
See In re Phillip B., 156 Cal Rptr. 2d 48, 51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (stating that "[t]he state is the guardian of society's basic values. Under the doctrine of parens patriae, the state has a right, indeed a duty, to protect children. State officials may interfere in family matters to safeguard the child's health, educational development and emotional well being")

See also:

"An officer [or any person in government office i.e. Judge] who acts in violation of the Constitution ceases to represent the government." Brookfield Const. Co. v. Stewart, 284 F.Supp. 94.

23. Fatherhood, is that basic value that must be maintained by this court as a substantive duty and remedy at law to your petitioner/Appellant. The condition of being a Father, does not mean that the state can divest him of his constitutional
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rights and secured liberties by using the respondents unconstitutional, patently unfair and unjust surrogate court systems: "Under our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1967). Neither does it follow that the condition of being a father does not justify a kangaroo court. Respondents continuous enterprise denying your appellant his rights and secured liberties is in fact, ex post facto as procreating cannot be a crime:
"An "ex post facto law" is defined as a law which provides for the infliction of punishment upon a person for an act done which, when it was committed, was innocent; a law which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; a law that changes the punishment or inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; a law that hangs the rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than was required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the offender; a law which, assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or the deprivation of a right which, when done, was lawful; a law which deprives persons accused of crime of some lawful protection to which they have become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or of the proclamation of amnesty; every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his disadvantage." Wilensky v. Fields, Fla, 267 So.2d 1,5." [Source: 6th edition, Black's Law Dictionary, p 580.]

24. Petitioner as the lawful Father to my children and has the lawful right not to defend and punish 1 the unlawful taking of my children from me by respondents:
Glanville, however, maintained a contrary doctrine, and insisted that the action lay. For, said he, the father hath an interest in every of his children, to educate them and to provide for them; and he hath his comfort by them; wherefore it is not reasonably that any should take them from him, and to do him such an injury, but that the should have his remedy to punish it. Vaughan v. Rhodes (1822) 2 McCord 227
A secured liberty under Article I, section 1 All men are by nature free and independent and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property; and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness." Clause.
1

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25. It is a fact, that I have the substantive right to be entitled to the custody care and control of my own children, and without the substantive right given to me, any fraud placed upon me vitiates all contracts as they are now established by said respondents in this matter the PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY:
A parent, however clearly he may deem himself entitled to the custody of his infant child, must not resort to force and artifice to obtain possession of it: Commonwealth v. Fee, 6 Serg. & R. 255. He should enter through the straight gate of the law to obtain such possession, and not attempt to climb over it in some other and wrongful way.: Jones v. Cleyborn, 54 Ga. 9, 13; Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 299, 312; 30 Am. Rep. 593. "Governmental power only extends to restraining each one in freedom of his conduct so as to secure perfect protection to all others from every species of danger to person, health, and property; that each individual shall be required to use his own as to inflict injury upon his neighbors; and these seem to be all immunities which can be justly claimed by one portion of of society from another, under government of constitutional limitation." In Re Newman (1858), 9 C. 502. "When a parent is deprived of the custody of his child, and therefore of its services and earnings, he is no longer liable for its support and education." Selfridge v. Paxton, 145 Cal. 713, 79 Pac. 425; Ex parte Miller, 109 Cal. 648, 42 Pac. 428; McKay v. McKay, 125 Cal. 65, 57 Pac. 677; Matter of McMullin, 164 Cal. 504, 129 Pac. 773; People v. Hartman, 23 Cal. App. 72, 137 Pac. 611.

IV THE COURTS OF THE COUNTY OF MORRIS, AND ALSO THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY HAVE FACTUALLY ESTABLISHED AN IRREFUTABLE FRAUD AND EMNITY AGAINST FATHERHOOD, AND DO NOT ACT IN THE CHILDRENS BEST INTERESTS AS THE FACTS THROUGHOUT SOCIETY SHOW, THAT DENIAL OF FATHERHOOD IS IN FACT, CHILD ABUSE; AND IS NOT IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, AS UNDER LAW AND MAXIM OF LAW, MY CHILDREN FOLLOW MY CONDITION AND NOT THAT OF THE MOTHER, AND ANY ATTACK
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UPON ME IS AN ATTACK UPON THEIR OWN BEST INTERESTS. 26. The respondents in this matter, in collusion with said courts, do in fact fraudulently conspire to set the initial tribunal in regards to this matter, in which to make this a civil matter. This is cogently and willfully done in bad faith, under the fraud and guise of being in the best interest of the child, when in fact, it is a ploy to force Peter Bresko into a civil (or unknown) proceeding so that said respondents and court can deny Mr. Bresko and his children their constitutional rights, and other protections at law. Instead, in this fraudulent equity proceeding, (or undefined) said respondents and contemnor tribunal turn off law in order that Mr. Bresko and his children may be denied their natural born, common law and/or civil rights, all under the guise of due process of law and/or equity.
Equity. In the early history of the law, the sense affixed to this word was exceedingly vague and uncertainIt was then asserted that equity was bounded by no certain limits or rules, and that it was alone controlled by conscience and natural justice 3.The remedies for the redress of wrongs and for the enforcement of rights, are distinguished into two classes, first, those which are administered in courts of common law; and secondly, those which are administered in courts of equity. Equity, Court of: one which administers justice, where there are no legal rightsbut [are] used when courts of law do not afford a complete remedy, and where the complainant has also an equitable right. [Bouviers Law Dictionary, 1859]

Dr. Daniel Amneus in his watershed work: The Case for Father Custody openly delineates these well known facts for the reasons for establishing these rogue courts:
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illegitimacy rate and a sixty (no longer fifty) percent divorce rate with virtually automatic mother custody. A judge may try a divorce case in the morning and place the children in the mothers custody. He may try a criminal case in the afternoon and send a man to prison for robbing a liquor store. The chances are three out of four that the man he sends to prison grew up in a fatherless household like the one he created in the morning when he tried the divorce case. He sees no connection between the two cases. Fatherless children are 5 times more likely to commit suicide, 32 times more likely to run away, 20 times more likely to have behavioral disorders, 14 times more likely to commit rape, 9 times more likely to end up in a state-operated institution, 20 times more likely to end up in prison. Fatherless girls perpetuate the next generation of fatherlessness, encouraged by the removal of the stigma of illegitimacy and by the growth of a government Backup System which is designed to repair the damage created by fatherlessness, but which actually encourages and subsidizes it. [The case for Father Custody, 1999 by Dr. Daniel Amneus, Primrose Press, Alhambra, CA. cover sheet]

Our society fails to guarantee [Father custody] support. We have a thirty percent

These rogue feminist courts which respondents imbue, are in fact no friend to fatherhood, nor to we the people of the state of New Jersey. They are the enemy of my children, as factually, under their cogent tenure, they have established a fascist regime which produces the here to be mentioned social pathology in which respondents gain direct and/or indirect remuneration from their planned and engineered destruction of home and family through destroying fathers such as me, fraudulently done In the Best Interests of the Child to develop social pathology for their own profit. The facts are incontrovertible and have become a mantra throughout the populaces experience: FACTS
Upwards of 25 percent of children in our society do not have a father living at home. Children in such families are over-represented in terms of reported cases of physical abuse and other forms of child maltreatment.

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[Child Maltreatment and Paternal Deprivation. A Manifesto for Research, Prevention and Treatment. By Henry Biller and Richard Solomon, (Lexington MA; D.C. Heth. 1986), p. 21] According to The Family in America: New Research, December, 1989, citing a Milwaukee County inter-office memo, of all 1050 ongoing substantiated child abuse and neglect cases in Milwaukee County in May 1989, 83 percent involved [single female headed] households receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). These researchers [Robert Schoen, Harry N. Greenblatt, and Robert B. Mielke] report that 78 percent of all divorce petitions in New Jersey were filed by wives [p. 147] [Quoting attorney Riane Eisler]: By social convention, the vast majority of divorces were filed by women. [p. 174]: In New Jersey, in 1968, under the adversary system, over three-quarters of the plaintiffsthose who initialed the legal divorce proceedingswere wives filing charges against guilty husbands. According to David Chambers, Making Fathers Pay (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979) p. 29, the wife is the moving party in divorce actions seven times out of eight. According to the Legal Beagle, February, 1986, 72 percent of divorce filings are made by wives. According to Yuanxi Ma, Chinese feminist, about 60 percent of Chinas divorces are initiated by women (Off Our Backs, April, 1988). According to Joan Kelly, author of Surviving the Breakup, Divorce is sought about three-to-one by women (cited in Joint Custody Newsletter, January, 1988). According to Christopher Lasch, NYRB, 17 February, 1966, three-quarters of divorce are granted to women. According to Elsie Clews Parsons The Family: An Ethnographical and Historical Outline (New York: G. P. Putnams Sons, 1906) p. 331, A large majority of divorces are obtained by women. According to a three-day survey by the County Clerks Office in Orange County, New Jersey, two of every three divorce petitions listed the wife as the plaintiff (Fathers Forum, August, 1987). According to court records in Marion, Howards, Hancock, Grand and Ruch counties in Indiana in 1985, of 2,033 dissolutions granted, 1599 (76.6%) were filed by wives, 474 (23.3%) were fled by husbands (National Congress for Men Network, Vol. 1, number 3). Judicial bias was empirically documented in a study of custody decisions making in the Colorado courts (Pearson & Ring, 1982) Given the complexity of child interviewing and assessment, judges lack of training and the potential for bias, it is questionable whether judges are competent to conduct such interviews (Goldstein, Freud, Solnit & Goldstein, 1986). Mental Health experts have addressed the possibility that some judges are stepping beyond their professional bounds and are acting in the capacity of mental health professionals. The issue of judicial competence was addressed by a West Virginia court, which stated that the intelligent determination of relative degrees of fitness requires a precision of measurement which is not possible, given the tools available to judges. (Garska v. McCoy, 1981)

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[Factors Affecting Childrens Power to Choose their Caretakes in Custody Proceedings, by Eric Speth, J.D. Ph.D.; Custody Newsletter, #12/13 1995, Village Publishing, 73 Valley Drive, Furlong, PA 18925.] The proportion of children living with two parents declined from 85% in 1970 to 68% in 1996, and the proportion of children living with one parent grew from 12% to 28%. Of these single parents, in 1996, 39% were divorced, 37% had never been married, 21% were separated from their spouse, and 4% were widowed. [U.S. Dep't of Commerce, supra, note 6, at 27, 48.] KIDNAPPING CHILDREN This may now be the poison that is turning family discord into family destruction, with the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children reporting almost 1,000 parental kidnappings in this country every day. These are still overwhelmingly maternal, but if fathers begin launching pre-emptive strikes (perhaps after reading Seidenberg), even this astounding figure could increase. [Domestic Armageddon, by DR. Steven Baskerville] Fatherless Homes Statistics RE: Youth Suicide and Divorce/Single parent Homes: VARIOUS STUDIES "In a study of 146 adolescent friends of 26 adolescent suicide victims, teens living in single-parent families are not only more likely to commit suicide but also more likely to suffer from psychological disorders, when compared to teens living in intact families." Source: David A. Brent, (et. al.) "Post-traumatic Stress Disorders in Peers of Adolescent Suicide Victims: Predisposing Factors and Phenomenology." [Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry 34 (1995): 209-215.] "Fatherless children are at dramatically greater risk of suicide." [Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Center for Health Statistics, Survey on Child Health, Washington, D.C., 1993.] "Three out of four teenage suicides occur in households where a parent has been absent." [Source: Jean Beth Eshtain, "Family Matters: The Plight of America's Children." The Christian Century (July 1993): 14-21.] "A family structure index - a composite index based on the annual rate of children involved in divorce and the percentage of families with children present that are female-headed - is a strong predictor of suicide among young adult and

35

adolescent white males." [Source: Patricia L. McCall and Kenneth C. Land, "Trends in White Male Adolescent, Young-Adult, and Elderly Suicide: Are There Common Underlying Structural Factors?" Social Science Research 23 (1994): 57-81]

27. Mr. Peter Bresko is his childrens lawful father, and of which he has their best interests in mindhe refuses to enslave either his children or himself to a system which is assured to only enslave, burden, imprison, and which unlawfully creates and expands both debtors prisons and a socialist welfare empire. Factually, this court is bound by its own words to act by their own law in Mr. Breskos childrens best interests, which is clearly protecting the Father (Mr. Bresko) from the state. They have an unalienable right to be under my care, custody and control over that of their mother and/or the state. Thereby, it is a well demonstrated fact, that respondents acting in overt collusion with each other using the fraud of In the Childs Best Interest doctrine, that I will be denied full custody of my own children, be totally disenfranchised; and be conscripted into financial obligation that I do not owe in order so that respondents will benefit from my demise and enslavement:
Jones v. Jones, 156 Fla. 524, 527, 23 So. 2d 623, 625 (1945) (citations omitted). This concept still exists in Florida's family court system today; Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal recently noted that "there remains a temptation for many judges to consider the right to custody as the mother's to lose and unless her fitness is legitimately challenged, the father's right of equal consideration is often ignored." Ayyash v. Ayyash, 700 So. 2d 752, 754 n.3 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997). See Also: MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT, GENDER BIAS STUDY OF THE COURT SYSTEM IN MASSACHUSETTS (1989), reprinted in 24 NEW. ENG. L. REV. 745, 745 (1990) [hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS STUDY].

36

[107] See, e.g., id. at 746 (noting that "women face discriminatory attitudes and actions" regarding child custody, but failing to recognize that men face discriminatory attitudes and actions regarding child custody); id. at 748, 830 (reporting that "perceptions of gender bias may discourage fathers from seeking custody and stereotypes about fathers may sometimes affect case outcomes," but failing to examine either the perceptions or the stereotypes and how they affect fathers so that, by their own data, 93.4% of the time mothers receive primary residential custody); id. at 829 (suggesting that it is appropriate for mothers to overwhelmingly receive custody because of, in part, "the unequal sacrifice of earning potential these women make in order to be primary caretakers," yet failing to examine gender bias against men who are culturally forced into the "provider" role). See Also: A prime example is a 1951 study commissioned by the World Health Organization and conducted by John Bowlby, a preeminent psychoanalyst. Bowlby set up a study to follow the effects of maternal deprivation. Paternal deprivation was not studied. Yet, Bowlby felt confident enough to report that "the child's relation to his mother . . . is without doubt in ordinary circumstances, by far his most important relationship." Bowlby's findings were widely implemented by child care institutions and reinforced court findings that children should be kept with mothers at all costs. Consequently, to reduce the toddler-mother "separation anxiety" as reported by Bowlby, psychologists recommended that fathers be denied overnight visitation. Studies such as these have been incorporated into our family court system and have become unquestioned aspects of our family law. See WARSHAK, supra note 6, at 35-36; see also Martha J. Cox & Blair Paley, Families as Systems, 48 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 243, 244 (1997) (noting that child development studies have focused on the role of the mother-child relationship); infra text accompanying note 162 (noting that as late as 1996, the guidelines in Florida's Twelfth Judicial Circuit provided that a noncustodial parent-almost always the father-could not have overnight visitation with a child until the child turned two years old)

28. Mr. Breskos childrens status, which has clearly and lawfully been established by him and under his protection, does not give this court in personam jurisdiction nor subject matter jurisdiction over the parties, and in fact; brings said children under his care, custody and control as a matter of law.

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29. Their best interests by the facts so stated, by your own law and maxims of law, state that they must follow Mr. Breskos condition, and his authority, again; which is factually ordinate to respondents and/or any court. It is a now well-recognized fact, that it is your tribunals un-warranted influence under color of law, and under color of authority that is factually precipitating the jeopardy, and direct harm that his children suffer by your decisions. AT NO TIME HAS PETER BRESKO EITHER ABANDONED NOR PLACED INTO THE PUBLIC CHARGE ANY OF HIS OWN CHILDREN:
Not since the overthrow of the Weimar Republic have the leaders of a major democracy used their office and the mass media to disseminate invective against millions of their own citizens. In fact, it was Adolph Hitler who urged that the state must declare the child to be the most precious treasure of the people, and who explained, in the words of Rabbi Daniel Lapin, that as long as government is perceived as working for the benefit of children, the people happily will endure almost any curtailment of liberty. Using children to tug on our heartstrings may be not only a weakness of the sentimental. It also may be a ploy by those cynical and unscrupulous enough to exploit children for their own purposes. This is likely to be remembered as one of the most diabolical perversions of governmental power in our history, a time when we allowed children to be used and abused by fast-talking government officials and paid for it with our families, our social order, and our constitutional rights. [Insight Magazine, Quote of Dr. Steven Baskerville, Professor, Harvard University]

Clearly, respondents are a clear and ever present danger to the rights of Fatherhood, ergo: your appellant and petitioner in this matter.
The Court uses three standards of review. First, strict scrutiny is applied to any statute based on a suspect classification or fundamental right. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (reviewing an Oklahoma statute that forbade the sale of 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 while females over 18 could purchase the beer).

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[192] See STONE ET AL., supra note 180, at 680-82. Despite the heightened level of scrutiny, the Court has nonetheless continued to uphold some statutes that discriminate against either gender. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 475 (1981) (upholding a statute subjecting men but not women to statutory rape charges when they engage in sex with a partner under the age of 18); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981) (upholding the maleonly draft); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975) (sustaining a federal statute that granted female navy members a longer time period in which to achieve a mandatory promotion); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 356 (1974) (upholding a Florida statute that provided a property tax exemption for widows but not widowers); Gedulig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974) (upholding New Jersey's exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities under the state's disability insurance program). Consequently, the Court has sent mixed messages as to exactly which level of scrutiny would be used when reviewing equal protection challenges to laws. See STONE ET AL., supra note 180, at 681-82. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("[C]ourts must subject [all legal restrictions that curtail the civil rights of a single racial group] to the most rigid scrutiny.") Government must show a necessary and compelling reason for burdening a specific race, national origin, or alienage. See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 24 (1972). Second, intermediate scrutiny is applied to any statute based on the quasi-suspect classes of gender. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75 (1971) ("A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.'" (citation omitted)). The Court uses this level of review for invidious (intentionally harmful) or benign (intending to help women or redress past discrimination against them) discrimination. See STONE ET AL., supra note 180, at 679-82, 713-18. Government must show a substantially related interest to an important governmental objective. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). Third, the rational relation test is applied to any statute not based on a suspect or quasi-suspect class; the government action must bear a rational relationship to an acceptable goal sought by the government. See JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 524 (3rd ed. 1986). The statute will be upheld as long as it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective, which is almost always the case. See id. Prior to 1971, the Supreme Court reviewed gender classifications using the rational relation test. See HERMA HILL KAY, SEXBASED DISCRIMINATION 26-27 (2d ed. 1981). In 1971, the Court began to use a heightened level of scrutiny when reviewing gender-based statutes. See id.; Reed, 404 U.S. at 75.

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RESPONDENTS HAVE FACTUALLY ACTED IN BAD FAITH TO PETER BRESKO, AND HAVE UNCLEAN HANDS, AND THEREBY; CANNOT USE THE LEGAL PROCESS AND ARE IN FACT IN AN ABUSE OF PROCESS, TO USE THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY, FOR A PURPOSE NEVER INTENDED NOR ALLOWED AT LAW. 30. Mr. Bresko is his childrens own father, serving his childrens best interests as the facts presented above concur; that he will ask nor burden either the state of New Jersey nor Welfare for Child Support in the raising of his own children, which is a superior doctrine, than that of Parens Patriae or socialist / feminist model and thereby, as a fit parent, with clean hands, he must be given superior rule and authority within my own home and within my own family.
The majority applies the doctrine of parens patriae in order to grant Patrick visitation. In Williams v. Williams, 425 NW2d 390, 393 (SD 1988), we held that trial courts have the authority and obligation to protect children from remaining in an environment detrimental to their emotional and physical well-being. See also SDCL 19-14-26 and -27. The cases where we have recognized parens patriae deal with children of the marriage whose custody is at issue because neither parent really serves the child's best interests. See Matter of Guardianship of Petrik, 544 NW2d 388, 391 (SD 1996); Jeschke v. Wockenfuss, 534 NW2d 602, 605 (SD 1995); Swenson v. Swenson, 529 NW2d 901, 904 (SD 1995); Williams, 425 NW2d at 393; Jasper v. Jasper, 351 NW2d 114, 117 (SD 1984). Tamara is not an unfit parent. However, the New Jersey Legislature "acknowledged the importance of parental autonomy by cautioning that even an award of visitation to a stepparent 'shall not conflict with any visitation or custodial right of a natural or adoptive parent[.]'" Nancy S. v. Michele G., 279 CalRptr 212, 217 (CalCtApp 1991) (quoting CalCivCode 4351.5(j)).

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Using law as to implement feminist practices policies and procedures as the rule of law in the State of New Jersey:
"Parens patriae, literally 'parent of the country,' refers traditionally to the role of the state as sovereign and guardian of persons under a legal disability to act for themselves such as juveniles, the insane, or the unknown." W. Va. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir. 1971).

31. Respondents are not bowing to Mr. Breskos lawful command and authority under law, and instead are using their unclean hands and fraudulent expertise as a motive for profit motive:
The Honorable Richard S. Tuthill, a Civil War Veteran, concluded opening day by instructing his makeshift staff 'not to rush "neglected and wayward" children into court, but rather to 'confer with parents, priest or pastor, using every effort to set the child right without resorting to an arrest save the final reserve', bringing children to Juvenile Court "only as a last resort." Tanenhaus, Id. at 8 [What is the State to Do? Juvenile Justice in Historical Perspective, presented at the Chicago Council on Urban Affairs annual luncheon, July 17, 1997]

32. Respondents are factually, in bad faith using the incomprehensible power and authority of the people of the state of New Jersey, as a first resort, in the first instance against Peter Bresko, as his childrens own father; to factually enslave and disenfranchise him, and to use the courts of the State of New Jersey as their legal instrumentalities for the sole purpose of gaining and enriching themselves, as a profit motive in direct violation to the concise rule of law and in contradistinction to our form of government. 33. Respondents, whom have acted in bad faith in this matter, as a matter of law, have no right to his childrens services while Peter Bresko is their father, thereby, child support must be completely denied. (see Pyle v. Waechter, 1926, 202 Iowa

41

695, 210 N.W. 926, 42 A.L.R. 557; Soper v. Igo, Walker & Co., 1905, 121 Ky. 550, 89 S.W. 538, 28 Ky.L.Rep. 519, 1 L.R.A., N.S., 362, 11 Ann.Cas. 1171, 123 Am.St.Rep. 212.) Respondents are in fact engaged in alienation of affections of his children against him, and harboring his children within the welfare system or denying him custody in direct violation of law. (See Everett v. Sherfy, 1855, 1 Iowa 356; Washburn v. Abrams, 1906, 122 Ky. 53, 90 S.W. 997; Sargent v. Mathewson, 1859, 38 N.H. 54; Caughey v. Smith, 1872, 47 N.Y. 244). There is no special privilege at law recognized to interfere with the legal and lawful custody of my child. (See Restatement of Torts, 700, Comment). 34. Respondents have no legal right to his services. They cannot require him to work, nor have no common law remedy for his deprivation of his society, or his intercourse or affections. (See supra p. 691. * * * the inferior hath no kind of property in the company, care, or assistance of the superior * * * and therefore can suffer no loss or injury. 3 Bl.Comm. 142. See also Cowen, Domestic Relations; Action for Loss of Consortium, 1951, 25 Aust.L.J. 390, 1952, 26 Aust. L.J. 358). As Respondents have acted in bad faith for the purposes of either direct or indirect remuneration for the purposes of profit and/or reward under Title IV-D Welfare remuneration scams and/or schemes, they have unclean hands and can neither benefit by or from any court action, or profit in any way, shape or form at law in any State of New Jersey Court or tribunal:
The doctrine [of unclean hands] promotes justice by making a [petitioner] answer for his own misconduct in the action. It prevents a wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits of his transgression. [Petitioner] must come into court with clean hands, and 42

76 Cal.App.4th 970.

keep them clean, or he will be denied relief, regardless of the merits of his claim. Kendall-Jackson Winery, Ltd. v. Superior Court (E. & J. Gallo Winery) (1999)

and expects unlawful support from respondents as a fraudulent means to gain joint custody and control in order to obtain money and support in direct violation of my rights and secured liberties, and placing my children into direct jeopardy thereto, I must be given my lawful right to the full care, custody and control of my own children, as well as my property, for my best interest and thereby their best interests as well as my family which are established and come under my lawful protection. 35. Respondents lie and state that the children cannot suffer for the sins of the parents, however; Peter Bresko has not sinned in any way, shape or form, and has clean hands in this matter in accordance with law and morality. Thereby, Respondents whom have accrued the benefit, must assume the responsibility of their unclean hands as the maxim of law states: He who accrues the benefit, assumes the burden. VI RESPONDENTS HAVE NO PROPER AND LAWFUL INCORPORATIONS OF PROCEEDINGS, NO LAWFUL CONTRACT OR OBLIGATION OF DEBT, OR SPECIAL DEBT; OR OBLIGATION, OR SPECIAL OBLIGATION WHICH ALLEGEDLY ATTACHES TO ME, NOR PROPER JOINING OF PARTIES IN THIS MATTER, AND THEREBY, MY HOME AND FAMILY COMES UNDER MY SUPERIOR LAW AND PROTECTION.

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36. Respondents have acted through fraud to attempt to coerce him into an unconscionable contract, in order to divest Mr. Bresko of his rights and deny me the care, custody and control over his own children: 19.2 What makes a contract unconscionable? The Code does not define unconscionability nor does its text indicate what elements go into making a contract unconscionable. The official comments suggest: The basic test is whether in the light of the general background and the commercial needs of the trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contractThe principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surpriseand not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power. [RIGHTS AND REMEDIES UNDER UCC ARTICLE 2, by Harold Greenberg 1987, Wiley Law Publications, John Wiley & Sons, New York, ISBN 0-471-81283-8, pp. 282-283] 37. Whereas, in bad faith and direct collusion with each other, respondents under color of law and under color of authority, fraudulently and unlawfully use the aegis of government through their District Attorney, to represent his child, in order to disenfranchise Mr. Bresko, and thereby gain either direct or indirect U.S.C.A. Title IV-D Welfare remuneration scams and or schemes for their own purposes of profit and reward, and; 38. Whereas, in bad faith and direct collusion conspired against Bresko, said respondents have fraudulently in bad faith, usurped his lawful rights and authorities, and have protected and represented his children in direct
44

opposition to his wishes, and in direct arrogance and insolence to the concise rule of law, in order to disenfranchise him and take away his opportunity to act in his childrens best interests for their own good, and for his own families good. 39. Respondents have divested him of his liberties and property, against his consent, and over his continued objections and against his best interests and his families best interests, without proper compensation to him as mandated by law:
The compensation must be made before the citizen can be divested of his rights. San Francisco v. Scott, 4 Cal. 114; McCain v. Sierra County, Jan T., 1857, See also Constitution of New Jersey (1776) Art I, Id (above). [W]e believe that when no substantial harm threatens a child's welfare, the state lacks a sufficiently compelling justification for the infringement on the fundamental right of parents to raise their children as they see fit." Hawk v. Hawk 855 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tenn1993) Parents and children have a well elaborated constitutional right to live together without governmental interference. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

40. Thereby, said respondents, using color of law, under color of authority, have divested him of substantive due process of law, and his most basic secured liberties and foundationally secured rights:
"The law has three distinct purposes: 1. To maintain the existence and well-being of society. 2. To maintain the preserve the person and property of each individual member free from all burdens which are not common to every other member. 3. To maintain and preserve the special rights of each member, and also of each member in relation to property. [The Theory of Common Law, by James M. Walker Charleston, S.C., Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1852, p. 22]

41. As factually, no act or omission has been committed by Peter Bresko, nor any incompetence, and by right and perfect right as the lawful father to his children,

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said County of Morris, the State of New Jersey and/or the United States and said respondents have not established lawful agency nor jurisdiction in this matter, and thereby; Peter Breskos original natural born legal rights, secured to him under law incorporate to him as a matter of right and perfect right as I hereby do claim and establish, lawful title, and claim to his own children, and hereby demand them and control over all property, forthwith.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREAS, your petitioner in this matter, Peter Bresko, the truly damaged and aggrieved party in this matter, comes before Almighty God and his tribunal, seeking justice under the law. He hereby therefore, supplicates the following prayer for just relief under law from this tribunal: 1.) That my children instantly be returned to my own lawful custody and freed immediately from this unlawful restraint of their liberty pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:2-7 2.) That this lawful Habeas Corpus issue immediately AND IF NOT ISSUED WITHIN 48 HOURS, THE ABOVE MENTIONED TRIBUNAL AND ALL ITS ASSIGNS WAIVES ALL CLAIMS TO IMMUNITY AND HAS NO OTHER REMEDY AT LAW OR DEFENSE IN WHICH TO DEFEND THEMSELVES, AND THEREBY A DEFAULT WILL BE ENTERED ON THIS HABEAS CORPUS AND RELEASE WILL BE SECURED BY A HIGHER COURT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.

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3.)

That if the above mentioned respondents do not either hear or issue this Writ of Habeas Corpus THEY WILL BE IN DEFAULT WITH NO FURTHER REMEDY OR RIGHTS AT LAW.

4.)

That I retain my familys privacy in this matter, and said Morris County Family Courts or the Morris County Courts as well as The State of New Jersey should be recused from any further interference and damage to my family.

5.)

That I be allowed to raise my children as a father, with sole independent care, control and authority over that of my own children and own home in accordance with law.

6.)

That I be allowed to enjoy, control, defend and use my own property as I see fit, in accordance with law.

7.)

That I be allowed to live in freedom and peace AND THAT SAID RESPONDENTS AND/OR THEIR AGENTS BE PROHIBITED FROM FURTHER ATTACKS ON ME AND MY FAMILY.

8.)

If this Habeas Corpus is either denied, mitigated or ignored; that the abovementioned tribunal will in the first instance remit written response to Peter Breskos lawful Demand for Statement of Decision showing the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law supporting said denial.

9.)

That this court grant any other further relief that this court deems fair and just.

Dated: August 29, 2011

___________________________ Peter J. Bresko Petitioner, In Propria Persona 25 Chilhowie Drive Kinnelon, New Jersey 07405 (973) 291-8430
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Peter J. Bresko c/o 25 Chilhowie Drive Kinnelon, New Jersey 07405 (973) 291-8430 In Propria Persona _________________________________

: Peter Bresko, : : : Petitioner, : : Vs. : : Renate Bresko, Christian Van Pelt, Esq., : Unknown Entities 1-5, : Jane Does 1-5, John Does 1-5, : : Respondents. : _________________________________:

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY MORRIS COUNTY CHANCERY DIVISION/FAMILY PART DOCKET NO. FM-14-979-11 Civil Action CERTIFICATION OF PETITIONER FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Petitioner Peter Bresko, by way of this Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus against Respondents Renate Bresko, Christian Van Pelt, Esq., (attorney for Renate Bresko), Unknown Entities 1-5, Jane Does 1-5 and John Does 1-5, says: PARTIES 1. Petitioner Peter Bresko is a resident of Morris County, State of New Jersey.

His address is 25 Chilhowie Drive, Kinnelon, New Jersey, 07405, and he is the father of the minor children, Katerina Bresko, 13 years of age, and Peter Bresko, 9 years of age. 2. Respondent Renate Bresko, is the mother of the parties children, and it

cannot be determined where she resides at the time of this writing. Respondent is an Austrian National and non-US Citizen with Permanent Resident status, with no residence,

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no employment, no family, is a welfare mother who has fraudulently obtained public assistance, and has no ties to the community or the United States. 3. Respondents Christian Van Pelt, Esq. (office located at 54 Horse Hill Road,

Suite 202, Cedar Knolls, New Jersey 07927), Jane Does 1-5 and John Does 1-5, are involved with Respondent Renate Bresko in fomenting domestic violence allegations against Petitioner on grounds of harassment and other unsubstantiated positions, and in aiding and abetting Respondent Renate Bresko in fraud, kidnapping, criminal restraint and custodial interference with regard to the parties two (2) children. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS A. Respondent Renate Bresko falsely used/ misused the New Jersey Prevention of Domestic Violence Act to deny Petitioner access to the children. 4. Because the parties had separated and Petitioner filed a Complaint for

Divorce on January 31, 2011, with Respondent filing an Answer and Counterclaim, on March 3, 2011 The next day, Respondent Renate Bresko obtained a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act on alleged harassment. As such, Petitioner fathers parenting time was suspended/terminated without strict scrutiny and without cause or justification. 5. Said TRO was issued upon the false representations by Respondent Renate

Bresko alleging that Petitioner had harassed her by writing letters to her employer, the Accountancy Board, and the IRS, based on Petitioners contentions and evidence from Austrian counsel that Petitioner had discovered bank accounts in the name of Petitioner had been cleaned out by Respondent Renate Bresko. Respondent Renate Bresko

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wrongfully misused and abused the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act to cover up her wrongdoing and bad faith acts. She is using a fraudulent FRO to obstruct and interfere with Petitioners parental rights. B. The presumption of awarding custody of the children to the Respondent victim in any Restraining Order is a violation of both New Jersey Law and the Petitioners Constitutional Rights. 6. Any restraining order by Respondent against Petitioner cannot and should

not be allowed to be used as the excuse for the unlawful imprisonment of these children or to deny their Petitioner father his constitutionally guaranteed right to custody of his children. State v. Humphreys, 54 N.J. 406, 412-414 (1969) makes it clear that the State can't make conclusive presumptions in criminal cases by directing that "any Statute which purports to permit inference of one essential fact from proof of another can have no probative force independent of factual context in which it is applied". No evidence has ever been introduced that the Petitioner father has abused his children, has harmed them or is a threat to them. Therefore the awarding of temporary custody of the children to Respondent was both incorrect and unconstitutional. C. The children are having their Liberty and Constitutional Rights restrained by Respondent Renate Bresko and all other Respondents, they are not being harmed or in danger by Petitioner father; they are being forcibly and falsly detained; they are being illegally restricted from all their activities and their family; they are being discriminated against; they are being physically abused. 7. 8. The childrens Liberty is being restrained illegally and this court needs to act. The children are United States citizens and are being deprived of their

Liberty and Equal Protection guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
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Constitution. The children have a First Amendment Constitutional Right to associate with their Petitioner father. 9. The children are not under any threat of harm or violence from Petitioner

and did not need to be taken to a JBWS Shelter. The children are not seeking the help of the JBWS. 10. The children are being held against their will. They are being illegally

detained and restricted from their normal activities, including visitation with their family and friends, participation in summer sports, access to their summer school work, access to their possessions, their personal property. Every aspect of their lives has been restricted because of the unlawful actions of their Respondent mother. 11. The children are being forcibly detained. They have tried to run away. They

have been told by Respondent mother Renate Bresko that if they run away again they will be put into a Juvenile Detention Center or a Psychiatric Hospital. Respondent has moved the children five times in the past 2 months to prevent them from knowing where they are so that they cant plan another escape. Respondent mother Renate Bresko has also taken away the children cell phones to prevent them from calling any family member and asking for help. 12. The children have told their "counselors" that they do not want to be in the

JBWS Shelter. They have told their doctors that they do not want to be with their mother. They have reported to DYFS, their school guidance counselors, their teachers and their therapists that they are afraid of their mother and that she hits and physically abuses them. They have made videos of the physical abuse and infliction of excessive corporal
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punishment and excessive physical restraint they have suffered at the hands of their Respondent mother. The children have no voice and need to be heard by this court. D. The childrens mental health has been damaged. 13. The children have written to the family describing the ordeal of their

kidnapping, the physical abuse they suffered at the hands of Respondent Renate Bresko and co-conspirator Anne Mandanayake and asking for help. Please note their email of July 19 where Katerina Bresko describes her kidnapping and physical abuse at the hands of the Defendants friend Anne Mandayamake and refers to her Mother as Hitler; Katerinas email of July 22 when she requests an attorney; and her email of August 22 where she again pleads for an attorney to give the children a voice that they have so far been denied and to help free them from the Respondent. Please also note that Katerina describes how the Respondent has violated Judge Enrights order of not discussing this matter in front of the children and how the children have been put further into the middle of this controversy by being told that their father is an abuser. See attached Exhibit A. E. Respondent Renate Bresko has committed bad faith acts and criminal acts. 14. Respondent Renate Bresko maliciously and wantonly leveled the false

domestic violence charges against Petitioner because he had uncovered that Respondent Renate Bresko was falsely claiming entitlement to certain financial and other aid from her native country of Austria by returning there once every year with the children to fraudulently obtain the aid. Further issues arose that Respondent Renate Bresko perjured herself on her U.S. federal tax returns by claiming no to the existence of these foreign
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accounts in her tax returns. 15. Failure to report the existence of a foreign financial account is a violation of

the Bank Secrecy Act FBAR (Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts), which states that these accounts must be declared to the US Treasury Department by any United States person who has a financial interest in or signature authority or other authority over any financial account in a foreign country, if the aggregate value of these accounts exceeds $10,000 at any time during the calendar year. 16. This reporting failure constitutes serious criminal violations that must be

reported to the I.R.S., U.S. Department of Justice, New Jersey Attorney Generals Office, and the Austrian government. It constitutes evidence of unfitness to carry the title of Certified Public Accountant, which she is currently licensed as. 17. Respondent had made plans as early as 2009 to so f***ing divorce

Petitioner Peter Bresko and cause him to be f***ing suffering for the rest of his life. Respondent wrote these threats in her own handwriting in a journal that she left behind after moving out of the marital residence in late December, 2010. Please see attached Exhibit B. F. Respondent Renate Bresko and Respondent Christian Van Pelt, Esq. have Perpetrated Sheridan violations and must be referred to the appropriate authorities. 18. These bad faith acts constitute Sheridan violations pursuant to Sheridan

v. Sheridan, 247 N.J. Super. 552 (Chan. Div. 1990). Sheridan requires trial judges to report evidence (usually after a trial or hearing) of any illegal activity to the proper authorities, and also as required by the New Jersey Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon
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3B(3). 19. The notion that Sheridan can only be triggered when live testimony is

adduced in open court is incorrect. It also applies to other sworn proofs, such as answers to interrogatories, deposition transcripts and certifications or affidavits, as well as tax returns and financial case information statements (CIS). Nothing in Sheridan limits its applicability only to courtroom testimony. Nothing in Sheridan excludes other evidence provided under oath. To believe otherwise is to engage in contorted legal sophistry, or denial, or both. Another anecdotal fable is that Sheridan will not apply to fraudulent tax returns, if those returns are not actually entered into evidence. But this is a transparent ploy, precisely because the falsity of the returns can be shown in other indirect ways. 20. Sheridan offenders are either criminals or stand to be prosecuted as such:

a. Some charged with crime wind up getting indicted, prosecuted or convicted. When they do, some will say anything to exculpate themselves. This may include perjury; it may include ratting out their attorney, or their arbitrator, or their mediator, or in this instant matter falsely accusing Petitioner of domestic violence to try and deflect the criminal acts perpetrated by Petitioner Renate Bresko; b. When a Sheridan offender gets indicted, a lawyer, mediator or arbitrator, or others might be named as a co-defendant(s) for aiding and abetting. 21. These bad faith, and criminal acts by Respondent Renate Bresko, is

unequivocal evidence of her unfitness as a parent to the children. She is throwing up FRO roadblocks to keep Petitioner from having access to his children, and keeps moving the children around so they cannot be found. 22. Moreover, knowing that she has been ratted out, Respondent Renate

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Bresko, in concert with her attorney, Respondent Christian Van Pelt, Esq., and the other Respondents, have falsely used and blatantly misused the Prevention of Domestic Violence act as a sword rather than as a shield in violation of the New Jersey Supreme Court mandate spelled out in State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 586 (1997). The New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized that "in the area of domestic violence...some people may attempt to use the process as a sword rather than a shield." In Hoffman the Court ruled that two mailings of an envelope each containing a torn support order, a financial statement, and a motion to modify support, that were not sent anonymously and did not contain coarse language, did not constitute harassment. Hoffman, supra, 149 N.J. at 583. The recipient's legitimate expectation of privacy was not violated. Id. at 584. As the Court noted in Hoffman, supra, many protected forms of speech are annoying but not violative of the harassment statute. 149 N.J. at 583-584. 23. Respondent Renate Breskos legitimate expectation of privacy was not

violated, since she was committing and continues to commit criminal acts and bad faith acts. 24. What is interesting is that there was no prior history of domestic violence in

the relationship, and the domestic violence allegations only surfaced upon Respondents bad faith acts and criminal behavior being exposed by Petitioner. Petitioner had to expose Respondent because if he did not, he could be accused of participating in the cover-up, obstruction of, or interference of authorities, regarding the criminal acts. Further, Respondent acknowledged that there were some 280 phone calls made between the Petitioner and Respondent between the
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time of their separation and the filing of the TRO, most initiated by the Respondent. Respondent continued to telephone and attempt to speak with Petitioner after entry of the FRO in violation of its no contact order condition. 25. It is Respondent and not the Petitioner who has been found by the Kinnelon

Police to be stalking the Petitioner by lying in wait in front of his house on multiple occasions including 2 occasions before and after Respondent alleged a false assault by auto complaint against Petitioner as shown in Exhibit C. This clearly establishes that the Respondent is not afraid of Petitioner as fraudulently alleged by Respondent on multiple occasions. Additionally, Petitioner's children had submitted a proposed visitation plan drafted by Petitioner's daughter along with 32 reasons why they preferred living with Petitioner to the Respondent on March 2. This document was unsolicited by the Petitioner and clearly establishes that Petitioner had an extremely close nurturing relationship with his children which Petitioner then attempted to destroy the very next day by obtaining a TRO against Petitioner by the fraudulent use of the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act. G. Morris County Family Court Judges have committed judicial misconduct. 26. On March 9, 2011 Morris County Superior Court Judge Thomas Critchley

entered an order consolidating the domestic violence matter with the matrimonial matter. Notwithstanding this Order already in place, Respondent Renate Bresko brought yet another domestic violence application on April 5, 2011. After the hearing, Judge Critchley ordered that Petitioners parenting time be suspended, albeit fraudulently, until June 1, 2011. Outrageously, on March 9th, 2011, Judge Critchley called Petitioner Peter

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Bresko diabolical and stated that he would inform all of the family court judges in Morris County about his domestic violence. Please see attached Exhibit D. 27. Not only did Judge Critchley refer to Petitioner as "diabolical" he was also

giving legal advice from the bench to Respondent who was pro se. According to the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3, specifically3(C))(1)(b) judges are not supposed to give legal advice or act as lawyers in the matter in controversy. 28. On June 3, 2011, Judge Critchley refused to even hear Petitioner Peter

Breskos testimony of Respondent Renate Breskos abuse of the FRO and denied his request for a Temporary Restraining Order against Respondent Renate Bresko. Please see attached Exhibit E. Judge Critchley stated from the bench that he had previously found Petitioner to be not credible" and that he needed to "act as a gatekeeper for these types of applications". According to the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3, specifically 3(4)(6) judges should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, full right to be heard. Petitioner was also denied the Equal protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when he Judge Critchley cited the additional reason for denying this Restraining Order stating that he had already issued one in favor of the other party". Attached as "Exhibit F" a true copy of the pertinent pages of the 7-page transcript of June 3, 2011 TRO hearing. Finally, Judge Critchley held an ex parte hearing on June 17, 2011 without providing any notice to Peter Bresko or his counsel and suspended Peter Breskos Parenting Time indefinitely without cause or due process. This order has now been overturned by Judge Minkowitzs ruling of August 26th, 2011. 29. On June 2l, 20ll Judge Critchley held a domestic violence Order to Show
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Cause brought by Respondent and Defendants attorney Christian Van Pelt to again amend the Final Restraining Order. During this hearing, Judge Critchley stated that he would speak ex parte to both the Prosecutor's Office and to Judge Enright about Petitioner Peter Bresko. Attached as "Exhibit G" is a true copy of the pertinent pages of the 27-page transcript of June 21, 2011 hearing where Judge Critchley was challenged by Petitioners then attorney, Mr. Charles Lange, first for the comments that he had made on March 7 stating that he was making the record of this matter available to other judges, and then for these new admissions of ex parte communications with the both the Prosecutor's Office and Judge Enright. 30. On June 30th, 2011, Judge Critchley held ex parte bail hearing and illegally

and unconstitutionally remanded Peter Bresko to the Morris County Correction Facility for psychiatric evaluation even though as a Family Court Judge, Judge Critchley had no jurisdiction over Criminal Matters in the Morris County Courts and imposing the bail condition of a psychiatric evaluation was a violation of Petitioner Peter Breskos Fifth Amendment Constitutional Right to self protection and due process. This illegal and unconstitutional condition of bail was overturned by Morris County Criminal Court Judge Minkowitz on July 15th, 2011 after Petitioner Peter Bresko was illegally and unconstitutionally incarcerated for 15 days. H. The childrens lives have been put in danger by Respondent Renate Bresko. 31. On July 20, 2011, Respondent Renate Bresko allowed the children to visit

Petitioners mother for lunch. The children told Petitioners mother where that they were being held at the JBWS Shelter in Basking Ridge, NJ. On August 22, 2011 over a full
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month later Petitioner told Judge Enright of the Morris County Family Court that he believed that the children were still being held at this location. 32. Two days later, (August 24th, 2011), the children called Petitioners mother

and stated that that they were being moved out of the JBWS Shelter in Basking Ridge, NJ because their mother, Respondent Renate Bresko, said now that [Petitioner] knows where theyre staying, confidentiality has been breached and that she needs to move to a secret location someplace 2 hours south of here. The children then sent an email to Petitioners sister advising Petitioner to be careful because their mother is really angry with him and say that she is going to get him. See Exhibit H. I. The childrens right from unreasonable search and seizure has been violated by Respondent Renate Bresko. 33. The children called again on the night of August 25th, 2011 and stated that

Respondent Renate Bresko called the Basking Ridge Police Department that night and had the children physically searched like jailed inmates and forcibly had their cell phones taken away from them so that they could not call for any help in their new location. They stated that they are afraid of the Respondent and fear for their safety. They further stated that they would try to get messages out to tell the family where they are taken. 34. The children took Respondents cell phone without Respondents

knowledge and called Petitioners mother the evening of August 25th, 2011 and begged for help. They said that they moved and were now being held at a house on E. Amwellbury Road in Salem NJ a short distance from the shoreline and the Salem Nuclear Power Plant. They have been put directly into the path of a Category 1 hurricane. The
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children are terrified. They are not safe. They are scared for their lives and seek the comfort and nurturing environment of their home and family. They have been deliberately put in danger by their Respondent mother who does not care about the well being of the children. J. Respondent is violating Court Order prohibiting removal of children from the Jurisdiction of the Superior Court (violation of N.J.S.A. 9:2-2) and committing custodial interference (violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:13-4(a). 35. The children again took Respondents cell phone without Respondents

knowledge and called Petitioners mother on August 26th, 2011 and August 27th, 2011 and stated that the Respondent had moved them to a Quality Inn in Pennsylvania. They are of New Jersey. They are scared that they are still in the path of the Hurricane and are not out of danger from that storm. They stated that their Respondent mother had been advised by the Morris County Prosecutors Office on August 26th, 2011 that contact restrictions with the children against the Petitioner father have been removed by the Morris County Criminal Court Judge Minkowitz. They further stated that their Respondent mother is angry about this ruling and will violate it by taking the children and hiding them someplace where Petitioner father will not be able to find them. They state that their Respondent mother has told them that they will move several times in the next few weeks. K. The kidnapping (violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1); criminal restraint (violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:13-2); removal of the children from the jurisdiction of the Superior Court (violation of N.J.S.A.9:2-2; and custodial interference (violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:13-4(a); Respondent Renate Bresko meets all the elements of child abuse. 36. The children told Petitioners sister and mother that on June 16th, 2011 they
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were being forced into a car by Respondent Renate Bresko and another women, Ann Mandanayake, who helped to kidnap the children, who resisted, from their schools and be spirited away to the JBWS, because they refused to go with their mother. All named and unnamed Respondents are criminally restraining, kidnapping, and interfering with custody regarding the children.
"Because of the harmful effects on children, parental kidnapping has been characterized as a form of child abuse" - Patricia Hoff, Legal Director for the Parental Abduction Training and Dissemination Project, American Bar Association on Children and the Law

L.

Respondent Renate Breskos unstable behavior demonstrates mental illness and unfitness as a parent. 37. Given that Petitioner has been the full-time stay-at-home-dad for most of

the childrens lives and did obtain custody of the children early in the divorce process, only to have custody wrested away from him by the false and fraudulent allegations made by Respondent Renate Bresko, the children have a historically strong emotional attachment to their father and are having defiant outbursts against their mother for absconding with them. The Respondent has physically abused and intentionally inflicted excessive corporal upon the children as punishment for their emotional attachment to their father and for their statements to their mother that they want to return to their home and do not want to live with her. 38. The attached certification of Dr. Monty Weinstein indicates unstable

behavior aspects of the profile of Respondent Renate Bresko and that it is believed that she has Narcissistic Personality Disorder, is paranoid delusional and possibly sociopathic. For the Narcissistic Personality Disorder, her relationship with Petitioner and others is
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self-serving, exploitive and highly manipulative. Dr. Weinstein has explained that psychologically there are several criteria which have been applied to this personality disorder as it relates to Respondent Renate Bresko. These are: As a narcissist, she cannot take perspective, hence situations are blown out of proportion and she seeks the safety of a domestic violence shelter when there has been no incident of violence. She has little or no empathy. This means that she cannot identify with the feelings or thoughts of another person including her own children. She is preoccupied with her own personal distress and not the distress of her children. She cannot accept authority and hence has little concern for morals. She feels easily inferior and will try to be seen as superior. She is hypersensitive, and hence cannot accept any form of critique. She is exploitative, vain and not self-sufficient. As for being paranoid delusional, Dr. Weinstein has explained that Respondent falsely believes that she is being tracked and monitored by Petitioner and that she and the children are being abused, hence, the false multiple claims of domestic violence that do not rise to the level of domestic violence. 39. As for the claim of being sociopathic, Dr. Weinstein has explained that

Respondent fits that mold because of her flagrant violations and malicious misuse of the laws; her history of physical violence toward her own children; her lack of empathy and the use of the extremist organization, JBWS, to obtain unfair advantage in the divorce and custody matter. Respondent is using the children as pawns, as instruments of revenge against Petitioner, and as instruments of punishment of Petitioner. M. Petitioners Constitutional Rights have been violated by Respondent Renate Bresko and her agents.

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40.

Respondent Renate Bresko is unlawfully using the domestic violence laws

to hide the children from their Petitioner father. As a result of the governmental oppression involved in the all-consuming effort to steal the child, it has caused Petitioner emotional and physical distress because of the threat of loss of liberty to have a substantial, unimpeded relationship with his children. No person should have to live under the constant pressure of the government placing an onerous, unsubstantiated, and unconstitutional attack against him and then impose all kinds of tyrannical methods of compliance of suspect, bogus orders, along with collection of attorneys fees for purposes of allowing the Respondent mother Renate Bresko to abduct the children. 41. Since the Respondent Renate Bresko and her agents committed and are

committing unconstitutional acts against Petitioner and his children, without basis in fact or law, they have no immunity. The evidence so far proves that the Respondent actors and their agents have committed unconstitutional acts against Petitioner from the inception. 42. Attached hereto as Exhibit I is the Certification of Dr. Monty Weinstein,

Psy.D., M.P.A., D.A.P.A., and N.C.P. who is a world-renowned legal expert on child custody and has been retained as my expert pursuant to N.J.R. 5:3-3 (h). Dr. Weinstein is a Clinical Fellow of the American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy. This association is utilized by the American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys. He is also a Fellow of the American Orthopsychiatric Association, an association composed of psychiatrists and psychologists throughout the United States. He has been qualified as an expert in custodial issues over 2,500 times in 45 states and 4 countries. He is the recipient of the Distinguished Public Service Award. Dr. Weinstein has over 1,000 hours of

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certification at the Cambridge Institute and Harvard University. Dr. Weinstein is an expert witness on the New Jersey Public Defenders List of Experts, and has been qualified, appointed and testified in Morris County Family Court before Judge Whipple. 43. Dr. Weinstein finds that Petitioner is a loving, caring parent, and finds that

he is not a danger to his children, nor was any domestic violence committed against them by Petitioner. Dr. Weinstein feels that Respondent is gaming the system to prevent the children from having a relationship with Petitioner and therefore Petitioner should be granted shared custody of the minor children with immediate visitation. Dr. Monty Weinstein unequivocally states his belief that the childrens world is falling apart, in general as a result of this divorce, and in specific as a result of the actions of their Respondent mother for the past 4 months. He states that it is important to bolster the childrens emotional stability with as few changes as possible. The children need to stay in the same house, live in the same neighborhood and have the same friends they have known all of their lives. According to Dr. Weinsteins evaluation-certification of Petitioner, his Recommendation is as follows: My preliminary recommendation is that there be joint legal and physical custody between the parties, with neither party having primary responsibility, and immediate, specific, liberal, and unsupervised parenting time between Mr. Bresko and his beloved children. By reading their email messages, it is my belief that the children are in crisis and want and need to see their Father as soon as possible. The importance of this evaluation-certification is to indicate and state that Mr. Bresko has no pathology, is the victim of a contentious divorce, has been unjustly demonized as being a diabolical person by Mrs. Bresko and the Court, and, based upon the evidence presented to me as well as my long professional career specializing in this area, I believe that the children are

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traumatized by the actions of Mrs. Bresko and desperately need a stable, warm, nurturing environment. They need to reconnect with their Father and their traditional home.

THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 44. A writ of habeas corpus is an order in writing, signed by the judge who

grants the same, and sealed with the seal of the court of which he is a judge, issued in the name of the sovereign power where it is granted, by such a court or a judge thereof, having lawful authority to issue the same, directed to anyone having a person in his custody or under his restraint, commanding him to produce such person at a certain time and place, and to state the reasons why he is held in custody, or restraint. Bouviers Law Dictionary, (1859), Vol. I, p. 573. N. It is a writ of ancient origin, and is now regarded as the greatest and most important remedy known to the law. 39 CJS 427. 45. This writ devised for the preservation of liberty, to the end that no one

shall detain a free person. The word freeman includes many, whether sui juris, or under the power of another. For we only consider this: Is the person free? He who does not know that a freeman is detained in his house is not in bad faith; but as soon as he is advised of the fact he become in bad faith. This writ may be applied for by any person; for no one is forbidden to act in favor of liberty; and A person ought not to be detained in bad faith for any time; and so to delay should be granted to the person who thus detains him. In other words, a writ of habeas corpus should be returnable and heard intanter.
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O.

Jurisdiction of state courts. 46. The states being in all respects, except as to the powers delegated in the

federal constitution, sovereign political communities, are limited, as to the juridical power, only by that instrument and they, accordingly, at will, create, apportion, and limit the jurisdiction of their respective courts over the writ of habeas corpus , as well as other legal process, subject only to such constitutional restriction; Church, Hab. Corp. 67. P. The writ is also employed to recover the custody of a person where the applicant has a legal right thereto: as, the husband for his wife, the parent for his child, the guardian for his ward, and the master for his apprentice; Green v. Campbell, 35 W. Va. 698, 14 S.E. 212, 29 Am. St. Rep. 813; Ex parte Chin King, 35 Fed. 354; (1892) App. Cas. 326. 47. But in such cases, if an adult of sound mind is generally permitted to go at

large; if an infant of sufficient age and discretion, it is usually permitted to elect in whose custody it will remain, provided that it does not elect an injurious or improper custody; and if of tender years without such discretion the court determines its custody according to what the time interests and welfare of the child may at the time require: Hurd Hab. Corp. 450. 48. In the United States v. Green, (3 Mason 482), the common-law habeas

corpus was issued to try the right of custody to an infant to restore it to its father. On the hearing of a writ of Habeas Corpus to determine the custody of a minor child, it is an improper exercise of discretion to render Judgment depriving one of the custody and awarding it to another, where there is undisputed evidence of the right and fitness of the

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former to have such custody, and there is no evidence to the contrary. Carter v. Brett, 42 S.E. 348, 116 Ga. 114. 49. The court itself is mandated to issue its own habeas corpus in order to

return a childs proper liberty to the care, custody and control of the natural guardian of the father: In general, as the Father is by law clearly entitled to the custody of his child, the court will so far interfere as to issue the writ of Habeas Corpus and inquire into the circumstances of the case, in order to prevent a party entitled to the custody of a child from seeking it by force or stratagem. And the court will feel bound to restore the custody to the father, where the law has placed it, unless in a clear and strong case of unfitness on his part to have such custody. -- Commonwealth v. Briggs, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 203 NOTE: Valdez v. Cockrell, No 99-41216 (5th Cir. December 26, 2001) stated: The lack of a full and fair hearing during prosecution of a state crime conviction does not preclude deferential review of a federal habeas petition under 28 USC 2254. THE REMEDY OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 50. The remedy of Writ of Habeas Corpus would be better than any other

application, because it is immediate, and nobody is punished, if they comply and return the Petitioners children, Katerina Bresko and Peter Bresko, Jr. It would protect the children, restore their constitutional rights and stop their pain and suffering. The children would be allowed to be returned to their father, and the Respondents are taught a sharp lesson in not having to waste the court's time and judicial resources in the future. 51. The Writ of Habeas Corpus is more effective in enforcing return of custody
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to the rightful parents than contempt proceedings because it does not require the Judge to put an offender in jail or otherwise punish them, or force the Petitioners to bear the heavy burden of proof, when the State and Respondent Renate Bresko would have the duty of proving the heavy standard of proof. It is superior to contempt remedies in that it avoids lengthy delays in being heard and characterizes the end results of any other remedy, without all the bombastics. Q. The Writ is quick and efficient. Depending on the situation, the parties can be sitting before the Judge within hours or in a few short days. The remedy goes right to the wrongful conduct and corrects it. 52. The key here is that the Judge's decision is objective and leaves no room for

personal biases. It is a straight "up or down" ruling--whether the children are being abducted, kidnapped, restrained, involved in custodial interference, or not. It forces the parties onto higher ground from the combat zone of contempt hearings and the like, because it would be discouraged by this remedy's commitment to enforcement of the court order in place or enforcing the constitutionality of parental rights. 53. Where the Writ requires production of the children, Respondents or other persons must produce the child at the date, time and place specified. There must be proof of hardship in order not to produce the child. Otherwise, the child must appear or the Respondent(s) who fail to produce the child must be prepared to fully demonstrate the existence of sufficiently serious hardship, or then face contempt and possible incarceration. Technical or form defects in the Writ do not excuse a failure to respond to a Writ which requires the production of the child. The Writ may not be disobeyed in a custody or termination matter where the child must be produced before the Court. 54. Since Respondent removed the children from the Petitioner and from the jurisdiction of the Superior Court, and has absconded and concealed the children, the

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Court is empowered to issue the Writ of Habeas Corpus, directed to an appropriate officer, requiring that the children be brought directly to the court. 55. Where no body attachment is issued and the Writ of Habeas Corpus is disobeyed without a showing of sufficient proofs, the court before whom the writ is returnable shall, upon proof that the writ was served, issue a warrant of attachment against the person or persons served. The warrant is directed to the sheriff in any county where the person(s) served may be found and requires that the person(s) served be brought before the court that issued the warrant. The court may then order that the person(s) be confined until the order of the court is complied with. I certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true. If any of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment.

Dated: August 29, 2011

_______________________________ Peter J. Bresko In Propria Persona

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WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WHEREFORE, Petitioner father Peter Bresko prays for a Writ of Habeas Corpus directed to the Respondents, Renate Bresko, Christian Van Pelt, Esq., (attorney for Renate Bresko), and/or any other(s) commanding said Respondents to produce the minor children, Katerina Bresko and Peter Bresko, Jr. in this Court on September 2nd, 2011, at the time of the scheduled hearing, without delay, in order that the children can give testimony as to the ordeal they have suffered; to state which parent they want to have primary custody over them; that Petitioner Father be given custody, possession and/or control, and/or visitation rights to said minor children; and that an attorney be immediately appointed as Law Guardian for the children with the costs for same born by the Respondent.

Dated: August 29, 2011

___________________________________ Peter J. Bresko Petitioner, In Propria Persona 25 Chilhowie Drive Kinnelon, New Jersey 07405 (973) 291-8430

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CERTIFICATION STATE OF NEW JERSEY COUNTY OF MORRIS } } ss.: }

Peter J. Bresko, certifies that he is the Petitioner in the above-named proceeding and that the foregoing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is true to his own knowledge, except as to matters therein stated to be alleged on information or belief, and as to those matters he believes it to be true.

Dated: August 29, 2011

___________________________________ Peter J. Bresko Petitioner, In Propria Persona 25 Chilhowie Drive Kinnelon, New Jersey 07405 (973) 291-8430

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1. I, Peter J. Bresko, certify that on August 31, 2011, I served an Original and two

(2) copies of his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Writ of Habeas Corpus upon the Clerk, Superior Court of New Jersey, Morris County, Family Court, Courthouse, Washington and Court Streets, New Jersey 07963 by hand delivery. 2. I served a copy of the same documents to Respondent Christian Van Pelt, Esq.

(also for Respondent Renate Bresko since an AFRO is outstanding), at his office located at 54 Horse Hill Road, Suite 202, Cedar Knolls, New Jersey 07927, by U.S. Priority Mail with delivery confirmation. 3. I served a copy of the same documents upon the Morris County Prosecutors

Office, Administration & Records Building, 6 Court Street, P.O. Box 900, Morristown, New Jersey 07963-0900 by U.S. Priority Mail with delivery confirmation. 4. I served a copy of the same documents upon the Office of Attorney General,

Dept. of Law and Public Safety, Hughes Justice Complex, 25 W. Market Street, P.O. Box 080, Trenton, New Jersey 08625 by U.S. Priority Mail with delivery confirmation. 5. I served a copy of the same document upon the Advisory Committee on Judicial

Conduct, Administrative Office of the Courts, Hughes Justice Complex, 25 W. Market Street, P.O. Box 037, Trenton, New Jersey 08625 by U.S. Priority Mail with delivery confirmation. 6. I served a copy of the same document upon the Hon. Michael Wright, P.J.F.P.,

Superior Court of New Jersey, Morris County Courthouse, Washington & Court Streets, P.O. Box 910, Morristown, New Jersey 07963-0910 by U.S. Priority Mail with delivery confirmation. I certify that the foregoing statements made by me are true. If any of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment.

Dated: August 31, 2011

_______________________________ Peter J. Bresko, In Propria Persona

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EXHIBIT A

From: Katerina Bresko <bresko.katerina@yahoo.com) subject: Please help we hate these shelters and want to see dad again. To : "laura_bresko@yahoo.com" <laura_bresko@yahoo.com> Date: Tuesday, July 19,2011, LI:42 ANI

Aunt Laur4 Do you have any idea what it feels like to be kidnapped? Well its honible and one of the worst things thats ever happened. Mom picked us up early from school on the second to last day. Her and her friend Ann forced us to go into the car, they made up a lye that we were going to get ice cream. That made me wonder i knew that if we were really going to get ice cream she wouldn't be so worried about us getting into the car. For the car ride i kept my eyes open tooking around to see where we were going. We made one quick stop where my mom and Ann got out but we stayed in the car. I gave Peter a Sharpie marker and told him to express him self, He took this as a way to show his anger and hatred toward mom. When Ann came back she was so mad that she began choking Peter. Then i began to defend him and she she started hitting us both. Mom saw what was going on and she came to defend AnnlAnn gave us an evil smile and then we drove off. After about two minuets we stopped again.My mom wouldnt tell us where we were or what was going on.I then paniced. she told us that we wouldnt be seeing dad, grandma, or you anytime soon and that we would be staying here for a whiG. I freaked out and told Peter to run i grabbed Anns cell phone and called grandma telling her to pick is up at a neax by piz,zaparlor. On our way there the police stopped us and told us that we had to go back. I called grandma back and told her to pick us up where mom had dropped us up. I had no idea that we had to keep comfidenciality and after a few weeks we had to leave because grandma knew that we were in a safe house and she knew where it was. We have been going from safe house to safe house ever since.It is the most frusterating thing in the world watching people belive her lies. Dad is the nicest person in the world he wouldnt hurt a fly, yet everyone belives that he is some horible abuser. These safe houses are horrible they have bearly any food, tiny old rooms they are old and full ofpeople there is no privacy and everyone bows down to mom. Sometimes she reminds me of hitler. She is an evil austrian dictator who has lots of poryer and followers but no regard for any one elses thoughts or feelings. We are like prisoners in these shelters and hitler, like the rest of the world doesnt care. There are no solders to free us. Dad loves us so very much and i know that he must be in pain to see us suffer. I think back to all of the laughter that we shared and.fun that we had fogether. Because if her he did not see me in my birthday andi did not see him on his. he was always there to care for us but now because of her we have no one. Her newly found hatred towards him has made our love for him stronger if there is anything

that you can do to help us please do it. I know that actions speak lowder than words but these words have alot of meaning, and my actions havent been helping. We love you and miss the whole family very much, Please help, Katerina and Peter

On Fri,

7 122 I

ll,

Katerina

resko

<b r es ko. kate rin a@y a h o o. c o m> wrote

From: Katerina Bresko <bresko.katerina@yahoo.com> Subject: we need to speak to a judge To : "laura bresko@yahoo.com" <laurq_bresko@yahoo.com> Date: Friday, July 22,2011,12:43 PM
Dear Aunt Laura, I realy want to talk to a judge. It seams as though she (or he) might be our only hope. Me and Peter are sick of being at these shelters and 3 weeks has been enough. We want an attomey.Maybe you and grandma could pay for one? These shelters are horrible we need to come back home. We were taken to them against our will and we want to leave them soon. A judge might be our only answer. Mom and Ann kidnapped us and took us here. We miss dad and our family. What have we done to deserve this???? Please have us speak to the judge it might be our only hope of getting our lives back! We love you and miss you!! xoxoxoxo, Katerina and Peter

Peter Bresko
From: Sent: To: Joan Bresko fibresko@yahoo.com] Monday, August 22,2011 12:55 PM Peter J. Bresko Fw: hello from katerina and peter

Subiect:

--- On Mon, SlzzlllrKaterina

Bresko

wrote:

From: Katerina Bresko <bresko.katerina@yahoo. com> Subject: hello from katerina and peter To: "jbresko@yahoo.c " <jbresko@yahoo.colp Date: Monday, August 22,2011, 12:31 PM

hey gma!

sorry that i have not called orwritten lately. mo says thatthe judge won't let us talk to anyone in our family but we know she is a liar. she watches us all the time and won't let us call anybody or use a computer. even at camp they won't let rne use the phone cause mo has given them orders. peter and me are ok for now so don't worry but we are still stuck in the shelter and we hate it. we go to ymca camp during the day but at night we avoid seeing mo as much as possible. all we hear everybody say is what a bad guy dad is and that mo has to hide from him. she is such a big liar!! everybody believes her and she tells so many lies that now she believes them too. so guess who didn't go to austria wink wink. mo tried to make us but we told her no way. we hate going there and seeing her mean sisters and that smelly farm. we told her to go by herself and we'll go back home and see you and dad ha ha. were you or aunt'laura able to get us a lawyer? please find one quickly we need somebody to help us right now. mo moved her stuff out of the rental box and put it in her boyfriends gerhards house. i think that she wants us to move in with him but she says that she hasn't decided yet. she says that she hasn't decided what school to put us in but that we may still go to kinnelon. we tell her that we will only go to kinnelon and if she tries to put us in another school we won't go. she
1

likes living in this shelteiand telling evrybody her liss. she doesn't want to leave but i think that she has to this weekend. camp is over now too so i don't know where we will go next week. peter and me really hate her and everything that she has done to us and our family-especially to dad. please tell him thatwe both love him very much and hope that he is ok. tell him thatwe can't wait to come home and see him again. give dad and bagel big hugs from us. i am in the library and gotta go before she sees me. i will call as soon as i
can.

love katerina xoxoxo

EXHIBIT B

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EXHIBIT C

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EXHIBIT D

RENATE BRESKO,

A.D.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY CHANCERY DIVTSION: FATT{ILY PART MORRTS COUNTY, NEW JERSEY DOCKET NO. : FV-14-840-11
#

Plaint Lff ,
vs.
PETER BRESKO,
IRANSCRT PT

FINAL RESTRATNING
HEARING

OF

ORDER

Defendant.
Place
9

Morris County Courthouse Washington and Court Streets Morristown, New Jersey 07960
March J, 2AII

Date
BEFORE:

10 11
1,2

HON. THOMAS J. CRITCHLEY, J.

TRANSCRTPT ORDERED BY: JAhTET
APPEARANCES:

S . C.

13

L.

PORRO, ESQUIRE

!4
15 15
L1
1B

RENATE BRESKO, PRO SE CHARLES J. LAhIGE, JR. , ESQ . , Att.orney for the Defendant.

19
2A 2T TRANSCRTBER

KTNG TRANSCRIPTION SERVICES FRANK H. ULRICH 65 Wi llowbrook Boulevar,C

: Kristin Giangerelli

22 23 24 25

Wayne, NJ

07 41 0

Audio

Record,ed.

Record.ing Opr:

Col
1

loquy
as

81

mental well-being of our Children because as __

2
3
4

manifested in this parenting schedule, what the kids

wrote. The second they go to his house, he

them

bombards

5
6 7
B

with all this stuff that they should solve the problem. And, I feel so bad because they're little children; my son is 9 years oId, my daughter is 12 years old. They want to just be children. And, he just doesn't let go; he just puts them there and they should solve everything for us.
THE COURT: Okay. NIS. BRESKO:
THE COURT:

10 11 72 13

I tried to talk to him.

Hold on one second, let me think

for a moment. (Off the record)

(Back on the record)
MR. LANGE: your Honor, be

I4
15

I6
1,7

interested in -in looking at -a-\cheduled of parenting plan that was

prepared by Mrs. Bresko for Mr. Bresko's consideration?
THE

18 19

couRT: rf I

if you can summarize it, t, it' s it'

20
2L 22 23 24

that, would be fine?

I I

l:

MR. LANGE:

can,

THE COURT: Okay.

MR.

LANGE:

way t.oo complicated

'for

me

THE COURT:
1,4R. LANGE
:

A11 right.

25

to do that.

But

but it is

Col I oquy
1

B2

in written form

and

THE COURT:

AII righty, let

me

take a look.

3
4

MR. LANGE:

It's something that she crafted. -- that was written

weeks

MS. BRESKO: Th
ago.

5
6
1

THE COURT: The way

f see it is __ fa __ is

fairly

compli-cated, but at a -- r can terl at a grance

I
9

it has a lot of -- looks broadly like a 50/50 plan. And, a lot of back and fort.h.
MS. BRESKO: Can
THE couRT

10 11 L2 13
L4

can I exp -- or

: Hold on one second., let me j ust Historically, Mr. Bresko,

who

MR. LANGE:

who

works out of his house, has been the parent

-:----\

15 16 L7 18 19 20
2T

receives the children back from school, in the afternoons. And, what the iarties have always tried to work out is how to divide the time -THE COURT: t{mhmm.

MR. LANGE:

-- it's

-- it's

quite simple to

say every other weekend, but the afternoons and i evenings is what's arways been the point of contention.
THE COURT:

22

Okay. Let

me make

few

23
24 25

observations. r'm lookLng at o-2-, which is a letter written by the children urging -- for many reasons Ms.
Bresko -- to stay more time wit.h their father.
And,

Colloguy/tfre Court
1

Decision

what the praintiff

has said. is that her concern is,

2 3
4

that Mr. Bresko is using'the children to try to achieve certain aims in the divorce action.
Now, I have to s -- put this in the context

5
6

of having found an act of domestic violence, which f did, and I stated my reasons. And., I find it to be fairly a serious, manipulative, almost diabolical in its action, and the explanation, as I found, not credible. f would have, at least, entertained
an at.

l
B

10 11 L2 13
T4

apprication to suspend all parenting time as r did the time of the TRO application.
We

can, in our jurisprudence, take into

account acts of domestic violence in making assessments

.-a5.
16
T7 1B

of what's appropriate and sensible in terms of custody and parenting time. And, there 1s, expressed here, a desire and an action to destroy, to hurt, to cause pain; giving the plaintiff a choice of how much pain
she wants to live with, as expressed in one of the e-

19
2A

mails.
i

am concerned

that, that may continue is willing to give

2L 22

through the children.

But, for reasons, that are not

at all clear to me, the plaintiff

23
24 25

the children back to Mr. Bresko, very other ileekend. I will do so. I, m going to admonish Mr. Bresko not to involve the children in the divorce; to not poison them

The Court, Decisi on/Colloquy

1

2
3
4

agalnst their mother. The finding and expression here dS, a desire to destroy and cause pain to her, what better way to do that, having tried her employment, then through the childreni it should not be donef intend this record to be a
memento
but.

5
6 7
B

of that

and r wilr make it available to other judges who might

be dealing with thi-s issue. But, that is what we will do. But, I,11 reiterate, I would have entertained an

10 11

application to completely suspend, until there's been substantial psychiatric evaluation of Mr. Bresko,
MS. BRESKO:

Is there -- is there
know where

anyrray

I2
13 L4 15 15 L7 18 19 20 2T 22

there could be an evaluation?

TIIE COURT:

I donrt

we,re going to
an

go from here, maram. you may want to consult

attorney.

f have -- it's

too late for me to co __ to

There can be
FD docket. make

work furt.her on this case tbnight.

further applications in this docket or the

MR. LANGE:

Di -- can, your Honor,

this

coming weekend, Mr. Breskors weekend? He had -- Mrs.

Bresko had last weekend.

i

THE COURT:

f't

seems

sensible that this

weekend, would be his weekend. MS. BRESKO: Ys r but could

mornl_ngs

23
24

saturd.ay

there/ s German school, r want him to bring

German
s

25

the kids to

chool because he has not. done it

Co
1

I loquy

85

for the past six

weeks.

2 3
4

THE COURT: German school?

MS. BRESKO:

yes, thatrs in the order --

o1d

order. Three hours -THE

5
6

couRT: can you go to

German school, Mr.

Bresko?

1 8 9

MS. BRESKO: Three

hours, Lt, s from 9 til1 if you,re going: to limit

L2, in Morristown, herei the Morristown-Beard School.

MR. LANGE: Judge,

10 11

Mr- Bresko to just weekends, to take a three hour block

of time away from to -- take the children to

German

I2
13
L4

school, would seem unfair to him. / TIIE COURT: f hear what you,re saying.
MR. LANGE: What

I would like to suggest

Wed.nesday

15 16 L1 18 19 20
2T

though, is if you replaced it. with a

afternoon, then I think it would be fair for Mr. Bresko to

accommodate

Mrs. Bresko's wish to go to

German

school.
THE COURT:

That seems sensible, at this

time, then perhaps

i

someday

during the week he could after school that -me.

hav6 a -- three hours with them to replace that; okay?

MS. BRESKO: Three hours

22

23
24

that's fine, as long as they sleep with

THE COURT: Right..

25

MS. BRESKO: They

they go there

Cert i
1

fi cati

on

92

Ce

rti f i cat.i- on
do

2
3 4

It Kristin Giangerelli, the assigned transcriber,

hereby certify the foregoing transcript of proceedings on CD No. I , from index number 4:04237 to 0G:33:3g,

5
6 7 8 9

is prepared in fu1I compliance with the current Transcript Format for Judicial proceedings and is true and accurate non-compressed transcript of the
proceedings as recorded.
a

10
11
T2

Krist,in Giangerelfi

Ki{nCt@l i

Dare,

AOC #624 cc

+1 &1 I

13

65 Willowb t6k Boutevard Wayne, New Jersey 07470

(973)231 -6080

KTNG TRANSCRTPTION SERVICES

Date

!4
15 16
L7

18 19
2A

2I
22 23 24

2s

EXHIBIT E

ff

N,L].S.A 2C:25-L7 eE . geg. o PAGE 1 of 5 R) TRO ( ) Ar{ENDED TRO xY Superior Court, Chancer:y Division, Family Part, Morris County t- ) f'nrnicipal Court of Docket # F1/-14-001168-11Police Case # * fn the MatLer of Plaint,iff 's * sex M DaEe of birth oz/oz/tgse PLaintiff (victin):B-RESKo, PETER rr
****t*****i******t********************************i******************************t*t

D NAMC: BRESKO, RENATE E AI(A F Home Address 9 IIIATERS

KINNELON

EDGE

Sex F Date of birth gs /\? /r-gt z* Race CAUCASIAN f,Ft. 130 _- Ht.5' 3' , *
*

N,J 0? 405 *

N l{ork Address SMOLfi{ I,UPIN D FATRFIEIJ] 00000-0000 A Other Marks, Scars N I{ork Phone No. (973}439-7200

Color

BROlrtN*

WAS WATTING

IN A BLI}ilD SPOT A:r

THE BIUD OF THE1

whlch coast,itute(s) the fo]Iovring crlmlnaL offense(s) (check all applicdlcle Law Enforcement Officer: Attach N..T.S.P, UCR DVI offense report(s) ) I ( )Lewdness (X}Ilarasgment Crimin* Restraint Crimin{Restraint ) Homicide r \ rr -----T Fai"f ir*Laonmentr Falslrnftisonment / J'l'DDcttlJ- t i{criminal i,Iischief i isralking ( )Bu=9lary Se>crrar lssb1t Se:nra1 a.ssthi= ) Terroristic Threats (

DRIIIEWAY. PLTF WAS LEAV1TNG THE IIOUSE TO RETURN TIIE CHILDREN TO DEHr. PLTF WAS DRTVING TOITARDS E!{D OF DRIIIEWA3. DEFT I{AITED TO IJAST HINIIPE TO PtlIrL HER

)Kidnapping -rAny
)

KEYS. PLTF TF'S HEAD HTTTING PLTF'S gunnary) rLm]. Does defendant istory? ( rf yeE, Bt ( )ws (x)No ng courq Any prior /pe dings involving parties? (rr yes, enter Docket, #s, County, State) (x) Yr,EIIZ )no F1/-Ltl-840 -11 ; FM-14 -979-11. Has a Criminal t been filed in this matter? (rt yes, enter Docket, #, County, State) ( ) Y:tsS (x) No 5. If law enforcement offieials responded to domestic violence call, were weaponst Was defendant arrested? ( ) Y.ES (X) NO seized? { } YES (X) No {Describe)
'ta

.1*3"|1|f,*'.r Contact ( ) Criminal Trespass ) crimlra]fExua1 co prior fll5todlef dol,p{,cTiol.ence reported or unreported? (ff-yes, erplain) (x) rrs ( Nc c/rs .Gr\nrED To snrlcr Pr,TF r{rrg HER
(

5. (A) The plaintiff and defenda.nt are 18 years old or older or emancipated AlilD are ( ) divorced,' OR L. (X) married ( ) former household members; OR 2. ( ) present, household memb.ers {B) The defendant is 18 years old or ol-der or emancipated AlilD 1. plaintiff ald defendant are { )unmarried ( )co-parents ( )expectant parentg OR 2. { )plaintiff and defendant have had a dating relationship. 7, t{bere appropriate, ligt, children (rnclude name/ee>s./d.o.u./witn whorn resides}: M T2/zLIOL BRESKO RENATE BRESKO PETER \T
BRESKo

KATEBfNA

F oelza/ga

BRESKo RENATE

8.

The

plaintiff

(X)

and defendart: ( )presently (x)previously ( ) never resided together (Specify ) farnily relationship III}SBAND & WIFE
*cERTrFIee foregoing responses made by,, made by me are wi
* ** ***i**** ********* ** *

*************************************

I cerbify that the

Date

am aw

"tJffXJgSntit?X1P/ses

e that if any to punishnent.

Signature of plaintiff

?o&*t

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PLTF AND TOLD HIM THAT sHE WOULD FUCKING KILL HIM, IN FRONT OF THEIR SON. 5 Izq 1 1 : AS PLTF DROPPED CHILDREN OFF DEFT TRIED TO PULL PLTF'S CAR DOOR OPENS TO GET AT PLTF. DEFT COMES TO PLTF'S CAB AND OPENS PLTF'S CAR DOORS ON

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fdULTIPLE OCCASIONS. SINCE DEFT HAS GOTTEN RESTRAINING ORDER AGAINST PLTF, SHE CONTINUALLY TRIES TO BAIT HIM INTO PHYSICAL CONFROruTATIONS. DEFT HAS PUT HER FINGEB IT{ FLTF ' S FACE, DEFT CALLS PLTF,S NAfi'IES AND THREATENS THAT PLTF WILL NEVER SEE CHILDREN AGATN. 5/ 1 51201 1 : PLTF WAS BACKIruG OUT OF SCHOOL PARKING LOT, DEFT RAN OVER TO CAR AND TRIED TO DNAG DAUGHTER OUT OF CAR WHILE IT WAS STILL MOVING. 5 I 4 I 11 : DEFT WAS BLOCKING BOTTOM OF DH IVEI1IAY WHILE PLTF WAS TRYING TO PULL OUT. DEFT LEFT HER CAR, CAME UP DRIVEWAY, TRIED TO OPEN PLTF'S

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Name:

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CAR DOORS AIID WAS SCREAIiING

U/ERE

LOCKED.

IN MGE BECAUSE DOORS

ID
JUXLEWO JUXLEWO

SAID HE WILL REPORT THIS ANP ASKS WFIERE ARE HIS BHursEs. DEFT HAs BEEN VERBALLY ABUsrvE To DEFT HAS THREATENED TO KILL PLTF. DEFT HAS
THREATEI{ED TO TAKE CHILDREN AWAY AND HE NEVER SEE HIM AGAIN. AT BASEBALL GAMES, REPEATEDLY TRIES TO ENGAGE PLTF ALTHOUGH

DEC 2O1O: DEFT STRU0K PLTF AND THREW HIM AGAINST JUXLEWO BATHROOM WALL. DEFT HAs srRUcK PLTF, scRATcHEO JUXLEW0 HIM, AND HIT HIM. DEFT HAS LAUGHED WHEN PLTF .JUXLEWO

PLTF.

JUXLEWO

.ruxLEw0
JUXLEWO
.JUXLEWO

TRYIhIG TO AVOID

HER.

WILL DEFT HE IS

JUXLEWO .,UXLEWO JUXLEWO

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DOCn

#$4/so

Name:

jillian.lewis

Date; e13l201 t Tlme: 2:Sg:46

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Page:

"[

Document Name:

Untitled

#ry \d
Fh{M 1 130

FAMILY AUTOMATED CASE TRACKING SYSTEM

CASE COMIJIENTS INOUIRY
SEARCH DATE

PAGE:

OOO4

ool03/11 15;00

DoCKET/CASE

CASE TITLE
DATE

: :

FV 14 001168 l1
BRESKO PETER

J VS BRESKO RENATE
OPERATOR
COMMENTS

ENTERED

06 03 201 'l 06 03 2A11 06 03 2A11 06 03 2A1 1 06 03 201 06 03 2A11 06 03 201, 06 03 2011 06 03 2A11
1

DEFT WAS SCREAMING AND SPITTING IN PLTF,S FACE, TELLING HINd THAT HE WILL NEVER SEE CHILDREN AGATN " 511312A1 1 : DEFT ALSO JUMPED IFI FRONT OF PLTF'S cAR, DEFT WAS SCBEAMTNG AND yEt.LrNc AT PLTF.
512,1

4/3A/11.:

ID
JUXLEWO JUXLEWO J UXLEII'O JUXLEWO JUXLEWO

I1,I:
A

TAKE

DEFT SHOWS UP IN PI-.ACES THAT SHE KNCIfi$ PLTF WILL BE ANIts TRIES TO CREATE A CONFRONTATION WITH PLTF.

DEFT REACHED INTO PLTF'$ cAR TRYING BAG, PRIOR TO THREATENING TO KILL HIM.

TO

JUXLE$'O JUXLEI{O
.TUXLEWO

JUXLEWO

Ffi1906602 LAST PAGE CURRENTLY DISPLAYED PFl =ADD G0MMENT

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TMOR0162 DOC" #$4 t56

Name; j

illian, Iewis

Date: 6/g|2A11 Time, 3:00:56

pM

QaT3

* *
t

1. (x).N/A { prohibiced You the Eleene * 2' (x) (x) ( ) You are prohibiEed from retutning toof domesticof violence are ) from future acts violence ' 3. (x) (x) ( ) you are barred from the following locationE:

Defeffiait' s Name BRBSKO, REI{ATE ****************!r************************i*******************J*i_iffi* * PART r - RErrraF - rnstructions: Rer.ief sought by plaintiff . TRO IRO GRAIEIED DEF:E}'DArf,T: *
at(f, .

lr(ru^c L

t-v - L+ - uu 1l_6u -l-L

*
*

*
*
*

( )ofirER(s) (Lrsr
(x)

(X)RESTDENCES OF PITAIMTIFF

oNLy ADDREssEs KNowrs

(x)pLACEtS) Or EMpIJOyt{EMr oF prJj{IlflrlFF*

ro DEFD{DAM1};

*
f, o

* 4-

{ )( ) { )

(x) ( )

you are prohibited f

oTHER(s}

electronic or other forrn of contact with: PLATNTTFF

* * * *

*
*
*

*
*

* 5. * (x) (x) ( ) * i )( ) ( i

You are prohibited from making ar c make harassing communicatione to; Fr.anfrrFF oTFER(s) -sAtr{EAS#4ABo\rEoRrrs?NA!,tEs

*
*

*
* *

* 6 you are prohibited from stailring, r (x) (X) ( ) Eo lrarm, to Etalk or to followr pLAIrflffFF *

( )( ) ( )

oTHER(s,

-sAt4EAs#4ABotrEoRrJrsrNAMgs

'

,t

* *

*
*

You uu6t pay emerg'ent monetary relief to tcegcrile anmt & meth;o * PTITNTIFF ilil il ( )() ( i DEPBTDANf(S) 8. ( i t , ( J You musE .be sujtject to intafe monitorinf of conaitiong/restraints * * ( )( ) ( ) Other: (evaluaiionsortreatmente. deseribe) *

* *

* 7.

'9. { )( ) ( ) Peychiarricevaluationr
from PoEEeesing any and all firearms or other weapons and rnust, irnmediately surrender these firearmg, weapoDg, perrrrit(s) to cariyt application(sl to purchase f,jrearni arrd rit .me purchaser rD card to tbe officer senring this court order. Failure Eo do so will result in your arrest and incarceratLon. gEher weapon(s)ANy AND AI,I,

* *
*

n * * * N *
a

*]'o"tx)tx)(iPRoHrBrTroNAGAINsTPossEssIoNoFyltAPolls'vffi

*
* *

****************!r**t********t **** PITAfMffFF; * 11.()() ( ) You are granted excluslve pbssession * arternate houeing onry if

* * *
*
*

( )( ) ( * * 13.( )( ) ( ( )( ) (
L2.

specifically
:

of, (list residence or

known

to defendant):

*
* * *

You are granted temporar? custody of

) )

Oth Relief Plar tr tt ehiLdren:

* * * * *
*

you are to accgmPany to gcene. residence, ehared (indicate address, time, duration and pur?ose): Blace of bueinesg, oth.er

I.AW ENFORCEMEI{J

OFFICER:

*
* * * *
*

( )t ) ( ) gLaintiff

( )( ) { } Defendant
ORDER

********************t**************************!t**

NEI{ ,lERsEY DoMEgrIe \IJOLENCE couRT

ID:DV-100018t2p (Rev 0901)

?*3'\

fiEAPONS F'OR SAFEKEEPING { ) ro ANy rrA?l ENFoRCBMEMT oFFrcER HAVTNG JIrRrsDrcTroN: This order sha]l Eerrre as * * a warrant to search for and. seize any issued permit to cartar a firearrn, r * applicatLan to purchase a firearm fit"arm-s purchaser ident,ification card r r iesued to the defendant and the fol)_owing "od tireaim(s) or other ueapon(s): * * * 1.you aE-fieretffirmtanded to searcb for the l * Bermits to carry a firearm, applicar.ion ro prrror.a""-;-ti;;; "lo and firearurs * * purchaser ideDrification card and !o se:ire * -t'v" b"5 " "opy ' persoA at the premises or lOcation described as: of this erder upon the * * 2,You are hereby ordered in the event you seize any * * above, to give a receipt for the property selzed eo the pergon from whon * * they were taken were found, or ilr the absence of * * such a person toor in whoEe poseesej.on theytogether have a copy of Elris order with such receipt in or rlr e4 * * upon the said struclure fron the prolr"riy rrae ^/e * * 3'You are authorized to executewhich ord.er iimediatelyt.a]cen Ehie or as soon thereafter * bqlLs! * ' as ie practicable:(

vvwrsu lLr.!v-J.t-uUI-166-11Defendantrg Nane BRESKO, RENA'E *******!t*******t********************************i****t***t**********+******,r******** N WARXAMI: TO S&ARCH

FOR AI{D TO SETZE

)Anytime; ( )other,

1. ( )( ( )( , )( r,
2.
3.

* Ehe courr wirh a wri*en r.nvenrory of rhe prop"*y-;;;;l';; **********************t************************t*t*********************************t PART TT - REIJTEF - DEFENDAI{T:

;;ilrt;;.Il"u'o=

l ( ) uoparentingtirne/vieitationuntil furrherordered; ) ( ) parentj.ng time pureuant to suspended untiL furth r /\ ) ( ) parenr,lngEime/vi_sit,atj.onp l;;;:
)

Order

)( ) (
)( )(
N/A N/A N/A N/A
(
(

Rigk assessment ordered (by whomlany requirement"/

You musu provide compeneation EmergenE supBort for plaintiff For dependent (s) :

as followE
r

( )(
( (

Ongoing eupport for plainEiff: For dependent (s) : corpensaEory damages for plainiitr Punitive damages to pJ_aintiff ; To Third Party (iee ) (describe) :
( ( (

( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )

) Me*ical coverage for pffi ) for Dependent (s) : ( ) ttlortgage payments ( spe-ify ) ( )Rent
)
}

4, ( )( ) (

You mrst

particlpate in a latti

"*,*r

s) and

recipient (s) )

s. ( )( ) {

You are grauted temporaff nossess

tsemporar-y posEession

PART IT - RELIEF PI,AIMTTFF: 1. ( )( ) ()You are g,ranted

COMMETCfS:

of personal property (describe) I

NETg ,JERSEY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COT]RT ORDER

A violatl-on of any Eection of bhis Order by d'efendant may result in a*est incarcaration. Only a Court can change this Order. "rf
ID: DV-100OLFL2p (Rev 09Ol-)

?**3

Docket

No . FV- 14 - 001158- 11 Defend5nlE's ***/it*******i********************************!t***********************+*******t*******

Name BRESKO, RENATE

Family Div:ieion.

( ) fnO DEITfED by r.nrnicipal court, forwardcd to Fannily Part for adrninistratirre dismissal, and plaintiff advised of right to file new Complaint irr Superior Court,

/\

t;1f rno DElrrBD. Complainr diemisged by Family part.

( ) f:RO GRAI{IED: The Court hag established jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 et seq., and has fouad gufflcient gror:nds and exigent circumstances that an inrmediate danger of domest,ic violence exigts and that an emergensy restlaining ord,er ie necesEar-y purgua.nt to R.5:?A(b) aad N.J,S,A.2C:25-28 to prevent the occurrence or recurrence of domestic wiolence and to search for and seize firearms and other weapons ag indicated in Lhis order.
ALL LAW EIIFORCEMENT OFFTCERS I{ILL SERVE Al[D FTLLY BIFORCE THrS ORDER. This ex parte Domestj.c violence Complalnt and Temporary Reotraining Order meets the criteria of the federal Violence Againsb women Act for enforcement outside of the state of NewJerBey upon verification of EervLce of defendant. l8u.s.c.A 2255 & 2265.

* TIITS

ORDER SIATJL REMATN

nI

EFFBqT UNTrL FIJEf,rrER AerrON OF THE COITRT AlqD

ftj
***** ********* ******* **********
NOTTEE TO AP

1O PLLTNTTFF

1. ( l Both bhe plaintiff on( Division, Family

MORRTS COUNTY
COI'RTROOM

and

trdanL are ordered to appear for a final hearing lme) 0_8130 J\.M at the superior court, chancery s _CounEy, Iocated at (address )

SECOIVD FI,OOR

NOTE:

inf

NJ 07960must bring

orrna

rtgage receipts with you to eourE.

eial inforrnation including pay stubE, ineurance

mabter shaLr not be scheduled

2. ( )

The

finar hearing in this

until:

3. ( ) fnteryreter needed. Language: Upon sat,isfaction of the above-noted conditions notify the inrrrediately so that a finaL hearing date $ray be set.

Court,

fMPORTAI{T: the partsies cannot themselves change the terms of this Order on their own. Thie Order may only be chalged or diemissed by the Superlor Coure. tlre nanned defendant cannot, have any contacE with the plaj.ntiff without permissJ.on of the court.

violation of agy of the provisions listed in thls order or failure to cornply trlth tbe directive to surrender all weapona, firearm permits, applications or identification cards may constitute eriminal contempt pursuant to l[.J,s.A. 2C;29-9(b) and may also consEitute violations of other sgate and federaL Laws which may resuft in your arreat andlor criminal- prosecution. ThiE may result in a jail sentence.
A

NOTICE TO DEFENDAI{T:

the right to inrmediateLy f,ile an apBeal of this terporarlf order before the superior eourt, chancerT Divieion, Farnily Part, as indicated above, E[rd a hearing may be scheduled.
You have

Q*3U

EXHIBIT G

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY MORRIS COUNTY CHANCERY DIVISION: FAMILY PART DOCKET NO. : FV-74-840-11

A.D.
RENATE BRESKO,

Plaint iff
VS.

, TRANSCRT PT OF

HEARING

PETER BRESKO,

Defendant.

Place: Morris County Courthouse Washington & Court Street Morristown, NJ 07963
10 11 72 BEFORE:

Date: June 2I, 20II Afternoon Session

HONORABLE THOMAS CRITCHLEY

, J. S. C.

13

TRANSCRIPT ORDERED BY: PETER BRESKO I PLAINTTFF 25 CHILHOWIE DRTVE KTNNELON, N.J. 07405
APPEARANCES:

I4
15

I6
I1
1B

Attorney for Plaintiff Attorney for

CHARLES LANGE, JR.

CHRTSTIAN VAN PELT, ESQ.

I9
20

Defend.ant

ESQ.

2I
22 23 24 25

Sharon Conover KING TRANSCRTPTTON

FRANK

Wayne, NJ

H. ULR]CH 55 Willowbrook Boulevard

01 47 0

SERVTCES

Colloquy
1

22

Honor, that the chil_dren go to a camp, a sleep

camp

away

2 3
4

as soon as possible.

And that wil_l allow the

situation to diffuse, to cal-m down.

THE COURT:

That is an issue for

Judge

5
6 1
B

Enright and not for

me.. can

\ MR. VAN PELT: /We have to, we certainly

decide this here in this court, to the extent that.

decj-sions have to be made right away. Everyday that

this -- does not exist continues to be a day that client has to go to a shelter. for my client, Shelters are not nor for the children.

my

10 11

good

I2
13

MR. LANGE: Judge, thi_s j_s not only

testimony, j-t's opinion testimony.

THE COURT: Yeah.

I4
15 76
L7
1B

MR. LANGE: I have a contrary opi_nion as to

the reason why the children are act.ing up. It's

because they are deprived of the company of their

father.

But my expectation or my espousi-ng of that

79 20
2T

theory is of no moment today.

THE COURT:

Right.

I think you,ve assessed

a

it properly.

Now

as a gieneral rule f don't have

22 23 24 25

problem with chil-dren away to sleep over camp. Right

now the plaintiff
am

has custody of 'the chil-dren., But I

not going to do anything further to order it,

because ultimately we're going to get into a mess wit

Co1
1

oquy

23

too many j udges working

on

things dealing with I have issued

an

parenting time and issues like that. order of protection.

make
\.__

I've done what I can to try

and

it effective and f have confessed the failures

seen

that I see. One of the worst histories that I've in sitting

on domestic violence cases.
And I have

concerns that we are not done yet.

B

But time will

te1l

But f'm not going to

make

rulings regarding

those kinds of parenting issues.

MR. VAN

10 11
T2

PELT: Your Honor, if I may ask this

decision has to be made right away. Because it's very

difficult
And there
camp

to enroll children into a sleep is a cost associated with that.

And we

away camp.

13

If we find
make sure

I4
15 76
71
1B

for the chil-drenr w certainl-y want to

that it can be paid for.

wil-l need the

camp.

contribution of Mr. Bresko'in the payment of that

So how can we reach this decision today?
THE COURT:

f don't think we can

19 20

MR. VAN PELT: So they might be denied the

opportunity to go to a
THE COURT:

camp?

2I
22 23 24 25

I think you maybe right.

But I

cannot take it su esponte, particularly when j-t, s just

not my jurisdictj-on. They are going to di-vorce, all

these issues will be adjudicated in the divorce.
They

will be very difficult

to get to be on the

same page.

CoI
1

loquy

24

But there you have it.

MR. LANGE:

2 3
4

I would also note for the

record.

that Mr. Van Pelt has been involved for 45 to 60 days or so. That's the first time he raised that point of \_
summer camp. THE COURT: You may

5
6 1
B

want to confer with

counsel, I doubt there will be consent, but it's

possible. There's going to be a consent order

regardj-ng obtaining property and in some way, shape, or

10 11

form dealing with the j-ssue of the passport. It

maybe

that your client can dj-scuss it with the Division of

Youth and Family ServJ-ces, they may think it's

I2
13
T4

appropriate and sensible in terms of the chil_d

15

protective service perspectj-ve. But this is not the right court for that rel-ief .
Okay, thank you, 'good luck.
MR. LANGE: Judge; can
THE COURT: Yes.

L6
T7 1B

I say one thing?

79 20

MR. LANGE: And

this is giving a1l respect,

because

I only appeared in front of Your Honor four

But you indicated earlier

2I
22 23 24 25

times now and I have the upmost respect for your

reasoning and your rulings.

that you were going to approach the Prosecutor's Office. I would ask that Your Honor reconsider that aspect. fn your decision in the domestic violence

Coll-oquy
1

25

matter on March 7th, you indicated you were going to

speak

to the other judges on this case. I took that to

novel j-ssue of can you have harassment
when

mean t.he

you contact a third party. were going to t)f(

I didn't think that

you
And

about the Breskos individually.

now.

I don't think that

But Your Honor -8 9

THE COURT:

f don,t recal-l the issue,

what

was

the issue third party?

MR. LANGE: The issue was whether

10 11
T2

or not i_t
a

could be harassment if my cl-ient sent a l_etter to

third party and the plaintiff

issue a littIe
Honor was

didn't hear of for

weeks

13

after it happened. And Your Honor struggled with the bit, and that's what I thought your
when you said

I4
15 76
T1 1B

referring to in your decisj_on,

THE COURT:

you were going to discuss it witn your colleag:ues.

f'm sure I was, yeah.

MR. LANGE: But you've now told us today that

19 20

you see Judge Enright and you talk to her everyday, and

that you wanted to go to the Prosecutor's Office.

2I
22 23 24 25

would submit Judge, Mr. Van Pel-t is perfectly capable

of communicating with the Prosecutor's Office if that, the way he chooses to do it.
And f woul-d be less than

an advocate for my client if I didn't indicate that f,m

not comfortabLe with not knowing what you're telling

Col Ioquy
1

26

,Judge

Enright that does not appear in Mr. Van pelt's

2 3
4

papers, and what she maybe basing her reasoning on that I then can't argue with or aqree with.
THE COURT:

Right.

Regarding the

5
6 7
B

Prosecutor's OfFiee, I have occasion to refer things to

them whether it be perjury or other issues such as

that.

This is a littl-e

bit different.

But in a

sense

I believe that if I didn't make them aware of the larger picture, it maybe that 1aw enforcement could
never bring into focus some of the things that are
happening here.

10 11

In other words, a lot of these

I2
13

incidents may happen in different municipalities, different police officers get involved. I d.on't
see

I4
15

that as wrong. But once that happens, they do what they want with it.
mean

So referring somethingi does not

I6
71
1B

that they take any acfion.

MR. LANGE: Judge, I indicated what indicated

then for the edification

of the Court, Tia Monacchj-a is

I9
20

the assistant prosecutor who is assigned this matter at the

moment.

2I
22 23 24 25

THE COURT:

I appreciate that .
Your

MR. LANGE: f have nothing further,

Honor.
THE COURT: A11

right, thank you sir.

MR. VAN PELT: Nothing further.

The Court/Certification
1

21

(Hearing conciuded)

Certification T, Sharon Conover, the assigned transcriber,

hereby certify
CD
do on

3
4

the foregoing transcript of proceedings

5
6 1

No. 1, from\.::dex number 3:50:05 to 4232:10, is

compliance with the current Transcript

prepared in full

Format for Judicial Proceedings and is a true and accurate

non-compressed transcript

of the proceedings as recorded.

10 11 72

Sharon Conover 625 cc

Date: 6-

99- / /

KING TRANSCRIPTION SERVICES

13
T4

65 Witlowbrook Boulevard Wayne, New Jersey 07410

Date

15

76
T1 1B

T9

20
2T

22 23 24 25

EXHIBIT H

From: To: Subject: Date:

Laura Bresko Peter Bresko Fw: Re: Update Wednesday, August 24, 2011 12:57:21 PM

FYI-- Renate is coming to get you. See Kat' s email below.

Sent from Yahoo! Mail on Android

From: Katerina Bresko <bresko.katerina@yahoo.com>; To: Laura Bresko <laura_bresko@yahoo.com>; Subject: Re: Update Sent: Wed, Aug 24, 2011 4:24:02 PM

hey we are moving again confidentiality was broken!! hopefully there will be a computer there!! i will try to call once we are there oh tell dad to be careful! moms really angry and says she is going to get him
From: Laura Bresko <laura_bresko@yahoo.com> To: Katerina Bresko <bresko.katerina@yahoo.com> Sent: Tuesday, August 9, 2011 12:27 AM Subject: Update

Hello, Little Miss Camp Counselor-I understand that there's a job waiting for you when you're 17! You've "turned lemons into lemonade" and that's really awesome. You've taken a crappy summer and turned it into a great experience-- at least the YMCA camp part. ;) And keep doing what you're doing! You are the only one who can get anything from your mother. You make sure your mom doesn't remove you from Kinnelon schools. There's no reason she can't drive you to school each day, then you and Peter take the bus to dad's/your house, and then spend the night or she can pick you up when she gets home from work. Just remember, if she wants to live in public housing or in Paterson, that's her choice, but you don't have to suffer because of it. Your dad's restrictions on seeing you guys should be lifted in the next week or so. You should be seeing him real soon. Feel free to call home and leave him a message. He won't get

in trouble. Love the both of you!! I don't know when you'll get to do back-to-school shopping but we'll figure something out. Try to read your email more often, and call more often. We worry about you. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxooooooooooooooooooooooo!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Laura L. Bresko President Progress Testing, Inc. (800) 930-TEST 352-336-3780 352-336-3782 f lbresko@ProgressTesting.com 4140 NW 27th Lane, Suite G Gainesville, FL 32606

EXHIBIT I

Dr. Monty We,ins.tein

PS-Y.D, M.P.A-, D.A.P.A., I\]-C.P.

amily Therapy Institute, Inc. www.familyunity.com 50Years of Prof-essional Experience with Families and Children Distinguished Public Service Award for Work with Families and Children
F

248^ l2"Street' Nerv York,I{Y 10003 '(91?) 589-S008 'drmontyl@aol.com

A.SI!4FT, Clinical Member Fellow $lneric an,P svchotherapy As $ociati on F ellow of the fu rcri c an, Orthops;ychi atri c As so c o ci ati on
Li censed
P

s-yehothbf aprst,

fird

Malriage and Farrrily Theraprst

Listed in the National Dilectory of Farmly Therapy Providers

Outeach Centers tlroughout ttre U.S.

Board Certifi ed Clinical
Boar-tl Cer,hfied
P

sychotheraplst

glinical Dqnestic Violenee Expert

Amedoan Acadiamy ofForensic Counselors and Examiners Appointed by Courts in NJ to do Reunification Therapy and teat Parental .Alienation Syndrome 'Mental Heath Professional,of the,Year" - Citation presented by US Senator Kirsten Gillitrrand

August 8 ,2011 Hon. Catherine Enright, J.S.C. Superior Court ofNew Jersey Chancery Division/Family Part Morris County Courthouse Washington & Court Streets Morristown, New Jersey 07863

Re:
Dear Judge Enright:

Bresko vs. Bresko Oort o No. ntf-f + -97g-Il

I, DR. MQNTY WEINSTEN, Psy.D., M.P.A., D.A.P.A., and N.C.P., certifu that I am working with Mr. Peter Bresko using intense Psychotherapy in a Group Therapy environment. Mr. Bresko retained me as his expert. I have seen Mr. Bresko in nine (9) Group Sessions thus far in addition to otr daily counseling sessions which began in June and were resumed immediately
after his recent incarceration.

I have not performed any Forensic Psychology tests nor have I.referred him to other experts to administer such tests as Mr. Bresko exhibits no mental or nervous disorders nor are

Ilrn lvton,ty

ftinstein
and

P$Ir.D Ifi,_F.A, D.A.P.A, N,C.P. F.ryrrily fher4p5. Iqstitutg Ina

yea.r, of Disttnguished Prr blic Service Award for ttVork with
5o

*ro**imTnmni*
1O003 . (91D

S*tili* *U ChiiO.*o

cfiirdren

24E-l2uStret ' Nery York, I{y

SAL{FI" Clinical lv{ember:

Sg-8mg . drmontyl@aol.com
Lieerued Psychotherafr st flnd Marriege and Family Therapisf

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August 8, 2011 Hon. Stuart Minkowitz, J.S.C. Superior Court ofNew Jersey

Monis County Courthouse Washington & Court Steets

Morristown, New Jersey 07863

Re:
Dear Judge Minkowitz:

State vs. Bresko

I, DR. MONTY WEINSTEIN, psy.D., M.p.A., D.A.P.A., and N.c.p., certifr that I am working with Mr. Peter Bresko using intense Psychotherapy in a Group Th"r"pt environment. Mr' Bresko retaindd me as his expert. I have seen Mr. Bresko in nine ('q) Gto"p'sessions thus far in addition to our daily counseling sessions which began in June and were resumed immediately after his reoent incarceration. I have not performed any Forensic Psychology tests nor have I referred.him to other experts to administer such tests as Mr. Bresko exhibiis no mental or neryous disorders nor are any such matters before the Court. I have seen no such pathology in my
Bresko. examinations of Mr.

any such matters before the Court. I have seen no such pathology in my examinations of Mr. Bresko.

I have extensively examined Mr. Bresko and have found that no psychological pathology exists. I initially found him to sufFer Mild Adjustment Disorder due to the stresses of his divorce
and the recent incarceration.

I have now found that he suflers Post Traumatic Stress Disorder from his incarceration and Emotional Stress from being prevented from seeing his beloved children. The separation from his children after being their primary care giver for this long a period of time is causing ineparable and unnecessary harm to both the children and Mr. Bresko.
In light of these diagnoses, I have recommended that Mr. Bresko not work while undergoing Psychotherapy and Group Therapy until such a time that I determine.
As they have for the past several years, the Bresko children, Katerina, 13, and Peter, 9, look to Mr. Bresko for warmth, comfort and a nurturing environment. Keeping the children away from their father at this time for such an inordinately extensive period of time constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The children should not be living in a Battered Woman's Shelter at such a critical time in their lives and especially when Mr. Bresko can provide them with a home in a good childcentered neighborhood. Upon knowledge and belief; they are likely suffering Parental Alienation Syndrome and Extreme Separation Anxiety. I strongly advise that these children receive counseling and undergo Reunification Therapy with their father and a qualified Psychotherapist immediately.

Mr. Bresko has recently stated that his ex-wife has left her rental residence and is seeking to further alienate Mr. Bresko from the children's Jives by relocating out of the area and away from him. I feel strongly that the children should remain in their native community and school district where they can interact with their friends, f,amily and reconnect with their lives.

All clinical evidence shows that divorce is the most difficult crisis young children could ever face. They historically experience grief, resentment, anxiety and intense anger. It is important to butffess a child's emotional fragility with as few changes as possible. Based on the evidence that I have seen and my long professional experience, I believe that the children are traumatized by the actions of Mrs. Bresko and adding further trauma by forcing them to adjust to a new communityn and changing schools at this point in their lives will cause further insecurity and emotional crisis.
IvIr. Bresko has shown me a Pediatric Neurological Evaluation that has diagnosed his 9 year old son with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder and he also shown me further studies performed by the Kinnelon School District which confirm'this diagnosis and qualifr his son for a 504 Special Education Accommodation from his present school district. Removing this child from his only known school environment and friends, and placing this child in a new and unknown school will clinically cause feelings of rejection and embarrassment. Based upon the

evidence presented to me and my professional experiences in this area, I believe that any move away from his familiar school environment will likely delay his educational advancement and cause adjustment stresses as well as negatively impact his well being and self worth.

This is a severe situation and if this alienating behavior continues by Mr. Bresko's exwife then the children lose a strong relationship with a loving and caring father. Mr. Bresko has been the children's primary care giver for many years. Based upon the evidence presented to me as well as my long professional career specializing in this area, separating him from his children will likely cause the children to experience panic, anxiety, distrust and substance abuse in their future lives. This alienating behavior strongly suggests that Mrs. Bresko is attempting to break the bond between the children and their father.

Mr. Bresko states that his ex-wife is a certified professional accountant who is not working; has or is about to receive public assistance; and is living in a shelter for purposes to portray herself as the victim of abuse and violence. It has been stated to me that the reason his ex-wife is living in a shelter is to create the illusion that she is a woman in crisis when in reality she is a working professional attempting to develop a mother-child relationship with her children that doesn't exist. She values her own self-interests ahead of her children. Based on preliminary evidence and documents that I've reviewed, there is probability that Mrs. Bresko may suffer her own psychological pathologies including Narcissistic Personality Disorder and Persecution Complex and should be examined as a candidate for her own psychotherapy.
In reviewing the FRO documents and FRO hearing transcripts as well as the Criminal complaints lodged against Mr. Bresko, I see no history of any violence or allegation of any kind of violence. Most importantly, there is no allegation that Mr. Bresko has ever been threatening or violent to his children and has been nothing but an extremely engaged and loving father to his children.

Mr. Bresko has discussed with me that the.children had become so frustrated by not being allowed to come to their home that they would defy their mother and elope to their home on numerous occasions. This behavior confirms that the children are traumatized and are seeking the comfort of their home and family. Upon knowledge and belief, Mrs. Bresko is also using her self-created crisis to imprison the children in these shelters and then using the Courts to alienate them from their loving father.

I strongly advise that the Court interview the 13 year-old child, Katerina. I have been shown numerous emails that she has sent to her family which are strong evidence that she is reasoned, competent and has a genuine and voluntary desire to speak with the Cou(. I strongly advise that the children be represented by an attorney in this divorce who can advocate for their wishes.

RELEVANT FAMILY HISTORY:

Upon knowledge and belief, the following is the Relevant Family History facts as stated to me by Mr. Bresko:

In September 2005, Mrs. Bresko moved out of the marital residence into a 2 bedroom apartrnent in Kinnelon and effolled in Montclair University. The parties agreed to Joint Shared Custody and an informal Parenting Plan was crafted where Mr. Bresko would take care of the children during the 3 days each week that Mrs. Bresko attended classes. They agreed to share weekends jointly and many times both Mr. and Mrs. Bresko would stay overnight at each other's residence. During this time frame Mr. Bresko stayed at home and performed most of the duties of cleaning, cooking and laundry as well as taking care of the children after school. Mr. Bresko also volunteered for various duties at his daughter's school and became Class Parent for his daughter in grades 3,4 and 5.
In May 2006, Mrs. Bresko graduated from Montclair College with an Accounting
Degree.

In July 2006,the family vacationed in Florida and stayed at a home recently purchased by Mr. Bresko's mother and nearby to the Bresko family relatives who included the children's Grandparents, their Aunt and Uncle and numerous cousins. The parties agreed to move into this new house so that the children could be nearer to their family members. In August 2006, Mr. Bresko retumed to Florida and enrolled the children for the start of the school year while Mrs. Bresko stayed behind to move out of her apartment. Two weeks later, Mrs. Bresko changed her mind about this move and obtained an Order requiring the children be returned to New Jersey. Mr. Bresko followed the next month and moved back into rhe25 Chilhowie Drive residence. A Consent Order was reached in October 2006 for Joint Custody and a Parenting Plan was put into effect. In July 2007, Mr. and Mrs. Bresko attended a weekend marriage retreat called "Retrovaille" and agreed to reconcile. In August2007, Mrs. Bresko moved back into the family residence at 25 Chilhowie Drive, however the family now moved into the upstairs main residence and Mr. Bresko's parents moved into the first floor mother-in-law apartment previously occupied by Mr. Bresko and their children at various times. The couple agreed to pay rent to Mr. Breskg's parents in exchange for taking over the main part of the house.

In Septemb er 2007,Mr. Bresko left his office in Suffern NY and returned home to assume the duties of primary care giver for the children. Mrs. Bresko was responsible for putting the children on the bus in the morning and Mr. Bresko would take care of them after school by assisting with their homework and school assignments and preparing the family meals. Mr. Bresko would also take care of the children during school holidays, siok days, snow days and vacation days. Mr. Bresko's mother was still employed as a Teacher at this time and was living in the family home's apartrnent. She would also help take care of the children with whom they

with. Mr. Bresko's mother retired from teaching in 2008 and moved to Florida but maintained the apartrnent in the family residence and would return for extended stays each month up to the present time.
had by this time had developed a strong bond

From September 2007 to July 2010, Mrs. Bresko attempted to earn herNew Jersey CPA certification by studying for and taking various tests. She failed many times but finally passed on her last attempt in July 2010. During this period, Mr. Bresko continued to take care of the children so that Mrs. Bresko could have the time required to study for these demanding tests. In 2008, 2009 and20l0, Mr. Bresko volunteered for many extracurricular activities with his chil&en including Cub Scouts, Girl Scouts, Little League Baseball (as head coach), Travel Baseball (as Assistant Coach), Soccer (as Assistant Coach), Travel Soccer, Softball (as Assistant Coach) in addition to once again being Class Parent for his son. It was during this period that Peter Jr. first began to exhibit symptoms of ADD/ADHD and required special attention with his schoolwork and homework.

In September 2010, Mrs. Bresko learned that she had passed the final CPA examination and family took a vacation to the NJ shore to celebrate. Upon their return, Mrs. Bresko began to work more hours and spent more time away from the family each day usually retuming from work between 6 and 7 in the evenings. Mrs. Bresko also became very secretive about her evenings away from the family and would attend work related functions at night and on weekends.
In December 2010, the Mrs. Bresko decided to end the marriage. She did so by surreptitiously renting a house in a Kinnelon, New Jersey. When her plan to move immediately after Christmas was revealed, she asked Mr. Bresko to move in with her explaining that she 'owanted us all to get away from living in his mother's house." They discussed this move daily for the next week and Mrs. Bresko gradually explained that she wasn't happy living in the United States as she has no family here and wanted to retum to Austria with the children. She said that would like to be separated from Mr. Bresko for the next 6 months so the children can finish the school year. During these next 6 months, she wanted Mr. Bresko to go to counseling and work on his relationship with her. However, Mrs. Bresko would not be attending any counseling - it was only for Mr. Bresko. At the end of this 6 month period, Mrs. Bresko would decide if she wanted Mr. Bresko back and then the family would all move to Austriatogether. Mrs. Bresko announced these plans to the children the day after Christrnas 2010 and they were immediately resistant preferring instead to stay in their family home with their father.

It is important to note that Mr. Bresko has not spoken of his ex-wife in any threatening,
abusive or denigrating manner, nor has he shown any ill-will towards her. He has stated that he feels it unflorhrnate that his ex-wife decided to move away and that their marriage fell apart. He feels that his ex-wife had difficulties dealing with her decision and has been given misleading advice on how to use the courts to obtain an advantage in her custody dispute, He feels strongly of his concerns for the well being of his beloved children and the need.to protect them from any fi.rrther stresses or emotional damage.

After reviewing all of the documents related to this case, I have spoken with Mr. Bresko regarding specific incidents that may concem this Court and have addressed most of them with him in our Group Therapy sessions. SPECIFIC INCIDENTS AND THERAPIES APPLIED: MARITAL BREAKUP: I have discussed with Mr. Bresko the issues that lead up to his ex-wife moving out of the marital home. It is important to note that Mr. Bresko could give me no reasons for his wife to have made such a rash and life changing decision to move. It appears that his wife was tired of living in the marital home and resented owing her mother-inlaw money for back rent owed. She surreptitiously rented a house nearby to the marital home and initially hid that fact from Mr. Bresko and then attempted to convince him to move with her to this new residence. When Mr. Bresko refused, it appears that Mrs. Bresko began a campaign to alienate him from his children that ultimately led her to leveling suspicious charges against him with both the local Police and the Courts with the intent of discrediting her husband in the upcoming divorce. Mr. Bresko advised that his wife initially did not want to seek a divorce and that he was the one that filed when his wife's allegations became more and more serious. He referenced that complaints were made to New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services about him and that his ex-wife quickly became more and more bad-tempered and antagonistic towards him after she was served with the divorce papers. This ultimately led to her obtaining a Final Restraining Order against Mr. Bresko.
In February 2011, Mrs. Bresko was involved in a single car automobile accident when she lost control of her automobile a hit a telephone pole on her way home from work. Her car was a total wreck but Mrs. Bresko was luckily unhurt in this accident. It is interesting to note that, although separated and involved in a contentious divorce from her husband, Mrs. Bresko only called Mr. Bresko and asked him to come to her aid. Wonied for her health and safety, Mr. Bresko immediately left for the accident site and Qlought the children with him. He then insisted on taking Mrs. Bresko to the hospital for a medical examination and stayed with her in the emergency room. Mr. and Mrs. Bresko then spent the next several days working together on the insurance claim and even shopped together for a new car for Mrs. Bresko. It was after this period that Mr. Bresko asked his wife to attend couples counseling to deal with this divorce, but she
refused.

We have discussed the issue of Mr. Bresko sending the children away to Florida over the New Year's holiday 2010. Mr. Bresko explained that he was motivated by a sincere desire to remove the childrpn from the frontlines of the marital contretemps and had their best interests foremost in his mind. Realizing that his ex-wife was attempting io draw the children into the middle of this battle by suggesting to them that the entire family was moving into a new house without consulting Mr. Bresko first; removing the children to a safe and neutral location seemed especially urgent to him at the time. I advised Mr. Bresko that however well intentioned, his decision was impulsive and rash and have given him specific direction in our,Group Therapy sessions on how to exhibit more self control.

Mr. Bresko suffers from Mild Adjustment Disorder. I am working with him in psychotherapy and family dynamics. I have spent numerous sessions with him on dealing effectively with anger management and consultation on the best way to deal effectively with his family and children. I believe that given the right form of reunification therapy he will continue to be a good parental role model. SPECIFIC INCIDENTS AITID THERAPIES APPLIED: ALLEGATIONS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
I have reviewed all of the court documents and courtroom transcripts as provided to me by Mr. Bresko with regards to the allegations of Domestic Violence against him.
The Domestic Violence charge against Mr. Bresko is based on harassment with no evidence or allegation of any physical violence. He was found guilty of and admitted to sending documents to his wife's accounting firm employer detailing his ex-wife's financial malfeasance. Although the documentary evidence presented by Mr. Bresko was never disputed Mrs. Bresko, he was found guilty of harassment. Upon knowledge and belief; the domestic violence charge against Mr. Bresko has been totally distorted and does not require the protection of the Federal Violence Against Women Act or the New Jersey domestic violence prevention laws. I understand that Mr. Bresko has appealed this conviction based upon numerous flaws in the presiding Judge's decision in addition to conflicts of interest that were not disclosed. The Judge had numerous remedies available to him but chose to punish Mr. Bresko by limiting his contact with the children. This decision is extremely harsh, excessive, abhorrent, and has caused irreparable harm to all parties to this case, but especially to the children who have been wrongfully denied contact with their father. The decision also flies in the face of the intention of the Federal Violence Against Women Act to protect the victim rather than to punish the alleged abuser. It is my contention that the Court did more harm to the children by it's excessive punishment of Mr. Bresko, that it actually punished the children instead.
appeal. However, this conviction cannot preclude him from seeing his beloved children. For my expertise in not be used as a weapon to this subject, I submit that I have been certified by the American College of Forensic Examiners in Domestic Violence. I have published 25 journal articles on Domestic Violence which have been peer reviewed. These articles appeared in the periodical "Annals - The American Psychology Association". These articles have also been sold throughout the United States and

I submit that Mr. Bresko will prevail upon his

Europe.

I have also addressed the various Amended FRO complaints and am incredulous that Mr. Bresko has had his Parental Rights suspended based on allegations and without any evidence of harm directed by Mr. Bresko toward his children. It troubles me that the Domestic Violence Court never considered the impact these judgments had ori the well-being of the children and that the Court did not order expert opinion before issuing its decision. It is as if the Court had a "knee-jerk" reaction in order to overcompensate and placate Mrs. Bresko because Mr. Bresko

had been the children's caregiver for a number of years, and now Mrs. Bresko was seeking custody of the children through whatever means are necessary.

Mr. Bresko suffers from Emotional Stress due to these orders which have prevented him from seeing his beloved children. I am working with him in psychotherapy and stress reduction. I have spent numerous sessions with him on dealing effectively with stress and I believe that being reunited with his children will alleviate this. I have not advised any medication be prescribed at this time.
SPECIF.IC INCIDENTS AITID THERAPIES APPLIED: ALLEGATIONS OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT:

I have reviewed the Criminal charges made against Mr. Bresko and my sessions with him in these matters are being conducted under my professional privilege doctrine. However so, upon knowledge and belief; I believe Mr. Bresko will prevail in these Criminal Matters and these charges should not be used as a weapon to preclude him from seeing his beloved children.
There are three Criminal charges pending against Mr. Bresko and he and I have discussed them during our Group Sessions. Given the fact that Mr. Bresko is under the stress of not seeing his children for upwards of five months, the stresses created by the Criminal charges and the Final Restraining order, my observations of Mr. Bresko is that he has held up remarkably well given the multiple stressors.

I have discussed the events of May 31,2011 which led to a charge of vehicular assault against Mr. Bresko and an alleged violation of the FRO. I understand that the children had come back to their home that day after school directly from the school bus, but Mr. Bresko was not allowed Parenting Time with them and was attempting to return them to their mother's residence. I then note that an automobile accident took place in Mr. Bresko's driveway when Mrs. Bresko was sitting in her car waiting for Mr..Bresko to leave his house with the children, saw Mr. Bresko driving down his own driveway, and then pulled out in front of him to block the driveway at the last instant. If it is found that Mrs. Bresko was actually sitting in her car and waiting at Mr. Bresko's house then this would lead me to believe that she has no fear of Mr. Bresko in direct contradiction of her claim for having to move to a Battered Woman's Shelter in order to get away from Mr. Bresko. Mr. Bresko also informed me that there is a second police
report of Mrs. Bresko sitting in front of his driveway two weeks later. This additional circumstance leads me to believe that Mrs. Bresko does not fear Mr. Bresko, and in fact, indicates she may have been stalking Mr. Bresko. I

Mr. Bresko has told me that he was afraid for his and his children's safety and left the scene of the accident when his wife got out of her car and came towards him. I advised Mr. Bresko that however well intentioned, his decision was impulsive and rash and should have been handled differently. I have given him specific direction in our Group Therapy sessions on how to exhibit more self control.
I have discussed the events surrounding the placement of a "mommy cam" in Mrs. Bresko's house. I am against the use of any tactics that parents may use to put the children in the

middle of the conflict. However, Mr. Bresko advised that his daughter Katerina acted on her own after receiving the camera from her Aunt. Katerina and Mr. Bresko's son, Peter, were both being physically abused at the hand of their mother due to their blaming their mother for the divorce and the Court order preventing them from having contact with their father. It appears that the children were acting out against their mother and hurting her and she was fighting back and hurting them. This is a clearly an unsafe and toxic environment that the children were exposed to and it causes me great concern that the Division of Youth and Family Services did not remove the children from their mother immediately. Based on Mr. Bresko's comments to me about this scenario, it also troubles me that the Division of Youth and Family Services has sided with the mother against the father, when the children are being abused while totally under the mother's custody. The Division of Youth and Family Services, and its case workers and managers, are, obviously, mandated child abuse reporters. Yet, they've acted outside the scope of their authority, in violation of their regulations, and are acting as advocates for the mother.

I have given Mr. Bresko specific direction in our Group Therapy sessions on how to be a better parent; how to deal effectively with children during a divorce and custody case and how to
shield them from the marital dispute.

I have discussed the alleged placement of a GPS tracking device on his ex-wife's automobile and have been advised by Mr. Bresko that he has no involvement or knowledge of this incident and has not been near his wife or his wife's car since the accident in his driveway on May 31,2011.

I am available and willing to provide expert testimony to this Court uport notice.
My complete resume is attached to this certification. I certify the following for this
Courts consideration:

FIRST: I am a Clinical Fellow of the American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy. This association is utilized by the American Academy of Matrimonial Attorneys. I am a Fellow of the American Orthopsychiatric Association, an association composed of psychiatrists and psychologists throughout the United States. In addition, I have been qualified as an expert in custodial issues over 2,500 times in 45 states and 4 countries. I am an Adjunct Professor and have been utilized by law firms throughout the country. In addition, I am the recipient of the Distinguished Public Service Award. Besides holding two masters and a doctorate, I have over 1,000 hours of certification at the Cambridge Institute and Harvard University. I was also commended by tlp Govemor of the State of New York and other dignitaries for my children serving their country. SECOND: I am certified in dispute resolution by the New York State Unified Court System and recognizedby the Chief Judge Judith Kaye. I bave taken advanced training at Fordham Law School and other law schools in family mediation. I have mediated numerous
cases.

THIRD: I am on the editorial advisory board for the American Psychotherapy Association. I have spent the last ten years editing psychiatric and psychological manuals for publication in the national journal which is utilized throughout the United States. Also, besides being a gatekeeper for various manuscripts being published, I have published numerous book reviews for the American Orthopsychiatric Association in the area of social justice and scientific reliability and validity.
FOURTH: Further, for several years, I chaired the ethics committee in a psychiatric facility, and I have published at least fifty peer reviewed journal articles in the area of mental health. I have also been on national television and have studied the scientific validity of the deliverance of mental health services at New York University graduate school of public affairs. I was a clinical administrator for years at a large children's psychiatric facility, the Montenari Residential Treatment Center in Hialeah, Florida and I was a psychiatric unit director at the South Florida State Hospital directing a major psychiatric unit for the Florida State government. My partner for ten years was a Dr. Robert Gould, MD, who was chief of psychiatry at Bellevue and a full professor at New York Medical College, Cornell. I have done at least sixty assessments for him.

FIFTH: I developed my expertise on the deliverance of mental health services by editing the psychiatric journal reviewing book reviews, studying clinical administration at New York University, and being a clinical administrator at psychiatric facilities for numerous years. SIXTH: I am a Licensed Family Therapist in three states and a Nationally Certified Psychologist, and was on the Board of Directors for the National Psychological Association. One can look at my web page, www.familyunity.com, and see that I have been on numerous cases throughout the United States with letters of commendation not only from judges but also commendations from major law firms affiliated with the American Academy of Matrimonial
Attorneys.

SEVENTH: I am president of the National Parent's Rights Aqsociation, Inc. in Atlanta, Georgia, as well as president of the Family Therapy Center, incorporated in Georgia.

EIGHTH: Within the past several years, 2002 throudh20ll, I was one of the contributing authors to the proposed dissertation on Parental Alienation Syndrome as a psychiatric disorder. There were fifteerl original authors. I was one of the authors not only that contributed to the ./ presentation at the International Conference of Psychiatry and Parental Alienation, but my rutme is in the book by William Burnet, M.D. Chief of Psychiatry at Vanderbilt University and Chairman of the Parental Alienation Task Force. Dr. Bumet published this book; not only am I one of the contributing authors, but several of my case studies are mentionedin this volume. I was one of the first mental health professionals able to identiS this phenomenon. If one looks at my web page, they can watch an interview from twenty years ago with Matt Lauer on parental
alienation syndrome.

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NINTH: Furthermore, within the past year, I was appointed to provide psychotherapy to couples and children who were the victims of parental alienation syndrome. I was appointed and did work for the public defender in the State of New Jersey. I have been appointed and qualified by the Monis County Family Court. Judge Whipple.
TENTH: To give an example of my work, I have testified on parental alienation and domestic violence in Greensboro, North Carolina; Bucks County, Pennsylvania on three cases; Gainesville, Georgia; Marietta, Georgia and consulted on parental alienation in Germany, England, Australia, and New ZeaIand. ELEVENTH: I have been in conference with the state of New Jersey to train clinicians in parental alienation. I have also testified on numerous occasions in the area of domestic violence and I have published twenty five peer reviewed journal articles on violence in the American Journal of Psychotherapy. TWELFTH: This past year I was certified by the National Psychology Association as a certified clinical psychotherapist and further, I am certified by the American Academy of Forensic Examiners in the area of domestic violence. This past year I was also the recipient of the Mental Health Professional of the Year, awarded by a bi-partisan joint task force. I also received the distinguished honor of commendation in a proclamation by United States Senator Kirsten Gellibrand for my work in reunifying families. This can be seen on my web site. THIRTEENTH: I am an adjunct professor at Nassau College in New York where I taught several semesters in family development and human sexuality.

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RECOMMENDATION:
My preliminary recornmendation is that there be joint legal and physical custody between the parties, with neither party having primary responsibility, and immediate, specific, liberal, and unsupervised parenting time between Mr. Bresko and his beloved children. By reading their email messages, it is my belief that the children are in crisis and want and need to see their father
as soon as possible.

The importance of this evaluation-certification is to indicate and state that Mr. Bresko has pathology, is the victim of a contentious divorce, has been unjustly demonized as being a no "diabolical" person by Mrs. Bresko and the Court, and, based upon the evidence presented to me as well as my long professional career specializing in this area,I believe that the children are traumatized by the actions of Mrs. Bresko and desperately need a stable, wann, nurturing environment. They need to reconnect with their father and their traditional home.

Very truly yours,

Dr. Mori

Weinstein

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