Different Centuries, Similar Responses?

International Police Cooperation and the Depoliticizing of Terrorism in 1898 and 1998
1. Introduction............................................................................................................... 2 1.1. Research questions............................................................................................. 3 1.2. Prior research..................................................................................................... 6 1.3. Sources............................................................................................................... 9 2. Depoliticization....................................................................................................... 12 3. The International Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome 1898 ................................. 18 4. Interpol.................................................................................................................... 22 4.1. The debated origins of Interpol........................................................................ 22 4.2. The structure and functions of Interpol............................................................ 24 5. Depoliticization of anarchism and terrorism ...........................................................28 5.1. The political nature of anarchism and terrorism .............................................. 28 5.2. The Anti-Anarchist Conference and depoliticization ......................................36 5.3. Interpol and depoliticization ............................................................................ 46 5.4. Discussion........................................................................................................ 58 6. Why depoliticize?................................................................................................... 60 6.1. Ground for international anti-terrorist cooperation ..........................................60 6.2. Reaction to changes in social and political conditions in 1898 .......................64 6.3. Reaction to changes in social and political conditions in 1998 .......................68 6.4. Outcome of the bureaucratization of the police ............................................... 76 6.5. Reaction to an apparently similar threat ......................................................... 78 7. Conclusions............................................................................................................. 85 References .................................................................................................................. 89 Appendices.................................................................................................................. 98

1. Introduction

The President of the United States declared: [This ideology] is a crime against the whole human race and all mankind should band against [it]. The President urged that the speeches, writings and meetings of the supporters of the ideology should be treated seditious and that their activities should be constricted. The supporters of the ideology that already were in the country should be deported. The President drew a parallel between this doctrine and piracy. Like piracy, it should be covered by international law. 1 The president in question was not George W. Bush at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The lines that mark missing words are not replacing the word terrorist. 2 Theodore Roosevelt, who stated this in 1901, spoke about anarchism, the greatest threat to security and order in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe. This citation gives a good starting point for this study. It provides with a perfect example of the parallels between the two phenomena dealt with: anarchism of the 1890s and terrorism of the 1990s. Terrorism and the international combat against it is something that one comes across every day today while reading the newspapers, or listening to the news. What has recently been in the headlines is the War on Terrorism led by the United States. Less attention is paid to the more low profile police work done to prevent terrorist attacks or to catch terrorists. International police cooperation has existed from the period when terrorism as we today know it emerged.3 As early as a hundred years ago international terrorism, in the form of
1 2

Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919) stated this in 1901 about anarchists. Cited in: Tuchman, 1980, 107. However, the term "terrorism" has only been in use in France (from where it originates) since the 1970s

(Hermant and Bigo 2000) and it was totally absent from contemporary discussions of anarchist movements at the end of the nineteenth century [] Collyer, 2005, 283.
3

More about the nature of modern terrorism and its emergence below.

anarchism, was perceived as a threat to (European) security. Anarchists assassinated heads of states and the representatives of the police offices of European nations gathered in Rome in 1898 to discuss ways to confront this threat. This cooperation started an intensification on the field of international police cooperation and led to the creation of the International Criminal Police Commission in 1923. 4 Both the conference and the Commission, later known as Interpol, reacted to terrorism in a similar way, by depoliticizing it, breaking the terrorist acts down to their constituent, criminal parts. Thus depoliticizing in this context is equated with the criminalization of the acts. The aim of this study is to find out why the International Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome (referred to as AAC in this study) 1898 responded to the anarchist threat and similarly, in 1998, Interpol responded to the terrorist threat by depoliticizing the phenomenon. The study looks for reasons for this shared reaction in the similarities of the threats, in the social conditions of the two points in time, 1898 and 1998, and in the political situations of the states that have participated in these gatherings. The present chapter presents gives background information on the AAC and Interpol, discusses the sources used and the prior research on the subject and outlines the research questions. The next chapter aims at defining depoliticization. Chapters three and four present the Anti-Anarchist Conference and Interpol in more detail. Chapter five discusses the problematic nature of the concepts anarchism and terrorism and explores the way in which the AAC and Interpol depoliticized anarchism and terrorism. In chapter number six, an attempt is made to provide answers for the reasons the depoliticization was done. Finally chapter seven discusses the research results and suggests possible and interesting topics for further research.

1.1. Research questions

The aim of this study is to provide a comparative historical analysis of the ways in which the International Anti-Anarchist Conference (AAC) of 1898 and the International

Jensen, 1981.

Criminal Police Organization Interpol5 in 1998 depoliticized terrorism and why this was done. The research questions are: Why did the AAC and Interpol depoliticize anarchism and terrorism? What were the means for this? In pursuance of answering these questions it needs to be examined how the depoliticization was done, and in what situation. Scholars such as Anderson and Collyer have claimed that the threat of anarchism in the late nineteenth century and the threat of terrorism in our days have important resemblances. 6 Thus I want to ask the questions: was the threat the studied agencies had to face similar and did this promote similar answers? To analyze the depoliticization of anarchism and terrorism, I have studied resolutions of the Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome in 1898 and the resolutions regarding terrorism made by Interpol in 1951-1998.7 There are several reasons for the choice of the study question. The Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome was the first international gathering that dealt with terrorism and it has been claimed to have laid the basis for the organization today known as Interpol. Richard Jensen argues in his article The International Anti-Anarchist Conference of 1898 and the Origins of Interpol that international system of police cooperation today known as Interpol, originates from the Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome. He states that Interpol can be considered the descendant or at least a step-child of the Rome Conference.8
5

ICPO Interpol, until 1956 International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC). The abbreviation

Interpol was only invented in the early 1950s (Anderson, 1989, 53; Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006, 285.), but is used in this study about both organizations: the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC) and the current official name International Criminal Police Organization INTERPOL for reasons of clarity.
6 7

Anderson, 1989, 28; Collyer, 2005; Gray, 2003, 24. This is discussed in more detail below. The listing which resolutions are to be considered relating to terrorism is found at the Interpol

homepage: The first of these resolutions listed is the one of 1951. The listing stops in 2003. The resolutions on terrorism from 2003 to 2006 are listed by the author, and the criterion by which they are have been chosen to this paper is that their title includes the word terrorism. http://www.interpol.int/Public/Terrorism/resolutions.asp
8

Jensen, 1981.

The basic hypothesis of this study is that both the AAC in 1898 and Interpol of the late twentieth century faced similar threats and reacted to them with similar answers. The interest of this study is to provide with a notion on the development of international counter-terrorism in the studied period of one hundred years. It aims at looking at the different world political situations that provoked a similar-looking answer to a similarlooking menace. Why was the year 1998 selected for the analysis on Interpol? It could be supposed that the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 would have intensified the anti-terrorist policy in many countries of the world and thus of many international organizations. However, in the case of Interpol, the largest shift in the way terrorism was confronted in its resolutions did not occur after the attacks in the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001. It can be concluded from the resolutions made by the General Assembly of Interpol, that 1998 was a turning point in the history of the anti-terrorism of the organization. This year it became clear in the resolutions, that terrorism would be considered a criminal, and not a political act, by the organization. The resolutions of 1998-2006 represented this new approach.9 One could argue that the period that is studied is so long, and the threats so diverse in the nineteenth and the twenty-first century, that the whole basis of the comparison would not be acceptable. It certainly must be taken into consideration that Interpol as an organization has been transforming since its creation with the changes in its membership and the prevailing world situation.10 However, actions anarchists took at the end of the nineteenth century have a lot in common with actions the terrorists of even the twenty first century have taken, something that will be discussed in detail in the chapters that follow. As the threats the two different gatherings of the representatives of the police can be considered similar, it is interesting to see how the responses to the threats differed and resembled. The question why (anarchist) terrorism was depoliticized is interesting and important for several reasons. Thus far the question of depoliticization has been addressed either
9

I have studied Interpols relationship with terrorism in my work Empty Phrases: The Changing Attitudes Fooner, 1989, 24.

of Interpol Toward Terrorism 1923-2006. University of Helsinki, Department of Political Science, 2006.
10

very vaguely: [] anarchism was formally depoliticized in order to accommodate many, politically diverse national states,[] 11 or not at all. The final propositions of the Anti-Anarchist Conference in 1898 and the resolutions of Interpol after 1998 both addressed terrorism, which usually is considered as an inherently political act, as a crime, as opposed to a political deed. The aim of providing a ground for international cooperation by depoliticizing terrorism clearly gives one explanation for this. However, it is obvious that there have also been other reasons for the depoliticization, since it was not used as a strategy by Interpol during the years 1923-1997, from its foundation to our days. My task is thus to provide with some tentative answers for the underlying reasons of depoliticization of (anarchist) terrorism in 1898 and 1998.

1.2. Prior research

This study contributes to the history of the police force and to the history of counterterrorism and anti-anarchism. It relates to both criminology and international relations, this as summed by Andreas and Nadelmann remarkably understudied intersection of two disciplines.12 The study compares the way Interpol has encountered terrorism and the way in which the International Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome (AAC) confronted anarchist terrorism in 1898. It is based on the assertion of Richard Bach Jensen that the origins of Interpol were already laid in 1898 even though the organization was not founded until 1923. He has pioneered on this subject in his article The International Anti-Anarchist Conference of 1898 and the Origins of Interpol. The article introduces the conference and its influence on the European police culture. My interest in the long historical development of anti-terrorism has given the AAC of Rome a significant role in this study. The history of international police counter-terrorism has not been widely studied. A few researchers have looked at either the Anti-Anarchist Conference or Interpol. Scholars who have been important for this study are Malcolm Anderson, Mathieu Deflem, Bruce
11 12

Deflem, 2005. Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006, viii.

Hoffman, Hsi-Huey Liang, and Francesco Tamburini. Their analyses form a basis for my own observations. Richard Jensens earlier mentioned article is cited by all the scholars listed above. 13 My own work is also based on his conclusion that the basis for Interpol actually was formed twenty-five years before the creation of the organization. This is a strong proposition, because even today, on homepage of Interpol, the conference of Monaco in 1914 is referred to as the starting point of the organization. Additionally, the actual foundation of the organization did not occur before 1923. There are also other propositions for the antecedents of Interpol. The 1904 international convention against white slavery is mentioned by Mathieu Deflem, and also by Jean Npote, former secretary general of Interpol (from 1963 to 1978). Npote lists also other international conventions: the 1910 convention against pornographic publications, the 1912 convention against opium traffic, and the 1929 convention against currency counterfeiting. His argument was that all of these [ ] helped to articulate the problems and point the way to solutions that were ultimately to be found with the establishment of Interpol. 14 Mathieu Deflem has written several articles relating both to the Anti-Anarchist Conference and to Interpol. His approach is sociological, and he brings out important questions concerning the development of the autonomy of the police and anti-terrorism. These have been valid for my study. Deflem has related the notion of depoliticizing to both the AAC and to Interpol. 15 Francesco Tamburinis article La Conferenza internazionale di Roma per la difesa sociale contro gli anarchici (24 novembre-21 dicembre 1898) is valid because it gives a detailed view of the AAC and provides with new viewpoints to Jensens article and its suggestions. Not much research has been done on Interpol. According to Michael Fooner, one reason for the lack of research on Interpol is an incident in the mid-1970s, known as the Hubbard Story. Lafayette Ronald Hubbard, founder of the Church of Scientology, managed to spread misleading, negative information about the organization, and thus to create damage to scholarship in this field that was visible even ten years after the
13 14 15

And by others such as Emsley, 1997 and Fijnaut, 1997. Fooner, 1989, 19. Deflem, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006.

episode. The existence of the deceptive material has made scholars give up the research of the subject. Fooners worry is still in 1989 that these misleading resource materials are still at libraries, [ ] waiting to be used by unwary scholars if they should turn to the subject.16 The studies on Interpol that provide with basic information of the organization, Malcolm Andersons Policing the World. Interpol and the Politics of International Police Co-operation and Michael Fooners Interpol Issues in World Crime and International Criminal Justice both date to 1989. In his work, Anderson examines the organization and discusses the politics of international police cooperation. As Andersons, Michael Fooners research is extensive and substantial basic research on the organization. His study has been a very important source for my knowledge on Interpol. Nonetheless, it is somehow problematic. Fooner presents the organization accurately and analyzes it in a historical context. He also notices issues such as the U.S. relationship with the organization and thus sees well the external influences that have affected Interpol. What I find problematic in this study is its lack of criticism and questioning. Michael Fooner presents the history, structure and functioning of Interpol as it was and does not ask the question why. The reason for this could be seen in his pioneering position in the work ever written on Interpol. The other problem that relates to this study from my point of view is that unluckily it was published already in 1989 and thus does not cover the years this study concentrates on. In my opinion, the greatest changes in the Interpol response to terrorism occurred around 1998, which is why I mostly rely on Mathieu Deflems analysis on the latest developments in Interpol. Another examination of the development of the organization has been written by Fenton Bresler, however this book represents something in between a novel and a research. Regrettably few studies exist on the subject of international police cooperation. HsiHuey Liang provides with a historical approach on the modern law enforcement in his book The Rise of Modern Police and the European State System from Metternich to the Second World War. This book gives a long-term perspective of the origins of the modern police system. An important view on the subject of study is presented in Peter Andreas and Ethan Nadelmanns book Policing the Globe: Criminalization and Crime Control in International Relations. Andreas and Nadelmann challenge the predominant
16

Fooner, 1989, 12-15.

functionalist narrative about the internationalization of the police as a result of the globalization of crime and give a historical perspective to the phenomenon. Terrorism has been a much more popular field of research. Bruce Hoffmans vast study Inside Terrorism has provided me with vital information on the history of terrorism. As it happens, the study was written in 1998, so it gives a good picture of the way the terrorist threat was seen the year when Interpol made its changes of policy discussed in this paper. Michael Collyer and John Gray have made interesting remarks on the parallels of the anarchist threat in the late nineteenth century and the terrorist threat in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Michael Collyer contrasts the changes in the British migration/ anti-terrorist legislation in response to the terrorist activities of the anarchists in late nineteenth century and the Islamists recently in his article Secret Agents: Anarchists, Islamists and responses to politically active refugees in London (2005). His compares the political responses of the two periods as I concentrate on the responses made in the context of international police cooperation. 17 His approach is interesting and he makes notes that are valid also to my question of study. John Grays book Al Qaeda and What it Means to be Modern tackles the question of todays terrorism and suggests that terrorism actually is a by-product of modernity and draws important parts of its ideology from the Western world. He claims that The intellectual roots of radical Islam are in the European Counter-Enlightenment. 18 According to Gray, many ideas of todays radical Islam have been borrowed from the European anarchists of late nineteenth century.19

1.3. Sources

My sources include the final propositions of the Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome 1898 and the resolutions about terrorism by Interpol. These documents are made for different purposes, but still are in my opinion comparable. Both the resolutions made by
17 18 19

Collyer, 2005. Gray, 2003, 25. Gray, 2003, 24.

Interpol and the final propositions of the Anti-Anarchist Conference have been prepared internationally. All the words included in the documents have been pondered carefully and are the results of many compromises. The document on the final propositions of the Rome conference was declared secret. It has now been published in a vast book Early Writings on Terrorism by Ruth Kinna (2006). This edition contains a copy of the original document that is found at the National Archive (Archivio di Stata) of Rome. 20 The document was originally published in French in three hundred copies that were distributed exclusively to the participants of the conference and European chancelleries. I have not visited the archive in Rome, but I do possess copies of the program of the conference and the suggestions for the final propositions and also the amendments that some countries have made. These documents are found at the National Archive of the United Kingdom 21, and contain a lot of information that would be worth a wider study. In this study, the process of the making of the final propositions is not discussed, since the aim of this study is not to evaluate the process, but to discuss the eventual representation of the propositions. It is interesting to see what are the words and phrases that have been accepted by various countries of differing interests; in the case of the Anti-Anarchist Conference twenty-one European countries and in the case of Interpol a number of countries that has been growing throughout its history from 1923 onward and is now at 186 member states. It is important to remark that even though the resolutions made by Interpol in its General Assembly meetings each year have been made public, and published, nowadays also online, the resolutions made by the Anti-Anarchist Conference were considered top secret. In both cases the outcome needed to conform with the wished of the ones participating in their making. In the case of Interpol, in addition, the writers had a wide audience to think about. In contrast to the Interpol resolutions published online, the propositions of the AAC were written as a treaty between the participant countries and were kept secret from the public. In order to justifiably compare the two different types of documents, this must be kept in mind.
20 21

Jensen, 1981, Tamburini, 1997. Correspondence, FO 881/ 7179, The National Archives, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, TW9 4DU.

10

Notwithstanding, there are also prominent similarities between the sources examined: both are written as declarations and are well prepared. The purpose of the documents is to bind the countries that have been participating in their preparation. However, Interpol has only a limited authority regarding to national police, as most international bodies 22 and in fact the AAC had none; its decisions were non-binding. Therefore, at the same time as the resolutions are analyzed, it must be kept in mind that they have not necessarily been applied accordingly. Both the Interpol resolutions and the final propositions of the AAC are the result of long negotiations between countries of notably different political conditions. All of the sources evaluated are also the product of their own time; an issue that could cause some difficulties for the analysis. Even though one could think that this could undermine the whole starting point of the study, I do not find this to be a problem. It is something that has to be taken into consideration, but it is also a problem that every person writing about the past has to face; irrespective of the scope of time dealt with.

22

Liang, 1992, 14.

11

2. Depoliticization
International police cooperation is a mix of two different types of police sometimes known as the high and low police 23, the political and criminal police. Usually it is considered as an extension to national criminal police, but at least the Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome dealt with issues of highly political nature. 24 The concepts of high (political) and low (criminal) police clearly show the differences between the AAC of Rome and Interpol: Interpol has more clearly been representing the low police as the AAC seems to have had more features of the high police. Whereas the low police usually seeks to prosecute and condemn the criminals, the aim of the work of the high police is to collect intelligence and to disrupt the illegal activities of the adversaries. 25 The high police are more likely to act extralegally, 26 something that might have ensued from the propositions of the AAC. A clear example of the dissimilarities of the two approaches can be drawn from what Andreas and Nadelmann have noted:
The most concentrated international police efforts were reserved, however, for the Bolsheviks, who provided much the same spark for international police collaboration that the anarchists had before the war [World War I]. [] Politically motivated crimes and investigations continued to influence the evolution of police cooperation in Europe during the 1930s. Interpols channels were generally closed to communications in this area, so police and security officials charged with surveillance of Bolsheviks and other political adversaries maintained direct contacts with one another. 27

Despite these differences, both Interpol and the AAC apparently had a similar goal: to tackle terrorism in the most acceptable way possible, something that resulted, as I argue, in the depoliticization and, respectively, criminalization of the phenomenon. Depoliticization in the case is understood as an effort to negate the political and wider social motivations of the anarchist and terrorist groups.
23 24

Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006, 61. Political policing is generally directed at those individuals who challenge (or are perceived to

challenge) the legitimacy and rules of a regime in ways not acceptable to the regime.Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006, 62. This definition is of course wide, but it is clear that anarchist actions can be put under it. In some cases the terrorists today might also be subjected to political policing.
25 26 27

Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006, 62. Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006, 63. Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006, 92-93.

12

The concept of depoliticization is frequently used in this study and needs to be clarified. What makes this task challenging is the extreme ambiguity of the concept. 28 This chapter aspires to elucidate the interpretation of the concept in the framework of this paper. The concept of depoliticization can be used for various purposes. Besides an official act performed by a government it can be brought about by the media (e.g. depoliticizing a conflict) or by actors such as the AAC and Interpol on a certain issue. It can also be understood as a process in the society.29 Depoliticizing in the case of Interpol and the AAC meant that the ideology behind the terrorist actions was put aside and the criminal nature of the acts was emphasized. Terrorism was depoliticized by breaking terrorist acts down into their constituent parts, so that their criminal elements could be identified and subjected to police investigations.30 Understanding terrorism separate from its ideological motivations, enables to consider it criminal. This way terrorism can be separated from politics. Repoliticizing is the opposite: by underlining the political nature of terrorist acts, acts usually perceived as criminal, are given justification by their supporters. An online dictionary defines depoliticization and depoliticizing equally and in a straightforward manner:
To remove the political aspect from; remove from political influence or control. 31

Both of these different connotations are present in the subject of study. Anarchism and terrorism were removed from political control when governments decided they should be addressed on the international level. However, the implication more central to the study is to remove the political aspect from, the issue plunged into in this paper when examining the anti-anarchism of the AAC of Rome and the anti-terrorism of Interpol. In general, something depoliticized is interpreted as politically neutral. 32 It could also be perceived as the opposite of politicization. Kari Palonen clarifies the meaning of politicization by comparing it with politicking.
28 29 30 31 32

[] lextrme ambigut du concept [] Vedel, 1962, 5. http://www.thefreedictionary.com/depoliticization. Deflem, 2006. http://www.thefreedictionary.com/depoliticisation, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/depoliticize. Turner, 1989, 550.

13

In Weberian terms I consider politicking as the search for new power shares within an existing polity, while politicisation concerns the redistribution of such shares in a politycomplex in a manner that opens new Spielrume for politicking.33

Depoliticization thus removes an issue from the sweep of political. This relates also to the subjecting of anarchism and terrorism to the control of the police, moreover, the international police cooperation. The concept of depoliticization is used in this study in a manner that differs from its traditional use. Depoliticization in the context of this study is used to describe the outcome of the act of depoliticizing. The concept is thus not applied to describe a passive phenomenon and a reality in the society as in the 1960s, 34 but a deliberative act. Examples of the use of the strategy of depoliticizing can be found in history. It has been stated that modern liberalism was founded on the depoliticization of religion as a result of the wars on religion.35 At the beginning of the 1960s, depoliticization referred to a passive phenomenon. There was a fear and assumption of the depoliticization of the society in some Western European countries.36 At the time this signified a threat. 37 Contemporaries characterized the phenomenon as the erosion of ideology.38 It was distinguished from the contrary of politicization, politicization regarded institutions and depoliticization persons. 39 It was specified that there was a difference between depoliticization and the organized depoliticization, meaning the effort to diminish the interests of citizens toward large public issues.40 Moreover, a distinction was made between depoliticization and apolitical: when the term depoliticization is used, it refers to a decline or decrease in the political, as apolitical signifies an absence of political. This decline could have occurred in various issues. These issues included for instance the participation in the party
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

Palonen, 2003. Himmelstrand, 1961; Vedel, 1962. Turner, 1989, 555. Himmelstrand, 1961; Vedel, 1962, 8. Vedel, 1962, 11. Himmelstrand, 1961, 2. Vedel, 1962, 12. Vedel, 1962, 17.

14

politics or elections or the interest in the political decisions

and debates. 41

Himmelstrand described depoliticization in the following manner in 1961:

Depoliticization implies a transformation of political ideologies into a fairly unified political technology based on a widespread consensus as to what kind of goals one should try to attain. In this transformation a necessary element seems to be the gradual redistribution in the political debate of various types of content. Issues with factual, technical or economical implications become more frequent and references to values prominent in traditional political ideologies more scarce. [] It seems, then, that there are at least two dimensions of depoliticization: one which can be expressed as a ratio of issues with factual , technical and economical implications over all issues appearing in the political debate, and another dimension which can be defined as the degree of dissociation between references to ideological values and the discussion of practical, political problems.
42

Depoliticization was differentiated from depoliticizing as well, the first being passive and the second active. Depoliticization was always something lamentable. What the views of the 1960s had in common, was this pejorative approach to the phenomenon. In this study, the above distinction is not made, since the use of the term depoliticization in the manner it was applied in the 1960s is no longer prevalent. In the context of this study, depoliticization is used as a synonym to criminalization, an employment adopted by Mathieu Deflem.43 He sees that the depoliticizing, or criminalization of terrorism is accomplished by defining terrorism very vaguely (a crime against humanity) and/or by identifying and isolating the distinctly criminal elements (bombings, killings) from terrorist incidents. Depoliticization can also be understood as the transfer of functions commonly thought as political to organs that are (at least to some extent) remote from political control. 44 Buller and Flinders have argued: This may involve the creation of decision-making arenas that are theoretically insulated from political pressures or the adoption of rule-

41 42 43

Vedel, 1962, 37. Himmelstrand, 1961, 9. E.g. In terms of the objectives of social control, the bureaucratization of policing involves most

noticeably a de-politicization of the target of counter-terrorism. This criminalization of terrorism is accomplished by defining terrorism very vaguely (a crime against humanity) and/or by identifying and isolating the distinctly criminal elements (bombings, killings) from terrorist incidents. Deflem, 2006.
44

Buller and Flinders, 2005.

15

based systems that remove or significantly diminish the discretion of politicians. 45 An example of this is the transferring of law enforcement tasks to an international arena. However, in the cases of the AAC and Interpol, the transfer was only spurious; the actual decision-making power resided with the national governments as the decisions of the conference and of Interpol were not binding. In a self-contradictory manner, the act of depoliticizing is thus an extremely political act. It can be used by the state in a situation of crisis when the intervention of the state is justified by the national interest. Depoliticization is occasionally used to describe governmental action and something executed nationally. National depoliticization can be divided into three different tactics: 1. Institutional depoliticization, where politicians give the broad framework of action and a relative amount of freedom to specialists or businessmen in order to provide independence from short-term political considerations such as vote seeking. This can be reasoned with arguments such as the need for profound knowledge and operational flexibility. These grounds have been used when tasks usually managed by the public sector are delegated into the private sector. 2. Rule-based depoliticization involves the adoption of a policy that builds explicit rules into the decision-making process, which by its very nature minimizes the need for political discretion or choice. This has been used for instance to govern the monetary policy. 3. Preference shaping depoliticization uses [] ideological or rhetorical claims in order to justify a political position that a certain issue or function does, or should, lie beyond the scope of politics or the capacity for state control. This tactic attempts to shape the public expectations about the capacity of the state and the responsibilities of politicians. 46 Anarchism and terrorism were in fact depoliticized twice in the course of the events that led to the declarations of the AAC of Rome in 1898 and Interpol in 1998. This was first executed prior to the meetings had even materialized, when it was decided by governments that the issues should be dealt with internationally and by the representatives of the police instead of those of governments. This represents the institutional depoliticization.
45 46

Buller and Flinders, 2005. Buller and Flinders, 2005.

16

Flinders and Buller argue that depoliticization should be referred to as arena-shifting:

[] decisions are made no less political by delegating them to an independent body or making them according to a rule-based framework. In reality politics is transferred to a new arena. []While politicians may seek to insulate certain issues from the political domain, it is unlikely that the wider public of that polity will accept that a certain issue is no longer political. It is clear from past experience that if an issue becomes politically salient in the eyes of the public it will make little difference to the public whether the policy is the responsibility of a state-owned company, an independent regulator or a quasi-autonomous agency. 47

This kind of depoliticization raises the question of accountability, when issues previously managed by democratically elected politicians are transferred to organs under no democratic surveillance. Depoliticization can thus protect the government from the consequences of unpopular policies. However, the depoliticization that is discussed in this study was not implemented in the manner the term is often understood. The depoliticization in the AAC and Interpol was done by defining issues commonly considered political as non-political. Depoliticization was thus not undertaken by the police in order to wash their hands from these issues, and leave them for others to administer. On the contrary, it enabled law enforcement to act against anarchism and terrorism, through the use of criminal investigation.

47

Buller and Flinders, 2005.

17

3. The International Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome 1898

In the decades preceding the First World War, European countries were desperate to find the measures to control and suppress the most feared enemy of the time: anarchist terrorism. In the course of the 1890s sixty people were killed and some two hundred wounded in incidents that were claimed to have been organized by anarchists. 48 At first, the means to fight anarchist terrorism were sought for at the national level, but it soon became evident that international cooperation would be required in order to succeed in the suppression.49 According to Mathieu Deflem, the reason for the increasing interest for international police cooperation was the bureaucratization of law enforcement institutions throughout the Western world. His theory holds that the more autonomy police institutions get from the governments, the more opportunity there is for international collaboration among national police institutions. 50 With more autonomy, the work of the police concentrates on the practical side of the suppression of crime. Hence it becomes easier to find international approval for the measures. Mathieu Deflem states that [] International police cooperation for purposes of criminal enforcement, such as they continue to exist until this day, have origins in distinctly political efforts. 51 In the late nineteenth century, when international police cooperation was emerging, it first seemed that the cooperation would not rely on principles of international law, and would not focus on political crimes. In this context, it was surprising that the first step that was taken toward more organized international police cooperation was attempted on such highly political issue as anarchism. 52

48 49 50 51 52

Deflem, 2002. Jensen, 1981. Deflem, 2002. Deflem, 2005. Deflem, 2005; Fijnaut mentiones that the conference was organized to discuss how to combat

revolutionary violence from anarchists, Communists and others. Fijnaut, 1997, 110. The fact that the fight included communists and others is not explicated and the only reference in this paragraph is the work of Jensen, 1981.

18

Nevertheless, the outcome of the conference was concentrated on criminal matters and not on the political aspects of anarchism. 53 The murder of the Empress of Austria, Elizabeth, on 10 September 1898, caused, as Richard Bach Jensen has summed it, a wave of hysteria 54 across Europe. The Austrian foreign minister Count Goluchowsky referred to anarchists as wild beasts without nationality, who were a menace not only to sovereign rulers but to all persons and all private property.55 The assassin of the Empress was a young Italian anarchist, Luigi Lucheni. The press published the news, and the course of events led to wide-spread riots against Italy. The Italian government was alarmed, and its anxiety grew, as the French and Russian authorities claimed that the killing of the Empress was only the beginning of a wider anarchist plot. They gave warning that the next head of state menaced would be the King of Italy, Umberto I, himself. 56 The claimed existence of an anarchist conspiracy suited well the press, that got more sensational headlines and, above all, the police and the government that used it for the restrictions of civil liberties, the press and the rights of association.57 The ruling class in Italy viewed anarchism and the anarchist attacks one of the most important enemies that needed to be exterminated. 58 Italy also wanted to assure Europe that it was serious about fighting against anarchism, in a situation where a large part of the attackers were Italian. 59 The press had regularly been calling for extreme measures against the anarchist threat, and after almost every anarchist attempt, there was demands for a joint international cooperation against anarchism.60 In this situation, Rome decided to call for a European-wide Anti-Anarchist Conference. England was the last of the great powers to decide to join the conference.
61

53 54 55 56

Deflem, 2005. Jensen, 1981, 325. Cited in Liang, 1992, 160. Jensen, 1981, 325 and Tamburini, 1997, 230; However, the anarchist community was not a whole. E.g. Tamburini, 2000, 45. Tamburini, 1997, 230. Tamburini, 1997, 230. Tamburini, 2000, 45. Tamburini, 1997, 228-229. Jensen, 326.; The British Government also had been pressured to act by France and Russia, where the

only a small group of anarchists had subscribed to the killing of the Empress. Tamburini, 2000, 45.
57 58 59 60 61

heads of state had recently been assassinated by individuals linked to London. Collyer, 2005, 287.

19

The secretly held62 International Conference of Rome for the Social Defence Against Anarchists was opened on November 24, 1898, and it was attended by the representatives of twenty-one European countries. 63 The secrecy was so total, that some historians almost a century later have even claimed that the conference was never organized.64 The objective of the conference was to devise and to put into practice a common defense system against anarchist acts and against the propagation of anarchist theories.65 The fact that countries with very different ideologies, such as France, England, the German Empire, and Switzerland,66 took part in the conference shows the wide international acceptance for the importance for such a gathering to be organized. 67 Most of the participants were government representatives, but also national police heads of Russia, France and Belgium and municipal police chiefs of Berlin, Vienna and Stockholm were present. The delegates discussed the following topics: the formulation of an appropriate concept of anarchism, legislative measures against anarchism, and the development of international anti-anarchist law enforcement measures. 68 The final

62 63

Tamburini, 1997, 227. Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, the Principality

of Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Sweden and Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey. PROPOSITIONS arrtes par la Confrence internationale runie Rome sur linitiative du Gouvernement Italien en vue dtudier et dtablir les moyens les plus efficacies pour combattre la propaganda anarchique et soumises par elle lappreciation des Gouvernements qui sy trouvaient reprsents. Rome, December 21, 1898. Published in Kinna, 2006, 328-329. (Henceforth referred to as the final propositions of the AAC of Rome 1898.)
64 65

Tamburini, 1997, 228; Jensen, 1981, 323. The final propositions of the AAC of Rome, 1898.

More about the fight against anarchist propaganda in the chapter The International Anti-anarchist Conference of Rome.
66

France and Switzerland had changed their policy of providing asylum for political expatriates in the

1890s because of the growing fear of anarchist danger. On the contrary, all immigrants could access the United Kingdom freely during the period between 1826 and 1905. Extradition for political reasons was not possible. Di Paola, 2007, 190.
67 68

Deflem, 2005.

Deflem, 2005 and Jensen, 1981.

20

propositions were signed by all attendants except for the Great Britain, 69 a country that had a long tradition of being the liberal asylum for political criminals. 70

69 70

Tamburini, 1997, 250. Di Paola, 2007.

21

4. Interpol

4.1. The debated origins of Interpol

As I learned about Interpol, some puzzling aspects surfaced. It is a police organization without police powers; it is an international governmental organization without a founding treaty or convention to establish its legitimacy formally. But then again, the organization is marked by a surprising spirit of voluntary cooperation and harmony among a dissimilar and divergent group of races, religions, creeds, political persuasions, and cultural levels. 71

Criminals do not stop at national borders, why should police organizations? 72 Both international crime and international law enforcement expanded during the decades prior to the First World War.73 The International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC) nowadays known as the International Criminal Police Organization Interpol,
74

was

founded in Vienna in 1923, which makes it a quarter century older than the United Nations. It is an intergovernmental organization that is considerably little known, despite its status as the worlds oldest still active organ of international cooperation. Its objective was and has been to prevent and stop international crime. Some twenty countries were represented in the Vienna conference in 1923 held to discuss the issue of international crime, particularly drug trade. The delegates decided to create an organization through which this could be facilitated. 75 The basic idea of the functioning of the organization is to have in each member state central police offices

71 72

Fooner, 1989, 12. However, as James Sheptycki notes: In popular language, as well as a good deal of the more studied

discourses of academic criminologists, there is a commonly held idea that our globalizing world has produced transnational criminals of various stripes and that there is therefore an established need to develop transnational policing. - - - transnational police institutions and their object (transnational crime) have been constructed on the basis of a simplistic worldview that depicts existence as a perpetual battle of good against evil. Sheptycki, 2007.
73 74 75

Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006, 79. http://www.interpol.int/Public/icpo/governance/sg/history.asp Fijnaut, 1997, 111.

22

that can easily communicate and cooperate.76 This is both the weakness and the strength of the organization: Interpol is as weak as the local law enforcement offices allow it to be.77 Even though Interpol was founded only 78 a quarter century after the assembly of the Anti-Anarchist Conference of 1898, the organization can be considered the descendant or at least a step-child of the Rome conference. 79 Jensen claims that the inter-European cooperation against anarchists that was first coordinated in the conference of Rome laid the basis for the future worldwide cooperation of the police under the organization of Interpol.80 However, only the formation of Interpol organized international police cooperation on a more permanent basis. 81 Commonly, the history of Interpol is considered to have begun in 1914, when the first International Criminal Police Congress was held in Monaco. 82 In the congress, police officers, lawyers and magistrates met to discuss arrest procedures, identification techniques, centralized international criminal records and extradition proceedings. 83 Present were some three hundred people from fifteen countries of Europe, Central America, North Africa and the Middle East.84 Its achievements were modest: French was chosen as the language used in international police communications and preparations for the creation of standardized procedures for police identifications were made for a future conference.85 Many consider this conference as the starting point for the creation of Interpol. The 1923 conference that established the organization officially
76 77 78

Fooner, 1989, 71. Fenton Bresler in the Interpol documentary, 2007. Interpol was not founded with an international treaty, as Fooner points out in the above quote. Its

position as an international intergovernmental organization has been established over time. (Anderson, 1989, 57). In fact, the pre-1938 ICPC can not be even called an intergovernmental organization. (Anderson, 1989, 58). The League of Nations accepted the ICPC as an advisory board in the field of crime prevention in 1933. (Fijnaut, 1997).
79 80 81 82 83 84 85

Jensen, 1981. Jensen, 1981. Deflem, 2005. Anderson, 1989, 38; http://www.interpol.int/Public/icpo/governance/sg/history.asp. http://www.interpol.int/Public/icpo/governance/sg/history.asp Fooner, 1989, 31. Liang, 1992, 154.

23

has been seen as the planned follow-up of the 1914 meeting. 86 Some of the visions that had been present in 1914, were indeed implemented in 1923. 87 However, it cannot be said that the 1923 conference continued where the 1914 conference left off. Tuija Hietaniemi has argued that the importance of the Monaco Conference to the history of law enforcement has been overestimated. It was a joint meeting of police officials of the countries within which Romanic languages were used. Northern European countries were not present even as private persons. The meeting was crowded with the French, who got train tickets for half price. Russians were also represented. Important issues for the international police cooperation were dealt with, but the most consequential matter were discussions about the systems for the identifications of criminals. 88 The Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome in 1898 was the first time in history of a professional police meeting that interested also governments. The question of whether it laid the basis for the creation of Interpol, can be debated. Malcolm Anderson (1989) has asserted:
Although it has been argued that the secret conference held in Rome in 1898 to co-ordinate international action against anarchist bomb outrages was the forerunner of Interpol, the Rome conference was more like the anti-terrorist action co-ordinated by the Trevi group established in 1997.89

Despite and because of these different views about the true origins of Interpol, in this paper, I want to look further in Jensens claim and explore the similarities between the way Interpol has been coping with terrorism in the late twentieth century and the antianarchist propositions made at the AAC of 1898.

4.2. The structure and functions of Interpol

Interpol represents the worlds largest international police organization with its 186 member countries. Its mission is to encounter international crime and to organize joint
86

The meeting was called The Second International Criminal Police Congress, to signal that it continued Fijnaut, 1997, 112. Hietaniemi, 1997, 67. My translation. Also Fijnaut points out that the results of the Monaco conference Anderson, 1989, 38.

where the Monaco meeting had left off. Fooner, 1989, 32.
87 88

were limited. Fijnaut, 1997, 109.

89

24

action even between countries that do not have official diplomatic relations. 90 It is a police institution without conventional police powers. 91 Since its foundation in 1923, the organization has been open to all who have wished to join. Nowadays its headquarters is situated in France. It has four official languages: English, French, Spanish and Arabic. 92 The organization has four main organs, three of which in the headquarters: the General Assemblywhich [] takes all the major decisions affecting general policy, the resources needed for international co-operation, working methods, finances and programs of activities.93 The Executive Committee prepares the agenda for the General Assembly meetings that take place once year and supervises that the decisions made are implemented. The General Secretariat implements the decisions. The General Secretariat works every day of the year. In addition to these three main organs, the organization consists of the National Central Bureaus (NCB), that work in each member country. Interpol can also use consultants, who can be consulted on specific issues, but who do not have voting power in the organization. 94 The organizational structure of Interpol

The decision-making process of Interpol involves that all votes are in general done with a simple majority. No country has a right of veto or more votes than others. However, this does not mean that all countries would have the same amount of power in the

90 91 92 93 94

www.interpol.int. Fooner, 1989, 90. www.interpol.int. http://www.interpol.int/Public/icpo/GeneralAssembly/default.asp. www.interpol.int.

25

organization,95 for part of the influencing occurs before the voting and unofficially. The decision-making process is not revealed in detail, because of its confidentiality. 96 On its homepage, Interpol lists its core functions: 1. To secure communication between law enforcement officials internationally, 2. To maintain a database on criminals and stolen property, 3 . To offer support in fighting crime.97 What is clearly visible also in these functions, is that Interpol is not an organ of direct action, but mostly an organ of background and support work. Operations are reserved for national law enforcement. It is also evident, that neither Interpol nor the AAC of Rome have tried to tackle the reasons behind international crime, often said to be the gap between the chances for life and the standards of living between people. 98 The field of action includes fighting drugs and organized crime, financial and high-tech crime, trafficking in human beings, and other crime areas such as genocide, war crimes, crime against humanity, environmental crimes and law enforcement corruption.
99

All

these are widely agreed to be serious crimes.100 A fundamental part of the work of the organization consists of the apprehension of fugitives and serving as a tool for the national bureaus in suppressing and preventing terrorism. 101 Interpol has not had much public attention, which has circulated rumors and suspicions about the actions of the organization. The lack of publicity partly results from the low level of financial resources devoted to international police cooperation. 102 Interpol is primarily financed through fees by member countries; each country pays an annual sum of money agreed on separately. The budget of the organization in 2007 was 44.5 million
95

Sheptycki, 2002; See also the critique for the WTO, that has the same basic structure in its decisionAnderson, 1989, 93. http://www.interpol.int/Public/icpo/about.asp. Sheptycki, 2007. www.interpol.int. Anderson, 1989, 27. www.interpol.int. Anderson writes this in 1989 (Anderson, 1989, 53), my assumption would be that at least in developed

making e.g. Jawara and Kwa, 2003.

96 97 98 99

100 101 102

nations, the amount information has considerably grown. At least the Interpol-website is available to all and well presented.

26

Euros, which as a sum is notably low when one is looking at an organization of nearly two hundred countries.103

103

http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/FactSheets/GI01.pdf.

27

5. Depoliticization of anarchism and terrorism

This chapter presents the central concepts that are used in this study, anarchism and terrorism. It seeks to provide with a point of view to the problematic nature of the use of these concepts, that even experts have not yet managed to unanimously define. The definitions show that both concepts and what is included in their definitions are inherently political. The political nature of these two phenomena gives a good basis for the analyze of the propositions of the Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome and the resolutions formulated by Interpol on terrorism. The chapter describes the ways in which the Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome in 1898 and Interpol in 1998 depoliticized anarchism and terrorism.

5.1. The political nature of anarchism and terrorism

Institutionalized discourse such as that which has fomented around the concepts of transnational crime and terrorism fix meanings regarding phenomena that are essentially dynamic conceptual categories. Once the terms of discourse are naturalized, the institutions they express are endowed with rightness and the implications of the language choices made then cascade through all other levels of our thinking. 104

This citation gives an important viewpoint to the choice of not choosing only one definition of anarchism or terrorism in this study. Both terrorism and anarchism are very difficult to define and thus to encounter, especially at the international level. James Sheptycki has argued that the idea of transnational policing [] rests upon the designation of suitable enemies who play the bad-guy counterpart to the good-guy technocratic police experts []105 The use of language of the new international of technocratic police experts simplify the threats in order to identify suitable enemies. The stereotypes of enemies represent the globally criminalized other that threatens a just and true world order. 106

104 105 106

Sheptycki, 2007, 2. Sheptycki, 2007, 11. Sheptycki, 2007, 5.

28

Definitions on terrorism and anarchism exist, but usually they are very vague. The biggest problem is that whatever the definition is, it is somehow political. This chapter introduces some of the possible definitions for anarchism and terrorism, and presents the way these concepts are used in this study. It is a political decision to choose a definition for these words. That is why I have tried to avoid it. By definition, terrorism and anarchism are political concepts. Most of the characterizations of these concepts perceive the two phenomena as inherently political. Otherwise, the definitions do not seem to have anything overarching. 6.1.1. Anarchism

We might search in vain perhaps for a better definition of anarchism than that just given by a little girl twelve years old. Asked by a person who did not know the facts, what her father was doing abroad, the little girl replied: Hes working for Anarchy. But do you know, little one what Anarchy means? O yes, it means hating God, the Government and the rich!. 107

A contemporary viewpoint on the anarchist peril gives an indication of the difficulties of defining anarchism. First of all, the definition depends on who is defining and secondly, some definitions may seem pejorative from one point of view and flattering from another. Anarchism has often been related with terrorism, even in this study. It is crucial , however, to notice the difference between the two concepts and their backgrounds. The etymology of the word anarchism dates to ancient Greek with the meaning of without rulers, absence of leader/ chief. The difference of opinion in defining anarchism lies in the way in which the action, the will to eliminate the government and the more passive ideology are emphasized, propaganda by the deed versus propaganda of the word. 108 Anarchists could be classified into two types: the philosophical and the fighting anarchists, one believing in the attainment of anarchy by the peaceful process of evolution and the other by the employment of force and revolution. 109
107 108 109

Professor G.M. Fiamingo in Kinna, 2006, vol. 2, 99. Kinna, 2006, vol. 1, xxv. Charles Merriam, 1926, cited in Borum and Tilby, 2005, 204.

29

One definition of anarchism is presented in Sen M. Sheehans book Anarchism: The etymology of the word [] signals what is distinctive about anarchism: a rejection of the need for the centralized authority of the unitary state, the only form of government most of us have ever experienced.110 A more anti-anarchist definition is found in the dictionary Facta 2001 that refers to anarchism as an ideology that struggles against all social, political and economic order of the state or society and aspires a way of life free from laws and sanctions.111 I call this definition anti-anarchist because it includes the word to struggle that brings out the idea of anarchism not only as a resistant ideology but also an ideology of straight action. Borum and Tilby write:
Although modern terrorism has its roots in the tactics of early Russian anarchists, anarchism itself is not a terrorist philosophy. Terrorism is tactic, or another way of fighting. It is distinguished from other forms of violence not only by its motive, but by how it defines a legitimate target (i.e., civilian non-combatants). Anarchistslike any extremist or activist groupmay use terrorist tactics, but most would agree that anarchism as a social philosophy certainly does not require it.112

However, as some anarchists of the nineteenth century indeed were terrorists (in this case meaning that they tried to destroy people or property), others explicitly accentuated that they did not have any role in the acts of terrorism. Hence referring to all anarchists as terrorists is not equitable. 113 Even Peter Kropotkin, one of the most important anarchist theoreticians disassociated himself from the policy of propaganda by the deed.114 Additionally, at the end of the nineteenth century, the word terrorism did not have such a sinister tone that it nowadays has. Some were indeed proud to be terrorists.115 I will not disregard the problem caused by who can be called anarchist or terrorist, and who has the power to decide this. However, in my study, this is not relevant. My interest
110 111

Sheehan, Sen M.: Anarchism, Reaktion Books, London, 2003. (Sheehan, 2003) Facta, 2001, 486. aatesuunta, joka taistelee kaikkea valtioon ja yhteiskuntaan liittyv sos., pol., ja tal. Borum and Tilby, 2005, 202. Jukka Paastela: Terrorismista ja terrorismin tutkimuksesta, in the volume Terrorismi Ilmin tausta ja Kinna, 2006, vol. 1, xxv. Herrala and Puistola, 2006, 24.

jrjestyst vastaan sek tavoittelee laista ja pakotteista vapaata elmnmuotoa. My italics.

112 113

aikalaisanalyysej, (ed. Paastela) Eurooppalaisen filosofian seura ry., Tampere 2005, 109. (Paastela, 2005)
114 115

30

is to see how anarchism and terrorism were defined political or non-political by the ones that were holding power at the AAC of Rome and in Interpol in 1998. Whether a person called anarchist by, say, the Anti-Anarchist Conference in Rome, considered him or herself anarchist is not substantial in this context.116 As the English delegation at the AAC of Rome put it:
A definition is not necessary and would be useless. We are not aspiring for an opinion. For us, the only question is this one: is there crime or not? If the act is criminal, as a murder or agitation to murder, it does not become more criminal because it originates from anarchist thought. If the act is not criminal, it does not become criminal because of the fact that it is anarchist. 117

It has to be noticed that people with very different motives and also innocent people could have been branded anarchist or terrorist. This question was raised in the AAC of Rome as the Russians wanted the definition of anarchism to include a complement: a person could be called anarchist independent of the designation they give themselves. This was not added to the final version of the proposition text. 118 The conference dealt with anarchists as a whole, and the final propositions include measures for the suppression of the ideology and not only the acts. 119 However, it is not a presumption of this study that anarchists necessarily had something to do with terrorist actions. 6.1.2. Terrorism
The concept of terrorism has, in the past, been pronounced dead, analytically useless, and only valid in the eye of the beholder. Despite all the problems, the term and concept continue to be used. This continued use, perhaps because of the lack of a viable alternative,

116
117

About the definitions of terrorism eg. Jervas, 2003, 13-22 or Walker, 2002, 21. Cited in Tamburini, 1997, 242 and in Di Paola, 2007, 90. My translation, orig. Une dfinition nest

pas ncessaire et serait inutile. Nous ne poursivons pas lopinion. Pour nous, la seule question est celle-ci: y a-t-il crime, oui ou non? Si lacte est criminel, tel que meurtre ou lexitation au meurtre, il ne le devient pas davantage par le fait quil provient de lanarchisme. Sil nest pas criminel, in ne le devient pas par le fait quil est anarchique.
118

Tamburini, 1997, 241. Orig. Quelle que soit la dsignation quils se donnent eux-mmes My Eg. the hindering of the distribution of anarchist propaganda can be seen as a means to prevent

translation.
119

anarchist terrorism but also as a means to restrain the spread of anarchist ideology.

31

suggests that the term does seem to be able and useful to describe or denote a social phenomenon.120

The concept of terrorism is used also in this study, despite all the difficulties that are related to it. This paragraph presents some possible definitions of terrorism and clarifies why none of these can be used to define terrorism here. Terrorism has various definitions, among the most common could be listed the one found at the English Wikipedia: acts which are intended to create fear or "terror", are perpetrated for an ideological goal and deliberately target non-combatants. 121 The United Nations has not defined terrorism, but it often uses the definition written by Alex P. Schmid that is accepted also by many social scientists
Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-) clandestine individual, group or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal or political reasons, whereby in contrast to assassination the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought (Schmid, 1988).122

The United Nations short legal definition, also proposed by Schmid is: an act of terrorism is the "peacetime equivalent of a war crime. 123 The variety of different types of terrorism can be classified to three categories: statesponsored terrorism, popular or national-liberation-movement terrorism and radicalminority terrorism.124 What distinguishes terrorism from ordinary crimes is the ideological motivation: the incentive for ordinary crimes is usually the seek for personal gain. For example, according to The Institute for Counter-terrorism (ICT) the
120 121 122 123 124

Duyvesteyn, 2004, 440. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorism, version: 17:36, 23 May 2007. http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html Anderson, 1989, 128.

32

most important difference between terrorism and what might be perceived as ordinary crime is that
A terrorist is motivated by a higher cause or ideology that is greater than his or her personal motivations or gains. He or she acts for the furtherance of that external cause (whether it be a localized secessionist movement or global jihad) and the benefit this has to both the cause and the people of it.125

A terrorist seeks benefit not only for him or herself, but also for the cause and/or the community that supports it. A terrorist might also be glorified for his or her actions; something that ordinary criminals rarely receive. 126 An extensive description of terrorism is given by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT):
For the purposes of this database (of MIPT), terrorism is defined by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of the cause. Terrorism is violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm. These acts are designed to coerce others into actions they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they desired to take. All terrorist acts are crimes. Many would also be violation of the rules of war if a state of war existed. This violence or threat of violence is generally directed against civilian targets. The motives of all terrorists are political, and terrorist actions are generally carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity. Unlike other criminal acts, terrorists often claim credit for their acts. Finally, terrorist acts are intended to produce effects beyond the immediate physical damage of the cause, having long-term psychological repercussions on a particular target audience. The fear created by terrorists may be intended to cause people to exaggerate the strengths of the terrorist and the importance of the cause, to provoke governmental overreaction, to discourage dissent, or simply to intimidate and thereby enforce compliance with their demands.127

A study by Alex Schmid (1988) compared a large number of existing definitions of terrorism. Violence was mentioned in 80 percent of the studied definitions, political in 65 percent and fear or terror in 51 percent. This shows how difficult it is to find an accurate and acceptable definition of terrorism. 128 What is noteworthy is that criminal as a definitional element was only present in 6 percent of the 109 definitions studied. 129 In a basic typology, terrorism is divided into three types: political, criminal, and

125 126 127 128 129

Ganor and Conte, 2005. Ganor and Conte, 2005. http://www.tkb.org/RandSummary.jsp?page=about, Referred to in Duyvesteyn, 2004, 440. Jongman, Schmid et al., 1988, 5-6.

33

idiosyncratic.130 This has been the element Interpol has been concentrating on for the last ten years, when it has depoliticized terrorism. Scholars have conflicting opinions on the two different possible conceptual approaches to terrorism. It is conceivable to judge a terrorist act as an act of warfare or as a criminal act. By considering terrorism as a crime, it is necessary to treat it like one; to gather evidence, arrest the perpetrators, and put them on trial. This kind of approach (as that of Interpol) may pose problems for international cooperation and is not applicable is cases the terrorist act is executed by a distant organization or a country. To consider terrorism as warfare the importance of individual guilt is less relevant and the focus is on the proper identification of the enemy. In contrast, by treating terrorism as an ordinary crime, the possibility of treating criminals differently for political reasons is prevented.131 There also are scholars, who see that an act of terrorism is exclusively criminal an illegitimate act of warfare. Nonetheless, some terrorist violence can become legitimate or even heroic in among people. This can occur in case what started as a rebellion succeeds and the former rebellions establish a new form of government. 132 What the latest events seem to suggest is that both the warfare and criminal approaches have been used as the basis for anti-terrorist actions. For instance, the ongoing work of Interpol represents the criminal approach and the unfinished wars in Iraq and Afghanistan the warfare approach. Bruce Hoffman notes the differences between a criminal act and a terrorist act that may seem very similar. A criminal is acting for selfish reasons and his act is not [] designed or intended to have consequences or create psychological repercussions beyond the act itself.133 A criminal is not aiming at affecting the public opinion or transmitting a message with his act.
134

Hoffman thus

underlines the political nature of a terrorist act, which is of course in blatant contrast

130 131 132 133 134

Schmid and de Graaf in Jongman, Schmid et al., 1988, 48. Ganor and Conte, 2005. Anderson, 1989, 128. Hoffman, 1998, 41. Hoffman, 1998, 42.

34

with the act of depoliticization done by Interpol. He cites a statement that a terrorist without a cause (at least in his own mind) is not a terrorist. 135 Internationally, the regulation of terrorism (under this name) dates back to a convention adopted by the League of Nations on the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism(1937). According to Mathieu Deflem (2006), the convention of the League of Nations did not get much international support. Since then, international policies on terrorism usually have focused on specific elements that constitute terrorism (plane hijackings, bombings, hostage taking), a means to depoliticize the phenomenon and to facilitate international cooperation. Most counterterrorist strategies on the international level are about effectively sharing the information among states. 136 Terrorism does not represent a populous phenomenon on world scale, according to Interpols calculations an estimated thousand people were considered active terrorists in 1989.137 Supposedly, the number has grown, but still, the deaths caused by terrorist attacks are so small in number138 that terrorism would not be a notable issue on world scale, if it would not create so much insecurity and get so much public attention. 139
Nonetheless, it is equally clear that there has been a tendency to exaggerate the dimensions of the threat and the strategic impact that terrorist violence has actually wrought. By overreacting and falling prey to a sense of acute fear and intimidation, the terrorists power is disproportionately inflated in ways that are both counterproductive and often completely divorced from reality.140
135 136 137 138

Konrad Kellen, cited in Hoffman, 1998, 43. Deflem, 2006. Fooner, 1989, 9. 1,0007,000 yearly deaths compared eg.with the 3.9 million deaths caused by influenza every year. N.B. The Evening News on Monday, December 17, 1894 estimates the number of anarchists in London

Richard Jackson in Wolfendale, 2006, 755.

139

being around 8000. This can put the significance of the phenomenon into perspective comparing to the amount of terrorists today.
140

Hoffman, 2001, 418. Unfortunately, this comment was followed by a note soon to be found erroneous

(the article was published in September 2001): Americas current preoccupation with Osama bin Laden and attendanthowever inadvertent lionization of his stature and power is arguably such a case in point. Despite his vast wealth and alleged legions of minions, it is hardly likely that bin Laden could ever hope to vanquish the U.S. military, overthrow the government, or achieve any fundamental political changes in American foreign or domestic policy. Yet, this single individual is held in fear and accorded a stature far in excess of his specific

35

5.2. The Anti-Anarchist Conference and depoliticization

The Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome in 1898 was held in a situation of political turmoil created by anarchist activities in Europe. The aim of the conference was to create and facilitate international police cooperation among the participating states. It gathered decision makers and authorities to discuss the anarchist peril in colloquies that were organized from the 24 November until 21 December 1898. 141 The conference in Rome and its follower, the conference of St. Petersburg in 1904, managed to create a more formal ground for the practical police cooperation that had existed throughout the nineteenth century. The conference was a break-through in some areas of international cooperation and was the first organized international event of this sort. The international network of law enforcement offices had existed already before 1898.142 At the beginning of the conference, the participants agreed on policies of the decision-making. It was decided that every delegation should have one vote, irrespective of the number of delegates and that the process. Additionally, the attendants agreed that the outcomes of the conference would be kept secret. 143 Even though all participants saw the conference as a significant event, the political aspects that are related to the fight against anarchism were sensitive. The invitation to the conference was carefully made to emphasize the practical side of the police actions against anarchism, and it explicitly stated that technical and administrative staff were invited.144

capabilities and unique accumulation of financial resources or even what one human being could conceivably wield over a long-established nation-state, much less the globes sole superpower.
141 142

Jensen, 1981. Deflem, 2002, 70-77, Deflem, 2005. Tamburini, 1997, 243. There had even been a previous call for an

international conference against nihilism by Russia after the assassination of the Tsar in 1881. Di Paola, 2007, 191.
143 144

Final propositions of the AAC of Rome 1898. Liang, 1992, 162.

36

The conference in Rome along with the one held in St. Petersburg intensified the level of police cooperation in Europe. The significance of this was not apparent in large issues, but as the first step toward a more intense partnership, the conference did succeed. For instance new anti-anarchist intelligence bureaus were set up in several of the states that had participated. 145 The concentration on the low level of operation led to the partial success of the antianarchist treaties of Rome and St. Petersburg. The police officials met separately from the government representatives in informal meetings, and discussed the practical side of the exchange of information.146 As Mathieu Deflem writes:
The success of the administrative means of the international fight against anarchism, in other words, was enabled because of the attained level of expertise and professionalism in police institutions rather than because of any willingness on the part of the governments of national states to legislate anti-anarchist policies. 147

Among the other achievements of the conference were two clauses that applied to all criminal activity, not only anarchism. 148 These included the portrait parl and the Belgian clause of extradition. The portrait parl was a system for the identification of criminals by their physical traits. These were applied in the legislation of several countries after the conference. 149 The formal depoliticization of anarchism led to a comprehensive participation and promises of alterations in national legislations, but only a small number of countries took action based on the provisions of the conference. 150 The treaty that was prepared had to be ratified at national level. Only then did the international and national interests collide in a critical manner. The protection of national interests affected the fate of the decisions made at the conference. It also led to a situation where the location of the planned central bureau for the coordination of information could not be decided. Thus
145 146 147 148 149

Deflem, 2005. Deflem, 2005. Deflem, 2005. Deflem, 2005. As Jensen writes the triumph of anthropometry [] proved to be short-lived but the portrait parl

file adapted from Bertillons system is still employed by [] Interpol. Jensen, 1981, 334; Deflem, 2005 and Jensen, 1981, 331-333.
150

Deflem, 2005 and Tamburini, 1997, 253.

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the original plan of one office that would be connected to the national central bureaus (a system that is currently used in Interpol) contracted to a significantly less ambitious system where the exchange of information among the participating countries was facilitated.151 As Richard Bach Jensen states national self-interests and rivalries edged out international concerns.152 Considerations of political advantage played a key role in the outcome of the conference. Francesco Tamburini has argued that the several cases where a head of a state was murdered, or his life was menaced by an anarchist between 1898 and 1914, symbolize the failure of the Rome Conference.153 According to him, the lack of success was both on the diplomatic and the practical level. 154 The fact that England did not sign the final propositions, was at least a practical failure, since many of the anarchists who were considered as the biggest threat to European security dwelled in the safe and liberal Britain. 155 Thus, there is no answer to the question whether the Conference of Rome was a failure or a success. The later development suggests that neither view provides a comprehensive picture of the totality. The conference was criticized by contemporaries. The socialists feared for strict measures against their thought.156 The anarchist criticism wanted attention to be paid at the social conditions in Italy as the cause for the rise of anarchism. Characteristically, this critique was expressed and published abroad.157

6.2.1. The final propositions of the AAC of Rome

The Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome in 1898 sketched a protocol that was signed by all the attendants, except for the representatives of the British government. 158 The protocol includes the definition of anarchism, guidance to the participating countries
151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158

Deflem, 2005. Jensen, 1981. Tamburini, 1997, 261. Tamburini, 2000, 48. Di Paola, 2007, 190. Tamburini, 1997, 234. Tamburini, 1997, 235. Deflem, 2005 and the final propositions of the AAC of Rome 1898.

38

e.g. for the required changes of legislation and for the securing of more effective surveillance of anarchists in the participating states. The conference was followed by a second anti-anarchist meeting in St. Petersburg in 1904, stimulated by Russian authorities and the assassination of U.S. President McKinley by an anarchist in 1901. The final propositions of the AAC of Rome consist of three pages. These pages include five parts on the following topics relating to anarchism: 1. The political nature of anarchism. 2. The definition of anarchism. 3. The objectives of the conference on administrative reforms. 4. The objectives of the conference on extradition processes. 5. The objectives of the conference on legislative reforms. The propositions have been signed by the representatives of the following countries on December 21, 1898: Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, the Principality of Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Sweden and Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey. The aims of the AAC were: to define the elements that characterize an anarchist act; to suggest the most efficient means to control anarchist propaganda and actions, respecting the legislation of each participant state; to specify whether an anarchist act should be a case where the treaties on the expulsion of fugitives should be applied; to examine the means of keeping the anarchists under the surveillance of the police and in case it would be needed, to implement their expulsion or extradition; to scan the means adapted to preventing or hindering the press from distributing anarchist propaganda. These aims were deliberately made elusive and adjustable to enable discussions and evaluations of a wide range. The autonomy of the participant states was underlined to render possible a multi-state attendance of the conference. 159 The countries that participated each had different political notions, and the disagreements emerged at the conference.160 Even Italy which had called for the
159 160

Tamburini, 1997, 240. Di Paola, 2007, 210.

39

meeting, did not accept all the propositions. For example, it disagreed with the amount of restrictions of the freedom of the press, and especially the implementation of the capital punishment for the killing of a head of state.161 Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the final propositions were signed by all except for England. The propositions162 consist of five paragraphs. Some paragraphs are short, and others are divided into subparagraphs marked by letters. Some of the subparagraphs are further separated with numbers. Hence, these are marked in this study in the following way: e.g. 5/C/2. The first paragraph of the propositions is the most relevant to this study.
I. The Conference is of the opinion that anarchism does not have anything in common with politics and it should in no case be considered a political doctrine. 163

This paragraph contradicts with most of the definitions of anarchism. As mentioned above, the definitions of anarchism typically are based on the idea of anarchism as a political doctrine. By separating anarchism from politics, the conference depoliticized the ideology and thus criminalized it. This proposition was made by the Russian ambassador Alexander Nelidow and approved unanimously. 164 Russia has had a long history of treating political criminals differently from other criminals. This might have been the motivation for the suggestion; Russians wanted to treat anarchists as strictly as other criminals. The conference with representation from 21 countries decided that this phrase should be the first and thus most visible in the propositions. The ideological differences and the differences in opinion of who can be called an anarchist were so significant that this most likely enabled the finishing of the document. The wording of the first paragraph is deceptive, as can be seen from the subsequent.

161 162 163

Tamburini, 2000, 48. The final propositions of the AAC of Rome, 1898. I. La Confrence estime que lanarchisme na rien de commun avec la politique et quil ne saurait, en

aucun cas, tre considr comme une doctrine politique. The final propositions of the AAC of Rome, 1898. My translation.
164

Tamburini, 1997, 240.

40

The most cited part of the propositions is the following:

II. It is considered as an anarchist act, in the context of the resolutions of the Conference, every act anarchist.165 having as its aim the destruction through violent means, of all social organization. The one committing an anarchist act as presented above is considered an

The definition of anarchism was the first big topic the conference had to deal with. 166 This had not previously been done in any European parliament or court. There were difference of opinion between some countries of the exactness, in which the definition was to be made. The Monacan proposal was to define an anarchist act as it was eventually defined in the final propositions. 167 The proposal was approved with thirteen votes for and eight against. 168 Thus the trouble of defining who could be considered anarchist was avoided: an anarchist was someone who acted like one, which in this case was perceived as a person who used violent means to destroy the social institution. 169 The notion of destruction of all social organization gave anarchism a serious and sinister tone, at the same time as it left it for the participating countries to decide how this aim was to be proved. The English delegation at the AAC criticized the notion of an anarchist act as a violent act aimed against social institutions; according to delegates, the same definition could be applied to socialism and to any revolution that replaces the parliament with a king or vice versa.170 As any ideological background of the actions was excluded, this was of course true. This raises the question of the use of the anti-anarchist in the name of the conference. Why not convene an anti-violent or anti-criminal conference? Baron de Rolland, Avocat Gnral of Monaco, who had sketched the majority of the final propositions, suggested that the final propositions should include a notion that the new legislative measures would not have the effect that was hoped for, if the inequalities in
165

II. Est considr comme acte anarchique, au point de vue des resolutions de la Confrence, tout acte

ayant pour but la destruction, par des moyens violents, de toute organization sociale. Est repute anarchiste celui qui commet un acte anarchique au sens indiqu ci-dessus. The final propositions of the AAC of Rome, 1898. My translation.
166 167 168 169 170

The definitions of anarchists and terrorists is discussed in more detail in chapter 5. Jensen, 1981, 327. Tamburini, 1997, 241. Jensen, 1981, 327. Tamburini, 1997, 242.

41

social and economic conditions that nourish popular agitation were not considered. This suggestion was left out of the final propositions.171 The fact that this was suggested is very interesting, as it in fact was in contrast with the aim of the whole conference. The conference wanted to deal with anarchism as a crime, and the view presented by de Rolland, in it would have been accepted in the propositions, would have undermined the whole basis of the conference. Why deal with anarchism as a crime, if it was actually a desperate sign of a needed change in European societies? The third part of the propositions regarded administrative measures. It presented the future actions the participants should take. The wording used at the beginning of the listing is noteworthy: The Conference pronounces the following wishes:172 As mentioned before, the AAC could only voice its expectations, and not stipulate anything. The decisions made at the conference only gave guidelines for the participating states, and could very easily be ignored. The participating states were directed to a more efficient monitoring of the anarchists. For this purpose, a central police authority was to be established. The founding of a central authority aimed also at facilitating communication among the participant states. The directions also included guidelines for expulsions. The adoption of the new identification system, the portrait parl, was confirmed. The fourth paragraph contained more wishes on the extraditions of anarchists and included a reminder for the states not to treat anarchists as political criminals. This could have been directed at the United Kingdom, since this country had previously offered asylum for anarchists.173
171 172 173

The final part of the propositions was the most

Tamburini, 1997, 248. The suggestion was left out naturally according to Tamburini. La Confrence met les voeux suivants. Kinna, 2006, vol.3, 327. My italics. According to Jensen, it was surprising that England even participated, something that historians have

denied. England used to be the safe haven for anarchists and it had even prevented the organization of international conferences and joint actions against nihilists and anarchists in 1881 and 1893. Englands foreign and internal political situation was however such that it was crucial for it to show willingness to participate. The prevailing government being ruled by the Conservative Party, and the persuasions of the Foreign Minister of Italy, Canevaro, of the conferences programmes moderation and non-bindingness alleviated the difficulty of the decision to participate.wBritain had also suffered from a flow of undesirable immigrants , and thus the expulsion of anarchists, an issue that was to be discussed at the

42

extensive. It presented the actions that should be covered by criminal law in each country. These included the preparation of an anarchist act but also anarchist propaganda. The accentuating of the non-political nature of the Anti-Anarchist Conference was in clear contrast with some of the paragraphs of the final propositions. In fact, it even seems that the depoliticization of anarchism was pressed to secure severe sentences for anarchist crimes. When the issue of the extradition of anarchists in their homelands was discussed, it is first of all wished that an anarchist should be extradited only if anarchism is considered a crime also in the receiving country.174 By this clause, the participants wanted to prevent anarchists from fleeing to a country that provided asylum for them. It was also reminded that the anarchist actions should not be have been considered political, but criminal in the case of extradition. 175 This was most certainly mentioned because some countries did not extradite political criminals. The most discussed subjects were the difficult topics of surveillance and the suppression of the freedom of expression and the freedom of movement. These were also the issues that were included in the final propositions. The AAC obviously had as a goal not only to apprehend anarchists after they have committed terrorist actions, but also to prevent these acts from materializing. This was less visible in the later Interpol resolutions studied. The fifth part of the propositions of the AAC gave detailed advice on interpolations to national legislation. It was recommended in paragraph 5/A/ that the participant countries would include in their national legislation the criminalization of the preparation of an anarchist act, the membership or founding of an association that had as goal the perpetration of an anarchist act, the assisting of anarchists, the provocation for an anarchist act, the fabrication of illegitimate explosives, or anarchist propaganda in the army. The complicity to an anarchist act was demanded to be punished in each country. These recommendations were clearly not only giving instructions on how to
conference, was of interest to England. The Queen also had an impact: she was shocked by the murder of Elizabeth and wanted her country to join the conference. Jensen, 1981, 326-327.
174 175

Art. 4 A, Kinna, 2006, vol.3, 326. Art. 4 C, Kinna, 2006, vol. 3, 327.

43

deal with the group of anarchists, that had been described as such in the first paragraph of the propositions (the committing of an anarchist act makes a person anarchist). Also paragraphs C, D and E of the fifth part of the propositions were open to various interpretations. Paragraph 5/C/1 wished that in every country the distribution of all printed texts and pictures that provoked an anarchist act should be punished. 5/C/2 also suggested that all the trial documents considering anarchist acts should be kept secret from the public. The propositions of the fifth part are of course applicable to many soon-to-become-criminals, but also to the supporters of the anarchist ideology itself, which was not criminal. Especially the question of what can be called promoting or assisting anarchist acts was left open. Paragraph 5/D continued with more suggestions for a tighter censorship; it advocated the limitation of reports on anarchism published in the press. Each participating country could decide what texts to limit. As the contents of the texts that should be restricted was not specified, these guidelines can be regarded as non-political. However, what seems to have been widely agreed in late nineteenth century Europe was the legitimacy of censorship. This adds one layer of political in the study; the political that possibly no participant even impugned, the general acceptance of censorship. Paragraphs 5/E/1 and 2 gave additional advice on the prevention of the diffusion of the anarchist thought: all material that would be banned in a later phase, was to be seized already before it was distributed. Also in order to confine the spread of the thought, it was recommended that anarchists should be isolated from other inmates when imprisoned. Paragraphs 5/F, G and H that finish the propositions advised all countries to reinstating death sentences for anarchists committing anarchist acts against heads of state. It was accentuated that the executions of anarchists should not be public. This guideline illustrates on the one hand the fear authorities had toward the anarchist thought and on the other the awareness of the largest tool the anarchists had in spreading their thought: publicity. The question of death sentences divided the attendants of the conference and the proposition was accepted with votes thirteen against seven. 176 That a topic as big as the approval of the death sentence ended up in the final propositions with the signatures of
176

Tamburini, 1997, 251.

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the representatives of twenty countries does not necessarily imply that all these countries would have approved the proposition. The final propositions were not binding, so signing them may have been interpreted as diplomacy. Death sentences still remain a question in extradition cases even today. 177 The last paragraph of the propositions text was closed with the conclusion that anarchist crimes should always be treated as such, irrespective of their motivation. 178 This last notion reveals the paradox that was inherent in the whole conference: what is an anarchist act without motivation? Is it not a clearly violent act? Why then it needed to be dealt with at a conference especially aimed at fighting anarchism? The contents of these paragraphs illustrate how difficult it was not to cross the line between the banning of the whole anarchist thought, and preventing their violent acts from happening. The criminalization of the phenomenon was possibly seen as an answer in the balancing between the demands for more civil liberties, such as the freedom of speech, on the one hand and the fight against anarchism on the other. It is apparent that what began as a fight against anarchist crimes pronounced in the first paragraphs of the document, became a struggle against anarchist propaganda in the last
177 178

Anderson, 1989, 32. Compare the propositions of the conference with Nevadas Crimes against Public Peace (dates from

1998) that makes it unlawful for any person to: (a) . . . advocate or teach the duty, necessity or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence or other unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform; (b) . . . print, publish, edit, issue or knowingly to circulate, sell, distribute or publicly to display any book, paper, document or written matter in any form, containing or advocating, advising or teaching the doctrine that industrial or political reform should be brought about by crime, sabotage, violence or other unlawful methods of terrorism; (c) . . . openly, willfully and deliberately to justify, by word of mouth or writing, the commission or the attempt to commit crime, sabotage, violence or other unlawful methods of terrorism with the intent to exemplify, spread or advocate the propriety of the doctrine of criminal syndicalism; (d) . . . organize or help to organize or become a member of, or voluntarily to assemble with, any society, group or assemblage of persons formed to teach or advocate the doctrine of criminal syndicalism; (e) . . . assemble for the purpose of advocating or teaching the doctrines of criminal syndicalism, or (f) . . . permit [the] assemblage of persons prohibited by . . . paragraph (e) . . . (Donohue and Kayyem, 2002).

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part. Anarchism was depoliticized but at the same time, it was visible that the actual measures against it would be very political, as they included measures such as preventive censorship.

5.3. Interpol and depoliticization

Interpol is an intergovernmental organization that is considerably little known, despite its status as the worlds oldest active organ of international cooperation. Interpol was founded in Vienna in 1923. Its founders were police chiefs and other representatives from twenty countries,179 without the initiative of governments and without a formal treaty ratified by member states. The whole system was decided upon in five days; a permanent body with a constitution, officers, a headquarters, and operational procedures. Despite its non-formal foundation, since its first steps, Interpol has been treated as a legitimate organization by governments worldwide. 180 Interpol is an organization concentrated on fighting international criminality. The existence of the organization has often been questioned because of the mission it has set for itself. To fight international criminality is in fact, strictly defined, not possible, as there is no international criminal law. A criminal is someone who breaks the criminal law, and international law on all issues does not exist. Thus there cannot be any international criminals. 181 In a way, Interpol is working in the gray area between the international and the national. It always operates under national law and its principle consists of the idea that national sovereignty prevails.

179

131 representatives from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Germany, Poland, Italy,

Switzerland, Sweden, Latvia, Turkey, Greece, France, the Netherlands, Egypt, China, Japan and the United States. Besides these present were, naturally, delegates of Austria and also the representation from the disputed territory of Fiume. Fooner, 1989, 7.
180 181

Fooner, 1989, vii, 7, 45. eg. Fooner, 1989, 36-37.

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Interpol is an international organization 182, working with issues that consider multiple countries. In addition to being subordinate to national legislation, in its constitution, it is particularly accentuated that Interpol is working in the spirit of the 'Universal Declaration of Human Rights.' 183 It seems clear that international terrorism is an international crime (if such a thing can be said to exist). But the relationship of Interpol with terrorism has been problematic from the beginning of the organization. It forms a key part of the constitution that It is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character. 184 This Article 3 was added in the constitution in 1946 (and reworded in 1956) when Interpol was re-organized after the Nazi takeover during World War II.185 Article 3 ruled the conduct of Interpol for the following decades. Article 3 was later clarified in an Interpol policy document that outlined the Legal framework governing action by Interpol in cases of a political, military, religious or racial character. The basic idea of this document is to allow Interpol the possibility to check that the actions taken do not violate this article.
In order to determine such a violation, a distinction is made between offences which are by their very nature considered to be of a political, military, religious or racial character, on the one hand, and offences of which the predominant nature must be more carefully studied to determine its constituent components.186

One mans terrorist is another mans freedom fighter is a proverb that is proven to be true. This has been the stumbling block for Interpols action against terrorism. However,
182

UN recognized it as an intergovernmental organization in 1971, until that point it had the status of an

non-governmental organization. http://www.interpol.int/Public/icpo/governance/sg/history.asp; Fooner, 1989, 51-53.

183

Interpols constitution, article 2, Interpols constitution, The Nazis took over Interpol after the annexing of Austria, and attached it to their national police

http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/LegalMaterials/constitution/constitutionGenReg/constitution.asp
184

http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/LegalMaterials/constitution/constitutionGenReg/constitution.asp
185

system. This is why during the World War II period the organization is usually considered defunct. The original constitution of 1923 was seen to have made this possible with its simplicity, so the constitution needed to be rewritten to prevent autocratic control. Fooner, 1989, 40, 49-50.
186

Deflem, 2005.

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an act of terrorism comprises a series of acts that constitute various criminal offences, 187 and this has provided Interpol with a joint ground between its member states in its antiterrorist actions. The definitions of terrorism vary from country to country. This creates a problem to Interpol, since the national laws reflect these different points of view, which makes law enforcement at international level difficult. Not even the United Nations has been able to agree on a definition of terrorism, even if it unconditionally condemns as criminal all acts, methods and practices of terrorism, in a General Assembly Resolution of 1983. The only instrument of enforcement is the restricted International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings from 1997.188 As a result from the principle that interventions on issues that could be considered political are not allowed, one could anticipate that Interpol would be unable to fight terrorism at all. This is what happened in the 1950s and 1970s. 189 It was later admitted by Interpol that this was the case, that in fact all cases of international terrorism were to be presumed political in nature by the organization. Eventually, the organization had to recognize that terrorism involves crimes that are indisputably within its mandate. These include for instance murder, kidnapping, extortion, robbery and arson. The members agreed that it was hypocritical not to deal with terrorism even though it clearly was an international crime. 190 At that time not all governments were definitely against of all kinds of terrorism. Michael Fooner writes: In effect, governments were, in different ways, only opposing terrorists activity selectively.191 Interpol was not needed, since governments only opposed terrorism in cases it was functional.

187 188 189 190 191

Ganor and Conte, 2005. Gregory 2000:102, cited in Deflem and Maybin, 2006; http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp. Fooner, 1989. TVI Interview: Commander Raymond Kendall. Cited in Fooner, 1989, 10. Fooner, 1989, 10.

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During the time Interpol held back from political interventions i.e. interventions involving terrorism and even Nazi war criminals192, it did have much involvements in the affairs of the world. In addition to terrorism, the concept of international crime includes for example money laundering, drug trafficking, traffic in illicit arms and stolen art, other forms of financial fraud, white slavery, murder, counterfeiting and robbery. Many international crimes are intertwined with terrorism, especially the drug trade, because terrorism often gets its funding from it. 193 One reason terrorism seems to not be addressed by Interpol in its resolutions during the years preceding the 1980s was that the concept was not as commonly used as today and had different connotations. For example in the 1930s, it was mostly used to describe repression by totalitarian states against their citizens. It did not delineate the violence targeted against the leaders as in the late nineteenth century 194 or spectacular symbolic violence as terrorism is commonly understood today. After World War II, terrorism was mostly associated with revolutionary movements that opposed colonial rule in African and Asian countries. This was a period when terrorism got sympathizers from the Western countries and the politically correct appellation of freedom fighters was brought into use.195 This might be one motive for the emphasis on the political nature of terrorism. As presumably the last group overtly labeled itself terrorist in the 1940s,196 the emergence of the pejorative implications of the word possibly date from the same period. Further problems to the efficient fight against terrorism could be imagined to rise from the varied membership of the organization: after all some of its members, such as Cuba, Iran and Syria have been labeled sponsors and protectors of terrorism by the United States.197
192

This was a mistake and created suspicions of Interpol harbouring Nazi sympathisers. Anderson, 1989, Gray, 2003, 74, 90-91; Drugs can also be used as alternative currency for the illegal purchase of Hoffman, 1998, 23. Hoffman, 1998, 26. Hoffman, 1998, 29. http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?

97.
193

weapons. Anderson, 1989, 28.

194 195 196 197

p=washfileenglish&y=2004&m=April&x=20040429144342dmslahrellek0.642544.

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Fighting terrorism has today become a key part of the work of Interpol. The official website of the organization states that: Interpol has identified public safety and terrorism as a priority crime area [] 198. This has especially come about since the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001. After the attacks Interpol has increasingly concentrated on fighting terrorism. At the same time also the national police organizations have increased their efforts in counter-terrorism. Mathieu Deflem indicates two strategies199 of the depoliticization or criminalization of terrorism that are also visible in the Interpol resolutions. First, in case an ideologically motivated act contains criminal elements, these are considered to prevail when discussing the totality of the act and the possible countermeasures. This attitude was adopted by Interpol in 1998. Second, terrorism is generally defined in a vague manner. In fact, Interpol has not given a definition at all.
Thus, while ideological sentiments, political responses, and formal laws on terrorism can be very diverse in the world, the target of terrorism at the level of police bureaucracy is defined in a language that can be shared among police institutions across the world. 200

From the police perspective, terrorism is thus a crime and it can be treated as such. 201

6.3.1. The resolutions on terrorism

This chapter gives a quick overview on the resolutions Interpol has written on terrorism from 1951 until 1998. The resolutions have been prepared at General Assembly sessions held each year. Only resolutions considering terrorism listed by Interpol are used in this study. The listing includes a few resolutions that do not mention the word terrorism, as from 1951 until 1983 the word terrorism was not used by the organization. At least two reasons for this exist: first, the notion terrorism was not as commonly used then as it is today and second, most importantly, the organization avoided the concept in order to secure its political neutrality.
198 199 200 201

http://www.interpol.int/Public/FusionTaskForce/default.asp. Deflem, 2004. Deflem, 2004. Deflem, 2004.

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Altogether Interpol has written eighteen resolutions that concern terrorism. 202 The use of the term resolution on the General Assembly decisions is, in fact, misleading, since they would better be named recommendations. Interpol cannot force member states, it can only suggests what actions should be taken.203 Interpol itself lists resolutions regarding terrorism from the year 1951 onward. From 1951 until 1983 political neutrality was considered a primary issue in Interpol and the importance of the Article 3 of the constitution It is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character. was highlighted repeatedly in the resolutions of the General Assembly. Later Interpol was blamed for being hypocritical for not taking any stand of crimes that were clearly under its mandate. 204 The resolutions of the period did not provide with concrete advice in preventing and suppressing terrorism, but mostly empty phrases on enhancing cooperation between member states and condemning violence. Especially a resolution from 1951 Requests for International Enquiries205 it was made clear that Interpol would not intervene in crimes of a predominant political, racial or religious character, even if these were breaches against the legislation of the member states. The emphasis on political neutrality in the resolution might be explained with the incident of the previous year, when a group of Czechoslovakians hijacked two airplanes and fled their country. Czechoslovakia declared these runaways criminals and requested Interpol for a wanted notice for the arrest of the fugitives. The representative of the United States and director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, claimed that with an interference to this issue, Interpol would violate its own principle of not intervening in political issues. The U.S. viewpoint was that the hijackers were political refugees. This dispute ended with the withdrawal of the FBI and Czechoslovakia along with four other members from Interpol.206
202 203

The list of the resolutions is enclosed. The General Assembly makes recommendations, urges policy matters and suggests possible actions to Fooner, 1989, 10. AGN/20/RES/14, Lisbon, 1951. Fooner, 1989, 9; Fijnaut, 1997, 125.

take. Fooner, 1989, 80.

204 205 206

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The question of terrorism versus fight for freedom was a difficult issue for Interpol, which it also was for other international organizations. In 1972, after the Munich Olympics massacre,207 both Interpol and the UN had difficulties in taking a stand. The Interpol resolution Hostages and Blackmail 208 that was formulated in the meeting of the General Assembly in Frankfurt from 19 to 26 September 1972, right after the terrorist attacks in the summer Olympics in Munich on 5 September, had obvious references to the events, even though it was not specifically mentioned:
CONSIDERING that certain aspects of modern international criminality, such as the holding of hostages with the intention of perpetrating blackmail or other forms of extortion, have developed to the extent of constituting a severe menace to the life and safety of persons as well as the security of property []209

The resolution proposed that in order to prevent future tragedies of this kind, member countries should do everything they can within the limits of the Constitutions Articles 2 and 3.210 The limit mentioned in the resolution indicates how delicate the question of political neutrality was. In the UN a majority of the member states wanted the organization to condemn the attacks, but many Arab, African and Asian states argued that people who struggle to liberate themselves from foreign oppression and exploitation have the right to use all methods at their disposal, including force.211 Hoffman notes: By condemning terrorism the UN was endorsing the power of the strong over the weak and of the established entity over its non-established challenger in effect, acting as the defender of the status quo. The resultant definitional paralysis subsequently throttled UN
207

Terrorists took 11 Isreali athletes as hostages during the Olympic Games. The athletes were killed

when the police tried to free them.

208 209

AGN/41/RES/7 Frankfurt, 1972. http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/GeneralAssembly/AGN41/Resolutions/AGN41RES7.asp ARTICLE 2: The aims of the International Criminal Police Organization-INTERPOL are: a) To ensure

3.10.2006.
210

and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police authorities within the limits of the laws existing in the different countries and in the spirit of the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights"; b) To establish and develop all institutions likely to contribute effectively to the prevention and suppression of ordinary law crimes. ARTICLE 3: It is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.
211

Hoffman, 1998, 31.

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efforts to make any substantive progress on international cooperation against terrorism beyond very specific agreements on individual aspects of the problem.212 Similar conclusions could be drawn from the ways Interpol confronted terrorism, and the same critique could be aimed at Interpol. In 1979 the first changes in the anti-terrorist policy of Interpol emerged. The resolution o f 1979 Acts of Violence Committed by Organized Groups213 stated that some groups could only claim to have an ideological motivation for their criminal activities. Prior to this year all groups that claimed to be ideologically motivated, were considered so in Interpol. This was the first time when the motivation and the act were separated from each other. Michael Fooner has noted: During the 1950s and through the 1970s, Interpol in effect acquiesced to the then prevalent view that acts by international terrorists should be presumed to be political in nature. A change toward a tighter attitude against terrorism was visible at the end of the 1970s. According to Fenton Bresler, the reason for this behavior was the fear that any actions against terrorism taken by Interpol could lead to the disintegration of the organization, because countries such as Syria and Libya would then leave the organization. 214 The cautious conservatism together with the outdated technology of Interpol led to frustration among European police officials. Some wanted the organization to modernize itself while some adduced the possibility of the European police collaboration under an organization named Europol.215 A more effective approach to combating terrorism in Europe was needed, and in 1976 TREVI was founded to tackle this problem. 216 The dissatisfaction toward Interpol might have be one cause for the change of attitude in the organization during the following decade. The 1980s was a period of change in the policies and dynamics of Interpol. The French had had a leading role in the post-war Interpol, but new leading members emerged in
212 213 214 215

Hoffman, 1998, 32. AGN/48/RES/8 Nairobi, 1979. Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006, 100. However, the organization was only officially founded in 1999. TREVI was either named after the famous fountain in Rome or as a French acronym for the subject of

Interpol documentary, 2007.

Ibid., 187.
216

its mandate terrorism, radicalism, extremism and international violence (Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrmisme et Violence Politique). Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006, 101.

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the 1980s: the U.S., West Germany, Britain, Canada, and Japan became important players within Interpol during this decade. Malcolm Anderson claims that these countries did not control the organization.
The six richest countries have paid the same subscriptions for some years and the leading states do not have permanent seats on the Executive Committee. There has been no consistent drive by the leading six for influence on all matters and the lead on issues often comes from other countries. [] The absence of ambition on the part of leading members to control the organization can, however, be interpreted in some periods as a lack of desire to develop the role and effectiveness of Interpol. 217

The new stance was gradually formed between the years 1982 and 1985. A resolution from 1983 was the first to refer to terrorism, but it still emphasized the importance of Article 3. 218 Many Third World nations wanted Interpol to act in a more determined way against terrorism and change its interpretation of the binding Article 3. The Executive Committee did not want Interpol to take this task. The developed nations were reluctant as well. The United States unexpectedly changed its attitude that was formed in the 1950s and stated that Interpol had an obligation to address terrorism. By 1984 the U.S. had acquired a strong representation in the organization and by 1985 a new policy toward terrorism was accepted widely and member countries could deal with it from a law-enforcement perspective. 219 According to Anderson, this reinterpretation of the Article 3 was the result of a combination of American pressure, sensitivity to sections of western public opinion alarmed by terrorism, and fear that the Organization could be marginalized. 220 Conte and Ganor justifiably pose the question why to even talk about terrorism at all:
An act of terrorism, after all, will comprise a series of acts that, in and of themselves, constitute various criminal offences. To take an example, a bombing of an Embassy will likely involve the unlawful possession of explosives, the willful destruction of property and the willful injury to or killing of persons. Each element is a criminal offence in most jurisdictions and, as such, is capable of being dealt with by the relevant municipal jurisdiction.221

This is a view that Interpol gradually adopted during the 1980s and 1990s.
217 218 219 220 221

Anderson, 1989, 92. (AGN/52/RES/9 Cannes, 1983). Fooner, 1989, 43. Quoted in Deflem, 2005. Conte and Ganor, 2005.

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During the 1990s, there were certain highly publicized terrorist incidents (such as the World Trade Center bombing on February 26, 1993). Deflem has related these events to the changes in the policy of Interpol.
222

The most perceptible shift in the attitude

toward terrorism in Interpol did not take place after the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States as could have been estimated. It occurred earlier, in 1998. Earlier, the problem that Interpol had been facing was that terrorism was considered political and the organization thus could not oppose to it in a straightforward manner. In 1998 Interpol confirmed the commitment to combat international terrorism. It new strategy was to depoliticize and criminalize terrorism so that opposing it could be included in the field of action of the organization. Interpol depoliticized terrorism as it adopted the new version of the Guide for combating International Terrorism, a change characterized by Mathieu Deflem. 223
Since 1998, a formal set of Interpol Guidelines for Co-operation in Combating International Terrorism more explicitly addresses the relationship of terrorism to Article 3 of Interpols Constitution, forbidding Interpol to undertake matters of a political, military, religious or racial character. Basically, terrorist incidents are broken down into their constituent parts, only the criminal elements of which can then be identified and subjected to police investigations.224

Cairo declaration on terrorism that dates from 1998, was completely different comparing to the previous resolutions. 225 It this resolution, the commitment of Interpol to combat international terrorism was confirmed. 226 Article 3 of the constitution was no longer mentioned. The timing of this major change in the Interpol policy is further discussed in chapter seven. The Cairo declaration was the first resolution to mention the word countermeasures. The word reveals a more pragmatic approach to terrorism. Most important for the General Assembly was to set up an international action plan to make the coordination
222 223 224 225 226

Deflem, 2006. Deflem, 2006. Deflem, 2006. Interpol resolution: AGN/67/RES/12 Cairo declaration against terrorism, 1998. Deflem, 2006.

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among the member states of Interpol more efficient. The fields in which joint action was declared to be enhanced were:
[] the extradition of fugitive terrorists, the sharing of information essential to criminal investigations and to terrorism prevention measures, the detection of all types of traffic in weapons, explosives or other items directly or indirectly connected with the activities of organized terrorist groups, and the adoption of specific criminal charges relating to the use of new technologies for terrorist purposes. 227

Basically, these were the same fields of action in which Interpol had striven for intensive cooperation throughout its existence. Now they were especially related to terrorism. This resolution indicates that the organization actually had always been doing work that can be related to stopping terrorism. Terrorism could no longer be separated from other types of international crime, since terrorism always constitutes of crimes such as murder or arson, which are considered crimes globally. The impact of the terrorist attacks against U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya to this resolution is worth of studying, but not possible within the scope of this study, as the documents on the discussions that led to the General Assembly declaration are not available. Two car bomb explosions in two East African capitals took place simultaneously and killing more than 200 hundred people. 228 The attacks happened on 7 August, 1998, as the General Assembly meeting in Cairo took place two months later, from the 22 until the 27 October. 229 In 1999230 the fight against terrorism was declared as one of the main aims of Interpol. The resolution stated that to provoke a state of terror could not be justified under any circumstances irrespective of considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them [] 231 Thus the most cited article of the Constitution, Article 3, was virtually abrogated.

227 228

Interpol resolution: AGN/67/RES/12 Cairo declaration against terrorism,1998. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1998_U.S._embassy_bombings Interpol resolution: AGN/67/RES/12 Cairo declaration against terrorism,1998. Interpol resolution AGN/68/RES/2 The financing of terrorism, 1999 Interpol resolution AGN/68/RES/2 The financing of terrorism,1999.

. http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0001454.html.
229 230 231

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The terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 were regarded as an international issue also by Interpol: Shortly after 9/11, Interpol Secretary General, Ronald Noble, argued that while the terrorist attacks took place on U.S. soil, they constituted attacks against the entire world and its citizens.232 The resolution on the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 conformed to the new policy of Interpol. 233 That the General Assembly meeting took place just two weeks after the attacks (in 24 to 28 September 2001) can be seen in the resolution that concentrated on honoring the victims and declaring that the attacks were a violent mass murder and a crime against humanity. The possibility of the attacks being of political nature was not mentioned in the resolution Article 3 was no longer central. The terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 and the explosions of bombs in Madrid in 2004 and London 2005 clearly had an impact on security concerns all over the world. At the same time, the number of Interpol resolutions on terrorism grew substantially.234 There was also a clear shift in the wording of the resolutions. This shift is interesting in many respects: one possible reason for this could be the growth of U.S. interest and influence in the organization after the end of the Cold War around the early 1990s, and especially after the terrorist attacks in 1998 and 2001. At the same time, however, Europol was created (it began its full activities on July 1, 1999 235) and its significance especially in counter-terrorism issues grew. 236 If the interests of European states in Interpol consequently declined, why did the organization then adopt a more severe attitude in relation to terrorism? The question why Interpol depoliticized terrorism in 1998 is discussed in the next chapter. The adoption of anti-terrorism on the agenda of Interpol both promoted the issue of international police cooperation on the political agenda internationally and brought
232 233 234

Deflem, 2006. AG-2001-RES-05, Terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 (Budapest, 2001). From the 18 resolutions Interpol has made on terrorism, during the years 1951-2006, 8 have been http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=facts a supranational organization that initially looked like little more than a regional-level variant of

written during the last 10 years.

235 236

Interpol (prompting some grumbling about the apparent duplication) had by the end of the decade been transformed into a reflection of and a vehicle for much more intensive and extensive EU-wide police cooperation. Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006, 187. See also ibid. 217-222.

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Interpol to the core of international security. Further, it raised the question of the necessity of a European law enforcement authority. 5.4. Discussion

This chapter has presented the way in which the Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome in 1898 and Interpol in 1998 depoliticized (anarchist) terrorism. The theory Mathieu Deflem has introduced on the depoliticizing of terrorism is relevant here. 237 According to Deflem, terrorism has been depoliticized by both the AAC and Interpol by breaking terrorist acts down into their constituent parts, so that their criminal elements could be identified and subjected to police investigations. In order to separate terrorism from politics, it was necessary not to understand a terrorist attack as a whole, separate from the ideological motivations behind it. This way, it could be seen that terrorism actually was, and is, committing ordinary crimes. What is noteworthy is that even though the fight against terrorism is in such a big role in the work of Interpol, the organization has not defined terrorism. In contrast, the first thing the AAC of Rome did in 1898 after setting an agenda for the conference, was to find a definition to anarchism. 238 Even though Interpol has not defined terrorism, the criminalization of terrorism followed the same logic as the definition the AAC wrote: An anarchist was someone who committed an anarchist act and a terrorist was someone committing a terrorist act. Both acts were perceived criminal, irrespective of the reasons or ideologies behind the actions. It can be noticed from the propositions and resolutions studied above, that the AntiAnarchist Conference of Rome and Interpol have faced similar difficulties and found similar coping strategies when dealing with terrorism. Some issues that were present in 1898, still remain problematic in our days. Two examples could be brought out: extradition and death sentences, which are linked together.

237 238

Deflem, 2006. Tamburini, 1997, 241. This definition is however very vague. More about this in chapter the AAC of

Rome.

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The AAC added a reminder to its proposition text on extradition. It was stated, that the anarchist actions should not be have been considered political crimes in the case of extradition.239 This was most certainly mentioned because some countries, especially England, did not extradite political criminals. The problematic nature of extradition is still existent in our days. Even though the amount of the treaties that concern extradition has grown, all measures must be compatible with national legal systems. For instance the red notice (a notice that seeks the arrest or provisional arrest of a wanted person with a view to extradition based on an arrest warrant disseminated in member states) of Interpol is enforced differently in different countries: England demands for further evidence against the suspect and the United States almost automatically issue arrest warrants on the request of Interpol.240 Death sentences were not approved by all countries in the late nineteenth century. The situation is still the same. This makes the question of extradition highly political; if a country that still employs death sentenced requests the extradition of a criminal, it is often refused on the basis that capital punishments are not acceptable to most nations. Political interests tend to prevent police cooperation on the field of counter-terrorism, more than in any other field of criminality. 241 The next chapter discusses further the reasons for the depoliticization of anarchism in 1898 and terrorism 1998.

239 240 241

Art. 4 C, Kinna, 2006, vol. 3, 327. Anderson, 1989, 30. Anderson, 1989, 147.

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6. Why depoliticize?
As noticed in the previous chapter, both the AAC of 1898 and Interpol in 1998 decided to cope with (anarchist) terrorism by depoliticizing the phenomenon. This chapter aims at examining more closely the possible reasons for the depoliticization: the social and political conditions of the points in time studied, the effect of the bureaucratization of the police, the nature of international police cooperation and the similarities between the anarchist threat in 1898 and the terrorist threat in 1998. The chapter suggests that the depoliticization had many reasons. These reasons were not identical in 1898 and 1998, but have apparent similarities. For instance the problematic nature of international police cooperation has not altered very much in a century.

6.1. Ground for international anti-terrorist cooperation

Francois Mitterand stated in 1987:

Since terrorism is international, investigation, prevention, repression and sanctions should also be international.242

This wish is not new. Nearly a hundread years earlier the Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome that had the same goal (the international repression of anarchist terrorism). That the wish has not been fulfilled even now, reveals the amount of difficulties that exists in the creation of joint police action against terrorism. Since the appearance of the modern type of professional police in eighteenth, early nineteenth century, law enforcement has represented an expression of state sovereignty. Now this aspect has become questionable with the internationalization of crime. 243 The sovereignty principle is still not irrelevant in policing and criminal justice. Criminal offences are still investigated by state agencies and international criminal law does not

242 243

Anderson, 1989,127. Anderson, 1989, 1, 14. Andreas and Nadelmann challenge the view of the internationalisation of police

as a result from the internationalisation of crime. Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006.

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exist. In matters concerning the police, the type of crime defines whether it can be dealt with by joint police action. 244 This chapter discusses the variety of challenges international anti-terrorist police cooperation has faced and still faces. 7.1.1. International law and criminality

There is no ready-made international law. International law is formed little by little by international agreements. The International Court of Justice has accepted the following six sources as the constituents of international law: custom, treaties, the basic principles of international law, case law, highly qualified publicists, and soft law, which covers for instance treaties. Any genuine international criminal law does not exist, a country can claim jurisdiction either by nationality or territoriality. 245 Can international crime exist if there is no international criminal law? The agents who can operate in the prosecution of criminals, are state controlled. Thus the task of international police cooperation is to help sovereign states in enforcing their laws.246 Interpol has set itself an agenda many scholars would declare impossible: to fight international crime. However, the organization has managed to cope with it. The stand Interpol has taken is discussed in the monograph published on the fiftieth anniversary of the organization.
In practice, the term international offence means any criminal activity concerning more than one country, either because of the nature of the crime committed, or because of the identity or behaviour of the criminal or his accomplices. A criminal who has committed offences of a local nature .. in several countries .. is an itinerant criminal and therefore an international criminal. This is completely independent of the seriousness of the offence.247

The fact that this issue is dealt with like this is quite interesting. The same method of going round the most difficult problems is the strategy of depoliticization used by both the AAC and Interpol. International crimes were divided into pieces of ordinary,
244 245 246 247

Anderson, 1989, 14. Malanczuk, 1997. Anderson, 1989, 26-27. Cited in Fooner, 1989, 37.

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national crimes. The AAC and Interpol did not have plunge into the whole. This tactic was at the same time very useful and the only possible way to work through at least some issues, but at the same time very questionable, because the entirety was forgotten.

7.1.2. International anti-terrorist police cooperation

The emergence of international police cooperation can be seen as a result of the rapid development of the last 150 years: urbanization, development of mass transportation systems, the growth of the amount of people crossing international boundaries, the evolution of communication techniques, and the escalation of international commerce.248 International police collaboration has different forms such as the exchange of intelligence, surveillance of suspects, investigation of crimes and the provision of training facilities and the exchange of information about police techniques. 249 It has a dual mission: prosecution and prevention and the balance between these two shifts. 250 Especially during the last part of the twentieth century, common views on the importance of anti-terrorist police cooperation have emerged. Terrorism has become increasingly international, the possible victims of terrorism and their property cross state boundaries more and more often, and public opinion condemns terrorism pronouncedly.251 Anti-terrorist cooperation is useful, since working together can provide countries with information that they would be unable to gather alone. Cooperation can also be used isolate terrorists, 252 e.g. by freezing their assets. Nonetheless the statement of Andreas and Nadelmann must not be underestimated: [] the internationalization of crime control is primarily the outcome of ambitious efforts by generations of Western powers to export their domestically derived definitions of crime.253 This is something that might be visible in the Interpol antiterrorist agenda, and is worth further study.
248 249 250 251 252 253

Anderson, 1989, 20. Anderson, 1989, 1. Bensahel, 2006, 46. Anderson, 1989, 127. Bensahel, 2006, 35. Andreas and Nadelmann,

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There are numerous difficulties for the establishment and functioning of joint police action:254 dissimilar traditions in law enforcement, different levels of social and economic development, ideological conflicts and discords in foreign policy. Issues that might cause difficulties can be political, legal or psychological. However, in industrialized democracies the methods of policing resemble and the awareness of the common problems create the growing need for cooperation among states. In the interests of these countries is also to learn from the experience of other countries. 255 The police is always a political institution in a broad sense, since it enforces law and dominates the view of what public order should be. 256 As crimes are in fact created by law, it varies over time what is criminalized and decriminalized. 257 This poses difficulties to international collaboration. The advantage of the direct contacts among law enforcement officers in different countries is the police autonomy and durability. From short term perspective, governments change quite often but the police as an institution remains and its policies vary relatively little. 258 Homogenization in defining crime has happened globally, but rapid changes are possible due to varying political situations in different countries. 259 In addition to the homogenization of laws, what is required for a functional international cooperation is both the informal and formal regularizing of relations. International agreements are important, but so are personal relationships, working groups and international meetings. This transnational criminal enforcement community is often overlooked in the international relations studies, even though it is an influential part of global governance and transgovernmental relations. 260 International police cooperation, especially anti-terrorist cooperation, thus has faced many challenges, that have not essentially altered in the period of over one hundred years. That international criminal law does not exist as a whole, is one of the key factors that prevent effective international cooperation. A second factor that challenge the
254 255 256 257 258 259 260

Aldrich discusses the difficulties for transatlantic intelligence exchange. Aldrich, 2004. Anderson, 1989, 12. See also Bensahel, 2006, 39. Emsley, 1997, 1-2. Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006, vi. Berlire, 1997, 47. Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006, vi, 8. Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006, 9.

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creation of international anti-terrorist cooperation, are the different ideologies that separate the countries of the world. Different notions on who is a terrorist would possibly prevent effective anti-terrorist action, unless the problem of terrorism would not be so significant that common ground between the majority of the countries of the world has been searched for. This common ground was found in the depoliticization of anarchism in 1898 and in the depoliticization of terrorism in 1998. As terrorist actions have been broken down into their constituent parts, thus revealing unchallengeably criminal elements, the basis for international anti-terrorist police action was created. This is one possible motivation for the depoliticization of anarchism in the AntiAnarchist Conference of Rome in 1898 and the depoliticization of terrorism by Interpol in 1998.

6.2. Reaction to changes in social and political conditions in 1898

The late nineteenth century witnessed immense socio-economic changes. The rise of Marxism/ Communism born of the alienation and exploitative conditions of nineteenth-century capitalism 261 occurred at the same time Europe was already preparing for the war later to be known as the First World War between 1914 and 1918. Until this era, religion had provided the only justification for terrorism. Many things changed during the nineteenth century. The authority of the monarch as the one who derived from God was questioned. With the rise of nationalism new nation states, such as Italy, were born.262 Radical political thought as anarchism, nihilism and Marxism assumed a lot of importance263 and anti-state terrorism rose.264 Terrorism transformed from a mostly religious to a secular phenomenon. 265 The Propaganda by the deed dictum later made famous by the anarchists, was most likely first put into practice by the Narodnaya Volya or Peoples Will. Narodnaya Volya was a Russian anti-tsarist group that attained its goal with the assassination of Tsar
261 262 263 264 265

Hoffman, 1998, 17. Hoffman, 1998, 17. Hoffman, 1998, 90. Hoffman, 1998, 17. Hoffman, 1998, 90.

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Alexander II in 1881. The plan of the establishment of the Anarchist or Black International was a result of the gathering of a group that openly praised the assassination of the Tsar and looked to Narodnaya Volya as a model. 266 The anarchist operations of the time were based on individual action, or acts executed by small cells of radicals. The fact that the operations were not controlled by a central organ made the suppression and prevention particularly difficult for the police. 267 This remains a difficulty even today, as terrorist actions are performed in a similar way. These difficulties were most likely one motivation for the search for joint police action against anarchism. The attendants of the AAC of Rome were: Germany, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, the Principality of Monaco, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Sweden and Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey. Of these countries, Turkey was facing the threat of Armenian nationalist movements in the 1880s and 1890s. Greece, Bulgaria and Serbia were the area of operations of the Inner Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO). Italy was suffering from the fact that a large part of the attackers were of Italian background.268 In 1898 it was also estimated that the next target for an anarchist attack would be the King of Italy. 269 Russia had already witnessed the capability of an anarchist plot when the Tsar had been murdered. Thus anarchism was a European-wide concern. The final resolution analyzed above, tried to avoid difficult issues with its wording. The whole question of who is an anarchist was answered very vaguely: an anarchist was someone who committed an anarchist act. 270 This seems rational: only a committed crime renders a person anarchist. However, the aim of the conference was not only to catch the anarchists (which means the ones that have committed a crime), but also to prevent these incidents from happening. In order to prevent anarchist attacks, it was
266 267 268 269 270

Hoffman, 1998, 19. Hoffman, 1998, 19. Tamburini, 1997, 230. Tamburini, 2000, 45. Jensen, 1981, 325 and Tamburini, 1997, 230. Kinna, 2006, 326.

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necessary to include preventive measures in their propositions. For example, as mentioned above, it was suggested that the governments of the participant countries would discuss the possibility of limiting the publishing of reports on anarchist acts. The propositions also demanded that each country should have accept preventive seizure for written material if it was likely to be seized at a later stage. This allows to come to the conclusion that The fight against anarchism was evidently a matter of a decidedly political nature, especially because and when it included policies reaching beyond the control of criminal incidents inspired by anarchist motives. 271 A contemporary article The Anarchist Beast 272 discussed the question of the political nature of anarchism. The article dealt with the prevailing situation in Britain, where anarchists were considered political criminals and thus were protected. The anonymous writer concluded that anarchists were not political criminals in the ordinary sense. Their victims could be democratically elected and they make no pretence of removing hereditary tyrants or of overthrowing oligarchies. The anarchist is not a political assassin; he is merely a noxious beast. It is clear that the writer was opposed to anarchists We wish to remove him [the anarchist] from the sight of humanity. However, he made an important point while writing about issues that were dealt with in the final proposition of the AAC: anarchist propaganda and anarchist associations. He wrote:
To what extent anarchist propaganda or anarchist associations should be tolerated in civilized communities is a more difficult problem [than how anarchist criminals should be dealt with]. The chief difficulty lies in the fact, horrible as it is to confess, that a war against anarchism is to a certain extent a war against opinion (though it be the opinion of brutes), and that the repression of an opinion is to a modern Government an almost insuperable task.

One reason why the AAC needed to be kept secret, could have been one of the writers observations:
Were all the associations of these miscreant forcibly dissolved, the difficulty of discovering the individual anarchist would be augmented, though at the same time the spread of the disease might be checked.

271 272

Deflem, 2005. Kinna, 2006, vol. 2, 185-188.

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Governments were divided in two in their views of the way they thought anarchist terrorism should be encountered. Others considered that repression was the best alternative for controlling anarchists. In contrast, other governments saw that repression actually laid the perfect breeding ground for anarchist terrorism. 273 This was most likely a big obstacle for the creation of the AAC final proposition. However, in the course of the last decades of the nineteenth century, the view that terrorism required repression became more popular and the consensus was to depoliticize and criminalize it. 274 This must have paved the way for the wide participation and acceptance of the AAC in 1898. Historians widely accept the view that the manifesting of terrorism during the 1880s and 1890s, created more insecurity and thus more interest to new measures to tackle the terrorist threat.275 In this context, it is easy to understand why so many different countries of diverse political backgrounds joined together in the AAC of Rome in 1898. The possibility of arguing that states had no choice is quite clear: if anarchism was perceived as an ideology that only aimed at destroying political, social and economic systems of the world, it is evident that this threat needed to be dealt with in the strictest way possible, otherwise the stability would have been lost. As many European nation states and their political systems were the newly established, the stability was vital for them. Nonetheless, it cannot be claimed that the aims of the late nineteenth century anarchists would have been that radical and that uncompromising. Many were not after a revolution, they only wanted to protest and many of the contemporaries agreed with their reasons. The protest was often, however, expressed through extreme terrorist actions, that were disapproved by most, even anarchists. 276 According to Francesco Tamburini anarchism ensued from the social conditions of the late nineteenth century and the officials did not want and could not understand it and responded to it with inadequate legislative measures. The repression of anarchists by the police together with the sad economic conditions created the amount of hate that even

273 274 275 276

Kinna, 2006, vol. 1, xxxv. Kinna, 2006, vol. 1, xxxv. Kinna, 2006, vol. 1, xxxv. Kinna, 2006, vol. 1, xxxviii.

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led up to murders. The legislative measures reflected the fears of the leading class in Italy277 and presumably all over Europe. Also Ruth Kinna argues that the strategy that was taken by the AAC of Rome was not viable:
The tendency of states to criminalize anarchism as terrorist was tantamount to a refusal to listen to or take seriously any of the grievances anarchists and others expressed. Indeed, it ratcheted-up the tension and helped further inflame radical opinion. 278

Thus the depoliticization of anarchism can be explained partly by the shared will of the states that participated at the AAC of Rome to obscure the underlying reasons, social inequalities, for this kind of radical political activity and consider it as normal criminality. Another possible reason for the depoliticization of anarchism could have been the apprehension of a war among European states. An act of terrorism can be used as a reason/excuse for war as was witnessed later, when Gavrilo Princip attacked the Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914. The act of a member of an extremist group (also called anarchist) was politicized279 and led to the outbreak of World War I. Politicization in this case means the fact that the act of one person was perceived as an act by the whole nation, as a political act and not as a criminal act. Depoliticization, or criminalization, is the opposite, and gives the states the possibility to maintain peace, regardless of individual, terrorist actions.

6.3. Reaction to changes in social and political conditions in 1998

Interpol gradually built a new anti-terrorist strategy during the 1980s and 1990s. Overtly terrorism was depoliticized and opposition to terrorism declared one of the main aims of the organization in the years 1998-1999. This study looks for reasons for this policy.
277 278 279

Tamburini, 2000, 44. Kinna, 2006, vol. 1, xxxviii. The Serbian government was aware of the objectives of the extremist group Princip belonged to, but it

is not evident that the government would have been committed to war with Austria. Hoffman, 1998, 23. This is why I refer to the act as politicized; the was was not unavoidable after such an attack, that could have been labelled as crime, thus depoliticized.

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Richard Bach Jensen suggests that the origins of Interpol lay in the Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome that was held in 1898. This conference ended up with a straightforward declaration on anarchism: anarchism has nothing to do with politics. Nonetheless, from the eighty-four years of the existence of Interpol, only during the last eight years has terrorism been considered non-political. This chapter aims at suggesting some tentative answers for the question why was terrorism depoliticized in 1998? The emergence of international terrorism can be dated to July 22, 1968 when for the first time a passenger aircraft was hijacked for political means. The hijacking was used as a symbol and an instrument to create direct communications between the Palestinian terrorists and the Israeli government.280 In 1968, there were eleven active international terrorist groups (three ethno-nationalist/ separatist and eight radical leftist groups). The number rose five fold over the next ten years. It was the result of the belief that international terrorism was the key to worldwide attention. 281 The reason for this development can be looked for in the growth of economic inequalities both within states and especially between the countries of the Third World (as it became known as) and the developed countries.282 As in the case of the situation of the late nineteenth century discussed in the previous chapter, a suggested reason for the depoliticization of terrorism could have been the wish to obscure the economic and social inequalities stimulating the actions. The collapse of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the 1990s altered the balance of power in the world. At very fast pace, the world transformed from a bipolar system to a system where the United States represented the sole great power. As a consequence, the biggest threat to the security of the United States, the possibility of a nuclear war with the Soviet Union, was also vanished. Two major changes in terrorism occurred during the 1980s and 1990s. From the 1960s until the 1990s the major terrorist organizations were ideological, ethno-nationals and separatist organizations.283 The early 1980s saw, however, the rise of state-sponsored
280 281 282 283

Hoffman, 1998, 67-69. Hoffman, 1998, 75. Hoffman, 1998, 80. Hoffman, 1998, 200.

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terrorism as a deliberated instrument of foreign policy. The hostage crisis in Iran in 1979 can be considered as the most visible demonstration of this: fifty-two Americans were held hostages in the embassy in Tehran by militant Iranian students, who were perceived as acting on behalf of the newly established Iranian regime. This was the starting point of an anti-American terrorist campaign by Iran. 284 During the 1990s, a transformation of terrorism from political terrorism with tactical and instrumental aims occurred 285 and a new threat was becoming obvious. Terrorism with a religious motive, whose aims may not be political and whose violence has no obvious upper limit286, had gradually become the most important feature of terrorist activity.287 None of the eleven groups that were committed to international terrorism in 1968 had primarily religious aims or motivations. 288 The first modern religious terrorist groups emerged only in 1980, and then their number was remarkably small: two of sixty-four terrorist groups active at the time. Iran had transformed into an Islamic republic in 1979. This had a role in the return 289 of the religiously motivated terrorism, but cannot be seen as the unique reason for it. The re-emergence of religious terrorism has also been associated with the emigration of a quarter of a million radicalized Muhajedin from Afghanistan.290 Even though the starting points for the changes have been located in the Islamic world, since the 1980s the rise of religious terrorism has been influenced by all the major religions of the world. 291 In 1995 a half of the identifiable international terrorist groups were religiously motivated. 292 The rise of religion as a motivation for terrorist acts can be seen as a result of the failure of old ideologies: the Soviet Union had collapsed in the early 1990s and it was clear that capitalism was not benefiting all. Societal changes such as accelerated population
284 285 286 287 288 289

Hoffman, 1998, 186. Aldrich, 2004. Aldrich, 2004. Hoffman, 1998, 87. Hoffman, 1998, 90. The connection between religion and terrorism is not new. More than two thousand years ago the first Aldrich, 2004. Hoffman, 1998, 87. Hoffman, 1998, 90-91.

acts of what we now describe as terrorism were perpetrated by religious fanatics. Hoffman, 1998, 88.
290 291 292

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growth and urbanization combined with the breakdown of local services increased the sense of public insecurity.293 The turn to religion for a vision of a better world when secular ideologies and the promise of modernization had failed, seems like a reasonable explanation. This change is not especially visible in the resolutions of Interpol. It only took place in 1998 and became confirmed in the resolution of 1999, where it was stated that to provoke a state of terror could not be justified under any circumstances irrespective of considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them []. 294 This has been interpreted as depoliticization in this study, but in the light of the changes that occurred in terrorism during the 1990s, it would perhaps be more accurate to call this dereligionalization, as religion as the motivation for terrorist actions has grown. Religion, as politics, as a motivation for terrorist actions was most likely a very difficult issue to confront on the international level, as religion as fuelled a multitude of conflicts throughout the history of mankind. The rise of religious terrorism changed the nature of terrorism. As Hoffman writes:
The reasons why terrorist incidents perpetrated for religious motives result in so many more deaths may be found in the radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimization and justification, concepts of morality, and world-view embraced by the religious terrorist, compared with his secular counterpart.295

In religious terrorism the basis of the use of violence is not constrained by political, moral or practical concerns, since it is legitimized by religion. Political terrorists rarely aim at the largest amount of victims possible, whereas for religious terrorists often see their victims as enemies to their beliefs. Secular terrorism seeks for approval also from outsiders, as religious terrorists do not need it. This results in the defining of all others but the members of the community as enemies, for example infidels. One of the basic differences between these two motivations to terrorism is in the way the terrorists see themselves in the system. Political terrorists want to correct or replace the existing
293 294 295

Hoffman, 1998, 92. Interpol resolution AGN/68/RES/2 The financing of terrorism, 1999. Hoffman, 1998, 94.

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system, but religiously motivated terrorists see themselves as outsiders and thus are not committed to the developing of the existing order. 296 The religious terrorists are a new type of adversary for those who wish to counter them. They are difficult to identify, they are unpredictable and traditional counter-terrorist measures used against secular terrorists are not useful for the confronting of religious terrorists.297
As the British home secretary remarked in March 2004, We are in a serious business here. These people do not negotiate, they do not have a platform, they do not have a political stance that we can talk to them about, and they do not have fear or prosecution or punishment.298

During the 1990s terrorism transformed into a more diffuse phenomenon with the escalation of what may be termed amateur terrorism, more or less spontaneous or personal acts of violence that had little or no connection to an existing terrorist group. 299 The training that previously was held in camps, was now more available for potential terrorists via bookstores, mail-order, CD-ROM and Internet.300 The rise of religious terrorism opposing the United States 301 combined with the antiAmericanism of the fundamentalist Muslims could be considered one of the reasons why the United States became more interested in the organization of Interpol. The Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 was considered an example to Muslims around the world and it encouraged them to resist to the advance of the West, especially that of the United States.302 In addition, the emergence of anti-American state-sponsored terrorism at the beginning of the 1980s and the unsuccessful (or even counterproductive303) economic and military

296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303

Hoffman, 1998, 94-95. Hoffman, 1998, 128. Aldrich, 2004, 750. Hoffman, 1998, 185. Hoffman, 1998, 203. Hoffman, 1998, 93. Hoffman, 1998, 96. Hoffman, 1998, 192.

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countermeasures against state sponsors of terrorism304 might have consolidated the view of the usefulness of international police cooperation as a viable anti-terrorist tool. The influence of the interests of the United States on the organization can only be speculated, but presumably it was not negligible. If the United States saw Interpol as a relevant organ for its national safety and wanted the member states to join its fight against terrorism, the depoliticization, or dereligionalization, of terrorism should have been useful to enable as many countries as possible to join the fight. Since the structure of Interpol is collaborative, the traits of the participating police institutions are visible in its actions. The police agencies of the United States have increasingly been affecting multilateral anti-terrorist efforts. They have also contributed to the improvement of Interpol. Deflem states that the concerns of the United States, and other parts of the western industrialized world, are veritably visible in the counterterrorism of Interpol. The heed payed on the fundamentalist Islamic groups is an indication of this.305 Besides being the representant of Western values, the U.S. has been a convenient target for terrorist attacks, since an attacks against the country has guaranteed maximum media attention.306 The role of media attention is worth noting also in the process of the depoliticization and criminalization of terrorism. Terrorism aims at communicating a message. With the criminalization of the phenomenon, the message behind terrorist acts can be undermined. In order to get the same spectacular effect of their acts, terrorists today need to seek more dramatic and more lethal actions than before. 307 The threat of the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) by terrorists was topical in 1998, when the first resolution that depoliticized terrorism was written by Interpol. Religious terrorists were seen as the most potential actors to carry out a WMD attack. 308 It is likely that the U.S. saw itself as the most obvious target if such an attack would occur. The most lethal and destructive
304 305 306 307

In 1998: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. Hoffman, 1998, 191. Deflem, 2004. Hoffman, 1998, 137. The amount of international terrorist incidents declined during the 1990s, but the number of victims Hoffman, 1998, 197.

increased. Hoffman, 1998, 177, 200.

308

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attacks of the 1990s had concerned the country: a similar attack as the 1995 nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway system was planned to carry out in the U.S., the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and the bombing of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma directly attacked U.S. citizens on the soil of the country. 309 These all were religiously motivated. The world-wide reconnaissance organization of Interpol could have appeared as an applicable instrument for the prevention of such a massive terrorist attacks in the future. The change in the anti-terrorist policy of Interpol could be seen as result of the growth of the U.S. influence on the organization. As the western Europe regards terrorism a result from wider problems in the international system, the United States has usually claimed that the source of terrorism is in certain countries. 310 The influence of the United States in Interpol would be an interesting subject for further study. Based on the resolutions, it is impossible to say anything about the possible power of the U.S. inside Interpol. The problematic relationship the U.S. used to have with the organization is worth of more attention. Michael Fooner states there was a turn in the organizations leadership in 1984. It became stronger after the American delegates criticism about the malfunctioning of the management and the structure of the organization. 311 It would be of great interest to properly evaluate the impact of the United States on Interpol. How large was the U.S. influence at the General Assembly meetings, especially in 1998? In both points in time, the United States had faced the threat of international terrorism. In 1998 there was a change in the anti-terrorist attitude of Interpol right after the terrorist attacks against the United States embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. It would also be interesting to examine the impact of Interpol on U.S. foreign policy issues. Nowadays Interpol has a legal status in the United States that is entirely similar to the legal status of a government entity. 312 Interpol has been under different dominations since its creation. When it was created, it was mostly a Central European organization, later it was taken over by Nazis. When the
309 310 311 312

Hoffman, 1998, 93, 199; Aldrich, 2004, 750. Aldrich, 2004, 750. Fooner, 1989, 164. Fooner, 1989, 58.

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headquarters was moved to France in 1946, French domination over the governing and the jobs of Interpol began. This period came to an end in the 1980s.313 This raises the question of the current domination. As international crime control is one of the most important and one of the most overlooked dimensions of U.S. hegemony in world politics314, this question is very important. Has the 186 member organization finally reached something that could be called a democratic structure or is it still open to overrepresentation by some member countries? Interpol has created a means to fight terrorism, that is not in conflict with the basic principle of Article 3 in the constitution of Interpol: The key aspect is that terrorist incidents are broken down into their constituent parts, the criminal elements of which can then be identified and subjected to police investigations. 315 Deflem sees this as the reason why the cooperation of the police forces of ideologically very different countries can be managed through Interpol.316 The decision to act like Interpol has acted during its existence, has been political, even though the aim was to keep the organization politically neutral. Terrorism cannot be separated from other types of international criminality, since its perpetration includes the committing of crimes and since it often is funded with criminal deeds. It is a political decision to call an act terrorist, but it is also a political decision to call a person criminal. The change that occurred in the anti-terrorism of Interpol in 1998 was partly a result of changes in the social and political conditions in the world, among the most important the growth of the U.S. influence and growing role as a world police. In the 1990s, terrorism was becoming more anti-American and religiously motivated, and the United States no longer faced the threat of the Soviet Union after its dispersal. This left room for the United States to act more efficiently against terrorism, and partly it channeled its efforts through Interpol.

313 314 315 316

Fooner, 1989, 91. Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006, 10. Anderson 1997:95, cited in Deflem, 2005. See also Deflem, 2006. Deflem, 2005.

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6.4. Outcome of the bureaucratization of the police

In the modern state, real authority...rests necessarily and unavoidably in the hands of the b u r e a u c r a c y . Max Weber.317

Mathieu Deflem has examined international police cooperation in several studies. 318 His theory holds that []anti-terrorist efforts at the level of police rest on a formalrational conception of the means and objectives of counter-terrorism []319 International police cooperation can be constructed on the basis of the treatment of terrorism as a depoliticized crime. Terrorism is thereby fought in ways that are considered to be efficient, irrespective of normative concerns. 320 Terrorism is criminalized either by defining terrorism vaguely, and/or by identifying and isolating the distinctly criminal elements (bombings, killings) from terrorist incidents. 321
Relying on the sociology of Max Weber (1922), I conceive of public police agencies as bureaucracies that are formally sanctioned by states with the task of order maintenance and crime control. Bureaucracies have a tendency toward independence from their political centers on the basis of acquired expertise and knowledge. Although public police bureaucracies always remain related to the governments of national states (on which their legitimacy is based), police institutions achieve institutional autonomy in the means and objectives of their activities because they rely on a purposive-rational logic to employ the technically most efficient means and develop professional systems of knowledge. The theory does not deny that public police agencies are related to state control, but holds that the behavior of police institutions is not wholly determined by reference to their relation to the political center of states and, thus, that police work is not necessarily driven by the ideological dictates of governments.322

Ideologies and politics divide nation states, and impede efficient cooperation among the law enforcement agencies of different countries. Depoliticization has facilitated the cooperation. Terrorist incidents, such as the attacks in New York City and Pentagon in the United States in 2001, have resulted in the governments wishing to fight terrorism in
317 318 319 320 321 322

Cited in Deflem, 2006. Deflem 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006; Deflem and Maybin 2005. Deflem, 2004. Deflem, 2006. Deflem, 2006. Deflem, 2004.

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function of political aims, and use the police institutions in order to fulfill this goal. According to Deflem, the level of bureaucratization of police institutions is at an unprecedented high level, and thus the police institutions are able to resist this tendency of politicization, and continue treating terrorism in a depoliticized manner. 323
Bureaucratization is conceived in Weberian-terms as an increasing influence of formalrational principles of action that affect police institutions to not only determine the most efficient means of policing, but ultimately also the proper and more specific goals given a general mandate. In this respect, it is most crucial that public police institutions gradually abandoned the directives of their governments to police political opponents and instead began to focus on distinctly criminal enforcement tasks framed on the basis of professional conceptions of the nature and extent of crime.324

In counter-terrorism, as the examples of Interpol and the AAC have shown, depoliticization can be equated with criminalization; the law enforcement activities target the discernibly criminal aspects of terrorist activities. Deflem affirms that from the perspective of the police, the basic notions on crimes, irrespective of the perpetrators motives, are generally shared among the police of diverse nations and thus international police cooperation is possible. According to Deflem societal upheavals, also the anarchist threat at the end of the nineteenth century, have affected the bureaucratization of the police in a contradictory manner. The wish of the governments to use the police for the implementation of the political goals of the states have occurred simultaneously with the strengthening of the professional expertise of the police, which has empowered the resistance to politicization. Deflem accentuates that his theory does not imply that the police would be independent from politics, but wants to consider that the police is not completely subordinate to the governments of national states. 325

Because of its Weberian orientation to investigate bureaucratization influences under specified historical conditions, the theory of police bureaucratization is conceptually equipped to take into account the societal contexts of police behavior and the influence of social processes and structures, whether political, legal, economic, or cultural, on police bureaucracies.326
323 324 325 326

Deflem, 2004. Deflem, 2004. Deflem, 2004. Deflem, 2004.

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Even though he indicates the above, and additionally that the autonomy of the police has different implications that depend on the social conditions, the theory is not sufficient in explaining the changes in the policy of Interpol alone. This is true, even if, according to Deflem, The very structure of Interpol, in other words, is a manifestation of the police emphasis on a formal rationalization in means. 327 The theory of the bureaucratization of the police, that results in a more pragmatic approach toward phenomena such as terrorism, is important and provides some answers to my research questions. However, the problem lies in the fact, that Deflem addresses recent occurrences, and the theory does not provide explanation to the question why the depoliticization of terrorism has happened twice, as early as at the end of the nineteenth century, when obviously the process of bureaucratization was not at an unprecedented high level. Thus this theory contributes with an important perspective on the research question, but does not provide with a comprehensive answer to the reasons of depoliticization.

6.5. Reaction to an apparently similar threat

Late nineteenth century can be considered as the point in time where terrorism as we today know it, a visible and international threat in Europe, emerged. This is one reason for the research question of this study: even though they might seem distant, the threat of terrorism today, and the threat of anarchism in the late nineteenth century are similar in several ways.328 The examining of the nature of the threats will provide suggestions on the research question: why were both anarchism in 1898 and terrorism in 1998 depoliticized. Terrorism has certainly transformed in the last one hundred years, but it reflects both change and continuity.329 The aim of this chapter is to explore the similarities between the threats that were visible a hundred years ago and the threats visible still today.
327 328

Deflem, 2004. The terrorist threat in the United States today has also been compared to the Red Scare of Hoffman, 2001, 418.

communists at the beginning of the twentieth century. Donohue and Kayyem, 2002.
329

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The revolutionaries of the last decades of the nineteenth century did consciously use a different method that was used in revolutionary action before them; terrorism instead of the rural jaqcuerie, mass protest or armed struggle. For some, terrorist was a label adopted proudly. The development of technology, especially the availability of dynamite provided the late nineteenth-century anarchist activists with a new, relatively easy weapon for terrorist actions. The ideology of anarchism that was visible to the public made the threat more coherent and international. 330 The murder of Empress Elizabeth II of Austria, and the claims of the existence of a wider anarchist plot, created fear in the whole Europe. In this situation, the anti-terrorist police cooperation emerged in 1898. The anarchist actions of the nineteenth century were the doing of individuals on the fringes of anarchism.331 The contemporary press labeled the actions anarchist and linked them with several, very divergent groups. 332 In my opinion, an analogy of the relating of anarchism with terrorism could be seen in the way islamist has almost become a synonym of terrorist in our days. As todays terrorists, the anarchists of late nineteenth century organized in fluid and informal networks, they had their own media of propaganda and their attacks were motivated and/or organized through the force of their ideas. 333 Even if anarchism was not perceived as a cultural threat, it still represented an attack on society and the established ways of life.334 The transnational nature of the threat is evidently much greater in our times than a hundred years ago. Additionally, the fear that terrorists might be able to acquire weapons of mass destruction makes the importance of their suppression even greater.335 John Gray argues impressively by claiming radical Islamism as a principally modern phenomenon:
330 331 332 333 334 335

Kinna, 2006, vol. 1, xxi. Jensen, 1981. Ibid., 324. Kinna, 2006, vol. 1, xxxviii. See also Duyvesteyn, 2004, 443-444. Kinna, 2006, vol. 1, xxxviii. Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006, 233.

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As one commentator wrote, distilling a mass of confusion into a single formula: September 11th was an attack on modernity by Islamist fascists. In fact, radical Islam is like fascism chiefly in being unequivocally modern. 336 As radical Islamists believe that a new world could be created by acts of terror, [] percursors of radical Islam can be found in the late nineteenth-century European revolutionary movements that turned to propaganda by the deed.337 Gray takes an example of Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian thinker, No one did more in laying the intellectual foundations of radical Islam than [Qutb] . Qubt saw the west as spiritually empty. Hating the west with all his heart, he still borrowed several thoughts from the west. He was especially indebted to European anarchism. The idea of a revolutionary vanguard dedicated to bringing into being a world without rulers or ruled has no precedents in Islamic thought. It is clear borrowing from European radical ideology. 338 However, Gray also notes the differences between the terror spread by anarchists of the last decades of the nineteenth century and the terrorists of the twentieth and twenty-first century. Anarchists attacked public officials and did not search for as many victims as possible.339 In any case The strategy is the same to remake the world by spectacular acts of terror.340 Some have claimed that the ones that used terrorist strategies during the nineteenth century often challenged illegitimate regimes and got support from foreign countries. Michael Collyer, who has compared the suppression of anarchists and Islamist terrorists in Britain argues that:
[] anarchists were feared and rejected by society in much the same way as radical Islamists are received today and the British government of the day came under similar international pressure to curtail their activities.341

336 337 338 339 340 341

Gray, 2003, 20. Gray, 2003, 20-21. Gray, 2003, 21-22. Gray, 2003, 21. Gray, 2003, 22. Collyer, 2005, 298.

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Where the assassins of the fourteenth century and the anarchists of the late nineteenth century attacked government officials and leaders and the Japanese kamikaze pilots in the 1940s attacked other armed troops, the terrorist attacks today are directed against civilians and symbolic targets. Attacks against civilians are a modern phenomenon. 342 Hizbollah that has been called the creator of suicide bombings, used its tactic against military targets or embassies in the 1980s. Still in the 1970s and 1980s terrorist organizations had a clear ideology and were more hierarchical than today.343 Bruce Hoffman has argued that in contrast to previous terrorist organizations, the amorphous structure of many of the modern terrorist organizations and the lack of clear leadership is advisedly created to help the escape of the perpetrators and to complicate the fight against these groups. In addition, modern terrorist organizations often do not have clear objectives, which makes the attacks on civilians seem more random and able to create more fear. However, as the writer himself notes:
Whether even this development is in fact new is also debatable. Over a hundred years ago the so-called Anarchist International (also known as the Black International) championed a similar strategy of violence perpetrated by loosely aligned, largely unconnected cells of like-minded radicals.344

What relates the situation of the late nineteenth century to the current one, is the similarity not only between the threats that create unforeseeable terror, attacks that are unpredictable and violence used against civilians in order to achieve political ends enemy. Anarchism and terrorism are at the same time a good and a bad enemy. Good because they both can be seen as the other, something bad that is distant from us. 346 This way they both are favorable enemies for international cooperation. Without an accurate definition, all countries can have their own opinions on who is a terrorist or anarchist and who is not. This is why it is fairly easy to find the will, but not necessarily
342 343 344 345 346

345

but also between the situation viewed from a theoretical point of view of the concept of

Burke, 2007, 131. Hoffman, 2001, 418. Hoffman, 2001, 418. Hoffman, 2001, 324. See Harle, 2000 for more on the division between the Other and Us.

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the basis, for the possibilities for international cooperation in suppressing anarchism and terrorism. Why are they then at the same time bad enemies? In my opinion, the threats of anarchism and terrorism might have been too obscure. When anarchists and terrorists are eliminated, the world is going to be a better place. But is it possible to bring terrorism to an end? This is what makes anarchist and the terrorist threat of today so terrifying and a bad enemy. The threat is not clear, the ideology is not clear, and the possibility of the next attack lurks in every corner. What is also difficult with this threat comparing to normal military threats is that even the greatest power does not protect from the attacks. The risk the attackers take cannot be predicted, since it is taken by one, or several individuals or perhaps by an organization but not calculated by several politicians. Both anarchism and terrorism are also bad enemies, because they cannot be separated from politics. Many definitions of terrorism include the notion that terrorism is motivated by an ideology. Anarchism is a political doctrine and thus the fight against anarchism is unchallengeably political. Mathieu Deflem examines the political nature of the fight against anarchism:
The fight against anarchism was evidently a matter of a decidedly political nature, especially because and when it included policies reaching beyond the control of criminal incidents inspired by anarchist motives. Aware of the politically sensitive nature of anarchism, the anti-anarchist meetings in Rome and St. Petersburg purposely conceived of anarchism as a strictly criminal matter, the enforcement of which was to be handled at the administrative level by police institutions.347

The evidently political background of both anarchism and terrorism is the reason why they have been made more manageable by defining them as mere criminal acts in 1898 and 1998. After Empress Elizabeths murder, on September 17, 1898, The Saturday Review wrote an article considering the murder. Its comments on the concept of Anarchism need to be kept in mind. The paper represents Elizabeth a passionate lover of free life who was done to death in the name of freedom.
347

Deflem, 2005.

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And to this woman, in her graciousness and her simplicity, came the ruthless assassin. He calls himself an Anarchist, this monstrous child of a diseased Europe, and we are prompt to accept the statement. Too prompt; for assuredly there is nothing in common between the coloured dreams of the idealists who conceived Anarchism such men as Rclus and Kropotkin and the squalid madness of these so-called Anarchists. However foolish it may be to suppose that men can live in peace and plenty without any organized form of government, it is not a criminal conception, nor does it necessarily lead to promiscuous assassination of those in power. But Anarchism is easily said, and the police, who both manufacture criminals and encourage crime, slump all the political diseases of Europe under that convenient and evil name.348

The critique presented above must be kept in mind while dealing with late nineteenth century police and their statements. First of all, anyone could have called himself an anarchist. And as a consequence, it was possible for the police to label anyone anarchist, since it was not clear what the concept meant. In fact, the person whose action provoked the organization of the AAC, Luigi Luccheni, murderer of Elizabeth II was not an anarchist at all. Virtually the whole anarchist movement disavowed his act. 349 The socialists even feared that the anti-anarchism of the conference could be extended to anti-socialism.350 The above quote brings out one distinction that was contested by coevals; the distinction between idealists, good anarchists, such as Kropotkin and so-called anarchists who commit the terrorist acts. As this distinction was not commonly made, the question raises whether it was the easy way out for the police to call a criminal anarchist. How about terrorist in our days? If a terrorist commits a murder, why is he not a murderer? If an anarchist kills a head of state, why is he not a killer? Maybe because by using these labels the police justifies its own actions, that may go beyond its powers? As Michael Collyer notes, using the label terrorist delegitimizes opponents and therefore legitimizes the response to them. 351 Still in our days there seem to exist two separate categories of criminals: ordinary criminals and terrorists. What separates the two is evident: a terrorist has a political (maybe religious) goal for his actions. But still, Interpol and the Anti-Anarchist
348 349 350 351

Kinna, 2006, vol. 2, 153. Tamburini, 1997, 229. Tamburini, 1997, 234. Collyer, 2005, 283.

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Conference of Rome have represented themselves as exponents of the ordinary police thus made to fight ordinary criminals. Considering ideologically motivated crimes as ordinary crimes has been the only possible means to form a basis for international police cooperation on these matters. The similarities presented above have motivated this study that finds it useful to compare the coping strategies of different centuries and see whether they have evolved or not. The following chapter concludes the study.

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7. Conclusions
This study has examined how and why the Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome in 1898 and Interpol have depoliticized (anarchist) terrorism. The definitions of both anarchism and terrorism include the notion that both of these are inherently political. The AAC and Interpol have coped with (anarchist) terrorism in a way that might be called depoliticization. Depoliticization in this study has been used to define the act of removing the political aspect from anarchism and terrorism, which I have equated with criminalizing these acts. The political motivation for terrorism has prevented international police cooperation from acting against it during decades. During the existence of Interpol, until the change in 1998, it was not allowed for the organization to take action against for instance politically or religiously motivated crimes. The strategy of depoliticizing terrorism from 1998 onward gave Interpol the possibility to act against terrorism, as the motivations for the criminal acts were separated from the acts themselves. When discussing the AAC of Rome, the concept of depoliticization is accurate, as its final propositions began with the notion that I. The Conference is of the opinion that anarchism does not have anything in common with politics and it should in no case be considered a political doctrine. 352 Calling this statement an act of depoliticization gives a good idea on the coping strategy of the AAC, as anarchism is in general understood as an inherently political doctrine. Even if the strategy of Interpol has been called depoliticization, the impression given by the resolutions might be deceptive, especially when related to the propositions of the AAC. The nature of terrorism altered during the 1990s. The rise of religious terrorism gives a reason to suggest that the Interpol declaration that to provoke a state of terror cannot be justified under any circumstances irrespective of considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be

352

Kinna, 2006, vol.3, 326.

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invoked to justify them []353 was not aimed at terrorist actions that have a political motivation, but rather at actions with religious motivation. I suggest that terrorism is something that can never be depoliticized, even when it is claimed to be a crime and nothing but a crime. As Brian Jenkins has noted:
What is called terrorism thus seems to depend on ones point of view. Use of the term implies a moral judgement; and if one party can successfully attach the label terrorist to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuades others to adopt its moral viewpoint.354

Terrorism is always a pejorative term, that is only used of ones opponents. 355 The depoliticization of (anarchist) terrorism has many advantages for those hoping to create international anti-terrorist police cooperation. However, it also involves problematic aspects: if the motivation or cause for the terrorist actions is not seen relevant, the difference between violence perpetrated by states and by non-state actors such as terrorists is blurred.356 What has linked the coping strategies of the AAC and Interpol toward (anarchist) terrorism has thus been the criminalization of the acts. Why was the Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome 1898 called anti-anarchist and not anti-violent? Most likely because anarchism had been labeled as the biggest threat of the time. Maybe also because dealing with anarchism as a serious crime separate from all others, but only in seriousness, could help in ignoring the social conditions that had fuelled the phenomenon. Perhaps it is still the same with terrorism. Terrorists are named the absolute evil, and thus the reasons behind the anger toward the Western world can be forgotten. As shown above, the AAC of Rome began with the statement on the non-political nature of anarchism. Interpol only stated terrorism non-political at the end of the 1990s. Before this, it was unable to participate in the suppression of terrorism due to the underlining of the Article 3 of its constitution: It is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake
353 354 355 356

Interpol resolution AGN/68/RES/2 The financing of terrorism (Seoul, 1999). Cited in Hoffman, 1998, 31. Hoffman, 1998, 31. Hoffman, 1998, 33.

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any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character. The lack of will to confront terrorism was marginalizing the organization and possibly fuelled the creation of Europol. The Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome and Interpol have had similar coping strategies with similar threats. As in late nineteenth century, the international police cooperation in counter-terrorism might bring international police cooperation on a whole new level. 357 It is also possible that the pattern of depoliticization to the realizing the politically sensitive nature of terrorism might be repeated. The historical example shows that the pattern has been both evolutionary and cyclical. What is new at this point in time, is the transatlantic interconnectedness in security issues and the evolution of a transatlantic security community based more on policing alliances against non-state actors than traditional security alliances against state-based military threats., 358 something that clearly existed in European-wide context in the last years of the nineteenth century.
Terrorism cannot be defeated, because it is a tactic and not an enemy. It will continue as long as people view it as an effective way of achieving their political goals, particularly if they believe that they cannot do so in any other way.359

Terrorism today is less distinguishable from common crime, for example theft, fraud, and extortion are regular terrorist activities. 360 The two experiences show that the basis for international anti-terrorist cooperation has been and will be consisted of two imperatives: the depoliticization of the phenomenon and the non-binding nature of the decisions. As terrorism can be used against those in power, governments will not approve that it would be defined by others who can be considered terrorist and who not. As long as state sovereignty exists, terrorism cannot be defined internationally. The reasons for the depoliticization (or dereligionalization) of terrorism and anarchism are multiform. The existence of international police cooperation may be seen as clashing with the view on the priority of the self-determination of nation-states. The
357 358 359 360

Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006, 190. Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006, 190. Bensahel, 2006, 35. Veness, 2001, 408.

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bureaucratization of the police has gradually provided the police with more autonomy and thus enabled more international cooperation on law enforcement matters. However, anti-terrorism remains a domain in which international collaboration is arduous. The depoliticization of terrorism has provided tools for international anti-terrorist cooperation. It seems to be that factors such as the development of social and political conditions, and the interests of governments in the two points in time studied, have been the most important factors affecting the depoliticization. By depoliticizing inherently political phenomena, anarchism and terrorism, governments could put aside the matters that triggered them. A comprehensive study on the decision-making processes in the Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome and Interpol could provide significant and unexpected results on the depoliticization of (anarchist) terrorism. Also the impact of the United States on Interpol is an issue worth further study. This study has sought to provide a view on the depoliticization of anarchism and terrorism in 1898 and 1998. It also has made an attempt on expounding on the reasons behind this behavior. It concludes by stating that the Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome and Interpol faced an apparently similar threat in 1898 and 1998 against nations and national interests and reacted to it in an apparently similar manner, which sought to view the anarchists and terrorists as criminals, rather than political agents with a politically inspired claim. The similar-looking reactions were provoked by both a very similar threat posed by anarchists in 1898 and by terrorists in 1998. However, the depoliticization of (anarchist) terrorism was a response to this threat that was chosen by, and not given to the Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome in 1898 and Interpol in 1998.

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http://www.ictconference.org/var/119/20471-Ganor_Conte_Human%20Rights.pdf DEFLEM, Mathieu: Global Rule of Law or Global Rule of Law Enforcement? International Police Cooperation and Counter-terrorism. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 603:240-252, 2006. DEFLEM, Mathieu: Wild Beasts Without Nationality': The Uncertain Origins of Interpol, 1898-1910. Pp. 275-285 in The Handbook of Transnational Crime and Justice, edited by Philip Reichel. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2005. DEFLEM, Mathieu: Policing World Society. Historical Foundations of International Police Cooperation. Oxford University Press, Oxford/ New York, 2002. DEFLEM, Mathieu: Social Control and the Policing of Terrorism: Foundations for a Sociology of Counterterrorism. The American Sociologist 35(2), 2004, 75-92. DEFLEM, Mathieu, and MAYBIN, Lindsay C.: Interpol and the Policing of International Terrorism: Developments and Dynamics since September 11. Pp. 175-191 in Terrorism: Research, Readings, & Realities, edited by Lynne L. Snowden and Brad Whitsel. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2005. DI PAOLA, Pietro: The Spies Who Came in from the Heat: The International Surveillance of the Anarchists in London. European History Quarterly, Volume 37, Number 2, April 2007, 189-215.

DONOHUE, Laura K. and KAYYEM, Juliette N.:

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Other references The Interpol website: www.interpol.int: Interpol resolutions on terrorism: http://www.interpol.int/Public/Terrorism/resolutions.asp History of Interpol: http://www.interpol.int/Public/icpo/governance/sg/history.asp Interpols constitution, http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/LegalMaterials/constitution/constitutionGenReg/co nstitution.asp

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U.S. Department of State webpage: http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfileenglish&y=2004&m=April&x=20040429144342dmslahrellek0.642544 14.6.2007. Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anarchism , Version 17:25, 24 May 2007. http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Achille_Lauro_(nave) , Version 10:13, 22 May 2007. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1998_U.S._embassy_bombings , Version: 03:28, 13 June 2007 Other websites: http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0001454.html http://www.europol.europa.eu/index.asp?page=facts http://www.thefreedictionary.com/depoliticisation http://www.thefreedictionary.com/depoliticize http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_definitions.html 13.11.2007 http://untreaty.un.org/English/Terrorism.asp

All addresses were valid on December 11, 2007, unless otherwise mentioned.

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Appendices
Annex 1: Interpol resolutions on terrorism 1951-2006
AGN/20/RES/14 AGN/41/RES/7 AGN/48/RES/8 AGN/50/RES/2 AGN/52/RES/9 AGN/53/RES/6 AGN/53/RES/7 AGN/54/RES/1 AGN/55/RES/3 AGN/64/RES/8 AGN/67/RES/12 AGN/68/RES/2 AG-2001-RES-05
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- Requests for international enquiries (Lisbon, 1951) - Hostages and blackmail (Frankfurt, 1972) - Acts of violence committed by organized groups (Nairobi, 1979) - Tagging of explosives (Nice, 1981) - Terrorism (Cannes, 1983) - Violent crime commonly referred to as terrorism (Luxembourg, 1984) - Application of Article 3 of the constitution (Luxembourg, 1984) - International terrorism and unlawful interference with civil aviation (Washington, D.C., 1985) - Co-operation in terrorist cases; Guide for NCBs and specialized services (Belgrade, 1986) - Monitoring of resolutions (Beijing, 1995) - Cairo declaration against terrorism (Cairo, 1998) - The financing of terrorism (Seoul, 1999) - Terrorist attack of 11 September 2001

Resolutions on terrorism made after 26th August 2003362:

AG-2004-RES-18 Interim guidance to the General Secretariat in cases of membership in a terrorist organization AG-2005-RES-05 The United Nations Security Council's request to Interpol to assist the UN's anti-terrorism fight AG-2005-RES-10 Addressing Internet activities supporting terrorism AG-2006-RES-08 The need to alert the global law enforcement community about dangerous escaped criminals, including terrorists AG-2006-RES-09 Home-grown terrorists - al-Qaeda linked / al-Qaeda inspired terrorism

Annex 2: List of Interpol Member States 2008 363

A
361

Afghanistan | Albania | Algeria | Andorra | Angola | Antigua & Barbuda | Argentina | http://www.interpol.int/Public/Terrorism/resolutions.asp. These do not include resolutions made after

2003 on terrorism, because Interpol has not listed them on the website.
362

These resolutions are dealt with separately since Interpols homepage has not been modified after the

26th of August 2003. After that date, I am only presenting those resolutions, that have the word terrorism in their title. These resolutions can be found on the internet http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/GeneralAssembly/AGN75/resolutions/default.asp.
363

http://www.interpol.int/Public/Icpo/Members/default.asp 22.1.2008.

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Armenia | Aruba | Australia | Austria | Azerbaijan B Bahamas | Bahrain | Bangladesh | Barbados | Belarus | Belgium | Belize | Benin | Bhutan | Bolivia | Bosnia - Herzegovina | Botswana | Brazil | Brunei | Bulgaria | Burkina Faso | Burundi C Cambodia | Cameroon | Canada | Cape Verde | Central African Republic | Chad | Chile | China | Colombia | Comoros | Congo | Congo (Democratic Rep.) | Costa Rica | Cte d'Ivoire | Croatia | Cuba | Cyprus | Czech Republic D E F G Denmark | Djibouti | Dominica | Dominican Republic Ecuador | Egypt | El Salvador | Equatorial Guinea | Eritrea | Estonia | Ethiopia Fiji | Finland | Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia | France Gabon | Gambia | Georgia | Germany | Ghana | Greece | Grenada | Guatemala | Guinea | Guinea Bissau | Guyana H I J K L M Haiti | Honduras | Hungary Iceland | India | Indonesia | Iran | Iraq | Ireland | Israel | Italy Jamaica | Japan | Jordan Kazakhstan | Kenya | Korea (Rep. of) |Kuwait | Kyrgyzstan Laos | Latvia | Lebanon | Lesotho | Liberia | Libya | Liechtenstein | Lithuania | Luxembourg Madagascar | Malawi | Malaysia | Maldives | Mali | Malta | Marshall Islands | Mauritania | Mauritius | Mexico | Moldova | Monaco | Mongolia | Montenegro | Morocco | Mozambique | Myanmar N Namibia | Nauru | Nepal | Netherlands | Netherlands Antilles | New Zealand | Nicaragua | Niger | Nigeria | Norway O P Q R S Oman Pakistan | Panama | Papua New Guinea |Paraguay | Peru | Philippines | Poland | Portugal Qatar Romania | Russia | Rwanda St Kitts & Nevis | St Lucia | St Vincent & the Grenadines | San Marino | Sao Tome & Principe | Saudi Arabia | Senegal | Serbia | Seychelles | Sierra Leone | Singapore | Slovakia | Slovenia | Somalia | South Africa | Spain | Sri Lanka | Sudan | Suriname | Swaziland | Sweden | Switzerland | Syria T Tajikistan | Tanzania | Thailand | Timor - Leste | Togo | Tonga | Trinidad & Tobago | Tunisia | Turkey | Turkmenistan U Uganda | Ukraine | United Arab Emirates | United Kingdom | United States | Uruguay | Uzbekistan V Y Z Venezuela | Vietnam Yemen Zambia | Zimbabwe

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Sub-Bureaus United Kingdom: Bermuda | Gibraltar | Cayman Islands | Anguilla | Montserrat | British Virgin Islands | United States: China: Turks and Caicos Puerto Rico | American Samoa Hong Kong, Macao

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